"Probably the most expensive and far-reaching labor controversy which can properly be ~~called~~ classed among the historic controversies of this generation was the Chicago strike of June and July, 1894. Beginning with a private strike at the works of Pullman's Palace Car Company at Pullman, a suburb of Chicago, it ended with a practical insurrection of the labor employed on the principal railroads radiating from Chicago and some of their affiliated lines, paralyzing internal commerce, putting the public to great inconvenience, delaying the mails, and in general demoralizing business. Its influences were felt all over the country, to greater or less extent, according to the lines of traffic and the courses of trade." (Wright, Industrial Evolution, 313)

Browne, Altgeld of Illinois, 117-~~119~~ 120:
"Pullman, on the ~~sprawl~~ southern edge of Chicago's sprawling area, had been built some fifteen years before to house the plant and employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company, whose principal business was (and still is) the manufacture of sleeping and 'parlor' cars and their operation on the larger railways of the country. In addition, it manufactured cars for the general market, and maintained a large repair plant. Externally, the 'model town' of Pullman appeared model enough: but it was pervaded, as company-owned towns generally are, by a somewhat oppressive atmosphere of semi-feudalism. From this red-brick paradise, the serpent of trade-unionism had always been rigorously excluded: and visitors were wont to note among the dwellers therein a certain sense of restraint and uneasiness, not unnatural to persons living by favor of a zealous and vigilant over-lord. The paid-up capital of the Pullman company had increased from an original $1,000,000 to $36,000,000, and the company had accumulated undivided surplus profits of $25,000,000. Dividends to the amount of $2,520,000 were paid to its stockholders for the year ending in June, 1893. During the depression following the world's fair there was a heavy falling-off in business, and the company immediately reduced its force, adopted 'short-time' measures, and cut wages. In the six months preceding May, 1894, the total wage reductions amounted to about twenty-five per cent. No salaries were reduced during this period, and the company refused to lower the rents of the tenements occupied by its workers, although these rents were from twenty to twenty-five per cent higher than the workers would have had to pay for similar accomodations elsewhere in Chicago and its neighboring towns. As a result of all this, there was much suffering and discontent in Pullman throughout the winter of 1893-1894. In the early spring large numbers of the workers joined the American Railway Union, which had been organized at Chicago during the previous year 'for the purpose of including railway employees born of white parents in one great brotherhood,' and which now comprised about 150,000 members. On May 9 an employees' committee representing all departments of the Pullman plant waited upon the management and urged the restoration of wages to the basis of June, 1893. The officials refused to consider this, on the ground that business conditions at that time made wage concessions of any sort impossible. Next day, contrary to an explicit promise on this point,

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three members of the employees' committee were dismissed by their foreman for alleged lack of work. Incensed by this action, the local unions met that evening and voted for an immediate strike. As soon as the strike was declared the company laid off all its remaining employees, and closed its shops.

"Between June 9 and June 26 a regular convenvion of the American Railway Union met at Chicago, and the Pullman situation received careful consideration. Officials of the union proposed to the Pullman company that the points at issue in the strike be arbitrated by a joint committee. The company, however, declined to consider or even to receive any communication from the American Railway Union; and as a result it was decided by unanimous vote that members of the union should cease handling Pullman cars on all railroads after June 26. According to the report of the United States Strike Commission, 'the officers and directors of the American Railway Union did not want a strike at Pullman, and they advised against it; but the exaggerated idea of the power of the union, which induced the workmen at Pullman to join the order, led to their striking against this advice. Having struck, the union could do nothing less, upon the theory at its base, than support them.' Fundamentally, the action of the American Railway Union was not a strike at all, but a sympathetic boycott, directed solely against the handling of Pullman cars. The members of the union did not quit their places; they announced their readiness to man and run all trains of which Pullman cars were not a part; and their officers particularly asked that such cars be separated from mail trains, in order that the latter should not be delayed."

Cleveland, on the Chicago Strike in his "Presidential Problems," 82-83: "The employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company could not on any reasonable and consisten theory be regarded as eligible to membership in an organization devoted to the interests of railway employees: and yet, during the months of March, April, and May, 1894, it appears that nearly 4,000 of these employees were enrolled in the American Railway Union.

"This, to say the least of it, was an exceedingly unfortunate proceeding, since it created a situation which implicated in a comparatively insignificant quarrel between the managers of an industrial establishment and their workmen the large army of the railway union. It was the membership of these workmen in the Railway Union, and the union's consequent assumption of their quarrel, that gave it the proportions of a tremendous disturbance, paralyzing the most important business interests, obstructing the functions of the Government, and disturbing social peace and order."

Eugene V. Debs, president of the Railway Union, issued a manifesto soon after the strike was proclaimed, declaring: "The contest is now on between the railway corporations united solidly on the one hand, and the labor forces on the other.---I appeal to the strikers everywhere to refrain from any act of violence. A man who will destroy property or violate law is an enemy and not a friend of the cause of labor." It seems that, in the early days of the strike, at least, this appeal was carried out, and there was very little, if any, violence.

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From the report of the U.S.Strike Commission,Sen.Exec.Doc.No.7, 53 Cong.,3 Sess.:

"The General Managers' Association."

"This voluntary,unincorporated association was formed in 1886,and has as members the 24 railroads entering or terminating in Chicago. [No. of miles operated-40,983. Capitalization-$2,108,552,617.]

"In its constitution the object of the association is stated to be 'the consideration of problems of management arising from the operation of railroads terminating or centering at Chicago.' It further provides that 'all funds needed shall be raised by assessments divided equally among the members.' There are no limitations as to 'consideration of problems' or 'funds' except the will of the managers and the resources of the railroad corporations.

"Prior to the recent strike the association was chiefly concerned with matters other than wages. It dealt with all questions concerning transportation entering at Chicago in which the roads had a common interest. It thus determined the policy and practically fixed the relations of all the roads toward the public as to switching,car service,loading and unloading cars,weights of live stock,rates,etc.,and sustained each road in maintaining the position of the association as to these matters.

"Until June,1894,the association dealt incidentally and infrequently with wages. There were few railroad controversies as to wages during its active life,dating from January 20,1892. Hence its possibilities as a strike fighter and wage arbiter lay rather dormant. The following are instances of its action as to wage questions. Its roads fixed a 'Chicago scale' for switchmen,covering all lines at Chicago. In March,1893,the switchmen demanded more pay from each road. The association concluded that they were paid enough-if anything,too much. The roads so informed the men. The Switchmen's Mutual Aid Association of North America wrote to Mr. St.John,as chairman,acquiescing. He,as chairman of the General Managers' Association,concluded his reply as follows:

" 'The association approves the course taken by your body and desires to deal fairly with all employees and believes that our switchmen are receiving due consideration.'

"This seems to show that employees upon association roads are treated as under subjection to the General Managers' Association.

"The commission questions whether any legal authority, statutory or otherwise,can be found to justify some of the features of the association,which have come to light in this investigation. If we regard its practical workings rather than its professions as expressed in its constitution,the General Managers' Association has no more standing in law than the old Trunk Line Pool. It cannot incorporate,because railroad charters do not authorize roads to form corporations or associations to fix rates for services and wages, nor to force their acceptance,nor to battle with strikers.-----

"The association is an illustration of the persistent and shrewdly devised plans of corporations to overreach their limitations and to usurp indirectly powers and rights not contemplated in their charters and not obtainable from the people or their legislators.-----

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"It should be noted that until the railroads set the example a general union of railroad men was never attempted. The unions had not gone beyond enlisting the men upon different systems in separate trade organizations. These neutralize and check each other to some extent, and have no such scope or capacity for good or evil as is possible under the universal combination idea inaugurated by the railroads and followed by the American Railway Union. The refusal of the General Managers' Association to recognize and deal with such a combination of labor as the American Railway Union seems arrogant and absurd when we consider its standing before the law, and its past and obviously contemplated future action." (Pp.XXVII ff.)

"Rents." (From the same report.)

"If we exclude the aesthetic and sanitary features at Pullman, the rents there are from twenty to twenty-five per cent higher than rents in Chicago or surrounding towns for similar accomodations. The aesthetic features are admired by visitors, but have little money value to employees, especially when they lack bread.

"The company's claim that the workmen need not live in its tenements and can live elsewhere if they choose is not entirely tenable. The fear of losing work keeps them in Pullman as long as there are tenements unoccupied, because the company is supposed, as a matter of business, to give a preference to its tenants when work is slack. The employees, believing that a tenant at Pullman has this advantage, naturally feel some compulsion to rent at Pullman, and thus to stand well with the management.---While reducing wages the company made no reductions in rent. Its position is that the two matters are distinct, and that none of the reasons urged as justifying wage reduction by it as an employer can be considered by the company as a landlord.

"The company claims that it is simply legitimate business to use its position and resources to hire in the labor market as cheaply as possible and at the same time to keep rents up, regardless of what wages are paid to its tenants or what similar tenements rent for elsewhere; to avail itself to the fullest extent of business depression and competition in reducing wages, and to disregard the same conditions as to rents. No valid reason is assigned for the position except simply that the company had the power and legal right to do it.---

"At the time of the strike about $70,000 of unpaid rent had accumulated. It is fair to say that the accumulation of unpaid rent was due to leniency on the part of the company toward those who could not pay rent and support their families. Neither have any actual evictions taken place. The company has held these matters in abeyance pending wage reductions and strike difficulties." (Pp.XXXV ff.)

"The demand of the employees for the wages of June, 1893, was clearly unjustifiable. The business in May, 1894, could not pay the wages of June, 1893. Reduction was carried to an excess, but the company was hardly more at fault therein than the employees in insisting upon the wages of June, 1893. There was little discussion as to rents, the company maintaining that its rents had

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nothing to do with its wages.----Some slight concession in this regard would probably have averted the strike, provided the promise not to discharge men who served upon the committee had been more strictly regarded." (Ibid, XXXVII)

"Upon June 15 and 22 it [the company] declined to receive any communication from committees of the American Railway Union, one proposition of that body being that the company select two arbitrators, the court two, and these four a fifth, to determine whether there was anything to arbitrate. The company also refused to consider any arbitration at the solicitiation of the common council of Chicago, and repeated its stereotyped answer that there was nothing to arbitrate when appealed to by Mayor Pingree of Detroit, himself a large manufacturer, whom Mayor Hopkins accompanied to Pullman. At that interview Mayor Pingree claimed to have telegrams from the mayors of over fifty of the largest cities, urging that there should be arbitration." (P.XXXIX)

In the "Editor's Table" of the New England Magazine for October 1896, there is the following comment: "We must remember that we have the explicit statement of Mayor Pingree, the Republican candidate for the governorship of Michigan, -a statement made with the claim of inside knowledge- that the commanding officers of the Federal forces sent to Chicago agreed that there was no need whatever of there being sent there, but that the state authorities were anxious and entirely able to do everything that needed to be done, and that, though silently and faithfully obeying orders.

Comments of The Nation on the Strike.

July 5, 1894-Vol.59, pages 5 and 6: "On the 7th of May last the workmen of the Pullman car works made a formal request for a restoration of the wages they were getting before the reductions of last year. Mr.Pullman met them two or three days later and gave the reasons why the conditions of business would not allow the restoration of the old rates. He said that the business depression and the reduction of orders for cars had compelled the company to reduce their force from 5,816 men in the beginning of 1893 to 2,000 on the 1st of November; that by hard struggling and by underbidding for work he had been able to keep the latter number employed and to increase the number gradually until he had 4,200 employed. How he had done this he explained in detail. He took an order for 55 passenger-cars from the Long Island Railroad at $300 per car less than actual cost to the Pullman Company. He took an order for 300 cattle-cars and 250 refrigerator-cars for the Northwestern Railroad at $12 per car less than cost, and 25 cars for the Lake Shore Road at $79 each less than cost.----In order to provide work and wages for the town of Pullman, where the company's largest interests lay, he had closed the Detroit works altogether." When the men struck "Mr.Pullman was very much relived by the removal from his shoulders of the responsibility for the bread and butter of the 4,200 men and their families."

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Ibid: "The present boycott is an attempt to starve out society. The whole population subsists by the movement of trains, and cannot exist more than a few days without such movement. When the pinch comes, it will not be only the duty but the dire necessity of everybody-lawyers, doctors, merchants, and all who depend upon their labor for their bread-to offer their services to the railroads as guards, or switchmen, or trainmen or what not."

July 12, 1894- 59:20 :- "It is an astonishing revelation that Debs, the manager of the strike, was under treatment for dipsomania two years ago, and that it is a question whether he is at present entirely sane. The physician who treated him then says he was suffering from alcoholism in its worst form, and was aphysical and mental wreck. He says that he telegraphed to Debs a few days ago imploring him to stop, as the condition of his nervous system made him irresponsible for his own orders. That a man of his physical and mental condition should be able to paralyze great railroad systems, and throw several States into such a condition of anarchy that the President of the United States has to concentrate the regular army at the centre of the disturbance, and issue proclamations for the suppression of rioting, is certainly the most extraordinary development of the labor problem that the world has yet seen. It puts this country before the world as the sport of lunatics and madmen."

July 12, 1894- 59:19 :- "President Cleveland's method of dealing with Governor Altgeld is a model one. He wastes no time in arguing with him, or in defending himself against his attacks, but in a few terse sentences sets him before the country in his true light as the friend and champion of disorder. Altgeld is probably as unconscious of his own bad manners as he is of the bad odor of his principles; but boorish, impudent, and ignorant as he is, he can scarcely fail to wince under the treatment which he receives from the President.---Altgeld's tirades are serving the useful purpose of showing to the people, not only of Illinois, but of all other States, the folly of putting the administration of public affairs into the hands of professional blatherskites, who are either too ignorant or too unprincipled to conduct themselves in accordance with the spirit of American institutions."

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Pullman Strike:

Brand Whitlock, who had ample opportunity to observe the strike from all angles, because of his close association with Governor Altgeld at the time, in his "Forty Years of It" speaks of the strike as follows: (90-92)

"They called it the Debs Rebellion, and for a while it assumed some of the proprtions of a rebellion, or at least frightened many people in Illinois as much as a rebellion might have done. We were in the midst of all its alarms during the whole spring and summer, and down in the adjutant-general's office at the State House there was the stir almost of war itself., with troops being ordered here and there about the state, and the Governor harried and worried by a situation that presented to him the abhorrent necessity of using armed force. I was reading over the other day the report to the War Department by my friend Major Jewett Baker, then a lieutenant in the Twelfth United States Infantry, detailed with the National Guard of Illinois; and in his clear and excellent account of all those confused events the scenes of those times came back: The long lines of idle freight cars, charred by incendiary flames: the little groups of men standing about wearing the white ribbons of the strike sympathizers, and the colonel of the regular army, in his cups at his club, who wished he might order a whole regiment to shoot them, 'each man to take aim at a dirty white ribbon'; the regulars encamped on the lake front, their sentinels pacing the posts at the quickstep in the rain; and then that morning conference in the mayor's office in Chicago, at which I was permitted to look on----when there appeared Eugene V. Debs, tall, lithe, nervous, leader of the strikers, his hair, what there was of it, sandy, but his head mostly bald, his eyes flashing, his mouth ready to smile, soon to go to Woodstock jail, to emerge a Socialist, and become the leader of that party.

"Major Baker's report shows, indirectly and by inference, that much of the criticism which the Governor endured was not justified, since he turned out all his troops as fast as local authorities asked for them. At any rate, he acted according to his democratic principles and to his conception of his duty. His principles were in a sense different from those of President Cleveland, with whom he disagreed in that notable instance when the President in his vigorous, practical way sent federal troops into Chicago; the Governor protested, as one of his predecessor's in the governor's office, Senator Palmer, had protested when President Grant sent federal troops under Phil Sheridan into Chicago at the time of the great fire. Almost everybody who had any way of making his voice heard sided with President Cleveland, and the end of the strike was accredited to him. Doubtless the grim presence of the regular troops troops did overawe the hoodlums who had taken advantage of the strike to create disorder, but if the credit must go to armed force, the report of Major, or, as he was in those days, Lieutenant, Baker shows that that little company of the Illinois National Guard which ruthlessly fired into the mob in Loomis Street one night virtually ended the strike.

"Perhaps Governor Altgeld was willing to forego any 'credit' for an act, which, however necessary to the preservation of order, demanded so many lives."

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Henry D.Lloyd published an article in the New York Morning Journal of October 18,1896,which is reprinted in Volume I of his biography,pages 147-151,which dealt with the Pullman Strike and Altgeld's part in it. Lloyd was in a position to know the facts because of his association with and friendship with the Governor. It reads in part as follows:

"I was an eye-witness of Governor Altgeld's conduct during the great Pullman Strike of 1894.---I spent a number of hours with him at the most critical point of those eventful July days.---The real Governor Altgeld,as I saw him,was in constant and anxious conference with the Adjutant-General of the State and other military officers. He wasx receiving and sending dispatches connected with the movement of state troops. He was fertile in suggestions which lay outside the sphere of his technical obligations.----So resolute was the Governor that there should not be the slightest occasion for any chance of a failure on the part of the State to do its full duty in the protection of life and property that he sent troops when called for,even though he did not believe that the alleged need for their services was genuine. As one demand for troops came by telegraph and was answered by an order for their dispatch,the Governor said to me in substance:

" 'I have reason to fear that these troops are wanted at that xx place only to help the railroad defeat the demand of their demand of their men for higher wages'-this was the case of a strike not connected in any way with the general strike-'but I cannot refuse to send them in the face of allegations of public danger.'

"In the intervals of all this business the Governor discussed the various aspects of the trouble with the frankness of one talking with a personal friend. He deplored the strike, and said that,in his judgment,it could not possible succeed,or even last many days longer. The farmers and business men of the State were wild,he said,on account of the stoppage of traffic on the roads.---

" 'If it becomes necessary,' he said,I particularly remember,'I could and would put 100,000 men into the city of Chicago inside of five days. The whole State would answer to the call as one man.' The records of the time show that every application from Chicago for State troops was promptly answered,as from every other place in the State.---- Governor Altgeld acted in this crisis with the most scrupulous faithfulness to his xxx official obligations. He did this,as the remark quoted above,indicates,although he believed,as other cool and conscientious observers believed and believe,that the troops were being called for by the railroads for other reasons than to put down disorder; that the 'riots' were largely 'fakes,' and that what was real of them was mostly the work of the railroads.---The railroads had everything to gain by a little well-advertised rioting which could be attributed to the strikers. The strikers had everything to lose by violence,and they knew it. Whatever Governor Altgeld,who is a shrewd and successful lawyer,judge,man of affairs,and politician,may have divined of all this,he did not allow it to lead him into any failure to comply to xxxxx the fullest with the strict letter and the spirit of his public duty to preserve order. Even as a mere politician,he would

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have been led by his estimate, ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ described above, of the intense and almost unanimous disapproval of the strike to show not the slightest ~~xx~~ sign of paltering with it. There were other personal reasons as strong.

"In the center of the city of Chicago, Governor Altgeld has property to the value of many hundreds of thousands of dollars. 'Free rioting' would have destroyed this and the whole fortune he had built up by a life of prudent and sagacious enterprise. Those who can believe that a man of distinguished intellectual ability, whose life training has been that of the law, the most conservative of sciences, who has sat for years as a judge upon the bench, without whisper of reproach, who has never given favor by so much as one ~~xxxx~~ word, private or offcial, to a single one of the radical social theories of the day, not even going so far as to except the mildest 'municipal socialism' of European monarchical cities, who, as Governor has kept well within the most conventional lines of public enterprise, and who has indulged that 'Satanic Radicalism' of his which keeps so many good people in New York and Massachusetts awake these nights, in nothing more revolutionary than prison and insane asylum reform and factory inspection, who has accumulated a large fortune in real estate and some of the best office property in the business heart of Chicago. Those who can believe that such a man is an 'anarchist,' and believes in free rioting in general, ought at least to have common sense and sense of humor enough to know that he could not have believed in the particular 'free rioting' which took place in Chicago in July, 1894. "

On Page 152 of Caro Lloyd's "H.D.Lloyd" there is a quotation from Lloyd's note-book, which reads as follows:
"E.W.Bemis was told that Mayor Hopkins [of Chicago] before leaving office procured forty affidavits showing that the burning of freight cars was done by railroad men [meaning men hired by the railroad companies]: that the railroad men moved cars outside of fire limits, then burned them, inciting bystanders to participate. Hopkins, fearing these affidavits might be destroyed by some subsequent railroad mayor, took certified copies before leaving office."

In the "Editor's Table" of the "New England Magazine" for October 1896, there is an interesting article giving some "unwritten history" of the strike. Among other things, the point is brought out that under a law of 1887 the city of Chicago was liable for all damges done to property by mob violence, even though the city may have been unable to prevent the destruction. The question then arises why there was no claim for damages made by the railroads for the cars which were burned by mobs in Chicago, even though the Fire Department officials of Chicago estimated the damage thus done to amount to about $355,000 worth. Furthermore, "we must remember that we have the explicit statement of Mayor Pingree, the Republican candidate for the governorship of Michigan, - a statement made with the claim of inside knowledge - that the commanding officers of the Federal forces sent to Chicago agreed that there was no need whatever of their being sent there, but that the state authorities were anxious and entirely able to do everything that needed to be done, and that, though silently and faithfully obeying orders like good soldiers, they resented the situation

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as tending to bring under just suspicion and dislike the military arm of the national government."

Still further on this same question, Browne, page 150, has the following foot-note: "That General Miles himself was opposed to sending Federal troops into Chicago is vouched for by no less an authority than the then ranking officer of the United States Army, Lieutenant-General John M. Schofield, who on page 494 of his 'Forty-Six Years in the Army' writes as follows: 'The next day (July 3), in the President's room at the Executive Mansion, in reply to my suggestion that his presence was needed with his command, General Miles said he was subject to orders, but that in his opinion the United States troops ought not to be employed in the city of Chicago at that time.' Secretary of War Lamont also advised against this use of the Federal troops."

During the presidential campaign of 1896, Altgeld, in the course of his speech-making, addressed a meeting at Cooper Union, New York, on October 17, 1896, where his whole speech, practically, was taken up with a discussion of the Pullman Strike of two years previously. Among other things he said:

"The trouble at Chicago was, by systematic effort and deliberate misrepresentation, so magnified as to make it seem that we were bordering on anarchy, and that consequently federal interference was necessary. The impression was sought to be made upon the country that we were bordering on civil war and the destruction of society, and that neither the local authorities nor the State authorities were willing to maintain law and order; while the real fact was that the federal government took steps to interfere in Chicago before there was any rioting or any serious trouble of any kind, and that the State authorities, who stood ready to act promptly, were intentionally ignored.

"The disturbance at its worst did not equal in point of destruction the disturbances that occured at Buffalo, New York, the year previous; was not nearly so bloody or destructive as a number of disturbances that have occured in Pennsylvania, and was not as bloody and destructive as had occured in Ohio while McKinley was Governor."

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When the federal troops were ordered to Chicago, Debs made the following statements: (From the N.Y.Sun, July 5, 1894, Page 3) "The first shot fired by the regular soldiers at the mobs here will be the signal for a civil war. I believe this as firmly as I believe in the ultimate success of our cause. Bloodshed will follow, and ninety per cent of the people of the United States will be arrayed against the other ten per cent. And I would not care to be arrayed against the laboring people in the contest, or find myself out of the ranks of labor when the struggle ended. I do not say this as an alarmist, but calmly and thoughtfully."

In his chapter on "Some 'Inner History' of the Railway Strike" Browne discusses the question of why no application for State troops was made by the railroad officials in Chicago, and why they appealed to Washington and the Federal forces instead. A study of the report of the Strike Commission, of the official dispatches exchanged by Altgeld and Cleveland, of Altgeld's Cooper Union Speech, of Cleveland's 'The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894", of the report of the Adjutant-General of Illinois, of H.D.Lloyd's account of the matter, and ~~from~~ other sources, seems to confirm practically all of Browne's contentions, which, accordingly, I reproduce here, interspersed with my own references to the sources which confirm his statements. (Browne, Altgeld of Illinois, 141-152)

"If events at Chicago in late June or early July had seemed to warrant such action, a request for State assistance might properly have been made by either the mayor of Chicago, the sheriff of Cook County, the United States marshal for the northern district of Illinois, or the railway officials whose property was attacked or threatened. But neither the mayor nor the sheriff could legitimately make such an application until their own resources for preserving the peace had been exhausted; and only in this emergency also, or unless the local authorities refused to exert their best efforts, were the United States marshal or the railway officials justified in making a direct appeal to Springfield or to Washington. There can be no doubt that the mayor and the sheriff, with their regular forces augmented by a large number of special police officers and deputy sheriffs, had the situation well in hand up to and including July 3, the day on which federal troops were ordered to Chicago. [Official statement of sheriff to this effect in Strike Commission's report.] Regarding their failure to apply for State aid during the disturbances of July 4th and 5th. various explanations have been offered.-----Doubtless the most reasonable explanation is that, with Federal troops already on the ground, further assistance seemed unnecessary. But, at any rate, neither the mator nor the sheriff appealed to Springfield until July 6th, when the mayor acted in accordance with Governor Altgelds urgent suggestion. [Despite reassuring telegrams from Chicago, Altgeld feared trouble and sent the assistant adjutatn-general to report the actual conditions to him. The latter stated that it was his belief that although the local authorities had been able to handle the situation so far, he doubted whether they would be able to do so much longer, and advised the sending of State aid. Thereupon, in Altgeld's own words at Cooper Union, he "sent a telegram to a

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friend in Chicago requesting him to see Mayor Hopkins at once and tell him that it seemed to me the situation was serious and that he had better apply to the State for aid. This message was at once communicated to Mayor Hopkins, and about noon of that day, the 6th of July, the day on which the property of the Illinois Central Railroad) was being destroyed, the mayor telegraphed for troops, and by sun-down of that day we had put over 5000 State troops on duty in Chicago, although some of them had to be transported 150 miles to reach the city."]

"The failure of the United States marshal for northern Illinois to request State aid is less explicable because he, unlike the mayor and the sheriff, seems to have become alarmed early in the strike. On June 30 we find him engaged in organizing an army of special deputy marshals, and on July 3 he is telegraphing to Washington that 'no force less than the regular troops of the United States can procure the passage of the mail-trains or enforce the orders of the courts.' All this time three thousand State troops could have been mobilized in Chicago on two Hours' notice. [That the Federal marshal had a right to ask for State aid is shown by the fact that on June 16 of the same year, Attorney-General Olney had advised the Federal officials who found it impossible to cope with the miners in the coal-strike of the time, to ask for State protection first, and then only if that should prove inadequate, was the Federal Government to be called on for assistance.]

"In (several) situations during the coal and railway strikes, Federal officers for the southern district of Illinois asked and received State military aid in similar or largely similar circumstances. Obviously, there must have been some rather extraordinary reason why the United States marshal and other Federal authorities ignored for the northern Illinois district should have consistently ignored the procedure which the corresponding officials for southern Illinois had adopted on several occasions under the explicit instructions of Attorney-General Olney himself.

"Obviously, also, there must have been some extraordinary reason why the railway managers in Chicago were no less reticent about asking for State assistance than were the Federal authorities for that district. They knew, or should have known, that Governor Altgeld was responding promptly and energetically to every call for troops from other sections of Illinois; and they knew also that there were at this time in Chicago at least three regiments of State militia, ready for immediate service. Yet from the beginning of the strike until July 6, two days after the Federal troops arrived, no single application for protection or assistance was made to Governor Altgeld by any railroad official in the city where the strike originated and was chiefly fought out. In Altgeld's own words, the State troops were not put on duty in Chicago 'because nobody in Cook County, whether official or private citizen, asked to have their assistance, or even intimated in any way that their assistance was desired or necessary.' [Dispatch to Cleveland, July 5, 1894.] Only one expalnation of this surprising fact seems

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possible. The General Managers' Association had planned from the outset to keep State troops away from Chicago and to have Federal troops brought in. No doubt the common distrust of Governor Altgeld played some part in determining this course; and probably it was also felt that Federal soldiers would be more efficient and less inclined to sympathize with the strikers. But these considerations were of small account in comparison with the all-important moral effect which the presenc e of United States troops would exercise, not merely upon the strikers and their adherents but upon public opinion throughout the country. The railway managers were unitedly resolved upon two things: to win the strike, and to destroy the American Railway Union. They understood as clearly as do their successors to-day that nothing is of surer efficacy in breaking a strike and discrediting a labor organization than Federal intervention. What was before merely a conflict between wrokers and employers becomes at once, in the public view, a conflict between workers and the Govepment; and from that point the result is never in doubt. To make certain of Federal intervention in the railway strike at Chicago, it was necessary to prevent State intervention; and the railway managers worked consistently in pursuance of this double purpose.

"Under our prevailing economic code of 'dog eat dog,' such a purpose may well be considered both natural and legitimate. But what must impress any impartial person as wholly unnatural, wholly illegitimate, is the amazing unanimity and zeal with which the Federal authorities, at both Chicago and Washington, fell in with the railway's intrigues. ----As already stated, the first intervention from Washington occurred on June 30, four days after the strike went into effect. Up to this dat, and indeed for three days afterward, there was no unusual disorder in Chicago, no exceptional threat to Federal property, no organized resistance to Federal court writs, no serious obstruction of the mails. Public opinion was still largely on the side of the Pullman employees, and the railroad strikers were winning by peaceable means all along the line. [A sworn statement by Debs, accepted as correct by Cleveland in his account, is as follows: "The employees, obedient to the order of the convention, at once, on the 26th, refused to haul Pullman cars. The switchmen, in the first place, refused to attach a Pullman car to a train, and that is where the trouble began; and then, when a switchman would be discharged for that, they would all simultaneously quit, as they had agreed to do. One department after another was involved until the Illinois Central was practically paralyzed, and the Rock Island and other roads in their turn. Up to the first day of July, or after the strike had been in progress five days, the railway managers, as we believe, were completely defeated. Their immediate resources were exhausted, their properties were paralyzed, and they were unable to operate their trains. Our men were intact at every point, firm, quiet, and yet determined, and no sign of violence or disorder anywhere. That was the condition on the thirtieth day of June and the first day of July." At this point, 'it must have been ~~existent~~ plain to the managers that if the strike remained a peaceful one, the railways would be defeated. If, however, violence and crime were associated with it, public sympathy would no longer sustain the strikers, and the power of

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the law would be invoked against them.' [Peck, Twenty Years, 381.] With Federal sanction and co-operation, the old device of the agent provocateur was now brought into play. Upon June 30, upon representations from the district attorney at Chicago, Attorney-General Olney authorized the United States marshal in that city to employ a large force of special deputies. This the marshal lost no time in doing, to the number of between three and four thousand men. [3600 according to the Strike Commission which called this act a "very bad precedent."] These special deputies, ~~according to the United States Strike Commission~~, were selected by and appointed at the request of the General Managers' Association ~~and its constituent members~~; they were armed and paid by the railroads, and acted in the double ~~capacity~~ capacity of railway employees and United States officers, although while exercising authority they were under the direct control of the railroads and not of any public official. [Verified] Thus, as a first step, the Federal Government gave over its local police power directly into the hands of the railroads, allowing them to recruit (chiefly through detective agencies) a considerable body of reckless and irresponsible men, to arm them, and to send them out in the guise of United States officers to do whatever was required of them by the railroads. The Chicago superintendent of police, in an official report, refers to these special deputies as 'thugs, thieves, and ex-convicts'; and that characterization is amply verified in the testimony of many witnesses before the United States Strike Commission. As later events proved, no step could have been more disastrous to the public peace (however fortunate for the railroads) than the injection of these quasi-official gunmen into the situation at Chicago. Their presence and behavior incensed the railway employees in such degree that outbreaks of violence became inevitable; and to their account must be laid the responsibility for directly or indirectly inciting the largest part of whatever disorder occurred during the succeeding two weeks. (See note on "unwritten history" from N.E.Magazine on a previous page.) Page 70

"In the same dispatch of June 30 which authorized the employment of special deputy marshals on a huge scale, Attorney-General Olney -- also placed the local Federal judicial power at the exclusive disposal of the railroads. The prinicpal means to this end employed was the appointment of Edwin Wlaker 'as special counsel for the Government, to assist the district attorney in any legal proceedings that might be instituted'; together with the suggestion that Federal injunctions be drawn up and issued against the strike leaders. President Cleveland in his account of the strike, speaks of Mr. Walker as 'an able and prominent attorney in Chicago' -a description accurate enough as far as it goes, but somewhat incomplete. Mr. Walker was at that time, and had been since 1870, the able and prominent attorney of the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway, one of the principal roads involved in the strike. He had also acted in a similar capacity for other of the roads involved. Thus the cloak of Federal authority was thrown over a salaried official of the railroads; and the legal powers of the Federal Government were placed at his disposal for fighting the railroads' battle. Mr. Walker proved entirely worthy of his unique opportunity. He immediately drew up the injunction bills, as suggested by the

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Attorney-General; three days after his appointment he had accomplished the railroads' prime purpose of getting Federa l troops into Chicago; and a week later he obtained the indictment of Debs and his fellow-officers of the American Railway Union."

On July 10, Debs and three others were indicted for complicity in obstructing the mails and interstate commerce, but they gave bail and were released. About a week later they were again arrested and indicted for contempt in disobeying the injunction of July 3 which made it a crime to even attempt to "persuade" men to strike. This time they did not give bail, with the result that, in Debs' own words: "As soon as the employees found that we were arrested and taken from the scene of action they became demoralized, and that ended the strike." On July 20th the last United States soldiers were withdrawn from Chicago. Debs and his associates were convicted of violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law(!) and carried their case to the Supreme Court, where Justice Brewer, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, answered in the affirmative the two questions: "Are the relations of the general Government to interstate commerce and the transportation of mails such as to authorize a direct interference to prevent a forcible obstruction thereof? Second, if authority exists, -as authority in governmental affairs implies both power and duty, - has a court of equity jurisdiction to issue an injunction in aid of the performance of such duty? " Debs' conviction and sentence of six months in prison, and that of his associates to three months in prison, were therefore upheld. This is the cause of the famous struggle over "government by injunction" which formed an important plank in the Democratic platform of 1896 and which became not only a campaign issue but a subject for volumes upon volumes by scholars and politicians.

In the concluding sentence to his story of the affair, Cleveland, with an almost perceptible proud heave of his chest, declared: "Those who were most nearly related by executive responsibility to the troublous days whose story is told may well especially congratulate themselves on the part which fell to them in marking out theway and clearing the path, now unchangeably established, which shall hereafter guide our nation safely and surely in the exercise of the important functions which represent the people's trust." ("Presidential Problems" 117)

To quote Cleveland again, we "must not fail to mention here as part of the history of this perplexing affair, a contribution made by the governor of Illinois to its annoyances." Altgeld's contributions were in the form of protests against Cleveland's sending of Federal troops into Chicago when Illinois, in the Governor's opinion, was "not only able to take care of itself, but stood ready to furnish the Federal government any assistance it might need elsewhere." In his first message to Cleveland, Altgeld stated that the trouble was in getting men to operate the trains, not in protecting trains from the strikers. He insisted that Cleveland was misinformed else he would not have violated the Constitution by infringing on the right of the State and the local authorities. Cleveland characterized this message a "lengthy statement

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which so far missed actual conditions as to appear irrelevant and, in some parts, absolutely frivolous." Several dispatches were sent each way until finally Cleveland's "patience was somewhat strained" and he sent the following:

"While I am still persuaded that I have neither transcended my authority nor duty in the emrgency that confronts us, it seems to me that in this hour of danger and public distress, discussion may well give way to active efforts on the part of all in authority to restore obedience to law and to protect life and property."

It is this dispatch which led to the editorial in the Nation quoted on page 67.

This was the last message exchanged between the two, and, "closed a discussion which in its net results demonstrated how far one's disposition and inclination will lead him astray in the field of argument." (Presidential Problems, 113)

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