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SENIOR PROJECT

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What causes Genocide?

A Comparison of Benjamin Valentino's and Matthew Krain's theories of Genocide Onset in the German and Guatemalan cases

Department *of* International Studies

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Submitted to the Department of International Studies of Allegheny College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

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I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

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Abstract:

Genocides have occurred far too frequently in the last century. In this comprehensive project, I attempt to discover what causes the onset of genocides. Benjamin Valentino argues that elites use genocide as a tool to solve their most difficult problems. Matthew Krain argues that circumstances can create the right conditions for genocide. I chose to test and compare these theories in the German and Guatemalan cases, while paying attention to specific and unique historical events that may demonstrate weaknesses in the theoretical approaches. I found that Krain explained the German Holocaust better than Valentino did. However, I felt that Krain's approach did not completely capture the reasons why genocide occurred in Germany and that Valentino's explanation was better for why the Guatemalan genocide occurred. Overall, it seemed that both theories were an imperfect fit. Instead, I would recommend an approach that advocates for a set of variables, as genocide does not seem to be explained by only one or two variables.

Chapter 1- Introduction and Literature Review

Why study genocide and genocide onset? Genocide is a type of political violence, that seeks to destroy an entire ethnic, racial, or religious group. These victims are often targeted because of ethnic hatred, opposing ideologies, or coveted resources. They are targeted often because they are simply the "other" and another group imagines that life would be better without them. The international community often only becomes involved in a genocide *after* thousands have lost their lives. Instead of becoming involved in genocidal conflicts after they have occurred, I propose that we should focus on preventing genocide. To do so, we need to understand the causes of genocide better. We, as an international community, need to be able to recognize the signs of genocide and take the appropriate steps to prevent the genocide from occurring.

My question is broadly "what causes genocide?" This means that I am looking specifically at *genocide onset*, or the beginning of a genocide. This paper is not intended to be the definitive work on all aspects of genocide. My question does not ask what ends a genocide, or how certain actors may prolong a genocide, for example. This is intentional, so that I can focus on the forces and actors that create the necessary conditions for a genocide to occur. By pinpointing and closely examining the mechanisms towards genocide, I hope to find potential ways that the international community can prevent genocides from occurring.

Focusing on preventing genocide is not a novel concept. The U.N. Genocide Convention of 1948 stressed the importance of preventing genocide and early intervention when genocides do occur. Since the U.N. Genocide Convention there has been the Rwandan, Bosnian and Iraqi genocides, just to name a few of the better-known genocides. Instead of preventing genocides as promised, it seems that the international community is far more willing to allow genocides to occur. When a genocide does break out, the international community has to decide if it wants to intervene militarily. Asking countries to intervene militarily on behalf of people that they do not necessarily share a connection to can, and empirically seems to be a political quagmire. It would hard for a country's leader to validate a decision to intervene in a foreign country militarily, because as with almost any military intervention, it can be expected that some soldiers would die. Therefore, even countries that have signed and therefore pledged their support to the U.N. Genocide Convention have a vested interest in ignoring cases of genocide.

By focusing on why and how genocides occur, I hope that the international community will better understand which states may start a genocide. If this is better understood, the international community may have to intervene militarily less often. By improving our understanding of genocide onset, the international community can delegate its resources and political capital to the appropriate at-risk states. Therefore, the international community would not spread itself too thinly and would be better able to deter genocide from occurring. It would also help remove the burden of post-war aid that many of these countries receive from the international community.

The definitional difficulties of the term "genocide"

The term 'genocide' was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944. Lemkin was a Polish Jew who believed that the particular strain of malicious violence that the Nazis committed during WWII deserved a new term, "genocide." *Genos* is the greek word that means race or tribe, and –*cide* is the Latin word for killing. For Lemkin, genocide would categorize a particular type of political violence that sought to exterminate all of a particular ethnic or racial group. His definition has been widely debated and altered by political considerations. When the U.N. was debating the specifics of the Genocide Convention, the USSR did not want to include political groups into the definition of who may be targeted, as the USSR was committing mass murder against its political opponents. Later, political scientists have struggled to handle this definitional difficulty. Some include political groups into their definition of genocide, while others have decided to call it "politicide". R.J. Rummel has chosen to call all government violence that results in deaths or intentional deaths (such as starvation, or forced labor camps) "democide".

The international community's official definition of genocide is rather tricky. I quote the Genocide Convention here at length, so that it is apparent exactly why the definition of genocide can be confusing. The convention states that:

> genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
>
> - (a) Killing members of the group;
> - (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
> - (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.

The idea that genocide requires the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" makes early prevention and categorization of genocide challenging. It is difficult for an expert to be able to tell at the beginning of a conflict if a specific group is being targeted.[1] It is difficult for even an expert to argue that only a particular sub-set of the population is being targeted, instead of a random or wide variety of victims. People also have fluid identities and so they may not always identify in one particular way.[2] Or, they could be mistaken to be part of one group or another, but personally have no identification with that group. This problem is exacerbated if it occurs during the cover of an internal or external war,

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[1] For example, in the Guatemalan case, the violence of 1982-83 was only labeled as a genocide years after the genocide, and only after overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the conflict was indeed a genocide. Forensic Anthropologists had to excavate mass graves and determine from the skeletons the ethnicity, time of death, and cause of death. (*Granito*)

[2] There are two major camps of social identity theory, the primordialists and constructivists. Primordialists, who have largely been discredited argue that social identities are stagnant and unchanging. Constructivists argue that social identities can be chosen, or can be politicized when events create the correct conditions for a person to take action based on an identity. For example, a person may choose to identify as a Muslim or a Republican. A person may be a woman and never feel compelled to act on this identity. However, a person may act on that 'woman' identity, when they feel like it is threatened. A recent example of this woman identity being politicized is when Todd Akin (formerly R- Missouri) stated that 'legitimate rape' could not result in pregnancy. Of course, a person may not choose to respond with their identity even when some other members of that identity feel threatened. This is why the constructivist perspective is considered more valid, because actual political action requires self-identification and self-motivation.

because there can be both war deaths and genocide deaths. It may be difficult to differentiate between the two , and therefore a genocide could occur without anyone realizing.[3]

1b, 1d, and 1e are also confusing, because by this definition, a genocide could occur *without any actual deaths*. Indeed, even the signatories to the convention seem unsure of what kind of mental harm would constitute genocide. When the United States signed the Genocide Convention in 1988, 40 years after the original treaty was created, they had a list of reservations and understandings[4]. One of these understandings was: "That the term `mental harm' in article II (b) means permanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar techniques" (UN Genocide Convention). This is one signatory's definition of 'mental harm' while other signatories may not find it an acceptable definition and choose to follow their own definition.

Literature Review

Ethnic Hatred Perspective

Scholars that align with this perspective believe that hatred between two or more ethnic groups is the primary impetus for genocide.

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[3] Again, consider the Guatemalan case. It is plausible that without dedicated human rights workers, the genocide could have been missed. There are also examples of highly disputed potential genocides, such as in Darfur and the Ukraine.

[4] "Reservations" and "Understandings" are terms used in treaties to signify particular hesitations and clarifications a signatory may have. "Reservations" are portions of the treaty the signatory does not agree with and the explanation of why a signatory does not agree with it. "Understandings" seek to clarify potentially ambiguous concepts and demonstrate how the particular signatory will interpret a particular concept. Signatories are also given the chance to respond to these various reservations and understandings and disagree or agree with what other signatories have declared. See the U.N. Genocide Convention Treaty for the full list of reservations and understandings.

David Newbury argues that genocides come from "deep local roots" (Newbury 75). In some societies, particular ethnicities are considered worth more than other ethnicities. Because of these arbitrary valuations, ethnicity can fuel other grievances (Newbury 87). Some institutions and opportunities become less accessible to those of different ethnicities. Often, a person's ethnicity determines a person's socioeconomic status, and thus creates the conditions for entire social groups to exist in different socioeconomic spheres (Newbury 84). Newbury argues that genocides are a result of these unfair social constructions (Newbury 76). Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity creates a society that is dictated by inequality and the access or limitation of opportunities to different ethnic groups. Social cleavages and distance appear between ethnic groups as identities are polarized. This means that general socioeconomic inequality can create the necessary conditions for genocide because the impoverished group can label another group as the main cause of their inequality (Newbury 77). Impoverished and oppressed groups often deal with these situations by "[creating] or [adopting] an ideology, a vision of ideal social arrangements" (Staub 370). By doing this, groups create an almost tangible future of what could be. They begin to believe that they should take steps so they do not suffer the present situation much longer. This "better future" dream creates a powerful illusion that could lead to a group believing that their life would be much better if another group did not exist. It offers an element of hope that can trigger an explosion of violence.

The previous paragraph was about how this mechanism can work for groups who are, or more importantly *perceive* themselves to be oppressed. However, more often, genocides are committed by those who have more power. This more powerful group may perceive a less powerful group as a threat to the status quo. Some examples of how a minority group could

threaten the status quo are: the minority group could be gaining power such as money or other resources, or a greater share of leadership in a government. Sometimes there are also strong historical and cultural memories that make the powerful group feel threatened by the less powerful group. For example, these memories could be when the now-powerful group was marginalized or discriminated against. Often the non-powerful group was marginalized by another group. The non-powerful group may want to eliminate the possibility of the other group taking power again. They could also be present because of unfair circumstances such as colonial master favoring one ethnic group over another. For example, the Belgians put Tutsis in high government positions, creating a legacy of ethnic hatred between the two ethnicities that persists to modern-day (Hochschild 4).

When these groups target weaker groups, they act to defend what they believe belongs to them. They do so "not only to defend their privilege and status, but also to defend an identity and world view, a legitimizing ideology that makes their position in society right in their eyes" (Staub 372). Campbell suggests that genocide can be used as a sort of social control to stop behavior deemed as deviant (Campbell 150). On some level, the perpetrators of genocide in this perspective believe that their victims are evil, because they threaten to disrupt the status quo. The perpetrators will describe and portray their targeted victims as evil and as the reason why there are problems in society (Campbell 151). This type of violence is often more moralistic than predatory, because they describe their victims in terms of evil, rather than simply stating that they would like to remove them. This means that the perpetrators, at least in their minds have legitimate cause to kill the transgressors.

Although ethnic hatred may be a pre-condition for some genocides, it is not a satisfactory explanation of *when and why* a genocide may occur: "some of the bloodiest mass killings in history have occurred in relatively homogeneous societies, between groups of the same or closely related ethnicity, nationality, religion or class. Conversely, many deeply divided societies have endured for extended periods without experiencing mass killing" (Valentino 2). For example, if hatred between the Hutus and Tutsis was created during the turn of the twentieth century when King Leopold was in the Congo, why did a genocide first occur between these ethnic groups in 1994? Why did the genocide occur in Rwanda and not Burundi, which also has a significant Hutu and Tutsi population?[5] Thus, ethnic hatreds may help to determine which countries may be at risk for genocide, but not determine when a genocide will break out.

Lack of Democracy

Adherents to this perspective argue that genocides occur because countries concentrate power within the hands of a few elites. The lack of democracy allows elites to do whatever they wish, even if that means killing their people.

The main proponent of this perspective is R.J. Rummel, who argues "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely." Rummel argues that any intentional killing of citizens by a government is similar, and created the term 'democide' to describe this type of violence. He defines democide as "intentional killing of an unarmed and non-physically threatening person, or the responsibility for a person's death such that it is as though intended (as deaths from overwork and deprivation in forced labor camps or on plantations)" (Rummel 1994, 2). From this

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[5] Burundi's ethnic make-up is 85% Hutu and 14% Tutsi. Rwanda's ethnic make-up is 84% Hutu and 15% Tutsi. (CIA Factbook)

definition, it can be seen that Rummel is dealing with a larger scope of political violence than just simply genocide. His basic thesis still holds explanatory power for genocide, and he applies his hypothesis to specific cases of genocide. In his studies, he collected reports of state-sponsored mass killings against the people, and discovered that there was a strong correlation between the degree of power a state holds over its people and democide (Rummel 1994, 2). He argues that totalitarian are willing and able to use force against any opposition (Rummel 1995, 4). Totalitarian regimes also often have a strict ideology that often often does not allow for opposition. In a totalitarian regime, as opposed to a democratic regime, the people do not have much power and are therefore completely at the mercy of the regime.

Furthermore, power is concentrated in the hands of a few elites, who may see a minority as a threat to the regime. Because the minority does not belong to the powerful elite, they have no defense against the violence of the elite (Rummel 1995, 18). Instead of totalitarianism, Rummel suggests that democracy and democratic institutions will allow opportunities for peaceful opposition. Rummel argues that totalitarian communist regimes have killed by the tens of millions, but democratic regimes debate the necessity of killing a serial murderer (2). Democratic regimes allow for opposition, but regimes that have "absolute power" polarize interests and create a culture where disagreement is solved through violence (Rummel 1995 book, 25-6).

William Easterly argues against Rummel's theory that democracies will not and have not committed genocide. He argues that: "A majority of the population may democratically agree on the killing of an unpopular minority. Famous historical examples are the democratic governments in Australia, Canada, and the United States who killed indigenous

peoples" (Easterly, 4/5). Easterly does agree though that the most effective measure against genocide is democracy, but it is more complicated than simply the presence of democracy (Easterly, 11). He finds that the quality of democracy and socioeconomic factors are important. It is not enough to simply have democracy. Rather the democracy must be well-supported through strong institutions. He finds that richer economies are less likely to resort to mass killings. This could also signify that these richer economies have stronger institutions that allow for peaceful opposition.

Colaresi and Carey suggest that institutions, especially military and police institutions, in a society can be used for two functions: repression of legitimate opposition and protecting the state from enemies of the state (Colaresi and Carey, 41). Therefore, simply having institutions is not good enough, these institutions must be used to protect citizens. There must also be some sort of protection for the people from the force monopolized by the government. This can be as simple as free, fair, and regular elections that remove bad leaders from power. The enemies of the state need to be actual threats to the safety and stability of the state. Colaresi and Carey argue that there needs to be a certain amount of control enforced by the government, so that the state can enforce laws and protect its people from legitimate threats. However the institutions need to have restrictions. Strong institutions and a strong respect for all human life are important. It is not enough to simply have democracy. Rather the democracy must be well-supported through strong institutions. Easterly argues that one or the other is not sufficient to prevent a genocide: "democracy… should be supplemented by human rights protection and other guarantees of individual rights to bring about beneficial outcomes for all" (Easterly 23). The democracies that committed genocide targeted those that were not considered full-members,

or even members of their society. These victims lived within the geographical borders of the country or expanding country, but were not considered human. The political instability task force found that the most volatile situation is "political competition that is dominated by an ethnic or other parochial group in combination with relatively open competition for the executive" (Colaresi and Carey 40). In other words, the task force found that a relatively democratic government can still be a high-risk situation if a strong respect for life is not emphasized. These regimes can use their institutions against their people for their own particular goals.

Strong democratic institutions seem to be important in determining whether or not a country will commit human rights abuses. However, it does not adequately explain *why and when* a genocide might occur. Genocides are a particular form of political violence. A genocide means that an entire ethnic, religious, or political group is systematically targeted and eliminated. The number of historically totalitarian or undemocratic far outweighs the number of genocides that have been committed. Plus William Easterly has demonstrated that democratic regimes may also commit genocides. Therefore, the quality and presene or lack of democracy may help indicate the likelihood of a country's chances of committing genocide, it does not determine *when and why* a genocide will occur.

Strategic

The scholars that adhere to this perspective argue that elites use genocide as a solution to their most challenging problems.

Valentino argues that military and political elites use genocide as a means to solve their most difficult problems. Valentino argues that elites use genocide as a "brutal strategy designed to accomplish leaders' most important ideological or political objectives and counter what they see as their most dangerous threats" (Valentino 3). This means that he sees genocide as a tool for the elites. It is also the last and most powerful course of action that elites can take. Elites will choose to use genocide when all of their other potential options have been used and they have no choice but to kill everyone who stands in their way. This means that they will seek other potential actions before they seek genocide. This is because genocide is permanent, and requires intense political and economic resources to carry out. When a regime commits genocide, they risk other countries or actors interference. They also risk economic actions such as embargoes and economic sanctions. Therefore, from this perspective, elites must be completely convinced that their goals are worth the risk of isolating themselves internationally and potential military intervention.

Political Opportunity Structure

Adherents of this perspective believe that circumstances force actors to react differently to each other. If the circumstances are dire enough, elites might choose to use genocide to realize their goals.

Matthew Krain examines the relationship between openings in the political opportunity structure and political violence. He argues that "political violence is a function of the political opportunities and constraints of the immediate political environment" (Krain 333). Potential openings in the political opportunity structure can be: civil wars, international wars, regime

change and the like. More generally though, he argues that a political opening can be any opening in the access to political participation, ruling alignment shifts, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages between elites (Krain 333). Elites often try to maintain the status quo, as the status quo benefitted them, so any challenge to the political opportunity structure is met with resistance (Krain 333). Furthermore, elites attempt to minimize potential opportunities that could challenge the system. This leads to a climate that is comfortable with the status quo and would not appreciate a large change. Therefore, one can expect that the greater the challenge, the greater the resistance.

Krain argues that when the configurations of power change in society actors will have to change their strategies to realize the specific goals that they wish to attain (Krain 333). Structural shifts change the costs of actions which makes particular actions more or less viable (Krain 333). During these pockets of political opportunity, elites must act swiftly and strongly to consolidate power within their ranks. Even when the elites do not intend to commit genocide, they must consolidate power in order to function as a competent state. A state needs to be able to protect itself, enforce laws, and raise taxes. Without a consolidated power, this becomes impossible. Indeed, if the elites fail to consolidate their power, they may face stronger challengers of their power, because the political opportunity structure is still open. Most often, the elites will react to openings in the political opportunity structure by either attempting to accommodate challengers or by closing openings in the political opportunity structure. However, sometimes the elite feel that accommodation or small-scale or medium-scale repression would not sufficiently eliminate the threat. In these cases, elites can choose to resort to state-sponsored mass-murder. These elites “remove the threat posed by an opening in the

political opportunity structure by eliminating all those who might take advantage of that opening" (Krain 333). Krain found the strongest correlation between potential political opportunities and genocide was a civil war.

Analysis of the Literature

Although many of these theories seem to be preconditions for a genocide, most do not explain why a genocide occurs when it does. Often these conditions are present in a country long before the country had a genocide. In other words, a strong feeling of ethnic hatred seems to be important for a power to target a certain group, but it does not explain *when* a particular group chooses to act. The same problem occurs with the lack of democracy literature. There is no definitive correlation that a totalitarian regime will commit a genocide. There are plenty of totalitarian regimes that have not committed genocide.[6] A lack of democracy may serve as an indicator of countries to examine more closely, but it does not mean necessarily that the country is committing genocide. Instead, I argue that Krain and Valentino offer the best explanation of *why* and *when* a genocide may occur. This is because both of these theories focus on motivations and conditions in which one group may seek to eliminate another group.

[6] It is possible that some of these totalitarian regimes have committed other human right abuses, but not specifically *genocide.*

Chapter 2- Theory and Methods

Theory

I am taking two widely- known and accepted theories of genocide that contrast each other. Benjamin Valentino argues that elites use genocide as a tool to solve their most difficult problems. Matthew Krain argues that political opportunities, such as civil wars, change the costs of certain actions, and therefore how actors within a system act. Thus, if a group poses a strong threat to elites, they may chose to use genocide to eliminate the threat. In other words, Valentino argues that elites solve their problems through genocide, and Krain argues that circumstances can force elites to use genocide.

I hypothesize that Krain's theory is a better explanation of genocide onset, because it takes into account situational evidence. Once again, I would like to quote Krain: "political violence is a function of the political structure opportunities and constraints of the immediate political environment" (Krain 333). Although elites may *want* to simply eradicate another group, they might not always be able to. The elites also need to have the correct conditions to take these steps. For example, a strong system of institutions or heavy reliance on the international community may make genocide impossible for elites. Using genocide would be too costly for them. However, during the course of a large political structure opportunity, such as a civil war, the opportunity to use genocide becomes much more feasible, because the costs of taking such action become much smaller.

Methods

I will examine this question through two qualitative case studies. I choose this method mainly because I am examining whether elites (Valentino) or political structure opportunities (Krain) are more important in determining genocide onset. If a qualitative, statistics-based approach was applied to this case, it would not adequately explain the question. This is because it is hard to quantify elite actions and political opportunities. For example, it would be hard to quantify that another group poses a threat to the elites. It could be done, but then there would most likely be problems of choosing the correct proxies and endogenity. Furthermore, statistics would not be able to tell if elites or political opportunities are more significant to the onset of genocide. There will be elements of both theories that are present, but only through a quantitative study can it be determined which one causes genocide.

There are also problems with a qualitative study. A statistical study can examine the relationship between many different factors relatively quickly, whereas a qualitative study takes much more time to determine these relationships. It is entirely possible that neither elites or openings in the political opportunity structure create the necessary conditions for genocide. Or, they could be important factors, but only a small part of the reason genocides occur. I will attempt to minimize this problem by not simply choosing one theory over the other, but rather with the idea that it is possible that neither hypothesis is an adequate explanation. During my empirical chapters, I will be open to the possibility that I will need to revise or create a new explanation for genocide onset.

For my case studies, I chose Germany and Guatemala. I chose these cases from a most different system approach. The theory behind choosing a different systems approach is that if a hypothesis holds true between two such different cases, it is more likely that it is not some

unknown factor causing the phenomenon but rather it is more likely that the hypothesis is true. For example, had I chosen Germany and Armenia as my case studies, it is possible that the genocides in these countries were not caused by elites or openings in the political opportunity structure but rather a strong economy and a relatively similar geography. By choosing German and Guatemala, the study is enriched by their differences. Germany is located in Western Europe. Western Europe is a cultural and political power in the world. Europe is a strong and relatively stable continent, and some of the countries are the most powerful in the world. Germany does not have an indigenous population, and had had a relatively stable democratic government. Guatemala, on the other hand, is located in Central America. Central America is a very poor area of the world and has little, if any political power on the international level. It has a long history of colonialism and poverty. Guatemala had a very poor economy, had an indigenous population (the Maya), and had a series of dictators and political upheavals. The Holocaust occurred from 1933 to 1945 which is much earlier and longer than the Maya genocide which occurred from 1981 to 1983. For a majority of the Holocaust Germany, from 1939 to 1945, Germany was officially engaged in an external war, even though there were offensive moves beforehand. Guatemala was embroiled in a long civil war from 1960 to 1996. These are just some of the differences between these two cases to illustrate that these two cases do not share many commonalities. Thus, they are a good pairing, because it shows that it is unlikely that some unknown factor common to both is actually the impetus to genocide onset.

Definitions-

For the purposes of this paper, these will be the definitions used.

Genocide- Unlike the U.N. Genocide Convention, I believe that the term genocide should be reserved for actual instances of murder. I personally prefer Rummel's definition but it is for democide, so I will adapt it for genocide by using part of the U.N. Genocide Convention. *Genocide is the intentional killing to destroy, in part or in whole, an unarmed ethnic, racial or religious group, or the responsibility for a ethnic, racial, or religious group's death as though death was intended (such as forced labor and deprivation through a work camp).*

Elites- Both of my theories focus on the actions of the elites, and thus this term needs to be defined. I will define *elites as leaders in a society whom have the power to make decisions on behalf of others in the society and have the ability to organize and use force.*

Actors- *Actors are any person or organized group that operates within the state, or depending on the situation, an external group or person that influences the state.*

Chapter 3- Germany Case Study

Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss the German Holocaust (1939 to 1945) in the context of the two theories, Krain and Valentino. I will discuss both the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical approach. It is my intention that through the discussion of the events in the German genocide, it can be determined whether either theory is an adequate explanation for the onset of genocide in these two very different cases. By closely examining the theories and the case study, I hope that the international community will gain a better understanding of what can create the correct conditions for genocide. By determining what the necessary conditions for genocide are, it is more likely that genocides can be prevented in the future.

When one thinks of genocide, many people would first think of the German Holocaust. The Holocaust is very well-known partly because it occurred in a modern country located in Europe. The Holocaust also occurred during an international war that a large portion of the world was involved in. During the German Holocaust, there were many domestic and international pressures that created the current conditions for genocide. But what factors were actually salient for genocide? Through the theories of Matthew Krain and Benjamin Valentino I intend to sort through the events leading up to the Holocaust in order to determine what created the genocide.

In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss internal events in German that occurred and therefore could have helped cause the German genocide. I will then discuss how both Krain and Valentino would view these events and which events would be particularly salient to their

theoretical approaches. During this section I will compare and contrast the two theories and determine which, if either theory explained the German Holocaust better. Then I will discuss external influences on the German Holocaust. I will once again take both Krain and Valentino's theories and discuss how these external influences lead to genocide. Finally, I will take both internal and external factors and judge them within the context of Krain and Valentino. During this section, I will determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of both theories and discuss whether either theory is a sufficient explanation for the onset of genocide in the German case. It should be noted that this chapter does not intend to be a comprehensive history of Germany before the Holocaust. Instead, I have carefully selected key moments and events that may have led to the genocide. Through discussing these events, I hope to find a pattern and a plausible explanation for why such a tragedy occurred.

Treaty of Versailles

The Treaty of Versailles was the peace agreement after World War I. The Treaty of Versailles was and is considered by some experts to be too harsh (See Martel, Keynes etc.). The Treaty of Versailles is a large treaty, consisting of 438 articles, not including various annexes. To many scholars, the Treaty of Versailles is seen as a major contributor to the rise of Nazi socialism.

The Treaty of Versailles was written in January 1919 with delegates from almost three dozen Allied nations. This was the first "great war" in history, and these peacemakers had a lot of work:

> Delegates not only had to discuss complex and sensitive territorial, financial, and military terms for Germany and its World War I allies, but they also had to redraw the maps of Easter and Central Europe and the Middle East, in the wake of the wartime collapse of the vast Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Turkish Ottoman empires. This task was greatly complicated by long-standing ethnic and religious resentments and rivalries among the inhabitants of these regions. Slavicek 8

Still, even though the Germans had lost the war, they felt as if the terms of the treaty would be manageable. The Germans felt that their army was not actually defeated. because the German Army had surrendered before Germany had been invaded. Instead, they believed because the German Army had surrendered before they were ever invaded that they could have won the war. This was a belief that was aided by senior officials of the German army (Evans 61). These German Army officials created a myth and culture that propagated a belief in the infallibility of the German Army.

The new German government, which was in the process of changing from a monarchy to a democracy, did not expect that the terms of peace would be as harsh as they were (Schulze 165). Germany was forced to return 13 percent of its territory, such as Alsace-Lorraine, which Germany had ruled for almost 50 years (Evans 62). Germany was also forced to give up Poland. Germany felt that this territory was part of their country, and was not occupied territory.[7] Allied forces occupied much of the Rhineland, which was the heart of Germany's industry. The Germans resented this move, as the occupation made them no longer a completely sovereign country. Germany was also forced to demobilize the majority of their military, navy, and air

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[7] Therefore, when Germany invaded Poland in 1939, they believed that the invasion was not aggressive but rather that the Poles had stolen the land from them after reparations after WWI.

force (See Versailles Treaty, part V, particularly articles 160, 165, 181, 183, 187, 198, and 203). I quote the Treaty of Versailles here in length so that it is clear how restricting the Treaty of Versailles was on the German military.

ARTICLE 160.

1. By a date which must not be later than March 31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry. After that date the total number of effectives in the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers.
   The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed four thousand.
2. Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs shall be organized in accordance with Table No. 1 annexed to this Section.The number and strengths of the units of infantry, artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in the aforesaid Table constitute maxima which must not be exceeded.
   The following units may each have their own depot:
   An Infantry regiment; A Cavalry regiment; A regiment of Field Artillery; A battalion of Pioneers.
3. The divisions must not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarters staffs.The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or of other organizations for the command of troops or for preparation for war is forbidden.
   The Great German General Staff and all similar organizations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.
   The officers, or persons in the position of officers, in the Ministries of War in the different States in Germany and in the Administrations attached to them, must not exceed three hundred in number and are included in the maximum strength of four thousand laid down in the third sub-paragraph of paragraph (1) of this Article.

ARTICLE 165.

The maximum number of guns, machine guns, trench-mortars, rifles and the amount of ammunition and equipment which Germany is allowed to maintain during the period between the coming into force of the present Treaty and the date of March 31, 1920, referred to in Article 160, shall bear the same proportion to the amount authorized in Table No. III annexed to this Section as the strength of the German Army as reduced from time to time in accordance with Article 163 bears to the strength permitted under Article 160.

ARTICLE 181.

After the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the German naval forces in commission must not exceed:

6 battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in Article 190.

No submarines are to be included.

All other warships, except where there is provision to the contrary in the present Treaty, must be placed in reserve or devoted to commercial purposes.

ARTICLE 183.

After the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the total personnel of the German Navy, including the manning of the Deet, coast defenses, signal stations, administration and other land services, must not exceed fifteen thousand, including officers and men of all grades and corps,

The total strength of officers and warrant officers must not exceed fifteen hundred.

Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the personnel in excess of the above strength shall be demobilized.

No naval or military corps or reserve force in connection with the Navy may be organized in Germany without being included in the above strength.

From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty all the German surface warships which are not in German ports cease to belong to Germany, who renounces all rights over them.

Vessels which, in compliance with the Armistice of November 11, 1918, are now interned in the ports of the Allied and Associated Powers are declared to be finally surrendered.

Vessels which are now interned in neutral ports will be there surrendered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The German Government must address a notification to that effect to the neutral Powers on the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 187.

The German auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries enumerated below will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships.

INTERNED IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES:

Berlin. Santa Fe. Seydlitz. Yorck.

IN GERMANY:

Ammon. Answald. Bosnia. Cordoba. Cassel. Dania. Rio Negro. Rio Pardo. Santa Cruz. Schwaben. Solingen. Steigerwald. Franken. Gundomar. Furst Bulow. Gertrud. Kigoma. Rugia. Santa Elena. Schleswig. Mowe. Sierra Ventana. Chemnitz. Emil Georg von Strauss. Habsburg. Meteor. Waltraute. Scharnhorst.

ARTICLE 198.

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces.

Germany may, during a period not extending beyond October 1, 1919, maintain a maximum number of one hundred seaplanes or flying boats, which shall be exclusively employed in searching for submarine mines, shall be furnished with the necessary equipment for this purpose, and shall in no case carry arms, munitions or bombs of any nature whatever.

In addition to the engines installed in the seaplanes or flying boats above mentioned, one spare engine may be provided for each engine of each of these craft.

No dirigible shall be kept.

ARTICLE 203.

All the military, naval and air clauses contained in the present Treaty, for the execution of which a time-limit is prescribed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The Germans were angered by the terms of the treaty, because they felt that they were crippled (Schulze 165). Indeed, the Germans felt that their once powerful army was no more than a police force. There was a strong feeling that the Treaty of Versailles was a strong attack against a defenseless German state, because the German government was not part of the negotiations of Versailles (Schulze 166). Instead, Germany was relatively at the mercy of the

Allies. The Germans felt that they did not have any defense against the Western might, who, from the German perspective, were trying to arbitrarily cripple Germany. The following picture is a protest poster against the Versailles Treaty. The main caption says what will we lose! It then says that Germany will lose 20% of its production regions, 10% of its population, 1/3 of its coal production, 1/4 of their potato production, 4/5 of their iron reserve, and completely their colonies and naval fleet. [8]



This poster demonstrates that the German people were outraged at the impeding territorial loss and that they considered the territory that they would lose part of their German motherland. In this particular poster, it seems that it was more important and devastating that they were losing

[8] Louis Oppenheimer, was wir verlieren sollen! (What we will lose) retrieved from the Library of Congress.

population and territory than their colonies and fleet. However, this could just simply be portrayed in this light because other posters stressed the loss of their military, or that these domestic issues would motivate and politicize a war-weary German people more than imperialism or the loss of military would.

One of the most devastating blows against Germany was the war reparations. The Reparations Commission of the postwar Entente powers calculated a sum that included the estimated total war damages and how much each Allied country would have to pay in benefits to their veterans. According to articles 248 and 249 of the Treaty of Versailles, the German government had to pay for the cost of the Allied occupational forces in Germany:

ARTICLE 248.

Subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may approve, a first charge upon all the assets and revenues of the German Empire and its constituent States shall be the cost of reparation and all other costs arising under the present Treaty or any treaties or agreements supplementary thereto or under arrangements concluded between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers during the Armistice or its extensions.

Up to May 1, 1921, the German Government shall not export or dispose of, and shall forbid the export or disposal of, gold without the previous approval of the Allied and Associated Powers acting through the Reparation Commission.

ARTICLE 249.

There shall be paid by the German Government the total cost of all armies of the Allied and Associated Governments in occupied German territory from the date of the signature of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, including the keep of men and beasts, lodging and billeting, pay and allowances, salaries and wages, bedding, heating, lighting, clothing, equipment, harness and saddlery, armament and rolling-stock, air services, treatment of sick and wounded, veterinary and remount services, transport service of all sorts (such as by rail, sea or river, motor lorries), communications and correspondence, and in general the cost of all administrative or technical services the working of which is necessary for the training of troops and for keeping their numbers up to strength and preserving their military efficiency.

The cost of such liabilities under the above heads so far as they relate to purchases or requisitions by the Allied and Associated Governments in the occupied territories shall be paid by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Governments in marks at the current or agreed rate of exchange. All other of the above costs shall be paid in gold marks.

Not only did Germany have to pay for all war damages, they also had to pay for the Allied forces that were occupying their sovereign state. All in all, the total war reparations were 132 billion gold marks (Schulze 170). The German government tried to negotiate these terms, however the Allies did not concede many of their points. Indeed, when the French government believed that the Germans would not uphold the reparations, they invaded Germany and took the coal mines by force. On January 11, 1923, French and Belgian troops invaded and occupied the Ruhr district, which had the largest coal mines (Schulze 171). Powerless to formally protest against the occupation, the German government encouraged political parties and labour unions who called for a strike against the foreign occupiers (Schulze 171). Because of these strikes, the people of the Ruhr region required governmental assistance to survive. The German government, which was already bankrupt from a war and reparations and was during the Great Depression, entered into a period of high economic inflation (Schulze 171).[9]

The fall of the Weimar Republic

The Weimar Republic was founded in 1918-1919 and ended in 1932-1933. The precise dates are contended, as there were multiple events during these years that could have marked the beginning and ending of the Republic (Heiber 1). However, the generally accepted dates are

[9] The Great Depression will be discussed in further detail later in the paper. The author felt that it was crucial to make the connection between the Ruhr occupation and its strain on the fragile German democracy in this section.

November 9th, 1918, when the Kaiser abdicated his position to January 30th, 1933 when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany.

The Weimar Republic was the state that was before the Third Reich. The Weimar Republic ended in 1933, and the 'official' start of the Holocaust was in 1939. The Weimar Republic created some of the correct conditions for genocide. The Weimar Republic was a weak democracy that was plagued by rightist elements in the government who wanted to return to a pre-1918 Imperialist state. Because it had a dysfunctional economy and political system, it created the correct setting for mass mobilization and support of the Right. It was no mistake that the Nazis were relatively well-supported in 1939. Instead, it was a carefully crafted political mechanism that gave the Nazis the political momentum that would thrust Germany into the Third Reich.

Nazi Propaganda

Adolf Hitler was an engaging and dynamic public speaker. His speeches were filled with hope and promises of a better future, and in economic terms, he did secure stability and even prosperity. Hitler restored the German economy, rearmed Germany, and reversed much of the humiliation from the Treaty of Versailles. This made him enormously popular (Fischel 29). Much of the Right's support base was created by those who were mostly interested in safety and stability (Weitz 332). They were swayed to the Right's cause because the Nazis offered a compelling story and vision for what Germany could be under their control.

One popular thing that Hitler advocated for was the unification of German blood. Specifically, he meant that Austria and Germany should be united into one country (Hitler 1).

His argument for the unification of Germany and Austria is characterized with antagonistic and nationalistic rhetoric:

> Deutschösterreich muß wieder zurück zum großen deutschen Mutterlande, und zwar nicht aus Gründen irgendwelcher wirtschaftlichen Erwägungen heraus. Nein, nein: Auch wenn diese Vereinigung, wirtschaftlich gedacht, gleichgültig, ja selbst wenn sie schädlich wäre, sie müßte dennoch stattfinden. Gleiches Blut gehört in ein gemeinsames Reich. Das deutsche Volk besitzt solange kein moralisches Recht zu kolonialpolitischer Tätigkeit, solange es nicht einmal seine eigenen Söhne in einem gemeinsamen Staat zulassen vermag. Erst wenn des Reiches Grenze auch den letzten Deutschen umschließt, ohne mehr die Sicherheit seiner Ernährung bieten zu können, ersteht aus der Not des eigenen Volkes das moralische Recht zur Erwerbung fremden Grund und Bodens. Der Pflug ist dann das Schwert, und aus den Tränen des Krieges erwächst für die Nachwelt das tägliche Brot. Hitler 1
>
> (Germany-Austria must go back to a great German Motherland and that should not be stopped because of any economic considerations. No, no: even if this reunification was economically passive, even if it was damaging, it must nevertheless take place. Same blood belongs in the same empire. The German people possess no moral right to be colonial powers, while its own sons are not capable of being in the same state. When the empire's borders contains the last German, and when the safety can no longer satisfy their needs, stands the right out of necessity of their own people the moral right to the acquisition of foreign grounds and soils. The plow is now the sword, and out of the tears of wars grows for the afterworld the daily bread.)

The Right was also successful in creating a ‘common language‘ that united the diverse groups that made it up and delivered powerful concepts. Such words were “*Volkstum* [The essence of German blood is moral and hardworking], *Deutschtum* [Similar to *Volkstum*], *Überfremdung* [Jews and Poles overfilling Germany], *Dolchstoß* [Jews stabbing Germany in the back, especially during WWI], *Diktat von Versailles* [Treaty of Versailles], *Schieberrepublik* [The Weimar Republic is a Jewish system of exploitation], *Schmährepublik* [The Republic that sullies the German blood/identity], *Judenrepublik* [Weimar Republic is a Jewish Republic], *Kampf* [struggle against the illegitimate Germans and Weimar Republic], *Drittes Reich, [und] Führer* [A leader that embodies the essence of German blood and destiny] (Weitz 333).” This common language was distributed through public speeches, in church sermons, and in novels and pamphlets. The Nazis sought out the public, and created a massive publicity culture. For example, in Thalburg, a mid-sized Hannoverian town, held Nazi informational seminars almost every other week (Weitz 346). By creating a nearly constant stream of largely anti-semitic informational sessions, the Nazis created a culture that became swayed by the anti-semitic sentiments. The information was so wide-spread, that it was almost impossible to escape, and almost impossible to ignore. There were no shortage of problems that post-1918 Germany faced, and the Nazis supplied a ‘plausible’ aggressor, the Jew. In the context of the political and economic crises that surrounded the Weimar Republic, these ultra-nationalistic sentiments became extremely powerful. It gave Germans hope that even though things were particularly bad, it was not their fault or the fault of their governments, but rather it was the fault of the betrayers, the Jews.

To a Nazi, the Jew was the pinnacle of evil. This was not a sentiment that they were shy about or hid. They were quite explicit about their hatred of Jews "Nazi propaganda depicted the Jews in the same way as the devil was imagined during the Middle Ages. Just as witches were construed as minions of Satan and were burned at the stake, the Nazis viewed Jews as agents of bolshevism and international finance" (Fischel xxxvi). The Jew was the handy scapegoat for all of the problems that were present in the Weimar years. The Jews were considered the force behind every action that was against Germany's alleged right to success. Even if it seems impossible that the Jews were truly behind these forces, Hitler believed that it was the Jews: "Hitler believed that both bolshevism and democracy were Jewish inventions. Following the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, Hitler considered himself at war with the Jews through their proxies the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union" (Fischel xxxiii). Through the anti-Semitic propaganda distributed by the Nazis, these ideas were expressed. It was handy to blame the Jews for the problems that the country faced, because by blaming the Jews, the Nazis and their audiences did not have to consider that they themselves may be at fault for the failings of Germany. Instead, they could find a common enemy and destroy that enemy.

The Weimar Republic allowed the Nazis to distribute their ideas of a culturally and morally superior German, or Aryan. It was because this perfect blood was sullied by those who wished to destroy Germany, namely Jews, that Germany was stripped of its world power status. It was because of their Jewish enemies that there were problems in Germany. It was *not* the fault of faithful Germans. Because the Nazis were able to use free speech inherent in the ideals of the Weimar Republic culture, they were able to create a much larger power base. The political

freedom and opening that the Weimar Republic afforded the Nazis allowed them to become much more powerful than they had been previously.

Political Turmoil and the Creation of a Larger Nazi Power Base

The Weimar Republic was a democracy, and was the first democracy in German history. Previously, Germany had been Prussia, an imperialist monarchy state under the control of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In 1918, Prussia was turned into a democracy, but it did have its enemies. Just because the German state changed its form of government does not mean that all of its people wanted the change. There were Communist critics, but unlike Russia, these critics never became large players in the Republic because they lacked the required funds and support. Instead, the Right became the players that were against the Weimar Republic and were instrumental in its downfall (Weitz 331). Some of the most powerful institutions in the Weimar Republic were controlled by the Right. These institutions were the Protestant and Catholic Churches, the army, the state bureaucracy, the industrial and financial sectors, and schools and universities (Weitz 331). Supporters of Democracy in the Weimar government had attempted to change some of its personnel to those who believed in democracy, but it was largely unsuccessful. The only institution that was able to turn over some of its personnel was in the public sector. However, even in this institution, many of the positions were dominated by people who were against democracy. All of these institutions had people at the top and middle-levels who preferred the pre-1918 imperial system. This particular officials had marked anti-democratic tendencies (Weitz 331). During the Weimar Republic, these people with outspoken anti-democratic tendencies had the opportunity to build new organizations such as parties and associations that

advocated a violent use of politics. These types of parties and associations would come together in the early 1930s to form the Nazi Party (Weitz 332).

The Radical Right had changed its tactics after seeing how modern politics worked in WWI. Although some still advocated for a return to a monarchy, the majority had lost its faith in the power of a monarchy. Instead they advocated for a strong leader with the power of mass mobilization (Weitz 332). The Right was willing and had previously advocated for violence against revolutionary forces. It had also largely become anti-Semitic. They felt that the Weimar Republic had created a morally bankrupt country and that they wanted to regain the prestige they felt Germany had wield before the Treaty of Versailles. To correct this moral failing and to regain the prestige they felt that Germany deserved, the old elites were willing to apply ‘modern‘ strategies to combat the liberal elements of Weimar. These modern strategies were: favoring a strong and dynamic authoritarian leader over a monarch, using rhetoric and mass mobilization to convince the public of their cause, and using violence when necessary to achieve their goals.

When Heinrich Brüning, a member of the Right, became Chancellor in 1930, he advocated for an authoritarian political system. He used article 48 of the Weimar Constitution which states:

(1) Wenn ein Land die ihm nach der Reichsverfassung oder den Reichsgesetzen obliegenden Pflichten nicht erfüllt, kann der Reichspräsident es dazu mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht anhalten.

(2) Der Reichspräsident kann, wenn im Deutschen Reich die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung erheblich gestört oder gefährdet wird, die zur Wiederherstellung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung nötigen Maßnahmen treffen, erforderlichenfalls mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht einschreiten. Zu diesem Zwecke darf er vorübergehend die in den Artikeln 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 und 153 festgesetzten Grundrechte ganz oder zum Teil außer Kraft setzen.

(3) Von allen gemäß Abs. 1 oder Abs. 2 dieses Artikels getroffenen Maßnahmen hat der Reichspräsident unverzüglich dem Reichstag Kenntnis zu geben. Die Maßnahmen sind auf Verlangen des Reichstages außer Kraft zu setzen.

(4) Bei Gefahr im Verzuge kann die Landesregierung für ihr Gebiet einstweilige Maßnahmen der in Abs. 2 bezeichneten Art treffen. Die Maßnahmen sind auf Verlangen des Reichspräsidenten oder des Reichstages außer Kraft zu setzen.

(5) Das Nähere bestimmt ein Reichsgesetz.

Paraphrased in English, Article 48 allowed Brüning to declare a national emergency and rule Germany through decree. Although he had to consult the Reichstag, for the most part Germany was ruled by a presidential dictatorship (Weitz 351). Brüning wanted to force Germany out of the Depression by balancing the budget by large spending cuts and not helping private businesses (Weitz 350). The Reichstag was divided on his policies, and he called for new elections, because he felt that the public would agree with his plans. However, he did not consider that his plans did not address short-term needs of the people. The elections held on September 1930 allowed the Nazi Party to win 18.3 percent (107 seats) of the Reichstag.

Hindenburg, who was the President of the Weimar Republic from 1925 to 1934, was largely supported by the Center and the Right. He was adored "as a figure of masculine prowess, order, and stability, and a link to the bygone imperial age. The most that can be said of him is that he did not actively undermine the republic during his presidency, and he took seriously his oath to the constitution. But the election of a general who, in his most fundamental beliefs, was hostile to democracy made a travesty of the republic" (Weitz 352). Hindenburg was approached with the scheme to make Hitler the Chancellor by his advisors and prominent businessmen, who were mostly conservatives who wanted to overthrow democracy from within (Weitz 357). They wanted to restore Germany's world power status world-wide and the creation of of an

authoritarian system domestically. "The established Right was not enthralled with Hitler and the Nazis, who remained too radical and unpredictable. But after all the failed plans and with Germany still, formally, a republic, still mired in depression, still living under the strictures of Versailles, Hitler and the Nazis had become acceptable to the established conservatives and large segments of the middle class" (Weitz 357). In the Weimar Republic, some of the most influential elites were conservatives who were not happy with the foundation of a democracy. Instead, they wanted to return to a Germany that was more authoritarian in nature. Although they did not necessarily want Hitler and the Nazis from the outset, they realized that Hitler had the political capacity to change Weimar into the authoritarian state that they desired. These more central conservatives became willing to give the power to Hitler, which Hitler accepted. The Nazis and Hitler rose to the power because circumstances created the correct conditions for their rise.

The Rise of Anti-Semitism

One of the most influential radical right thinkers was Oswald Spengler, who wrote *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* [*The Decline of the West*]. He argued that when a race became soft, their culture would decline. Spengler argued that the German race had become soft, which is why the German state had encountered so many problems after World War I. To combat this trend a new and strong leader needed to arise to lead his people into a new era. He also argued that socialism should be combined with nationalism. Socialism in Spenglerian terms argued for self-discipline and sacrifice for the country. Through a strict self-discipline the German people could become great once more. His work argued for a militarized German state that would seek out and destroy its enemies. These enemies were the Jews. This is an opening in the political

opportunity structure, because it is an extraconstitutional change. The Jews were not afforded the same civil rights that the rest of the population was given. A majority of civil society began to align with anti-Semitic parties and political stances, so that when the Nazis killed Jews, it was less likely that the society would protest. Although many did not actually want to kill the Jews, the hatred was present. Hitler did not specifically state in his rhetoric that he wanted to kill Jews. Instead, he played on the anti-Semitic feelings of the people:

> During the era of the Weimar Republic (1919-1935), Hitler's rhetorical outbursts against the Jews were calculated to feed on the anti-Semitism of millions of Germans, but he fell short of calling for their annihilation. Hitler's anti-Jewish beliefs were more extreme than those of the average German, but he cloaked his radicalism by appeal to the more traditional forms of anti-Semitism. Many Germans harbored anti-Semitic feelings and likely would not have objected to the removal of Jewish citizenship rights or their segregation from the rest of the population. But outside of Nazi Party ranks, there was no massive popular agitation to expel jews from Germany or to unleash violence against them. Fischel 1

No one could mistake that the Nazi party was against Jews. It was clearly apparent as one of their central philosophies and motivations for their political party. However, they were able to speak widely and broadly about this ethnic hatred, and still gain political momentum. It seems that very few, if any people outside of the Jewish faith protested against the treatment of Jews. Knowing full-well about the Nazi's hatred of Jews, the Germans voted in increasing numbers for their rise to political power.

Some of the most influential civil society members were anti-Semitic. About 70 to 80 percent of Protestant clergy were aligned with anti-Semitic political parties during the Weimar Republic (Fischel 17). The clergy is supposed to exhibit a moral and just standard of behavior for their congregations. The clergy is supposed to have a final ruling on what constitutes moral behavior, and their stances serve as an example to be followed. When a clergy acts in a certain way, it is an example to be followed. When the majority of clergymen agree on something, it seems almost infallible and just. By choosing, in high numbers, to be part of anti-Semitic political parties, the moral crux of Germany deemed anti-Semitism to be a good, or even honorable way of life. The clergy could have chosen to be neutral towards Jews, but instead they chose an explicitly agonistic stance towards an entire people. Although these clergy may have not supported annihilation of the Jewish people, they did support rhetoric and political parties that blamed them for the failings of the Weimar Republic and the Treaty of Versailles. By choosing to align with such political parties, the clergy in affect helped create a culture of intolerance towards the Jews.

Furthermore, the civil society allowed for outright lies to be spoken against the Jews. Jews were often criticized for not protecting their country during World War I. The Nazis proclaimed that no Jews had joined the army. They were accused of cowardliness and avoiding their duty as members of the German state. However, records show that about 18% of the German Jewish population had actually served in World War I. Hitler had even had his life saved by a Jewish comrade, however these acts of heroism were ignored. Even as these lies were being said, the army refused to acknowledge that Jews had actually fought in World War I (Fischel 8). By allowing lies about Jews to be proclaimed, the army agreed and supported the

rise of anti-semitism. They allowed for misinterpretations and for hatred to flourish, because it was portrayed that the Jews did not defend their country. By saying nothing, the army helped to create an opening for the political ambitions of the Nazis. The Nazis were able to capitalize on the hatred of the Jews to rise to power. No one helped to rectify the Jewish perception in society. Instead, important leaders helped to propagate the myth of Jewish betrayal.

Domestic Policies

When the Nazis rose to power in 1933, they did not immediately start killing Jews. Instead, there were internal policies that created the correct conditions for genocide. It is still debated what happened, but when the *Reichstag* was burned down, a trigger of extreme policies were enacted. The *Reichstag* created a political opportunity that allowed the Nazis to justify harsher actions against the Jewish population. *Kristallnacht* was a deliberate attack on the Jewish people, that largely went unchallenged. It gave Nazis the impression that there would be little, if any, resistance to further and harsher measures against the Jews. Finally, the Nuremberg Laws created a precedent of inhuman measures against the Jews. They were no longer people, but rather they were Jews, a class that was lower than human. All of this events created conditions that were very antagonistic to the Jewish population. These events created the conditions that it would be better if the Jews were simply no longer present in German society.

Kristallnacht

Kristallnacht (Night of Crystal), occurred on November 9th and 10th, 1938. It was a pogrom against the Jewish people throughout Germany and its conquered territories at the time.[10]

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[10] Austria and the Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia)

The night gets its name from the shards of glass that lined the streets, smashed from the windows of temples and Jewish-owned homes and businesses. The Germans released a statement that stated *Kristallnacht* was a spontaneous public outrage against the Jews because of the assassination of Ernst vom Rath, a German embassy official. He was shot while he was in Paris, by a young Jew. The young Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, had shot the German official as revenge, because the Germans had evicted all Polish Jews from Germany, no matter how long they had lived there.[11]

The result was that hundreds of Jewish stores were attacked and looted, 90 Jews were killed, 30,000 were imprisoned in concentration camps or Gestapo prisons for 'protective custody' (Fischel 25). This night was seen as the government legitimizing violence against the Jews (Fischel 24). German insurance companies were not held responsible for the damages done during Kristallnacht- the Jews were held responsible (Fischel 25). Herman Rauschning (Nazi politician)- "The reaction of the German people to the pogroms of the fall of 1938 shows how far Hitler has led them in five years and how much he has degraded them." (Fischel 26)

The Wannsee Conference

Many people inside and outside the government knew that Jews were being killed in the Soviet Union, but very few knew that the goal was total extermination of the Jews in Europe (Fischel 45). This process would be a large and consuming project, so Hitler could not expect to carry out this plan in secret. Therefore, he needed the complete cooperation of his government. Heydrich invited the state secretaries to attend a meeting to coordinate the Final Solution (Fischel 45). They met in a suburb of Berlin on January 20th, 1942. Jews in the East would be

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[11] See Section 2.4.1 for more details on the Poland-German Jew situation

used for labor, with the expectation that most of them would die from the harsh work conditions. There might be a few that survived and they would have to be contained. Those that survive will be eliminated, because they "can be regarded as the germ cell of a new Jewish reconstruction if released" (Fischel 45). The goal was to eliminate every single Jew in Europe and the British Isles, and this meant that they condemned about 11 million to death. None of the officials acted with horror. Instead, they were cooperative and even enthusiastic to annihilate the Jews from Europe (Fischel 46).

This was a political opening because the extermination of the Jews was well-supported by the bureaucracy of the state. Not a single official objected to the impending genocide. There was no second-guessing the decision to kill all of the Jews. Instead, there was enthusiasm and excitement. This shows how anti-semitic the German state had become, and clearly demonstrated to Hitler that there would no resistance.

The Failure and Complicity of the International Community

The International Community was instrumental in creating the correct conditions for genocide. As the conditions worsened in Germany, Jews had to make decisions about what they wanted to do. Some Jews refused to leave, believing that a watchful outside world would prevent any Nazi excesses (Fischel 10). Some Jews attempted to flee and seek refugee in foreign countries, but were largely discouraged from doing so. Many countries put quotas on how many Jews that they would accept in a given year. By doing this, the international community allowed for Jews to remain in Germany as the country became increasingly radical. Also, because the major powers became involved in a war with Germany, Germany was unable to move Jews to

Madagascar as they had planned. Although this is not necessarily a failure of the international community, it is a result of the world war that the international community was part of. Finally, The International Community, specifically the United States also funded the precursor to the Final Solution, the Eugenics Program. The Eugenics Program sought to remove from society any members that were deemed 'unworthy'. This project was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. Because this project was funded and fully acknowledged by international actors, it reduced the political costs of such a project. Support of the eugenics program demonstrated to the Nazis that killing undesirables was acceptable and even considered pioneering. It demonstrated that the international community may not care if Jews are murdered. In fact, they could even support such a measure. Therefore, this lowered the costs of killing Jews, because the Nazis could reasonably expect non-interference from the international community.

The Rise of Quota Systems for Jewish Refugees

The international community, after World War I was dealing with domestic issues instead of occupied with the German situation. There were tremendous strains on their internal domestic situations, and they could not commit to absorbing the Jews affected by the Nazis. However, by ignoring the increasingly antagonistic situation, the international community created the belief that the Jews did not really matter. South Africa denied 93% of refugee applicants. Palestine, a logical and desired refugee locale, enacted a visa quota. They only allowed 75,000 refugees over a 5-year period (Fischel 27). One of the most harmful measures enacted was in Poland. The Polish government decided that Jews living abroad now needed a special stamp. They would not give this stamp to ex-patriates that have been living abroad for longer than five years. Germany

retaliated by arresting most of its Polish Jew population. Poland did not allow these Polish refugees back into its country until international pressure forced them to. The result was that thousands of Polish Jews were concentrated on the border, with no home or state (Fischel 25). In May 1939, about 900 Jewish refugees went to Havana and were refused entry because of invalid permits. Jewish- American organizations petitioned the U.S. government, but they were not listened to, the Jews had to return to Europe and emigrate to Belgium, Holland and France (Fischel 29). They effectively lowered the costs of killing the Jews, because even after the Nazis used violence against the Jews, no country was willing to incorporate them into their populace. Indeed, during the hour of the Jew's greatest needs, the outbreak of World War II, Jews were not allowed to flee into many countries. When war broke out in September 1939, all immigration to the U.K. was banned, and "young adult Jewish immigrants were interned and sent to British overseas territories together with German nationals" (Fischel 27).

The Evian Conference, held in July 1938, demonstrated this reluctance to actually commit aid to the Jewish people.[12] This meeting was commissioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and had 32 countries attend. The alleged intention of this conference was to come to an international consensus of how to handle the masses of Jews fleeing Germany. However, the real purpose of this conference was to divert these refugees from the United States:

> [According to] an internal American State Department memorandum declared, the purpose of this American initiative was 'to get out in front [of liberal opinion] and attempt to guide the pressure [to increase Jewish immigration] primarily with a view to forestalling attempts to have the immigration laws liberalized.' As Arthur

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[12] "... More than one commentator has pointed out that Evian is 'naive' spelt backwards." Landau 137

> Morse reflected: 'On this noble note the Evian Conference was born. It would be months in planning, would silence the critics of apathy and, if all worked well, would divert refugees from the United States to the other co-operating nations.' Landau 137

Even though at the Conference it was made clear that the Jews faced a real problem in Germany, both the United States and Britain argued that they could not take in large amounts of Jews (Landau 137). Indeed the Evian Conference was an attempt to make it someone else's problem. Holland and Denmark were the only European countries at the conference that agreed to increase their refugee quota. However, they would soon be invaded by Germany, so this sanctuary just postponed the same situation. Further perpetuating the situation, some of the delegates professed decidedly anti-semitic responses:

> The Australian delegate informed the conference that his country had no racial problem and had no desire to import one, while the Canadian representative was reported to have said of the number of Jews his country would accept: 'None is too many!' The British representative at Evian, Lord Winterton, subsequently informed the cabinet that the Americans 'had wanted [to include] some clause of a denunciatory character towards the German government, but the British delegation under instructions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, have resisted this successfully'. Landau 138

Furthermore, the delegates of Evian sent a memorandum to Hitler that argued that none of the delegates at Evian "challenged the right of the German government to introduce measures affecting its own subjects, because such rights fell only within the province of state

sovereignty" (Landau 138). It was almost as if Hitler took this as a formal denunciation of international concern, because a month after the memorandum, *Kristallnacht* occurred.[13] By pledging to help, but ultimately not actually doing anything to help the Jews in Germany, lowered the costs of killing Jews and assured Hitler that there would be little interference from the international community.

The Failure of the Madagascar Plan

As Hitler was creating his perfect country, he had to also find a way to deal with the Jews, the people he accused of being the root of all of Germany's problems. Historians are divided on the question of whether Hitler had planned to annihilate the Jews from the beginning. There is evidence to suggest that Hitler did not actually plan on killing the Jews at the beginning. Rather, it can be argued that circumstances forced Hitler to kill the Jews. In some ways, it would have been easier for him to relocate the Jews. However, no foreign countries wanted to accept the refugees and Hitler was unable to control the sea lanes to deport the Jews. Therefore he had to kill the Jews to get rid of their 'traitorous' influence in Germany.

This situation is evident in the Madagascar Plan. First, there was the Schacht-Rublee negotiations of 1938 to 1939, during which Hitler agreed to let 100,000 young Jews to go to another country. In this plan, Hitler was basically attempting to sell the Jews for money: "In hindsight, the plan was perfectly logical from a Nazi point of view: if Jews were not really human, one could sell them rather than exorcise them- if there were someone who would buy them. The tragedy was that there was no buyer" (Bauer 41). The young Jews were allowed to

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[13] Kristallnacht's significance will be discussed in depth later. However, it is important to note that it is viewed as the first official act of state violence against the Jews.

leave Germany with only a portion of their property, and the Jews abroad would need to raise a huge sum to secure the Jew's passage from Germany (Bauer 41). However, the Jews abroad did not have the required money to free the Jews, but it was also feared that giving money to Hitler would only serve to increase his destructive power (Bauer 41). Ultimately, this negotiation did not succeed for either Hitler or the Jews.

As late as October 1940, Hitler gave the order to move the Jews of Mannheim-Pfalz in Western Germany to France. He did not send them to Poland, where a majority of the concentration and death camps would be located. This move only made sense if Hitler was planning to evict the Jews to Madagascar (Bauer 42).[14] On June 18th, 1940, Hitler informed Mussolini of his plan to move the Jews to Madagascar (Browning 18). However, for this plan to succeed, both France and Britain needed to be defeated (Browning 19). However, Germany was unable to defeat Great Britain, and subsequently control the sea lane required to reach Madagascar, so this plan fell through (Fischel 33). Browning suggests that the failure of the Madagascar Plan had an important impact on the Nazi's decision to kill the Jews:

> [Nazi leaders] were making decisions based on the Madagascar Plan as the reality of Nazi Jewish policy in the Summer of 1940. Despite the constant postponements, the self-imposed "obligation" to solve the Jewish question still weighed heavily upon the Nazis. The greater the frustration, the lower the threshold to systematic mass murder. Thus the Madagascar Plan was an important psychological step toward the Final Solution. Browning 19

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[14] It is assumed that Hitler gave an oral order to mass-murder the Jews in mid-March 1941. (Bauer 42)

The Nazis were not able to simply remove the Jews from their beloved country, so they had to consider other solutions to solve their Jewish problem. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, another front to the war was opened. This made it impossible for Hitler to spend more resources attempting to relocate the Jews to a far-away island (Fischel 37). Instead, he had to turn to a more domestic solution.

The Eugenics Program

The term "eugenics" was coined in 1883 by Sir Frances Galton from the Greek word *eugenes* which means "good in birth" (Burke and Castaneda 6). This type of science believes that it can 'perfect' society through developing scientific standards for reproduction and biological selection (ibid 6). The scientists believed that they would be able to determine who was going to live a life not worth living, and instead of allowing that tortuous existence to live, they could remove it from society. They saw their work as something that was moral and a service to the greater good. During the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea of being able to cleanse a population of impurities through science became popular.[15] This movement especially flourished internationally between World War I and World War II (Barrett and Kurzman 488). There were many projects supporting this research world-wide (Burke and Castaneda 6).

Although Hitler is infamous for creating a eugenics program as a precursor to the Final Solution, eugenics was not a concept he came up with or even pioneered. Before eugenics were used in Germany, the practice was prevalent in other parts of Europe, Latin America, and the

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[15] It should be noted that not all eugenic programs and studies advocated killing. In the United States, some programs simply advocated for improved maternal and child health care, improved education and public health (Burke and Castaneda 8).

United States (Burke and Castaneda 8). In fact, eugenicists were well-respected members of society, not only to the uneducated masses, but also to the academic and medical communities (Burke and Castaneda 8). Eugenicists were often considered to be some of the more respectable members of society, because they were using science to better society. In the United States, thirty-three states supported legislation that sterilized mentally-ill people (Burke and Castaneda 9). In figure 1, it is shown how the interest in eugenics picked up in between the world wars:[16]




Figure 1. International eugenics conferences and adoption of eugenic sterilization policies (*Sources*: See text).

It also shows how there was a strong international presence for the study and implementation of eugenic policies. The study of eugenics was not an isolated instance in Germany, rather it was an international phenomenon. Because there was an international fascination and acceptance of eugenics, it allowed Germany to foster a strong eugenics program that was the precursor for the Final Solution.

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[16] Figure 1 is taken from Barrett and Kurzman page 499

The German program was even financially sponsored by the Rockefeller Center. Furthermore, the United States also thought that there were ‘undesirables‘ and did not accept immigrants that they felt were of inferior blood (Tyner 55). The United States did not want immigrants that they viewed as not racially pure to immigrate to the United States because they were worried that if these racially inferior people immigrated to the United States it would compromise the racial purity of the United States (Tyner 59). Indeed, these socially undesirables were even seen as threats to the security of state (Tyner 59). Even Aldous Huxley, writer of the great American Novel, *Brave New World*, argued that the majority of the population was undesirable. He argued that the majority of the population was stupid, and only a small percentage of the world was intelligent. He believed that the small intelligent group should seek to dominant the masses (Woiak 105).

Krain's explanation of the German Holocaust

Krain argues that openings in the political opportunity structure can create the circumstances necessary for genocide. The time period surrounding the Holocaust was turbulent. The world was suffering a severe economic depression, had already seen one World War, and the fragile peace of the Weimar Republic was fraying. Germany, while flourishing in cultural and creativity during the Weimar Republic, was seething from the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles. At a cursory overview, it seems that Krain's explanation of genocide may have some saliency.

Although Krain does establish an important relationship between openings in the political opportunity structure and the onset of genocide, I argue that he does not consider all of the potential openings. He only considers openings in the political opportunity structure to be: civil

wars, external wars, extraconstitutional changes, or decolonization, that result in any opening in the access to political participation, ruling alignment shifts, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages between elites (Krain 333-6). He does not consider some of the international influences and decisions that can create openings in the political structure. It would be very hard to talk about the onset of the German Holocaust without considering the implications of the Treaty of Versailles, for example. The Treaty of Versailles created a charged political atmosphere that was characterized by a distinct German feeling of humiliation and anger at the Allies. Article 231 forced the Germans to assume all blame for the outset of World War I, which the German people did not feel was accurate. Furthermore, the German Army was dismantled and the Rhineland was occupied by the Allies. These actions created an atmosphere that was more agreeable to an aggressive German nationalist state, because many Germans felt as if their nationality and German identity was under attack.[17]

Krain also does not consider the effects of economic depressions or booms and their effects on political opportunities. Economics often play a critical role in politics. During the 2012 election season in the United States of America, one of the major areas of contention between the two political parties was the economic recession. The Republican Party largely built its political platform around creating new jobs. A disappointing economy created political opportunities for the political parties. At the very least, a strong economy allows for strong institutions that the state can be grounded from. A weak economy makes for a weak state. The Great Depression started in 1930, and the Holocaust followed only a few years later in 1939.

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[17] This belief was also strengthened by rhetoric from the Right and anti-semitic elements who argued that Germany was stabbed in the back by traitors, such as the Jews.

The Great Depression certainly had an effect on the rise of the Third Reich, which led to the Holocaust.

He also does not discuss how failed governments can lead to political opportunities. After World War I, Germany transitioned to the Weimar Republic, which was a very weak democratic state. It is widely considered that the Weimar Republic was a weak democracy, and in some ways allowed Hitler to rise to power. When the Weimar Republic was unable to satisfy the needs of the German people, it made the rise of the Third Reich more inevitable. Not only was the Weimar Republic weak, but it was plagued with actors who wished for nothing more than a return to a pre-1918 imperialist Germany.

However, even with the limitations of Krain's original theory, it does seem to serve as a plausible explanation for the onset of genocide in Germany. There were plenty of openings in the political opportunity structure before the Holocaust. These openings in the political opportunity structure changed the costs of the actions taken by the Nazis and other actors during the genocide. It made the costs of killing the Jews more acceptable, both to the German people and to the Nazis. Hitler and his Nazis were in many ways a reaction to the jarring political opportunities left open by WWI, the Great Depression, and the failure of the Weimar Republic. For the average German, the Nazis created a German State that could be respected again. In light of the humiliation the Germans had faced, killing the Jews to have the Nazis restore their status of being a world power was more acceptable than the humiliation of not being a world power.

Valentino's explanation of the German Holocaust

Valentino argues that elites can use genocide to solve their most difficult problems. He argues that the most significant cause of genocide was that Hitler and the Nazis believed the "Jews posed a mortal political and racial threat to the German nation" (Valentino 167). Valentino argues that Hitler believed in the claims of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which claimed that Jews were part of a vast international coalition that sought to eliminate Germany. Hitler even believed that Jews were the reason Germany had lost World War I (Valentino 167). Hitler believed that Jews were manipulating the governments of the United States, France, and England , and have even engineered the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.[18] He believed that the Jews were Marxists, and would use communism to bring down the German state (Valentino 167). He also believed that the Jews were not a religious group, but rather they were a biologically distinct group.[19] Hitler thought that the Jews were a parasitic group of people. He believed that they were unable to create their own state and thus they were attempting to take the German state for their own. The Jews infected the German race through interbreeding. Hitler feared that if nothing was done to check the Jewish infiltration, the German-Aryan race would die (Valentino 168). They became thoroughly convinced that the only course of action to save Germany was to eliminate all of the Jews from Europe. Valentino argues that genocide was *not* the first course of action sought by Hitler, but rather it was chosen after all other possibilities had been eliminated (Valentino 167).

The first phase of actions against the Jews was to remove Jews from political and biological influence. This was accomplished by abolishing Jewish political and economic rights.

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[18] Hitler believed that the Russian elite were of German descent (Valentino 167)

[19] This line of thought follows an adaption of social-Darwinist theory: "In a perverted analogy to Darwin's theory of natural selection, proponents of this thesis argued that human beings belonged to unique races competing for survival. Racial purity was the most valuable asset in this struggle" (Valentino 168).

Jews were no longer allowed to serve in government and academia. Furthermore, marriages between Jews and Germans were forbidden by law (Valentino 169). It is unlikely that the Nazis ever believed that these anti-Semitic laws would be enough to protect their interests. Instead, it seems as if they were always intended as the opening move in their offensive attack against the Jews. The second phase of Nazi action against the Jews was coerced emigration. Valentino argues that *Kristallnacht* may have been part of the Nazi plan to make it impossible for Jews to live in Germany. The Nazis also revoked Jewish German citizenship and they sanctioned organized violence against Jews. Valentino argues that the Nazis did this so that the Jews would be willing to emigrate (Valentino 169). German bureaucrats explored the possibility of creating a Jewish state in Palestine, so that Germany could remove all of their Jews (Valentino 169). By 1939, about 72 percent of Germany's five hundred thousand Jews had fled the country (Valentino 170).

However, when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, the Nazis inherited two million Jews, many more than had previously resided in Germany (Valentino 170). Hitler also invaded France, which increased the Jewish population count under Nazi control 3.7 million. Hitler wanted to repopulate Poland with ethnic Germans. This meant that the Jews and the Poles would both have to be removed. The systems of coerced emigration already in Germany was not sufficient to remove all of these new undesirables (Valentino 170). When World War II broke out, the Nazis were even more desperate to solve the Jewish problem. They believed that the reason that they had lost World War I was because the Jews had betrayed them. Therefore, to win this war, the Nazis had to eliminate their Jewish problem.

The first action was not to exterminate the Jews, but rather they concentrated Jews into some of their territories. They wanted to use the Jews for economic exploitation before they deported them. The Nazis tried to send the Jews to the Lublin area of Poland, but it was later decided that this area was needed for the resettlement of ethnic Germans (Valentino 171). However, it was hard for the Nazis to balance both the needs of *Lebensraum* and the reservation needs of Jews. Himmler and Heydrich both suggested that it would be inhuman and un-German to exterminate the Jews. Instead, they chose to construct ghettos. Many people did die on the way and at the ghettos, and the Germans did very little to improve the quality of life for these Jews. However, the Nazis did not seek to annihilate their enemies during this time (Valentino 171). The most strongly supported and researched deportation plan was Madagascar, but when the Nazis did not conquer British, the plan fell through.

When Germany decided to invade the Soviet Union, the Germans were engulfed in a two-fronted war. Valentino argues that this move increased the urgency of eliminating the Jews (Valentino 172). Hitler did not want to be involved in a two-fronted war, and largely blamed the situation on the Jews. He argued that the Jews had influenced Britain and the United States. Hitler believed that any internal German dissent with the war was because of Jewish influence. He believed that he must eliminate the Jews so that Germany could succeed in the war effort (Valentino 173). He also worried that the ghettos would create large populations of people who were against the Germans. If they were rescued, they could become combatants against the German state. Hitler also believed that he would conquer all of Europe. This would increase the Jewish population count to about 11 million. Hitler could not just simply deport them. Instead he had to eliminate them. Because he believed that the Jews were infiltrating and betraying

Germany again, Hitler felt that he could not wait until after the war to remove the Jews, he had to do it now. Valentino ends his argument with a quote from Christopher Browning, that asks some important questions, specifically to those who believe that it was always Hitler's intent to kill the Jews:

> If Hitler was merely awaiting the outbreak of conflict to pursue his 'war against the Jews,' why were the millions of Polish Jews in his hands since 1939 granted a thirty-month 'stay of execution'?... If Hitler could kill at least seventy thousand Germans through the euthanasia program between 1939 and 1941, why was it not 'opportune' to murder several hundred thousand German Jews who constituted an 'internal menace' in wartime? It certainly would have occasioned far less opposition than euthanasia. Why was this period not used to make preparations and plans for mass extermination, avoiding the clumsy improvisations of 1941? In short, the practice of Nazi Jewish policy until 1941 does not support the thesis of a long-held, fixed intention to murder the European Jews. Christopher Browning, as quoted by Valentino 176

This quote, I feel is the strongest piece of evidence that Valentino offers for his argument. I think that it cannot be argued, based on the evidence, that Hitler always wanted to kill the Jews. Instead, the question seems to become why did Hitler decide to kill the Jews in 1941?

Chapter 4- Guatemala Case Study

Introduction

Guatemala is a different country than Germany. It has a huge indigenous population that has historically been disenfranchised. Guatemala is also not a power player in the international sphere. Therefore, inherently, what happens in Guatemala has far fewer consequences for other countries than what happens in Germany. Indeed, it can be argued that Guatemala was seen by more powerful countries such as the United States of America as an economic opportunity rather than a sovereign country. Additionally, the regions that Guatemala belongs to, Central and South America are not as economically or politically stable as Europe. The instability of the region surrounding Guatemala certainly contributed to the instability within Guatemala.

There are similarities that also exist between the two countries. First, they both experienced a genocide against a disenfranchised group of society. Both dictators during the genocides believed that the genocide was justified because the Jews and Maya threatened the security and safety of the state. Both of these dictators had heavily militarized states that allowed them to try to kill an entire ethnic group.

Domestic openings in the political opportunity structure

Guatemala has always been a poor country and has had a history of military dictatorships. It is a country of extreme income inequality, and ethnic discrimination. It has also largely been a playing ground for the United States. It is a country that has a large mountainous region and a historical reliance on coffee and banana exports. Finally, the country has had to cope with a long

civil war that turned into a genocide against the Mayan people. Guatemala did not chose its conditions, but the conditions have shaped its fate. In a lot of ways it can be argued that the genocide was a product of the forces inside of Guatemala.

United Fruit Company and the CIA Coup

The United Fruit Company dominated the Guatemalan economy from late 19th century until the severity of the civil war in Guatemala made it impossible for them to conduct business. Guatemala has always been poor and it has a difficult geography. The majority of its land is covered by mountains, increasing the difficulty of transporting goods. The Guatemalan government tried and failed for years to construct its own railroad system that would connect Guatemala City to Puerto Barrios, a port city. Although they tried, the Guatemalans were simply unable to do this on their own, and the resources used to build a failed railroad plunged them into economic debt. They were at a very weak bargaining position when the United Fruit Company stepped in (Dosal 31).

Manuel Estrada Cabrera, the totalitarian dictator of Guatemala, made a desperate gamble with an American. He commissioned Minor Keith to build a railroad in Guatemala, but he ultimately gave power over to the United Fruit Company. Keith was allowed to pick 168,000 acres of prime banana land, and they did not have to pay for tax duties on banana exports for 35 years (Dosal 44). Finally, most stunningly, the government was not allowed to interfere with the United Fruit Company: “in effect, the concession gave Keith and associates a valuable railroad and the rights to develop banana plantations free of any interference or taxes” (Dosal 44). Estrada Cabrera profited personally but jeopardized the future of his country: “For five hundred shares valued at $50,000, Estrada Cabrera surrendered a line worth nearly $8 million and control

of his country's economic infrastructure" (Dosal 46). The United Fruit Company got a contract for its control over the railroad which gave the government the option of buying back the railroad after 99 years. Other than that, the United Fruit Company controlled Guatemala's main export, bananas, and its transportation. They were not Guatemalan and they had no interest in helping the Guatemalans, instead they exploited indigenous people and extracted most of the potential wealth from Guatemala. Most of the profit the United Fruit Company produced went to pockets abroad (Schlesinger and Kinzer 41).

When Dr. Juan José Arèvalo Bermejo rose to power in December 1945 on a liberal platform. This was different than most of his predecessors, who were mostly military dictators. He created a new Constitution, which committed to a fair and honest political system. This was the first attempt in Central America (Schlesinger and Kinzer 33). Following him was Juan José Arévalo, who was the first popularly elected President of Guatemala on March 15, 1945. However, some of his policies threatened the future of the United Fruit Company, specifically land reform policies. Arévalo wanted to reform the system of land ownership, because most Guatemalans were landless, and therefore did not have much income or a home. Most large landowners exploited those that were landless. In fact, the large landowners were afraid that if more people had land, they would lose their cheap labour supply (Schlesinger and Kinzer 40). On November 13, 1950, Jacobo Arbenz became president. He was the president in charge before the civil war.

Largely, Guatemala was more democratic than the it had been before Arévalo took power. Now Arbenz had to take steps to implement the larger reforms sought by the Liberals. In 1950, 70 percent of arable land was owned by 2.2 percent of landowners (Schlesinger and Kinzer 50).

A majority of the economy was under the control of American corporations, mostly the United Fruit Corporation. This American-controlled portion of the economy was worth nearly $120 million (Schlesinger and Singer 50). Based on a World-Bank study of the conditions in Guatemala, Arbenz attempted to reform Guatemala's inequality. At first, Arbenz tried to limit the enormous influence of the foreign companies by directly competing with them rather than simply nationalizing them (Schlesinger and Kinzer 53). He also constructed an agrarian reform bill, Decree 900, which sought to purchase uncultivated land from large landowners and give it to peasants. They would pay the landowners based on its declared taxable worth as of May 1952 (Schlesinger and Kinzer 54). The United Fruit Company was especially upset at this provision, because it had consistently devalued its land so that it did not have to pay as much taxes as it should. When Arbenz took land from the United Fruit Company, the U.S. State Department complained to the Guatemalan government, because the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was on the board of the United Fruit Company. The complaint wanted more money for the land, even though Arbenz compensated them based on the claimed value of land. The United Fruit Company also had a lot of land that remained uncultivated, so that no one else could even come close to competing with them.

A top United Fruit Company executive, Walter Turnbull, came from America to 'negotiate' the terms. He argued that the United Fruit Company should be exempt from the new laws for three more years. Turnbull clearly expected to be obeyed. Arbenz replied that for such a measure to be given, the United Fruit Company would have to follow the laws of Guatemala, begin to pay export taxes, allow the government to arbitrate disputes between the labour and company, and pay consider paying compensation to Guatemala for exhausting its land

(Schlesinger and Kinzer 74). The United Fruit Company did not like these demands and felt that they foretold that the new Guatemalan government would not be easy to coerce. The United Fruit Company also felt that this type of reforms did not properly thank the United Fruit Company for its investment in the country.[20] Between the land reforms and the newly harsh stance that the Guatemalan government was taking against the United Fruit Company, the United Fruit company started to take action against Arbenz. They began suggesting that Arbenz was really a threat to freedom and was actually a Communist.

The United Fruit Company started a propaganda machine that was determined to color Arbenz and his policies Communist. They sought to attract President Eisenhower's interest, who consider President Truman to be soft on Communism (Schlesinger and Kinzer 100). The Republicans in office started to remove the restrictions on the CIA that were in place under President Truman. Both Secretary of State John and head of the CIA Allen Foster Dulles were on the board of the United Fruit Company. They were receptive to the idea of using covert CIA forces to coup the Guatemalan government. Although the Guatemalan ambassador in Washington attempted to defend his country's agrarian reform, he was not listened to (Schlesinger and Kinzer 104). Instead, the U.S. supported "Operation Success", a covert military action that would dispose of Arbenz and create a civil war and later a genocide.

Overall, the gamble was not lucrative to the United Fruit Company, because it never reached the same power it had wield before the coup. In 1958, the United Fruit Company accepted a decree that forced it to surrender some of its trade and lands to local companies

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[20] Although the United Fruit Company did aid somewhat in the development of Guatemala, they certainly received far more from Guatemala than what they put into Guatemala (Schlesinger and Kinzer 74).

(Schlesinger and Kinzer 229). By 1972, the United Fruit Company sold of its remaining land in Guatemala to the Del Monte Corporation (Schlesinger and Kinzer 229).

Castillo Armas and Election Fraud- Militarizing the Government

The man that was put into power after the coup was Castillo Armas. He did very little to help the poor, and indeed his policies favored the aristocracy. He abruptly refused the land reform polices and industrialization of Arévalo and Arbenz and reverted the country back to a traditional reliance on coffee and bananas (Schlesinger and Kinzer 233). In only 18 months Armas was able to revert all but .5 percent of the farms given to peasants back to large landowners. He extended 'emergency' security measures such as press censorship and anti-union measures. He postponed the 1956 elections, and instead held congressional elections where only his political party was allowed to run, the National Liberation Movement (MLN). He supported his position by saying that he wanted to protect his country against Communism, and this was the price for such protection (Schlesinger and Kinzer 233). However, the rise of Armas increased corruption, particularly among his administration. There were almost weekly plots against the government, until on July 27th, 1957, Armas was assassinated. The gunman was portrayed as a Communist, but no one really believed that (Schlesinger and Kinzer 235).

The MLN wanted to keep the power, even though their president was dead. They decided their candidate would be Miguel Ortiz Passarelli, who was a relatively obscure government official. The MLN did not expect Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, who had previously tried to run for president twice, once against Arbenz and once against Armas. He believed Arbenz had rigged the election, and was furious that Armas had cancelled the 1956 elections (Schlesinger and

Kinzer 236). He was a popular figure in Guatemala, so the MLN was afraid of him and rigged the elections. However, the reaction against the obvious unfairness of the elections was so strong that the MLN had no choice but to hold another set of elections in 1958. Ygídoras won the election and assumed power on March 15, 1958. Soon afterwards, the U.S. began planning an invasion of Cuba, and needed Guatemala's location for training. The U.S. had helped ensure Ygídoras´s rise to power, and called in the favor. The extensive training required infrastructure, so it was obvious that the Americans were heavily invested in Guatemala. This bred resentment especially from the Guatemalan Army, who were very Nationalistic. About half of the army rose up against Ygídoras, but he was able to call on his American supporters to help him quell the outbreak (Schlesinger and Kinzer 239). However, it is possible that had the U.S. not intervened, the rebellion would have been successful. Some of the rebels fled into the hills, believing that the government was only a puppet for foreign interests. With American support, Ygídoras was able to crush the revolt. However, he became increasingly unpopular, both with his fellow countrymen and his American supporters (Schlesinger and Kinzer 243). Finally, the Minister of Defense, Enrique Peralta Azurdia, became the next dictator.

Enrique Peralta Azurdia spent almost no resources on the poor. He quickly militarized Guatemala, and trained squads to find and kill guerillas. He rejected offers from the U.S. to use Green Berets, because he wanted to rely on his own men (Schlesinger and Kinzer 244). He was ruthless against Communist members as well. His men raided a secret meeting of a banned Communist party and arrested twenty-eight people. None of these people were ever seen again. It was reported that the leader was dropped from an airplane into the Pacific Ocean (Schlesinger and Kinzer 244). Peralta Azurdia promised that there would be elections in 1966, but his main

opponent, Mario Méndez Montenegro was found dead four months before the election. It was officially reported as a suicide, but his family protested that claim (Schlesinger and Kinzer 245). His brother, Julio César Méndez Montenegro became his replacement, and won the election on March 6, 1966. However, the military tried to coup Méndez Montenegro, but American pressure was able to force them to back down. Still, the Army was able to force Méndez Montenegro into giving their commanders a free hand (Schlesinger and Kinzer 245). This allowed the Green Berets to operate in Guatemala, and in turn allowed for unrestrained violence against the guerrillas (Schlesinger and Kinzer 246).

Demographics of Guatemala

Guatemala's ethnolinguistic make-up is a large part of its history and political sphere. The socioeconomic foundation of Guatemala has rested on a subjugated and impoverished Indian population (Davis 3). These Indians form the majority of Guatemalan population, however, they have very little, if any, say in the government and policies of the country. This economic inequality creates conditions for genocide, because when the majority rises up against the privileged few, it jeopardizes the status quo. The elite must protect the status quo at all costs, because it favors them. If the historically disenfranchised Indians got power, it would be almost guaranteed that the incumbent elite would not have the same privileges that the currently wield. Therefore, they had to remove the possibility of this outcome by any means necessary.

The majority of Guatemalans, even in 1980 were rural (Kluck 43). The greatest divide ethnically was the division between Hispanicized, Spanish-speaking *ladinos* and indigenous *indio*. Although *ladinos* could certainly be poor, almost every *indio* lived in extreme poverty

(Kluck 43). The official language of government and business in Guatemala was Spanish, which *ladinos* spoke, but *indios* most likely did not speak. However, to demonstrate the prevalence of *indios* is the fact that about half of the population spoke at least one of the twenty indigenous languages (Davis 3). *Ladinos* were also able to read and write, something that most *indios* could not do (Kluck 43). However, ethnic identity was more constructivist than primordialist, meaning that it was possible to rise up in the social ranks (Kluck 44). If an *indio* learned Spanish, changed their dress, and moved to a *ladino* community, they could become a *ladino*. There are some tensions between the ethnic groups, however they are not based on specifically ethnicity, but rather the actions and positions they support:

> Ethnic relations have been changing and dynamic. The relationship between Indians and *ladinos* varies from relatively cordial and tolerant to openly hostile and occasionally violent. In the 1960s and 1970s some Indians challenged *ladino* political and economic domination of Indian communities; few *ladinos* have been content to see their traditional hegemony threatened (Kluck 44).

Although *ladinos* are the privileged members of society, not every *ladino is* privileged. There is a distinct upper, middle, and lower class of *ladino* in Guatemala. Ownership of factories and businesses were confined to a small, mostly ladino elite (Kluck 87). Economic growth in the country tended to benefit the elite rather than the entirety of the population. There was also a small mostly urban middle class and a larger group of wage earners. However, even though most of the urban dwellers were poor, they were still richer than the traditional and mostly *indio* agrarian economy (Kluck 87).

Still, even though some *ladinos* are also poor, the indigenous population is without doubt "the poorest, most exploited, and most discriminated against sector of the Guatemalan population" (Davis 14). They are treated as a 'sociological minority' by the dominant *ladino*, or a group that is demographically larger, yet is discriminated against by a smaller group (Davis 14). From 1950 to 1975, as population increased, an increasing number of *indios* were unable to support themselves from the land they had (Davis 15). This created an increase in the amount of seasonal workers that flocked to large costal plantations for work. However, these plantation systems simply exploited the high supply of workers. The workers were paid little and only the most desperate would go there: "so oppressive are the conditions under which [the Indians] must work in the coastal belt that, despite the conditions in the hills, no peasant having an annual income of more than 100 U.S. dollars migrates voluntarily to the coast" (Davis 15). The large landowning elite took advantage of those who were desperate. They knew full-well that the peasants did not have another option, so instead, they were forced to work under inhuman circumstances. This blatant disregard for the standards of human life certainly contributed to the ethnic mobilization of the Maya, and therefore subsequently lead to the correct conditions for genocide in 1982-3.

Another example of the elite *ladino* blatant disregard for the *indio's* struggle to survive is the civil patrols. The civil patrols were established by the Guatemalan government in the early 1980s as a part of its counterinsurgency plan (Davis 27). All able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 60 were required to spend one day every eight to sixteen days protecting the roads and their villages from guerrillas (Davis 27). However, they were not compensated for this enormous amount of time. This meant that the men were forced to be away from their farming

and other sources of income (Davis 28). The civil patrols also were forced to participate in road-building and other rural development projects for no pay (Davis 29).

> In most highland towns each Indian man must spend one day of every eight fulfilling his civil patrol duty. Although it was possible to pay for a replacement, on average each able-bodied Indian man must devote approximately forty-five to fifty days of labour each year to participation in his local civil patrol unit. If we assume that an Indian male could earn 2.25 quetzals (earlier $1 Guatemalan quetzal was equivalent to one U.S.; since 1983 it has decreased drastically in value) a day by selling his labour, each man was contributing, through his participation in the civil patrol, approximately 101.25 to 112.50 quetzals a year to the state in the form of an indirect 'labour tax.' With the per family monetary income in rural Guatemala somewhere between 300 to 500 quetzals a year, this 'labour tax' represented an enormous financial drain on the peasants household economy... in other words, the civil patrol system... was contributing to the undermining of Guatemala's rural peasant economy. (Davis 29)

The civil patrols served two important functions for the Guatemalan military. It both helped to curb the guerilla's effectiveness, but more importantly, it helped the Guatemalan army to control the large indigenous population. Any person that refused to join the civil patrols were considered a subversive, and often would be punished by local authorities (Davis 28). The army maintained that participation in the civil patrols was voluntary, however it was not voluntary in practice (Davis 28). The army recognized correctly that the indigenous population would be more likely to support the guerrilla movements, so instead of allowing this, the army attempted to make the indigenous people so busy and so close to starving that they could not afford the time or

resources to support the guerillas. Of course, this was a risky venture for the army, because it created grievances that could clearly be traced back to them. Therefore, the civil patrols did help to create enough grievances for indigenous villagers to support and join the guerrillas. Because the army realized that these villages were often supporting the guerillas, the army began its scorched earth policy, killing entire villages, who certainly had members that did not support the guerrillas. However, it did not matter to Rios Montt, because he was convinced that every single causality in his war was justified. He truly believed that every person he murdered was against him and the state, and therefore, the killings were necessary and legal. (*Granito*)

Earthquake of 1976

One opening in the political opportunity structure that Krain does not consider is environmental disasters. In 1976, Guatemala had a deadly earthquake, that increased strains on the political and economic systems of Guatemala. The earthquake exposed and politicized the inequality between economic and ethnic groups. There was a large amount of corruption and favoritism with the relief aid that motivated some people to act for their own rights. However, as historically disenfranchised groups became more active, the military retaliated. This increased both death squad and guerrilla activity. Because there was such a strong reaction to the earthquake, the government had to respond with increasingly violent policies. This is also evident in the rulers of Guatemala after the earthquake. In 1978, Fernando Romeo Lucas García was elected president, but the election was widely contested and regime was considered corrupt. that Efraín Ríos Montt lead a coup in 1982, which is the same year the genocide started. It should be noted that the dictators before the genocide were also not particularly friendly to their

people. What I am arguing is that after the earthquake there was more social and guerrilla action. This allowed a very nationalistic dictator like Rios Montt to implement previously unseen violent tactics in Guatemala. There was not a strong precedent of the executive power protecting its people, and when the people rose up against this, they felt the full force of the Guatemalan military.

On February 4, 1976, an earthquake hit Guatemala. According to the USGS, this earthquake was the 19th deadliest earthquake since 1900 (USGS). The official report said that 22,778 people died and 76,504 people were injured (Glass and Urritia et al. 638). This earthquake registered as a 7.5 on the Richter scale and happened at 3:05 in the morning, ensuring that most villagers were asleep (Glass and Urrittia et al 638). Over 1 million people became homeless as a result of this earthquake (Black and Needler 36)[21]. Puerto Barrios was also destroyed by the earthquake. Puerto Barrios is Guatemala's main port and therefore is crucial to Guatemala's economy. Even buildings that were equipped to withstand earthquakes were destroyed. It was also cut off from the capital, Guatemala City for months. The poor were affected the most, because the typical dwellings of the poor were not equipped to handle earthquakes. The dwellings that were constructed properly held up: "Established residential areas, which had been constructed to withstand earth tremors, were relatively unscathed, as were commercial and industrial centers in and out of the capital" (Black and Needler 36). Glass and Urritia et al. conducted a study analyzing what kinds of dwellings were the best equipped to handle an earthquake. They found that houses made of adobe and had over seven people were


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[21] This figure is considered unreliable, because in some departments (administrative regions) those who were homeless *before* the earthquake were also counted in this figure. (Olson and Olson 74).

the most likely to be destroyed. They also found that houses that were non-adobe were more likely to withstand the earthquake (Glass and Urritia et al 639).

Of course, this demonstrates the relationship between income inequality and the likelihood of death in Guatemala. Those who live in a house made out of adobe with seven or more other people are more likely to be the poor. It should also be noted that medical officials in Guatemala cited the primary cause of death during this tragedy was "crushing due to the collapse of adobe-wall dwellings (usually one-story) with roofs of heavy beams covered with heavy tile. These were death traps. The walls could not sand much lateral movement and collapsed, often bringing the roof down with them, and together crushing those beneath" (Olson and Olson 74). The report goes on to say that "the chief of orthopedic surgery at Roosevelt Hospital in Guatemala City estimated that 85 percent of the operations performed after the earthquake were for the repair of broken and crushed bones, especially vertebrae" (Olson and Olson 74). This means that a high percentage of those who were only injured during the earthquake received their injuries from insufficient buildings. Those who cannot afford a house that is equipped to handle the shocks of an earthquake are doomed to death, or injury and homelessness if they were lucky.

It is not as if this earthquake was a fluke, instead Guatemala is prone to earthquakes[22]:



As can be seen by the image above, Guatemala has had its share of magnitude 6.5 to 7.5 earthquakes since 1900. Therefore, one would expect that Guatemala would be better prepared and even expect or prepare for the earthquakes. Indeed, it seems that some people, those with

[22] Image source http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/central_america/seismicity.php

money, have. However, Guatemala is not a rich country, and therefore, this leaves a large amount of the population exposed to earthquakes. The earthquake also illustrates this socioeconomic divide. Only three days after the earthquake, the Central Capitalist Alliance (CACIF) reported that its production was close to normal (Levenson 61).[23] However, it was much longer for those who had their homes destroyed, especially because many of them had been artisans who made their living at home (Levenson 61).

There were international and domestic relief efforts, but these efforts exposed social tensions within the country (Black and Needler 36). Labour unions tried to demand better conditions and relief for those who were homeless because of the earthquake. However, employers also had to cut their labour supply and labour union leaders were often the first employees laid off (Black and Needler 37). This lead to more strikes, which in turn increased the activities of death squads, who had been practically dormant for the last two years (Black and Needler 36). Organizations like the Central Capitalist Alliance (CACIF) denounced the "growing and militant labor movement" and wanted them to instead simply "reconstruct by working" (Levenson 61). President Laugerud made sure that the reconstruction after the earthquake favored the rich (Levenson 62). He said "Opportunities for progress, for advance in development, for access to better living standards will be achieved without the destruction of wealth already created" (Levenson 62). This clearly indicates that the president would protect those who were already in power. His actions also supported this stance. There were multiple international and domestic relief organizations in Guatemala. President Laugerud allowed them

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[23] Those who had industrial and commercial properties constructed them well, which in Guatemala means that they were relatively earthquake resistance. This shows that they were constructed not from adobe and maintained by those who were wealthier. (Levenson 60).

to be responsible for the various regions affected by the earthquake. However, because these organizations were given such autonomy, there was also corruption:

> All of the relief agencies tended to substitute paternalism for popular participation, or, once knowledgeable about local hierarchies, groups, and conflicts, choose to send aid through the local groups which supported the overall policies of the relief agencies... The many Protestant relief organizations directed aid through the local Protestant to the detriment of the many Catholic Action peasants. (Levenson 62)

The above quote demonstrates that the aid after the earthquake did not necessarily have the intended effect of aid, that is it did not help everyone that was affected by the earthquake. Instead it became a product and impetus of an increasingly polarizing political climate in Guatemala. The military was appointed by President Leugerud to oversee the entire aid process. The military was not simply a tool of the executive power; instead it was an active participant in Guatemalan politics. It had its own political party. Therefore, the military was very interested in using this relief aid to promote its own political agenda (Levenson 62). The military used its position to give resources to villages, but with an expected return:

> In a few areas the military gave away the *lamina* [light-weight sheets of tin to build temporary shelters] paid for by relief groups, and in others it declared it was selling the *lamina* but that no payment would be expected for two years, a time period which coincided with the lead-up to the presidential elections... Of course, many recipients understood that they would not necessarily have to pay back the loan if they voted correctly. It is doubtful whether the military won real friends in the villages and towns

with its policy, but it was the case that the military strengthened its reach into the countryside and barrios of the city where previously it had little connection. Levenson 63 In the following few years, the military remained an important development institution in the rural and slum areas of cities. This laid out a foundation for their future actions against the rural people.

International opportunities in the political opportunity structure

The genocide occurred in 1982-3, a tumultuous time for the international world. The Cold War would end in a decade, but it was still unclear at this point if that would happen. Vietnam had fallen to Communism, after the United States had fought and lost a prolonged war there. Argentina, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were experiencing civil wars. Argentina's war is called the "Dirty War" because it was a war against its own people. The military junta in power was more afraid of its own population than any external foe. However, even though the war was bad in Argentina, they did not attempt to eradicate an ethnic group like Guatemala. In Argentina, victims were chosen by political and educational backgrounds, in Guatemala, victims were chosen based on ethnic identity.

The School of the Americas

The United States' Army train foreign troops through the School of the Americas (SOA)[24]. The American Military believes that through training the foreign military leaders would adhere to higher levels of democracy and rule of law (McCoy 47). This is because through training, the Americans could create warriors that would not allow excesses and abuse

[24] School of Americas is the former name of this institution; it is currently known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (Whinsec).

human rights. Although the graduates would still be soldiers, it was thought that they would be less likely to resort to human right abuses if they had correct training. The US government has said that its goal with the School of the Americas is to "provide doctrinally sound, relevant military education and training to the nations of Latin America; to promote democratic values and respect for human rights; and to foster cooperation among multinational military forces" (Office of the Inspector General, 1997: 8, as quoted in McCoy 47). The goals of this organization seem valid, however, the School of the Americas have created much controversy.

Some NGOs and watchdog organizations have argued that the School of Americas has produced alumni that have had “key roles in nearly every coup and major human rights violation in Latin America in the past fifty years” (Nelson-Pallmeyer, 1997: 9, as quoted in McCoy 48). Indeed, in Guatemala, General Efrain Rios Montt, the military dictator currently on trial for genocide, is an alumnus of the School of the Americas. Even if the Guatemalan courts do not find him guilty of genocide, it cannot be denied that 200,000 Maya people lost their lives during his rule. However, the SOA argues that human rights abuses are committed in spite of, not because of, the tutelage given at the SOA. According to both official US Army and McCoy’s independent research, it has been determined that only a small fraction of the graduates of the School of the Americas have committed human rights abuses (McCoy 57). McCoy then goes further and looks at the relationship between number of classes taken and human rights abuses. McCoy found that there was a high correlation between number of classes and human rights abuses. In other words, the more classes a person took at the School of the Americas, the more likely that person was going to commit human rights abuses (McCoy 57). Her data found that graduates who took only one class at the School of the Americas made up less than one percent

of human rights abusers. If the course load increased to two courses, then the abusers made up about four and a half percent, effectively doubling the amount of human rights abuses. Three or more classes did not equal as high of a percentage jump, instead it only accounted for about five and a half percent of human right abusers (McCoy 58). McCoy does suggest that there are some limitations to these conclusions:

> The effect of a student's rank is also strong and highly significant... officers are nearly four times more likely to be reported as abusers than enlisted soldiers... One [possible explanation is that] officers ... are much more likely to violate human rights than lower-ranking soldiers. Another is that human rights monitors have an interest in placing blame as high up on the hierarchy as possible, in which case higher-ranking officials will be overrepresented among human rights abusers. It could also be argued, however, that governments have an incentive to scapegoat lower-ranked soldiers while hiding the roles of their superiors, in which case lower-ranked soldiers will be overrepresented among abusers and this result will actually underestimate the difference between officers and enlisted soldiers. McCoy 58-59

It is far more likely that an officer or other high-ranking official would take more classes at the School of Americas than an enlisted soldier. Therefore, the results of McCoy's study may be seen as more of a commentary on the relationship between military rank and human right abuses. At any rate, it does demonstrate that the School of the Americas did not reduce human rights abuses. Instead, it seems to have given the military leaders the tools and techniques to commit human rights abuses.

The training manuals were originally declassified by the Freedom of Information Act. They have subsequently been destroyed during the Bush era, because they do not support official United States' policies (lawg.org).

Krain's take on the Guatemalan Genocide

Once again, Krain´s theory does not quite cover all of the important factors that contributed to the genocide in Guatemala. The genocide occurred from 1982-1983, but in this chapter I begin with the United Fruit Company´s history at the end the 19th century. The United Fruit Company was essential for creating the chain of events that would create a civil war, which would later lead to a genocide. Furthermore, the United Fruit Company demonstrates the United State´s complete lack of respect for the sovereignty of Guatemala, an important cause of the genocide. Because of The United States´ interference in Guatemala, there was the opportunity for the rise of a huge nationalistic movement that resisted the government because it was considered a puppet for foreign interests. The United States interfered in almost every step of Guatemalan history before the civil war, and therefore bears some responsibility for the genocide in Guatemala.[25]

I also consider the implications of regional unrest. What happens to your neighbors influences what happens in your own country. It can be no coincidence that several Latin American countries used the same techniques to control their populations. Techniques such as disappearing and pushing undesirables off of planes were common to both Argentina and Guatemala, for example. It would be impossible to talk about the Guatemalan genocide without

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[25] The United States knew that civilians were being targeted in Guatemala and did not react or intervene.

considering the impunity and violence that surrounded it. I also consider the international climate, such as the Cold War, and the recession of the early 1970´s. These situations made interference in the Guatemalan crisis less likely, plus it increased the unrest within the country. Because there was more unrest in the country, it made it more likely that struggle would persist for longer, because more people would be motivated to act against the government. On the other side, this unrest made it more crucial for the government to act increasingly savage to its opponents. Plus, as civil unrest increased, the government become more convinced that more people were against the government, which forced them to eliminate this threat.

Valentino's take on the Guatemalan Genocide

Valentino categorizes the genocide in Guatemala a counter guerrilla mass killing (Valentino 106). The insurgency began when the a group of military officers tried to coup the existing government (Valentino 206). This insurgency was unsuccessful in gaining a following from the rural population from 1961 to 1978. There was government-sponsored killing, but it was relatively mild until 1978, when the insurgents began to amass a relatively high number of rural supporters. These supporters began to adopt a guerilla-like strategy, which forced changes: "these fundamental changes in the nature of the guerrillas' tactics prompted equally fundamental changes in the regime's strategy for defeating them. The Guatemalan regime's effort to isolate the guerrillas from their newly won civilian supporters resulted in a devastating campaign of mass killing" (Valentino 206).

The rebel groups were not popular for the majority of rural Guatemalans because their conflict was seen as only one group of elite military officers against another group of elite

military officers: “most peasants had little interest in the conflict since they saw no reason to support one group of military officers against another” (Valentino 206). Therefore the movement did not garner a large amount of support from Guatemala’s Indians. To convince more people to join their movement, the guerrillas advocated the *foco* theory. The *foco* theory “suggested that a small number of daring guerrillas could spark a national revolution by staging highly visible raids and terrorist attacks on government forces. Harsh government repression, in turn, would convince even more people of the need to join revolutionaries and overthrow the regime” (Valentino 207). The guerrillas thus focused on small-scale attacks and bombings, kidnappings and assassinations in urban areas. True to the *foco* theory, the Guatemalan government retaliated against the guerrillas. In 1965 to 1967, the guerrillas increased their attacks, and from 1966 to 1967 the government retaliated strongly against the guerillas. The government declared a state of siege and sought to violently repress the guerillas.

The government tried to root out the guerrillas by targeting villages. However, there were only a few hundred guerrillas at the time, so most of the government’s targets were innocent victims. These civilians could have also been government supporters (Valentino 207). By 1976, disappearances and assassinations were commonplace, but it was not at the levels of mass killing. The violence was sufficient for the government’s needs: “this level of violence proved sufficient to keep Guatemala’s relatively small, primarily urban-based political opposition in check” (Valentino 208).

The earthquake of 1976 killed about twenty thousand people and exposed many of the social strains of Guatemala. More than one million people were homeless, and the government did very little to help them. There was also an economic downturn in the early 1970s and a

population explosion that also increased societal problems. The large Maya population who were more likely to be poor than other members of society were hit very hard by these factors (Valentino 208). Through these broad social factors, the guerrillas began to gain more momentum and the movement gained a large social base. The government's harsh tactics probably increased the popular support for the guerrillas: "David Stoll suggests that the majority of support for the guerrillas stemmed from the peasantry's reaction to overly harsh government repression, not from revolutionary ideological impulses or social or economic discontent" (Valentino 209). The Guatemalan government saw that the guerrilla movements were supported by a large amount of popular discontent. The government under President-General Romeo Lucas realized that they could not directly conquer the guerrillas and that they needed to crush the guerrillas' civilian support (Valentino 210). Rios Montt came to power and wanted to crush the guerrillas at any costs. Under his direction, the Guatemalan government took a scorched earth approach. This was a calculated attack:

> The Guatemalan army's brutality was not primarily the result of bloodthirsty leaders, undisciplined troops, or racism directed against the guerrilla's indigenous supporters. Although each of these factors probably contributed to the violence, the actions of the Guatemalan military, as well as statements made by Guatemalan leaders, suggest that the brutality of the campaign is best understood as a calculated military response on the part of the regime to the exigencies of warfare against a mass-based guerrilla insurgency. Valentino 211

Valentino argues that the genocide was not simply an accident or a out of particular loathing of the indigenous population, but rather a survival tactic for the Guatemalan government. The

violence was targeted most heavily against the areas that had the most guerrilla activity. It was not targeted towards villages based on ethnic identity.

Chapter 5- Discussion and Conclusion

When I started this project, I thought by the end of it I would be convinced of what causes genocide. However, I cannot say that I am convinced. Still, I think that I have found some important conclusions within my comprehensive project.

First, I would argue that Krain's theory is more plausible in the German case than Valentino's theory. This is because Krain accounts for more of the conditions that make genocide possible than Valentino. Krain's theory is Germany helps to account for how international communities and organizations as well as internal domestic actors lowered the costs of killing Jews until it was clear that killing Jews would not necessarily elicit a strong response. The circumstances of WWII also forced the Nazis to find a quick and domestic solution to the Jewish problem. It is possible, although perhaps not plausible, that the Holocaust would have never happened if it were not for the circumstances of WWII shutting down potential avenues of ridding the Jews from Germany.

Second, I would argue that Valentino's theory is stronger in the Guatemalan case, because it shows how when the guerrilla forces gained momentum, the government had to react in stronger terms. Both sides increased their hostility until the government responded with a scorched earth policy, essentially a genocide.

I am not entirely convinced that either of these theories completely and adequately describes the onsets of these genocides. Some of the events described here clearly impacted the onset of genocide, however the theories did not account for their possibility. Through my historical research of major events leading up to each genocide, I have found that some events were crucial. For example, the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles against the German people

definitely had an impact on the onset of genocide in Germany, however neither theory suggests the importance that a peace treaty can have on the likelihood of genocide. Similarly in Guatemala, neither theory suggests the importance that international businesses can have on the likelihood of genocide.

It should not be completely surprising that I have not discovered the reason why genocides occur. The onset of a genocide is complex, otherwise the international community would know exactly why they started and work to prevent it. Current research has led me to believe that genocides occur because of a variety of causes that collide against each other to create unbearable friction. There needs to be research that tests a variety of different factors which could potentially prove more significant than Krain's or Valentino's theories. Perhaps, a model similar to Harff's early warning system found in *No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955* would prove to be a more capable predictor of genocide onset.

Kapital Sechs- Zusammenfassung auf Deutsch- die Einführung bis das Kapitel über den Holocaust

Der Völkermord ist ganz schrecklich. Es gibt keine andere Beschreibung und es ist nicht ein Schock, dass ich den Völkermord als schrecklich beschreibe. Es passiert viel zu oft und wir müssen den Völkermord anhalten. Es ist nicht einfach den Völkermord anzuhalten, weil wir nicht komplett verstehen, warum er passiert. Es gibt viele Gelehrte, die über Völkermord schreiben, aber es gibt keinen bestimmten Grund, warum der Völkermord beginnt. Wenn es einen bestimmten Grund gibt, warum der Völkermord beginnt, dann kann die internationale Gemeinschaft etwas gegen künftigen Völkermord tun. Mit diesem Aufsatz hoffe ich, dass ich etwas über den Anfang des Völkermords erklären kann. Dieser Aufsatz ist nur über den Anfang des Völkermords, und deshalb nicht über die Ereignisse des Völkermords oder den Schluss des Völkermords. Das heißt, er ist nicht die bestimmte Autorität für den Völkermord. Es ist nur ein Teil von unserer Kenntnis vom Völkermord, aber ich hoffe, dass es hilfreich ist.

Die Vertretungsstelle der Vereinten Nationen hat ein Abkommen in 1948 über den Völkermord geschrieben. Der Punkt dieses Abkommens war die Völkermorde zu beenden. Das Abkommen war nicht erfolgreich, weil die Völkermorde sich seit diesem Abkommen fortgesetzt haben. Länder zögern einen Konflikt einen Völkermord zu nennen, weil das Abkommen sagt,

dass die Länder eindringen müssen, wenn ein Konflikt ein Völkermord ist. Deshalb haben wir noch Völkermord. Ein Problem ist, dass Länder nicht die Souveränität anderer Länder brechen. Die Verhinderung eines Völkermords kostet Leben und Geld und es ist schwierig für ein Land diese Ausgabe zu begründen. Es ist auch nicht immer klar, ob ein Völkermord passiert oder nicht. Die Völkermorde passieren oft während eines Krieges. Mit weiterer Information ist es möglich, dass Länder interessierter einen Völkermord anzuhalten würden.

Eine Kritik der Literatur

Der Hass der Volksgruppe Perspektive

Expertinnen, die diese Perspektive glauben, argumentieren, dass der Hass zwischen zwei oder mehr Volksgruppen der Grund ist, warum der Völkermord passiert. David Newbury argumentiert, dass in manchen Gesellschaften einige Volksgruppen nicht so viel wert wie andere Volksgruppen sind. Die ungerechten Werte dieser Volksgruppen könnten einen Völkermord beginnen, weil die Leute elend sind, weil sie in einer armen Volksgruppe geboren waren. Wenn sie in einer anderen Volksgruppe geboren waren, dann ihr Leben ganz anders wäre. Die sozialwirtschaftliche Gruppe einer Person ist auf ihrer Volksgruppe festgelegt ist, deshalb kann die Volksgruppe in ganz anderen sozialwirtschaftlichen Gruppen existieren (Newbury 84). Es schafft eine Gesellschaft der Volksgruppen, die sich selbst in krassem Gegensatz zu sonstigen Volksgruppen definieren. Verarmte Volksgruppen können ihre Probleme auf ein zweitere Volksgruppen vorwerfen (Newbury 77). Verarmte und bedrückte Volksgruppen können “an ideology, a vision of ideal social arrangements” um ihre schlechten Umstände machen zu verändern (Staub 370). Es gibt den veramten und bedrückten Volksgruppen eine Chance ein

besseres Leben zu leben und eine Hoffnung, dass die schwierigen Umstände besser werden können. Dieser Traum besseres Leben ist mächtig, und die Volksgruppen können Aktionen, die gegen die Elite sind. Die Eliten glauben oft, dass die Minderheiten böse sind. Die Minderheit bedroht den gegenwärtigen Stand und oft bedeutet das, dass sie das Land bedroht, oder was die Elite glaubt, was das Land sein soll. Die Elite muß ihr Land und ihre Macht gegen die Minderheit beschützen, weil wenn die Minderheit Macht hat, möchte die Minderheit Macht und Justiz von der Elite haben. Die Macht der Eliten ist ein Teil ihrer Ideologie und Haltung.

Der Mangel an die Demokratie

R.J. Rummel hat gesagt, dass "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely" (Die Macht ermordet und unbeshränkte Macht ermordet unbedingt) (Rummel 3). Das bedeutet, dass Rummel glaubt, dass der wichtigste Grund, warum Völkermord passiert, die Konzentration der Macht ist. Er hat in seiner Forschung gefunden, dass die meisten Völkermorde passieren, wenn die Regierung totalitär ist. Er glaubt, dass der Grund für diesen Zusammenhang ist, dass totalitäre Regierungen das Militär ohne die Zustimmung der Leute benützen können (Rummel 2). Das heißt, dass die totalitären Regierungen wahrscheinlicher als die demokratischen Regierungen ihre Macht benutzen, weil die totalitären Regierungen die Unterstützung der Leute brauchen. Wenn es eine Widerspruchsbewegnung gegen die Regierung gibt, dann eine totalitäre Regierung kann die Widerspruchsbewegnung zerstören (Rummel 4). Macht ist konzentriert in den Händen der Eliten und die Eliten können paranoid sein, und die Eliten können sogar kleine Bedrohungen beseitigen. Die Minderheiten sind gefährlich für die Eliten, weil die Eliten in einer totalitären Regierung völlige Kontrolle brauchen. Wenn ihre Macht und Kontrolle nicht völlig

scheint, dann die Eliten können viele Widerspruch Bewegnung gegen sich haben. Die Minderheiten haben keine reale Verteidigung gegen die Eliten und die Minderheiten sind oft verlezt weil die Eliten sich schwach fühlen. Rummel behauptet, dass Demokratie und demokratische Institute die Auflösung gegen Völkermord sind. Demokratie und demokratische Institute geben Möglichkeiten für friedlichen Widerspruch gegen die Regierung. Dieser Widerspruch braucht nicht Gewalt, sondern es braucht Freiheit.

William Easterly behauptet, dass demokratische Regierungen Völkermord begehen können. Die demokratischen Regierungen können eine Minderheit beseitigen. Zum Beispiel gibt es das eingeborene Volk in Amerika, Kanada, und Australien (Easterly 4-5). Easterly behauptet, dass es wichtig ist, dass die Qualität der Demokratie gesund ist.

Strategische Perspektive

Valentino behauptet, dass die militärischen und politischen Eliten Völkermord benützen, um ihr schwierigsten Problem zu lösen. Völkermord ist nur ein Instrument für die Eliten. Völkermord ist auch die letzte Aktion, die die Eliten nehmen können, weil Völkermord unveränderlich ist. Die Eliten können nicht die Toten zurückbringen. Valentino behauptet, dass die Eliten Völkermord nur benützen, wenn sie andere Aktionen zu benutzen versuchen. Völkermord braucht viel ökonomisches und politisches Kapital, deshalb die Eliten sind seriös und ganz verpflichtet. Die Eliten müssen bereit andere Zielen zu aufgeben sein, weil der Völkermord nicht einfach ist.

Politische Gelegenheiten Struktur

Matthew Krain behauptet, dass "political violence is a function of the political opportunities and constraints of the immediate political environment" (politische Gewalt ist eine Funktion des politsche Gelegenheiten und Grenzen von die dringende politsche Umwelt) (Krain 333). Eine politische Gelegenheit ist ein Bürgerkrieg, ein internationaler Krieg, oder ein Regimewechsel. Es ist auch eine Eröffnung in der politische Beteiligung, und ein Schisma zwischen den Eliten (Krain 333). Die Eliten versuchen, den gegenwärtigen Stand zu erhalten, weil das derzeitige System sie begünstigt (Krain 333). Die Eliten versuchen politische Gelegenheiten zu begrenzen. Je größer die Veränderung desto großer der Widerstand. Wenn es eine Veränderung gibt, verändert sie den Aufwand der Aktionen und deshalb die Eliten verändern ihre Strategie (Krain 333). Die Eliten müssen ihre Strategie verändern, weil Aktionen mehr oder weniger existenzfähig sind. Oft unterbrachten die Eliten einen Herausforderer, weil es einfacher und wenig teuer ist. Aber wenn die Herausforderer gefährlich gegen den gegenwärtigen Stand war, dann werden die Eliten oft die politische Öffnung schließen. Wenn die Eliten die politsche Öffnung schließen, ist es nicht immer oder oft Völkermord. Es kann Völkermord sein, aber Völkermord ist eine extreme Auflösung. Sie benützen Völkermord nur, wenn sie glauben, dass angemessene oder kleine Unterdrückung nicht genug die Situation zu kontrolliern ist. Krain behauptet, dass die große Gelegenheit für Völkermord Bürgerkrieg ist.

Die Methodologie

Ich benütze eine qualitative Bewertung, weil eine qualitative Bewertung genau bei Auswertung der Beziehungen gut ist. Ich benütze auch ein geschichtliche Bewertung, weil ich

auch die Theorie kritisiere. Das heißt, dass ich die Angelegenheiten des Völkermords völlig erforsche, weil die Theorien vielliecht nicht gründlich genug sind. Eine qualitative Bewertung erlaubt mir diese Frage zu beantworten. Es erlaubt mir auch Gelegenheiten zu untersuchen, die nicht quantifizierbare Angaben haben. Zum Beispiel untersuche ich die Auswirkungen des Vertrags von Versailles auf den Anfang des Völkermords in Deutschland. Ich finde, dass es sehr wichtig ist, aber es wird schwierig diese Beziehung in einer quantitativen Untersuchung zu sehen.

Ich habe Deutschland und Guatemala für meine Länder gewählt. Sie sind unterschiedliche Länder. Ich habe unterschiedliche Länder gewählt, weil unterschiedliche Länder andere Gründe beseitigen, warum Völkermord passiert. Unterschiedliche Länder verstärken die Hypothese, weil wenn die Hypothese richtig für unterschiedliche Länder ist, dann die Hypothese nicht nebensächlich ist. Deutschland und Guatemala sind unterschiedlich, weil sie aus anderen Kontinente sind. Es ist wichtig, dass meine Länder aus verschiedenen Kontinenten kommen, weil örtliche Einflüsse Ereignisse einflussen können. Deutschland ist in Europa, der ein zentraler, mächtiger, und ökonomischer ausgebildeter Kontinent ist. Guatemala ist in Mittelamerika, die ein armes, schwaches, und Drittweltland ist. Ich finde diese Unterschiede wichtig für die Untersuchung des Völkermord, weil die Hypothese des Krain sich auf Zustände bezieht. Der Ort des Landes beeinflusst die Ereignisse des Landes. Ich habe zwei verschiedene Kontinente gewählt, weil ich beweisen möchte, ob die bestimmte Ereignisse des Land bewirkt waren. Wenn ich nur einen Kontinent benutzt, kann dann der Völkermord nur passieren, weil Regionale Einfluss sein. Es ist deshalb wichtig, dass ich andere Kontinente auswähle. Guatemala hat auch ein eingeborenes Volk, das Maya heißt, und Deutschland hat kein

eingeborenes Volk. Dieses eingeborene Volk ist wichtig, weil die Regierung des Guatemala sie systematisch benachteiligt hat. Sie hat eine stärke Klage gegen die Guatelemala-Regierung. In Deutschland gibt es auch eine Minderheit, die die Juden heißt. Die Juden waren auch benachteiligt, aber ihre Benachteiligt war anders als die Benachteiligt der Maya. Die Benachteiligung der Juden war anders als die Benachteiligung der Maya weil die Maya arm und kraftlos waren. Die Juden waren verhasst, weil sie zu mächtig und reich waren. Die Juden haben für alle die Probleme des Deutschlands beschuldigt. Verschiedene Arten von Benachteiligung sind wichtig, weil sie viele Arten von Klage schaffen.

Deutschland Kapitel

Der Holocaust ist von 1939 bis 1945 in Deutschland passiert. Der Holocaust war sehr schlecht und bewies, dass ein Völkermord in einem ökonomischen entwickelten Land passieren kann. Natürlich gibt es viele Gelegenheiten und Umstände, die gegenwärtig für Völkermord zu passieren brauchen. Der erste Teil des Kapitels ist über den Holocaust des Deutschlands und der zweite Teil des Kapitel ist über die Theorien der Krain und Valentino.

Der Vertrag von Versailles

Der Vertrag von Versailles war nach den Ersten Weltkrieg und hat viele bestimmte Umstände für Volkersmord geschaffen. Vielleicht die wichtigstene Sache ist, dass der Vertrag von Versailles ein Gefühl von Hass geschaffen hat. Der Vertrag von Versailles hat Deutschland als eine Weltmacht beseitigt, weil Deutschland kein Militär noch hatte, und Deutschland hat die Reparationszahlungen begleichen. Die Deutschen glauben, dass sie nicht richtig schuldig für den

ersten Weltkrieg waren. Die Deutschen haben abgetreten, bevor Deutschland eingedrungen war (Evans, 60). Die Deutschen haben geglaubt, dass Deutschland haben frei abgetreten, und deshalb sollten sie bei der Alliierten leicht behandeln. Die Deutsche glauben, dass sie betrogen haben. Die Deutschen glauben, dass sie betrogen bei die Juden haben, weil die Deutschen glauben, dass sie zu mächtig bei ein andere Land zu abgeschlagen waren. Die Bestimmungen des Vertrages von Versailles haben diese Gedanken unterstützt. Deutschland hat dreizehn Prozent seines Land zurückgeben gemusst. Ein Teil war Alsace-Lorraine, die Deutschland für ungefähr funfzig Jahre beherrscht hat (Evans 62). Ein anderer Teil war Polen. Dieses Land fühlt sich wie Heimat für die Deutschen, statt wie besiegtes Land. Die Alliierten hatten auch das Rheinland besetzt. Das Rheinland hat den großen Teil der Industrie in Deutschland. Die Besatzung hat die Deutschen immer erinnert, dass Deutschland besetzt war. Die Alliierten Besatzung hat auch deutschen Nationalismus verstärkt, weil die Deutschen sich nicht wie ein Hoheitsrecht gefühlt hat. Die Deutschen könnten nicht den Misserfolg des ersten Weltkrieges in ihre Vergangenheit stecken. Österreich konnte nicht mit Deutschland kombinieren, obwohl Woodrow Wilson Selbstbestimmmung für die ganze Welt versprochen hat. Deutschland hat sich auf den Alliierten betrogen gefühlt. Die Alliierten wollten Deutschland arm und schwach, sodass Deutschland nie wieder einen Krieg beginnen konnte.

Die Nazis hatten aus diesem Umstand Macht bekommen. Deutschland war nicht glücklich, und Deutschland hatte viele Klagen. Die Nazis haben das Volk des Deutschlands eine Auflösung gegeben um Deutschland Weltmacht Lage zu zurückbringen. In einiger Sinn, die Aktionen der Alliierten haben die bestimmte Umstände für die zweite Weltkreig geschafft.

Weimarer Republik

Das politische Atmosphäre des Weimar Republic wurde giftig. Die Politiker haben Gewalt und Schrecken benutzt, um ihre Haltung zu zwingen. Politische Parteien begannen bewaffnete Gruppen zu benüzten, um ihre Partei zu schützen und um andere politische Parteien einzuschüchtern (Evans 73). Diese bewaffneten Gruppen waren nicht nur für andere politische Parteien. Die bewaffnete Gruppe waren auch für die Staatsangehörigen, weil die politische Parteien möchten, dass die Staatsangehörige aufgedrückt bei ihrer Macht war. Jede politische Partei möchte, dass die Staatsangehörige ihre politische Partei unterstützen wurden. Es gab viele nationalistische politische Parteien und Bewegnungen. Die stählerne Helme waren eine solche nationalistische politische Partei. Die stählerne Helme haben aus den Soldaten des ersten Weltkrieges gegründet. Die stählerne Helme waren gegen alle Typen der Feigheit und Schwäche, weil sieglaubten, dass diese Aktionen der Grund war, warum Deutschland schwach war. Die stählerne Helme glauben, dass die Auflösung der Probleme des Deutschlands durch einen starken Führer, nationale Einheit und Kameradschaft auflösen können. Die stählerne Helme hatten ungefähr 300,000 Mitglieder in die 1920s.

Adolf Hitler war ein dynamischer und überzeugender Sprecher. Seine Reden waren hoffnungsvoll. Hitler hat ein besseres Leben versprochen, und er hat diesen Traum in ökonomischen Begriffen aufgefüllt. Hitler hat die deutsche Armee wieder bewaffnet und er hat die verlorenen Gebieten wie Polen und Alsace-Lorraine wieder besetzt. Hitler war sehr beliebt auf dem deutschen Volk (Fischel 29). Viele Leute wollten nur Sicherheit und Stabilität, und sie glaubten, dass die Nazis Sicherheit und Stabilität bieten konnten (Weitz 332). Es gab auch eine gewöhnliche Sprache über die Feinde der Regierung und die Probleme der Reigierung:

“Volkstum, Deutschtum, Überfremdung, Dolchstoß, Diktat von Versailles, Schieberrepublik, Schmährepublik, Judenrepublik, Kampf, Drittes Reich, [und] Führer” sind Beispele diese gründlichen Wörter (Weitz 333). Diese Sprachwörter und Gefühle haben sich durch Romane, Kirchepredigt, und öffentliche Reden ausgeteilt. Diese öffentlichen antisemitischen Reden und Prosa haben nicht nur zugelassen, sondern auch haben sie die Umstände für Völkermord geschaffen, weil die öffentliche antisemitische Rede und Prosa die Gesellschaft durchgedrungen waren. Das heißt, dass antisemitische Reden ein Teil des politischen Einflussbereich waren und die Leute wurden nicht einfühlsam und die Leute wurden zu antisemitischen Gefühlen und Aktionen desensibilisiert.

Deutschland hat viele Probleme nach dem ersten Weltkrieg, und die Nazis haben die Juden für die Probleme Deutschlands beschuldigt. Die Nazis haben Die Juden Übel gefunden. Die Nazis waren sehr deutlich über ihren Hass der Juden. Die Nazis haben geglaubt, dass die Juden der Grund waren, dass Deutschland nicht mehr eine Weltmacht war. Die Juden waren die Kraft hinter jeder Aktion, die gegen den Erfolg Deutschlands waren. Der Hass der Juden der Hitler war wahnsinnig, weil Hitler glaubte, dass die Juden in entgegengesetzten Ideologie unterstützt haben: “Hitler believed that both bolshevism and democracy were Jewish inventions. Following the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, Hitler considered himself at war with the Jews through their proxies the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union” (Hitler glaubt an, dass beide Bolschewismus und Demokratie wurden jüdische Erfindungen. In Anlehnung an das deutsche Eindringen von Russland in Juni 1941, Hitler betrachtete sich selbst bei Kreig mit die Juden und durch ihre Stellverteter die Vereinigte Staaten, Großbritannien, und die Sowjetunion) (Fischel xxxiii). Für Hitler waren die Aktionen der Alliierten nicht eine

vernünftige Enscheidung, sondern die Aktionen der Alliierten waren die Aktionen der Juden. Die Nazis haben immer die Juden angeprangert und die Nazis haben die Juden als einen Prügelknaben beschrieben. Die Nazis haben in der Weimarer Republik ihre Ideen über eine Meisterrasse, die Arier heißt. Die Arier hatten perfektes Blut, das nicht mit Judenblüd verdarb. Die Arier haben gegen die Juden gekampft, weil die Juden gegen Deutschland waren. Die Juden versuchten die Reinheit der Arier zu verderben.

In der Weimaren Republik haben viele Institutionen mächtige Mitglieder, die nicht Demokratie unterstützen. Diese Institutionen, die mächtige Mitglieder hatten, die gegen Demokratie waren, waren die aufbegehrende und katholische Kirchen, das Militär, die staatliche Bürokratie, und die Universitäten. Die Anhänger, die Demokratie unterstützt haben, versuchten die Fiende der Demokratie zu beseitigen, aber die Anhänger der Demokratie waren nicht erfolgreich. Die Leute, die nicht Demokratie unterstützten, blieben in Haltungen der Macht. Diese Leute, die nicht Demokratie unterstützten, mögen lieber das System des Imperialismus, der vor 1918 benutzt hat. Dieses Gefühl war ein Vorproduckt der Nazis. Sie wollen einen starkeren Führer, der die Macht der Beeinflussung hat (Weitz 332). Heinrich Brüning wurde in 1930 Kanzler. Brüning wollte eine autoritäre politische Regierung schaffen. Er hat ein autoritäre politische Regierung geschaffen, wenn er Artikel 48 der Weimaren Verfassung benutzte. Artikel 48 der Weimarer Verfassung sagte:

(1) Wenn ein Land die ihm nach der Reichsverfassung oder den Reichsgesetzen obliegenden Pflichten nicht erfüllt, kann der Reichspräsident es dazu mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht anhalten.

(2) Der Reichspräsident kann, wenn im Deutschen Reich die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung erheblich gestört oder gefährdet wird, die zur Wiederherstellung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung nötigen Maßnahmen treffen, erforderlichenfalls mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht einschreiten. Zu diesem Zwecke darf er vorübergehend die in den Artikeln 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 und 153 festgesetzten Grundrechte ganz oder zum Teil außer Kraft setzen.

(3) Von allen gemäß Abs. 1 oder Abs. 2 dieses Artikels getroffenen Maßnahmen hat der Reichspräsident unverzüglich dem Reichstag Kenntnis zu geben. Die Maßnahmen sind auf Verlangen des Reichstages außer Kraft zu setzen.

(4) Bei Gefahr im Verzuge kann die Landesregierung für ihr Gebiet einstweilige Maßnahmen der in Abs. 2 bezeichneten Art treffen. Die Maßnahmen sind auf Verlangen des Reichspräsidenten oder des Reichstages außer Kraft zu setzen.

(5) Das Nähere bestimmt ein Reichsgesetz.

Brüning beherrschte Deutschland durch sein Dekret. Er hat die Macht des Landes in den Hände des Reichspräsidents konzentriert. Brüning hat die Gesetze des Deutschlands geändert. Deutschland wurde eine präsidente Diktatur (Weitz 351). Brüning war nicht sehr beliebt bei den Bürgern. Brüning hielt Wahlen in 1930, die den ersten Zeit die Nazis 18.3 Prozent oder (107 Plätze) bekamen. Hindenburg, der der Präsident des Deutschlands von 1925 bis 1934 war, war gegen Demokratie, sogar wann er der Präsident war. Die Tatsache, dass der Präsident der demokratischen Regierung gegen Demokratie war, erklärt wieder, dass die Weimar Republik schwach war. Berater kamen zu Hindenburg mit einem Plan Hitler als Kanzler zu machen. Die Konservative wollten Demokratie von innen stürzen (Weitz 357). Hitler wie der Kanzler war nicht ideal, aber die Konservativen hatten nicht viele Gelegenheiten, um ihre Ziele zu erreichen:

"The established Right was not enthralled with Hitler and the Nazis, who remained too radical and unpredictable. But after all the failed plans and with Germany still, formally, a republic, still mired in depression, still living under the strictures of Versailles, Hitler and the Nazis had become acceptable to the established conservatives and large segments of the middle class" (Die bestehende Konservative waren nicht bezaubert mit Hitler und die Nazis, die zu radikal und unberechenbar blieben. Nach alle die Pläne schlugfehl und Deutschland war noch förmliche eine Republik, Deutschland hat noch wirschaftliche Depression tief gesteckt, war noch unter die Grenze der Verfassung von Versailles, wurden Hitler und die Nazis akzeptabel zu die bestehende Konservative und große Teilen des Bürgertum) (Weitz 357). Manche Konservative, die vor dem politischen System 1918 Deutschland zurückkehren wollten, vertrauten Hitler nicht, aber viele Konservative glauben, dass Hitler Massenpolitik dominieren konnte. Wenn Hitler Massenpolitik dominierte, dann konnten die konservativen Elemente des politischen System Demokratie beseitigen.

Hitler schiente sehr klug und er hasste die Juden. Als eine politische Figur, begann er nicht mit Hassreden. Es war klar, dass die Nazis antisemitisch waren, aber Hitler sagte nichts am Anfang über ein Völkermord oder Massenmord der Juden, stattdessen Hitler hat relativ moderat Wörter benutzt.[26] Hitler sprach über Judenhass in eine Weg, dass viele Leute mit ihm sympathisieren konnten:

> During the era of the Weimar Republic (1919-1935), Hitler's rhetorical outbursts against the Jews were calculated to feed on the anti-Semitism of millions of Germans, but he fell short of calling for their annihilation. Hitler's anti-Jewish beliefs were more extreme

[26] Es ist auch unklär, ob Hitler wollte in diesem Moment der Juden beseitigen.

> than those of the average German, but he cloaked his radicalism by appeal to the more traditional forms of anti-Semitism. Many Germans harbored anti-Semitic feelings and likely would not have objected to the removal of Jewish citizenship rights or their segregation from the rest of the population. But outside of Nazi Party ranks, there was no massive popular agitation to expel jews from Germany or to unleash violence against them.
>
> (Während die Ära des Weimarer Republik (von 1919 bis 1935), hatten die Rede des Hitler gegen die Juden gerechnet zu wächsen auf den Antisemitismus von Millionen des Deutsche, aber Hitler rief nicht für ihre Vernichtung. Die antisemitische Glauben des Hitlers waren extremer als die antisemitsiche Glauben des durchschnittliche Deutsche, aber er verbarg sein Radikalismus und er appellierte zu die traditionelle Arte von Antisemitismus. Manche Deutsche hatten antisemitische Gefühle und sie protestierten wahrscheinlich nicht zu die Aufhebung jüdische Bürgerschaft oder ihre Rassentrennung von die Bevölkerung. Ausser die Nazi Partei, gab es keine große Bewegung, die Juden weis aus Deutschland, oder Gewalt benutzte gegen die Juden.) Fischel 1

Jeder wusste, dass die Nazis gegen die Juden waren, aber fast niemand wusste, dass die Nazis die Juden beseitigen wollten.

Der Misserfolg und Mitschuld der internationale Gesellschaft

Es gab viele internationale Probleme nach den ersten Weltkrieg. Andere Länder konnte nicht die Juden aus Deutschland aufnehmen, wenn die Nazis die Wohnumstände erschuert haben, und die Juden aus Deutschland geflohen sind. Weil es sehr schwer für die Juden aus Deutschland zu fliehen war, blieben die Juden oft in Deutschland. Die Juden waren noch ein Probleme für die Nazis, und die Nazis wurden stärker Ungerechtigkeiten gegen die Juden nahmen. Palestine erlaubte nur 75,000 Flüchtlinge während ein fünf Jahre Dauer (Fischel 27). Wann der zweite Weltkrieg in September 1939 entbrannte, schloss Großbritannien seine Grenze. Dieser Zeit war der Anfang des Holocaust. Im Zeit, der die Juden die International Gesellschaft am meistens brauchen, die internationale Gesellschaft ließ die Juden allein.

Die Konferenz von Evian hat in Juli 1938 passiert. Präsident Franklin D. Roosevelt hat die Konferenz geleitet und zweiunddreißig Länder sind gekommen. Der Grund, dass die Konferenz abgehalten hat, hat mit die jüdische Flüchtlinge gehandelt. Aber die zweiunddreißig Länder haben nichts getan. "Doch geriet die Konferenz zum Fiasko und ging es den Anwesenden, so Historikerin Anderl, vor allem darum, das eigene Gewissen zu beruhigen: Von den 32 teilnehmenden Staaten erklärte sich einzig die Dominikanische Republik bereit, Flüchtlinge aufzunehmen" (der Spiegel). Beide die Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika und Großbritannien, die beide Weltmacht und Vorbilde waren, sagten, dass sie nicht mehr jüdische Flüchtlinge akzeptieren könnten. Die Konferenz von Evian war ein Versuch, für diese Weltmacht das Problem von jüdische Flüchtlinge zu ein anderes Land zu geben. Die Länder waren auch oft antisemitisch in ihre Antworten zu die Anfrage, dass sie mehr jüdische Flüchtlinge akzeptierten (Landau 138).

Der Misserfolg des Madagaskarplan

Es ist nicht klar, ob Hitler am Anfang die Juden beseitigen wurde. Hitler hat Macht am 1933 genommen, aber der Holocaust hat nur am 1939 begonnen. Für sechs Jahre hat die Nazis andere Plan mit die Juden gemacht. Die Juden sind von 1933 bis 1939 auch gestorben, aber nicht wie der Holocaust und nicht als mechanisiert und organisiert. Ein Plan, der die Nazis mit die Juden versucht haben, war der Madagaskarplan. Am 18. Juni 1940, Hitler hat Mussolini informiert, dass Hitler ein Plan die Juden nach Madagaskar hatte (Browning 18).[27] Für die Plan zu arbeiten, brauchten Deutschland beide Großbritannien und Frankreich zu besiegen. Deutschland könnte nicht Großbritannien und Frankreich besiegen. Wann Deutschland hat die Sowjetunion in 1941 eingedrungen, das Krieg hat noch ein Feinde, und Deutschland könnte nicht die Juden nach Madagaskar schicken (Fischel 37). Hitler musste die Juden beseitigen und er könnte nicht die Juden fort schicken, deshalb er musste die jüdische Problem bei Heimat auflösen.

Die Eugenik Plan

Die Eugenik war nicht ein neues Konzept, den Hitler gegründet hat. Bevor die Eugenik war in Deutschland, die Eugenik war in andere Teile Europa, Lateinamerika, und sogar die Vereinigte Staaten (Burke and Castaneda 8). Die Wissenschaftler der Eugenik glaubten, dass ihrer Arbeit gut für die Gesellschaft war, weil die Wissenschaftler glaubten, dass die Gesellschaft besser wurde, ob die Gesellschaft keine Geisteskranken oder andere unerwünschte Personen hatte (Burke and Castaneda 6). Die Eugenik war populär mit viele Länder, und hatten diese

[27] Historiker glaubten, dass die Ordnung, die Juden zu beseitigen, hat um mittel Marz 1941 gegeben (Bauer 42).

Länder Konferenzen und Gesezte, die die Eugeniksterilisieren unterstütze. Diese Bild ist über das Wachstum der international Konferenzen und Gesezte, die die Eugeniksterilisieren unterstütze, in andere Länder zwischen den Ersten Weltkrieg und den Zweiten Weltkrieg.[28] Die leichtste Farbe heißt internationale Konferenzen, die mittle Farbe heißt Strategie des Gebiet, und der dunkleste Farbe heißt Strategie des Landes. Die Untersuchung der Eugenik war nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern es eine internationale Untersuchung war. Das heißt, dass auf einen internationalen Boden, die Untersuchung der Eugenik war anständig, und von diese internationale Untersuchung, Hitler und die Nazis haben die Holocaust getrieben. Die Nazis waren bereit für die Holocaust durch die Untersuchung der Eugenik. Die Untersuchung der Eugenik in Deutschland war bei




Figure 1. International eugenics conferences and adoption of eugenic sterilization policies (*Sources*: See text).

[28] Das Bild ist von Barret und Kurzman, Seite 499.

die Rockefeller-Stiftung fundiert. Die Rockefeller-Stiftung ist eine amerikanische Stiftung, nicht eine deutsche Stiftung. Wahrscheinlich kannten die Rockefeller-Stiftung nicht, was wurde später in Deutschland passiert, aber das Geld von die Rockefeller-Stiftung benützte später um die Juden zu beseitigen, weil die Eugenik ein wichtiges Vorproduckt der Holocaust.

Kristallnacht

Kristallnacht hat am 9. bis 10. November 1938 passiert. Das Ereignis bekam seinen Name weil es Glas von zersplitterte Fenster auf die Straße gab. Dieses Glas war von zersplitterte Fenster von das Haus der Juden. Die Angreifer haben bei die Regierung bevollmächtigt. Die Regierung hat nicht die Verantwortung für den Pogrom genommen, sondern die Regierung hat den Pogrom auf ein Tod eines nazistischen Beamte. Der nazistischen Beamte hat bei ein jungen Jude ermordert. Die deutsche Regierung hat gesagt, dass Kristallnacht eine spontane Reaktion gegen die Juden, weil ein junger Jude hat ein Arier ermordert hat. Diese Ereigniss war der Ansatzpunkt, dass offizielle Gewalt gegen die Juden passierte. Die Gewalt und antisemitische Gefühle waren nicht neu. Nur eine wenige Monate vor der Kristallnacht passierte, gab es einen Zeichnung, die am Galgen hängenden Juden hatten. Es gab auch eine Drohung mit dieser

Zeichnung, die “es wird Zeit” sagte (Kingreen 7).[29]



Diese Zeichnung zeigte, dass die deutsche Bevölkerung gegen die Juden war. Es war nicht nur die Regierung, aber auch die Bevölkerung.

[29] Dieses Bild ist von Kingreen, Seite 7.

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