It was not until the fall of 1863 that Abraham Lincoln was able to point to any substantial results of the long months of hard thought and cautious experiments he had given to the Civil War. By that time he did have something to show. The border of the Confederacy had been pressed back and shut in by an impregnable wall of ships and men. Not only were the borders of the Confederacy narrowed; the territory had been cut squarely in two by the opening of the Mississippi, which, in Lincoln's picturesque phrase now "ran unvexed to the sea." He had a war machine at last which kept the ranks of the army full. He had found a commander-in-chief in Grant and not less important he had found simultaneously with Grant Sherman, McPherson, Thomas, as well as the proper place for the men with whom he had tried such bitter experiments, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, Buell, Rosecrans. He had his first effective results, too, from emancipation, that policy which he had inaugurated with such foreboding. Fully one hundred thousand former slaves were now in the United States army and they had proved beyond question their value as soldiers. More than this, it was evident that some form of emancipation would be soon adopted by the former slave states of Tennessee, Arkansas, Maryland and Missouri. At every point in short the policy he had set in motion with painful foresight and labor was working as he had believed it would work, but it was working slowly. Lincoln saw that many months of struggle and blood and patience was needed to complete this task; many months and in less than a year there would be a presidential election and he might be obliged to leave his task unfinished. He did not hesitate to say frankly that he wanted the chance to finish it. Among the leaders of the Republican party were a few conservatives who in the fall of '63 supported Lincoln in his desire for a second term, but there were more who doubted his ability and who were secretly looking for an able man. At the same a strong
and open opposition to his re-election had developed in the Radical wing of the party. The real cause of this opposition was Lincoln's unswerving purpose to use emancipation purely as a military measure. The earliest active form this opposition took was probably under the direction of Horace Greeley. In the spring of 1863 Mr. Greeley had become thoroughly disheartened over the slow progress of the war and the meagre results of the Emancipation Proclamation. The Battle of Chancellorsville only increased this discouragement. He was looking in every direction for some one to replace Lincoln and eventually he settled on General Rosecrans, who, at that moment was the most successful general before the country. Greeley, after consulting with a number of Republican leaders, decided that someone should go to Rosecrans and sound him. James R. Gilmore ("Edmund Kirk") was chosen by Mr. Greeley for this mission. Mr. recounts Gilmore in his "Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln" as an evidence of the extent of the discontent with Lincoln in the party that Mr. Greeley gave him at least a dozen letters from Republican leaders. In fact, he had letters, as he says from about all the more prominent Republican leaders excepting Roscoe Conkling, Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson.

Mr. Greeley's idea was, as he instructed Mr. Gilmore, to find out first if Rosecrans was "sound on the goose," (political slang for sound on anti-slavery policy), and secondly if he would consider the nomination to the Presidency. If, Mr. Gilmore found Rosecrans satisfactory Greeley declared that he would force Lincoln to resign, put Hamlin in his place and compel him to give Rosecrans the command of the whole army. His idea was no doubt that the war would be finished promptly and Rosecrans would naturally be the candidate in 1864.

Mr. Gilmore went on his mission. Rosecrans seemed to him to fulfill Mr. Greeley's ideas and finally he laid the case before him. The General replied very promptly: "My place is here.
The country gave me my education, and so has a right to my military services." He also declared that Mr. Greeley was wrong in his estimate of Lincoln and that time would show it.

Lincoln knew thoroughly the feeling of the Radicals at this time; he knew the danger there was to his hopes for a second term in opposing them, but he could neither be persuaded nor frightened into modifying his policy. The most conspicuous example of his firmness was in the case of the Missouri Radicals.

The Radical party in Missouri was composed of men of great intelligence of perfect loyalty, but they were men of the Fremont type, idealists, incapable of compromise and of impatience at caution. They had been in constant conflict with the conservatives of the state since the breaking out of the war and by the spring of 1863 the rupture had become almost a national affair. Both sides claimed to be Union men and to believe in emancipation, but while the Conservatives believed in gradual emancipation the Radicals demanded that it be immediate.

The fight became so bitter that as Lincoln said to Mr. Taussig, who came to him early in 1863, begging his interference, "Either party would rather see the defeat of their adversary than that of Jefferson Davis." "You ought to have your heads knocked together," he added in his exasperation.

Finally, he determined that he must break up somehow what he called their "pestilent, factional quarrel," and sent a new Military Governor, General J. M. Schofield, to Missouri. The advice he gave him was this:

"Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invader and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass and persecute the people. It is a difficult role, and so much greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other."

General Schofield was not able to live up to Lincoln's counsel. He incurred the suspicion and dislike of the Radicals and they determined that he must be removed. In August a great convention was held and a committee of seventy persons appointed
to go to Washington and demand from Mr. Lincoln a redress of grievances. The of course had the sympathy of the Radical anti-slavery element of the whole North in their undertaking, and when the Committee of Seventy started for Washington it received an ovation in almost every State through which it passed. Every mile of its journey seemed to increase its friends. Arrived in Washington it became the center of the town's interest and a great reception was given it in the Union League Hall, at which eminent men denounced the Conservatives of Missouri and demanded instant emancipation.

An arrangement was made for the President to receive the Committee on September 30th and to hear the statement of their grievances. The imposing procession of delegates went to the White House at nine o'clock in the morning. At their own request all reporters and spectators were refused admission, perhaps for the first time in the history of the Administration, and even the great front doors of the White House were locked during the forenoon.

The conference began by the reading of an address which denounced the Conservative party, demanded that General Schofield be removed and General Benjamin F. Butler be put in his place and that the enrolled militia of the State be discharged and national troops replace them.

After the reading of the address the President replied. Mr. Enos Clark of St. Louis, who was one of the delegates, records the impression his reply made upon his mind:

"The President listened with patient attention to our address; says Mr. Clark, "and at the conclusion of the reading replied at length. I shall never forget the intense chagrin and disappointment we all felt at the treatment of the matter in the beginning of his reply. He seemed to belittle and minimize the importance of our grievances, and to give magnitude to artificial and unimportant matters. He gave us the impression of a Western petitifoger before a justice of the peace jury. But as he talked on, and made searching inquiries of members of the delegation, and invited debate, it became manifest that his manner at the beginning was really the foil of a master, to develop the weakness of the presentation. Before the conclusion of the conference he
addressed himself to the whole matter in an elevated, dignified exhaustive and impressive way.

There was no report made of this conference but I remember that Mr. Lincoln made this statement: "You gentlemen must bear in mind that in performing the duties of the office I hold I must represent no one section of the Union, but I must act for all sections of the Union in trying to maintain the supremacy of the government." And he also said this: 'I desire to do so conduct the affairs of this administration that if, at the end, when I come to lay down the reins of power, I have lost every other supporter and friend, I shall at least have one friend left, and that friend shall be down inside of me." These were characteristic expressions.

Towards the conclusion of the conference, and after the whole matter had been exhaustively discussed by the President and the petitioners, Mr. Drake, our chairman, stepped forward and said: "Mr President, the time has now come when we can no longer trespass upon your attention, but must take leave of you," and in those deep, impressive, stentorian tones peculiar to Mr. Drake, he added, 'Many of these men who stand before you today return to inhospitable homes, where rebel sentiments prevail, and many of them, sir, in returning there do so at the risk of their lives; and if any of those lives are lost by virtue of the military administration of that government, let me tell you, sir, that the blood will be upon your garments and not upon ours.'

During this impressive address the President stood before the delegation with tears streaming down his cheeks, seeming deeply agitated.

The members of the delegation were then presented individually to the President and took leave of him. I shall always remember my last sight of Mr. Lincoln as we left the room. Mr. Charles Johnson and myself were walking together, and as we passed out of the room we looked back. Meantime Mr. Lincoln had met some personal acquaintances with whom he had exchanged pleasantries, and instead of the tears of a few moments before, he was indulging in hearty laughter. This rapid and wonderful transition from one extreme to the other impressed me greatly."

Ex-Governor Johnson of Missouri, another member of the Committee says of Lincoln's reply to their address:

"The President in the course of his reply, hesitated a great deal, and was manifestly, as he said, very much troubled over the condition of things affairs in Missouri. He said he was sorry there should be such divisions and dissensions; that they were a source of more anxiety to him than we could imagine. He expressed his appreciation of the zeal of the Radical men, but sometimes thought they did not understand the real situation. He besought us not to get out of humor because things were not going as rapidly as we thought they should. The war, he pointed out, affected a much larger territory than that embraced within the borders of Missouri, and possibly he had better opportunities of judging of things than some of us gentlemen. He spoke with great kindness, but all the way through showed his profound regret at the condition of affairs in our state. He regretted especially that some of the men who had founded the Republican party should now be arrayed apparently against his administration.

* Mr. John Hay, one of the president's secretaries was present and made notes of Mr. Lincoln's remarks, which are published in part in "Abraham Lincoln: A. History."

* Interview for this Magazine made by J. McCam Davis.
"I had met Mr. Lincoln twice before then. This time he appeared differently from what he had on the two former occasions. There was a perplexed look on his face. When he said he was bothered about the thing he showed it. He spoke kindly, yet now and then there was a little rasping tone in his voice, that seemed to say: 'You mustn't try to fix this thing up without tormenting me.' But he never lost his temper."

Mr. Lincoln sent the Committee away, promising to reply by letter to their address. The events of the next day showed him more plainly than ever the following the Committee had. The night after the conference Secretary Chase gave them a great reception at his house. He did not hesitate to say in the course of the evening that he was heartily in sympathy with their mission and that he hoped their military department would be entrusted to a gentleman whose motto was "Freedom for All." Going on to New York the Committee was given a great and enthusiastic meeting at Cooper Union at which William Cullen Bryant made a sympathetic speech and where various members of the Committee indulged in violent denunciations of the Conservative element of the country and did not hesitate to threaten Mr. Lincoln with revolutionary action if he did not yield to their demands.

Mr. Lincoln was not of course insensible to the political power of the Missouri Radicals. He knew this was a test case. He knew that they made their issue at a critical time for him, it being the eve of the fall elections. He was the last man, too to underestimate the loyalty and sincerity of the men who were trying to force his hand. "I believe after all," Mr. John Hay, his Secretary, heard him say some time after the conference, "that these Missouri Radicals* * * get nearer to me than the other side in thought and sentiment, though bitterly hostile personally. They are the unhandsomest fellows in the world to deal

* Interview for this Magazine by J. Moqua Davis.
with but after all their faces are set Zionward."

So important did his supporters consider it that he do
something to pacify radical sentiment that Mr. Leonard Swett, o:
one of Lincoln's most intimate friends, and one heartily in sym-
pathy with his policy, urged him to take a more advanced posi-
tion in history on slavery; to recommend in his annual message
a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery:

"Turning to me suddenly he said, 'Is not the question of
emancipation doing well enough now? I replied it was. 'Well,'
said he, 'I have never done an official act with a view to pro-
mote my own personal aggrandizement, and I don't like to begin n-
now. I can see that emancipation is coming; whoever can wait
for it will see it; whoever stands in its way will be run over by it."

In spite of the pressure and threats of the Committee of
Seventy Lincoln when he answered their letter on October 5,
yielded to none of their demands. He would not remove General
Schofield. He would not. He closed his letter with a few of
those resolute sentences of which he was capable when he had made
up his mind to do a thing, in spite of all opposition:

"I do not feel justified," he said, "to enter upon the
broad field you present in regard to the political differences
between Radicals and Conservatives. From time to time I have
said and done what appeared to me proper to do and say. The
public knows it all. It obliged nobody to follow me, and I trust
it obliges me to follow nobody. The Radicals and Conservatives
each agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I
could wish both to agree with me in all things, for then they
would agree with each other and would be too strong for any foe
from any quarter. They however choose to do otherwise; and I do
not question their right. I too shall do what seems to be my
duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri or elsewhere respon-
sible to me and not to either Radicals or Conservatives. It is
my duty to hear all, but at least I must, within my sphere, judge
what to do and what to forbear."

There was no mistaking this letter of Lincoln. It told the
Radicals not only of Missouri but of the whole North that the
President was not to be moved from his emancipation policy and
it stimulated their search for a man to put in his place. At
that time--the fall of 1863--Grant was the military hero of the

* "Abraham Lincoln: A. History" By Nicolay and Hay.
country and his name began to be urged for the Presidency.

Now Lincoln had never seen Grant. Was he a man whose head could be turned by a sudden notoriety? He felt a keen anxiety to know the General's true feeling on the subject. Could it be that just as he had found the commander for whom he had searched so long, that he was to lose him through a burst of popular gratitude and hero-worship. He decided to find out Grant's feeling. He did this through Mr. Russell Jones of Chicago, a friend of the General.

"In 1863 some of the newspapers, especially the New York "Herald", were trying to boost Grant for the Presidency. While General Grant was at Chattanooga, I wrote him, in substance, that I did not wish to meddle with his affairs, but that I could not resist suggesting that he pay no attention to what the newspapers were saying in that connection. He immediately replied, saying that everything of that nature which reached him went into the waste-basket; that he felt he had as big a job on hand as one man need desire; that his only ambition was to suppress the rebellion;
But there were other men names than Grant's in the mouth of the opposition. All through the winter of 1863 and '64 in fact the great majority of the Republican leaders were discussing different candidates. One of the men whom they approached in this period was Hannibal Hamlin. He was a man of strong anti-slavery feeling and it was well known that Lincoln had never had gone fast enough to suit him. Would he accept the candidacy, he was asked? Mr. Hamlin would not listen to the suggestion. Lincoln he said was his friend. Their views were not always the same but he believed in Lincoln and would not be untrue to his official relation. Not every member of the official family however had the same sense of loyalty. Indeed, before the end of 1863 there was an active campaign for the nomination being conducted by one of the members of the Cabinet, Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. Chase had been a rival of Lincoln in 1860. He had gone into the Cabinet with a feeling very like that of Mr. Seward that Lincoln was an inexperienced man, incapable of handling the situation and that he or Mr. Seward would be the premier. Mr. Seward soon found that Mr. Lincoln was the master and he was
great enough to acknowledge his supremacy. Mr. Chase was never able to recognize Lincoln's supremacy. He continued to regard him as an inferior mind and seemed to believe honestly enough that the people would prefer him as President if they could only have an opportunity to vote for him. All through the winter of 1863 and 64 he carried on a voluminous private correspondence in the interests of his nomination and about the middle of the winter he consented that his name be submitted to the people. The first organized attempt to launch his candidacy was a circular marked "confidential," sent out by Senator Pomeroy of Kansas, calling on the country to organize in behalf of Mr. Chase. The Secretary hastened to assure Mr. Lincoln that he knew nothing of this circular until he saw it in the newspapers but he confessed that he had consented that his name be used as a presidential candidate and said that if Mr. Lincoln felt that this impaired his usefulness as Secretary of the Treasury he did not wish to continue in his position.

Now, Lincoln had known for many months of Mr. Chase's anxiety for the nomination but he had studiously ignored it. General John Eaton says that once when he was in the room with Lincoln, who was signing commissions, he noticed one made out to a man whom he knew to be hostile to the President and he told Lincoln so. "Yes," said Lincoln, "I know it. I suppose I am doing it all the time," and he went on with his work. He could not be persuaded by anybody to do anything to interrupt or hinder Mr. Chase's electioneering:

"I have determined," Mr. John Hay heard him say as early as October, 1863, "to shut my eyes, as far as possible, to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good Secretary, and I shall keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have a worse man. I have observed with regret his plan of strengthening himself. Whenever he sees that an important matter is troubling me, if I am compelled to decide in a way to give offense to a man of some influence, he always ranges himself in opposition to me and persuades the victim that he has been hardly dealt with, and that he would have arranged it very differently. It was so with General Fremont, with General Hunter when I annulled his hasty proclamation, with General Butler when he was recalled from New Orleans, with these Missouri people when they called the other day. I am entirely indifferent as to his success or failure in these schemes so long as they do
his duty at the head of the Treasury Department."

Now that the Secretary called his attention to the matter
he replied courteously but indifferently:

"* * * My knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's letter having been made
public came to me only the day you wrote; but I had, in spite
of myself, known of its existence several days before. I have
not yet read it, and I think I shall not. I was not shocked or
surprised by the appearance of the letter, because I had had
knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee, and of secret issues which,
I supposed, came from it; and of secret agents who, I supposed,
were sent out by it, for several weeks. I have known just as
little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know.
They bring the documents to me, but I do not read them; they
tell me what they think fit to tell me; but I do not inquire
for more. * * * *

"Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Dep-
artment is a question which I will not allow myself to consider
from any standpoint other than my judgment of the public ser-
vice; and, as I view it, I do not perceive occasion for a change.

Mr. Chase was free as far as Lincoln was concerned to con-
duct his presidential campaign from his seat in the Cabinet but
the Republicans of his State were not willing that he should do
so and three days after the Pomeroy circular first appeared in
print the Union members of the legislature demanded in the name
of the people and of the soldiers of Ohio that Lincoln be re-
nominated. There was nothing to do then but for Mr. Chase to
withdraw.

Indeed it was already becoming evident that Lincoln's
most determined antagonists in the party that it would be use-
less for them to try to nominate anybody else. On all sides-
in State Legislatures, Union leagues, caucuses, the people were
demanding that Lincoln be re-nominated. "It is no use," said
Mr. Greeley despondently: "nobody else can be named. The people
will have him." The case was a curious one. Four years before
Lincoln had been nominated for the presidency of the United
States because he was an available candidate, not from any gen-
eral confidence that he was the best man in the Republican party
for the place. Now, on the contrary, it was declared that he
would have to be because he had won the confidence of the people
so completely that no candidate would have any chance against him.
In four years he had risen from a position of comparative obscur-
ity to be the most generally trusted man in the North. The great reasons for this popular confidence were that they understood exactly what he was trying to do and why he was trying to do it. From the beginning of his administration in fact Lincoln had taken the people into his confidence. Whenever a strong opposition to his policy developed in any quarter it was his habit to explain exactly why he was doing what he was doing and why he was not doing the thing he was urged to do. These letters, though addressed to private individuals or to committees were really meant for the people. He wanted them to understand a question as he understood it. If they did not agree, all right; at least they would see clearly his reasons for acting as he was doing.

These public letters are Lincoln's most remarkable state papers. They are invincible in their logic and incomparable in their simplicity and lucidity of expression. The plain people to whom the they were addressed understood them and felt in their every line the rigid mental honesty of the man. They answered all the questions of the man whose only desire in the crisis was to see clearly the right and best to do. Scarcely less important than these letters in convincing the people of the wisdom of his policy were Lincoln's stories. In February 1864 just as the popular demand for Lincoln began to develop, the New York Evening Post published some three columns of Lincoln's stories. The New York Herald jeered at the collection as the "First Electioneering Document" of the campaign, and reprinted them as a proof of the unfitness of Lincoln for the presidency. But Jeer as it would the Herald could not hide from its readers the wit and the philosophy of these stories. Every one of them had been used to explain a point, to settle a question, and under their laughter was concealed some of the man's soundest reasoning. Indeed at that very moment the Herald might have seen if it had been more discerning that it was a Lincoln story going up and down the country which was acting as one of the strongest arguments for his renomination, the story of the man who after a sorry experience
These public letters are Lincoln's most remarkable state papers. They are invincible in their logic and incomparable in their simplicity and lucidity of expression. By means of them he convinced the people of his own rigid mental honesty—put reasons for his actions into their mouths, gave them explanations which were demonstrations. They believed in him because he had been frank with them and because he tried to make matters so clear to them—used words they could understand—kept the principle free from all non-essential and partisan considerations.

He had written such a letter to Greeley in August, 1862, explaining his view of the relation of emancipation to the war: "What I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union." Such were his letters in May and June, 1863, replying to the Democrats of New Jersey and Ohio, who protested against the arrest of Vallandigham for treasonable speech; such his letter to James C. Conkling in August, 1863 explaining the view of peace, of emancipation, of colored troops.
decided that it was never best to swap horses in crossing a stream. Lincoln had told it to illustrate the danger of changing presidents in the middle of the war. He might have written a long message on the value of experience in a national crisis and it would have been meaningless to the masses but this homely figure of swapping horses in the middle of a stream appealed to their humor and their common sense. It was repeated over and over in the newspapers of the country. It was in every man's mouth and was of inestimable value in helping plain people to see the danger of changing presidents until the war was over.

The Union convention was set for June. As the time approached Lincoln enthusiasm grew. It was fed by Grant's steady beating back of Lee towards Richmond. The country, wild with joy, cried out that before July would be the Confederate capital, the war would be ended. The opposition to Lincoln which had worked so long and so steady dwindled until all of which it was capable was a small convention in May in Cleveland at which Fremont was nominated. He accepted the nomination on the ground that Lincoln was acting as a military dictator abusing individual rights and the liberty of the press but offered to withdraw if the Republicans would nominate a man who could be trusted in the executive chair.

The Union convention met in June. That it would nominate Lincoln was a foregone conclusion. "The convention has no candidate to choose," said the Philadelphia Press. "Choice is forbidden it by the previous action of the people." The preliminary work of the convention, seating delegates and framing a platform was rapidly disposed of. Then on June 8 after a skirmish about the method of nominating the candidates Illinois presented the name of Abraham Lincoln. A call of States was immediately taken. One after another they answered; Pennsylvania for Lincoln; New York for Lincoln; New England solid; Kentucky solid and so on through the States represented. Only one dissenting delegation in the entire Missouri, whose Radical Union
representatives gave twenty-two votes to Ulysses Grant. On a second reading of the vote this ballot was changed so that the final vote stood five hundred and six for Lincoln.

The President took his renomination calmly. "I do not allow myself to suppose" he said to a delegation from the National Union League, which came to congratulate him, "that either the convention or the League have concluded to decide that I am either the greatest or best man in America, but rather they have concluded that it is not best to swap horses while crossing the river, and have further concluded that I am not so poor a horse that they might not make a botch of it trying to swap."

The renomination of Lincoln had taken place when the country and the administration were rejoicing in Grant's successes, and still prophesying that the war was practically over. The development of the next few days after the nomination put a new look on the military situation. Instead of entering Richmond Grant attacked Petersburg, but before he could capture it the town had been so reinforced that it was evident nothing but a siege could reduce it.

The Army of the Potomac in its march from the Rapidan to the James, extending from May 4th to June 24th, had lost nearly 55,000 men. If Petersburg must be besieged it was clear that the army must be reinforced— that there must be another draft. The President hinted that this was possible only a week after the convention in an address in Philadelphia at the Sanitary Fair:

"If I shall discover," he asked, "that General Grant and the noble officers and men under him can be greatly facilitated in their work by a sudden pouring forward of men and assistance, will you give them to me? Are you ready to march? Then I say, Stand ready," he said, "for I am watching for the chance."

A few days later he visited Grant and rode the lines of Petersburg. All that he saw, all the events of the following days, only made it clearer to him that there must be another outpouring of men. His friends besought him, nnkk to try to get on without it. The country was growing daily more discouraged as
it realized that its hope of speedy victory was vain. A new
draft would arouse opposition, give a new weapon to the Demo-
crats, make his re-election uncertain. He could not afford it.
He refused their counsels: "We must lose nothing even if I am de-
feated;" he said; "I am quite willing the people should under-
stand the issue. My re-election will mean that the rebellion is
to be crushed by force of arms," and on July 16th he called for
500,000 volunteers for one, two and three years.

All the discontent that had been prophesied broke forth on
brutality
this call. The awful maim and maim of the war came upon the country
as never before. There was a revulsion of feeling against the
sacrifice going on such as not had been experienced since the war
began. All the complaints that had been urged against Lincoln
both by Radical Republicans and by Democrats broke out afresh.
The draft was talked of as if it were the arbitrary freak of a
tyrant. It was declared that Lincoln had violated constitu-
tional rights, personal liberty, the liberty of the press, the rights
of asylum, that in short he had been guilty of all the abuses
of a military dictator. Much bitter criticism was made of his
treatment of peace overtures. It was declared that the Confeder-
ates were anxious to make peace and had taken the first steps but
that Lincoln was so blood-thirsty that he was unwilling to try
any means but war.

In July Mr. Greeley joined those who were attacking the Pres-
ident for not trying to make peace. He had received a private
letter from an irresponsible and effusive individual known as
"Colorado Jewett, stating that two ambassadors of "Davis and
Company" were in Canada with full and complete powers for a
peace, and requesting Mr. Greeley to come immediately to Niagara.
Taking the matter seriously the editor of the Tribune wrote the
President a long and hysterical letter, urging that the offer be
accepted and some one be sent to Niagara. Mr. Lincoln saw his
chance to demonstrate to the country the futility of peace nego-
tiations. He replied immediately appointing Greeley as an am-
bassador to meet the parties.

"If you can find any person anywhere," he wrote him, "professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union, and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him that he may come to me with you, and that if he really brings such proposition he shall at the least have safe conduct with the paper (and without publicity, if he chooses) to the point where you shall have met him. The same if there be two or more persons."

This was a turn that the editor of the Tribune had evidently not expected, but Mr. Lincoln insisted that he carry out the commission, his only conditions being the ones stated above, and he sent him the following paper:

"To Whom It May Concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

Abraham Lincoln."

Mr. Greeley went to Niagara but as it turned out the persons whom he had taken seriously had no authority whatever from Mr. Davis and they declared that no negotiations for peace were possible if Mr. Lincoln's conditions must be conceded. So the conference, which ran over a number of days, and which was enveloped in much mystery, fell through. At the end it got into the newspapers, though only a portion of the correspondence was published at the time. It was evident to people of sense however that Mr. Greeley had been hoodwinked. It was evident, too, that the President was willing to carry on peace negotiations if those points for which the war had been fought were yielded.

The "peace-at-any-price" party in the North were not silenced by this effort of Mr. Lincoln to show his willingness to conduct peace negotiations. They continued their agitations and their cause gained strength daily, so disheartened were the people with the lack of success in the field and the prospect of the draft.

As July dragged on and August passed there was no break in the gloom. Farragut was threatening Mobile. Sherman Atlanta,
Grant Petersburg, but all of these three great undertakings seem to promise nothing but a fruitless slaughter of men. The despair and indignation of the country in this dreadful time all centered in Lincoln. Republicans, hopeless of electing him, talked of replacing him by another candidate. The Democrats argued that the war and all its woes was the direct result of his tyrannical and unconstitutional policy. The more violent intimated that he should be put out of the way. A sign of the bitterness against him little noted at the moment but sinister in the light of after events was an inscription found written one August morning on the window of a room in a Meadville (Pa.) Hotel. The room had been occupied the night before by a favorite actor, J. Wilkes Booth. The inscription ran: "Abe Lincoln departed this life, August 13, 1864."

In the dreadful uproar of discontent one cry alarmed Lincoln more than all others; this was the revival of the demand that Grant be run for the presidency. It was not so much the fear of defeat as it was the dread that the campaign would be neglected if the General went into politics. He concluded that he ought to sound Grant again. Colonel John -- Eaton (now General), a friend of Grant, was in Washington at the time and often with Mr. Lincoln. Referring to the efforts made to nominate Grant Lincoln asked if the Colonel knew what the General thought of the attempt.

"No," the Colonel said; he didn't.

"Well, said Mr. Lincoln, "I tell you, before Grant came over here and the Rebel army threatened Washington, we didn't sleep nights, but since Grant came here, if the Rebels threaten the Capital we do sleep nights. We have such confidence in Grant that we believe what will be done he will do and what he don't do we don't believe can be done. "Now," he continued, "if Grant is the great general we think he is, he must have some consciousness of it and know that he cannot be satisfied with himself and secure the credit due for his great generalship if he does not
finish the job," and he added, "I don't believe they can get him to run."

The President then asked the Colonel if he could not go to Grant and find out from him how he felt. Colonel Eaton started at once on his errand. Reaching headquarters and being received by the General he found it difficult to approach his subject, but finally worked his way to it by recounting how he had met parties recently in travelling who had asked him if he thought Grant could be induced to run against Lincoln, not as a partisan, but as a citizen's candidate, to save the Union. Grant brought his hand down emphatically on the strap arm of his camp-chair:

"They can't do it! They can't compel me to do it!"

"Have you said this to the President?" asked Colonel Eaton.

"No," said Mr. Grant, "I have not thought it worth while to assure the President of my opinion. I consider it as important for the cause that he should be nominated and elected as that the army should be successful in the fall.*

The alarm of Lincoln's friends at this period is graphically pictured in the following letter, probably written toward the end of August:

Astor House, New York.

My Dear Wife:-

New York, Monday, - - - - -1864.

The fearful things in relation to the country have induced me to stay a week here. I go to Washington tonight and can't see how I can get away from there before the last of the week.

A summary of events is as follows:

The malicious foes of Lincoln are calling or getting up a Buffalo Convention to supplant him. They are Sumner, Wade, Henry Winter Davis, Chase, Fremont, Wilson, etc. The democrats are conspiring to resist the draft. We seized this morning three thousand pistols going to Indiana for distribution. The war democrats are trying to make the Chicago a loyal man. The peace democrats are trying to get control of the government and through allegiance with Jefferson Davis to get control of both armies and make universal revolution necessary.

The most fearful things are probable.

* Interview with General Eaton for this Magazine.
"I am acting with Thurlow Weed, Raymond, etc., to try to avert. There is not much hope. Unless material changes can be wrought Lincoln's election is beyond any possible hope. It is probably clean gone now.*, *

Lincoln himself had made up his mind that he would be defeated. What would be his duty then? It was quite clear to him, so clear that he wrote it down on a slip of paper:-

"Executive Mansion, Washington, August 23, 1864.

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be reelected. Then it will be my duty to so cooperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such grounds that he cannot possibly save it afterward.

A. Lincoln,*

He folded the slip and when the Cabinet met he asked the members to put their names on the back. What was inside he did not tell them. In the incessant buffeting of his life he had learned that the highest moral experience of which a man is capable is standing clear before his own conscience. He laid the paper away, a compact with his conscience in case of defeat.

The Democrats had deferred their National Convention as late as possible, hoping for a military situation which would enable them to win the people. They could not have had a situation more favorable to their plans. But they miscalculated in one vital particular. They took the despair of the country as a sign that peace would be welcome even at the cost of the Union and they adopted a peace platform. They nominated on this platform a candidate vowed to war and to Union—General McClellan. So unpopular was the combination that General McClellan in accepting the nomination practically repudiated the platform.

But at this moment something interfered to save the administration. Farragut took Mobile and Sherman captured Atlanta. "Sherman and Farragut" said Seward, "have kicked the planks out of the Chicago platform." If they had not quite done that they

* Abraham Lincoln; A History." by Nicolay and Hay.
had at least given heart to Lincoln's supporters, who went to work with a will to secure his re-election. The following letter by Leonard Swett shows something of what was doing:

Executive Mansion, Washington, Sept. 8, 1864.

My Dear Wife:

There has never been an instance in which Providence has kindly interposed in our behalf in our national struggles in so marked and essential manner as in the recent union victories.

You know I had become very fearful before leaving home, when I arrived in New York I found the most alarming depression possessing the minds of all the Republicans, Greeley, Beecher, Raymond, Weed, and all the small politicians without exception utterly gave up in despair. Raymond, the Chairman of the National Committee, not only gave up but would do nothing. Nobody would do anything. There was not a man doing anything except mischief.

A movement was organizing to make Mr. Lincoln withdraw or call a convention and supplant him.

I felt it my duty to see if some action could not be inaugurated. I got Raymond after great labor to call the Committee at Washington three days after I would arrive there, and came first to see if Mr. Lincoln understood his danger and would help to set things in motion. He understood fully the danger of his position and for once seemed anxious I should try to stem the tide bearing him down. When the Committee met they showed entire want of organization and had not a dollar of money.

Maine was calling for speakers. Two men were obtained and I had to advance them a hundred dollars each to go.

The first gleam of hope was in the Chicago convention. The evident depression of the public caused the peace men to control the convention, and then just as the public began to shrink from accepting it God gave us the victory at Atlanta which made the ship right itself as a ship in a storm does after a great wave has nearly capsized it.

Washburn of Illinois a man of great force came and he and I have been working incessantly. I have raised and provided one hundred thousand dollars for the canvass.

Don't think this is for improper purposes. It is not. Speakers have to be paid. Documents have to be sent, and innumerable expenses have to be incurred.

The secessionists are flocking to the Northwest with money. Voorhees and Vallandigham are arming the people there and are trying to make the draft an occasion for an uprising. We are in the midst of conspiracies equal to the French Revolution.

I have felt it my solemn duty under these circumstances to stay here. I have been actuated by no other motive than that of trying to save our country from further dismemberment and war. People from the west, and our best people say if we fall now the west will surely break off and go with the south. Of course that would be resisted and that resistance would bring war.

All through September and October the preparation for the November election continued. The loyal ——— of the North men to whom the Union cause were much more than has ever been fully realized — worked incessantly. The great orators of the Republi-