The hall itself in which they met was gorgeous in white and gold and crimson. Three great chandeliers, of a hundred candles and a thousand glittering pendants each, swung from its ceiling. So famous is the clock set in the great mantel piece that it gave its name to the room. It was a room which was the very jewel of the splendid building in which the French government houses its ministry of foreign relations. In this magnificent setting the 70 representatives of the thirty nations sat. They were a great body. They included the unquestioned leaders of all the allied nations.

It should be a matter of pride to every American, whatever his party inclinations, that the most impressive figure in that gathering was the President of the United States. He not only was the leader by general recognition of all the Allies, but when he stood before them to address them he looked the part. I do not say he was the most interesting person to look it. The most powerful of the French delegation, the man they call "The Tiger," Clemenceau, out of courtesy to this nation which had most endured in the war, was made the president of the body.

Clemenceau was the most individual and interesting figure. As presiding officer, he sat at the middle of the high table, Lloyd George on his right and President Wilson on his left. He is a short man, with a great head and drooping moustache, and always sat hunched in his chair with his head lifted to the ceiling, and listening, his hands, which are in public covered with grey gloves, lying in front of him on the table. This was his invariable position when he was not
on his feet or now and then turning to make a comment to one or another of the gentlemen beside him.

There were of course other famous figures that held the attention of an observer. There was Lloyd George, always smiling and always alert and watchful. Nothing escaped him, and nothing alarmed him,—a great compromiser, a great mixer. There was Orlando, the best of the Italians, even if he has made so much trouble; and Venizelos, of Greece, and Marshal Foch. One could spend all the hour describing and characterizing the men of this group. One of the very striking things was the number of brown and black men there. There was every shade, from the purest black of Africa (Liberia) through all the browns of South America and the yellows of the Orient. Nothing gave you a stronger sense of the international character of the gathering than these various shadings of the skins of the delegates.

The most picturesque figure in the group was the representative of Hedjaz, Emir Faical, a man with the face and eyes of a poet. — Generations of power and refinement and religious mysticism behind him, a lineal descendant of Mohammed himself. He certainly was the handsomest thing at the peace conference, and his beauty was not a little enhanced by a wonderful turban and veil of rose grey silk, both outlined in diamonds. —

There was a great sense of possible power in the body, a feeling of the willingness to unite for the good of the world. It is fair to say, I think, that you felt both power and will to unite in the majority of the delegates, but not in all of them. You could not look the round of those faces and not realize that there were
at least a few men that did not understand the first letter of what it is all about, and a few more—much more dangerous—that had a contemptuous disbelief in the undertaking. That is, there were in the conference a few men that neither believed it desirable or possible that a League of Nations should be worked out. They were there to make a peace, a peace which would profit as largely as possible their individual countries, which would take from the enemy the last drop of blood that could be drawn—peace with a vengeance—peace by the old fashioned methods was all that they saw or believed in. But this element was small in the conference, the great majority believed that it was their business to work out a new kind of international understanding and to devise some kind of machinery for keeping nations together in peace.

It was a great group, one of enormous dignity and authority; but it was evident from the first that dignity and authority were not going to save it from trouble. In fact from the time that the peace conference was born it was apparent that it was, like man, born to trouble as the sparks to fly upward. From the start nothing it did suited everybody. It sometimes seemed as if nothing it did suited anybody. And certainly whatever it did, it was subject to the fullest, and often the most disrespectful criticism from press and public.

Oddly enough, the first trouble that came to the conference was because it settled down to do really hard work. That is, the thing which in reality was one of the wisest moves of the conference raised the first real protest and hubub.

Before the delegates had reached Paris, the Allied con-
Naturally, one would suppose that the peace conference would begin with the first, that it would set the troubled world in order before it attempted to rearrange it for the future. But it did nothing of the kind. The first undertaking of the peace conference was to devise a machine for keeping peace before it had made it. That is, it started out to devise a league or society of nations, instead of making a treaty with the conquered countries. This decision looked to a great many people like putting "the cart before the horse."

There were not a few people in Europe and in America who blamed President Wilson for his insistence on this course. But President Wilson was not the only one that believed this was the true method of work. The procedure had strong supporters in England. The arguments which they gave to the leaders in the conference were so strong that it was universally decided to begin work by making a league. The events of the last four months have proved the wisdom of the decision. Look over the dissensions and wrangling that is going on this very moment over the settlements which are provided in the treaty itself, and you will see that it is very unlikely that the conference could be brought now, today, to a point of making a league which would be universally accepted.

This very situation was one of the things that was foreseen by those who advocated the putting of "the cart before the horse" as it was called, this making an arrangement for permanent peace before we had the peace.
conference had adopted, as you will remember, a kind of decalogue for their guidance. They were the famous 14 points of President Wilson. There was not a little fun in Paris over these 14 points. Clemenceau is said to have remarked that the Lord had given is only ten commandments, but Wilson had gone Him four better and had given us fourteen. It was understood that they were the basis on which peace was to be formed. They were troublesome from the very start, quite as troublesome as the ten commandments and the Golden Rule are to those of us who belong to the Christian church. And just in the same way that the critics of the Christian church employ these great rules of human conduct to show up our short-comings, so those who doubt the findings of the peace conference are holding up these 14 points to show how it has failed.

The first point guaranteed open covenants, openly arrived at. The public and the press seem to have supposed from this that the conference was going to do all its work in open sessions, that its examination of facts and of proposals, its discussions, its adjustments of conflicting views and its efforts to find a basis to which all could agree, were to be done on the floor of the conference chamber. When it was discovered that the conference took its work much more seriously, that it was dividing itself into commissions, that these commissions retired to carry on their investigations and discussions just as our committees of congress retire to their committee rooms to make the bills which they return to the floor of the House—a terrible hubub arose in Paris. There was a feeling that all that was said and done ought to be open to the newspaper
men particularly. I am not sure but one of the reasons of the dissatisfaction with this work behind closed doors was that the public suddenly realized that the conference itself did not regard itself as an inspired body. The imagination of the peoples of the world had been so stirred by this international coming together, its hopes had been so raised by the presentation of the possibilities from the earth to the earth through readjustments or through a world society, particularly the presentations made by President Wilson, that when they saw the gentlemen that were to do this great thing for them acting like other men who had things to work out, settling down to hard labor as men have always done, somehow it pricked the balloon, took the wind out of their sails.

They saw that we were not going to ride over a calm sea to the millennium, that we had to work our way to it. This sudden realization dismayed and shocked not a little of the idealistic sentiment in the public. What nobody seems to have fully realized was that the members of the conference were not sure of anything, knew very little of what they had to grapple with and did not know at all how they could work out any one of the many problems which they foresaw were coming to them. It was particularly the press which was angry and revolutionary, because the conference insisted on not talking until it had something to say.

But in spite of all the hubub, the different commissions which had been formed went on with their work. The chief of these, of course, was the commission on the League of Nations. It was to this that the leaders in the conference, the "big five" as they were
called, and the representatives of certain of the smaller nations, gave all their time as had been decided. That they should have had quiet in order to concentrate on this task, any man of sense will admit. That they should not have talked for the public until they had something madly, anyone of sense will admit. But the most difficult thing in the world in Paris for those who were working on this League of Nations was to get anything like quiet. The most difficult thing was for them to be allowed to keep their attention on the League. They had to pay the price of their decision to make the league before they had made peace, for all the problems involved in the peace pounded at their door, beat on their windows, came in through the keyhole. It seemed in Paris as if every morning brought a new problem. We used to say to one another in the morning when we took up our newspapers, "What country that we never heard of arrived last night?" The extraordinary thing was that so many problems arose that nobody could have foreseen. It was evident that it was not the enemy alone that was going to make trouble in the final settlement. I think most of us felt that if the aspirations of the little countries were fully recognized by the Allied powers and that they were allowed to have their own kind of government and were promised the protection of the Allies in working out their destiny, that they would be so busy and so happy with their chance that the last thing they would think of would be quarreling. But almost at once it was seen that these young nations that had struggled so long to get into the world, were just