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A Dog and Pony Show: The Minuteman Civilian Border Patrols in a Postmodern Political Context

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science of Allegheny College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

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Introduction

The genesis of this project was in a "Junior Seminar" which I took with Professor Shannon Mattiace in the fall of 2014. The seminar was on comparative politics with a focus on Mexico. While I was considering research topics, it was mentioned in class that vigilante *grupos autodefensas* were emerging in parts of Mexico, to protect their villages from drug cartels. Vaguely recalling the Minutemen as vigilantes who purported to protect the US-Mexican border from somewhat similar threats, I wondered if a comparison could be made. Professor Mattiace encouraged me to try it, and the result was a paper entitled "Comparative Vigilantism: Armed Movements in Mexico and the United States." I was curious about the different justifications for and modes of action these groups employed, and found a way of organizing these thoughts in framing analysis, to which I was introduced in an article on the EZLN revolutionary movement by Ramon Máiz. Looking into the Mexican idea of "substantive democracy" as a potential explanatory factor for the different forms which vigilantism took on each side of the border, I arrived indirectly at Inglehart's postmodernization theory.

For my Senior Comprehensive Project, I decided to look more deeply into Minuteman rhetoric. Inglehart's postmodernization theory is a starting point for the present theoretical analysis, but I have added bordering discourse as discussed by DeChaine and others, and finally analyzed the whole through the lens of philosopher Michel Foucault's theories on discipline and punishment.

When I stated writing about it, the Minuteman phenomenon appeared to be an ongoing one. I attributed any decline in media coverage and political attention which it was receiving to its waning novelty. Indications were that Minutemen were still conducting patrols on the border and influencing political discourse around immigration. Minuteman leader Jim Gilchrist was

advertising Operation Normandy for the following spring, which he claimed would dwarf all previous patrols.

But, in hindsight, the Minutemen were rapidly losing ground. By April of 2015, references to Operation Normandy had seemingly all but disappeared from the internet. Gilchrist continued to comment on politics through the end of 2015, but then abruptly fell nearly silent. However, extremist discourse around immigration, accompanied by overtones of political violence, is hardly dead, but can almost be said to have been reincarnated. The unexpectedly successful presidential campaign of Donald Trump, the casual nativism of much of the rest of the Right which it has masked, and the hyperbolic alarm expressed in recent months in the United States and Europe over Middle Eastern refugees, make understanding nativist discourse, and how we got to the present state, all the more urgent. I hope that this paper can make a small contribution toward that endeavor.

Before continuing, I will attempt to succinctly define the Minuteman phenomenon. The Minutemen are a loosely organized anti-immigrant movement, originating in 2005, the focal point of which consists of civilian patrols along the US-Mexico border. Most Minutemen say that they merely observe the border and report unauthorized crossers to the Border Patrol, although the movement has a distinct military ethos, and Minutemen have a penchant for openly carrying weapons, to the extent that being an "armed" movement is part of their identity. This paper will examine the Minutemen as a political phenomenon, defining Minutemen primarily by their self-identification with that label. I will neither use nor dispute the labels of "militia" and "vigilante" which are commonly applied to the Minutemen. They are of little relevance to my focus on the Minutemen as a political phenomenon, difficult to define, and unnecessary, as the present work is not a comparative one.

Chapter 1: Violence on the Border: The Minutemen in Historical Context

The Minutemen chose that name, Davis and Chacón (2006) write, to "evoke the populist iconography of American Revolutionary 'patriotic citizen-soldiers'" (p. 250). The original Minutemen were, of course, New Englanders, but the citizen who takes up arms without waiting for the state is a very familiar and resonant figure in the Southwestern United States. While the Western vigilante is often romanticized in popular culture as a protector of the downtrodden, the reality was at best more complicated, and he was at least as likely to be an agent of the already powerful, and acting to establish and uphold race and class hierarchies.

Private Repression

Davis writes that the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed "three geographically distinct if non-exclusive systems of private repression," or organized non-state violence, each of which had a political character and upheld existing power structures. In "the industrial heartland," consisting mainly of the Midwest but including Pennsylvania and West Virginia, giant industrial concerns kept stability with "literal armies of armed guards, plant detectives, and company police." These purported law enforcers broke strikes and workers' spirits, not without mass casualties, in "such epic 'private' battles as Homestead in 1892 [and] Blair Mountain in 1921" (Davis & Chacón, 2006, pp. 16-17).

In the Deep South, the lynch mob and the Ku Klux Klan enforced white supremacy "by the noose and pyre in a continuation of the antebellum traditions of seignorial violence against slaves and the conscription of poor whites as slave hunters." Elite planters and respectable gentlemen had led the violent overthrow of Reconstruction, and they "continued to condone and orchestrate racial violence whenever it was politically expedient or reinforced their economic

dominance." In fact, Davis argues, the sharecropper system which so advantaged landed whites could not have existed without "chronic racial violence and the extinction of Black civil rights" (Davis & Chacón, 2006, p. 17).

As for the third category, and the one most relevant to this paper,

> Vigilantism constituted a distinctive system of locally sanctioned violence throughout the former Western frontier states, but especially in the Southwest where Anglo rule had been imposed by military conquest on Native American, Hispanic, and Mexican populations (Davis & Chacón, 2006, p. 17).

Vigilantes in the Southwest upheld the political and economic dominance of moneyed Anglos. It was the West that was the focus of a national phobia toward Asian immigrants who arrived in California in the mid nineteenth century, most manifest in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1907 which informally excluded Japanese, and, later, by the dispossession and internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

Davis acknowledges that the three systems of "private repression" overlapped. The second incarnation of the Klan in the 1920s had a national reach, "middle-class vigilantes often played auxiliary roles in the big showdowns between Mid-western labor and capital," and the Pinkertons were brought in against the IWW in Montana. Moreover, Western vigilantes, as stated above, acted as both strikebreakers and enforcers of Anglo racial prerogative. Davis' rationale for nevertheless treating them as a distinct type lies in the justification that the Western vigilante has historically claimed for acting: that "the state is either absent, in the hands of criminals, or in default of its fundamental obligations." All three of these claims, as will be shown in Chapter 2, are features of Minuteman rhetoric in the present day. Like the Minutemen today, and unlike their counterparts in the Deep South, Western vigilantes of the nineteenth century won defenders from outside the

region. By contrast with the Western claim of a right to act when the state in in default, "white Southerners . . . have always asserted supreme racial prerogatives that that override any state or federal statute and require no convoluted rationalization. . . . The Southerner appears to the primal priority of race and 'white honor'" (Davis & Chacón, 2006, pp. 18-19). Variations on the Southern rationalization are also found in Minuteman rhetoric.

When Anglo-Americans first arrived in the Southwest in large numbers during the California Gold Rush of 1849, vigilantes did not only dispensed rough justice to bandits and thieves but also expelled Hispanic and Asian miners from their claims (Davis & Chacón, 2006, pp. 22-23). The state government colluded with the expulsion of foreign miners: the California legislature in the spring of 1850 instituted a Foreign Miner's Tax. Mobs of Anglo miners obligingly helped the county assessors collect the "prohibitive" twenty dollar per month tax from Asian and Mexican miners, and expel those who could not pay. "There is no evidence, however, that any assessor bothered to distinguish Mexican American citizens from Mexican aliens, nor that foreigners from Europe were required to pay a penny." In a leery echo of the "illegal alien," the military governor of California had stated in January of 1849 that foreign miners were present "in direct violation of the laws," although no such laws existed (Hine and Faragher, 2007, pp. 98-99).

Not only did Western vigilantism in the years that followed "police the boundaries of 'whiteness' and 'Americanism,'" Davis writes, but "vigilantes, sometimes deputized as posses, were also the strikebreakers of last resort, as well that the popular arm of antiradical crusades" (D & C pg. 17). In the twentieth century Davis sees, in essence, a co-optation of Western vigilantism by "wealthier farmers, middle-class professionals, and local business elites." In his view, its primary function ever since has been to serve the interests of large agricultural corporations:

> In the 1930s, vigilantism on an unprecedented scale was franchised as part of the employer counterrevolution led by the fascistic Associated Farmers. Briefly revived by growers during the epic strikes of the United Farm Workers in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the vigilante ethos subsequently migrated from the farm valley to the conservative suburbs, where the specter of "illegal" immigrants helps fill the aching vacuum in right-wing imagination left by the collapse of the international communist conspiracy (D & C 20).

Although "the last recorded lynching of a Mexican occurred in 1928," Yoxall (2006) writes, "border vigilantism has continued well into the late twentieth century." For example, in 1972, "Kenneth Adami willfully killed five undocumented Mexican immigrants who had sought shelter from freezing temperatures in his abandoned hunting shack" (pp. 526-27). It is during the early 1990s, however, that Yoxall locates the rise of the modern civilian anti-immigrant action that would culminate in the Minutemen. In El Paso, a citizen's group confusingly calling itself the "United States Border Patrol" formed a blockade along the Rio Grande for twenty-four hours in "Operation Hold the Line." In California, citizens participated in the "Light Up the Border" campaign, illuminating urban sections of the border at night with their cars' headlights to deter unauthorized crossing. Californians also "formed the 'Airport Posse' in which citizens patrolled the airports for 'suspicious' people" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 526).

The Clinton administration responded to this pressure with a flooding of immigration enforcement into border cities, forcing unauthorized immigrants to make dangerous crossings in rural areas, mainly through the deserts of Southern Arizona. Local ranchers rose up against them, joined by a few devoted foes of immigration travelled to Southern Arizona, including California residents Jim Gilchrist and Chris Simcox.

One of "the first to react" was Roger Barnett, a rancher and former Deputy Sherriff of Cochise County, Arizona, who took to "carrying assault weapons, wearing military clothing and using hunting dogs to track migrants crossing his ranch. Barnett and others organized the "Cochise County Concerned Citizens Group (CCCC)," which "in April 2000 . . . began circulating a flyer entitled 'Ranch Rescue' . . . that provid[ed] an open invitation for volunteers to camp out with local ranchers to help 'protect' their property rights.

"Ranch Rescue" and the "Barnett Boys," along with Anglo ranchers acting independently, were soon committing violence against migrants and other Hispanic persons on a semi-regular basis. Yoxall lists a number of reported occasions were ranchers pointed guns at migrants, detained them, sicced dogs on them, and even forced them into vehicles. As a result of most of these incidents, border patrol agents took the migrants into custody, but neither they nor local law enforcement took any action against the Anglo perpetrators (Yoxall, 2006, pp. 529, 564-565).

Following a 2007 civil trial in Cochise County Superior Court, Roger Barnett was ordered to pay $99,000 to a family of US citizens of Mexican descent whom he had traumatized, detaining at gunpoint while they were out deer hunting and may have accidentally strayed onto Barnett's land. As of that date, no criminal charges had ever been filed against Barnett, "a man who boasts of having personally apprehended 12,000 border-crossers. Although he won the case, attorney Jesus Romo Vejar, who represented the victimized family with assistance from the Southern Poverty Law Center, described the atmosphere surrounding the trail as "like trying a case in Mississippi in the '60s" (Buchanan, 2007).

It is a similar 2005 lawsuit in which the SPLC also provided assistance, filed against Ranch Rescue leaders Casey Nethercott and Jack Foote, which eventually resulted in Nethercott being forced to surrender ownership of a 70-acre ranch he had allegedly converted into a "paramilitary

compound" to two formerly undocumented El Salvadorans ("Paramilitary Compound," 2006), that Yoxall credits with causing these violent groups to wane in prominence compared with the then "rapidly growing" Minutemen (Yoxall, 2006, p. 530).

The Minutemen

Christ Simcox, a former kindergarten teacher who abandoned his job and family in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, moved to Tombstone, Arizona, and "refashioned himself into a brash anti-immigrant militant." Simcox founded the Civil Homeland Defense in 2002, a self-described "committee of vigilantes" and "border patrol militia" which he claimed captured more than five thousand unauthorized immigrants. Holthouse (2005) observes that Simcox had radically changed his rhetoric by 2005, claiming to sympathize with the plight of unauthorized migrants and characterizing his new patrol organization as "more of a neighborhood watch program. Jim Gilcrist, in 2005 a relative newcomer to the Arizona anti-immigrant scene, "gave his sound bites an even more extreme makeover by frequently comparing himself and most of his volunteers to 'white Martin Luther Kings,' and the Minuteman Project to the civil rights movement."

From the very first anti-immigrant operation widely associated with the name "Minutemen," which took place in April 2005 under the joint aegis of Gilchrist and Simcox, the names used by Minutemen groups and for Minuteman "operations" have a tendency to be inconsistent, reflecting their fractious nature. Yoxall, for example, refers to the group which conducted this first operation as the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps or MCDC. Scherr (2010) calls the MCDC "an offshoot of the Minuteman Project." "Minuteman Project" was originally a name for the April 2005 operation, and has been taken by Gilchrist for his organization, when he and Simcox found that, in Holthouse's words, "Cochise County . . . wasn't big enough for both

their egos." After the April 2005 event Simcox initially described plans to continue patrolling as the "Civil Homeland Defense" but was soon leading the MCDC.

About 150 volunteers, and many more members of the media, counter-protestors, and legal observers turned out on April 1, 2005 for the much-hyped patrol. Holthouse reports that the atmosphere was charged, with rumors circulating that the group would be attacked by the notorious MS-13 gang, and cries of "lock and load" in response to imaginary dangers. Nevertheless, this first operation ended without major incident.

The official Border Patrol appeared to take a divided attitude toward the civilians who sought to help—or embarrass—them. Officials "reported that the MCDC got in the way of their operations by setting off sensors," and "officially attribute[d] any and all decreases in undocumented immigration to their own efforts to increase enforcement, primarily by bringing in additional seasoned officers the week before the MCDC kicked off." But "officers that spoke off-the-record said that undocumented immigration had virtually stopped in the sector patrolled by the MCDC and that the MCDC had actually made a valuable contribution" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 534)

President George W. Bush condemned the group as vigilantes, but some Republican officeholders, including Colorado Congressman Tom Tancredo, who actually spoke at a Minuteman rally, and CNN anchor Lou Dobbs, praised the Minutemen (Holthouse 2005). In a few years, according to Gilchrist, candidates in GOP primaries were actively competing for Minuteman leaders' endorsements.

Over the next few years, Minuteman groups conducted several other high-profile operations, such as the MCDC's "Border Fence Project" where Minutemen set out to erect a model barrier without aid from the government (Dechaine, 2009, pp. 52-53), and Operation Sovereignty, another much-hyped series of patrols.

The MCDC has always had turbulent leadership. In 2007, Simcox executed something of a purge, expelling eighteen senior members of the group who had questioned his management of the group's finances. The MCDC spun off a couple of different advocacy groups and political action committees, and then severed relations with at least one of them. Simcox left the group in 2009 to make an unsuccessful campaign for Congress. On March 15, 2010, his successor, Carmen Mercer, sent an email to members urging them to "forcibly engage" unauthorized border crossers. A week later she announced the dissolution of the group on a national level, admitting that this decision had been made partly "because [national leaders] did not want to take legal responsibility for the actions of its fired-up volunteers." But she urged local chapters to continue patrolling independently (Scherr, 2010). As of writing, a website purporting to represent the MCDC, minutemanhq.com, is online but appears not to have been updated in several years.

Gilchrist's organization, the Minuteman Project, appears to have been consistently more stable, though it also appears to be currently in steep decline or no longer extant. His website, currently hosted at http://baesic.net/minutemanproject/, appears to have been regularly updated through the end of 2015 but not since. The Twitter account linked to the website, @jgmmp, posted multiple Tweets on most days in December of 2015, but only one so far in all of 2016, and February 25.

The most recent attempt by Minutemen at a major operation was "Operation Normandy," which Gilchrist claimed would draw thousands of volunteers and cover the entire US-Mexican border, and coincide with protests at all 51 Mexican consulates in the United States (Salcedo, 2014). It is evident that the operation, even in its planning and recruitment stages, turned into an embarrassing failure for Gilchrist. By April 2015, all references to Operation Normandy had been removed from Gilchrist's website. Although Minuteman-affiliated sources claimed that protests at

Mexican consulates took place during the summer of 2015, there was clearly no mass mobilization on the border.

While a casual explanation of why the Minuteman movement arose and fizzled out when it did is not the goal of this paper, a couple of preliminary ideas suggest themselves. In the first place, the level of immigration across the Southern border is currently nowhere near where it was a decade ago; in fact, Pew reported in 2015 that 140,000 more Mexicans had left the United States than had arrived during the past five years, (Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015), although the number of Central Americans continues to modestly increase.

In Gilchrist's mind in particular, the Minuteman project and its central focus, the civilian border patrol, was primarily about bringing awareness to what he considered the crisis of unauthorized immigration. By 2014 he was satisfied that he had achieved great success in this regard. With "mainstream" voices taking increasingly extreme positions on immigration, ever more federal resources being put into border security, and no possibility of comprehensive immigration reform, at least until after the 2016 elections, Gilchrist and like-minded individuals may no longer see a need to demonstrate.

Finally, with a black Democrat in the White House, it seems that some of the more radical members of the Minutemen may have no longer believed that the federal government could be politically pressured into cracking down on unauthorized immigrants. In 2009, MCDC Vice President Al Garza left the group to from the Patriots Coalition, a more militant and radically anti-government group. Scherr (2010) reports that "some ideas of the reinvigorated 'Patriot' movement, including antigovernment conspiracy theories, appear to be gaining popularity in Minuteman circles." It may be the case that the Minutemen were a phenomenon that could only emerge from the Bush era, where militant right-wingers saw the government as fundamentally on their side, but

in need of toughening up on immigration, an issue on which Bush was considered a moderate. In the Clinton era, by contrast, militant anti-immigrant organizations were direct and violent in confronting those they suspected of being unauthorized immigrants, because they did not see the government as an ally, but, perhaps, as an enemy. Right-wing antigovernment militancy emerged most infamously in the Clinton era with the siege at Waco, Texas, and the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.

Similarly, in the Obama era, those who might have been willing under Bush to pursue the Minutemen's political strategy, which is merely suggestive of violence, might opt instead, for example, to join the Oath Keepers, a right-wing group self-described as being composed of military and law enforcement personnel who follow the Constitution as they interpret it, rather than statutory law or their own superiors. Oath Keepers made an appearance "protecting property" during protests in Ferguson, Missouri (Larimer and Phillip, 2015). Those who have threatened law enforcement and engaged in standoffs at rural ranches under the leadership of Cliven and Ammon Bundy engage in somewhat similar violent assertion of their control over space as did Ranch Rescue.

Chapter 2: Minuteman Framing and Rhetoric

This chapter will present and analyze selected examples of minuteman rhetoric. "Minuteman rhetoric" will be defined as rhetoric used in communications, both internal and external, as well as written and oral, authored between 2005 and 2015 by individuals and groups associated with the Minuteman Project or the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps. Examples of such rhetoric were taken from a variety of sources. Several researchers, in addition to many members of the media, have interviewed Minutemen and reported key quotes. Johnson (2011) collected posts to a now-defunct online forum for minutemen. Yoxall (2006) collected two key documents distributed to volunteers at the Minutemen's inaugural 2005 event: a "Minuteman Pledge" and a "Standard Operating Procedure for Minuteman Project." Jim Gilchrist, and Carmen Mercer for a brief period, maintained websites, which are important sources of rhetoric. Gilchrist's Minuteman project maintained a very active Twitter account, @jgmmp, through the end of 2015. For the sake of brevity, these Tweets are quoted without formal citation, but all Tweets quoted in this chapter are from the @jgmmp account.

Statements selected for inclusion in this chapter are those which particularly spoke to collective action. In addition, statements were selected to cover, as far as possible, a diversity of time periods since the formation of the Minutemen in 2005, internal and external communications, and "official" public statements or internal documents carrying the imprimatur of leaders such as Gilchrist and Simcox, and less formal statements, especially by individuals not holding leadership positons.

This chapter is grouped according to the categories of "collective action frames" laid out by Snow and Benford (2000). As they write, "collective action frames are not merely aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but also the outcomes of negotiating shared meaning." This

chapter will examine Minuteman rhetoric with a special eye toward such "meaning," that is, stated or implied attempts to influence the meaning of the American identity and related concepts, and reactions to meanings they have acquired over the years.

Snow and Benford (2000) classify collective action frames into three types: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational or action. Diagnostic frames identify the social problem which a movement seeks to address and those responsible for the problem. Prognostic frames present a solution and potential strategies for achieving it. Motivational frames provide justification and motivation for those engaging in collective action. Although Máiz (2010) writes that motivational or action frames "define the repertory of possible actions (p. 248)," this paper will follow my reading of Snow and Benford in placing that function under prognostic framing. Thus, in this chapter, rhetoric speaking to a strategy or plan of action, whether as an active plan or a possibility, will be classified as prognostic framing, while motivational or action framing will be reserved for rhetoric which motivates and justifies action.

Diagnostic Framing

Diagnostic frames, in Máiz's (2010) words, "identify certain events or situations as problems or wrongs that are themselves merely so many cultural, political, or economic manifestations of *the* problem [emphasis in original]" (p. 248). As such, diagnostic frames are generally reductive, attributing a wide variety of purported social ills to a single cause. Identifying the causal agents of the problem is another important function of diagnostic frames.

The central problem in Minuteman framing is, of course, the United States' lack of adequate border enforcement and the resultant presence of unauthorized immigrants in the country. Minuteman rhetoric almost never contains the most overt forms of racism. But presence of unauthorized immigrants, and purported non-enforcement of immigration laws, is said to threaten

both the material well-being of deserving American citizens and the integrity, order, and even existence of the United States of America on a more abstract, ideological level. *Authorized* immigration is also sometimes, though not frequently, explicitly identified as a problem. Moreover, a significant portion of minuteman rhetoric targets immigration, and foreigners, without explicitly specifying legal status, and would logically apply to both authorized and unauthorized immigration. The primary agent blamed for the immigration problem is the US federal government while the political left, business, foreign actors, and migrants themselves are all identified as additional causal agents.

Alleged material harms of unauthorized immigration

The concrete, material harms alleged by the Minutemen to be caused by unauthorized immigration generally concern economic disadvantage to native-born Americans and the threats of crime and terrorism. Two categories of material harm often alleged by other anti-immigrant groups, including some of the Minutemen's precursors (CITE), but notably absent (or nearly so) from Minuteman rhetoric are diseases immigrants might bring with them and crimes against property allegedly committed by unauthorized immigrants.

From 2013 to 2015, the Minuteman Project's Twitter account published a number of statements, usually accompanied by dubious statistics, supporting the common complaint that the employment of immigrants hurts the prospects of native workers. "All Tennessee's employment growth since 2000 went to immigrants," the account alleges. House Speaker Paul Ryan is said to have "snatched some 200,000 jobs out of the hands of Americans thanks to his [2015] omnibus spending bill." At times, Minutemen look with alarm at the potential for undocumented immigrants to advance economically even in ways that do not obviously compete with citizens. Minutemen

have expressed hostility, for example, toward banks which accept the *matrícula consular*, a form of identification issued by Mexican consulates (Bleeden *et al.*, 2010, pg. 181).

A complaint that is more frequently emphasized, by a wider range of Minuteman sources and throughout the timeframe examined, is that unauthorized immigrants take advantage of welfare and social services, at a great cost to taxpayers. Chris Simcox raised this complaint on his website at least as early as 2006 (DeChaine, 2009, p. 56). A member of the Minutemen told Bleeden *et al.*:

> As a taxpayer, I object to paying massive amounts of money to help them be born and educated, while American children . . . are being hurt by the lack of good schools, good teachers, and good medical facilities because we are spending that much more [sic] money on people who are here illegally (p. 186).

The Minuteman Project has taken up this theme with enthusiasm on its Twitter account in recent years. One Tweet claims that "Census data reveals that 43% of all immigrants remain on welfare 20 years after arriving in the U.S." "Undocumented immigrants to strain safety-net hospitals in Connecticut (and elsewhere)" according to a 2015 Tweet. Immigration reform proposals are targeted with similar allegations. A 2015 Tweet states that "GOP lawmakers just agreed to $4 billion in tax credits for illegal aliens." In 2013 the account repeated a claim, ultimately derived from a controversial Heritage Foundation analysis, that "comprehensive immigration overhaul could cost taxpayers $6.3 trillion."

Unauthorized immigration is said to expose the US to danger from terrorists, drug traffickers, and other violent criminals. At times apparent care is taken to differentiate such persons from the bulk of immigrants generally, even from the bulk of "illegals". The "Standard Operating Procedure" declares:

> "The human flood breaching our Homeland Defense is not necessarily the enemy per se; drug dealers, criminals and potential terrorists are, and they should be the source of any ire you may be experiencing (Yoxall, 2006, p. 553).

A 2013 Tweet from the Minuteman Project acknowledges this distinction while minimizing its policy consequences: "The coziness of drug cartels and terrorists demands that we tighten border security, regardless of how we feel about illegal immigration."

In many other instances, Minuteman rhetoric conflates the putative violent criminals among unauthorized immigrants with unauthorized immigrants in general. The "Minuteman Pledge" declares that:

> Minutemen vow to use every legal means at our disposal to assist law enforcement authorities in identifying and apprehending *those who violate our borders, whether they are illegally trafficking people, weapons, arms, property, sexual slaves or any other contraband* [emphasis mine] (Yoxall, 2006, p. 553).

Here, "those who violate our borders" apparently refers to anyone crossing without authorization; all such people are said to be "trafficking." The 2005 "Border Fence Project" was said to protect against "incursion, invasion, and terrorism" (DeChaine, 2009, p. 53). The categorization of all unauthorized migrants as terrorists was made all but explicit by Simcox in a 2006 Fox News interview, when he asked rhetorically: "We're being attacked by people from a foreign country. Is that not terrorism in its own right?" (Dechaine, 2009, p. 55).

Ideological problem of unauthorized immigration

Ideological concerns seem to speak to Minutemen more deeply than the foregoing material concerns. Internal documents such as the "Minuteman Pledge" and "Standard Operating Procedures" place much greater emphasis on ideological than material concerns, while

communications aimed at the general public, such as the Minuteman Project Twitter account, balance them more evenly.

Collapse of Law and Order, or Anglo Power

Perhaps the most important theme of Minuteman discourse is the assertion that the "transgressive act" of border crossing, especially without authorization, the perceived abdication by the federal government of its duty to prevent unauthorized entry, and the presence of unauthorized immigrants in the United States, violate and undermine "law and order." In the Minuteman mind "law and order" has a clear, if possibly unconscious, connection with the exclusive holding of power by those seen as "true" Americans, that is, for the most part, Anglo-Americans. (Gilchrist's website occasionally finds opportunities to take shots at African American movements like Black Lives Matter, when it can be connected to immigration ("Father to Congress"). "Law and order" and associated themes, rooted in reaction to the use of civil disobedience during the Civil Rights Movement, have had this connotation in the United States for several decades.

The law and order concern is expressed in the first instance with concern for the integrity of the physical Southern border. "A Minuteman believes," reads the "Pledge,"

> In a strong, secure America that begins with borders open only to those who have a legal right to enter, and who have met all the lawful criteria to cross into our territory established by the sovereign American people.

The concern about unauthorized crossing pivots revealingly pivots over the course of a sentence to one about the political power of "the sovereign American people" and the integrity of "our territory."

The most concrete manifestation of the Minuteman "law and order" concern is the idea that elite actors, particularly the federal government, demonstrate, and thereby encourage, disrespect for the law, and thus unauthorized crossing and unseemly behavior by unauthorized immigrants and Hispanic persons, by not enforcing immigration laws stringently enough. A 2014 Tweet from the Minuteman Project puts it succinctly: "The Obama administration doesn't take immigration law seriously, so why should illegals?" (Salcedo, 2014).

Minutemen appear to believe that the softening of Americans' political stances on immigration, even when not accompanied by change in law or policy, emboldens unauthorized immigrants. A Tweet from 2013 reads: "illegal aliens already think immigration reform is a done deal and if they can cross the border, they'll get amnesty." A post on a Minuteman affiliated discussion board reads: "Americans have become lazy, complacent, too PC to do anything to protect ourselves and stop this invasion once and for all (Johnson, 2011, p. 155)."

In addition to non-enforcement of immigration laws, the asserted rights of unauthorized immigrants (or alleged unauthorized immigrants) and the recognition thereof undermines law and order. A 2015 Tweet reads: "Illegals aren't entitled to any rights, but that doesn't stop them from complaining." "The plight of illegal immigrants isn't about civil rights, but the rule or law," reads a 2014 Tweet. In an echo of law and order politicians of the 1960s lamentation of the Warren Court's findings of rights for criminal defendants, a 2014 Tweet bemoans "Free Lawyers for Illegal Alien Kids." The Border Patrol, according to "Standard Operating Procedure," "are attempting to do a job with one hand tied behind their backs" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 561). One Tweet from 2013 complains that the "U.S. [is] flying deportees deep into Mexico, over dangerous border;" apparently they should be put in danger as punishment.

An underlying theme is a feeling of disenfranchisement on the part of conservative Anglo-Americans who see their near-monopoly on political power in the region, if not the country, coming to an end. The proper political prerogatives of the established elite are elucidated in two Minuteman Project Tweets from 2013. One reads: "We should not hand out citizenship like penny candy on Halloween. It's worth something to be an American." The second suggests a conflation of *laissez-faire* capitalism and (Anglo)-American exclusivity, lamenting that "businesses go outside of our free-enterprise system to bring in foreign workers who will accept low pay, poor conditions, and long hours."

Observing the conflation of security and exclusive Anglo prerogative, DeChaine writes: that Minutemen's

> Call for greater U.S. border security bespeaks an intense border *insecurity*. Relying on common tropes of American identity in the crafting of its appeals, the group's rhetoric reveals a stock of motivations consonant with broadly shared majoritarian anxieties (Dechaine, 2009, p. 58, emphasis in original).

Highlighting the claim that mainstream Anglo views are disregarded, Gilchrist wrote in 2015: "never has the input of the general public over the illegal alien invasion dilemma been allowed to be considered in any decision making" (Gilchrist 2015a). Revealing something reminiscent of what Bleeden *et al.* (2010) call the "hypercitizen" ideology, a poster on a minuteman-affiliated online forum wrote, regarding a school which allegedly taught the Pledge of Allegiance in Spanish: "Just called the principal. I reminded her that We the TAX PAYERS have the RIGHT to decide if these TEACHERS can CHOSE whatever to teach these kids!!" (Johnson, 2011, p. 149).

Spatial exclusionism

Aside from questions of law and order or political power, Minutemen evidently consider living in proximity with Hispanic persons, and certain other immigrant groups such as Muslims, to be inherently undesirable. This is rarely or never stated in so many words, but it is quite evident on examination of Minuteman rhetoric. As this perception is not explicitly stated, it is not justified, so the reasoning can only be assumed to be considered self-evident to the Minutemen or politically unwise to state (i.e., highly racist).

This theme is evident, in the first instance, in complaints about the use of the Spanish language and Hispanic cultural practices in the United States. Minuteman figure Jim Wood summed this up in 2006, writing "the national language, character, and culture of our sovereign American people are under attack by 'multi-culturalism' run rampant. It's dangerous and it's destructive" (Dechaine, 2009, p. 54). A protestor at a minuteman-associated rally held a sign reading: "We Don't Want Your Stinko De Mayo" (Doty, 2007, p. 121).

The Spanish language is a particularly salient target. Gilchrist complained in 2014 about automated answering services which require the used to "press one for English, press two for Spanish" (Salcedo, 2014). A 2015 Tweet from the Minuteman Project laments a finding by the Center for Immigration Studies that about one in five US residents speaks a language other than English at home.

Some miscellaneous Minuteman Project Tweets which also speak to the undesirability of Hispanic people include "Immigration bill will send U.S. population soaring." Another, referring to migrants from Central America, states that (even) "Mexico doesn't want illegals in their neighborhood."

It should be noted here that, while Minuteman rhetoric generally avoids explicit racism, the discursive climate on which it draws if rife with it. David Foote, leader of Ranch Rescue referred to Mexico as "a pile of dog shit, made up of millions of little dog turds like you." An anonymous statement posted in 2006 to the website of an anti-immigrant "citizen activist group," ostensibly addressing unauthorized immigrants, reads "You have all sorts of diseases. . . . Your breath might be far more deadly than it smells" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 532). Simcox himself was quoted in 2003 (two years before the debut of the Minutemen) referring to Mexican immigrants as "a swarm of uncontrolled refugees." Gilchrist, meanwhile, as Yoxall reports, is (or was) "a member of the California Coalition for Immigration Reform, 'a hate group whose leader routinely describes Mexicans as savages'" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 536).

Meanwhile, Minuteman rhetoric suggest the undesirability of sharing space with immigrants through a variety of metaphors and indirect allusions. "The Republican presidential field," a 2015 Minuteman Project Tweet complains, is "split on allowing immigration from nations *infected* with the Islamic State [emphasis mine]." Gilchrist, speaking in 2014 about planned protests at Mexican Consulates in the United States, refers to "all fifty-one of them that are scattered throughout the United States" (Salcedo, 2014). The "Standard Operating Procedure" refers to "the human flood" crossing the border.

Agents Causing Problem/Counter framing

A key function of diagnostic frames is to identify the causal agents of the problem. The most important such in Minuteman rhetoric, is the United States federal government and decision makers at the federal level, who allow and aggravate crisis, as a result of both simple inactivity and decisions made in bad faith. Migrants themselves, who are usually seen as having malicious intentions, are another key causal agent in Minuteman rhetoric, especially later and less formal

rhetoric. Other causal agents include foreign governments and nonstate actors, businesses and wealthy individuals who employ immigrants or lobby for permissive immigration policy, those who have specifically come out in opposition to the Minutemen, and the political left generally. This subsection will analyze, from a framing perspective, Minuteman rhetoric addressing each of the foregoing agents. Where pro-immigrant rhetoric from these groups is mentioned by Minutemen, I will analyze their response to it from the perspective of counter-framing.

Government

Minutemen generally blame both Republicans and Democrats for being insufficiently active in combatting unauthorized immigration. A Minuteman website states that "the Obama Administration, expanding upon the failures of the Bush Administration, is grossly negligent in its sworn oath of office to protect the sovereignty of the United States" ("Update"). The federal government wastes resources on lesser priorities; "Taxpayer funding of federal 'climate change' activities twice that of border security," reads a 2013 Minuteman Project Tweet. Even Republicans lack vigor. "Thank you Republicans for cowering at the opportunities you have had over the decades to reverse the illegal alien invasion dilemma," Gilcrist writes (2015a). "GOP Senate faces choice on filibuster: Teach Democrats a lesson or wuss out" according to a 2014 Minuteman Project Tweet.

Especially since the election of President Obama, policymakers are often considered to be acting in bad faith, or at least to have compromised loyalty. "The goal of the political establishment all along," Gilchrist wrote in 2015, "has been to 'play ball' with each other to ensure that they will remain in control and in office perpetually" (2015a). Gilcrist claimed in 2014 that the Democratic Party has shaped immigration policy since the 1960s with the aim of earning immigrant votes (Salcedo, 2014). Obama is said to be "writing his own open border laws." His administration

"regularly cuts fines for businesses that hire illegal aliens by an average of 40%," claims the Minuteman Project Twitter account. Obama "plays politics with border security, and his Justice Department STOPS Arizona from acting to save American lives, property, and sovereignty!" ("Update"). "From top to bottom," the Minuteman Project Tweeted in 2015, "Obama's DHS is staffed by cronies, bagmen, and outright con artists."

GOP politicians are not immune. The "chaotic lawlessness" of unauthorized immigration has "been sponsored by both parties" (Salcedo, 2014). The Minuteman Project Twitter account weighed in on GOP presidential candidates in 2015, stating that "Marco Rubio has long standing ties to Big Business billionaires seeking to import millions of cheap foreign laborers." Even Donald "Trump flip-flops on H1-B visas." (Although Gilchrist, the leader of the Minuteman Project and probable owner of the account, showed no signs of taking back his previous endorsement of Trump).

The Minutemen have given only a little attention, at least in public, to the possibility that government agents might interfere with their patrols or other actions. In 2005, Simcox told the Washington Times: "I dare the President of the United States to arrest Americans who are protecting their own country." In anticipation of Operation Normandy, Gilchrist acknowledged in an interview that "a lot of militias are standing watch at private property to avoid interference from law enforcement and the adversaries, uh, harassing and intimidating them" (Salcedo 2014).

Political Left

There is some echo in Minuteman rhetoric of the common stereotype of political liberals as being naive. The Minuteman Project Tweeted in 2014 that "Fasts and vigils [conducted by pro-migrant demonstrators] are 'protest theater' that aims to stir up emotion but doesn't fit how immigration laws are enforced." This would be a strange statement for the Minuteman Project to

make if it is read as a criticism of "protest theater" in general, given that Gilcrist has described his own patrols as "a dog and pony show" (Bleeden *et al.,* 2010, p. 180), but the potential irony is resolved if it is instead read as an attempt to frame the opposing "protest theater" as naive, as well as emotional, in a soft, or implicitly feminine, way.

Gilchrist, or whoever he authorized to tweet to the @jgmmp account, is The manager(s) of adept at finding simple framing statements in pro-migrant rhetoric and negating them in a few words. Tweets from 2013 and 2014 read: "With 24 million Americans looking for work and only 4 million job openings, who says the U.S. has a labor shortage?" "Los Angeles Times editorial- "The border isn't the problem" – Really? How did 11+ million people get there?" "Another fashionably elitist notion: US must pursue open-door policies to stand tall in the age of global ground shift." "NAFTA 'benefits' the same being used for legalizing 11+ million undocs: job creation, higher wages, boosting economy. Wrong then, wrong now!" Sometimes the opposition framing apparently needs no counter at all in the mind of the Minuteman, as when a "New York Times reporter calls amnesty for illegal immigrants a 'civil right.'"

In many instances, Minuteman rhetoric frames the Left and supporters of immigrants as acting in bad faith, or at best self-interest. "The 'racist' label," Bleeden *et al.* (2010) were told, "is a tactic frequently used by our opponents in their attempts to end civil discussion" (p. 181). "Facing a crisis of membership, AFL-CIO to allow non-union workers and activists to join its ranks; immigrants later," reads a 2015 Tweet. Framing them definitely as bad actors, another Tweet claims that "The Democrat candidates are competing to see who can introduce the most lawlessness at our Southern Border."

Special scorn is reserved for those who oppose the Minutemen directly. Gilchrist calles the Southern Poverty Law Center a "fundraising machine disguised as a so-called charity" and views

being attacked by them as "A BADGE OF HONOR." Counter protestors who have occasionally made appearances at Minuteman events are answered with a combination of dismissal and accusation of bad faith and wrongdoing. Simcox's Minuteman Handbook declares that "Minutemen do not respond to any taunts or harassment from *outside agitators* [emphasis mine]" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 555), borrowing a favorite phrase from Southern resistance to the Civil Rights Movement. Gilchrist spoke in 2014 of potential "interference from . . . the adversaries, harassing and intimidating them" (Salcedo, 2014).

Economic Elites

Though not a central focus, businesses are accused in Minuteman rhetoric of contributing to the problem by employing unauthorized immigrants and lobbying for more permissive immigration policy. A 2013 Tweet read: "It's appalling how many businesses depend on breaking the law to generate profits." A 2015 Tweet complains that "Many Businesses Ignore E-Verify Laws" (though later that year, the account endorsed a CATO Institute report finding that E-Verify is an undue burden on business). Another 2013 Tweet complains that "while laying off thousands of workers, big companies demand immigration reform for new labor." Pro-immigrant groups are said to have the financial backing of "the 1% of the 1%," and, in particular, billionaire George Soros (2015 Tweets).

Migrants as Agents

Writing in 2009, DeChaine finds that Minuteman rhetoric ""appears on the surface to be relatively devoid of . . . open hostility toward migrants as persons (p. 56)." I do not concur, except to the extent to which DeChaine's statement refers to the avoidance of overt racism. While such hostility has perhaps been expressed with even more prominence in the last few years, Minuteman rhetoric has always identified migrants (or potential migrants) as a causal agent of the problem. I

do agree, however, that Minuteman rhetoric consistently identifies government as the *primary* causal agent of the problem.

Nonetheless, it is critical to an understanding of the Minuteman view of Migrants to note, as Doty (2007) has, that Gilchrist believes in the "reconquista conspiracy." In 2005 he told the *Orange County Observer*: "to me there is a clear and present danger of insurrection, sedition and succession by those who buy into the fact that this really is Mexico's territory and doesn't belong to the United States and should be taken back." (Simcox has stated that he does not believe in the reconquista conspiracy.) The 2005 "Minuteman Pledge" attributes at least some degree of agency to unauthorized migrants by calling them "those who violate our borders (Yoxall, 2006, p. 553). The "Standard Operating Procedure" attributes bad faith by calling potential unauthorized immigrants "people who wish to take advantage of a free society" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 556). A 2013 Tweet alleged a "surge of Mexican nationals requesting asylum under [a] ploy designed to overwhelm [the] system."

Unauthorized immigrants are also seen to undermine the rule of law by engaging in political protest, especially protest that involves civil disobedience or other law-breaking. A 2013 Tweet announces "In no other country would this be tolerated – Illegal immigrants blockade Atlanta office to halt deportations." Another reads "More disrespect for our laws- Dozens try to interfere with Border Patrol agents during lawful traffic stop in Tucson." A Tweet from 2014 reads: "DREAMERS vow confrontations with lawmakers to push amnesty."

Especially but not exclusively in unofficial discourse, Minutemen demonstrate great hostility for the exercise of any degree of political power by unauthorized immigrants, and by immigrants and Hispanics generally. In that vein, that Minuteman Project Twitter account gives notice that ""two illegal aliens [have been] named to city panels in California" and "Hillary

[Clinton]'s Latino outreach director is a former illegal alien who illegally emigrated [sic] to the United States and is not an eligible voter." Minuteman sources at times endorse the belief that unauthorized immigrants cast votes in significant numbers (Corsi, 2014). Moreover, at least some anti-immigrant circles show an ingrained hostility toward Hispanics voting at all. A 2014 YouTube video of a young Hispanic man delivering a box of absentee ballots to an election office in Arizona—a legal act in that state at the time—was labeled as "fraud" and "ballot box stuffing," and resulted in hundreds of comments calling the man a "thug," a "criminal," and even in calling for his death (Kaufman, 2014).

Foreign Agents

Minuteman rhetoric also casts foreign governments, and various non-state actors, as causal agents of the problem. In 2005, a Minuteman Project volunteer expressed to Doty his "strong views about Mexico . . . comparing [then President] Vicente Fox and the Mexican government with Saddam Hussein's Iraq" (Doty, 2007, p. 114). Public statements in recent years from the Minuteman Projects about foreign actors are generally less inflammatory, but place blame unambiguously. But specific allegations about sinister activities on the part of the Mexican government, at least in public, seem to end at statements Mexican officials have made, as exemplified in a 2013 Tweet reading: "Mexico raps US immigration bill on border security – "Fences do not unite." And the point is what, exactly?"

Nonstate foreign actors, however, are alleged to work directly against US immigration laws. A 2013 Tweet reads: "Mexican researchers working on 'interactive map' to help undocumented Central Americans in dangerous journey to U.S." In 2015 a Tweet claimed that "officials have determined that ISIS is using the refugee program to infiltrate America."

Victims

Defining the innocent victims of the problem and causal agents of the problem is the final major function of diagnostic framing. It is in this function that Minuteman diagnostic framing is notably vague, except in special cases. The main victims are implicitly legitimate or deserving Americans, but the criteria for membership in this group can at most be inferred. Tweets from the Minuteman Project referencing victims of the economic alleged economic consequences of unauthorized immigration, or victims of alleged activities of the political left on behalf of migrants, refer to "American Citizens," "the Rights of American Workers," "American Students," "Young conservative scholar" (who was allegedly "purged" for his views on immigration), and "Dr. King's dream for America." One Tweet states directly that "America's poor and minorities are victims of illegal immigration." Without conducting a quantitative analysis, it is strikingly apparent that most Tweets on the theme of victimhood contain a form of the word "America."

Minuteman rhetoric occasionally acknowledges some classes of immigrants as deserving, or even as victims of (alleged) US immigration policy. A 2015 Tweet claimed that "Obama is bigoted against Christians, but no one is calling him on it," and the linked article claimed that an existing "religious test" bars Christian refugees and admits Muslims ("Obama's Religious Test"). A 2013 Tweet distinguished the European immigrants who are the ancestors of most Minutemen from unworthy Hispanic immigrants, stating: "When immigrants flooded our Nation through Ellis Island in the 19th Century, they didn't demand healthcare, food stamps, place to live!" Nevertheless, it would seem that the preference of most Minutemen is to bar most or all contemporary immigration, despite their focus on unauthorized immigration and rule of law framing. A concern often present in more moderate Right-wing discourse on immigration, that

unauthorized immigrations gain an unfair advantage over those who seek to enter legally, appears nowhere in the Minuteman rhetoric I have analyzed.

Notably, Minuteman rhetoric occasionally frames unauthorized migrants themselves as victims. Simcox's Minuteman Pledge states that "we share . . . great compassion for the many powerless victims of cruel, illegal human trafficking and labor exploitation" (Yoxall pg. 553). A 2014 Tweet from the Minuteman Project reads "RUTHLESS human smugglers cash in on wave of illegal aliens." Minutemen told Johnson about "rape trees," where *coyotes* are reputed to assault women whom they have been paid to help into the United States. Although framing of migrants as victims is vastly outweighed by framing accusing them of bad faith and lawlessness, it highlights the centrality of the broken border and non-enforcement of law as the central focus of Minuteman diagnostic framing.

Prognostic Framing

Prognostic framing, according to Snow and Benford (2000), "involves the articulation of proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan." Scholarship suggests that major influences on the prognostic framing used by a movement are its diagnostic framing, which may suggest or constrain reasonable solutions, and the solutions advocated by rival movements (i.e., counter-framing). Differing prognostic framing is a common way in which broad movements break into smaller factions (Snow and Benford 2000, pp. 616-17). In fact, it could be argued that their particular strategy of civilian border patrol is the essential defining feature of the Minutemen (although this paper defines them by self-identification).

Ultimate Solution

The ultimate aim of the Minutemen is the physically and civically exclude unauthorized migrants, and, to a significant extent, all Hispanics and people seen as foreign or other. The primary

manifestation of this aim is, of course, the call preventing unauthorized crossing of the US's southern border. (The United States' Northern border occasionally appears as an afterthought in Minuteman rhetoric. Unauthorized entry through airports, or by sea, is not mentioned at all in the rhetoric I have examined.) In accordance with the generally reductive character of collective action framing, ending unauthorized crossing, or "closing" the border, is often seen in Minuteman rhetoric as a panacea for many diverse social ills. A 2013 Tweet sums it up: "[a] tight border is critical for national and economic security, crime prevention and public safety; discuss broader immigration issues later." The traditionally enfranchised American people should decide which, if any, potential immigrants to admit, using whatever criteria they prefer. A 2015 Tweet declares that "Immigrants from around the world are invited to America at the pleasure of the United States citizenry." Stopping unauthorized immigration is presumably a major part of "the enormous task of returning America to its heralded status as a 'nation of laws'" (Gilchrist, 2015b).

As Minutemen diagnose not just the act of unauthorized border crossing but the presence of unauthorized migrants in the US as part of the problem, one would expect their diagnostic framing to include a plan for what should happen to unauthorized immigrants already here. But in actuality, this question is explicitly referred to only occasionally and almost never in detail. And the answer tends to be inconsistent, sometimes even when coming from the same individual or group. On one occasion (probably in 2005 or 2006), Simcox suggests a belief in what has been called "self-deportation" stating:

> When you secure the borders, cut off welfare and social services to illegal aliens at the expense of the American taxpayer, and strictly enforce the laws against hiring illegally, the problem of what to do with the estimated 12-20 million illegal aliens already in this country will drastically shrink in size and scope" (DeChaine, 2009, p. 56).

But within a year or so, Simcox seemed to be urging much more active measures when he declared: "If you're breaking into this country when this country is at war, then you're a potential enemy of this country, and you should be treated accordingly" (DeChaine, 2009, p. 55). Gilchrist, for his part, wrote in 2015:

> Part of [the] enormous task is to repatriate the millions of illegal aliens currently occupying US territory back to their homelands, where they can stand in line at a US embassy to apply for legal entry into the United States of America…just like the millions of "LEGAL" immigrants have done before them. For many of them, they will not be allowed to return to our country, and rightfully so (Gilchrist 2015b).

As for their desired future immigration policy, a 2013 Tweet from the Minuteman Project suggested a tolerance for guest workers: "if you hire someone to mow your lawn for the summer, does that mean you need then and their whole family around forever?" But "emerging technologies will make immigrant agricultural workers increasingly unnecessary." While, as noted in the last section, the Minuteman Project has apparently implied support for admitting Christian Syrian refugees into the United States, "Muslim countries should be the ones taking Muslim refugees." The Minuteman Project has Tweeted its opposition for alleged proposals that would ease immigration rules for "the Irish" and "Asian Americans."

Strategy

To actually achieve the end of an unbreachable border and restrictive immigration policy, Minutemen in their early years relied almost solely on federal government action, which would be spurred by Minuteman political protest, primarily taking the form of highly visible but nonviolent civilian border patrols. In recent years both the reliance on government action to suppress unauthorized crossing and the centrality of civilian border patrols as the means of spurring

government action have become less clear. This subsection will first explore the means by which the Minutemen believe unauthorized immigration can and should be suppressed, and then the various modes of action to spur the suppression strategy which Minutemen have discussed will be explored.

The Minutemen believe that the federal government could end unauthorized crossing of the Southern border if the right resources, and the political will, were committed to that purpose. A Minuteman website posted in 2010:

> The tragedy that is the escalating violence in our southern sector could have been prevented years ago, and countless American lives saved, if the federal government had . . . acted decisively for a secure border patrolled by the National Guard boots on the ground and a secure border fence! ("Update").

In addition to beefed-up conventional enforcement, there is some indication that Minutemen would support extreme and highly violent measures. In 2015 the Minuteman Project Twitter account referred, with apparent approval, to then-Presidential candidate Ben Carson's call for the use of drones on the southern border. Another Tweet that year asked "Should violent illegal criminals get the death penalty?" in reference to remarks apparently made by Iowa GOP state senator and Congressional candidate Mark Chelgren to the (Knoxville) *Journal-Express*.

As far as what needs to be done politically, Gilcrist stated in 2014:

> The Republicans should stand strong—and I mean unbending—not cooperate with President Obama on any of these [immigration-related] issues, including other issues, and hold his feet to the fire, and they should not cooperate whatsoever with any Democrat in this country (2014 Salcedo).

One important function of prognostic frames, according to Máiz (2010) is to "self-legitimatorily identify those who are to lead the community in its struggle . . . who synechdochically represent the whole community as 'bearers of the true word'" (pg. 248). In the present case, these agents are the Minutemen themselves. The "Standard Operating Procedure" proclaims: "We are citizens who set the example, of the people for the people and by the people." It further declares the Minutemen "our maligned and misunderstood group of truly patriotic nationalists" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 557). Minutemen sometimes attempt to portray themselves as unifiers. Yoxall writes that Gilchrist and Simcox claimed that, at their inaugural 2005 event, "forty per cent of their volunteers would be minorities, including, according to their website, African-Americans, American-Mexicans, American-Armenians, four paraplegics and six amputees [internal quotation marks omitted]" although the actual turnout was "nearly all white." A 2013 Tweet announces "Common ground: Border security trumps electoral politics." Another reads: "Conservative U.S. Hispanics aim to stop amnesty and big government."

Other agents of the eventual solution are certain Right-Wing politicians, and low-level officeholder and functionaries in government. Minutemen praise various initiatives passed by state and local governments that are designed to help combat unauthorized immigration, or at least protect the locality from the invasion of unauthorized immigrants, in the absence of federal action. Furthermore, officers of the Border Patrol are praised, or at least spared blame. "Never have a bad word for these guys and gals," the Standard Operating Procedure directs. "Remember that they are trying do to the job with one hand tied behind their backs (Yoxall, 2006, p. 561)."

One way to make change which the Minutemen discuss is through electoral. This has actually become much *more* emphasized in recent years with Gilchrist using Twitter and his website to endorse Donald Trump for president and a handful of candidates for statewide and local

office CITE. The primary explanation is probably the increase over the past decade in far-right anti-immigrant discourse in "mainstream" politics, for which Gilchrist claims a great deal of credit (Salcedo, 2014).

Early in the history of the Minutemen, by contrast, tamer modes of political engagement were seen as futile, or as having already been tried and failed, as will be discussed more under motivational framing, as the failure of conventional tactics is used to justify more radical ones. There is also evidence, as Johnson observes, of thought among Minutemen that tame engagement, such as writing, gathering information, and contacting decision makers are less robustly masculine than patrolling (maybe seated on a lawn chair) in the desert, and consequently the proper domain of women, those not physically able to patrol, or those lacking courage.

The signature strategy of Minuteman prognostic framing, the civilian border patrol, has multiple potential purposes, and several ways in which it could be conducted. The purposes and modes of conduct of actual patrols selected by Minutemen, and the rhetoric used to justify them, are highly important. Perhaps as important are the purposes for and modes of patrol which Minutemen do not enact (at least not as a large group) but implicitly or explicitly justifies as potentials.

Civilian Border Patrols

Object of Civilian Border Patrols

Minutemen patrols in the early years were said to be for the closely related purposes of spurring federal action to crack down on unauthorized immigration and bringing attention to the perceived crisis. The "Standard Operating Procedure" reads "Minutemen understand that, while our actions cannot stop illegal activities along the border, we can change world perception and national thought concerning Homeland and Border Security" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 555). The MCDC boasted on its website in 2010 that "Our efforts were from millions of our fellow Americans the

first messages of warning they had ever heard about the threat of illegal immigration . . . and our increasingly lawless and unprotected border ("Update)."

When it comes to viewing civilian patrols through the lens of a direct protest against the federal government, the prognostic framing becomes murkier. The "Standard Operating Procedure" reads: "The idea is to become force-multipliers for the Border Patrol. Our effort will be a shock and awe to the President and Congressional leaders" (Yoxall pg. 559). The interpretation of Bleeden *et al.* (2010) is that Simcox was "attempting seriously to aid (and perhaps humiliate) the US Border Patrol," while Gilchrist, with "what he called the 'dog-and-pony show'" was engaged in "what can best be described as guerilla theater writ large" (pg. 180). Still, Simcox is deeply conscious of the political implications of his actions, and an attempt on his part to "humiliate" the official Border Patrol is largely a protest against their perceived inadequacy.

In later years, during the lead-up to "Operation Normandy," and following Simcox's 2013 child molestation arrest, since which time he as been continually incarcerated awaiting trial, it was Gilchrist who was unclear on the purpose of the action. While he never made explicit a shift in strategy, it seems that Gilchrist intended this action, planned for May 2015 as a massive civilian patrol covering the entire Southern border, to at least temporarily halt unauthorized crossing without the aid of government. (An email I sent to the address listed for Gilchrist on his website, requesting clarification on this and other points, was not answered). In a radio interview, Gilchrist stated: "I want Operation Normandy, Minuteman Project style, to be the beginning of the end of this chaotic lawlessness" (Salcedo 2014).

Modes of Action in Civilian Border Patrols

As was discussed in the previous chapter, the US-Mexican Border and "borderlands" have historically been a stage for civilian as well as state-sponsored violence, with racial, nationalist,

and “bordering” overtones. The Minutemen claim to bring something relatively new to the borderlands: the nonviolent, even non-confrontational civilian border patrol. Their refrain is “observe and report.” According to the “Standard Operating Procedure”:

> Patrols conducted during daylight are simple. Take shifts spotting with binoculars, spotting scopes etc. If you see a group, call Border Patrol. . . . Identify yourself as an MMP volunteer. Give them your location. Report the group you have spotted in specifics” (Yoxall, 2006, p. 560-61).

Yoxall (2006) writes that

> During the [first] operation, all volunteers were rigidly instructed to have no interactions with suspected undocumented immigrants or to detain any suspect in any way. Further, they were told the use of firearms was only permitted if the volunteer faced an imminent, deadly threat and could not retreat (p. 553).

About two thirds of volunteers carried firearms, even though they were told that they were likely to be sent home if their firearm left its holster “for any reason” (Yoxall, 2006, p. 558).

While the instructions for daytime patrols in the “Standard Operating Procedure” prohibit even gesturing to suspected unauthorized immigrants, those for nighttime patrols permit minutemen to turn on a light when border crossers are heard nearby, and “watch them scatter,” a tactic to at least delay unauthorized crossers before the Border Patrol can arrive.

A range of more escalated tactics beyond those that have so far been employed by Minutemen are discussed and hinted at in Minuteman rhetoric, and have in some cases been carried out by individuals and groups with close ties to the Minutemen.

These include possibly lawful tactics, such as confronting suspected unauthorized crossers verbally or visually, or performing citizen’s arrests. Yoxall (2006) finds that performing a citizen’s

arrest for an unauthorized entry into the United States might be lawful, under certain circumstances (pp. 542-44). But even official Minuteman rhetoric contains hints of highly lawless and highly violent forms of escalation which are now rejected in favor of the current tactics, but might be reconsidered at some future time. The "Standard Operating Procedure" speaks to this line of thinking: "Why risk going to jail and ruining the mission by engaging a group of illegals? The time for that is not yet upon us" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 559).

This statement is even more chilling if it is read with a mind to the military ethos of the Minutemen. In military usage, "engage" is essentially a euphemism for "kill." Holthouse (2005) reported that some MCDC members would "fantasize about murder, saying 'it should be legal to kill illegals." One "suggest[ed] he respected the lives of stray cats and dogs more than undocumented immigrants" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 536).

Motivational framing

The final part of collective action framing, motivational frames urge individuals to action as part of the group and justify the taking of action. In the present case, the Minutemen have a fondness for sweeping startling claims about their "rights." As citizens, Minutemen have a right to patrol the border, on public or private land. While some find it easier to stick to private ranches to avoid alleged harassment, Simcox asserts that Minutemen "are certainly welcome, just like any other sovereign American citizen, to set up anywhere on that border, as long as it's on US territory" (Salcedo, 2014).

Minutemen leaders motivate their membership with praise for their own toughness and initiative and scorn for the passive masses. "When the going gets tough, the tough get going," the "Standard Operating Procedure" reminds Minutemen and potential recruits. Put another way: "You're an American Dammit. Act like one. We have a rich history of stepping up and doing the

job that the government refuses to do. You stay at home, the scum sucking maggot politicians win. So pull your fat ass out of that chair and come save your country." If you do, if you "chose to make the sacrifice and become the active majority rather than the silent majority, you will have accomplished more in one month than the sum total of all you years of complaining and demanding action from your public servants" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 556).

Minuteman motivational framing justifies more than protest designed to make the government step up, importantly, it implicitly asserts the right of conservative Anglos to bypass procedural democracy and govern directly. The "Standard Operating Procedure" asserts: "we, as citizens, *are the government*, [and] are acting within the social contract of our right to freedom [emphasis mine]" (*ibid.*). As "composing letters, e-mails and faxes did not make an impression on our public servants," "we will assert ourselves as citizen representatives of the government" (Yoxall, 2006, p. 557).

Finally, the asserted existential nature of the threat, and the language of "invasion" and "war" is a powerful form of motivational framing that would imply that unauthorized immigration must be stopped by any means necessary, and furthermore that unauthorized migrants are an enemy and must be treated as such. This is the framing which motivates people to indiscriminant violence.

Chapter 3: The Minuteman Phenomenon in Light of Postmodernization and Exclusionary Discourses

Postmodernization Theory

What has come to be called "modernization theory" was pioneered in the nineteenth century by thinkers like Karl Marx and Max Weber. It observed that the values of societies change as they industrialize. In pre-industrial societies, where is not really possible for most people to

achieve material prosperity or even security, this is not the focus popular politics or though. On the contrary, as Inglehart (1997) points out, "agrarian societies were characterized by value systems that stigmatized social [and economic] mobility." These values maintained stability where "the main source of wealth was land, which is in fixed supply" (Inglehart, 1997, p. 30). Religion and secular ideology encouraged the rich to be charitable and the poor to accept their lot, while providing them with "guarantees that (in this world or the next) everything will turn out well." While "Religion is the dominant influence on the belief systems of most preindustrial societies," faith in "the state or a strong political leader" can stand in for "an omniscient and benevolent God," and, occasionally, a secular ideology such as Communism for religion. Inglehart points out that "under conditions of great unpredictability, people have a powerful need to see authority as not only strong, but also benevolent—even in the face of strong evidence to the contrary" (Inglehart, 1997, p. 38).

But as a society industrializes, it becomes possible for the masses to achieve material security and even dream of prosperity. Consequently, traditional values are deemphasized in favor of what Weber called "the pervasive rationalization of all spheres of society," primarily focused on economic achievement. People accepted assembly line labor, "the discipline of the factory foreman," and government bureaucracy. "Cultural changes in Protestant Europe," as Inglehart writes, "lead to the reversal of the traditional stigma against economic accumulation." Inglehart labels the broad set of values that became dominant with industrialization "materialist values" (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 5, 28, 32).

Observing the development of advanced industrial societies in recent decades, Inglehart concludes that it can no longer be explained by traditional modernization theory.

He contends that the process of modernization has reached an inherent limit. As the bulk of the "postmaterialist" generation had, due to unprecedented industrial development, and the rise of the modern welfare state, never feared for their basic material security, they placed more value on "subjective well-being" in comparison to economic achievement. The wider trend of postmodernism, is characterized by the decline in the need for "survival values" that characterized both agrarian *and* industrial societies. Postmodern societies are tolerant of a far wider range of individual lifestyle choices. It is no longer felt necessary, for example, to insist on heterosexual marriages to produce legitimate children who would traditionally contribute economically, fight in wars, and of course comprise the next generation. Postmodernism "bring[s] declining emphasis on all kinds of authority. For deference to authority has high costs: this individual's personal goals must be subordinated to those of a broader entity." While when "under threat of invasion, internal disorder, or economic collapse, people eagerly seek strong authority figures who can protect them," the cost to deferring to political, religious, and even scientific authority may not be deemed worth it in times of security (Belfiglio, 2014, pp. 9-10).

To a large extent, the Minutemen epitomize the new right-wing, or, as Inglehart terms them, "fundamentalist" movements which are characteristic of the new political alignments that have taken shape in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century in advanced societies. As economic issues become less politically dominant, the traditional Left-Right "conflict over income and ownership of the means of production" no longer dominates politics. This is most easily seen in European multi-party states. In Germany during the 1980s and '90s, for example, the Green party "had a major impact even though only a small portion of the electorate votes for it." According to Inglehart, the Greens can be seen as a comprehensive postmodern party, supporting not only environmental protection but disarmament and expanded rights for women, gays and

lesbians, the disabled, and immigrants. But "the Greens have been countered by a Republicaner party characterized by cultural conservatism and xenophobia," which was "stigmatized as the heirs of the Nazis" and so won few votes. But anti-immigrant feeling was strong enough in Germany that two thirds of the parliament supported a 1993 constitutional amendment restricting political asylum (Inglehart 1997 pg. 240-48).

In the United States, the rise of political postmodernism was manifested in "student protestors" who eventually caused the Democratic Party to take a postmodern turn, alienating much of its traditional working-class base, some of whom supported George Wallace and then Richard Nixon. In 1972, "for the first time in history, white working-class voters were about as likely to vote for the Republican as for the Democratic candidate." Unlike some European countries, the US emerged from the Postmaterialist transformation "still ha[ving] as two-party system, with the same party labels as before: superficially, the system seems unchanged."

Many of the Minutemen's political stances accord with a view of them as fundamentalist resisters to postmodernism. They are xenophobic and resent perceived expansion of rights. Minutemen place high value on (their own) authority and subordination of the individual to the group (for example, in the strident insistence in the "Standard Operating Procedure" that new Minutemen follow their self-proclaimed leaders and previously tested methods), although not of themselves to the state authority. Minutemen see a threat to their economic well-being as more important than any claim to human rights, and, in many ways, are still fighting the old fight over control of capital (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 242-46. Finally and perhaps most importantly, as Inglehart's postmodernization theory predicts, they are not at the extreme right on economic issues but adopt language from both the traditional Left and Right, seeing themselves at odds with businesses which

employ immigrants for low wages as well as moochers who would take their money through undeserved government assistance.




Figure 3.1: Political realignment when societies undergo postmodernization, from primary focus on class-based economic conflict to postmodernism and resistance to postmodernism. This is not to imply that the new Left and Right occupy the middle of the traditional economic scale, but that primary political alignment is no longer based on economics. See also Fig. 8.3 in Inglehart (1997).

However, there may be a significant extend to which the minutemen themselves are postmodern. A major characteristic of postmodernism, according to Inglehart, is a low tolerance of risk and focus on remote threats, which is enabled by the security of our day-to-day existence. Thus,

> Ironically, as survival has become unprecedentedly secure, the peoples of advanced industrial societies have become increasingly sensitive to risk. . . . According to this diagnosis, the distributional conflicts over 'goods' (such as property, income, and jobs) that characterized industrial society have given way to distributional conflicts over 'bads,' such as the risks of nuclear technology, genetic research, and the threat to the environment" (1997, pg. 36).

While Inglehart mentioned mostly left-wing concerns, the dawning of the twenty-first century brought sharply into focus a new "bad," which represented a vanishingly small risk for any individual but captured the American psyche and for years dominated US politics:

international terrorism. Societies react to crisis by embracing authoritarianism, and on September 11, 2001, the United States experienced perhaps the first major example of what Inglehart calls "an historical crisis" in a society where Postmodernization had been evident for several decades. Traditionally, Inglehart writes, historical crisis is accompanied by "the Authoritarian Reflex" which takes the form of "fundamentalist or nativist reactions" and "adulation of strong secular leaders." The reaction of the United States to the 9/11 attacks clearly showed that the Authoritarian Reflex was still alive and well. A wide range of policies were targeted toward eliminating any possible risk of attack from Islamic terrorists, and Americans on the Right and even on the Left spoke quite openly of the need to sacrifice individual freedom for collective security.

But Minutemen hardly showed willingness to sacrifice their own freedom, and knowingly acted in contradiction to the wishes of President George W. Bush, who condemned the group as "vigilantes" (Holthouse, 2005). This individual demand for absolute protection from risks of bads, while insisting on an expansive version of one's own rights, may constitute a form of Right-wing postmodernism not accounted for by Inglehart. Supporting the postmodern character of the Minuteman worldview is the highly metaphorical nature of their language describing border crossing ("flood" and "invasion"), the self-proclaimed theatrical nature of their protest actions (a commonality with the Left-wing protestors of the 1960s whom Inglehart identifies as the initiators of American political postmodernism), and finally, their valorization of concepts like "culture" and "tradition," something they hold in common with many left-wing postmodernists reacting to what they see as the stifling prioritization of economic growth. In the case of the Minutemen, this manifests in opposition to the presence of Hispanic "immigrants for emotional and psychological, more than material, reasons," desiring "not so much a defined, material racial hierarchy, such as

the Jim Crow south or exploitative labor, but a vaguer *understanding*, that they, the native withes, are socially, economically, and politically privileged" (Belfiglio, 2014 pg. 11).

Arguably, most racist and xenophobic reactions in the past were ultimately related to material concerns. On the one hand, racist belief systems justified the economic advantages of colonialism and slavery. On the other, racist backlash provided psychological catharsis to populations facing material crisis, such as Nazi Germany and the American South in the wake of military defeat and economic collapse. In a striking illustration of this point, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the South, lynchings of blacks increased when the price of cotton fell. The lychers had no illusion that local blacks controlled the cotton market; they simply sought comfort in reinforcing their racial mastery (Inglehart 1997, pg. 39).

The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the reaction to them differ in a subtle way, in that they had little direct material impact on the lives of most Americans. But, in an unprecedentedly secure postmodern world, the psychic impact was enough to provoke an existential crisis in American politics, triggering the authoritarian reflex and xenophobia.

Bordering and Exclusionary Discourse

"According to traditional, geography-based logic," writes DeChaine, "a border exists as a given entity whose contours can be cleanly and clearly recognized, measured, and mapped." But a line on a map hardly seems an adequate explanation for what motivates Minutemen. In examining Minuteman rhetoric, DeChaine therefore looks to a new "countervailing claim," originating in part with "the emergence and development for postmodern theories of the social character of spaces beginning in the 1960s." This view asserts

> That whatever form they may assume, all borders are socially motivated constructs. They are bounding, ordering apparatuses, whose primary function is to designate, produce,

> and/or regulate the space of difference. Thus conceived, borders simultaneously shore up insides and outsides while establishing the terms of their relationality. . . . differentiating the self from others, one culture from another, desirable elements from undesirable ones, and, often enough, "us" from "them." Moreover . . . a border's contingent configuration is often masked by certain political and economic discourses that labor diligently, sometimes feverishly, to maintain the semblance of stability, integrity, and reality (DeChaine, 2009 pp. 44-45).

DeChaine reveals the "alienization" of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. "Alienization, he explains, "is a bordering project . . . to render individuals and groups abject and unassimilable—irredeemable others whose putative exclusion from the national body is virtually absolute (Dechaine 2009 pg. 45). Discourses conflating the physical border with the socially constructed border allow Minutemen and others, without using explicitly racial language, to make it clear, and furthermore, seemingly self-evident that unauthorized migrants, and by extension Hispanic migrants in general, can never be a part of the civic life of the United States; they will either destroy it or remain figuratively, if not physically, bordered out of it.

Winders (2007) examines bordering through the lens of contemporary anti-immigrant politics in the South*east.* Especially in the wake of 9/11, he observes, the conflict over the border has been treated as national, with Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) proclaiming in 2006 that "every state is a border state" As Hispanic immigrants begin to move into the South in significant numbers, Winders argues, the specter of the national border and the national immigration debate is used to address what are really local, and racialized, issues, often ones about control of physical and metaphorical space and what might be called local bordering. These local "border projects"

include everything "from local ordinances to eliminate day-labor sites to southern politicians' attempts to change constitutional rights (Winders 2007 pp. 920-21).

Winders acknowledges that "in some ways, the border's workings on the South are similar to its workings elsewhere as a mechanism to define safe from unsafe, 'us' from 'them."' But, he contends, "the South's past (and present) exclusionary projects around heritage, whiteness, and other formations provide powerful means of interpreting and reacting to community change." The national anti-"illegal" rhetoric is readily meshed with decades (or even centuries) old racist Southern tropes, and the discourse of "culture" and "way of life" that have long been used to circumvent explicit anti-Black racism.

> Protecting state resources from "illegal immigrants" in Georgia and Mississippi, for example, becomes protecting 'southern hospitality and ways of life. . . . Along the same lines, concerns about immigrants as vectors of disease in Tennessee and Mississippi tap deep memories of "contamination" used to control black domestic workers in Atlanta and elsewhere after the Civil War (Hunter 1997) and overall fears of non-white bodies as dirty and invisibly dangerous (Winders 2007, pg. 934).

Although it is less well remembered, the Southwest also has a long racialized history of spatial conflict, *de jure* and *de facto* racial segregation, and even the enslaving of American Indians, especially in California (Hine & Farragher, 2007). Lassiter argues that its laws and tactics were strikingly similar to Jim Crow. Perhaps what is happening here is that, rather than anything fundamentally new coming to the South, Anglo-American Southerners are attempting to place Hispanics at the bottom of the existing racial order. And, just as Southern cities quickly learned to imitate the *de facto* segregation techniques and language of Northern cities, such as resisting "forced bussing," to halt racial progress, the South is importing border discourse from the

Southwest and national politics to preserve its racial status quo against the entry of Hispanics in terms of equality.

In his 1997 book *Civic Ideals*, political scientist Rogers M. Smith observed the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment without surprise. After all,

> "Through most of U.S. history, lawmakers pervasively and unapologetically structured U.S. citizenship in terms of illiberal and undemocratic racial, ethnic, and gender heirarchies, for reasons rooted in basic, enduring imperatives of political life (Smith, 1997 pg. 1).

There were "forms of civic inequality," even "forms of second-class citizenship" in American ideology through most of its history. And, though immigration laws "manifested passionate beliefs that America was by rights a white nation, a Protestant nation, a nation in which true Americans were native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors," some of this thought was justified not by simple tribalism or America's illiberal "ascriptive traditions" but by its liberal and republican traditions, "particularly the republican stress on a homogeneous and martial nation" (Smith 1997 pp. 1-5).

The resurgence of anti-immigrant sentiment in the 1990s, and by extension its continuation into the twenty-first century and its dramatization by the Minutemen, represents a predictable reaction to several decades of liberalized immigration laws and an expanding concept of citizenship, just like the "Redemption" of the South after Reconstruction or the backlash against immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe in the 1920s. The Minutemen vividly demonstrate an exclusive and "martial" version of citizenship, reinforcing their own identity as an Anglo people and justifying their place in a racial hierarchy in a way supportable by some version of republican values, invoking the ancient idea of the citizen-soldier CITE.

As far as the Minutemen's view of themselves, and their self-proclaimed political role, it is perhaps best characterized by Bleeden *et al* (2010)'s concept of the "hypercitizen." The hypercitizen claims to have made significant sacrifice for his government and society, particularly by paying taxes, and, to his own belief, not having gained more in benefits from the government than he paid. The hypercitizen consequently "demands accountability from all officeholders and those who have not paid their 'fair' share." Thus, "through such actions as the power of the vote and taxpaying, the hypercitizen is sanctioned . . . as the legitimate owner of government."

This explaining a phenomenon Bleeden *et al.* observe in the beginning of their chapter: On the one hand: Minutemen take great pride in their "performance of active citizenship." Minutemen whom the researchers interviewed spoke with pride about their militarily service and ownership of homes and businesses. Furthermore, the Minutemen's active stance in combatting unauthorized immigration, in contrast with what they see as the government's and the vast majority of US citizens' passivity on the issue, further qualifies the Minutemen as self-sacrificing protectors of society, and thereby hypercitizens. But, "these are precisely the performances that so enraged [Minutemen] when performed by noncitizens." As discussed in Chapter 2, they are alarmed at the thought of unauthorized immigrants becoming politically active, and are hostile to their economic advancement even apart from the complaints about immigrants taking welfare and competing with native workers for jobs.

In his 1977 work *Discipline and Punish,* Michel Foucault observes that, in former times, lawbreakers were dealt with by "punishment as a public spectacle," most notably in public executions or other physical torture, but also milder methods such as "the use of prisoners in public works . . . distinguished by their 'infamous dress' and shaven heads." But most of these punishments were discontinued in the western world in the early nineteenth century (pp. 16-18).

Instead, punishment, in Foucault's view, no longer targeted the body but the soul. While most forms of modern punishment, such as imprisonment, do act upon the body, Foucault considers this incidental to "a punishment that acts in the depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations" (pp. 20, 25).

To deter lawbreaking without the fear of severe punishment and public spectacle to remind people of the possibility of punishment, punishment must be made to seem certain, or at least likely, to follow crime, "hence the idea that the machinery of justice must be duplicated by an organ of surveillance that would work side by side with it, and which would make it possible either to prevent crimes, of, if committed, to arrest their authors" (Foucault 1977 pg. 103). "For Foucault," Lachenicht and Lindegger (1997) observe, pervasive surveillance, "produces self-control, which disciplines people to fit into a modern industrial society (pg. 5), but is still essentially a "technique of power" (*ibid.* pg. 4). Furthermore, surveillance based measures such as probation are an essential part of modern judicial consequences for crime, a fact whose implications will be further explored below.

Lachenicht and Lindegger (1997) contend, however, that spectacle, in Foucault's sense of the term, retains importance today, especially with the growth of mass media, and can complement surveillance. There are a number of reasons why one might expect to see spectacle alive and well in the borderlands of the Southwest United States. Lynch mobs of the South and vigilantes of the West, as discussed in Chapter 1, upheld their brand of public order with graphic and public violence long after most of the western world had eliminated such practices from its justice systems. The antics of Maricopa County, AZ Sheriff Arpaio, who has actually revived chain gangs (Ford, 2013), evidence a new life for made-for-TV spectacle.

Chavez (2008), to my knowledge the only scholar to apply Foucaultian analysis to the Minuteman phenomenon, sees both surveillance and spectacle playing important roles, writing: "In short, the Minuteman Project used surveillance to produce a spectacle on the Arizona-Mexico border." As far as the political function of this display, Chavez explains that

> Two aspects of the spectacle, that it demarcates power positions and does so in a public way, are central to the activities of the Minuteman Project on the U.S.-Arizona border. In this case, the public performance was one that emphasized the power and privileges of citizenship. . . The subjects in this spectacle were the "illegal aliens" who dared to violate the law and in doing so put the privileges of citizenship into question, at least for the Minuteman organizers and participants (Chavez 2008, pg. 116).

Such as public spectacle of border watching fits well with Foucault's view of surveillance as "a practice of power that instill[s] discipline in subjects, producing docile bodies.

In Foucault's view, surveillance is used not only to prevent crime but to *punish* it. Offenders, he writes, are punished not only by explicitly punitive measures such as fines or imprisonment;

> "they are punished by 'security measures' that accompany the penalty (prohibition of entering certain areas, probation, obligatory medical treatment) . . . which are intended not to punish the offence, but to supervise the individual, to neutralize his dangerous state of mind, to alter his criminal tendencies, and to continue even when this change has been achieved. The criminal's soul is not referred to in the trial merely to explain his crime and as a factor in the juridical apportioning of responsibility; if it is brought before the court, with such pomp and circumstance, such concern to understand and such 'scientific'

application, it is because it too, as well as the crime itself, is to be judged and punished" (1977, pg. 27).

"Through such processes of discursive exchanges," Dilts (2006) writes, "the 'delinquent' emerges" (p. 2), and it the delinquent, or the "felon," rather than the crime itself, that becomes the focus of punishment.

Twenty-first century Foucault scholars have expanded on the themes of surveillance as punishment, punishment of the soul, and the shift in focus from the crime to the criminal to argue that modern punishment of criminals, especially in the United States, is not merely intensive surveillance but rather a whole system of creating and reinforcing the excluded class of "criminal" or "felon." Dilts argues that the civic disabilities which jurisdictions in the United States impose on felons after their release from confinement, particularly the lifetime revocation of voting rights, serve this function. Bauman (2000), examining the infamous Pelican Bay prison in California, argues that, lacking any meaningful focus on rehabilitation—the "work-related discipline and re-subjectification that characterized" the prisons Foucault had in mind—represents not so much surveillance-based punishment as "a factory of exclusion."

I now argue that, in creating and maintaining the "illegal immigrant/alien," the state and "private repression" apparatus operates in a way that is directly parallel to the way the criminal justice system and accompanying discourse creates and maintains the "delinquent" or "felon." According to statutory law, a person who crosses the border of the United States without authorization commits a misdemeanor, and deporting him or her is a civil, not a criminal, procedure. But an individual who has crossed the border without authorization, no matter how much time has passed since that act, is functionally "a legally and morally abject" person. As with someone who has once been convicted of a felony, the unauthorized immigrant is barred from a

wide range of civic and economic functions. He or she not only cannot vote, or, like authorized immigrants, entertain under current law hope of one day becoming a citizen but in most cases cannot hold a driver's license. An unauthorized migrant must be employed and paid "informally" or else use fraudulent documents. In practice, the capacity of unauthorized immigrants to seek protection from civil authorities such as labor regulators or even local police is severely limited. Depending on the executive policy in place, they may have cause to fear any encounter with law enforcement may result in their detention and deportation.

It is unlikely that the Minutemen will succeed in either making the border impenetrable or in causing all twelve million odd unauthorized immigrants currently in the country to be deported, but where they and the broader anti-immigrant movement can and have had success, as will be revisited in the conclusion of this paper, is in shoring up these secondary, lifelong consequences for unauthorized entry that analysis in light of Foucault's observations on criminal justice tell us are so important to maintaining the abject status of the unauthorized immigrant, and by extension the Hispanic person in general with whom she is conflated, and the traditional racial hierarchy and the Anglo-American's privileged place at the top of it.

Viewing the Minutemen through the lens of Foucault's theories on crime and punishment thus has significant explanatory power both for *why* Minutemen act the way they do and for *what* precisely they are doing, on a political, civic, and psychic level. Minutemen react with alarm to any sign of political activity on the part of unauthorized immigrant, as the 2006 Los Angeles rallies. Finally, in its modern form, according to Foucault (1977), "justice no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is bound up with its practice," but

> "The apportioning of blame is redistributed: in punishment-as-spectacle a confused horror spread from the scaffold . . . Now the scandal and the light are to be distributed differently;

> it is the conviction itself that marks the offender with the unequivocally negative sign: the publicity has shifted to the trial, and to the sentence; the execution itself is like and additional shame that justice is ashamed to impose on the condemned man; so its keeps its distance from the act . . . Hence that double system of protection that justice has set up between itself and the punishment it imposes" (p. 23).

Accordingly, by appeal to their victim's unauthorized status, Minutemen are able to hold themselves and society blameless from whatever happens to them, producing the fiction that unauthorized persons, or non-Anglos generally, are not kept in a lowly status by the actions of Anglos but by Justice itself.

Conclusion

The Minutemen, as, in Yoxall's words, "an inherently racist group," which lies at the intersection of political violence and discourse and so occupied, for a time, a uniquely influential position in the immigration debate, represent a clear threat to those of us who want to see a pluralistic United States. Scholarly attention, and the attention of researchers at the Southern Poverty Law Center, has been paid to the emergence of the Minutemen from a backdrop of racial violence, and to their bordering discourses, but perhaps not enough to the intersection of violence and discourse which they represent. Foucault's ideas in *Discipline and Punish* have unique power to shine light on the intersection of systemic violence and political discourse, and the ways in which they might apply beyond the realm of the criminal justice system are worthy of exploration. Chavez is, as far as I know, the only scholar who has attempted to apply Foucault to the Minutemen, but he does not attempt to address these broader questions.

It is essential that anti-immigrant discourse be taken seriously. As we have seen, the Minutemen represent its incarnation in one historical moment, but they did not invent these ideas and the ideas will not disappear anytime soon. By going beyond merely dismissing nativist rhetoric as hate speech or ill-informed, we come to understand both its persuasive power and the structurally and ideologically flawed political system from which it emerges.

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