ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

POLITICAL SCIENCE 610

SENIOR PROJECT

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The Effect of Discretion on Efficacy: A Study of 4 State Bureaucrats

Department *of* Political Science



April 17, 2017

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THE EFFECT OF DISCRETION ON EFFICACY: A STUDY OF 4 STATE BUREAUCRATS

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of Allegheny College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

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Acknowledgements.

I must first thank Professor Brian Harward. In the past four years, I have taken almost all of your classes because I was genuinely interested in them, but also because I was inspired by your teaching methods. The work I have done at Allegheny, especially my 'comp,' has truly been enjoyable thanks to you. Not only have you been an amazing teacher, you have also been a personal mentor. I cannot thank you enough for all of the opportunities you have given me. My Allegheny experience would not be the same without you.

To my family, without whom I never would have gotten through these past four years. Mom, you have always motivated and encouraged me to go beyond my comfort zone. Thank you for always being supportive; you never pushed me too hard but always guided me in the right direction. Brooklyn, thank you for always being there for me. I must also thank you for editing almost every paper I wrote in college; your writing skills are truly phenomenal.

Liam, thank you for your constant support and love. Thank you for all of the coffee runs to Tim Horton's, and the countless sushi dates. You truly made my college experience so much happier and more memorable. I could not have made it through this semester without you.

Erin, I can't imagine life without you - you have always been there for me. Thank you for suffering through the 'kins booth' moments with me, and celebrating achievements and milestones together. I will most definitely suffer from withdrawals next year when we no longer live together. Thank you for helping me survive this 'comping' semester!

Alexa, thank you so much for your friendship this semester. Even though you graduated early, you have constantly supported me throughout this comping' process. Thank you for always being there for me!

Ariana, I cannot explain how happy I am that we got to live together this year. I credit my sanity this year to your constant cookie baking. You always knew exactly what to say, and how to cheer me up when I doubted myself or my 'comp.'

Brenda - I owe you everything. Without you, I would not have discovered my passion for political science, nor would I have even gone to Allegheny College! You made political science fun, and I have loved sharing exciting moments with you. Thank you for your help and support with this project. I could not have done it without you.

Chapter One.

Introduction.

This research aims to discover if increased discretion granted to state street-level bureaucrats improves efficacy and overall job satisfaction. In order to answer this question, a survey of four state street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) will be supported by a thorough theoretical analysis. One survey will be conducted in each of the four policy areas denoted by Gormley's Policy Typology (1986), for a total of four case studies from the following state bureaus: (1) New York Department of Environmental Protection; (2) New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; (3) Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape; (4) Midwestern State Department of Education. These four case studies will then be analyzed against the literature set forth by Michael Lipsky (1980), William Gormley, Jr. (1986), as well as theories of delegation and principal-agent theory in order to effectively address the research question.

What is a Bureau?

Bureaus are very unique organizations, unlike businesses, corporations, or for-profit organizations (Downs 1967). In order to be classified as a bureau, an organization must possess a set of primary characteristics. These include the following: (a) it must be a very large organization, in which the top-level officials know less than half of its employees; (b) the members are full-time employees that rely on this employment for the majority of their income; (c) internally, the bureau is responsible for hiring, promoting, and evaluating employees; (d) the output or results of the bureau's work is a public service and therefore not for sale on any public markets (Downs 1967). Bureaus are formed through the federal legislature by the passing of a

bill (Browne 1980). Federal bureaus are a part of the executive branch of government, and each has a specific area of expertise on which it advises politicians and provides valuable public services to citizens (Browne 1980). Federal bureaus are subject to supervision and evaluation by Congress, as they receive federal funding. Along with major federal bureaus, state departments can also be categorized as bureaus (Browne 1980). Bureaus at the state level will be the focus of this research project.

A major defining characteristic of bureaus is the hierarchical structure and set of formal rules (Downs 1967; Gray & Sibley 2014). Because bureaus are non-profit organizations, and are not selling actual products on a market, they are left to devise a system of guidelines and regulations of their own (Downs 1967). Considering that bureaus have large staffs, each dealing with numerous clients and customers, having a set of formal and rigid rules facilitates efficiency within the bureau (Gajdusheck 2003). If no such regulations or rules existed, each client could potentially be served or treated differently (Downs 1967; Keiser 1999). Having structured procedures and protocols provides a sense of uniformity in the way clients are treated and provided with services. This is also a formal check against discrimination and personal biases (Downs 1967 & Lipsky 1980; Carrington 2005). Another reason for strict rules is to establish a budget and monitor the expenditures of individual street-level bureaucrats; given the limited resources of many bureaus, following a budget and monitoring spending is crucial (Downs 1967). Therefore, bureaucracies possess rules, policies, and protocols, that "constrain the behavior of street-level bureaucrats," (Keiser 1999).

Who are Street-Level Bureaucrats?

In 1883, the Pendleton Act created the professional bureaucrat or civil servant; this act made administrative bureaucrats separate from politics and responsible for executing and implementing policies neutrally and without influence from corrupt corporations or politicians (Brehm & Gates 1997).

Street-level bureaucrats, unlike federal bureaucrats, are employed by bureaus that operate on the state and local level (Lipsky 1980). While all bureaucrats have the unique ability to affect people's lives, SLBs have an even greater impact given their close and personal contact with people on a daily basis (Lipsky 1980). The term "street-level bureaucrats," coined by Michael Lipsky, includes school teachers, police officers, welfare and parole officers, medical and public health professionals, etc (Lipsky 1980). Michael Lipsky first explored the concept that SLBs actually create and implement policies. Lipsky's innovative work brought to light the possibility that the day-to-day routines of bureaucrats, combined with their lack of resources and high uncertainty in the job, actually allows for their behavior and decisions to become policy (Lipsky 1980). For example, Lipsky (1980) states, "I argue that public policy is not best understood as made in legislature or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers." To demonstrate the vast impact of street-level bureaucrats, Brehm and Gates (2010) state, "decisions by unseen bureaucrats affect the safety in our homes, the quality of our air and water, the conditions of our workplaces, the security of our shores, the education of our children, the vulnerability of our national defense, and the surety of banks and insurance."

Lipsky (1980) argues that street level bureaucrats have great influence over public services for two reasons; (1) “debates about the proper scope and focus of government services are essentially over the scope and function of these public employees,” and (2) “street level bureaucrats have considerable impact on people’s lives.” In other words, SLBs are a citizen’s direct line to the federal or state governments; in many cases they are the only contact that people will experience with government policy (Lipsky 1980; Schneider & Jacoby 1996). As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) explain, SLBs are so imperative because their decisions are reflective of their personal values and preferences, that “actualize policy.” It is because of this unique ability to implement and alter policy, that street-level bureaucrats were chosen as the focus of this research project.

SLBs share a set of identifying characteristics. These characteristics are as follows: (1) he/she is employed by a bureau; (2) he/she is a full-time employee and relies on this employment for the majority of her income; (3) his/her role in the bureau is a part of a hierarchy, and job performance is monitored; (4) the results or output of her work is not sold on financial markets (Downs 1967).

Street-level bureaucrats also share a set of motivations that are the driving forces in both their reasoning for working for the bureau, and their quality of work for the bureau. These motivations include power, income, prestige, convenience, security, personal loyalty, pride in proficient performance of work, a desire to serve the public interest, and a commitment to a specific program or policy (Downs 1967; Gailmard 2010). These motivations are at the forefront of every decision and action made by a SLB (Downs 1967; Brehm & Gates 1997; Lipsky 1980). From this set of motivations, it is clear that some of these goals (power, money income, prestige)

are very personal, but other goals are more altruistic (Downs 1967). The reason for many SLBs joining their bureau and dedicating their life's work for these bureaus is because of the public services they are providing to citizens; this sense of public service and duty is incredibly motivating to street-level bureaucrats (Downs 1967; Lipsky 1980; Brehm & Gates 2010).

Struggles of Street-Level Bureaucrats

Considering their impactfulness, it is troubling to note that many bureaus struggle with inadequate resources, training, and staff (Lipsky 1980; Brehm & Gates 1997). These shortages in resources can drastically affect how policies are implemented, and therefore, how many people receive benefits and vital services.

While many of the struggles of street-level bureaucrats are monetary and logistical within the bureau, many of the limitations of the efficiency of SLBs have to do with human nature. It is important to note that street-level workers are not working in an ideal world where policies perfectly align with the circumstances they face; instead, street-level bureaucrats "work in a world of often painful accommodation and compromise," (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003). Given this realistic view, there are many natural limitations in human decision making. For example, there is a very limited amount of time that a SLB can spend on decision making, and also only a limited amount of information that one can process at a given time (Downs 1967). As previously mentioned, with the lack of resources among bureaus, street-level bureaucrats may not have access to all of the information or resources they need to make an informed decision (Downs 1967). Along with this, many SLBs are incredibly overworked and therefore cannot devote their full attention to a specific issue, which can reduce the quality of their decision

making abilities at the given time (Downs 1967). Given that the majority of street-level bureaucrats are overworked, many working within bureaus that produce a high-volume of communications experience major backlogs (Downs 1967). These communications could include public health information that needs to be rapidly disseminated given a current health crisis, for example. These backlogs cause more delays in decision making, as well as a reduction in the quality of decisions made given further time constraints (Downs 1967 p. 130). For example, according to Gormley and Balla (2013), the passing of the Affordable Care Act caused a substantial increase in the workload of SLBs, thus affecting their ability to work effectively and deliver resources efficiently.

Building from this, another major problem facing bureaus involves the lack of training of many street-level bureaucrats (Gormley 1986). Many bureaus, such as welfare offices, are high-traffic offices and require a large staff (Taylor 2014). This can cause over-worked bureaus to hire people with inadequate training and education. Gormley (1986) harshly describes that a major, "part of the problem is that the street-level 'crats are not the best and brightest public servants," (Gormley 1986). Gormley also notes that a major problem is "laziness" (1986). More specifically, many SLBs will overlook protocol or bypass important steps simply out of laziness or apathy (Gormley 1986). This also leads to SLBs selecting which policies and regulations to follow. Some are guilty of avoiding certain policies or regulations, and opting to follow simplier policies to avoid stress and conflict during the workday (Gormley 1986; Carrington 2005; Keiser 1999).

This lack of a properly trained and motivated staff can lead to inadequate performances, therefore failing to meet the needs of the citizens the bureau is designed to serve. Furthermore,

the behaviors of SLBs can have a negative effect on the delivery of services, or policy outcomes, such as having a negative attitude toward clients, rash decision making, imposing time costs on clients or delaying the delivery of services, as well as distributing services based on personal biases (Lipsky 1980). According to Lipsky, these simple behaviors have the potential to alter policy outcomes due to the effect they have on the clientele (1980). This is important because "virtually all of us, see bureaucrats several times a day. Our lives at home, on the job, at schools, and at play are affected by unseen bureaucrats making multitudes of decisions," (Brehm & Gates 1997).

Importance of Discretion in the work of Street-Level Bureaucrats

For the purposes of this research project, discretion is referred to as the amount of freedom or autonomy a person has to make decisions involving their work (Tummers & Bekkers 2014). Given the nature of bureaus, with their hierarchical structures, delegation to lower SLBs is a natural, and a very normal occurrence (Downs 1967). According to John Locke, discretion is crucial and necessary for a government to run efficiently and effectively (Carrington 2005). Given the unique nature of street-level bureaucratic work, discretion has become an inherent part of public service. As Hupe and Hill (2007) explain, SLBs are forced to use discretion in their daily work simply because of their unique responsibility to interact with different people, distribute services, and interpret policies. SLBs are public servants and interact with and serve people on a regular basis, and are therefore subject to many unique and unexpected situations and challenges (Lipsky 1980; Hupe & Hill 2007; Marvel & Resh 2015; Sowa & Selden 2003). As Lipsky (1980) states, "The essence of street-level bureaucracies is that they require people to

make decisions about other people. Street-level bureaucrats have discretion because the nature of service provision calls for human judgment that cannot be programmed and for which machines cannot substitute." Therefore, discretion must be granted to SLBs in order for them to fulfill their duties and provide services to the public.

Why Does Efficacy Matter?

For the purposes of this research project, efficacy is interpreted as the ability to produce the desired result, having "pleasurable or positive emotions resulting from the appraisal of one's job," as well as being satisfied with the outcomes of one's work outcomes (Ramos et al. 2014; Cooper et al. 2014). Given the struggles that most SLBs face on a daily basis, including the lack of resources and limited training or education, efficacy is incredibly important. Multiple social and political scientists have proven that when a street-level bureaucrat feels personally invested in her work, she is more likely to continue working diligently and will continue to promote the policies that she was a part of developing (Brehm & Gates 1997). Brehm and Gates also found that the more an individual bureaucrat can relate to the solidary preferences of the agency, and can maintain a sense of control or autonomy in their workplace, the more they will work and the less they will shirk (1997). Because of this, feelings of personal efficacy are important in the work of a street-level bureaucrat.

Efficacy is also important because policy slippage is very common among lower level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980). Bureaucracies are hierarchical structures, the policies are normally formulated at the top levels, but carried out and implemented at the lower levels by the street-level bureaucrats. There are many causes for policy slippage, including lack of

communication between upper and lower level bureaucrats, lack of resources to implement the policies, discrepancies in policy preference between upper and lower level bureaucrats, and personal biases of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980; Brehm & Gates 1997).

State Level vs. Federal Level

Discretion among bureaucrats has been studied significantly more at the federal level as compared to the state level (Gerber & Teske 2000). This presents another gap in the literature that this research project was designed to fill. While the majority of studies on discretion and bureaucratic policy-making have focused on the national-level, studying the state-level is crucial given what the literature has proven about the significance of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980).

There are potentially significant differences between state and federal bureaucracies, and how they operate, which may present important differences in how discretion affects street-level bureaucrats' efficacy. For example, the priorities of federal and state agencies differ, as state agencies are tasked with serving their unique and diverse constituents. Therefore, as all fifty states are unique, the bureaus in each state are unique. State agencies and governments are also given discretion to implement federal policies and programs; this allows them to implement policies differently, based on the needs of their states (Gerber & Teske 2000; Keiser 2003). More specifically, Gerber and Teske explain how state agencies have the capability to respond to environmental crises in a very effective way, because of their familiarity with their state governmental processes, including state budgets (Gerber & Teske 2000). For example Gerber and Teske explain that a state agency successfully handled a hazardous waste crisis because of

their ability to "resist much political control, and respond rationally to environmental problems," (2000). Therefore, state agencies are important to study given their unique ability to handle complex crises within their own states. In this present study, state-level bureaucrats were chosen because of the lack of literature and research on state bureaus and bureaucrats.

Project Outline:

This research is important to conduct and explore because of the impact that street-level bureaucrats have on the daily lives of all citizens. Not only is it their job to provide vital public services, but they serve as a citizen's direct line to the federal and state government's policies and laws (Lipsky 1980; Brehm & Gates 2010). The central question of this research project is as follows: What explains variation in efficacy among state street-level bureaucrats? Through four case studies of state SLB's across diverse policy areas, this research project sets out to answer this question.

Chapter 2 will provide a thorough explanation of the major theories used in this research project, including the delegation of discretion, principal agent theory, and Gormley's policy typology.

Chapter 3 explains the hypothesis and provides a detailed explanation of the analytic methods. In this chapter, I will explain how the participants were chosen, as well as the rationale behind each survey question asked to the four state SLB's. I will also explain how the information collected through the survey will be used to test my hypothesis.

Chapter 4 contains the case studies which detail the respective state street-level bureaucrat's type of work as well as a summation of their survey responses. These case studies

will provide background information for each bureau, as well as a description of each street-level bureaucrat's job and day to day responsibilities. Most importantly, these case studies will document the information provided about the levels of salience and complexity, discretion, and efficacy, for each state SLB.

The final chapter will analyze and synthesize the data collected from the Qualtrics survey and will be tested against my hypothesis. The final chapter will critically assess this study, explain study limitations, and also provide suggestions for future research.

Chapter Two: Introduction of Major Theories

This chapter will provide an explanation of the major theories used in this research project. First, discretion will be examined in depth, covering both the advantages and disadvantages of granting discretion to SLBs. Following this, principal-agent theory will be discussed. Principal-agent is especially relevant because it provides the foundation for how delegation is granted to SLBs, and the potential consequences of this delegation. The concept of efficacy will also be examined, in relation to job satisfaction for street-level bureaucrats. Finally, Gormley's policy typology will be explained in detail (1980). Overall, this section will examine the theories, and provide a foundation for the hypothesis involved in this research question.

Advantages of Discretion:

There are several arguments for discretion being a vital component of street-level bureaucratic work. For example, many regulations that guide a street-level bureaucrat's work are written ambiguously and in very general terms; this very fact requires them to use their discretion in interpreting these laws or regulations (Keiser 1999; Carrington 2005; Hupe & Hill 2007). Also, given that many bureaus are struggling to have adequate resources, many SLBs use their discretion as a tool to overcome the lack of resources in order to best serve their clients (Carrington 2005). The use of discretion is also very important because many of the problems that SLBs face can not be simplified into basic rules and protocols (Lipsky 1980; Carrington 2005). Moreover, the unique circumstances that SLBs are forced to handle immediately, with their clients, are unpredictable and therefore unable to be written down in policy-form (Carrington 2005). Given this, SLBs are not only placed under a time constraint, but they are

forced to act quickly and make decisions and choices that require discretion and affect people's lives in meaningful ways (Hupe & Hill 2007; Marvel & Resh 2015; Carrington 2005). Discretion is also crucial because on a regular basis, SLBs are required to make decisions without all of the necessary resources to make a perfectly informed decision (Brehm & Gates 1997; Lipsky 1980). Moreover, given the ambiguous and often contradictory nature of policies and laws, it is important to note that SLBs are forced to make choices rapidly and on the spot, leaving them little time to thoroughly consult the texts of the policies (Hupe & Hill 2007).

Disadvantages of Discretion:

While discretion has the potential to improve the quality of a street-level bureaucrat's work, discretion can also be abused (Carrington 2005). There are many arguments against the existence of discretion in SLBs daily work. One of these arguments states that discretion "begins where the law ends;" moreover, acting on discretion is not legal because they are working outside of the law and making their own decisions and personal interpretations (Carrington 2005; Keiser 1999). Explaining this further, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) explain that, "like putty, discretion can be squeezed by oversight and rules but never eliminated; it will shift and reemerge in some other form in some other place." Another argument against discretion is that it causes bureaucratic outcomes to be arbitrary and not uniform (Carrington 2005). If street-level bureaucrats are all exercising discretion, their decisions are therefore all going to result in different outcomes.

Given that SLBs mainly interact with people and provide vital public services, granting them discretion provides the potential for discrimination (Brehm & Gates 1997). According to

extensive research conducted on street-level bureaucrats, most decisions are made based on personal judgments of people and identity (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003). Therefore, the personal judgments of SLBs can potentially cause the SLB to distribute services in a discriminatory manner (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003; Brehm & Gates 1997). Many SLBs operate within human service bureaus, or welfare offices that are essential in providing necessary resources (Keiser 1999). Because of this, the street-level bureaucrats have the discretion to decide who receives resources, and who does not (Keiser 1999). If SLBs have biases against particular demographics, these biases are therefore reflected in the ways public resources are allocated, therefore altering the intended policy outcome (Lipsky 1980).

Principal-Agent Theory

"A principal-agent relationship, according to the standard theory, is an arrangement under which one acter, referred to as the *agent*, is charged with performing certain acts that are useful to another actor, called the *principal*, typically in exchange for compensation from the principal" (de Ferranti et al. 2009). Although principal-agent theory was originally developed for the field of business, it has been adapted to involve issues of government.

This project is analyzing the effect that discretion has on individual bureaucrat's efficacy. There is ample literature analyzing the effect that discretion has on shirking and policy slippage inside bureaus, but none has looked at the effect of discretion on individual policy outcomes and efficacy (Tummers & Bekkers 2014). For this study, the agent is the SLB, and the principal is their supervisor or manager of their program. Therefore, the question in this study

becomes: how does the discretion granted to the agent by the principal, affect the agent's efficacy?

Some of the most common challenges with principal-agent theory include moral hazard and information asymmetry. Moral hazard involves the differences in values or policy preferences between the principal and the agent, causing discrepancies in how policies are interpreted and implemented (Gailmard 2010). Information asymmetry refers to the gap of knowledge between the principal and the agent (Gailmard 2010). More specifically, if the principal has great expertise on the policy subject, and the agent does not possess the same level of knowledge, he or she could potentially interpret or implement the policy incorrectly.

Both moral hazard and information asymmetry can cause policy "slippages" or unintended policy outcomes from the principal's perspective (Lipsky 1980). One cause of slippage is the hierarchical structure that is so common in bureaucratic agencies. The hierarchical structure naturally requires orders to be handed down from the top level officials (principals) to the lower level officials or street-level bureaucrats (agents) (Lipsky 1980). As orders are passed down the hierarchical ladder, slippage can occur as the orders are interpreted differently by each level. The potential for misinterpretation is reflective of the policy preferences by the lower-level agents. Assuming that the principal and the agent do not have identical preferences, nor identical knowledge on the subject, 'slippage' is virtually unavoidable (Lipsky 1980; Brehm & Gates 1997). As Dworkin explains, "when someone is in general charged with making decisions subject to standards set by a particular authority...Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is therefore a relative

concept," (Dworkin 1977). Therefore, when principals delegate discretion to an agent, the agent is virtually free to implement the policies based upon his or her own preferences.

Another cause for policy 'slippage' is also reflective of the personal biases of street-level bureaucrats. As SLBs are essentially policy-makers, given their unique ability to decide who receives services and who does not, their personal biases can result in discriminatory policies (Lipsky 1980). Even if the principal wrote the policy in a neutral and nondiscriminatory manner, the SLB while implementing the policy, can choose to neglect a certain demographic, or distribute policies unequally therefore creating a discriminatory policy (Lipsky 1980). This form of policy 'slippage' is a prime example or moral hazard.

Moral Hazard

Dick Thornburgh, former United States Attorney General said, "most bureaucrats were highly motivated towards public service and possessed the kinds of skills that were needed to run a department like ours," (Gormley & Balla 2013). This statement correlates to the literature surrounding SLBs' motivations, which found that policy-oriented people are more likely to enter into public service (Gailmard 2010). From a study conducted on public servants, Gailmard (2010) found four strong motivators for joining public service: 1) attraction to policy making, 2) commitment to the public interest and civic duty, 3) compassion, and 4) self-sacrifice. Furthermore, many street-level bureaucrats that enter public service begin their careers as 'idealists' and have a specific goal they wish to achieve (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003). SLBs are human and therefore operate with their own self-interest in mind, and are driven to

follow certain incentives (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003; Waterman, Rouse & Wright (2004).

Given that people choosing to enter public service are highly motivated and interested in policy, they are therefore bringing their own values and preferences to their work (Gailmard 2010). This is when the problems arise in principal-agent theory. Each bureau has it's own set of policy preferences and goals, that are set by the bureau directors and the executive branch of government. The individual goals or values of a bureau can attract workers that are especially interested in that policy area. For example, those inclined to preserve the environment would choose the Environmental Protection Agency for employment over the Department of Energy (Gailmard 2010; Brehm & Gates 1997). Taking this one step further, many SLBts not only chose to work for an agency they identify with, but they self-select to work in on a specific program or policy that they desire to change or alter to match their ideal preferences (Gailmard 2010). One major motivation for SLBs is to acquire expertise in their policy area because doing so can grant them more discretion (Gailmard 2010). When street-level bureaucrats are more educated in their policy areas, they are referred to as having 'expertise,' (Gormley 1986). Possessing expertise in the field can grant them more freedom and discretion, therefore allowing more opportunity to use this discretion to reflect their own preferences and values (Gailmard 2010; Gpr,;eu 1986). While this is beneficial, and more educated street-level bureaucrats can perform at a higher level, there is more risk for moral hazard.

A major concern is that the bureau official's (principal's) policy preferences do not always match the preferences of the street-level bureaucrats and lower-level employees (agents) (Waterman, Rouse, & Wright 2004; Rubin & Chiques 2015). Many policy-oriented street-level

bureaucrats find that they cannot abandon their personal agenda and personal ideals because that is what drew them to public service in the first place (Gailmard 2010). As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) describe, street-level bureaucrats cannot simply "check their preferences at the door" before beginning their work days, they are a part of who they are and influence every aspect of their work. Given that the decisions made by SLBs actually become the policies they are implementing, their preferences matter significantly.

Moral hazard has major implications when discretion is granted from the principal to the agent. When work is delegated from the principal to the agent, the principal loses a certain degree of control in how the policy is implemented because of the discrepancies between the values and preferences of the principal and the agent (Hupe & Hill 2007). According to research on the behavior of SLBs, values and morals are heavily relied upon when making decisions, more so than the written texts of policy (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003). In a study on 48 street-level bureaucrats, it was revealed that daily decisions are made more with personal judgments rather than legal reasoning (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003). This is not to say that the rigid rules and hierarchical structure do not affect or guide the decisions made by SLBs; the rules and policies just provide a template in which they inject their own moral reasoning (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003). As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) eloquently describe, "legal and bureaucratic reasoning is offered to justify extraordinary actions, but these justifications often appear as a rubber band stretched around moral decision making, binding but not determining the decisions."

Solutions for Moral Hazard

While moral hazard is a major concern for state agencies, Gailmard's Public Service Motivation theory potentially found a solution (2010). Given that street-level bureaucrats are policy-motivated and carry a set of individualized morals and preferences, many will choose an organization that they can easily "buy into," (Gailmard 2010). Moreover, many SLBs will chose to work for an organization that aligns with their own values, and whose goals "fall within the servant's zone of values," (Gailmard 2010). Also, Brehm and Gates (1997) found that the more an individual bureaucrat can relate to the solidary preferences of the agency, and has the opportunity to maintain a sense of control or autonomy in their workplace, the more they will work and the less they will shirk. de Fanti et al.explain this further by stating that principals will specifically attempt to recruit agents that share values and whom they believe will act in their best interest (2009). Therefore, if the agent "buys into" the goals of the agency, the amount of discretion granted to the agent by the principal has the potential to affect their productivity and quality of work.

Another potential solution to the moral hazard problem is the expertise that street-level bureaucrat's possess in their policy areas. Given that SLBs self-select to work for an agency whose values align with their own, many have also obtained degrees and advanced knowledge that enhances their credibly to work for these agencies (Gailmard 2010). Having expertise provides SLBs the unique opportunity to operate with high levels or discretion, higher than those without the same expertise (Gailmard 2010). Having expertise also can alleviate potential information asymmetry within the bureau; when SLBs are obtaining advanced degrees and are well-versed in their policy areas, they are more likely to implement the policy as it was intended by the principal (Gailmard 2010).

Discretion can also be granted to street-level bureaucrats as a solution for the moral hazard dilemma (Tummers & Bekkers 2014). Moreover, according to a survey of over 5,000 street-level bureaucrats in the mental health field, when SLBs are granted discretion, two positive effects can occur: 1) client-meaningfulness increases, and 2) the street-level bureaucrat becomes more willing to implement the policy (Tummers & Bekkers 2014). This idea is also supported by the work of Brehm and Gates who found the more discretion granted to SLBs increases their sense of autonomy, and therefore they are more likely to work efficiently rather than shirk (1997). Discretion can also alleviate the risk of moral hazard by serving as a tool to generate equality (Keiser 1999). While it is proven that by SLBs exercising discretion, they can actually generate discriminatory outcomes, discretion can also produce the opposite result (Keiser 1999). Moreover, "discretion is seen as a positive force that can be used by street-level bureaucrats to stretch the law to respond to clients' needs and to better respond to individual circumstances," (Keiser 1999).

Importance of Efficacy

Efficacy and job satisfaction are very important to consider when discussing SLBs. This is because job satisfaction and positive feelings of efficacy can motivate a SLB to not only produce better quality work, but stay in their bureaus and jobs in the public sector for longer periods of time (Cooper et al. 2014). According to Wagner III, satisfaction can be measured by asking an employee about their individual or self-reported satisfaction with their personal productivity, satisfaction with their work environment, satisfaction with their supervision, and satisfaction pertaining to their ability to make decisions and participate in the agency's work

(1994). More specifically, the idea of participation contributing to satisfaction has been thoroughly explored by Wagner III (2014). From this study, he found that there are statistically significant correlations between participation and job satisfaction (Wagner 1994). Yet it is important to note that this study points out potential problems with survey participants both over and understating their personal satisfaction (Wagner 1994). Relating to this, when employees feel supported and valued by their supervisors, their motivation is improved which in turn results in greater effectiveness and more productivity (Petter et al. 2002). This idea is also supported by Brehm and Gates, who explain that employees that feel comfortable and in control in their work environment are more likely to work and less likely to shirk (1997).

Following the concept of participation and job satisfaction, is the idea that formal discretion can increase job satisfaction (Ruben & Chiques 2015). Moreover, the formal structure in bureaucracies that facilitate the discretion from principal to agent can actually increase job satisfaction for the agent (Ruben & Chiques 2015). This study also finds that those with the most discretion have reported higher levels of satisfaction than those with less discretion granted to them (Ruben & Chiques 2015). This idea is also supported by Maynard-Moody and Portillo (2010), who explain that, "street-level workers rely on their discretion to manage the physical and emotional demands of their jobs. They also rely on their discretion to claim some small successes and redeem some satisfaction,' (Tummers & Bekkers 2014).

Gormley's Policy Typology.

The effects of discretion on bureaucrats have been widely tested and analyzed by many social scientists, providing ample literature on the topic (Tummers & Bekkers 2014). But, there

are very important components in this field of study that have been left out of the research. For example, this research project is specifically looking at the effect discretion has on personal efficacy in street-level bureaucrats across diverse policy areas, something that has not yet been explored (Tummers & Bekkers 2014). More specifically, the majority of the literature on this topic involves studies of bureaucrats that work within the same field. For example, one study was conducted on just social workers, or on one individual agency (Tummers & Bekkers 2014; Wood & Cook 1989; Sandfort 2000; Parinandi 2013). There has yet to be one comprehensive study analyzing the effect of discretion on bureaucrats across different fields and policy areas. According to Hupe & Hill, Michael Lipsky's *Street-Level Bureaucracy* book failed to distinguish between different occupations; Hupe and Hill believe that these differences in occupation may have significant consequences in how policies are implemented by street-level bureaucrats (2007). Therefore, this research project will address both of these gaps and will analyze the effect that discretion has on personal efficacy among street level bureaucrats in different fields.

In order to comprise an accurate and diverse group of street-level bureaucrats to study, I relied upon William Gormley Jr.'s policy typology theory (1986). This policy typology is based upon the levels of salience and complexity involved in the particular policy (Gormley 1986).

Salience is referred to as, the quality of being particularly noticeable or important to the public(Gormley 1986). According to Gormley, in order for a policy issue to be considered salient, it must affect a large number of people in a very significant manner (1986). Furthermore, Gormley explains that, "salience is low unless the scope of conflict is broad and the intensity of conflict is high," (Gormley 1896).

According to Gormley, a “ highly complex issue is one that raises factual questions that cannot be answered by generalists or laypersons,” (1986). In order for a policy area to be deemed complex, it requires expertise and specialized education and knowledge. In other words, a layperson could not adequately write nor implement policies on complex issues according to this theory (Gormley, 1986). Moreover, salience is measured off of public opinion, and complexity is measured based on its technical and scientific complexity (Gormley 1986).

Highly salient issues are those that significantly impact a very large amount of people (Gormley 1986). Highly complex issues involve very intricate factual or scientific problems that a general politician or bureaucrat could not solve; highly complex issues require the advisement of an expert in that field (Gormley 1986). The levels of salience and complexity in a policy issue are not concrete, but are fluid and can change depending on several conditions. These include, advancements in technology, new regulations or laws, or a change in public opinion (Gormley 1986). As a general rule of thumb, highly complex issues tend to include environmental, energy, or transportation issues, while less complex issues can include commerce, employment regulations, or housing (Gormley 1986). An example of a policy issue that is very fluid between complexity and salience are health issues. For example, when a health crisis breaks out, the awareness of the public is heightened and the need for new medical treatments quickly increase, causing both saliency and complexity to rise (Gormley 1986). Likewise, when there is not a health crisis, both the salience and complexity of health issues lower.

Saliency and complexity in policy issues are very closely connected to the work of street-level bureaucrats. The level of saliency and complexity in a policy issue directly affects the bureaucrat's accountability on the issue, as well as the need for the bureaucrat to be very

informed and serve as an expert on the topic (Gormley 1986). According to Gormley's policy typology, when both salience and complexity are low, SLBs are given more discretion and are more free to make decisions without the pressure of intense scrutiny or supervision from their superiors (1986). The opposite holds true when both salience and complexity are heightened (Gormley 1986).

Figure 1. Gormley's Salience and Complexity Typology

	High Salience	**Low Salience**
High Complexity	Simultaneous pressure for accountability and expertise	Pressure for expertise
Low Complexity	Pressure for accountability becomes intense	Little pressure for accountability or expertise

Gormley, William T. Jr. (1986) "Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System"

Chapter Three: Hypothesis & Analytic Methods

Hypothesis 1: If a street-level bureaucrat (agent) is granted more discretion by her supervisor (principal), she will report higher levels of efficacy in her daily work outcomes.

Inverse of Hypothesis 1: If a street-level bureaucrat is limited or restricted in discretion by her supervisor (principal), she (agent) will report lower levels of efficacy in her daily work outcomes.

I hypothesize that the state SLB operating within the highly salient and non-complex policy area will report the lowest levels of efficacy. Therefore, in comparison to this category, I expect the three other SLBs will report higher levels of efficacy in comparison to the SLB in the highly salient and non-complex field. This hypothesis is derived from Gormley's policy typology, which states that SLBs operating within highly salient and non-complex policy fields will be subject to extreme accountability, while also having little freedom or discretion (Gormley 1986).

As mentioned in the methods section, Gormley's policy typology will be employed to test the hypothesis in this research project. Moreover, analyzing the four state SLBs in their respective categories will assist in answering the research question: what explains the variation in efficacy among state SLBs?

Figure 2. Hypothesis Visualization

	High Salience	**Low Salience**
High Complexity		
Low Complexity	*H1:* Lowest Efficacy	

Analytic Methods

This research project consists of two components: a theoretical background detailing the current literature on bureaucratic discretion, and a case study section providing a relevant and personal perspective to support the literature. The theoretical background will focus primarily on the work of William Gormley, Jr., and Michael Lipsky, (1986; 1980). Lipsky provides the foundation for street-level bureaucrats, including their demographics, working conditions, available resources, and decision making power. The purpose of the case studies is again, to provide a more focused and personalised view of the effect discretion has on the work of street-level bureaucrats.

For this study, participants will be asked a series of short answer questions regarding their level of control or discretion over their daily work activities, as well as their self-reported feelings of efficacy with their work. The survey will not ask detailed questions about their scientific research nor specific information about projects they are currently working on. The survey will be disseminated through Qualtrics.com, an online survey generator. After completion of the survey, the participants will be given a debriefing form. No compensation will be rewarded for completion in this study.

The four participants for this study were chosen with specific guidelines in mind. In order to ensure consistency, all four participants are employed and work at the state level. For

example, the State Department of Education, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and New Jersey Department of Environmental Conservation, and Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape are all strictly at the state level. The individuals employed by these agencies were chosen for this study based on the following criteria: 1) the individual could not be a higher-level employee, for example, they could not be an executive director of the agency; 2) the individual had to be working in one of the four policy typologies set forth by Gormley (1986); 3) the individual must meet the criteria for a bureaucrat as defined by Anthony Downs (1967).

The participants will be selected on a "first come first serve" basis. Given the literature on the heavy work-loads of street-level bureaucrats, I anticipated that it would be difficult to secure four participants for this study. Therefore, I reached out to over thirty street-level bureaucrats, across several states and agencies. The participants were contacted through initial phone calls, explaining the survey and soliciting their participation in the study. If the street-level bureaucrat agreed, a follow-up email was sent explaining the survey and providing an informed consent form. Once the informed consent was signed and returned to me, I sent the street-level bureaucrat the survey through Qualtrics.com. Once all four surveys were collected, a debriefing form was sent to the participants. The responses will then be tested against the hypothesis set forth by this research question, as well as the literature.

The survey was intentionally created with open-ended questions, coaxing the participants to provide as much detail as they were willing to share. Modeled after the research by Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003), this open-ended survey was designed to collect personal stories from individual SLBs. Allowing them to share personal information about their work has

the potential to reveal their decision-making processes, as well as their values and satisfaction with their work outcomes (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003). The survey method is valuable because many quantitative studies found that their statistical results were lacking qualitative data (Keiser 2003).

In a study conducted by Maynard-Moody and Musheno, street-level bureaucrats were interviewed and asked to share personal stories about their work on the "front lines," (2003). It is their research that motivated this research project. Their model of interviewing street-level bureaucrats and collecting their stories, provided very significant and telling information that was useful in analyzing the current literature on the subject. For example, a western police officer said, "I can't say I follow the rules completely. I don't. But I interpret them in each situation and make the best call. Yeah, from my own value system, I suppose." A western vocational rehabilitation counselor described, "I don't use the cookbook method. It's all based on what people need to become as independently employed as possible. You know, not everyone requires support for eight or ten months, a year, two years, whatever." A western middle school teacher explains, "I deal with kids one to one, whereas the administration deals with the kids as a whole. I look at it on a kid-by-kid basis. I really don't care what the building policy is." (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003).

These responses reveal some of the inherent challenges that SLBs face given the nature of their work. Given the success of their research, this research project hopes to use the online survey to generate genuine and open responses from street-level bureaucrats, that can then be used to test my hypothesis and also further analyze the literature on this subject.

In order to test the hypothesis and effectively address the research question, Gormley's Policy Typology will be utilized (Gormley 1986). This typology categorizes policy areas based on levels of salience and complexity. For this study, the four participants were organized into their respective categories that aligned with Gormley's theory (1986). Gormley's theory clearly defines the parameters of each category in terms of pressure for accountability and expertise, as well as the amount of discretion needed in each policy area (Gormley 1986). Therefore, using this typology, the research question and hypothesis will be addressed.

Rationale for Survey Questions

1. *Please enter your job title, along with a brief job description.*

This question is simply to provide background information for the case studies in this research project. It may also allow the street-level bureaucrat participating in the study to share more information about their daily work activities, which would be useful in conducting this research.

2. *Please indicate the level of work complexity at which you perform in your current employment.*

This question specifically addresses Gormley's policy typology (1986). More specifically, in addressing salience and complexity.

3. *What kind of decisions have you made in your current role?*

This question hopes to categorize the bureaucrat by salience and complexity levels in their decision making processes.

4. *Please provide examples of policies or regulation that you have to implement and follow frequently.*

This question hopes to coax the SLB into providing specific policies or laws that the street-level bureaucrat works with on a daily basis. Having this information can help the researcher qualify or assess the categorizations of the SLB based on Gormley's policy typology. More specifically, based on the policies and regulations provided by the survey participant, the researcher can analyze the levels of salience and complexity.

5. *Do you feel that your daily work is restricted by your agency's policies?*

This question aims to address whether or not the agency's policies and rigid structure actual hinder the SLB's work. Many studies have shown that increased discretion actually benefits the work of street-level bureaucrats (Tummers & Bekkers 2014; Carrington 2005). Based on the literature, this question hopes to discover if in fact the bureaucracy's rigid structure is harmful or not.

6. *Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?*

Given that a defining characteristic of a bureau is a rigid set of regulations or protocols, this questions address whether or not this rigidity is harmful or helpful to the street-level

bureaucrat in accomplishing his or her goals. Very similar to question five, this question is worded with a more positive connotation.

7. *In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities?*

This question aims to address the level of discretion granted to the agent by the principal. I chose to use the phrase 'free to use your own judgment,' rather than the word 'discretion,' to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding in the question.

8. *To what extent are your decisions subject to review by a supervisor? Under what conditions are those decisions reviewable?*

This question specifically addresses the issue of supervision and the ability of SLBs to make decisions freely. According to Brehm and Gates (1997), while bureaus have rigid formal rules, as well as a hierarchical structures, "supervisors are severely limited in their abilities to influence subordinate behavior." Yet other scholars believe that supervision and the hierarchical structure of bureaus play a strong role in monitoring and controlling bureaucratic behavior at the street level (Downs 1967).

9. *Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by the agency?*

This question speaks to some of the limitations of street-level bureaucrats. For example, many bureaus are struggling to provide adequate resources to its employees (Lipsky 1980). This

question aims to find if the SLB is content with the amount of resources, or if they feel their work is restricted by the lack of resources.

10. *Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job*.

According to Cooper et al., "for public employees, understanding job satisfaction is even more important, as public employees provide public goods that every citizen enjoys. Whether we are considering a teacher, an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator, or a city manager, every citizen who pays taxes and wants to pursue a well-functioning government has a vested interest in maximizing bureaucratic job satisfaction," (2014). Therefore, given the impact that SLBs have on the lives of citizens, it is crucial for bureaucracies to monitor employee satisfaction. This question was also intended to address efficacy. More specifically, efficacy being the ability to produce the intended result, this question had the potential to address moral hazard and the complexities of principal agent theory, as discretion was granted to this street-level bureaucrat by their supervisor.

Chapter Four: Case Studies

This chapter will present four case studies, each detailing the work of an individual state SLB. The case studies will provide a background of the respective SLBs bureau, a justification for the policy typology categorization, my expectations for their survey responses, and finally, the survey responses from each SLB. The survey responses will be separated by the following categories: discretion, supervision and structure, and efficacy.

Figure 3: Case Studies

	High Salience	**Low Salience**
High Complexity	New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: Entomologist	Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape
Low Complexity	New York Department of Environmental Conservation	Midwestern State Department of Education

Figure 4. Case Study Expectations

	High Salience	**Low Salience**
High Complexity	New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Given that there is pressure for both accountability and expertise: -I hypothesize that this street-level bureaucrat will have the highest freedom in discretion to make decisions because of his unique expertise. -I also hypothesize that he will feel high levels of satisfaction and efficacy in his job outcomes as a result of his discretion. -I also hypothesize that although his expertise is unique, his work will be subject to review frequently because of the salience and need for accountability -I hypothesize that this street-level bureaucrat will have expertise in this field of work	Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape Given that this category requires pressure for expertise and little accountability: -I hypothesize that this street-level bureaucrat will have high discretion and much freedom in making decisions because of the complexity and need for expertise. -I hypothesize that efficacy will be high because while there is pressure for expertise, there is little pressure for accountability because it is not a highly salient issue -I hypothesize that this street-level bureaucrat will possess some expertise given the complexity
Low Complexity	New York Department of Environmental Conservation Given that this category requires an intense pressure for accountability, and not so much complexity: -I hypothesize that discretion will be somewhat limited, given the regulations and low complexity levels. -I hypothesize that efficacy will be lower given the limited discretion granted to the street-level bureaucrat , because of the high salience of this policy issue -I hypothesize that this street-level bureaucrat will not have expertise	Midwestern Department of Education Given that this category requires little expertise and little accountability: -I hypothesize that the street-level bureaucrat will have high discretion granted to him because the pressure for accountability and expertise is fairly low. -I hypothesize that efficacy will be high as a result of high discretion and minimal review by supervisors -I hypothesize that this street-level bureaucrat will not possess expertise

Case Study #1: New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection - Entomology (Highly Salient & Highly Complex)

The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection was founded on the United States' first "Earth Day," April 22, 1970 (NJ DEP 2015). New Jersey was the third state to create a unified agency solely committed to environmental protection and conservation (NJ DEP 2015). Now, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection employs roughly 3,000 people in five different divisions (NJ DEP 2015). The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection is leading the country in pollution prevention as well as environmental protection strategies (NJDEP 2015).

This street-level bureaucrat is an entomologist and works for the office of mosquito control coordination within the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. The work he does on a daily basis is highly complex, as it involves specific scientific knowledge about entomology. On a daily basis, he has to balance multiple policies that cover complex subject matter such as water management, equipment use, bio-control, and arbovirus surveillance.

Before the outbreaks of Zika and the increased media coverage of mosquito borne illnesses, entomology and mosquito control would be considered a highly complex issue that is low in salience. But, given the recent outbreaks of the Zika virus in the United States in the past year (2016), I have deemed a state entomologists' work as both highly complex and highly salient. This case study will detail the work of a street-level bureaucrat operating within the highly salient and highly complex policy typology, and will address issues of discretion, supervision, agency regulations and policies, as well as efficacy.

Expectations Based Upon Gormley's Policy Typology

This highly salient and highly complex policy area requires both intense pressure for expertise and accountability (Gormley 1986). Based on this categorization, I would expect that this street-level bureaucrat possesses high levels of expertise, as mosquito control is a highly complex subject area. This is expected because the highly complex and scientific work requires a unique skill-set and advanced knowledge (Gormley 1986). Given that this subject matter requires advanced knowledge and expertise, I would expect that this street-level bureaucrat has been granted significant discretion by his supervisor. Also, given the high salience of mosquito control recently, I expect that this street-level bureaucrat's decisions and deliverables are subject to close review by the supervisor. This expectation is supported by Gormley's policy typology, which describes a street-level bureaucrat working under highly salient and highly complex conditions would experience both intense pressure for expertise and accountability (1986).

Survey Responses

Below I have detailed the responses from this street-level bureaucrat's survey. For convenience, they have been separated into categories.

Discretion

From the survey, this SLB described a high level of discretion and freedom in decision making. When asked how much freedom he has to use his own judgment, he responded with the following statement:

> I am free to use my own judgment in pretty much everything I do. My skill set it pretty unique for state government, few have this expertise.
> So my level of expertise having served in the county operations for 12 years and at the university for 15 years while working closely with the state programs I now oversee makes me uniquely qualified from an experience perspective…..add to that the education in entomology (masters). After All we are largely dealing with biology and interrupting the life cycle of an organism when it comes to mosquitoes and controlling them long term.

According to this SLB, the great freedom and discretion he enjoys is accredited to his level of expertise from both years of experience and advanced degrees in the subject area. Given this level of expertise and the vast amount of discretion he is granted, he advises the state on mosquito policy, and makes recommendations for improving outdated or unsustainable policies regarding mosquito control.

Supervision and Structure

Despite having high levels of discretion granted to him, supervision is a regular part of this street-level bureaucrat's daily work. This is because when SLBs operate within highly salient policy areas, they experience more pressure for accountability than policy areas with lower levels of salience (Gormley 1986). Speaking to this, this SLB explains that "all decisions are ultimately subject to review by a supervisor and board of commissioners." Also, when asked to explain what kinds of decisions he makes on a daily basis, he included that all decisions are subject to approval by his supervisor, as well as higher authorities. These authorities include the State of New Jersey Mosquito Control Commission, as well as the State Office of Mosquito Control Coordination.

Although this street-level bureaucrat enjoys great discretion and has the opportunity to advise on policy making, he is still required to work within a specific set of regulations and guidelines. He refers to this as a "framework" of statutes that have "evolved to meet the needs and are still in place to serve the needs" of the state of New Jersey. He also states that the "framework" and regulations do not deter or hinder his work, but provide a sense of structure. When asked if his daily work is restricted by agency's policies, he responded, "Yes, but I am in state government, you need to work within the framework to meet needs." For example, specific policies that he follows and implements on a daily basis include those surrounding water management, arbovirus surveillance, and equipment use.

> "The framework is largely the statutes we work under and programs that have evolved to meet the needs and are still in place to serve the needs. The New Jersey Mosquito Control Association, Associated Executives of Mosquito Control Work in New Jersey, NJ State Mosquito Control Commission, and the local county mosquito control programs. The NJ State Mosquito Control Commission membership is composed of various state agencies including the Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, Department of Environmental Protection, and the New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station in addition of six public members appointed by the Governor with consent of the NJ Senate. The NJ state mosquito Control Commission has an annual budget to carry on the operations and the Office of Mosquito Control Coordination is the staff that supports the New Jersey State Mosquito Control Commission. With regard to policy, we actually set the state policy and make recommendations on laws needed to combat the mosquitoes in the field."

To provide more insight into the complexities of this street-level bureaucrat 's daily work, see the following excerpt from his survey responses.

> "Our research is quite extensive with regard to needed policy on a variety of topics. The challenges are letting folks know we exist and getting a seat at the table early to help steer policy that would otherwise create mosquito production; something we don't want to be doing

with state environmental policy, and it happens more frequently than you might think. Stormwater retention/detention basins are but one example. They have to go in with new construction but are often designed poorly, fail and then become mosquito producers in the neighborhoods where people live. This winds up being a bad thing for health from the mosquito standpoint but serves to help the groundwater recharge problems. When taken to the extreme you eventually wind up creating more larval habitat than the local program can address. Well designed and installed systems don't produce mosquitoes and still meet the environmental needs; these tend to be a bit more expensive to install however. On the bio-control point, we help direct the fish species used throughout the state for mosquito control. Where to put them, when to put them, and how many. The idea is to reduce the mosquitoes without disrupting the natural food web (native fish populations) in these areas. With respect to our Airspray program we set the policy on what formulations are used and how they get applied for large tracts of land. The goal here is to use surveillance data to direct operations while reducing materials applied. Water management operations further reduce the need to make applications because the larval habitat is changed so as to not produce mosquitoes. We also support applied research proposals ultimately designed to improve mosquito operations overall."

Efficacy

When asked about efficacy and overall satisfaction in the outcomes of his job, this street-level bureaucrat reported high levels of satisfaction. His direct quote when asked to describe his satisfaction and efficacy was, "High." Unfortunately, he did not provide any explanation nor detail regarding his satisfaction and feelings of efficacy. It is important to note however, that he felt capable of performing his required tasks with the resources provided by the agency.

Case Study #2: New York Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Water (Highly Salient & Low Complexity)

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation was created on July 1, 1970 "to combine in a single agency all state programs designed to protect and enhance the environment," (NY DEC 2017). The Department of Environmental Conservation houses twenty four divisions and is "further organized into bureaus to fulfill the functions and regulations established by Title 6 of New York Codes, Rules and Regulations. Some programs are also governed by federal law," (NY DEC 2017). The New York Department of Conservation has offices in each of the nine regions of the state, and employs over 3,000 people that operate either within the central or regional offices (NY DEC 2017).

This street-level bureaucrat is employed within the division of water of the New York Department of Conservation. While she chose not to provide her job description, she did explain that, "a major role of mine is to develop water quality assessments based on monitoring data collected around the state. On a daily basis I analyze the data and develop assessments based on my analysis." She also explained that she has to closely follow and implement the annual reporting requirements of the Clean Water Act.

Similarly to the state entomologist's case study, water quality testing is an example of a policy issue in which the levels of salience and complexity are fluid, and can change depending on the context. Given the current state of water quality in the United States, and the attention it is receiving from the media and general public, I have labeled water quality testing as highly salient but low in complexity. This is consistent with Gormley's policy typology, that requires heightened public awareness of the subject in order to be categorized as a salient policy issue

(1986). This is especially true since the water crisis in Flint has attracted significant media attention.

This case study will detail the work of a street-level bureaucrat operating within the highly salient and non-complex policy typology, and will address issues of discretion, supervision, agency regulations and policies, as well as efficacy.

Expectations Based Upon Gormley's Policy Typology

Given that this is in fact a highly salient issue, I expect that this street-level bureaucrat faces intense pressure for accountability. Because this is a highly salient issue but a lowly complex issue, I expect that this SLB will experience some discretion. The high salience of the issue, I expect, will limit her discretion in her daily work activities. From the information provided by Gormley's policy typology (1986), I expect that this SLB's efficacy will be negatively affected by the policy area she operates in. More specifically, due to her high pressure for accountability, and little need for expertise, I expect that this SLB will report lower levels of efficacy compared to the other three SLBs.

Survey Responses

Below I have detailed the responses from this street-level bureaucrat's survey. For convenience, they have been separated into categories.

Discretion

When asked to detail her levels of discretion, this SLB explains that she has been granted discretion to "develop water quality assessments based on monitoring data around the state. On a daily basis, [she] analyzes the data and develops assessments based on [her] analysis." Therefore, she has enough freedom and discretion to interpret data and form her own recommendations. Her discretion is limited because her reports must follow the parameters of the Clean Water Act's annual reporting requirements. Therefore, while she does have discretion to analyze the water quality assessments, she still must form her reports around the requirements of the Clean Water Act. As this is a low-complexity category, Gormley explains that these matters can be routine and not require as much discretion as a highly complex policy area (1986).

Supervision and Structure

When asked about the extent of supervision, and the conditions that her decisions are subject to approval she responded with, "supervisor review is more for collaborative purposes than approval."

In terms of structure, this SLB felt that the agency's policies actually provided her with a sense of structure that allowed her to succeed in her work. She explained further by saying, "There are discrete deliverables which allow me to develop and objective and work accordingly to meet those deliverables."

Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by the agency? "There is always a backlog of work to be completed. I believe the resources provided to me through the agency are sufficient but more are always welcome and I believe that to be true for any area of work."

Efficacy

Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job: "This question could be answered differently on a Monday or a Friday. Being that it is Friday, I feel that my personal satisfaction with what I accomplished this week is not what I was hoping for on Monday. Overall, I am generally pleased with the amount of work that I produce."

Case Study #3" Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape: Grants & Contracts. (Low Salience & High Complexity).

The Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape (PCAR) was founded in 1975. The mission of this agency is to "end sexual violence and advocate for the rights and needs of sexual assault victims," (PCAR 2017). The employees of PCAR operate and staff the National Sexual Violence Resource Center, which "identifies, develops, and disseminates resources regarding all aspects of sexual violence prevention and intervention," (PCAR 2017). The Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape houses the following departments: Grants and Contracts, Training and Technical Assistance, Communications, and, Information Technology (PCAR 2017). The staff employed by PCAR work to ensure that victims in all 67 counties in Pennsylvania have access to quality victim services, as well as ensuring that the rape crisis centers have adequate resources, funding, and training (PCAR 2017).

This street-level bureaucrat is employed by the Grants and Contracts Department of PCAR. Her job description is as follows:

> "Manage the subcontracts of 50 rape crisis centers across Pennsylvania. This includes processing applications for funding, statistical reporting, subcontract preparation, supervision of the contract monitoring process, and providing technical assistance."

The Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape has been categorized as low in salience because access to care for rape victims has not been regularly featured in the news cycle, nor has there been extensive public awareness on this issue. According to Gormley, "a highly salient issue is one that affects a large number of people in a significant way," (1986). Therefore, despite sexual assault and rape being an important issue, it does not affect all people in a majorly

significant way, as water quality would for example. I have categorized the work done by street-level bureaucrats employed by PCAR as highly complex given the amount of statues they have to interpret, and the complex and intersectional nature of violence against women. According to Gormley (1986), a highly complex issue is "one that raises factual questions that cannot be answered by generalists of laypersons." Given that SLBs working for PCAR must navigate complex streams of funding, while also dealing with clients that have experienced intense trauma, it is justified for this work to be deemed highly complex.

This case study will detail the work of a street-level bureaucrat operating within the non-salient and highly complex policy typology, and will address issues of discretion, supervision, agency regulations and policies, as well as efficacy.

Expectations Based Upon Gormley's Policy Typology

Given that this SLB is operating in a highly complex policy area, I expect that she has expertise in the field. Also, because this field is not highly salient, I expect that she will be granted high discretion, while also not being subject to close review or supervision. As a result of the high complexity, I expect that she will have expertise, and therefore be granted more discretion. This expectation is supported by Gormley's study, that explains that in low salient policy areas, street-level bureaucrats do not experience intense pressure for accountability (1986). Given my hypothesis, I expect that as a result of the high discretion granted to her by her supervisor, both her efficacy and job satisfaction is high.

Survey Responses.

Discretion

When prompted to explain her level of freedom in decision making, she responded with, "I can decide on time lines, due dates, application content, and report content."

Supervision and Structure

Although this street-level bureaucrat feels great freedom in decision making, her decisions are also subject to review by her supervisors; especially those that involve the funding of a rape crisis center.

When discussing structure and formal rules of her agency, it is important to note that she does not feel restricted by the agency's policies, and actually feels that they provide a sense of structure that allows her to succeed in her work.

As this is a highly complex policy area, this street-level bureaucrat has detailed the policies and regulations that she implements and references frequently:

> "I must be familiar with the standards for all centers (including policies related to Board of Directors, By-laws, Organizational Operations, Conflict of Interest, Personnel, Fiscal practices, Risk Management Procedures, Staff Development, Confidentiality, Direct Services, Prevention Education services, Training, Religious Non-Affiliation, HIV/AIDS, Ethics, and Technology)."

This extensive list of policies and procedures justifies the complexity categorization for this state SLB. Managing dozens of rape crisis centers across the state requires knowledge not

only of financial and managerial policies, but also of the intricacies of trauma and crisis management associated with domestic violence victims.

Efficacy

When prompted to describe her level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of her job, she responded by stating, “Very satisfied!”

Case Study #4: Midwestern Department of Education (Low Salience & Low Complexity)

This Midwestern Department of Education oversees all public school districts in the state, and is supervised by the State Board of Education. The State Board of Education is appointed by the governor, and members are elected every two years for eight year terms. This state department of education houses over nine departments and employs over 500 people. This street-level bureaucrat is a departmental analyst for the State Department of Education. On a daily basis, he manages multiple projects and divides his time between them. In the box below, this SLB detailed his day-to-day job responsibilities.

His job description is as follows:

- Collaborate with education consultants and management to support the facilitation of postsecondary access and transitions through exible learning op ons including Dual Enrollment, Advanced Placement, and International Baccalaureate programs
- Coordinate Seat Time Waiver and Alternative Education Waiver programs in [the state]; a focus on compliance with program requirements and serving as a recognized resource on programmatic and technical aspects including legislative and policy recommendations
- Manage activities related to State and Federal grant programs including the creation of applications, coordination of reviews and approvals, development of rubrics, and ensuring compliance with grant reporting requirements
- Create streamlined processes to improve data collection, application and reporting processes, and data quality for my unit

According to Gormley's policy typology, I have categorized state education as both low in complexity and low in salience (1986). It was appropriate to categorize state education as a

low salient issue because in the United States, primary education is federally funded and required for all children. Because of this, education is not a highly salient issue in this country. Also, it is not considered highly complex because working for this bureau does not require highly scientific or technical knowledge. While this SLB does have to understand and work with many state and federal laws and policies, he is able to successfully fulfill his duties without high levels of technical expertise.

This case study will detail the work of a street-level bureaucrat operating within the non-salient and non-complex policy typology, and will address issues of discretion, supervision, agency regulations and policies, as well as efficacy.

Expectations Based Upon Gormley's Policy Typology

Given the low saliency and low complexity of state education, I expect that this street level bureaucrat will be granted high discretion. Given that this is a lowly salient issue, there is little pressure for accountability, therefore I would expect this street-level bureaucrat to experience high discretion on a daily basis (Gormley 1986).

Also, from Gormley's policy typology, it is clear that street-level bureaucrat 's in this policy area do not feel much pressure for either accountability or expertise (1986). I also expect to see that along with high discretion, this street-level bureaucrat will have more freedom in making decisions and will not have to have everything approved by his supervisor.

Survey Responses

Discretion

As I expected given the low salience, this SLB enjoys great discretion in his daily work. From his own words,

> "I am able to use my own judgment in various types of situations. I have many phone calls and e-mails from various stakeholders in education that ask me about various things related to state policy or law. Sometimes, I have to interpret the law, policy, or rule in order to help our "customers." I am able to use my best judgment in these cases. When I am unsure how to answer a question, I have a good group of colleagues that I can take through complex questions with."

From this statement, it is clear that this SLB not only enjoys great freedom in decision-making, but also in interpreting state laws and policies involving education.

Supervision and Structure

Given his high discretion and low salience, he rarely has to submit his work for formal review.

> "My supervisor basically trusts that I can make many decisions without any official review. There are some things that require supervisor approval. Most notably, these would be cases where we are sending some sort of official approval to a school district, or other stakeholders. Examples would be letters of grant or waiver approval, notices of noncompliance on reporting, and any other type of official letter that might go out."

When asked about the effect of the bureaucracies rigidity and structure, he explained that the sense of structure is actually beneficial and allows him to succeed.

> *Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?*
> "Yes. In general, the policies provide a sense of structure that allows me to succeed. Sometimes the layers of bureaucracy cause information to move slowly, which can be frustrating. In terms of cooperation throughout the various levels, my job isn't affected very negatively."

Given that this SLB has to 'juggle' multiple state laws and policies, this sense of structure provides stability and guidance.

Please provide examples of policies or regulations that you have to implement and follow frequently: I have to be aware of various pieces of legislation for the various programs that I work on. The legislation helps guide internal policies and procedures that guide our work in supporting school districts, buildings, and students. We spend a lot of time looking back at the legislation to make sure our actions are in alignment with what the law says. We also spend a lot of time taking questions from various stakeholders in education which cause us to reference the legislation regularly. One example would be the [state] Dual Enrollment law. Many people (parents, school districts, students, etc) interpret parts of the law differently. It is often our job to help when clarification is needed on the law. Another piece that guides our work is the Pupil Accounting Manual which relates to school funding and student counts. Between the legislation, internal policies, and pupil accounting manual, we have to make sure we are following a lot of rules and regulations. Sometimes it makes things complex.

Efficacy

"My most satisfying times are when I help a "customer" resolve some issue that has been a big problem for them. I often talk to parents across [the State]who are going through various challenges with their students or school districts. When I can offer them information or guidance that helps, I feel a lot of personal satisfaction."

Chapter Five: Interpretation of Survey Results

The central research question for this project is as follows: What explains the variation in efficacy among state street-level bureaucrats?

Hypothesis 1: If a street-level bureaucrat is granted discretion by the principal (supervisor), the agent (street-level bureaucrat) will report higher levels of efficacy in his/her daily work outcomes.

Through a comprehensive analysis of the literature on the subject and a survey conducted on state level SLBs, this study aims to find how the amount of discretion affects the efficacy felt by state SLBs.

As previously discussed, I expected that the state SLB operating within the non-complex and highly salient policy area would report the lowest levels of efficacy, given her extreme pressure for accountability and little freedom or discretion (Gormley 1986).

The following chart is the explanation of the amount of discretion each state SLB has been granted by their supervisor. These responses come directly from their answers to the following questions; "*In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities?"* and, "*To what extent are your decisions subject to review by your supervisor? Under what conditions are those decisions reviewable?"*

Figure 5: Level of Discretion Granted to State SLBs

	High Salience	**Low Salience**
High Complexity	NJ Dep of Environmental Protection-Entomologist *"[I feel free to use my own judgment] pretty much in everything I do. Skill set is pretty unique for state government. Few have this expertise." "All decisions are ultimately subject to review by a supervisor and board of commissioners."*	PCAR *"I can decide on timelines, due dates, application content and report content." "Decisions which would affect the funding/non-funding of a center [are always subject to review by a supervisor]."*
Low Complexity	NY Dep of Environmental Conservation *"[I use my own judgment] to develop water quality assessments based on monitoring data collected around the state. On a daily basis I analyze the data and develop assessments based on my analysis." "Supervisor review is more for collaborative purposes than approval."*	Midwestern State Department of Education *"I am able to use my own judgment in various types of situations. I have many phone calls and emails from various stakeholders in education that ask me about various things related to state policy or law. Sometimes, I have to interpret the law, policy, or rule in order to help our 'customers.' I am able to use my best judgment in these cases." "My supervisor basically trusts that I can make many decisions without any official review. There are some things that require supervisor approval. Most notably, these would be cases where we are sending some sort of official approval to a school district, or other stakeholders."*

From these survey responses, it is clear that the level of discretion varies among each state SLB. Most significantly would be the amount of discretion granted to the SLB working for the Midwestern Department of Education. He is able to enjoy extremely high levels of discretion as he is free to use his best judgment to interpret policies and laws before explaining his interpretation to clients. Comparatively, the SLB from PCAR is very limited in her discretion, as she can only make administrative decisions without supervision.

The chart below (Figure 6) depicts the self-reported levels of efficacy from the four SLBs participating in this project. The responses in the chart below are taken directly from their answer to the question asking, "*Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job."*

Figure 6: Self-Reported Personal Satisfaction

	High Salience	**Low Salience**
High Complexity	New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection *"High."*	Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape *"Very satisfied!"*
Low Complexity	New York Department of Environmental Conservation *"This question could be answered differently on a Monday or a Friday. Being that it is Friday, I feel that my personal satisfaction with what I accomplished this week is not what I was hoping for on Monday. Overall however, I am generally pleased with the amount of work that I produce."*	Midwestern State Department of Education "*My most satisfying times are when I help a "customer" resolve some issue that has been a big problem for them. I often talk to parents across [the state] who are going through various challenges with their students or school districts. When I can offer them information or guidance that helps, I feel a lot of personal satisfaction."*

From this chart, it is clear that the SLB in the non-complex and highly salient category did report significantly lower efficacy than the other SLBs. This is significant because the SLB from the NY Department of Environmental Conservation was given less discretion compared to the other three SLBs. It is important to note that the Midwestern Department of Education SLB not only enjoys high levels of discretion, but reported very high personal efficacy and satisfaction with his work. This supports the hypothesis that the amount of discretion affects the amount of self-reported efficacy. Similar to this, the NJ Entomologist also enjoys virtually unlimited discretion, and reports very high efficacy and satisfaction, therefore also supporting this hypothesis.

Given these results, the hypothesis has been supported. It has been proven that if a street-level bureaucrat is granted discretion by the principal (supervisor), the agent (state SLB) will in fact report higher levels of efficacy in his/her daily work compared to a state SLB with lower discretion.

This hypothesis was tested using Gormley's policy typology (Gormley 1986). Again, I expected that the levels of salience and complexity would affect efficacy because of the pressures for accountability and expertise in each category. More specifically, I expected that the state SLB operating within the non-complex and highly salient policy category would report the lowest levels of efficacy and satisfaction. This hypothesis was supported. Looking specifically at the reported levels of efficacy, it is clear that the SLB working for the NY Department of Environmental Conservation reported the lowest levels of efficacy. While she did not specifically say she was not satisfied with her job or was unhappy, there is a clear difference

between the responses from the other three state SLB's and her response. Below, I have added the chart again that addresses their reported levels of efficacy for reference:

Figure 6.1: Self-Reported Personal Satisfaction

	High Salience	**Low Salience**
High Complexity	NJ Dep of Environmental Protection *"High."*	PCAR *"Very satisfied!"*
Low Complexity	NY Dep of Environmental Conservation *"This question could be answered differently on a Monday or a Friday. Being that it is Friday, I feel that my personal satisfaction with what I accomplished this week is not what I was hoping for on Monday. Overall however, I am generally pleased with the amount of work that I produce."*	Midwestern State Department of Education "*My most satisfying times are when I help a "customer" resolve some issue that has been a big problem for them. I often talk to parents across [the state] who are going through various challenges with their students or school districts. When I can offer them information or guidance that helps, I feel a lot of personal satisfaction."*

From these responses, again, it is clear that there is a distinguishable difference between "*I am generally pleased,"* and "*I feel a lot of personal satisfaction."* This leads me to believe that the levels of salience and complexity do, in fact, play a significant role in explaining the variation in efficacy among state SLBs.

Furthermore, the results from the Midwestern Department of Education support this hypothesis because Gormley's typology states that in areas of low salience and low complexity, there is very little pressure for either accountability or expertise (1986). This state SLB supported this by reporting extremely high discretion, as well as very high personal satisfaction. The state

SLB working for the New York Department of Environmental Protection also supported this hypothesis. He operates within the highly complex and highly salient policy area, which as Gormley stated, experiences simultaneous pressure for accountability and expertise (1986). His survey responses supported the fact that having expertise does, in fact, result in greater discretion.

While the SLB working for the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape has limited discretion when it comes to important financial decisions, her efficacy and satisfaction were unaffected. This may be a result of the policy typology category of low in salience and high in complexity. SLBs operating within non-salient policy areas do not feel intense pressure for accountability by their supervisors, compared to someone in a highly salient policy area (Gormley 1986). This lack of intense supervision may positively affect her self-reported efficacy and satisfaction.

Final Analysis of Research Question: What explains the variation in efficacy among state SLBs?

Through addressing the hypothesis, the answer to this research question is the amount of discretion granted to the state SLB. Moreover, when SLBs are granted more discretion, they do report higher levels of personal efficacy and satisfaction with their job.

The chart below collectively details the reported levels of discretion, supervision, and job satisfaction from each of the four survey participants.

Figure 7: Summary of Survey Results

	High Salience	Low Salience
High Complexity	NJ Department of Environmental Protection -Very high discretion, has the opportunity to advise on policy because of his unique expertise -High pressure for accountability and review by supervisor -High efficacy and job satisfaction	Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape -High discretion regarding administrative matters -Limited discretion regarding financial decisions which are all subject to review -Little pressure for accountability -High efficacy and job satisfaction
Low Salience	NY Department of Environmental Conservation -Moderate discretion, able to interpret data and form conclusions -High pressure for accountability and supervision -Low efficacy and job satisfaction	State Department of Education -High discretion, has ability to interpret and advise on policy -Very low pressure for accountability and supervision -High efficacy and job satisfaction

Chapter Six. Conclusions

Contributions to Literature

While the research question was successfully answered by the survey results and supported by the literature, other valuable information was collected in this survey. The responses from all four participants provided valuable insight into the life of a street-level bureaucrat including the policies with which they work on a regular basis, the hierarchical structure of their bureaus, the importance of expertise, and the amount of resources provided to them by their respective bureaus. This section details this information as it is a valuable contribution to the existing literature on this subject.

Policies and Regulations

The chart below details the policies and regulations followed regularly by each of the four street-level bureaucrats that participated in this study.

Figure 8: Policies used by State SLB's

	High Salience	**Low Salience**
High Complexity	NJ State Entomologist Policies involving: Water management, equipment use, bio-control, arbovirus surveillance, applied research	PCAR Standards for centers (including policies related to Board of Directors, By-laws, Organizational Operations, Conflict of Interest, Personnel, Fiscal practices, Risk Management procedures, Staff Development, Confidentiality, Direct services, Prevention

		Education services, Training, Religious Non-Affiliation, HIV/AIDS, Ethics, and Technology)
Low Complexity	State Dep of Env Conservation Clean Water Act annual reporting requirement	State Dep. of Education Dual Enrolment Laws, Pupil Accounting Manual

From this chart, it is clear that formal policies and regulations do, in fact, impact and guide the daily work of street-level bureaucrats. While they are all granted some level of discretion, their daily decisions are affected by the policies and laws that their work revolves around. For example, the street-level bureaucrat working with water quality at the State Department of Environmental Conservation has to develop reports based upon the reporting requirements of the Clean Water Act.

Rules and Structure

As discussed in the introduction section of this research project, formal rules and structure are quintessential characteristics of bureaucracies (Downs 1967). Two survey questions in this study specifically addressed the effects of this structure on state SLBs work, both positive and negative.

Figure 9: State SLB Responses Concerning Agency Policies

	High Salience & High Complexity NJ Department of Environmental Protection	Low Salience & High Complexity Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape	High Salience & Low Complexity NY Department of Environmental Conservation	Low Salience & Low Complexity Midwestern Department of Education
Do you feel that your daily work is restricted by your agency's policies?	*"Yes but I am in state government, you need to work within the framework to meet needs."*	*"No."*	*Participant chose not to respond to this question.*	*"No."*
Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?	*"Yes."*	*"Yes."*	*"Yes. There are discrete deliverables which allow me to develop and objective and work accordingly to meet those deliverables."*	*"Yes. In general, the policies provide a sense of structure that allows me to succeed."*

From these survey responses, there is a very clear consensus that their respective agencies policies do provide a sense of structure that facilitates their success; 100% reported that the bureaus structure helps them succeed in their daily work. Also, half of the participants rejected the idea that their work is restricted by the agency's policies. These responses are valuable because the hierarchal structures of bureaus have been found to have conflicting effects on the work of SLBs (Gray & Sibley 2014).

Expertise

While only one of the four street-level bureaucrats discussed their expertise, it is important to mention given the levels of salience and complexity in his field. The New Jersey State Entomologist spoke at length in his survey about his level of expertise, how unique it is, and how it gives him authority to advise on policy making within the state of New Jersey. Given the high salience and high complexity, this survey response did support my expectation and hypothesis. This is also supported by the literature, as it has been proven that street-level bureaucrats that have more expertise than others will experience more discretion granted to them (Gormley, 1986; Gailmard, 2010).

In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities? *"Pretty much in everything I do. Skill set is pretty unique for state government. Few have this expertise. So my level of expertise having served in the county operations for 12 years and at the university for 15 years while working closely with the state programs I now oversee makes me uniquely qualified from an experience perspective to serve in this Administrator/ Secretary position. I understand the needs very well. Add to that the education in entomology (Masters) and we are good to go from the biological perspective."* -New Jersey State Department of Environmental Protection (High Salience & High Complexity)

Moral Hazard

The survey responses provided valuable information concerning the possibility of moral hazard. Again, moral hazard occurs when the principal and the agent have differing values or goals, therefore the agent can interpret or even implement the policies in a way that the principal did not intend. For example, the state SLB employed with the Midwestern Department of Education has been granted enough discretion to interpret laws and policies with his own judgment, then advise citizens on the meaning of these policies. Also, the Entomologist from the

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection can actually advise state lawmakers on matters of entomology and mosquito control.

"Sometimes, I have to interpret the law, policy, or rule in order to help our "customers." I am able to use my best judgment in these cases… Many people (parents, school districts, students, etc) interpret parts of the law differently. It is often our job to help when clarification is needed on the law." -Midwestern Department of Education (Low Salience & Low Complexity)

"With regard to policy, we actually set the state policy and make recommendations on laws needed to combat the mosquitoes in the field." -New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (High Salience & High Complexity).

These statements support the literature, in that SLBs do, in fact, make personal judgments on laws and policies that affect people's lives. The street-level bureaucrat from the State Department of Education shared the most insight into the moral hazard dilemma with principal-agent theory. He explained how he interprets the laws with his own judgment and then relays his judgments to parents, school districts and students. This supports the claims made by Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003), that street-level bureaucrats actually feel empowered to make decisions, and are aware of the effects they have over their clients. As Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, p. 20) state, "street-level workers reveal themselves as agents, as wielders of power who know what is best for other citizens."

Challenges with Resources

Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by the agency?

"There is always a backlog of work to be completed. I believe that the resources provided to me through the agency are sufficient but more are always welcome and I believe that to be true for any area of work." -NY Department of Environmental Conservation (High Salience & Low Complexity).

"I could use an administrative assistant to process paperwork and correspondence."
-Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape (Low Salience & High Complexity).

These statements by two street-level bureaucrats in different policy areas both support the concept laid out by Lipsky that agencies are struggling to provide adequate resources to their employees (1980). This also supports the research by Downs which suggested street-level bureaucrats are highly overworked and experience major backlogs (Downs 1967).

Limitations of Research Design

While this study was successful in answering the research question as well as providing valuable data to support the literature, this study was not without fault. Major limitations included the time constraint of this project, the fluidity of salience and complexity levels, and the nature of online surveys.

Difficulty Contacting State SLBs

One major limitation of this study involves one of the core defining characteristics of street-level bureaucrats: the fact that they are overworked. During the month of February, 2017, I had called and emailed over 30 street-level bureaucrats asking them to participate in this study. Despite advertising that the survey requires no longer than 20 minutes, all but four declined to participate. The main source of their hesitation to participate was their lack of time. Many even answered by saying they had far too much work given recent budget cuts, and several explained that they were overextended and could not spare extra time to take this survey. The fact that so many SLBs were overextended and overworked is the reason I chose to only survey one person

in each of the four categories. Also, from those who did offer to participate, two did not take the time to provide detail, and one even left a question blank. While it was discouraging to receive many rejections and poor quality answers, I did expect this result given the literature on the workload of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980; Downs 1967; Brehm & Gates 1997).

The difficulty securing four participants also forced me to shift from my original four bureaus to find other bureaus that did not perfectly fit into the salience and complexity categories. For example, I originally intended to survey a state SLB from a housing bureau for the low salience and high complexity category. After calling housing bureaus in over 15 states, I chose to contact someone from the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, using a professional connection.

Challenges with Fluidity of Salience and Complexity

While conducting this research project, I had clearly defined and categorized the four policy categories in November of 2016. In January of 2017, after the election of President Donald Trump, I had already categorized state education as low in both salience and complexity. Shortly after this was defined, Betsy DeVos was appointed Secretary of Education, resulting in an increase in public awareness of the potential changes to public education. Gormely's policy typology is very fluid, therefore the levels of salience and complexity can change given an event or current political climate (Gormley 1986). If I were to conduct this study again, I would change state education to low in complexity but high in salience.

Challenges with Online Surveys

One major limitation of this study involves the use of online surveys. More specifically, despite denoting where elaboration was requested, many state SLBs provided only one word answers, and rarely provided sufficient detail. This was especially challenging when analyzing the answers regarding personal efficacy. For example, two state SLB's responded to this question by answering "high" or "very satisfied," but there definitions of highly satisfied could be very different from one another. Without that detail, it is hard to gauge their genuine levels of satisfaction and efficacy. Another limitation is the potential for over-stating job satisfaction and personal efficacy. For example, according to a similar study conducted by Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003), many street-level bureaucrats did not feel comfortable speaking negatively about their agencies or their positions. Although this study is completely confidential, there is always the possibility that the participants did not answer with complete honesty in regard to their job satisfaction.

Suggestions for Further Research

While this study design was successful in identifying the effects of discretion on efficacy among diverse SLBs, this study could yield more significant results with a few modifications. In order to truly capture the effects of discretion on personal efficacy, I would suggest conducting phone interviews rather than an online survey. This is because while the survey asked for detailed answers, two out of the four participants chose to provide little to no detail, and answered many questions with few words. Conducting phone interviews may coax the participants to provide more detail, especially because the interviewer has the opportunity to ask

several follow up questions. Another way to bolster the results of this study would be to conduct multiple surveys in each policy typology category, rather than just one in each category. This way, if one participant declines to provide detail, it will not be detrimental to the study results.

Conclusion.

The central premise of this research project was to determine what causes the variation in efficacy among state SLBs. This study found that the amount of discretion granted to the SLB, paired with the characteristics of the policy field, determined their levels of efficacy. Along with successfully identifying the answer to the research question, this study also provided valuable information that supports the current literature on SLBs. While the study has limitations, it could be conducted again with minor adaptations to produce more significant results.

Appendix A: Survey Results

Survey Questions: (Qualtrics.com)

1. Please enter your job title, along with a brief job description.
2. Please indicate the level of work complexity at which you perform in your current employment.
3. What kind of decisions have you made in your current role?
4. Please provide examples of policies or regulation that you have to implement and follow frequently.
5. Do you feel that your daily work is restricted by your agency's policies?
6. Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?
7. In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities?
8. To what extent are your decisions subject to review by a supervisor? Under what conditions are those decisions reviewable?
9. Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by the agency?
10. Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job.

Case Study 1: **High Salience & High Complexity** - New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection - Entomology.

1. *Please enter your job title, along with a brief job description.*
    a. Administrator Office of mosquito control coordination, secretary to the NJ state mosquito control commission
2. *Please indicate the level of work complexity at which you perform in your current employment.*
    a. Work is highly complex and broad in scope of covering several departments/divisions. Policy, procedures, and precedent are taken into consideration.
3. *What kind of decisions have you made in your current role?*

    a. Decisions are made with greater freedom and discretion, including recommendations that are subject to approval.
4. *Please provide examples of policies or regulation that you have to implement and follow frequently.*
    a. Water management, equipment use, bio-control, arbovirus surveillance, applied research
5. *Do you feel that your daily work is restricted by your agency's policies?*
    a. Yes but I am in state government, you need to work within the framework to meet needs.
6. *Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?*
    a. Yes.
7. *In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities?*
    a. Pretty much in everything I do. Skill set is pretty unique for state government. Few have this expertise.
8. *To what extent are your decisions subject to review by a supervisor? Under what conditions are those decisions reviewable?*
    a. All decisions are ultimately subject to review by a supervisor and board of commissioners. I expect if things went badly, a review would be warranted.
9. *Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by the agency?*
    a. Yes, for the most part.
10. *Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job.*
    a. High.
11. *More detail he provided in an email (he rushed through the survey then got back to me through email)*

In state government there really is only one job at the top administrative level that knows a great deal about mosquito research, surveillance and control with responsibility to oversee the local programs and has annual resources dedicated to aid in their local efforts. The group is the NJ state Mosquito Control Commission and the Secretary of that Commission is also the Administrator for the State Office of Mosquito Control Coordination. As such it is critically important that this individual has a complete understanding of mosquito control operations from the bottom up. It is also necessary that Administrator have familiarity with the Research intuitions that have responsibility for addressing mosquito research and control in NJ. That institution is the NJAES for the State of New Jersey. Although they have responsibility in statute for mosquito research and control, over time their administrative attention to the matter has varied significantly. In my opinion, to be successful they need to have in place a research program that is connected with the stakeholders and supporting their need for applied research programs that benefit both the State and County needs. Supporting the NJAES programs operating under the umbrella of the State University and providing this network of applied research for stakeholders has become a challenging matter as their overall direction has evolved away from the NJAES mission. The NJ State Mosquito Control Commission can help provide resources for the NJAES programs but they need to be supporting professional staff and tenured faculty in mosquito research dedicated to serving the mosquito control community. So my level of expertise having served in the county operations for 12 years and at the university for 15 years

while working closely with the state programs I now oversee makes me uniquely qualified from an experience perspective to serve in this Administrator/ Secretary position. I understand the needs very well. Add to that the education in entomology (Masters) and we are good to go from the biological perspective. After all we are largely dealing with biology and interrupting the life cycle of an organism when it comes to mosquitoes and controlling them long term. Just need to get over the steep learning curve of the state bureaucracy to efficiently make things happen.

The framework is largely the statutes we all work under and programs that have evolved to meet the needs and are still are in place to serve the needs. The New Jersey Mosquito Control Association, Associated Executives of Mosquito Control Work in New Jersey, NJ State mosquito Control Commission, and the local county mosquito control programs. The NJ State Mosquito Control Commission membership is composed of various state agencies including the Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, Department of Environmental Protection and the New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station in addition of six public members appointed by the Governor with the consent of the NJ Senate. The NJ state mosquito Control Commission has an annual budget to carry on the operations and the Office of Mosquito Control Coordination is the staff that supports the NJSMCC.

With regard to policy we actually set the state policy and make recommendations on laws needed to combat the mosquitoes in the field. Our reach is quite extensive with regard to needed policy on a variety of topics. The challenges are letting folks know we exist and getting a seat at the table early to help steer policy that would otherwise create mosquito production. Something we don't want to be doing with state environmental policy. It happens more frequently than you might think. Stormwater retention/ detention basins are but one example. They have to go in with new construction but are often designed poorly fail and become mosquito producers in the neighborhoods where people live. This winds up being a bad thing for health from the mosquito standpoint but serves to help the groundwater recharge problems. When taken to the extreme you eventually wind up creating more larval habitat than the local program can address. Well designed and installed systems don't produce mosquitoes and still meet the environmental needs. These tend to be a bit more expensive to install however. On the bio-control point we help direct the fish species used throughout the state for mosquito control. Where to put them when to put them there and how many. Idea is to reduce the mosquitoes without disrupting the natural food web (native fish populations) in these areas. With respect to our Airspray program we set the policy on what formulations are used and how they get applied for large tracks of land. Goal is to use surveillance data to direct operations while reducing the materials applied. Water management operations further reduce the need to make applications because the larval habitat is changed so as not to produce mosquitoes. We also support applied research proposals ultimately designed to improve mosquito control operations overall.

Case Study 2: **High Salience & Low Complexity** - State of New York Department of Environmental Protection: Division of Water Quality

1. Please enter your job title, along with a brief job description.
2. *Please indicate the level of work complexity at which you perform in your current employment.*
    a. Work is substantially complex, varied and regularly requires the selection and application of technical and detailed guidelines
3. W*hat kind of decisions have you made in your current role?*

    a. Decisions are made with greater freedom and discretion, including recommendations that are subject to approval.
4. *Please provide examples of policies or regulation that you have to implement and follow frequently.*
    a. Clean Water Act annual reporting requirements.
5. *Do you feel that your daily work is restricted by your agency's policies?*
    a. Participant chose not to respond to this question.
6. *Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?*
    a. Yes. There are discrete deliverables which allow me to develop and objective and work accordingly to meet those deliverables.
7. *In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities?*
    a. A major role of mine is to develop water quality assessments based on monitoring data collected around the state. On a daily basis I analyze the data and develop assessments based on my analysis.
8. *To what extent are your decisions subject to review by a supervisor? Under what conditions are those decisions reviewable?*
    a. Supervisor review is more for collaborative purposes than approval.
9. *Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by the agency?*
    a. There is always a back log of work to be completed. I believe that the resources provided to me through the agency are sufficient but more are always welcome and I believe that to be true for any area of work.
10. *Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job.*
    a. This question could be answered differently on a Monday or a Friday. Being that it is Friday, I feel that my personal satisfaction with what I accomplished this week is not what I was hoping for on Monday. Overall however, I am generally pleased with the amount of work that I produce.

Case Study 3: **Low Salience & High Complexity** -Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape: Grants & Contracts

1. *Please enter your job title, along with a brief job description.*
    a. Manage the subcontracts of 50 rape crisis centers across Pennsylvania. This includes processing applications for funding, statistical reporting, subcontract preparation, supervision of the contract monitoring process and providing technical assistance.
2. *Please indicate the level of work complexity at which you perform in your current employment.*
    a. Work is highly complex and broad in scope of covering several department/divisions. Policy, procedures and precedent are taken into consideration.
3. *What kind of decisions have you made in your current role?*
    a. Decisions are made with greater freedom and discretion, including recommendations that are subject to approval.

4. *Please provide examples of policies or regulation that you have to implement and follow frequently.*
    a. Standards for centers (including policies related to Board of Directors, By-laws, Organizational Operations, Conflict of Interest, Personnel, Fiscal practices, Risk Management procedures, Staff Development, Confidentiality, Direct services, Prevention Education services, Training, Religious Non-Affiliation, HIV/AIDS, Ethics, and Technology)
5. *Do you feel that your daily work is restricted by your agency's policies?*
    a. No
6. *Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?*
    a. Yes
7. *In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities?*
    a. I can decide on time lines, due dates, application content, and report content.
8. *To what extent are your decisions subject to review by a supervisor? Under what conditions are those decisions reviewable?*
    a. Decisions which would affect the funding/non-funding of a center.
9. *Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by the agency?*
    a. I could use an administrative assistant to process paperwork and correspondence.
10. *Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job.*
    a. Very satisfied!

Case Study 4: **Low Salience & Low Complexity** - State Department of Education.

1. *Please enter your job title, along with a brief job description.*
    a. Departmental Analyst with the [State] Department of Education:
        i. Collaborate with education consultants and management to support the facilitation of postsecondary access and transitions through exible learning op ons including Dual Enrollment, Advanced Placement, and International Baccalaureate programs
        ii. Coordinate Seat Time Waiver and Alternative Education Waiver programs in [State]- a focus on compliance with program requirements and serving as a recognized resource on programmatic and technical aspects including legislative and policy recommendations
        iii. - Manage activities related to State and Federal grant programs including the creation of applications, coordination of reviews and approvals, development of rubrics, and ensuring compliance with grant reporting requirements
        iv. Create streamlined processes to improve data collection, application and reporting processes, and data quality for my unit
2. *Please indicate the level of work complexity at which you perform in your current employment.*
    a. Work involves the application of moderately complex procedures and tests that are varied. Supervision is provided on a need basis.
3. *What kind of decisions have you made in your current role?*

    a. Decisions are made on both routine and nonroutine matters with some latitude, but are still subject to approval.
4. *Please provide examples of policies or regulations that you have to implement and follow frequently.*
    a. I have to be aware of various pieces of legislation for the various programs that I work on. The legislation helps guide internal policies and procedures that guide our work in supporting school districts, buildings, and students. We spend a lot of time looking back at the legislation to make sure our actions are in alignment with what the law says. We also spend a lot of time taking questions from various stakeholders in education which cause us to reference the legislation regularly. One example would be the Dual Enrollment law in [state]. Many people (parents, school districts, students, etc) interpret parts of the law differently. It is often our job to help when clarification is needed on the law. Another piece that guides our work is the Pupil Accounting Manual which relates to school funding and student counts. Between the legislation, internal policies, and pupil accounting manual, we have to make sure we are following a lot of rules and regulations. Sometimes it makes things complex.
5. *Do you feel that your daily work is restricted by your agency's policies?*
    a. No.
6. *Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?*
    a. Yes. In general, the policies provide a sense of structure that allows me to succeed. Sometimes the layers of bureaucracy cause information to move slowly, which can be frustrating. In terms of cooperation throughout the various levels, my job isn't affected very negatively.
7. *In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities?*
    a. I am able to use my own judgment in various types of situations. I have many phone calls and e-mails from various stakeholders in education that ask me about various things related to state policy or law. Sometimes, I have to interpret the law, policy, or rule in order to help our "customers." I am able to use my best judgment in these cases. When I am unsure how to answer a question, I have a good group of colleagues that I can take through complex questions with.
8. *To what extent are your decisions subject to review by a supervisor? Under what conditions are those decisions reviewable?*
    a. My supervisor basically trusts that I can make many decisions without any official review. There are some things that require supervisor approval. Most notably, these would be cases where we are sending some sort of official approval to a school district, or other stakeholders. Examples would be letters of grant or waiver approval, notices of noncompliance on reporting, and any other type of official letter that might go out.
9. *Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by your agency?*
    a. Yes.
10. *Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job.*

a. My most satisfying times are when I help a "customer" resolve some issue that has been a big problem for them. I often talk to parents across [state]who are going through various challenges with their students or school districts. When I can offer them information or guidance that helps, I feel a lot of personal satisfaction.

Survey Questions: (Qualtrics.com)

1. Please enter your job title, along with a brief job description.
2. Please indicate the level of work complexity at which you perform in your current employment.
3. What kind of decisions have you made in your current role?
4. Please provide examples of policies or regulation that you have to implement and follow frequently.
5. Do you feel that your daily work is restricted by your agency's policies?
6. Do you feel that your agency's policies provide a sense of structure that allows you to succeed in your work?
7. In what ways do you feel you are free to use your own judgment while carrying out daily responsibilities?
8. To what extent are your decisions subject to review by a supervisor? Under what conditions are those decisions reviewable?
9. Do you feel able to accomplish your goals with the resources provided by the agency?
10. Please describe your level of personal satisfaction with the outcomes of your job.

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