
ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

History 610
Senior Project

Smuggling in Eighteenth-Century New Granada

Dylan Bish

5 April 2017




Department of History

ALLEGHENY COLLEGE


History 610
Senior Project

Smuggling in Eighteenth-Century New Granada

Dylan Bish


Honor Code Signature 

Approved:


4-17-17

Project Advisor's Signature

Professor Elisabeth Kalé Haywood


17 · iv · 2017

Second Reader's Signature

Professor Barbara Riess

Please do not cite, quote, or circulate without written permission from the author.

Table of Contents

Introduction – 1

Chapter 1: The Bourbon Reforms in New Granada – 6

Chapter 2: The Felt Impacts of Specific Contraband – 28

Chapter 3: La Sociedad y el contrabando – 44

Conclusion – 61

Bibliography – 64

Figures:

1-1. Anthony McFarlane, "New Granada: Relief" – 8

2-1. Anthony McFarlane, "Population distribution in New Granada, 1778-80" – 32

3-1. AGI, "Plano de la Ciudad y Puerto de Cartagena de Yndias, con la situación de la Armada Francesa que la saqueó y destruyó en 1697" – 49

Abstract

New Granada was a Spanish colony in South America that was heavily influenced by the contraband trade, or the smuggling of goods, in the eighteenth-century. The contraband trade was just as normal as legal trade in the colony, making it an integral component of colonial society. The Bourbon Reforms, a series of reforms during the same period, sought to curb the contraband trade and reestablish Spanish regal authority over the colonies. Slaves, grain and precious metals were crucial goods that were smuggled between New Granada and other foreign powers, which demonstrated the dependency that New Granada had on the contraband trade. Different portions of New Granada society also demonstrated the importance of the contraband trade, such as the Guajiros, who managed to remain autonomous from Spanish authority, largely because of their unique contraband economy that they created. All of these factors demonstrated that the contraband trade ran deep through New Granada society, royal policy and played an important role in its economy.

The Bourbon Reforms in New Granada

The Bourbon Reforms were an attempt to reassert Spanish dominance over its colonies. By the 18th century, Spanish authority over the colonies had diminished dramatically. The traditionalist Habsburg policies remained stagnant for two centuries, causing much of the political power in the colonies to be manipulated by other forces. Examples of this include the creoles, or people of peninsular Spanish descent born in the colonies, or even the outside influence of foreign powers, namely Great Britain and France, since illegal channels from merchants of these countries undermined the Spanish mercantilist system with cheaper and products. However, change was around the corner when the last Habsburg monarch of Spain, the incompetent and impotent King Charles II, died without a child and left the Spanish throne in the hands of a branch of the Bourbon dynasty. The Bourbons were the ruling royal family of France at the time, and typically speaking, were more forward-thinking than the previous Habsburgs in Spain. After Bourbon legitimacy had been recognized with the conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession in 1713, the new Bourbon family began pinpointing areas that required reform within the Spanish empire.[1] This was the beginning of the Bourbon Reforms. While there were a few early reforms that sought to make certain aspects of colonial administration more sensible, such as the establishment of the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 and again in 1739, many of the reforms that had more profound impacts on the colonies had occurred in the second half of the eighteenth-century.[2]

One of the important concerns regarding the colonies was that the contraband trade was draining the coffers of the crown. While this was true for all of Spanish America, this was especially true for New Granada, where smuggling was running more rampantly than in other

[1] Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27.
[2] Ibid., 27-28.

Spanish colonies. In addition to this, New Granada was an especially neglected colony in terms of development and Spanish attention, which ultimately fueled the contraband trade due to the numerous benefits that it provided, which will be explored throughout the text.

Thus, one of the first targets of reform was the colonial administration. In the Viceroyalty of New Granada, creole elite had a strong presence in the colonial administration, but the Viceroy was always a peninsular Spaniard appointed by the crown. Again, creoles in Spanish America were people of pure Spanish descent that were born in Latin America. In the hierarchy, creoles were considered second-class to the Spanish, simply because they were born in Latin America. This resulted in some skepticism from the crown regarding the creoles, since a few of the colonial elite with administrative powers were corrupt, and occasionally deliberately invested in the contraband trade.[3] In other words, the general idea was that peninsular Spaniards were more loyal to the crown's efforts than creoles. Ironically enough, this was definitely not always the case; the first Viceroy of New Granada, Jorge de Villalonga who served from 1719 to 1724 was "an active smuggler in Cartagena."[4] Still, a widespread purge of creoles throughout the colonial administration, as well as revocation of their privileges, occurred during the Bourbon Reforms. Another target of reform in New Granada was the military; defense of the colonies was costly, but still necessary. While this was not a new idea nor a new problem in the eighteenth-century, much of the military reforms that had been enacted in the first half of the eighteenth-century was focused entirely on the peninsular military. The crown realized that Spanish military failures in the Seven Years War were partially due to the negligence of the colonial military; this was especially true in Cartagena, arguably the most crucial port city in the entire Caribbean region, let alone New Granada. Lastly, economic reform was crucial; the

[3] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru* (Lousiana State University Press, 1990), 133-134.
[4] Ibid., 134.

crown's coffers were dwindling, despite the fact that the entirety of Spain was rich in resources. This was due to a mix of inefficient taxation systems, outdated mercantilist policies from the Habsburg era, poor methods of exploiting the resources that New Granada offered, as well as the rampant contraband trade. While reform was successful in allowing the crown to further exploit the resources that was available, there were many areas where it failed to deliver perfect results.




Figure 1-1. Anthony McFarlane, "New Granada: Relief", *Colombia Before Independence*, 11.

One of the first steps toward reform was the restoration of the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739. The Viceroyalty of New Granada had initially been established in 1717, but

was abolished in 1723 because of financial burden. Prior to the Viceroyalty of New Granada, the area had been under the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Distance between the regional capital of Peru in Lima and Bogotá or Cartagena was enormous, and thus made communication difficult. A lack of communication made it difficult to enforce policy, remain as updated as possible on current events, maintain security and infrastructure, as well as combatting smuggling. After all, New Granada was a remote region with little development, except in the vital cities of Santa Fe de Bogotá and Cartagena.

This lack of administrative efficiency was the reason for the establishment of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, both times, but the necessity was clear the second time that it was established. One of the general focuses of the Bourbon Reforms was to create a more efficient administrative system. The distance between Lima and Santa Fe de Bogotá was about 1100 miles, plus the terrain was mountainous and difficult to traverse.[5] While the establishment of the Viceroyalty of New Granada was a type of decentralization, during an era of reform where centralization was one of the ultimate goals, this did limit the power of Peru. Not only that, but it did create more efficient communication from the new capital of Santa Fe de Bogotá to the rest of New Granada.[6] Plus, the New Granada region had greater access to resources, and throughout the remainder of the eighteenth-century, it received greater attention in terms of resource exploitation and infrastructure, particularly closer toward the second half of the eighteenth-century.

With the re-establishment of the Viceroyalty, one of the first tasks of Viceroy Sebastían de Eslava was financial reform. While Eslava himself was not incredibly successful in this regard, he did set a precedent for his successors to follow. In short, his aim was to improve the

[5] Ibid., 1.
[6] Ibid., 3.

current taxation system, or to broaden "the range of taxation and to extend the administrative network for collecting taxes."[7] The prime example of reform in this area was the establishment of the aguardiente monopoly. Aguardiente was a popular alcoholic beverage in Spanish America, which was an incredibly strong brandy made of sugar. Since sugar grew well in different regions in New Granada, such as in what is now Venezuela, this made aguardiente even more popular and accessible.[8] Attempts of establishing this monopoly had happened in 1700, and many attempts occurred afterward, but there were many conflicts that made the monopoly difficult to enforce. Specifically, the merchants and local elites were stubborn and were persistent in maintaining their own personal interests. The aguardiente production brought in significant amounts of wealth for producers and merchants, plus there was a steady increase in production nearly every year. But, the amount of tax revenue that went to the crown remained the same. For example, in 1730, merchants in Guatemala earned 24,302 pesos, while payments to the royal coffers were 18,399 pesos. Four years later, merchants earned 30,122 pesos, but payments to the royal coffers were 18,399 pesos. In 1740, merchants earned 28,901 pesos, yet the royal coffers received 18,500 pesos.[9]

In other words, the merchants and producers were seeing an increase in wealth, but the crown was not earning more tax revenue despite growing profits.[10] This was because the merchants controlled the local governments, namely the *Alcaldes Mayores* or the *Ayuntamiento*, which collected taxes and oversaw the trading activities.[11] This allowed merchants to easily manipulate their profits. Thus, a monopoly controlled by the crown would mean that all sales and production would be regulated through the crown, meaning that there would be fewer ways

[7] Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 200.
[8] Ibid., 63.
[9] Miles Wortman, "Bourbon Reforms in Central America: 1750-1786," *The Americas* 32, no. 2 (1975): 224.
[10] Ibid., 225.
[11] Ibid., 225.

to smuggle the goods or evade other forms of taxation. The way in which this crown monopoly was implemented was by contracting the production and sales of sugar cane, which was the principal ingredient of aguardiente, while also requiring the crown to have percentage of the profits, which varied per contract.[12] To solidify the power of the monopoly further, the privilege of collecting taxes was revoked from the *Alcaldes Mayores* and transferred to Francisco Valdes, a peninsular Spaniard who was placed in charge of the taxation of agricultural products.[13]

Again, this monopoly took many years before it was implemented successfully. Starting in 1700, this was mostly because of the power of the merchants: they were earning enormous profits from aguardiente sales and wanted to keep their as much of their profits as possible. Thus, the merchants attempted to delay the implementation of these laws which would establish the monopolies. These delays were primarily from the local merchant elites challenging these laws, resulting in the monopoly being suspended in 1714. At the time, the presence of royal authority was weak, so there was little perceived reason to comply with the law. Plus, it was over two decades before the *Audiencia real* actually addressed and attempted to resolve this delay. However, the *Audiencia real* was the main detriment to enforcing this law; the only reason that the problem was even addressed was because the Council of the Indies demanded it. In 1736, a "royal directive finally ordered the reestablishment of the government's monopoly..."[14] The stalling of this monopoly demonstrates that colonial interests were held at a higher regard than the interests of the crown for colonial elites. In this particular case, the crown began to see that there were larger problems that required creative solutions; this led to a new focus on the *Audiencia real*.

---

[12] Ibid., 226.
[13] Ibid., 226.
[14] Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, 201.

By the mid-18th century, the creoles had a firm presence in the *Audiencia real* throughout Spanish America, including New Granada. While some of the most powerful and prestigious positions were still held by peninsular Spaniards, namely the Viceroy, the creoles were the majority in the *Audiencia* in the eighteenth-century. Of course, this was not necessarily a terrible catastrophe, but the crown often met resistance when attempting to enforce their policies, and much of this resistance came from the creole elite in the *Audiencia*. The *Audiencia real* acted as a judicial branch in Spain and its colonies. However, in the colonies, they held certain executive powers in addition to judicial powers. Consequentially, there was a concern regarding the growing influence of the creoles; creole elite had established a strong foothold in both judicial and executive branches of the administration of the colonies. There were two *audiencias* in New Granada; one was in Panama, the other in Santa Fe de Bogotá.[15] However, the *Audiencia* in Panama was entirely abolished in 1752, in an effort to centralize power in New Granada more efficiently.[16] This was because there were two opportunities for people to obtain political positions of power in New Granada, increasing the potential presence for creoles in the political system in New Granada.

The prime reason for the prominent presence of creoles in the *Audiencia* throughout Latin America was due to the practice of the selling of offices. In an ideal world, Spain would appoint peninsular Spaniards to positions of the *Audiencia* in Spanish America, but sometimes there were creole candidates deemed worthy and appointed to the position. However, the selling of offices allowed many creole elites to buy their way into power. Purchasing a governing position allowed creoles to serve their own interests, or perhaps the interests of the colonies, rather than the interests of the crown. These governing elites were born and raised in New Granada, and had

[15] John Leddy Phelan, *The People and the King* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 8.
[16] Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, 233.

a special attachment to their homeland. This was not a weird phenomenon, since humans tend to feel a special attachment to their homeland. This was potentially viewed as an issue from the perspective of the crown, since this attachment to their homeland may have outweighed their attachment to the crown.

Typically, these seats were sold for anywhere from 4,000 pesos to 20,000 pesos, which was not an insignificant amount of money for one person to have.[17] The reason why positions of power were sold to begin with was to raise revenue for the crown. This would normally happen during wartime, such as during the War of Spanish Succession, since money was an important concern to fuel ongoing war efforts.[18] This practice was seen as problematic by King Charles III, and as such, he sent a visitor general to explore the problems within the colonial administration.[19] This visitor general, Juan Francisco Gutiérrez de Piñeres, described these phenomena during his commissioned visit to the colonies, and also personally addressed it as one of the chief concerns of colonial administration for Spanish interest.

Since creole influence in Spanish America was one of the primary concerns of the crown, they focused on methods in which they could successfully diminish, if not completely remove, their influence. While they knew that it would not resolve all conflicts, the crown understood that it would have been a step in the right direction. In other words, reform of the colonial administration system was needed. Charles III identified the sale of offices as an important target for reforms. In 1776, the number of creoles in the *Audiencia* had reached its high point.[20] One of the purposes of the visitor general Gutiérrez de Piñeres given by the crown was "to augment royal income from the colony, by all means possible." Rather than increasing taxation

[17] John Leddy Phelan, *The People and the King*, 9.
[18] Ibid., 9.
[19] Ibid., 7.
[20] Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, 209.

and increasing the burden on the king's subjects, his true purpose was to overhaul the administrative system, which would cut back on expenses and increase administrative efficiency.[21] This focus on increased efficiency and innovation, rather than focusing on potentially more burden by merely increasing the amount of taxes, was one of the consistent components of the Bourbon Reforms.

Gutiérrez de Piñeres' first target was reducing the power of the creoles in the *Audiencia real*. The arrival of Gutiérrez de Piñeres marked the beginning of this purge, since he served as visitor general as well as regent of the *Audiencia real* starting in 1776. This gave him authority in controlling the appointments to the *Audiencia real*, and, by 1781, all creolesw were purged from their positions.[22] Additionally, these new seats were filled by peninsular Spaniards who held zero contacts with the creole elites of the area.[23] This meant that the creole elites would have a difficult time using their local influence on the new members of the *Audiencia real*. Gutiérrez de Piñeres also emphasized the importance of keeping them separated from New Granada entirely. Ultimately, he had hoped that dispensations which allowed marriage and settlement in Bogotá would be given less freely.[24] Ideally, this would stop any further assimilation into the local culture of New Granada, which would increase the loyalty of the colonies to their mother country, or at least make the members of the *Audiencia* more compliant to the wishes of the crown. Additionally, this was intended to show a shift in attention to the interests of the crown, rather than the interests of the colonies. This would fabricate a stronger legitimacy of the crown over its colonies, or perhaps create a more solid bond between New Granada and the crown.

---

[21] Ibid., 208.
[22] Ibid., 209.
[23] Ibid., 210.
[24] Ibid., 210.

While Gutiérrez de Piñeres' efforts to rid the *Audiencia* of creole influence were admirable, they were not enough to solve the bigger picture. Another one of Gutiérrez de Piñeres' goals was to establish the intendent system throughout New Granada.[25] The intendent system was another attempt to establish more centralized control of colonial affairs, giving the intendents the power to oversee the treasury and collect taxes. The intendent was quite a powerful figure for the crown, especially since intendents were appointed directly by the crown. In short, the intendents acted as another arm of the crown to control different parts of the administration in the colonies. However, such a system was never implemented in New Granada, due mostly because of the Comunero Revolt in 1781.[26] The Comunero Revolt was a direct reaction to many of the Bourbon Reforms, particularly in regions where monopolies impacted the profits of producers, such as Socorro or San Gil.[27] The Comunero Revolt itself was not particularly violent, although it did serve as a wake-up call to reformists. After the Comunero Revolt, Archbishop-Viceroy Antonio Caballero y Góngora opposed heavy reforms, such as the establishment of the intendent system.[28] He understood that after the Comunero Revolt that the crown and the colonial administration needed to proceed with caution, since there was growing unrest regarding widespread reforms. Plus, the treasury of New Granada was not wealthy enough to pay the salaries of the new officials that would come with the intendent system.[29] This was one of the larger shortcomings of the Bourbon Reforms; anymore widespread administrative reform was incredibly difficult to implement without a more centralized government.

---

[25] Ibid., 217.
[26] Ibid., 216-217.
[27] Ibid., 217.
[28] Ibid., 217.
[29] Ibid., 217.

In addition to the *Audiencia*, Gutiérrez de Piñeres also targeted families in the treasury administration. The main issue with the treasury administration was that many of the members were all related to one another, or in other words, were all part of the same creole family. There was a law, the *Real Cédula* of 1775, which forbade "employment in any exchequer office or treasury of individuals related to each other..."[30] In Santa Fe, this law was deliberately ignored, and much of the administration was controlled through connections with one family – the Alvarez family. This dynastic control of the treasury administration was another of Gutiérrez de Piñeres' main concerns.

Even worse, the Viceroy's administration also had its own connections with this family.[31] This demonstrated that creole elites could maneuver their way creatively through the colonial administration. Again, this shows that loyalty to the colony, rather than loyalty to the Spanish crown, was a persistent problem during the 18th century, or at the least, it persisted as a concern of the crown throughout the century. This was especially problematic, since the Viceroy was supposed to be crown's representation of authority in the colony. While the Viceroy himself was removed from this situation, parts of the Viceroy's administration were involved with local creole elites. This allowed his advisors to undermine his intentions. Referring to reforms regarding the aguardiente monopoly, this truly demonstrates how difficult reform was, since creole influence manifested in various ways that played off one another.

Of course, as we know with the Comunero Revolt, this did not mean that the creole elites were passive and content with the reforms. Many were wealthy and influential regardless of their political standing. The crown had a unique idea to appease the creoles: appoint creole elites to some type of prestigious title in peninsular Spain. Examples included high military rankings,

[30] Ibid., 210.
[31] Ibid., 210.

bureaucratic offices and ecclesiastical positions.[32] One effect this had was that these creole elites were drawn away from Latin America entirely, reducing their direct influence over their region.[33] Additionally, the crown's hope was that this would increase loyalty to the mother country, rather than their colonial counterparts. The idea was that the creoles would be grateful for their position, and as such, be more loyal to those that gave them their power. Plus, they would be spending time in peninsular Spain, growing more attached to the peninsula rather than the region they spent most of their previous life. While it was definitely a creative method to promote patriotism to the crown, it seems to neglect the fact that these creoles that would have high positions in peninsular Spain would have little influence on the opinions of other creoles back in Spanish America.

While some creoles did not hesitate in taking these positions, many were still unsatisfied. Like previously stated, it was impossible to please give every creole elite high ranking positions in peninsular Spain. While it was possible that these creoles that were stationed in peninsular Spain, thus given greater privileges, did feel a greater appreciation of the crown, that did not mean that the creole elites in Spanish America felt those sentiments. Despite this idealistic perspective, the reality was that Spain was attempting to create something that was undesired; a type of "empire-wide patriotism."[34] While the crown's ideas were certainly creative, the truth was that creoles, who were born, raised and spent most, if not all, of their adult life in the colonies, were too attached to their birthplace. Additionally, they were demonstrating to themselves that they were more than capable of governing themselves; after all, they were showing signs of self-governance themselves by maneuvering their way through the colonial

[32] John Leddy Phelan, *The People and the King*, 11.
[33] Ibid., 10-11.
[34] Ibid., 11.

administration. This was why discontent from the creole elite was high when they began losing their bureaucratic offices.

While the Viceroy was on the side of the crown, the Viceroy also understood the amount of power that some of these families possessed. Including the Alvarezes, other powerful families included the Prietos, the Ricuartes, the Caicedos and the Oriundos.[35] These families protested that the *Real Cédula* of 20 January, 1775, severely limited the talent that could serve in the treasury office.[36] Manuel Antonio Flores, the Viceroy who served in New Granada from 1776 to 1781, addressed these concerns in a sympathetic manner. While he understood the purpose of this *Real Cédula*, he also understood the potential difficulty of successfully implementing this law, considering that the candidates from these families were genuinely well-suited for their jobs, while the peninsular counterparts were often "trash by birth, upbringing and conduct."[37] In addition to this, the Viceroy thought it cruel to simply bar these families from these positions in the treasury office. Most of the members in these families had been raised and shaped for these positions in the treasury office. With this *Real Cédula*, they would be without work or a stable income. In short, the creoles were demanding a restoration of their privileges, and Viceroy Flores was sympathetic to their cause.

Of course, Gutiérrez de Piñeres was not content with this result, and spent much of his time carefully trying to undermine the Alvarez family as best as he could. While there was no concrete evidence that the Alvarez family was corrupt in some manner, their power and influence could not be ignored. The Alvarezes gained much of their influence through strategic marriages, particularly marrying into other wealthy of prominent families. Examples include a marriage link between Manual García Olano, administrator of the tobacco revenues in Socorro,

[35] Ibid., 14-15.
[36] Ibid., 15.
[37] Flores to Gálvez, 15 November, 1777, AGI 659. In *The People and the King*, 15.

or with Francisco Robledo, advisor to the viceroy.[38] Eventually, like his successes with the *Audiencia*, Gutiérrez de Piñeres managed to reduce the influence of the Alvarez family drastically within two years. The way this occurred was simply by emphasizing the importance of the *Real Cédula* that the Viceroy was reluctant to enforce. Gutiérrez de Piñeres emphasized the importance of recruiting drawing "on a wider group of candidates, and that employees should be prevented from serving in the in the place of their birth.[39] Although he did not manage to curtail their influence entirely, only three members of the family still held their fiscal office positions in Bogotá. The remaining seven had either been removed from office, died, transferred to another position or left entirely.[40]

Administrative reform was an important component of the Bourbon Reforms, but military reform was just as important. The Spanish had just been on the losing side of the Seven-Years War, which occurred from 1756 until 1763. The war was fought for a number of reasons, with every power involved having their unique intent in the war. The powers included were: Great Britain, Prussia, Portugal and various German principalities, against France, Austria, Bavaria, Russia, Spain and Sweden. However, Spain had not joined in the war until 1762, near the very end of the war. This served as a wake-up call for the Spanish, since the loss came to the surprise to many on the losing side of this war. Like with the administrative system of the colonies, Charles III realized that an overhaul of the colonial military system was needed. There were two levels of reform on the military itself; one focused on regular level, which were career soldiers, while the other focused on the militia level, which were considered a type of reserve unit.[41]

---

[38] McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, 210.
[39] Ibid., 211.
[40] John Leddy Phelan, *The People and the King*, 16.
[41] Allan J. Kuethe, *Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808* (University Presses of Flordia, 1978), 8.

In the colonies, the military had a serious discipline issue, both in the regular ranks and the militia ranks. While problematic for both, this was more problematic for the regular ranks, especially since these were supposed to be the higher quality troops. The regulars were properly trained and received sufficient supplies, meaning they were expensive to maintain. Additionally, there were so few regular troops stationed in New Granada, that it was almost pointless to even have them. This was particularly true in Cartagena, the most important port city in New Granada.[42] In Cartagena, a battalion of ten companies were stationed, which, with sufficient manpower, would have amassed to about 800 troops.[43] However, manpower shortages were frequent, nor was this anywhere near enough soldiers to repel a large invading force. Additionally, the militias were so few and so poorly trained that they were hardly effective in maintaining any type of order, let alone serve in warfare.[44] As a result, Field Marshal Alejandro O'Reilly, an Irish-born Spanish general was tasked with reforming the military in the colonies.

Alejandro O'Reilly was a highly-respected officer in the Spanish military. After the Seven Years War, he worked Cuba to help re-establish a military presence, as well as experiment with reforming the military on the island.[45] O'Reilly's approach to military reform was to focus on creating a new, more disciplined, militia-based system. A similar system had been implemented in peninsular Spain; O'Reilly codified his system in Cuba, hoping that it could be applied to all the Spanish colonies.[46] Thus, O'Reilly was promoted to inspector general of the Americas, and in 1771, shifted his attention to New Granada.[47]

[42] Ibid., 15.
[43] Ibid., 16.
[44] Ibid., 9.
[45] Ibid., 8-9.
[46] Ibid., 10.
[47] Ibid., 10.

One of O'Reilly's main goals was to implement a more efficient militia-based system, which would serve as reinforcements for the regular units.[48] The idea for this system was to create incentive for Spanish subjects to enlist in the militia, because they were also treated with the same privileges as those in the regular army. At the same time, they would receive similar training, though not as extensive, as regular units, and were also assigned "cadres of regular officers and enlisted men."[49] In addition to this, O'Reilly ordered more regular battalions to be stationed at both Cartagena and Panama, two vital port cities in New Granada.[50] Both cities were located in central parts along the coast of the Caribbean, though Cartagena was considered the more important due to its more central location as a trade port. Regardless, before any reforms, both cities were seriously neglected, especially Cartagena considering its importance to Spain. While it was true that Cartagena managed to repel invasions from time to time, such as an English invasion 1741, the credit cannot be given to the military garrison in Cartagena; many troops were rushed to Cartagena from Spain. Plus, the troops that were stationed in Cartagena were neglected so often that at one point they took the viceroy captive in 1745, primarily because troops were not being paid sufficient wages.[51] This demonstrates the severity of the negligence of the army and defenses in New Granada, and why reform was necessary.

To ensure that both Cartagena and Panama received proper attention, Alejandro O'Reilly practically quadrupled the amount of assigned manpower for both port cities in 1773, bringing in four battalions for Cartagena, and three battalions and twelve companies for Panama.[52] Additionally, he ensured that every man had sufficient supplies, uniforms and weapons; prior to

[48] Ibid., 9.
[49] Ibid., 9.
[50] Ibid., 13.
[51] Ibid., 16.
[52] Ibid., 16.

reforms, supply shortages were common.[53] These newly assigned battalions consisted of both purely regular battalions, in addition to newly reformed militia battalions. Again, the militia battalions generally served as reinforcements, or as a type of reserves, for the regular battalions. These militia battalions received identical training to the regular battalions. Obviously, this was to ensure that they would receive proper discipline and training, but training was conducted by regular officers, many of which were from peninsular Spain. With peninsular Spaniards training and disciplining the militia, there was hope for potential newfound respect, or perhaps adoration, for Spanish rule. Ironically enough, there seemed to be little tension between peninsular Spaniards and colonists serving in the military, despite the fact that the crown seemed skeptical of creoles in regards to administrative reform. This was most likely because many of the colonial troops serving in the military were not colonial elites. Plus, these new colonial militia were given the similar privileges to those of the regular peninsular Spaniards, such as exemption from certain taxes and obligation to quarter other troops.[54]

With a sudden increase in trained manpower, there were enough men to police certain areas. This led to a periodic decrease in contraband trade, since smuggling routes had more patrols and outposts, particularly one route that passed through Riohacha. This worked for about four years, until Guajiro Native Americans destroyed the fortifications.[55] The Guajiros were a prominent player in the contraband trade, and the fortifications were hindering their practice. There was a general lack of manpower to repress the Native Americans, or reinforce the outposts. The Guajiros demolishing these outposts shows us that illicit trade ran deep through New Granada. Part of the purpose of the Bourbon Reforms was to combat smuggling, which

[53] Ibid., 16.
[54] Ibid., 25-26.
[55] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru* (Lousiana State University Press, 1990), 37.

was perfectly clear in this case. At the same time, there was a clear reaction to reform, since the Guajiros were upset with Spanish meddling in their affairs. Again, this violent reaction shows historians that the impact of the contraband trade, as well as reform designed to combat it, ran deep in New Granada. The impact on society of the Guajiros is covered more extensively later in the text.

Regardless, by 1774, Alejandro O'Reilly's reform of the military in New Granada was successful to a certain degree, but the military reform ultimately had little impact. O'Reilly had a set a standard for the future of the militias and regulars of New Granada. After all, similar systems to the one that O'Reilly was trying to establish had worked elsewhere in the Spanish network, including Cuba and peninsular Spain.[56] However, the officers that were commissioned around 1773 to lead these militias in New Granada were incompetent and corrupt. This was especially true for the officer commissioned to Cartagena, José Pérez Dávila, who focused more on the quantity of troops rather than the quality of troops, which was exactly what the Spanish wanted to avoid.[57] Dávila expanded the militia to two battalions and fifty-eight companies.[58] His focus on quantity placed heavy strains on the economy of New Granada, since it was expensive to maintain. Even worse, there was not enough manpower to keep the militias well-organized. One of the key principles of reform was to ensure that new policies did not strain the colonies any more than they already were; military reform was initially supposed to not be strenuous, but incompetent and corrupt leaders ultimately reversed this decision. This was another one of the shortcomings of the Bourbon Reforms; O'Reilly had set a good standard that followed the goals of the Bourbon Reforms by attempting to prioritize more efficient systems

[56] Allan J. Kuethe, *Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808*, 10.
[57] Ibid., 21-22.
[58] Ibid., 22.

rather than merely expanding thoughtlessly. However, incompetent leaders such as José Pérez Dávila squandered any progress that was made.

The last focus of the Bourbon Reforms was economic reform. As mentioned before, one of the goals of the Bourbon Reforms was to ensure that excessive burden would not be placed on the colonists. The crown understood that contraband trade was happening, primarily because of the lack of access to goods that were needed in the colonies, especially in New Granada. Foreign powers had a greater supply of these goods, and consequentially earned larger profits from it by getting better deals with the colonists. Goods that were in high demand in New Granada included grain, slaves and textiles. New Granada also had certain resources that other foreign colonies wanted, such as cacao, tobacco, and hides.[59] There is a clear relationship here; New Granada had resources that other powers wanted, and those same powers had goods that New Granada wanted. To combat this, the crown decided to take a more liberal approach to trade, by limiting traditional mercantilism, where all trade was conducted through the *Casa de Contratación* in Cadiz.[60] While this theoretically ensured all trade was conducted through the Spanish network, this process was slow since all colonial trade was conducted through this company. This complicated the lengthy trading process and only made the contraband trade more attractive.

Thus, the crown enforced a policy of free-trade in 1778 until 1796. However, this policy did not permit any new legal channels with foreign powers. In fact, it only opened up additional ports for trade in peninsular Spain. In other words, all trade was not required to go through the *Casa de Contratación* in Cadiz, but could go through different ports, like Barcelona, Málaga,

[59] Linda Marguerite Rupert, *Creolization and Contraband* (University of Georgia Press, 2012), 167.
[60] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 147.

Santander and La Coruña.[61] This had profound effects on both the economies of peninsular Spain and the colonies. The general idea was that promotion of free-trade in peninsular Spain would increase the production and value of manufactured goods. As a result, value of exports from peninsular Spain had increased by 400 percent by 1796. However, the manufacturing industry in peninsular Spain was not the sector that flourished; instead, agricultural producers seemed to have capitalized on the new opportunity.[62] While this was not necessarily a negative outcome, it was not the desired outcome, since the crown was hoping to promote the manufacturing industry to serve the markets of the colonies better, thus undermining the contraband trade. At the same time, free-trade affected the value of imports into Spain from the colonies tenfold.[63] Yet, New Granada only accounted for three percent of these new imports into Spain from the colonies.[64] While the new free-trade policy did promote agricultural exportation in the colonies, it was not enough to improve the economy of New Granada by a significant margin.

In an attempt to further promote free-trade, the crown implemented the *comercio libre de negros*, which attempted to make slave-labor more accessible, particularly in Cuba, though the law was extended to Cartagena in 1791.[65] This would allow colonists to conduct business with merchants from other nations, and vice versa, without the need to smuggle goods, though it was explicitly for the trading of slaves. Alongside this, the crown was attempting to promote export-oriented agriculture, like the promotion of free-trade in 1778; more slaves would mean more labor to grow more cash crops.[66] This was especially aimed at New Granada, where valuable

[61] Ibid., 148.
[62] Ibid., 148.
[63] Ibid., 151.
[64] Ibid., 152.
[65] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 103.
[66] Ibid., 103-104.

goods such as cacao and tobacco thrived. However, many Spanish merchants were angered by this, as well as Viceroy José Manuel de Ezpeleta of New Granada, in 1791. In their eyes, the promotion of free-trade of slaves only gave smugglers, particularly British smugglers, a guise for the contraband trade.[67] Both the merchants and Ezpeleta had good reason to believe this; very few of the vessels carrying slaves were purely slave-carrying ships; many of them had a few slaves, as well as many other manufactured goods, particularly textiles, or other products. The resistance from both merchants and the Viceroy made implementation of these laws very difficult on the crowns behalf.

While the Bourbon Reforms did attempt to change various components of colonial structure, they were met with very limited success in New Granada. While the Bourbon Reforms sought to make different sectors of the colonies more efficient, they also sought to curb the contraband trade. The three areas of reform included the administration, the military and economy. With a loyal administration, implementation of laws that would benefit the crown would be easier to implement. While the visitor general Gutiérrez de Piñeres was successful in replacing nearly all the *Audiencia* with peninsular Spaniards, he largely failed to deliver in other areas of administrative reform. Successes would have potentially created a stronger set of laws, or could have removed unsavory influences within the administration. With a stronger colonial military, New Granada, particularly Cartagena, would be able to defend themselves more reliably, while also saving in expenses of sending mass amounts of peninsular regulars to defend. Plus, a stronger military would have made it much easier to sustain a presence along contraband routes, such as routes that the Guajiros utilized. Again, Alejandro O'Reilly saw limited success, as his successors botched any glimpse of success with their lack of foresight. Commercial reform was successful in regards to the aguardiente monopoly that was established by the crown,

[67] Ibid., 104-105.

but reforming the traditional mercantilist system proved difficult, as many merchants were reluctant to give up their trading power. The promotion of free-trade did increase the value of trade within the Spanish network, but it failed to restructure the overall economy by promoting manufacturing industry in Spain, while also promoting export-oriented agriculture in the colonies, particularly in New Granada. The mixed successes of the Bourbon Reforms show that the interests of New Granada trumped the interests of the crown; the contraband trade benefitted the colonists and hurt the crown's coffers tremendously. While the crown attempted to give the colonists new opportunities under the Spanish network, these new opportunities failed to fully establish Spanish legitimacy over their colonies.

The Felt Impacts of Specific Contraband

In New Granada, many valuable goods were smuggled into the colony, and many were illegally exported. Both played an important role in understanding the impacts of the contraband on the Spanish economy. Some of the most prominent imported contraband included slaves and textiles. On the other side, some of the most prominent exported contraband included precious metals, like gold and silver, and platinum. Through the study of these goods, historians can obtain a better understanding of the dilemma that haunted the crown regarding the contraband trade.

New Granada lacked the resources to combat the contraband trade, yet it was also difficult for the crown to curb the trade. Many of the goods that were smuggled into New Granada were vital for the economy, particularly slaves, making it difficult for the crown to enforce anti-contraband laws that would only serve to harm the economy of its colonies. At the same time, the crown was losing money from the smuggling of its colonies resources. An example of a policy that attempted to resolve the issue of the shortage of slaves in the colonies was the policy of *comercio libre de negros*, which many merchants in New Granada argued that it promoted the contraband trade further. Additionally, some economic investments seemed to overlook the contraband trade entirely, such as investment in redeveloping the silver mines in New Granada. In short, it was evident that New Granada was in a precarious situation; New Granada lacked the resources to properly invest in the means of exploiting its resources, nor could the crown implement policy which properly counteracted the contraband trade. Despite this, the contraband trade benefitted many of the colonists, as it gave them access to goods that they did not have access to through legal channels and a means of selling their own products as contraband for a better value.

One of the most prominent goods that were smuggled were slaves. Slaves were an integral part of the economy of many colonies, Spanish or otherwise. In New Granada, slaves were crucial for the expansion of precious metals mines, and later in the latter half of the century, plantations.[1] However, both of these uses were usually for rural regions, where hard labor was more prevalent. In urban regions, such as in the city of Cartagena, slaves were used for domestic purposes, or perhaps as an apprentice by an artisan. By the 18th century, Spain had little direct access to slaves. The main supplier of slaves in New Granada and other Spanish colonies were the British and Dutch.[2] This placed a strain on the relationship between the colonies and Spain, since many colonies required more slaves in order to have a functional economy. In other words, Spanish colonists required a large amount of slave labor, but Spanish merchants were unable to deliver adequate supply. Thus, colonists were forced to turn toward the contraband trade to meet the demands. This was especially true in export-oriented economies, like Cuba, where the exportation of cash crops was the fundamental component of its prosperity. Many elites believed that slaves were the single most important property that existed in the colonies, and they demanded protection of their property more than anything else. Slavery was a hotbed of conflicts, especially when slaves escaped. More often than not, however, slaves would be "stolen" by others when they ran away, usually meaning that a runaway slave would be captured by another slave owner.[3] This would escalate into a conflict where slave owners would petition to have their slaves returned, despite the fact that the process was slow and usually

[1] Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 22.
[2] Ibid., 22.
[3] Alan L. Karras, "Caribbean Contraband, Slave Property, and the State, 1767-1792," *Pennsylvania History 64* (June, 1997): 251.

unsuccessful.[4] There was little choice sometimes, since access to abundant, cheap slaves was limited.

These types of internal conflicts between slave-owning elites were more common in other colonies, like Cuba. This was mostly because there were numerous plantation owners that grew their own cash-crops. While there were plantation owners in New Granada, slave labor in precious metals mines were just as important as slave labor on plantations.[5] However, the crown recognized that there was profit to be had in an export-oriented economy in New Granada, since New Granada's climate could support some valuable cash crops, particularly cacao. Thus, the crown implemented *comercio libre de negros*, or free-trade of slaves, which was officially extended to Cartagena in February of 1791.[6] This allowed licensed foreign merchants access to the Cartagena market for the sale of slaves. However, this law angered many merchants, as they believed that this law was a guise for the contraband trade. The purpose of the law goes in hand with the crown promoting free-trade in 1778. Again, the crowns implementation of free-trade was only internal, meaning the crown had opened more ports for trade with the colonies. Previously, all colonial trade had been conducted through the *Casa de contratación*, which was located in Cadiz.[7] The promotion of free-trade did result in an increase of value of trade between the colonies and peninsular Spain, which was the intended effect. Yet, the impacts that it had on New Granada were not as great as they were in other colonies. Between 1778 and 1796, the total remittances "of all American products" imported into Spain from New Granada was merely 3 percent, compared to New Spain with remittances of 36 percent, or Cuba with 23 percent.[8] In

[4] Ibid., 251.
[5] Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 65.
[6] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru* (Lousiana State University Press, 1990), 102-103.
[7] Ibid., 148.
[8] Ibid., 152.

short, the promotion of free-trade was working very well in some colonies, but it did not seem to work as well in New Granada, and as such, the crown decided to attempt to bolster its efforts by promoting free-trade of slaves.

Regardless, the rationalization of the *comercio libre de negros* as a channel for the contraband trade was potentially true in most cases, but there was no real evidence to know for certain.[9] While the crown was attempting to shift the economy of New Granada to a more export-oriented economy, as opposed to an economy solely dependent on the extraction of precious metals, they were also potentially creating new channels for smugglers to participate in the contraband trade. Ironically enough, this shift toward an export-oriented economy was an attempt to combat the contraband trade, but instead, it seemed to have diverted the focus of the contraband trade, meaning foreign merchants had a new means of access to New Granada markets. Even more unfortunate for the crown, the transition to an export-oriented economy was slow in New Granada, despite the sponsorship of foreign free-trade of slaves in Cartagena. While it was not entirely clear why the transition was so slow, it can be assumed that the contraband trade was still part of the problem. New Granada and the crown could implement policies of free-trade in order to promote higher production in the colonies as much as they wanted, but this still did not counteract the contraband trade. According to Spanish merchants, the *comercio libre de negros* was actually detrimental to the fight against the contraband trade, since it gave foreign merchants access to Spanish ports. Of course, these merchants were contractually only allowed to sell slaves, but it was impossible to know what their cargo was before the ship docked.

[9] Ibid., 104.




Figure 2-1. Anthony McFarlane, "Population distribution in New Granada, 1778-80," *Colombia Before Independence*, 33.

At the same time, disguising cargo was nothing new for the contraband trade in New Granada. This practice was clear with grain trade between Spain and Great Britain, which was contractually legal according to the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713.[10] Under this treaty, British merchants could conduct business with Spanish colonies, but only through trade of grain and slaves; this was known as the *asiento*, which dictated that two barrels of grain were allowed to be carried for every one slave that was on board a ship as cargo. Usually, these merchants would

[10] Ibid., 142.

hold many more barrels of grain than they were contractually allowed to, but this was often overlooked by port officials, especially in Cartagena. Merchants often got away with this practice because there was simply a high demand for grain in Cartagena; there were not many legal channels to obtain grain, and people need food in order to survive. Plus, there was a lack of open fields for Cartagena to grow grain itself, nor was the climate optimal to do so.[11] This was a clear opportunity for smugglers the make easy, and safe, money. After all, it is difficult to turn away an opportunity for food if there is a demand for it.

Additionally, these grain barrels did not always carry grain; there were times that they would be stuffed with goods, such as textiles.[12] This was another product that Spain lacked for trade with its colonies. While textiles have various uses, they were just as necessary to live as grain; everyone needs clothes, and many people want blankets, or maybe even curtains. Regardless of their use, the fact remains that there was a market for textiles in New Granada; Spain was lagging behind other European powers in the eighteenth-century for manufactured goods, especially with textiles.[13]

During this time period, new inventions for the increased production of textiles had been created, with nearly all of them being invented by British men. In short, Great Britain had controlled the textile industry, having the means of producing very large amounts of textiles in a relatively short amount of times. In other words, foreign powers had the supply, while New Granada had a great demand. This meant that there were few legal channels to obtain sufficient amounts of textiles. As with grain, many smugglers would openly get away with this practice, since there was an incredibly high demand for textiles in New Granada. Again, historians see a

[11] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997), 105.
[12] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 142.
[13] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling*, 27.

clear opportunity that smugglers were capitalizing on; it would be foolish for these merchants to not take advantage of this market.

Of course, there were goods that were smuggled out of New Granada, as well. The most valuable goods that New Granada produced were precious metals; particularly, there were valuable gold mines in New Granada. In New Granada, between the years of 1782 and 1796, the legal exportation of precious metals to ports in Spain made up about 60 percent of their total exports.[14] While these numbers are for the years of 1782-1796, these numbers were relatively consistent during the earlier years of the 18th century. At the same time, it was estimated that somewhere between fifty percent and seventy-five percent of the total production of New Granada's gold production was smuggled.[15] This was an enormous amount of lost revenue, and reflects the attitude of smuggling that historians can see in New Granada. Of course, Spanish merchants and the crown had a demand for gold and other precious metals, but the fact remained that Spanish merchants had little supply for their subjects in New Granada. After all, New Granada needed a plethora of other goods that Spanish merchants typically lacked, such as pepper, cinnamon, oil, wine or even razors.[16] Consequentially, producers in New Granada would sell their products to those who benefitted them the most, which were most often foreign smugglers.

Precious metals production was in a unique position in New Granada, as precious metals production also benefitted from the previously mentioned *comercio libre de negros*. While this policy was designed to promote the exportation of agricultural goods, it also gave various precious metal mines access to more slaves. This was especially important since the lives of miners was rife with brutal living conditions. Additionally, even though most of the production

[14] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 154-156.
[15] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling*, 160-161.
[16] Ibid., 27.

of precious metals ended up being smuggled out of the colony, they still accounted for a large portion of the revenue that the crown received from the colony, but also generated much-needed wealth for New Granada. Archbishop Antonio Caballero y Góngora, the Viceroy of New Granada from 1782 to 1789, identified the expansion of the precious metals industry as a sector in New Granada that could benefit the region tremendously.[17] However, his focus in this case was to reestablish a firm foothold in the silver mining industry, which had been neglected in New Granada due to low yields.[18] Again, the gold mining industry was still prominent in New Granada, and made up about sixty percent of the total exports to Spain. However, the silver mining industry in New Granada had mostly disappeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries. In the eighteenth century, nearly all of the silver that was extracted out of Spanish colonies came from the Viceroyalty of Peru.[19] Comparatively, Peru's exportation of precious metals amounted to 89 million reales per year, whereas New Granada's exportation of precious metals amounted to 18 million reales per year.[20] At the same time, most of Peru's exportation of precious metals were silver, whereas most of New Granada's exportation of precious metals were gold.[21]

Archbishop-Viceroy Caballero y Góngora believed that if the former silver mines were exploited properly, then New Granada would have easy access to new revenue. This would help diversify New Granada economy, as well. After all, there is only a limited supply of precious metals in the world, and continued extraction would ultimately result in lower yields. On top of this, he had promoted the idea of returning to an older form extracting silver, by smelting silver

[17] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 42.
[18] Ibid., 42.
[19] Ibid., 154.
[20] Ibid., 154-155.
[21] Ibid., 154.

rather than using the process of amalgamation.[22] In practice, amalgamation is more efficient for extracting silver compared to smelting, but amalgamation required mercury. While Spain did have access to mercury, the supply was dwindling drastically by the 18th century. Plus, nearly all the mercury supply came from Peru, which would ultimately require more funds for transportation of mercury to amalgamation mills.[23] Archbishop-Viceroy Caballero y Góngora understood that both Spain and New Granada were in financial straits, and sought to utilize innovative methods to rectify the problem.

Archbishop-Viceroy Caballero y Góngora focused entirely on the region of Mariquita for the silver mines, which was located in the interior of New Granada.[24] Inspections of the former mines in the region in 1784 demonstrated that there was indeed an ample supply of silver. Thus, the process of reestablishing the mines had started, but it was not until 1791, well after Caballero y Góngora's term had ended, that mines produced any silver.[25] There were a number of reasons for delay. One of the reasons was the lack of labor; like previously mentioned, life in the mining industry was undesirable by many. This forced the expeditions to import slaves, which was also problematic; Mariquita was a remote region, and slaves were especially unhappy working in the mines, so they often escaped or rebelled successfully.[26] Additionally, as previously mentioned in the text, there was not an endless supply of slaves to keep the mines in operation. In fact, it was a waste of resources to keep importing slaves, considering the amount of time and resources were needed in order to bring the slaves to the interior, just to have a large amount of them escape. At the same time, the rainy weather conditions made it difficult for the expeditions to

[22] Ibid., 43-44.
[23] Ibid., 44.
[24] Ibid., 45-46.
[25] Ibid., 51.
[26] Ibid., 47.

clear paths to the mines, as well as maintain sufficient infrastructure or keep slaves from escaping.

Even more unlucky, a new process of amalgamation had been discovered in Austria in 1786.[27] Technologically, this was certainly a good thing, since this new amalgamation process took five hours to complete, while smelting could take up at least ten days. On the other hand, this new discovery halted the entire expedition in 1786, which had initially appeared to be turning into a successful mining operation.[28] The crown did not want to invest anymore resources into building and setting up forges that would have been used for smelting the silver if there was a more efficient means of purifying the silver, especially considering the economic constraints on both the crown and New Granada.[29] As such, the crown waited until there were men who were skilled and knowledgeable in this new process of amalgamation.[30] However, this only delayed the mining expedition further, which was especially frustrating for Caballero y Góngora since the expedition was nearly ready to produce silver. To make matters even worse, the seven specialists that the crown was gathering for New Granada turned out to not be as competent as they had thought. In fact, only one of them was a technological expert, meaning that he was the one who understood how to set up the process for the new amalgamation process; the rest of the specialists were only skilled workers who knew how to work the process once it was set up. Either way, it did not matter how competent he was, since he fell ill soon after his arrival in New Granada and died.[31]

Archbishop-Viceroy Caballero y Góngora was confident that the Mariquita region was excellent for exploiting silver, and was still faithful to the operation throughout his service as

[27] Ibid., 48.
[28] Ibid., 48.
[29] Ibid., 48-49.
[30] Ibid., 49.
[31] Ibid., 49.

Viceroy. However, his successor, Viceroy José Manuel de Ezpeleta, was less satisfied, especially since the inevitable success of the mines had been hyped up by the previous administration. When Viceroy Manuel de Ezpeleta took office, he examined the reports on the mining operation, but was reluctant to continue the activities.[32] Viceroy Manuel de Ezpeleta had a different ideology compared to Archbishop-Viceroy Caballero y Góngora; Manuel de Ezpeleta was more interested in "fiscal restraint," whereas Caballero y Góngora was clearly more inclined to try new ideas.[33] Regardless, Manuel de Ezpeleta continued the mining operation, though he did so cautiously with high expectations. Once the mining mission finally produced its first silver in 1791, but he was disappointed in the results. At that point, 137,000 pesos had been invested into the project, and the investment was not paying itself off. This frustrated Manuel de Ezpeleta further, since he had been assured that the mines would yield high profits, or at least enough profits to pay off the investments in a short time.[34] Plus, the royal administration continued to "emphasize financial restraint."[35] After four more years of disappointing results, by mid-1795, Manuel de Ezpeleta decided to end the mining operations. As a result, the mines given away for free to anyone willing to work them.[36]

The promotion of producing more silver in New Granada was an attempt to find more ways to earn more revenue. While it was possible that the mines could have ultimately produced more silver and earned more revenues for the crown and New Granada, whether through persistence or more fortunate timing, the fact remains that this reform seemed to overlook the problem of contraband entirely. Primarily, the contraband trade was still a rampant issue in New Granada during this reform. As examined in the previous chapter, it was pretty clear that the

[32] Ibid., 50-51.
[33] Ibid., 50.
[34] Ibid., 51.
[35] Ibid., 51.
[36] Ibid., 52.

crown and the viceroys knew that the contraband trade existed. Plus, the contraband trade of precious metals was still somewhere between fifty to seventy-five percent of the total production of precious metals in New Granada. In other words, it was quite possible that these new silver mines would have only added more to the contraband trade, which would have given detrimental results. The remote location of these mines also adds to this idea: the lack of sufficient infrastructure, plus the lack of sufficient military manpower to police what little infrastructure existed in the interior, made it easy for the contraband trade to thrive. Typically, producers would either sell their products to smugglers directly, or sell their products to merchants who would ultimately export their goods to foreign merchants. Because the interior region of New Granada was remote and mountainous, it was easy to smuggle goods in either manner. Regardless, while the revenues earned from the silver mines might have allowed New Granada to improve its infrastructure, the unsatisfactory production results that these mines gave in 1791 up until 1795 demonstrate that they would not have been as profitable as was initially anticipated.[37] In other words, New Granada was still plagued by a financial dilemma; New Granada was poor and neglected, yet investment in new production sectors seemed to bring unsatisfactory, if not detrimental, results.

One other good that was not as prominent in the economy of New Granada, yet prominent in the contraband trade, was platinum. Platinum was a newly discovered metal that was virtually unknown prior to the 18th century. In fact, when platinum was discovered in large quantities around 1740, the metal was more of a headache than a blessing, since it was found in large quantities inside gold mines, particularly in the Chocó province.[38] Ironically enough, the

[37] Ibid., 52-53.
[38] Luís Fermín Capitán Vallvey, "Export and Smuggling of Spanish Platina in the Eighteenth Century," *Annals of Science 53, no. 5* (1996), 467-468.

discovery of platinum happened primarily because of the growing desperation for gold.[39] However, platinum only served as a means of debasing gold during this time.[40] Because of this, some gold mines with large amounts of platinum were closed, since it was difficult to separate, and legal authorities began punishing those who smuggled platinum. When it was first discovered, there was no technology that could be used to melt platinum.[41] Since scientists had not yet discovered any meaningful uses, the value of platinum was low. In fact, there were only two real values for platinum up until around 1772; the metal was either used for scientific research purposes, or for private collection purposes.[42] In other words, the amount of platinum that was officially being shipped out of New Granada was small and insignificant; the same held true for any contraband trade of the metal.

The growing interest in gold production fueled the production of platinum, too. The sudden increase in gold discoveries of gold deposits was beneficial to both New Granada and the crown, yet it was also troubling, since platinum was also being discovered in large quantities alongside of it. Despite this, the growing discovery of more gold deposits in the eighteenth-century fueled excitement for more gold production, consequentially creating a higher demand for more labor. Thus, there was a higher demand for more slaves, but as previously mentioned, there was a limited supply of slaves in New Granada. Consequentially, gold producers turned toward smugglers, and would smuggle out gold dust in exchange for slaves.[43] This created a domino effect; more slaves were being imported into New Granada, while these new slave

[39] Kris Lane, "Gone Platinum: Contraband and Chemistry in Eighteenth-Century Colombia," *Colonial Latin America Review* (2011), 64.
[40] Ibid., 61.
[41] Ibid., 61.
[42] Luís Fermín Capitán Vallvey, "Export and Smuggling of Spanish Platina in the Eighteenth Century," 469, 470-471.
[43] Kris Lane, "Gone Platinum: Contraband and Chemistry in Eighteenth-Century Colombia," 67.

workers increased the exportation of gold dust.[44] At the same time, even more platinum was being discovered alongside these new gold deposits. During this time, platinum had little practical uses, and only served as a metal to debase the value of the gold being extracted. Penalties were put in place, usually fines, if one of was caught debasing gold, whether it was intentional or not.[45] In a surprisingly desperate attempt to solve the issue, the crown began sending officials over to these new gold deposits with the sole mission of dumping platinum into rivers, attempting to get rid of it entirely.[46] Of course, there was only so much that the crown could physically do in order to curb the production of platinum alongside gold extraction. However, the growing supply did result in a growing interest in the metal.

In the latter half of the 18th century, significant scientific and industrial advancements had been made regarding usage of platinum. One unique example of the usage of platinum included the invention of a platinum crucible, a scientific tool used to mix metals or other substances at very high temperatures, or they could be used for manufacturing optical glass.[47] Another example includes the creation of an alloy that was used for mirrors in telescopes.[48] By 1787, there were clear and practical uses for platinum. However, many of these scientific and industrial discoveries regarding platinum were taking place in France, not Spain. This meant that peninsular Spain had little demand for the product, since they had no practical use for it. Thus, producers of platinum were left in a strange spot, where they might have earned much larger profits by smuggling the platinum to the highest bidder. Consequentially, the supply of platinum began to maneuver through illegal channels in great quantities.

---

[44] Ibid., 70.
[45] Ibid., 69.
[46] Ibid., 70.
[47] Luís Fermín Capitán Vallvey, "Export and Smuggling of Spanish Platina in the Eighteenth Century," 472-473.
[48] Ibid., 472.

Despite this, Spain attempted to control platinum exportations through a monopoly, the *Casa de la Platina*.[49] While this theoretically would have resulted in Spanish merchants earning huge profits, since supply was high in New Granada, this was not the case. Since the demand was low through the *Casa de la Platina*, the prices were also low. This meant that the platinum producers were receiving very little by selling their platinum to peninsular Spanish merchants. Thus, many platinum producers turned to contraband traders, who paid a much higher price for the product.[50] Many of these merchants were dealing directly with France, where demand, as well as the price, were the highest. Just like the previously mentioned silver mines, many of these mines that contained platinum were located in incredibly remote regions.[51] Again, these remote regions lacked the infrastructure and manpower to successfully catch any acts of smuggling.

The problem that faced Spain regarding platinum was an interesting problem. In this particular case, the problem was not necessarily the taxes or any lengthy trading process, but the problem was that peninsular Spain had little use for the platinum. This made it extremely difficult for platinum producers to not turn to smuggling, since the platinum miners and producers could earn tremendous amounts of money by selling it to smugglers. This type of dynamic is interesting because it demonstrated that New Granada was capable of standing on its own in an economic sense. In other words, New Granada did not necessarily require the economic help of Spain to find a market for platinum. In fact, Spain had little use of platinum, yet New Granada still managed to produce and smuggle it outside of Spanish legal channels. Part of the message that the crown certainly wanted to send to its colonies was that the colonies

[49] Ibid., 477.
[50] Ibid., 476-477.
[51] Ibid., 482.

were reliant on the care given to them by the crown; this rampant contraband trade that benefitted the New Granada delivered a different message.

The contraband trade had influenced many sectors of New Granada. One of the most important contraband goods were slaves. While slaves were not necessarily in the highest demand in New Granada, the promotion of the slave trade through *comercio libre de negros* emphasized a crown-sponsored desire for a larger export-oriented economy. Ironically enough, certain reforms, like *comercio libre de negros*, seemed to hinder progress in fighting the contraband trade, as it gave foreign merchants an easy channel in which to smuggle goods. Similar practices occurred with the trade of the grain, where merchants would bring more grain than they were permitted, or sometimes hide other goods inside the barrels, namely textiles. Of course, New Granada had various goods that foreign powers desired themselves. An exorbitant amount of precious metals were estimated to be smuggled out of New Granada, as well as platinum. These sectors were incredibly difficult to monitor, as they were fixed in remote locations. It was clear that New Granada was in a very difficult situation; they needed resources, infrastructure and manpower in order to combat the contraband trade, but New Granada also had difficulty mustering together these resources, due in part to the difficulty of enacting proper policy to counteract the contraband trade.

La sociedad y el contrabando

La sociedad de Nueva Granada fue influida muchísimo por el comercio ilícito. Varias partes de esta sociedad experimentaron esta influencia incluyendo la ciudad de Cartagena, los militares en Cartagena y Nueva Granada y la provincia de Riohacha. Estos lugares o personas tenían una falta de varios bienes, pero los poderes extranjeros los tenían. También, Nueva Granada tenía varios bienes que los poderes extranjeros necesitaban, específicamente productos de los guajiros, un grupo de gente indígena, en la provincia de Riohacha. En otras palabras, en Nueva Granada, había dificultades en la sociedad; la falta de bienes, personas militares, recursos militares y de dinero. Con estos temas, la influencia del comercio ilícito en Nueva Granada creó un dilema en Nueva Granada; podía combatir el contrabando, y los colones tenía una falta de bienes útiles, o no combatió el contrabando, e ilegitimó la autoridad de la corona.

Durante el siglo XVIII, uno de las ciudades más importantes en Nueva Granada era Cartagena. Esta ciudad era un puerto marítimo, y era útil para el tráfico de los bienes en Nueva Granada. También, Cartagena era importante por razones militares; estaba situado en un lugar central del caribe. Es decir, Cartagena era uno de los puertos más importantes en Latinoamérica para la Corona.[1] Como consecuencia, Cartagena era uno de los puertos más interesantes para los poderes extranjeros, específicamente, el Reino Unido. La influencia del Reino Unido era muy fuerte por varias razones. Las colonias del Reino Unido estaban en lugares centrales del caribe, como el puerto de Jamaica. También, en general, el Reino Unido tenía una economía más fuerte de España. Es decir, la industria del Reino Unido, además los recursos naturales útiles, eran más fúerte que España. Por ejemplo, Jamaica recibió mucha harina de Pennsylvania, uno de los

[1] Allan J. Kuethe, *Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808* (University Presses of Flordia, 1978), 15.

regiones más fuertes para la producción de harina.[2] Pues, Jamaica tenía una excedentes de harina, y los mercantes de Jamaica la reexportaron.[3] Se explora esta dinámica más a fondo en este texto. Por supuesto, este interés fue mostrado por la influencia del Reino Unido y otros poderes extranjeros, porque el comercio ilícito, o el contrabando, influyó la economía de Cartagena muchísimo.

Cartagena era una ciudad en la costa norte de Nueva Granada, y estaba en un lugar central del caribe, además de las colonias de Suramérica. La posición de Cartagena para el interior de Nueva Granada, además otras colonias cercas como Perú, promovía su importancia y su desarrollada.[4] Primero, el área de Cartagena creyó un puerto natural; los movimientos de los corrientes creyeron bahías ideales para el comercio. Eso promovió la desarrollada de la ciudad de Cartagena muy temprana, en el siglo XVI.[5] Además, los vientos creyeron una ruta del comercio de marina muy efectiva.[6] Es decir, que el comercio era muy importante en la habitación de Cartagena. Por eso, mucha de la habitación de Cartagena era mercantes durante el siglo XVI y XVII.[7] En el siglo XVIII, la población de Cartagena era 16.000 personas, y muchas todavía eran mercantes, pero no como en los siglos pasados. Pero, había mucha tensión racial en Cartagena; diez por ciento de la población eran blancas, y el resto de la población eran mestizos, mulatos y negros. Típicamente, ellos trabajaron por soldados, obreros físicos, pulperos, barqueros, artesanos o esclavos.[8] Mucha de la gente blanca era la élite en Cartagena, y como consecuencia, había una gran disparidad del dinero.[9] Es decir, la ciudad de Cartagena era muy

[2] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997), 177.
[3] Ibid., 177.
[4] Ibid., 103.
[5] Ibid., 106.
[6] Ibid., 104-105.
[7] Leopoldo Landaeta, *El comercio y la navegación entre España y las Indias en época de los Habsburgos*, (París 1939), 124.
[8] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling*, 106.
[9] Ibid., 105-106.

segregada, aun entre la gente blanca y el resto de la población. Eso agravaba el problema del contrabando; la gente pobre necesitaba los bienes más baratos para sobrevivir, y los contrabandos eran más baratos que los bienes lícitos. Además, las élites en Cartagena querían sus propios bienes, y si pudieran comprarlos más baratos, lo haría. Es decir, toda de la sociedad participaron en el comercio ilícito, pero la gente pobre fue perseguida más que la gente élite.[10]

Por supuesto, la sociedad de Cartagena tenía una actitud positiva sobre el contrabando. Es decir, mucha gente en Cartagena durante esta época estaba dependido en el comercio ilícito. Estos bienes no necesariamente eran bienes de lujos; muchas veces, los bienes contrabandados eran útil para vivir. La dependencia de los colones en Cartagena fue mostrada en 1737, cuando un oficial de marina, Blas de Lezo, iba al porto de Cartagena por la primera vez. Cuando él llegó por la primera vez, inmediatamente, él dijo que la bahía de Cartagena estaba bloqueada por navíos contrabandados extranjeros.[11] Claro, cuando él, con sus navíos de marina de la Corona, llegó a la bahía de Cartagena, él pensaba que los navíos contrabandados extranjeros saldrían de la bahía. Pero, a los contrabandistas no les importaban los navíos de la Corona, y no salieron de la bahía cuando se dieron cuenta de que los navíos de Lezo eran de marina de la Corona. En otras palabras, los contrabandistas no tenían muchas dificultades para hacer el comercio ilícito, aunque su comercio fuera ilegal.

Antes del llegado de Blas de Lezo, la defensa de la costa en Nueva Granada tenía varios problemas. En el siglo XVII, había una armada, la Armada de Barloventa, que protegía el comercio y el agua española en el caribe.[12] Esta armada existía hasta el año 1749, pero en realidad, la armada no funcionaba buena.[13] Es decir, que la armada era muy ineficiente para

[10] Ibid., 106.
[11] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling*, 160.
[12] Ibid., 150.
[13] Ibid., 150.

combatir el contrabando ni defender la costa. Como consecuencia, la corona enfocó en ideas nuevas para defender la costa. Pues, la corona invirtió más en la Guardia de la Costa en 1713.[14] La Guardia de la Costa existía antes de eso, pero no hizo mucho. Es decir, la corona quería que la Guardia de la Costa tenía un papel más activa en el combate del contrabando y de la defensa de la costa. Al principio, el nuevo papel de la Guardia de la Costa funcionó bien. En 1716, el Capitán Jorge José Corez, el nuevo oficial de la Guardia de la Costa, ganaba premios que costaron, totalmente, 200.000 pesos.[15]

Después, la fuerza de la nueva Guardia la Costa disminuyó por siete años. En 1719, Jorge Villalonga era el primer virrey de Nueva Granada. Pero, Virrey Villalonga estaba involucrado en el comercio ilícito.[16] Es decir, él tenía conflicto de intereses; en realidad, parte de su trabajo era la imposición de la ley de la corona, y una parte de eso era el combate del contrabando. Sin embargo, él hizo su trabajo en maneras interesantes. Por ejemplo, en 1721 él solicitó a la corona por la comisión de diez navíos para la Guardia de la Costa. Por otro mano, en 1723, la corona solicitó al Virrey Villalonga para la construcción de dos navíos pequeñas para la Guardia de la Costa, y Virrey Villalonga lo rechazó.[17] Claro, había diferencia entre las dos solicitaciones, pero la actitud de Virrey Villalonga cambió por alguna razón. Al principio, parecía que tenía actitud de hostilidad en contra del contrabando. Al final, parecía que era desobediente de los órdenes de la corona. En otras palabras, la negligencia de Virrey Villalonga revirtió el progreso de la Guardia de la Costa. Durante los años de Virrey Villalonga, la Guardia de la Costa sola cogió cinco navíos de contrabando, y solo ganaba 6.000 pesos.[18] Virrey Villalonga era un ejemplo interesante de la corrupción en la administración de Nueva Granada.

[14] Ibid., 151.
[15] Ibid., 152.
[16] Ibid., 154.
[17] Ibid., 154.
[18] Ibid., 154.

Obviamente, él era el primer virrey de Nueva Granada, pero también su experiencia demostró la extensión del comercio ilícito en la sociedad de Nueva Granada; él era un ejemplo de la élite en Nueva Granada.

Cuando Virrey Jorge Villalonga salió de la oficina, otra vez, había progreso en la fuerza de la Guardia de la Costa. Durante los años 1724 hasta 1729, había varios comandantes de la Guardia de la Costa en Nueva Granada. Uno de los comandantes importantes durante esta época era Domingo Justiniani, en el diciembre de 1729. Él y su escuadra estableció los estándares para la Guardia de la Costa por el resto del siglo XVIII. También, Justiniani recibía mucho poder, en que él tenía control total de su flota. Antes de eso, los gobernadores u otros oficiales podían cambiar su dirección.[19] Con su poder, él tenía varias oportunidades para capturar muchos navíos por trente meses; él y su escuadra capturaron siete navíos, y ganaba 337.000 pesos. Pero, eso no era suficiente para la corona, porque la corona invirtió 562.000 pesos para Justiniani y su escuadra, pero la corona sola recibió 112.000 pesos, un tercio de las ganancias de Justiniani.[20] Por consiguiente, la corona suspendió la misión de la Guardia de la Costa, porque no era sustentable económicamente.

En vez de la Guardia de la Costa, la corona invirtió en otro método para reducir el contrabando. Bartolomé Tiende de Cuervo, el contable de la tesorería de Cartagena, insistía en la erección de fortalezas militares junto de la costa de Nueva Granada, específicamente en las regiones de Cartagena, Santa Marta y Riohacha. Esta situación era muy interesante, porque la Tienda de Cuervo era un hombre sospechoso; la corona había sabido que él era corrupto. Pero, él insistía que la corona debía enfocar en las fortalezas y el ejército, no de la Guardia de la Costa,

[19] Ibid., 157.
[20] Ibid., 158.

para combatir el contrabando.[21] Aunque Tienda de Cuervo fuera una persona sospechosa, la corona empezaba a invertir más en las fortalezas juntas de la costa. La idea de Tienda de Cuervo probablemente era que las fortalezas juntas de la costa protegerían la costa en los lugares más escondidos, en que la Guardia de la Costa no podían patrullar. Era obvio que la corona estaba desesperada para resolver el problema del contrabando, porque la idea de Tienda de Cuervo era una idea ridícula. En realidad, Tienda de Cuervo probablemente tenía intenciones ocultas, pero no se sabía estas intenciones. Sin embargo, la costa todavía tenía fortalezas junto de la costa, según de varios mapas de la costa de la provincia de Cartagena. Claro, las fortalezas sirvieron por defensas contra de las amenazas extranjeras, como invasiones, pero funcionaban por puestos remotos también. Era obvio que la Guardia de la Costa funcionaba mejor para patrullar la costa, porque los navíos podían examinar un área de agua grande, además persiguieron los navíos de contrabando. Como consecuencia, la corona suspendió la operación de Tienda de Cuervo en 1733, y en 1737, la corona, otra vez, invertía en la Guardia de la Costa, y mandó a un comandante famoso, Blas de Lezo, a Cartagena.



Figure 3-1. AGI, Mapas y Planos 117, *Plano de la Ciudad y Puerto de Cartagena de Yndias, con la situación de la Armada Francesa que la saqueó y destruyó en 1697*, el 24 de septiembre de 1697.

[21] Ibid., 159.

La tarea de Blas de Lezo en Cartagena era restablecer la Guardia de la Costa en Cartagena, y la región alrededor. Claro, la Corona entendió que el problema del comercio ilícito era grave, pero Blas de Lezo no lo entendió antes de su llegada a la bahía de Cartagena. Por supuesto, él entendió que necesitaba más ayuda que tenía, y solicitó más ayuda a la audiencia real. Para enfatizar la gravedad de la situación, él citó que el setenta-y-cinco por ciento de la producción del oro de Nueva Granada estaba contrabandeado fuera de la colonia.[22] Es difícil saber si este número era correcto, pero había evidencia que, por lo menos, el cincuenta por ciento de la producción del oro de varias minas estaban contrabandeados.[23] Desde entonces, los oficiales militares del puerto de Cartagena querían aumentar el tamaño de la Guardia de la Costa, y solicitaron la corona para seis navíos más. Claro, la corona apoyaba esta idea, pero la corona insistía que no tenía el dinero para esta solicitación. Esta solicitación habría costado más de 1.300.000 pesos, solamente para la construcción de los navíos.[24]

También, Blas de Lezo solicitó la ayuda de los oficiales locales. La situación de Lezo dictaba que tenía el poder para usar los fondos locales de Cartagena. Es decir, él podía solicitar fondos de los oficiales del gobierno de Cartagena, y también, de los mercantes de Cartagena. Cuando Lezo solicitó al gobierno local para los fondos, el gobierno se negó, diciendo que no tenía fondos suficientes.[25] Eso probablemente era verdad, porque Nueva Granada, por no hablar de Cartagena, era una de las colonias más descuidadas en América Española. Es decir, Nueva Granada no tenía los fondos, y no tenía infraestructura buena. También, la presencia de Blas de Lezo no fuera necesaria si Cartagena podría resolver el problema del contrabando con sus fondos. Sin embargo, Lezo solicitó a la ayuda de los mercantes de Cartagena. Pero, ellos se negaron

---

[22] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru* (Lousiana State University Press, 1990), 142.
[23] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling*, 160-161.
[24] Ibid., 153.
[25] Ibid., 161.

también, diciendo que ellos también no tenían los fondos para pagar los marineros ni navíos nuevos. Por otro mano, había evidencia que ellos se negaron su solicitación; ellos invirtieron en una compañía de corsarios, que irónicamente, fue formado del gobernador de Cartagena. Claro, esta compañía no era ilegal, pero era interesante que el gobernador tenía más interés en una compañía de corsarios, aunque él insistiera que la Guardia de la Costa podía combatir el comercio ilícito y restablecer la economía de Cartagena y la defensa de la costa de Nueva Granada.[26] Por otro mano, si hubiera una Guardia de la Costa fuerte, habría menos navíos para los corsarios; es decir, que las preocupaciones de los mercantes eran válidas. Claro, ellos querían maximizar sus beneficios.

Sin embargo, la compañía del gobernador y las operaciones de Blas de Lezo estaban dirigidos al mismo tiempo. Irónicamente, ellos tenían los mismos problemas; los dos necesitaban suministraciones, navíos y marineros. Por supuesto, los dos solicitaron a la Corona para más suministraciones y navíos, pero la Corona no podía suministrar todo lo que querían.[27] Cuando estaban esperando las suministraciones de la Corona, la compañía buscaba navíos que podían usar en la Habana. Desafortunadamente, la compañía no podía encontrar lo que necesitaba, pero irónicamente, la compañía fue a Jamaica, una isla del Reino Unido. Allí, la compañía encontró dos navíos pequeños que quería.[28] Otra vez, esta situación era muy irónica; en una manera, la compañía estaba combatiendo el comercio ilícito con las acciones de corsarios. Pero, la compañía compró unos navíos del Reino Unido, o navíos extranjeros. También, los mercantes del Reino Unido eran uno de los antagonistas principales del comercio ilícito. Eso se muestra la influencia profunda que tenía el Reino Unido en el mercado de Nueva Granada.

[26] Ibid., 161-162.
[27] Ibid., 163-164.
[28] Ibid., 163.

Por supuesto, dos navíos no eran suficientes para una compañía que estaba combatiendo varios navíos de contrabando. Normalmente, los navíos de contrabando estaban en grupos de seis o más. En menos de dos años, la compañía se falló, pero Blas de Lezo continuó su propia operación. Al mismo tiempo, Lezo expandió su propia escuadra; tenía ocho navíos. Con esta escuadra, Lezo tenía una fuerza relevante en contra del comercio ilícito. Por eso, la Guardia de la Costa bajo Lezo produjo resultados, pero realmente, eso era sola en la región inmediatamente alrededor de Cartagena. Nueva Granada tenía una costa muy larga, y muchas partes de la costa tenían puertos naturales. Es decir, los contrabandistas no necesitaban atracar en el puerto de Cartagena. Como consecuencia, Lezo necesitaba enfocar en varias regiones si quería combatir el comercio ilícito.

Como resultado, Blas de Lezo y su escuadra empezaba a patrullar otras regiones. Específicamente, patrulló la región alrededor de Portobello. Allí, él y su escuadra combatieron el comercio ilícito muy efectivamente. Pero, el comercio ilícito aumentó en la región alrededor de Cartagena.[29] Realmente, eso era inevitable, porque la magnitud del contrabando era enorme. Lo que necesitaba la Corona para combatir el contrabando era más suministraciones, navíos y marineros. Pero, obviamente, la Corona no los tenía, y Lezo todavía tenía su propia tarea para reducir el volumen del comercio ilícito. Los intentos de Lezo eran muy efectivos; las regiones en que Lezo y su escuadra patrullaron, el comercio ilícito disminuyó. Pero, oficiales de marina efectivos como Blas de Lezo no eran comunes, y como consecuencia, no podía combatir el contrabando en todo de la Nueva Granada efectivamente.

Aunque Blas de Lezo disminuyó el comercio ilícito en Portobello en maneras efectivas, eso no significó que la región prosperara. De verdad, el opuesto ocurrió; de repente, Portobello no tenía la comida que recibieron por el comercio ilícito. Irónicamente, oficiales del pueblo

[29] Ibid., 165.

solicitaron a Lezo para "comestibles", porque los contrabandistas de Francia, el Reino Unido y la República Holandesa los suministraron antes de las patrullas de la Guardia de la Costa.[30] Claro, Lezo no podía suministrar los comestibles tampoco, especialmente porque él y su escuadra tenía su propia falta de harina.[31] Para resolver este problema, Lezo y su escuadra regresaron a la región de Cartagena, para que los canales del comercio ilícito pudieron reabrir. Otra vez, el dilema sobre el combate del comercio ilícito era complicado. La Corona quería combatir el contrabando, y en este caso, había una presencia de la Guardia de la Costa que lo hacía eficientemente. Pero, eso no significó que los colones estaban satisfechos; de verdad, sus propias prosperidades se disminuyeron. La falta de las suministraciones, como la falta de harina, dificultó la situación de Portobello.[32] En este caso, la agitación de los colones prevaleció sobre las acciones contra del comercio ilícito.

Cartagena tenía un problema similar; las suministraciones del grano y de la harina eran muy pocas, entre otras cosas.[33] Eso era un problema grave, porque la población de Cartagena no tenía acceso a los comestibles. Pero, no solo era un problema de los colones en Cartagena; los militares que estaban en Cartagena no tenían acceso a la comida, incluyendo la Guardia de la Costa. Por eso, la Corona entendió que sus sometidos no podían vivir sin comida, y como consecuencia, hubo algunos asientos del comercio para que Cartagena pudiera obtener una suministración de grano suficiente. Pero, eso contradijo a la tarea de Lezo y la política de la Corona en general. La ley insistía que navíos anclados o navíos navegados en rutas sospechosas debían ser aprehendidos por la Guardia de la Costa. También, la ley insistía que los navíos

[30] Ibid., 165.
[31] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 143.
[32] Ibid., 165.
[33] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 125.

británicos que tenían bienes contratados eran legales.[34] El problema era que no era posible distinguir los navíos que tenían bienes contratados de los navíos contrabandistas. Este tecnicismo dificultaba el progreso del combate contra del contrabando, y también, ayudaba los britanos en el comercio ilícito.

Normalmente, los contratos, o los asientos, entre los colones españoles y el Reino Unido legalizaron el comercio de harina, o de esclavos. Pero, por la mayor parte, el producto favorecido en los asientos era la harina. La falta de la harina era muy grave en Cartagena. Mucho del grano que fue producido en Nueva Granada estaba en el interior.[35] Por supuesto, si Cartagena necesitaba el grano del interior de Nueva Granada, los mercantes necesitaban transportarlo. Pero, eso era otro problema consistente de Nueva Granada; la infraestructura de Nueva Granada no era buena, y la economía sufrió por eso. Claro, el terreno de Nuevo Granada, especialmente en el interior, no era fácil para atravesar, pero la falta de infraestructura suficiente agravaba al problema de transportación. Típicamente, la travesía de Cartagena hasta Tunja, una región en el interior que producía mucho grano, duraba cuatro meses.[36] Como resultado, mucho del grano durante las travesías expiró, aunque los mercantes no tenían una suministración suficiente del grano para Cartagena cuando empezaron su travesía. Como consecuencia, Cartagena tenía una falta grande de harina, y necesitaba buscar otras formas para suministrarla. La falta de harina era muy grave; había algunas veces en que el precio de la harina era 2.000 por ciento más alto de que lo debía. Obviamente, la población de Cartagena no podía pagar estos precios muy altos, pues Cartagena necesitaba satisfacer la demanda por otra manera. Eso era el papel del Reino Unido en el comercio de la harina; el Reino Unido suministró la que no tenía Cartagena.

---

[34] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling*, 165.
[35] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 140.
[36] Ibid., 140.

Otra vez, Cartagena y la Corona tenían un dilema grave. En Cartagena, había una falta de la harina, especialmente para la Guardia de la Costa. Claro, la Corona quería aumentar la presencia de la Guardia de la Costa en Nueva Granada para combatir el contrabando. La Guardia de la Costa hacía resulta buena, pero al mismo tiempo, había una falta de varios bienes, especialmente la harina para la Guardia de la Costa y Cartagena. Por eso, había asientos que permitieron los mercantes británicos al acceso del mercado de la harina en Cartagena; eso era útil por la Guardia de la Costa para los objetivos de la Corona, porque no debía tener militares enojados. También, en las mentes de los colones, eso era interesante; ¿por qué la Corona quería combatir el comercio del contrabando, pero el contrabando beneficiaba a los colones? La Corona insistía que los colones estaban dependidos de la protección de la Corona, pero el comercio del contrabando promovía otro mensaje. Es decir, la influencia del comercio del contrabando de poderes extranjeros retó la legitimidad de la Corona en Cartagena, porque el combate del comercio ilícito mostró el dilema grave entre la ley de la Corona y la realidad.

El impacto de la Guardia de la Costa en Cartagena y sus inmediaciones estaba discutido mucho por Lance Grahn. Grahn exploraba los impactos del comercio ilícito en la política de Nueva Granada, además la relación entre la sociedad y el comercio ilícito. Otro historiador, Allan Kuethe, exploraba los cambios de los militares en Nueva Granada, y los impactos en la autoridad de la Corona y el virrey de Nueva Granada. Pero, Kuethe no exploraba la Guardia de la Costa y sus cambios en su texto *Military Reform and Society in New Granada*, ni en sus capítulos en el libro *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*. Por otro mano, Grahn exploraba la evolución de la Guardia de la Costa y su impacto en el comercio ilícito en su libro *The Political Economy of Smuggling*. Es interesante que Grahn estudió la Guardia de la Costa, pero Kuethe no la estudió, aunque la Guardia de la Costa fuera parte de la militar de

España y Nueva Granada. Claro, los dos autores enfocaron en dos temas y conclusiones diferentes. Grahn insistía que la Guardia de la Costa recalcó el dilema del comercio ilícito en Nueva Granada. Kuethe exploraba la relación entre los cambios militares y la autoridad de la Corona, y si la autoridad de la Corona consolidó con las reformas militaras. Los dos historiadores tenían ideas semejantes, pero Kuethe no exploraba los impactos de la Guardia de la Costa en la autoridad de la Corona, aunque Grahn insistía que la Guardia de la Costa demostró el dilema entre la ley y realidad. Era posible que la Guardia de la Costa podría aumentar la autoridad de la Corona, si la Guardia de la Costa recibiera fondos y suministraciones suficientes. La Guardia de la Costa redujo el comercio ilícito durante algunos años, pero sus misiones costaron mucho y la Corona no podía sostenerla.[37]

Otra región muy relevante con el tema del comercio ilícito era Riohacha. En Nueva Granada, la provincia de Riohacha fue considerada parte de la frontera. Durante este tiempo, había una población muy pequeña, o por lo menos, tenía una población de colones españoles muy pequeña. La mayor parte de la población en la provincia de Riohacha era la gente indígena, específicamente, los guajiros. Era difícil saber exactamente cuantos guajiros estaban en la provincia de Riohacha, pero en 1776, la población de los españoles era 4.000 personas.[38] Por otra mano, estaba aproximado que había 16.000 hasta 40.000 Guajiros en la provincia de Riohacha.[39]

Los guajiros eran fascinantes porque eran un grupo de personas en Nueva Granada que vivieron independientes de la Corona. Cuando los españoles empezaron a colonizar la región de Nueva Granada, los Guajiros adoptaron una vida en que podían vivir independiente de los españoles. Los españoles trataban de convertir los Guajiros al catolicismo, pero los Guajiros

[37] Lance Raymond Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling*, 182.
[38] Ibid., 36.
[39] Ibid., 37.

resistían por muchos siglos. Era fácil mantener su independencia porque adoptaron una vida pastoral, en que cuidaban las reses, los caballos, las mulas y las cabras.[40] También, los Guajiros recogieron la perla, el palo de Brasil y la sal. Es decir, los guajiros tenían su propia estructura de la economía, y por eso, los poderes extranjeros tenían interés en ellos.

En el caso de los guajiros en Riohacha, los colones holandeses, específicamente los en Curazao, tenían muchas conexiones con ellos. Claro, los holandeses en Curazao necesitaron varios bienes para sobrevivir, como la comida o la ropa. Los guajiros tenían un mercado excelente para los holandeses; en realidad, la provincia de Riohacha era relativamente cerca de Curazao. También, los guajiros tenían varios ganados; ellos podían servir como comida, la crianza de más ganados o cuero. Aun mejor, los Guajiros tenían los bienes lujosos, como la sal o la perla. La sal era útil para la preservación de la carne, y las perlas eran valerosas. Es decir, el mercado de los guajiros era muy relevante para los holandeses. Sin embargo, el mercado de los holandeses era útil para los guajiros, también; los holandeses tenían las armas modernas, y la munición para estas armas.[41] Además, los guajiros necesitaban las armas para proteger su cultura y su economía en contra de los españoles.[42] En otras palabras, los guajiros y los holandeses tenían una relación de comercio mutual; los holandeses en Curazao necesitaban la comida, el cuero y otros bienes de los guajiros, y los guajiros necesitaban las armas de los holandeses para defender su autonomía.

La relación entre los holandeses en Curazao y los guajiros en la provincia de Riohacha creyeron otro problema grave para los españoles. Obviamente, los guajiros contrabandearon los bienes que, legalmente en los ojos de la Corona, eran parte del sistema español. También, los holandeses vendieron las armas y las municiones a los Guajiros. Esta relación entre los dos retó

[40] Linda Marguerite Rupert, *Creolization and Contraband* (University of Georgia Press, 2012), 190.
[41] Ibid., 190.
[42] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 132-133.

la legitimidad de España otra vez. Los guajiros sobrevivieron como una comunidad independiente de la guía de los españoles, y se podía decir que los guajiros eran más exitosos que los colones en la Riohacha. También, los colones españoles en la provincia de Riohacha necesitaron los bienes de los guajiros también; normalmente, el comercio lícito no pasaba por Riohacha porque no había muchos clientes.[43]

La Corona y algunos virreyes trataba de conquistar los guajiros, como el Virrey Pedro Messía de la Cerda, quien sirvió durante 1761 hasta 1772, o el Virrey Antonio Caballero y Góngora, quien sirvió durante 1782 hasta 1788.[44] El área de Riohacha tenía muchos recursos valerosos, como el palo del Brasil. Por supuesto, la Corona y Virrey Caballero y Góngora querían explotar los recursos de Nueva Granada en cualquier forma se podían. También, el comercio ilícito de los guajiros todavía era un problema. Es decir, la Corona y los virreyes tenían intereses para la pacificación de los guajiros. Pues, Virrey Messía de la Cerda trataba de conquistar los guajiros con 1.000 soldados en la provincia de Riohacha.[45] Cuando los soldados llegaron a la provincia de Riohacha, ellos descubrieron que los guajiros tenían mejoras armas que los soldados, y generalmente, había muchísimo más guajiros que los soldados. Como consecuencia, los soldados se retiraron, porque se dieron cuenta de que no podían pelear con los guajiros.[46] Eso demostró la relación útil entre los guajiros y los holandeses en Curazao; los holandeses intercambiaron los armas para los bienes de los guajiros. Sin las armas de los holandeses, era posible que los españoles conquistaron los guajiros por las excursiones militares. Es decir, la influencia extranjera de los holandeses influyó la relación entre los guajiros, una grupa de indígenas contrabandistas, y la Corona. Era un problema grave porque la Corona

[43] Ibid., 131.
[44] Anthony MacFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 147.
[45] Allan J. Kuethe et al., *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, 37.
[46] Ibid., 38.

quería explotar los recursos de las colonias, o en este caso, los recursos de Riohacha, pero no podía conquistarlos.

Además, había muchos intentos para poblar varias regiones de la provincia de Riohacha, porque era una estrategia alternativa, pero cada intento falló. Varios virreyes trataban de hacerlo, incluyendo José Alonso Pizarro en 1749 hasta 1753, José Solís Folch de Cardona en 1753 hasta 1761 y Manuel Guiror en 1773 hasta 1776.[47] Otra vez, los colones trataban de fijar sus residencias en algunas regiones de la provincia de Riohacha, pero los guajiros los atacaron para preservar su propia tierra.[48] Al final, el Virrey Pedro Mendinueta, quien sirvió en 1797 hasta 1803, concluyó que los españoles necesitaban vivir juntos a los guajiros.[49] En otras palabras, los españoles no podían resolver la presencia y la influencia de los guajiros.

La influencia del comercio ilícito en las sociedades y las comunidades en Nueva Granada. En Cartagena, la falta de la harina y otros bienes promovía a la influencia de los poderes extranjeros. Eso era un dilema para los españoles, porque sus colones necesitaban estos recursos para sobrevivir, pero todavía este comercio promovía el contrabando. La Guardia de la Costa trataba de reducir el comercio ilícito, y los colones sufrieron faltas de comestibles. En la provincia de Riohacha, los Guajiros sobrevivieron independientes de los españoles. Sus culturas y economías prosperaron separadamente de los españoles, y también, intercambiaron con otros poderes extranjeros. Como consecuencia, los Guajiros, los poderes extranjeros y los contrabandistas en Cartagena retaron a la legitimidad de la Corona.

[47] Ibid., 132.
[48] Ibid., 38.
[49] Ibid., 132-133.

Conclusion

For its entire lifespan, the Viceroyalty of New Granada was constantly facing the dilemma of smuggling. In New Granada, the contraband trade had manifested itself as an integral part of the economy, to the point where it was difficult to live without the contraband trade. Without the contraband trade, there would have been an intolerable lack of necessary goods. At the same time, the contraband trade in New Granada hurt the coffers of the crown as well as the treasury of the viceroyalty. The crown and viceroyalty tried the implementation of various policies in order to resolve some of the problems regarding the contraband trade. Some of these policies benefitted the crown tremendously, such as the monopolies which filled the coffers quite well. Other policies that aimed to curb the contraband trade itself failed to deliver satisfactory results, such as the investment in the coast guard. While the coast guard certainly did reduce the volume of the contraband trade, the crown itself was losing far more funds than what it was gaining back from deterring the contraband trade, which made it hard to sustain the efforts. Plus, many coast guard or other military personnel indulged in the contraband trade themselves, simply because they had to in order to live.

The contradictory nature of the crown's policy toward the contraband trade made it difficult to enforce. The crown insisted that the contraband trade was detrimental to the colonial economy and needed to be curbed, yet foreign goods were necessary at times in New Granada. This contradiction was especially true with the *asiento* and *comercio libre de negros*. While these policies were intended to give New Granada and other colonies the legal means of obtaining a steady supply of slaves and grain, these policies also gave foreign ships the right to dock and conduct business in Spanish colonial ports. While the foreign ships contractually obligated to only conduct specific business, this did not stop them from attempting to smuggle in

other goods. The crown was acknowledging the need for specific foreign products, while simultaneously discrediting the contraband trade.

With more time, further examination into specific contrabandists would have been beneficial. Specifically, research into the businesses of those who held positions of power in New Granada, such as Viceroy Jorge de Villalonga, could be interesting additions to understanding the role of the ruling elite on the contraband trade. Additionally, a closer examination of more goods, such as cacao and tobacco, would be helpful for understanding the economy of New Granada. Both were prominent exports in New Granada and were in high demand throughout Europe and the Americas.

Future research into contraband should attempt to examine the lower classes of urban society in New Granada. The case of the Guajiro Native Americans is important in understanding the ways in which the contraband trade directly challenge the authority of the crown, and it also shines light on a culture group that has often been overshadowed in history. However, there were still a high number of freemen, Native Americans or mestizos in the urban regions of New Granada, specifically Cartagena. These people also lived in a society of the contraband trade, and their roles or impacts should be examined if the information is available.

The contraband trade in New Granada was an important piece of the puzzle in understanding its history. The dilemma that the crown faced regarding the contraband trade was persistent. The contraband trade was so engrained into the culture and society of New Granada, that licit and illicit trade should not have been distinguished from one another. Of course, the crown wanted its subjects to believe that the contraband trade was against Spanish interests since they were losing tax revenue, but the reality was that the contraband trade typically served the

best interests of the colonists. Different policies were tried in attempting to curb the contraband trade in New Granada, but the contraband trade persisted through the eighteenth-century society.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archivos General de Indias, Audiencia de Santa Fe 541: *Registros: Virreyes de Santa Fe*, 1739-08-20 / 1772-12-08.

Archivos General de Indias, Mapas y Planos 51: *Mapa de la bahía de Cartagena de Indias*, 17 January 1631.

Archivos General de Indias, Mapas y Planos 76: *Mapa de Cartagena de Yndias y de sus inmediaciones*, 1665.

Archivos General de Indias, Mapas y Planos 230: *Mapa de la América Central comprendida entre el Golfo Dulce y Cartagena de Indias, por el Norte entre la Bahía de Fonseca y Panamá por el Sur, 1777.*

Archivos General de Indias, Mapas y Planos 117: *Plano de la Ciudad y Puerto de Cartagena de Yndias con la situación de la Armada Francesa que la saqueó y destruyó en 1697*, 24 September 1697.

Archivos General de Indias, Mapas y Planos 263: *Plano que comprende las obras mandadas executar en la Plaza de Cartagena de Yndias por Real Orden de 12 de Febreo de 1796*, 2 January 1788.

Archivos General de Indias, Mapas y Planos 264: *Mapa de la costa septentrional de América del Sur, desde la Península de Araya, en Venezuela, hasta Portobelo, en Panamá*, 17 April 1629.

Secondary Sources

Aizpurua, Ramon. *Curaçao y la costa de Caracas*. Academia Nacional de la Historia. Caracas: 1993.

Araz, Celestino Andres. *El contrabando Holandes en el Caribe durante la primera mitad del siglo XVIII*. Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1984.

Barbier, Jacques A. "The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787-1792." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 57, no. 1 (1977): 51-68.

Burdette, Hannah. "Literary Contraband: Indigenous Insurgency and the Spatial Politics of Resistance." *Revista Canadiense de Estudios Hispanicos* 39, no. 1 (2014): 273-301.

Elliott, J. H. *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830.* Yale University Press, 2006.

Feliciano Ramos, Hector R. *El contrabando Ingles en el Caribe y el golfo de Mexico, 1748-1778.* 1990.

Feliciano Ramos, Héctor R. "El comercio de contrabando en la costa sur e Puerto Rico (1750–1778)."*Revista/Review Interamericana* 14, no. 1-4 (1984): 80-99.

Grahn, Lance Raymond. *The Political Economy of Smuggling*. Dellplain Latin American Studies. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.

Hamilton, Marsha. "Commerce Around the Edges: Atlantic Trade Networks among Boston's Scottish Merchants."*International Journal of Maritime History* 23, no. 2 (Dec 1, 2011): 301.

Haring, C. H. *El comercio y la navegación entre España y las Indias en época de los Habsburgos*. París, 1939.

Hinckley, Theodore C. "The Decline of Caribbean Smuggling." *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 5, no. 1 (1963): 107-21.

Karras, Alan L. "Caribbean Contraband, Slave Property, and the State, 1767-1792." *Pennsylvania History* 64 (1997): 250-69.

Klooster, Wim. *Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents*Harvard University Press, 2009.

Kuethe, Allan J. and Lowell Blaisdell. "French Influence and the Origins of the Bourbon Colonial Reorganization." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 71, no. 3 (1991): 579-607.

Kuethe, Allan J. *Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808*. Florida University Press, 1977.

Kuethe, Allan J., Sandra Montgomery Keelan, Juan Marchena Fernández, Jacques A. Barbier, Lance R. Grahn, John R. Fisher, Maurice P. Brungardt, Anthony McFarlane, David Cahill,

and Brian R. Hamnett. *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru.* Louisiana State University Press, 1990.

Lane, Kris E. *Blood and Silver – A History of Piracy in the Caribbean and Central America.* Oxford University Press, 1999.

Lane, Kris E. *Colour of Paradise – The Emerald in the Age of Gunpowder Empires.* Yale University Press, 2010.

Lane, Kris E. "Gone Platinum: Contraband and Chemistry in Eighteenth-Century Colombia." *Colonial Latin American Review* 20, no. 1 (2011): 61-79.

Lane, Kris E. *Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750.* M. E. Sharpe, Inc. New York, 1998.

Mack, Taylor E. "Contraband Trade through Trujillo, Honduras, 1720s-1782." *Yearbook.Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers* 24 (1998): 45-56.

McCarthy, Matthew. *Privateering, Piracy and British Policy in Spanish America, 1810-1830.* 2013.

McCreery, David. "Smuggling and the 'Internal Economy' of Nineteenth Century Brazil: The Case of Goias." *The Americas* 53, no. 3 (1997): 333-51.

McCusker, John J. "Special Section Trade in the Atlantic World." *Business History Review* 79, no. 4 (Winter, 2005): 697-713.

McFarlane, Anthony. *Colombia Before Independence – Economy, Society and Politics Under Bourbon Rule.* Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Mota, Francisco M. *Piratas En El Caribe.* Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba: Casa de las Americas, 1984.

Moutoukias, Zacarias. "Burocracia, contrabando y autotransformación de las élites Buenos Aires En El Siglo XVII." *Anuario IEHS* 3 (January, 1998): 213-48.

Moutoukias, Zacarias. *Contrabando y control colonial en el siglo XVII.* Buenos Aires: Centro Ed. de América Latina, 1988b.

Phelan, John Leddy. *The People and the King – The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781.* University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.

Reichert, Rafal. "El contrabando y sus redes en el golfo de Honduras y su persecución en la capitana general de Guatemala, Siglo XVIII." *Historia Mexicana* 63, no. 4 (2014): 1551-81.

Rupert, Linda M. "Contraband Trade and the Shaping of Colonial Societies in Curaçao and Tierra Firme." *Itinerario* 30, no. 3 (2006): 35-54.

Rupert, Linda M. *Creolization and Contraband.* Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012.

Saguier, Eduardo R. "The Contradictory Nature of the Spanish American Colonial State and the Origin of Self-Government in the Rio De La Plata Region. the Case of Buenos Aires in the Early Seventeenth Century." *Revista De Historia De América*, no. 97 (1984): 23-44.

Sourdis Njera, Adelaida. "Los corsarios del rey: Un aspecto de la lucha contra el trato ilícito en el Caribe durante el siglo XVIII." *Boletín de Historia y Antigüedades* 91, no. 825 (2004): 231-58.

Vallvey, Luis Fermín Capitán. "Export and Smuggling of Spanish Platina in the Eighteenth Century." *Annals of Science* 53, no. 5 (1996): 467-87.

Wortman, Miles. "Bourbon Reforms in Central America: 1750-1786." *The Americas* 32, no. 2 (1975): 222-38.

Zahedia, Nuala. "The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655-1692." *The William and Mary Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (Oct 1, 1986): 570-93.