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Foreign Aid in Haiti



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I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College as a whole.

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Abstract:

This senior paper aims to investigate current theories surrounding foreign aid distribution through the lens of the island nation of Haiti. Applying some parts of these theories to the coffee industry in Haiti, I examine how foreign aid has affected the country of Haiti, and whether or not current theories can successfully explain the country's development. In the French language chapter, I examine the perception of foreign aid practices and native views on non-governmental aid agencies in Haiti through the examination of Haitian newspaper. I looked specifically at the Haitian newspaper, *Haïti en Marche*, a publication based in Port-au-Prince. The focus is upon the cholera epidemic in Haiti and the U.N. fallout after the disease was linked to camps of U.N. peacekeeping soldiers.

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Introduction:

Foreign aid has been a widely discussed issue since its inception nearly a century ago. Most early foreign aid distribution tended to follow a similar formula, with wealthy, developed nations like the United States and western European countries continually giving money to poor, underdeveloped nations in South America and Africa. It was widely believed that these less economically developed nations simply did not have enough money to pull themselves into the next stages of development, so it was up to more economically advanced countries to continue to push money into the economies of less fortunate countries so that they would eventually be able to join the ranks of the wealthy and developed. Today, this theory is often aptly referred to as the "Big Push" theory. It has been argued that this theory simply does not stand the test of time as many economically depressed countries who received aid from foreign agents over the past half century and beyond still rest well below what one could term a developed nation. Aid money is often given as a gift of good will, something that has been offered up to alleviate the suffering of the poor and destitute. In years past, money was also quite frequently used as a geopolitical tool, coming with terms imposed by the donor countries to maintain some semblance of control. Common terms include altering of trade laws to allow more foreign goods to enter the countries that are receiving aid, which often harms local producers who cannot compete with the mass-produced and normally much cheaper imported goods. Expert economists in the field of foreign aid often argue about the best ways to distribute aid money, or if the practice of giving aid money is at all beneficial to those who receive it.

Haiti, an island nation in the Caribbean, is one such country that is used to an influx of foreign aid money. Today, it is often said to be one of the poorest nations in the entirety of the western hemisphere. Natural disasters and an unstable government have caused the country to

become stuck in a seemingly perpetual state of destitution. Due to today's highly technological world, when a catastrophic earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010, the entire world saw the destruction within hours of its occurrence. Aid organizations poured into the country with fresh-faced volunteers to try and alleviate the suffering of those who had seen the horrors of this natural disaster. The 2010 earthquake was not the first natural disaster to tug at the heartstrings of nonprofit groups, nor would it be the last, but it was the catalyst for some of the highest levels of foreign aid to Haiti in recent years. The country was struck with another disaster ten months later when an epidemic of cholera broke out, a disease that had not been seen in Haiti for at least a century. As of February 2017, the epidemic still rages in Haiti with hundreds of new cases being reported every week (Gladstone 3). Investigations into the source of the disease traced it back to a camp of U.N. peacekeeping soldiers from Nepal. This led to a highly publicized series of events in which the U.N. attempted to avoid direct blame for introducing the disease until the U.N. finally issued an apology and announced plans to eradicate the disease in Haiti in late 2017. However, as of March 2017, the U.N. has only been able to raise about only about 2% of the money promised to Haiti (1).

Chapter one of this senior project examines several of today's most hotly contested theories regarding foreign aid through the lens of Haiti. The theories of two economists, Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly, are the basis of the theory chapter. The two offer fairly contrasting views on the subject, and they are two of the more widely read authors on the subject in the world today. Sachs is heavily influenced by the "Big Push" theorists of the mid twentieth century. His theory is based on the idea that poverty is a cycle, and foreign aid is the key to helping poor nations break that cycle. He argues that poor families must receive foreign aid so they are able to invest a bit of money that they would not have previously been able to invest in

bettering their lives. Then and only then will they be able to make better lives for themselves and their future families. On the other hand, William Easterly is much more focused upon small-scale aid that can lead to large scale changes over time. Easterly proposes the distribution of small gifts of aid, sometimes on a scale of simply one village at a time. He also proposes aiding the village or family receiving the gift with the managing of it in such a way that they will be able to invest it into a business that will lead them away from aid dependence. His support for small-scale aid comes in part from his ideas that small-scale gifts of aid are easy to track, therefore making it easy to trace aid from donor to receiver or to see if there are any broken or corrupted links in the ladder of distribution.

Chapter two is an exploration into the history of Haiti's involvement in export farming, with a focus upon the coffee industry. Haiti began as a French plantation colony, with its two biggest exports being sugarcane and coffee beans. Over the years, various factors led to a drastic decline in Haiti's coffee production. Coffee farming is a rather risky business for poor farm families as it can be years before the trees yield any crop that can be harvested for profit, and many farmers have to think about how they will feed their families in the moment. Most poor farmers focus upon short-term subsistence farming, growing crops that may be harvested within the season. The country's history of natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes exacerbates the issue as many unpredictable natural disasters have led to destruction of many years' worth of investments in coffee in a few short hours. Many nonprofit organizations have attempted to revitalize the industry due to the emergence of expensive, fair trade coffee, but even when tools and information are offered for free, it can be difficult to encourage poor Haitians to farm an unpredictable cash crop. The profits that can be made from "designer" coffee are high, but they also come at a fairly high risk because of how volatile world coffee prices are. If overproduction

occurs in any one year due to a competing coffee exporting nation having a larger harvest than expected, coffee prices will plummet and many Haitian farmers could find themselves in the very real scenario of having crops that cost more to harvest than they would be able to sell them for profit.

Chapter 3 is a French language chapter that focuses upon the perceptions of foreign aid agencies in Haiti through the focus of the Haitian newspaper *Haïti en Marche.* It is important to note that Haitians are already fairly wary of outsiders like foreign aid workers, who often live luxurious lives compared to those who are citizens in the countries they come to aid. Foreign aid workers have been stereotyped as opportunists who seem to have made a life of aid work, with many Haitians referring to their own country as a "république des ONG" [republic of Non-governmental agencies]. Many aid workers are transported in expensive cars and are housed in luxury hotels that many Haitians could never afford.

In late 2010, this underlying sense of unease around foreign aid workers exploded into downright mistrust when a cholera outbreak spread like wildfire through the country. After a few months, suspicions ran high as many blamed the United Nations for inadvertently introducing the pathogen into the country. The flames of this proverbial fire would fanned further when a U.N. commissioned report in May 2011 found that many factors, including a lack of natural immunity to cholera, were to blame for the outbreak, rather than admitting that the outbreak was the fault of poor planning on the part of the U.N. Six years and one court case later, the U.N. finally admitted that they were at fault in the cholera epidemic that according to some estimates claimed at least 10,000 lives, but even their promises to eradicate the disease and improve the sanitation systems in Haiti fell on deaf ears as many doubt that the U.N. will be able to come up with the funds to support their proposed work in Haiti.

Chapter 1: Current Foreign Aid Theory: Jeffrey Sachs vs. William Easterly

Understanding the theories behind foreign aid first requires knowing what foreign aid is, as well as knowing about differing views on aid distribution held by expert foreign aid economists. Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly will be the two main developmental economists whose viewpoints will be focused upon in this chapter. Foreign aid can take many forms, like money or goods, and it can be distributed in many ways. Relief aid is often given in the direct aftermath of a catastrophic event, like an earthquake or hurricane. It is usually a mix of cash and goods, providing for the immediate needs of people who are hurt or displaced and it normally does not come with any terms. The other main type of aid is developmental aid that is given to a country over a set period of time. It commonly is given with set terms of use, including implementing plans for economic growth that have been drafted by the donor country or organization. It may come from the government of a wealthier, developed nation such as the United States or one of the many industrialized nations in Western Europe, or it may come from an independent entity, such as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) or charity organization.

> "The standard definition of foreign aid comes from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which defines foreign aid (or the equivalent term, foreign assistance) as financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are (1) designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective (thus excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes); and (2) are provided as either grants or subsidized loans." (Foreign Aid)

It is the sort of aid that can be offered at any time, perhaps in response to a request from an underdeveloped nation or because a more developed nation sees the chance to aid an underdeveloped nation while also catering to its own self-interests.

Another type of aid that will be mentioned in this essay, albeit much more briefly and without an in depth theoretical explanation, is short term humanitarian relief. Short term humanitarian relief aid is usually offered up in response to a natural disaster, such as the aid that was sent to Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami. It may also be sent to relieve temporarily displaced people, much like donations that have been collected for Syrians residing in refugee camps after they fled their war-torn home country. The main difference between more long-term foreign aid and short-term, humanitarian relief aid is that short-term aid is exactly that, short-term. It is collected and distributed as quickly as possible in response to a sudden in event, and its main goal is to relieve and ensure the survival of as many people as possible. The sole purpose of short-term, humanitarian relief aid is to provide a quick fix for an emergency, and it is not intended to be dispersed over a long period of time.

Economist Jeffrey Sachs is one of the main supporters of supplying foreign aid to the poorest of the poor. He argues that the world's poor are stuck in a "poverty trap", and that "at the most basic level, the key to ending extreme poverty is to enable the poorest of the poor to get their foot on the ladder of development...they lack the minimum amount of capital necessary to get a foothold, and therefore need a boost up to the first rung." (Sachs 244) In his 2005 book, *The End of Poverty*, Sachs states that the world's poorest people lack six basic types of capital:

> **"Human capital:** health, nutrition, and skills needed for each person to be economically productive.

Business capital: the machinery, facilities, motorized transport used in agriculture, industry, and services

Infrastructure: roads, power, water and sanitation, airports and seaports, and telecommunication systems that are critical inputs into business productivity

Natural capital: arable lands, healthy soils, biodiversity, and well-functioning ecosystems that provide the environmental services needed by human society

Public institutional capital: the commercial law, judicial systems, government services, and policing that underpin the peaceful and prosperous division of labor

Knowledge capital: the scientific and technological know-how that raises productivity in business output and the promotion of physical and natural capital"


(Sachs 244)

Sachs argues that those stuck in this "poverty trap" require additional help, or they will forever be stuck in this vicious cycle of fighting to retain enough capital for basic survival. He provides three figures to show how someone in a healthy, functioning economy would be able to accumulate capital, how someone stuck in a "poverty trap" economy struggles to even maintain life, and how aid can theoretically help break the "poverty trap" by providing enough additional capital to foster investment.

Figure 1.1 summarizes how saving can help one accumulate capital and stimulate economic growth. Household income goes towards "consumption, taxation, and household savings." (245) in this sort of economy, the people are earning enough money to save a bit of it and invest in something like education for their children. They are also likely to be able to spend more money on consumption. When consumption is increased, the marketplace will grow because more goods are being produced and consumed. The government will then be able to tax

some of the revenue from increased consumption and they will be able to use it to benefit the people. In an economy with a stable government that invests in its people, the government will invest in things like infrastructure and education. The economy as a whole will grow because of the household spending its money in the marketplace as well as the government's investments. Sachs notes that in a healthy economy, even though depreciation and population growth negatively cause capital accumulation to decline, high enough levels of household and government spending tend to keep overall income levels rising (245).

Figure 1.1: The Basic Mechanics of Capital Accumulation




(Sachs, 247)

Figure 1.2 is a representation of a country that exists in Sachs' "poverty trap". All of the household income goes towards maintaining life. People who can barely afford to eat do not have any leftover income to save or to provide tax dollars so that their government can invest in basic infrastructures. Expanding populations and depreciation values of currency continue to grow just like the healthy economy showcased in Figure 1.1, but because no saving or investing is taking place in Figure 1.2, the economy of that nation continues to fall deeper into the never

ending cycle that is the "poverty trap". Each successive generation will continue to be poorer than the generation before them because increasing population growth and depreciation values of currency will mean that the level of capital per person in this economy will decrease at a higher rate each generation, resulting in overall negative levels of economic growth (248).

Figure 1.2: The Poverty Trap




(Sachs, 248)

Figure 1.3 shows what Sachs envisions for a poverty stricken country after they begin to receive aid money from outside their own regular household income. Sachs refers to the aid as ODA: official development aid, such as short term food aid and longer term loans called microfinance that may enable a farmer to purchase a piece of equipment or extra seeds that will allow him to produce more than is needed for subsistence so that he may sell the extra crop for a small profit. ODA can also be offered to the government to support projects that increase infrastructure, such as the building of a road or the creation of a public school for the

household's children (246-9). Sachs states that if "foreign assistance is substantial enough, and lasts long enough, the capital stock rises sufficiently to lift households above subsistence. At that point, the poverty trap is broken." (246)

Figure 1.3: The Role of ODA in Breaking the Poverty Trap



(Sachs, 249)

A basic summary of Sachs' theory on the "poverty trap" states that today's world is more than capable of ending world poverty at some point in the near future. It is simply a matter of supplying the right amount and type of aid to the proper impoverished nations. Once the six areas of capital that poor countries are lacking receive adequate amounts of aid stimulation, it is only a matter of time before these countries are able to lift themselves out of the poverty trap. As previously stated, Sachs has clearly been influenced by the "Big Push" theory that came out of the mid-twentieth century. The "Big Push" theory was first proposed by economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943. This theory basically states that aid is needed in the form of "a high minimum amount of investment to overcome to obstacles to development in an underdeveloped

economy and to launch it in the path of progress." (Bura) Its origins can be traced back to mid-century interests in the economic development of poor African nations, many of which were of interest to wealthier world powers because they had long been European colonies. Rosenstein-Rodan's original theory was based upon three indivisibilities that exist in underdeveloped nations that he stated were the need for a "big push" of outside capital: the indivisibility in the production function, the indivisibility in demand, and the indivisibility in the supply of savings. Indivisibility in the product function can deal with inputs, processes, or outputs that can lead to increasing returns. However, they all require a sufficient amount of social overhead capital like power and transport, industries that are often underdeveloped in economically depressed nations. This then requires a fairly high investment to develop basic infrastructure before a firm can make any additional profit yielding investments, so poor nations require external funding so that they are able to overcome their depressed economy. Rosenstein-Rodan explains the indivisibility of demand or the complementary of demand by stating that a "A large number of industries need to be set up simultaneously so that people employed in one industry consume the output of other industries and thus create complementary demand." Investment must be spread across a plethora of different industries to balance out the economy (Bura). The final indivisibility is the indivisibility in the supply of savings. In an underdeveloped nation like Haiti, the vast majority of people are in a very low income bracket. Haiti is often described as the poorest nation in the western hemisphere, so it is not likely that the average person there would be able to save a portion of their income each month. Investment in overhead capital requires a high volume of savings, but many people cannot afford to save even a portion of their earnings. Therefore, a poor nation would need large donations from outside sources to overcome the indivisibility of savings (Bura).

One article that appeared in the December 2011 issue of *The Economist* discusses Rosenstein-Rodan's original theory and what Jeffrey Sachs has done to expand upon it with his Millennium Development Village Project. Sachs' project aimed to help impoverished nations lift themselves out of the poverty trap "by improving access to clean water, primary education, basic healthcare, sanitation, and other science-based interventions such as improved seeds and fertilizer." ("The Big Push Back" 1) The motto of the project: "no single intervention is enough [...] we must improve them all" is very similar to the basic ideas behind Rosenstein-Rodan's original "Big Push" theory (1). The article points out that by the 1980s, there was no evidence that foreign aid investments as advocated for by the original "Big Push" theory had actually done anything to improve the lives of people who lived in the nations who received aid money and that a lot of the aid money from the middle of the twentieth century was squandered away by corrupt governments. The article also points out how difficult it can be to measure success in Sachs' Millennium Development Villages. The article states that in a developing nation, "you cannot do anything until you do everything" (1) In other words, many developing nations do not have any of the infrastructure that is often taken for granted in developed nations. Before you are able to invest in building a factory or offering seeds and equipment to a farmer, you must invest in building a road system for them to be able to transport their goods. It is essentially impossible for poor nations to accomplish anything alone because "even the simplest of tasks requires a network of other activities and that individual firms cannot organize such a large network, so the state or some other giant agency must step in." (1) Several employees of the World Bank have stated that randomized trials where "a [Millennium Development] village would be paired with a similar one not getting the same help-and the results compared" would be needed to accurately test if Sachs' projects were working (2). Sachs' denies that randomized trials would prove

anything because each village is "too complex and dynamic" (2) to be compared to another village. Further studies are required to accurately measure the effectiveness of Sachs' projects, the article states, but it says something that Sachs did not offer any advice on additional ways to measure the success of the Millennium Development Villages.

One of the other main players in today's discussions about foreign aid is economist William Easterly. He and Sachs are both main voices in modern discussions of developmental economics, but they are very much on opposite sides of the foreign aid argument. In his 2006 book, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*, Easterly remarks upon his relationship with Sachs within the first few pages. "Jeffrey Sachs is an eloquent and compassionate mania am always moved when he speaks. Unfortunately, his intellectual solutions are less convincing… [He] has played an important role in calling upon the West to do more for the Rest...but [his] implementation strategy is less constructive."(Easterly 6)

The main difference between Easterly's ideas behind ending poverty and Sachs' ideas is that Easterly is vehemently against Sachs' support of the "Big Push" theory. The "Big Push" theory basically states that "aid is necessary to finance a 'Big Push' to allow poor countries to escape a 'poverty trap' and climb the ladder toward prosperity." (Easterly, *LA Times*) Easterly refers to two types of developmental economists in *The White Man's Burden*, Planners and Searchers. He refers to those who support traditional foreign aid policy, like Jeffrey Sachs, as the Planners, and those who share a viewpoint closer to his own as the Searchers. "A Planner thinks he already knows the answers; he thinks of poverty as a technical engineering problem that his answers will solve. A Searcher admits he doesn't know all the answers in advance; he

believes that poverty is a complicated tangle of political, institutional, and technological factors." (Easterly 6)

While Easterly recognizes the Planners as doing valuable work by raising awareness about the many people who suffer from extreme poverty, he is heavily critical of their viewpoint that extreme poverty is a cut and dry issue that can be solved by throwing enough money at it. He argues that it is not a question of increasing the amount of money spent on aid, but a question of looking at the problem in a different way. The focus must shift from the big picture to village by village aid, as Easterly states that the Planners have a "total of 449 interventions" (6) to end world poverty with one large plan, but that they lack the local knowledge to aid villages on a case by case basis. He gives the example of supplying malaria medication to children in a rural village, with each dose only costing twelve cents. If the Planners were to tackle the issue, which would not be financially unobtainable with the amount of money they have raised in the name of alleviating poverty, they lack basic information. Along with being "distracted by simultaneously doing the other 448 interventions" (6), they more than likely do not have anyone on site in each village to know exactly how much of the medicine is needed. Coupled with poor communication in rural areas, Easterly argues, the low wages paid to local healthcare providers do not give much incentive to work harder to supply this cheap medicine (7). Easterly states that the Planners try too hard to apply the exact same plan of attack on poverty to a variety of situations, such as this example of trying to use an overly generalized blueprint to distribute a cheap but lifesaving medication to aid those with malaria. They do not have the ability to focus more clearly on each individualized locale because they are trying to implement so many different plans to combat poverty. This leads to many issues in the chain of aid distribution that cost money to fix if they are able to be identified, and many issues may not be identified at all. Even if they were able to

figure out what step of the distribution process was causing a hiccup, the poor communication between a rural village and the headquarters of an NGO implementing a large scale project would make it next to impossible to address. Easterly argues that the Searchers would be able to do a much better job with supplying these theoretical poor children with medication because they would be able to focus on them on a village by village basis. "They [the Searchers] could test whether a specific task had a high payoff for the poor, get rewarded for achieving high payoffs, and be accountable for failure if the task didn't work." (7)

It would not be a stretch to assume that Easterly's way of thinking has been heavily influenced by several economists who came before him, including Friedrich Hayek and Oliver Williamson. Influences from Hayek's *The Use of Knowledge in Society* can be seen throughout Easterly's writing. Hayek stated:

> "*If* we possess all the relevant information, *if* we can start out from a given system of preferences, and *if* we command complete knowledge of available means, the problem which remains is purely one of logic[...]This, however, is emphatically *not* the economic problem which society faces[...]The reason for this is that the "data" from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society "given" to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never be so given.

This is the basic explanation for Hayek's "man on the spot", which states that any one person in the world does not have all of the relevant information on a certain subject at any given time in which to make a decision. The "man on the spot" must make the best decision that he is able to in real time with only information that has been relayed to him at the time. Easterly applies this theory when he stands against the arguments of Jeffrey Sachs. Sachs, who in Easterly's opinion seems to try and apply aid to problems

that are too large to keep track of, does not make a conscious effort to make the best decisions possible in a situation. By switching the focus to smaller, village by village aid, Easterly is more able to take in all of the available information to make the best decision with the available information. In his following example, Easterly applies the idea that it is not possible for one party to be privy to every bit of information to make a decision. Instead, the party should try to make the best possible decision based upon the information that is available to them at the time. Very specific, village by village projects make it much easier to track aid from start to finish, so it should also be simpler to identify issues in the chain of distribution. A "man on the spot" who is running a small, single village aid project will be able to better focus on the information in front of them.

Easterly gives a real world example of a problem that went unsolved by the Planners but was essentially solved on a small-scale by thinking more like a Searcher. Citing the 2005 World Economic Forum, Easterly discusses that many famous political figures, like Bill Clinton, as well as celebrities like Bono, supported the idea of collecting bed nets for the poor. These nets would provide mosquito protection, and keep many poor people from contracting malaria. They did not struggle to raise money to fund the purchasing of the nets was not , argues Easterly, as they were able to raise over a million dollars on the spot from donors. The problem occurred after the money had been raised, as there was no effective plan in place to distribute them. The supply line of these nets was interrupted once they hit the countries where they were needed, either ending up on the black market or simply not being kept in stock at low-cost clinics (13). Distributors in the underdeveloped nations had no incentive to provide the nets to those who needed them the most, which explains why many went to the black market. Black market sales would provide an opportunity for profit, and those who could pay the market demanded price would be the only

ones who would be able to obtain nets when the low-cost clinics were unable to maintain their stock.

Easterly cites a nonprofit called Population Services International that operates like a Searcher. While it received initial aid money from an aid organization, it is now able to operate on its own because of its business model. The poorest residents receive the nets at a cost of $.50, and the wealthier residents of the area pay $5.00 a net. In both cases, the healthcare workers who provide them get to keep a profit of $.09 per net sold. The clinic workers have incentive to continue to order the nets, and the profit from the full priced nets mean that the clinic can afford to offer subsidized pricing to those who cannot afford them otherwise (13). Easterly cites the success of this program from the results of a survey that states that almost all of those who received nets from Population Services International used them compared to only thirty percent of people who received nets from a Planner type agency who gave the nets to people whether or not they sought them out (14). Once again, Easterly argues that the success of the Searchers over the failures of the Planners is showcased based upon the aforementioned study. By spending the time to provide bed nets in a very concentrated, rural area, the Searcher way of thinking was applied by the more successful agency because they took the time to examine each step in the process of distribution as well as make sure the agency would be able to support itself after the initial gift of aid. The onetime gift of aid was able to allow members of poor community to create a self-sufficient business that also manages to serve the needs of the community. It provided additional income for the clinic workers who sold the nets, as well as giving them incentives to make sure the nets continued to be in stock. The other example of an agency that used a Planner's way of thinking, throwing aid at a problem and then stepping away without observing the progress, had a pitifully low success rate according to the study. It was also not a

self-sustaining project, as there was not any creation of jobs in the economy, and it just created another area of the economy where the poorest of the poor would become dependent on aid money as a source of income.

William Easterly is in no way opposed to short-term, humanitarian relief aid in response to a sudden, tragic disaster situation. However, he is opposed to the sort of aid that does not, in his opinion, really seem to accomplish anything. He is against the ideas put forth by Sachs, mainly the idea that the issue of world poverty is a problem that the West can solve with a broad plan and that the only reason we have not yet solved the issue of poverty is that we have not yet put enough aid money towards solving the problem. On the contrary, Easterly argues that the best way to combat the issue of world poverty is to focus upon small-scale, solvable problems. Locating a problem and then following it from issue to resolution is the best way, in Easterly's mind, to make sure the issue is actually addressed as well as making sure there are not large scale squandering of valuable aid money. Weaning people off of aid by creating opportunities for them instead of blindly throwing money will benefit them more in the long run than making them dependent on government aid.

Helping people break away from aid dependency is all about the power of incentive, which was discussed at length by economist Oliver Williamson. Williamson wondered why some transactions took place in the marketplace between firms but others took place within the firm. Contracting between firms in the marketplace can lead to one firm acting opportunistically at the expense of the other firm, leading some firms to the alternative of vertical integration and moving transactions inside the firm. Vertical integration takes away the risk of firms acting opportunistically because theoretically what is good for one part of the firm will be good for the other part of the firm since they are now the same entity. Williamson describes market

transactions as high powered incentives and transactions that occur within the same firm as low powered incentives (Frant 366-67). In the case of foreign aid in a poor country like Haiti, the incentive to choose to work over passively receiving aid is an important concept to understand. If someone is able to passively receive aid without having to expend energy working towards becoming self-sufficient, they will never break away from aid dependency. It is essential that foreign aid agencies incentivize those receiving aid to strive towards self-sufficiency. In the previous example involving Population Services International, Easterly points out that clinic workers who sold bed nets had the incentive to continue to run the organization even after the aid organization stepped back. The clinic workers were able to earn a small profit for each net that they sold, so they were incentivized to keep the clinic well-stocked. Easterly contrasts these well-incentivized workers with poorly paid, largely non incentivized workers in a Planner aid organization. They would not have the same incentives to keep the clinic running, so they would be more likely to passively collect aid and continue to be dependent upon it.

Foreign aid is almost never offered up as a free, no strings attached gift that is given simply out of the goodness of a wealthier country's proverbial heart. It has been proposed by many aid organizations and aid giving countries that the best way to make sure aid is utilized for the "right" purposes is to attach conditionalities onto the aid money. In his 2007 book *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* author Roger Riddell discusses the idea behind these conditionalities. He states that "all aid donors, both official and non-governmental, have an obligation to ensure that the funds they provide are used for the purpose intended, and that they are utilized as efficiently and effectively as possible." (Riddell 235) He discusses one type of conditionality, structural adjustment loans (SALs) that gained popularity in the 1980s. These loans contained varying levels of conditionalities, basically controlling what the governments receiving the loans

would and would not be able to spend the aid money on. Riddell states that these loans placed huge strains on the governments of countries receiving the aid money because of administrative costs, as well as controlling the government spending to the point it negatively impacted the government as no one in the government was learning how to properly budget (237). Looking specifically at the utilization of structural adjustment loans in Haiti in the 1980s, many factors were affected:

> " In plain language, SALs involved reduction in government spending, increasing producer prices (especially those related to cash crops), privatization of state-owned enterprises, deregulation of financial markets, currency devaluation and relaxation on currency controls, liberalization of trade policies, cost recovery of government provided services, and not only overall withdrawal of the state from activities best carried out by market forces but also wholesale rethinking of how goods historically delivered by the state, or regulated by it, because of market failure, could be provided by private actors. SALs also stressed export agriculture over staple food agriculture, based on comparative advantage. " (Gros 976)

Many of the conditionalities imposed upon Haiti can be traced back to the ideologies of the father of modern economics, Adam Smith. By examining some of the theories expressed by Smith in his book, *Wealth of Nations,* one can trace the roots of some of the trade conditionalities imposed upon Haiti that caused many detrimental effects on the island nation's domestic economy.

According to Smith, humans trade because they are intrinsically wired to seek out situations that may allow them to improve their circumstances. Trade is unique to the human species, an evolution that is only undertaken out of one's need to satisfy a need or want.

> "Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages" (Smith, I.2.2).

In its most basic theory, trade will make both parties better off, which is why trade liberalization is so often prescribed as a win-win solution to the problem of poverty. Trade liberalization, in theory, suggests that both the underdeveloped nation and the nation that wishes to give it aid with the conditionality of entering their trade market both have some sort of agricultural item or produced good that the other hopes to obtain. Smith goes on to say that any creation of domestic monopolies will generally only hurt the players involved in the economy. It will also take away some of the free will from the people as they have reduced options for spending their capital.

> "To give the monopoly of the home-market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or hurtful regulation." (Smith IV.2.11)

With open trade, Smith insinuates, the foreign nation will be able to sell more of its good by expanding into a new country's market, and the underdeveloped nation will receive aid as well as opening its country up to receiving a more diverse set of goods than were previously available in the nation. As his book was written almost 250 years ago, of course Smith would not be able to predict the sorts of developmental inequality that would spring up between nations

between his time and the modern age. This then leads one to consider why more modern theories would implement his ideas in a completely different global landscape. However, the sort of win-win ideology that was attached to open trade was active in the aid conditional policies that were being implemented in Haiti in the mid-1980s.

Prior to the liberalization of their ports in accordance with aid conditionalities imposed by the United States, Haiti produced many of its goods domestically because high import tariffs had created a domestic monopoly that protected the livelihoods of small farmers and other local producers in the marketplace. Before 1986, the Haitian government received huge amounts of money from import tariffs from foreign governments as well as protecting the livelihoods of domestic Haitian farmers (Gros 980). Frankly, it was just too expensive for foreign producers to tap into the Haitian marketplace when these high import tariffs were in place, but the opposite was true almost the minute Haiti's ports "opened" due to a vast reduction in import tariffs.

The aid agency behind the decline of the Haitian agricultural industry was the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which mandated a large decrease in foreign import tariffs in 1987 in exchange for foreign aid. Almost immediately, U.S. rice began to flood the Haitian market because the import tariffs were very low compared to the rest of the world. Worldwide, average rice import tariffs hovered around 43.5%, but Haiti was forced to lower its import tariff of 35.5% to 3.5% in the 1980s and then again to just 1.5% in 1995 (Gros 981). Aside from transportation costs, it became almost free for the United States to tap into this new rice market. Rice production by domestic Haitian farmers nearly halved between 1985 and 2005, going from about 170,000 metric tons to only 100,000 tons while U.S. imported rice increased exponentially during the same time frame, going from 7,300 metric tons to 260,000 tons (982). Along with this, the IMF also advised the Haitian government to save money by cutting off the small

subsidies it had been offering to its farmers in the form of extra seeds (981). While Haiti had once produced all most all of its own rice crop before the mid-1980s, a single conditionality caused a significant part of their agricultural production to crumble in less than thirty years.

If this was not enough damage, the prices of rice began to rise significantly all over the world between 2007 and 2008. Haitians, many of whom lived in extreme poverty, had grown used to the cheap imported rice that had become a staple of most diets. They no longer had incentive to produce much of it domestically, so they had no options to obtain nutrition they had previously depended on. At this point, the United States once again stepped in to aid those who they thought could not save themselves, and began to subsidize imported rice to the point it was being given away for free at certain marketplaces around Haiti (983). While it can be argued that this saved the poorest of Haiti's impoverished people from starving, it is also an example of aid dependence. Haiti had become dependent on U.S. rice imports to the point the country was unable to function without them. In the event of a crisis like the increase of rice prices, Haiti once again had to look to a wealthier nation for a hand out.

Jeffrey Sachs argues for increases in foreign aid on a large scale level to eventually help impoverished people in their escape from the "poverty trap." Providing aid in the form of a food subsidy is one way he might suggest helping out a country in need. Looking back to Figure 1.2, he shows that with humanitarian relief like subsidized food, impoverished people will be able to spend a bit of the money that they had previously been forced to spend on basic survival on other goods or investments. As the cycle continues, they will be able to eventually break out of the "poverty trap" once they have accumulated enough capital. The simple graphic of the poverty cycle does not consider other outcomes of heavily subsidized food, which is a significant factor in Haiti. Starving Haitians were saved by the second subsidization of imported rice, but they are

also not able to accumulate capital if they cannot take part in the economy. Any who had previously farmed rice for a living would not be able to return to their old livelihoods. Those who had worked other trades would also not buy rice that was domestically produced in Haiti even if they could afford it because they could get the same good for free or nearly free. This simple "poverty trap" cycle graphic assumes that the capital normally spent on food will be saved or invested, when it is very likely that people will instead become dependent on aid. The Haitian government has become trapped in an aid cycle imposed upon them with the first conditional aid policies implemented in the 1980s. Having lost the ability to produce much of their own rice domestically, they had no choice but to require more aid in the form of rice subsidies nearly thirty years later in 2008. Aid may theoretically enable impoverished nations to escape Sachs' "poverty trap", but it may also trap them in a cycle of aid dependence that is almost impossible to escape.

William Easterly believes in taking much smaller steps to fight the issue of extreme poverty. He points out the issues with attempting to adopt the same large scale plan for combatting poverty in different nations. While something may sound good on paper, lack of communication and issues in distribution between aid agency and impoverished individual often make it impossible to find bumps in the road from point A to point B when the plan is applied. Supplying aid to a nation to encourage trade might work if both nations have something of equal value to trade with each other, but assuming this can have disastrous consequences. In the case of Haiti, while it had been a large player in the market of coffee production in the decades leading up to the 1980s, it no longer produced very much by the time its trading ports were opened (Gros 1980). Because Haiti could not combat the income it lost from government tariffs with another source of income from another good, the country's economy was in a downward tailspin when it

reduced its rice import tariffs in exchange for aid money. Easterly is critical of the way aid is being handled in Haiti today, which is similar to the way conditionality based aid was being applied in the 1980s. He describes his views in an interview with PBS:

> "Top-down development is the official aid agencies decide what Haiti needs, and they know the answers already, and they don't need to ask the Haitians. They don't even need the participation of the Haitians...You announce a plan. The characteristic feature of the top-down approach is a plan, a grand plan to solve everything all at once. ...You have a bunch of bureaucrats trying to run a whole complex society and economy without any knowledge of what is going on at the bottom, and it doesn't work." (Easterly, PBS Interview)

Because of his current opinions, it is likely that Easterly would have been against the policies implemented in Haiti. He would more than likely have been much more in favor of distributing aid among many small-scale projects that would involve native Haitians. He might suggest figuring out something in the economy that was lacking, and then suggest that a small amount of aid money be granted to a local producer or group of producers in a single village. Like the example Easterly gave in his book about supplying bed nets in a sustainable way, Easterly would be in support of something that came about from a Searcher way of thinking. With a bit of startup money and some ideas for a business model, this theoretical business could become a self-sustained entity fairly quickly. It would provide a needed service, jobs for those who required them, and it would become independent of the need for aid after an initial startup amount.

Foreign aid has been a hotly debated issue since its inception, and the answer to solving the world's issue of extreme poverty is different depending on which developmental economist

is consulted. Two of the most influential developmental economists of today have two different viewpoints. Jeffrey Sachs, author of *The End of Poverty*, supports the idea that the only reason world poverty has not yet been solved is because more aid money is needed. The extremely impoverished, he states, are stuck in a cycle of poverty that they require some sort of aid boost to escape. Aid in this kind of mindset often takes the form of large scale projects that are implemented very similarly no matter what nation they are being applied to. William Easterly, the other main voice of today's developmental economics, argues for a vastly different approach to combat world poverty in his book *The White Man's Burden.* He argues that large scale projects often fail to monitor the distribution of aid once the money has entered the underdeveloped nation, and that efforts should instead be focused upon small-scale, easy to monitor endeavors that involve the local people. This way, jobs will be created while also fostering an environment of economic growth when locals engage in business endeavors that allow them to evolve away from aid dependency. Aid conditionalities that can be traced back to early theories of trade economics written about by Adam Smith can cause more harm than good in certain nations that lack certain infrastructures. The island nation of Haiti has complicated relationship with aid, and only time and further endeavors into understanding the country's failing economy will tell what sort of aid or lack thereof can rescue the Haitian economy.


Chapter 2: Haiti's Coffee Climate: The Past, Present, and Future of Coffee Farming

As of September 2016, the World Bank reports that Haiti remains one of the poorest (nations in the Western Hemisphere. In 2014, it had a GDP per capita of only US $846, an amount lower than what many Americans living in urban areas pay per month on rent (The World Bank). These statistics are a far cry from the island when it was under colonial rule. The country that is now the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere was once known by another, much more pleasing moniker, the Jewel of the Antilles. At its economic peak, Haiti was a prosperous plantation colony that provided large quantities of export goods to France, its colonial ruler. Sugarcane plantations were the largest producers on the island, with much of the cultivated land producing this valuable cash crop. Second to sugarcane was coffee, which could be produced on smaller plantations while still yielding a large profit. Plantation culture, with vast farms and free slave labor, allowed Haiti to produce vast quantities of crops for export to Europe. For an almost two hundred year period ranging from the 1620s until the early 1800s, Haiti was the wealthiest of all of the French colonies (Lundahl 179). The beginning of the end was marked by the French Revolution and later Napoleonic wars, which essentially destroyed France's international economic presence as well as the main market for Haitian exports. While France was struggling to hold itself together on mainland Europe, Haitian slaves staged a revolution that lasted from 1791-1804. In modern history, it remains the only successful slave revolution that led to the founding of a free state that would be ruled by non-white citizens (Lundahl 179-80).

Statistics on Haiti's coffee exports can be traced back over two hundred years to when the country was a French colony. Exports were at 53,000 sixty-kilo bags in 1755, quickly jumping to over 580,000 bags in 1789. In the 1800s, coffee exports hovered around 500,000

bags annually, with this trend continuing into the next century. In the 1950s, the highest recorded annual yield of exported coffee was 740,000 bags (Arias, Brearley, & Damais 7-8).

Figure 2.1: Total Metric Tons of Coffee Produced in Haiti (1961-2003)



(Arias, Brearley, & Damais 7)


Figure 2.1 is a time series chart of total metric tons of coffee produced in Haiti between 1961 and 2003. During this time period, production was at an all-time high in 1961 though it quickly dropped. A few spikes in production occurred in the mid-1970s, early 1980s, and early 1990s, but for the most part coffee production in Haiti has continued to fall since the middle of the twentieth century.

In 1962, the U.N. created the International Coffee Organization (ICO), which created certain rules and quotas for over sixty countries that produced coffee in the name of keeping global market prices stable by preventing oversaturated markets. It seems to have worked quite for a period of about twenty years, but it was disbanded in 1989 (Arias, Brearley, & Damais 13). The 1980s were a tumultuous decade for the coffee industry in Haiti as well as for the rest of the country, as this decade marks the start of the modern day decline of the coffee sector in Haiti. Overall coffee production decreased by almost half between 1980 and 2003, going from just

under 43,000 tons to only 27,000 tons in less than twenty years. Looking at the numbers in bags, for the 2003-04 period in Haiti, about 300,000 bags were consumed domestically and the remaining 160,000 bags were exported for profit.

It is clear that coffee is much more often grown and sold at the domestic level rather than exported for a higher profit (Arias, Brearley, & Damais 7-10). Despite the chance to turn a much higher profit with the production and sale of higher quality coffee for the foreign market, many Haitians who are willing to undertake the already risky job of farming coffee continue to sell at home in the domestic marketplace.

Figure 2.2: Total Volume of Exported Coffee in Haiti in Metric Tons (1961-2003)




(Arias, Brearley, & Damais 10)

Figure 2.2 shows the total volume of exported coffee in Haiti in metric tons between 1961 and 2003. Much like Figure 2.1, overall volume of exported coffee has decreased as well as total production of coffee. Many factors have contributed to the decline in exported coffee, including overall decline in production and the fact that it can be much less risky for Haitian coffee farmers to sell their product domestically. Domestically sold product can be sold directly at a village marketplace, so the supply is simplified and Haitian farmers do not have to worry about world market price dictating how much they will be paid if they sell coffee to exporters.

Many Haitian coffee farmers prefer to sell on the domestic market rather exporting abroad, even though coffee can be a potentially high profit crop, for the simple reason that coffee's export price is extremely volatile to changes in world market price. After the collapse of the ICO stipulated regulations in 1989, coffee production was no longer closely watched and overproduction was soon to follow. In the early 2000s, this overproduction caused the world coffee prices to drop to the lowest they had been in over a century when adjusted for inflation. On certain farms, the money spent on cultivation was higher than the going price for coffee on the world market. If not for the fixed costs associated with production, it would have made sense to just abandon the farms completely (Arias, Brearley, & Damais 13).

Cycling back to the previously discussed theories presented by Jeffrey Sachs about the "poverty trap" dilemma, one can easily figure out why many small domestic producers would decide to focus upon crops that will feed their families in the here and now rather than taking a gamble on a crop that will not provide for their families unless then tend to it for nearly half a decade. Looking to Sachs poverty trap cycle for those who live in extreme poverty, these people struggle to sustain themselves. It is impossible for them to save any money for investments, and that is exactly what planting coffee is to someone who lives in such a dire situation. It is essential to their survival that they focus upon producing enough food to provide for their families in the coming days and weeks, as it is uncertain if they will even be occupying the same land in four years let alone still be tending to the same coffee crops that require years of upkeep to yield a profit.

Figure 2.3: The Basic Mechanics of Capital Accumulation



(Sachs 247)

Figure 2.3 is a replication of Figure 1.1 from chapter one, illustrating the basic mechanics of capital accumulation as described by Jeffrey Sachs. According to Sachs, it is theoretically possible to escape the above cycle of poverty, but not without outside aid. The only chance that these subsistence farmers have to be lifted from this grim cycle of poverty, Sachs states, is if some outside source provides them with enough income to invest and therefore be able to generate enough income that they would be able to put a bit towards their savings. Framed through the story of poor coffee farmers in Haiti, the subsistence farmers would need to receive aid that provided them with enough income to invest in a coffee farm as well as feed their families in the meantime if they had any wish to escape the poverty cycle through what could be a profitable venture in the right circumstances. However, the reality of Haiti's coffee farms is that this is simply not possible for the vast majority at this point in time. The luxury of being able to plan ahead is exactly that, a luxury. It is not something that the vast majority of rural farmers could even dream of doing when survival into the next year is something that is not a guarantee.

A man's livelihood in Haiti is not guaranteed to last into the next sunrise, something that is evident from the political upheaval and natural disasters that have plagued the country for much of the past two hundred years. In most recent memory, one can look to the earthquake that hit the country on January 22, 2010.


> The earthquake devastated all aspects of society. The quake destroyed 250,000 homes and 30,000 businesses. The government estimated the number of dead at 217,000 and an additional 300,000 injured people... up to one third of the country's 60,000 civil servants perished. Many government buildings were badly damaged, notably the National Palace, the Supreme Court, the Palais de Justice, the Parliament, the major courts and police" (Bode 762-63).

In a country with a population that hovers around ten million people, a single disaster destroyed a significant portion of those who were able to contribute to the economy. If over 217,000 were killed so soon after the earthquake that means more than two percent of the overall population basically vanished. This does not take into account the millions of people who were displaced or gravely injured in the aftermath of the earthquake, but it highlights the fact that a large number of people who would otherwise be involved in the country's economy were there one day and gone the next.

If one looks back further in time to a period when the coffee trade was not nearly as devastated as it is today, one can look at the destruction that was caused by another natural disaster. Hurricane Hazel hit the shores of Haiti in 1954, taking much of that year's coffee crop with it. That year, over forty percent of Haiti's coffee harvest was destroyed by a single storm. As coffee plants take years to mature, a farmer who had spent years tending to his coffee plants would have lost years of investments and work in just one terrible event (Lundahl 184). It is no

surprise that many farmers decide to invest their time and what little money they may have for seeds and tools on food crops that will produce an edible or marketable good in a shorter timeframe, which is certainly less risky than hoping that one's coffee plants survive long enough to prove themselves worth the trouble.

Figure 2.4: Total Harvested Hectares of Land Used in Coffee Production in Haiti (1961-2003)



(Arias, Brearley, & Damais 8)

Figure 2.4 shows the total area in hectares of land used for coffee production in Haiti between 1961 and 2003. Land used dropped in 1961 only to spike at several points in the mid-1970s before dropping again in the late 1970s. Production hit an all-time high in the early 1980s, and then experienced several spikes and drops until the early 1990s. After 1993, land use has been relatively stagnant until 2003 when the time series ends.

As if the country's issues with agricultural production that were tied to the uncertainty of natural disasters was not enough, the very soil used by farmers is slowly becoming destroyed. Environmental issues seem to be on the forefront of the minds of most people in today's world, but soil erosion is a very pressing problem in a country where the largest sector of the economy is made up of farming and closely related industries. Many of them are wholly dependent upon what they can produce on their small farms, they do not have the option to seek out food at an

outside market as they do not have any additional money to spend on food that someone else produces. As illustrated in Figure 1, Sachs "poverty trap" theory has the vast majority of small farmers using every cent they have to their names just to survive until the next day. All of their money goes towards rudimentary shelter and seed to produce for themselves what little they are capable of producing. As discussed previously, they also do not hold any real incentives to produce crops for export or market because it is too much of a risk or they simply do not have the additional resources available today to plan for tomorrow in the form of investments in cash crops like coffee. The effects on the soil of farming coffee as a cash crop versus farming food crops can be seen in this quote:

> "The most important substitution is the one of food crops for coffee. This takes place on hill and mountain sides which are often very steep. The coffee plant is a tree with roots and a canopy which contributes to binding the soil and protecting it from the direct impact of rain and wind. It is furthermore perennial. Food crops do not share these characteristics. They either tend to be annual or they are harvested more than once during the year. As a rule, a given plot carries a number of food crops at the same time, which contributes to the rapid loss of nutrients, and in general the ground is cleared during the harvest and when the time comes to plant or sow. Unfortunately, the latter time tends to coincide with the rainy seasons, which is when the ground is soft enough for putting in the plants or the seeds...i.e. the substitution of food crops for export crops increases the likelihood of soil erosion. What is more, once this process has been set in motion it feeds itself without any further need for population growth to stimulate it (Lundahl 181-82).

As Lundahl explains, the switch from cash crops produced for export or domestic market sales for profit to subsistence farming for survival is detrimental to the future of Haiti. In the long run, not only can coffee provide a much larger return on investment even in small quantities for a farmer who may only have the help of a few family members to run his farm, coffee is also much better for the environment in the farming sense. As a crop that is harvested much less frequently than most food crops, it does not leach the soil of many nutrients that will make farming any other crop in the same field during the next season more difficult. Coffee also serves to "hold onto" the soil with its thick root system that continues to expand year after year. Lundahl noted that food crops themselves also lend themselves to run off because the freshly plowed and loose soil is often washed away during the rainy season which tends to occur at the same time. Over time as this cycle of soil destruction continues, the amount of land in Haiti that can support crop growth will continue to decrease.

Sach's "poverty trap" theory discusses in one of its last steps that poverty in this sort of economy is generational, and it will continue to worsen as the cycle runs its course. As the population grows, people's standards of living will continue to worsen because they will have less and less available to them in each subsequent generation. This theoretical idea comes to life with the issue of soil erosion in Haiti because the country continues to lose land that could once support crops because subsistence farming must take precedence over arguably more sustainable cash crop farming. Though Lundahl remarks several times in his writing that statistics on Haiti must be taken with a grain of salt due to the lack of reliable reporting at various points in the country's history, the statistics he shares on soil erosion in the past century or so prove to be alarming. As quick side note to this information, as Lundahl provided his data in a unit of measure called hectares, is that one square mile is comprised of just a hair less than 260 hectares.

In the late 1930s, Haiti had about 540,000 hectares of good quality farmland and this number to only about 370,000 by the middle of the century. Between the 1970 and 1985, this number continued to drop, going from about 225,000 to only 205,000 hectares. As of the 1990s, Haiti has been losing between 6,000-15,000 hectares of good quality land a year, though the exact numbers are very difficult if not impossible to come by (Lundahl 182). This is a clear illustration of the ideas expressed by Jeffrey Sachs in that it is a situation that will continue to worsen if there is no outside help offered to the people of Haiti. The farmers are not fools and know that they are slowly destroying their land and for many, their only source of livelihood. However, they are literally stuck between a rock and a hard place because without help they cannot afford to do anything but try to live to see another day. They live too close to subsistence level that it long term planning is nearly impossible.

Of those farmers who still produce coffee in the country, more than eighty five percent of them have farms that measure less than five acres (Watkins 50). Many of Haiti's citizens inhabit the most rural parts of the country, something else that seems to damn them to lives in even deeper levels of poverty than their city-dwelling neighbors. More than sixty percent of Haitians live in what would be described as a rural area. Less than twenty seven percent of Haiti's GDP came from agriculture in 2004, but over sixty-five percent of the country's labor force went towards farming and related endeavors. "The size of the rural labor pool is already larger than that which can be absorbed by gainful rural activity, and with a growth rate of around 1.6-2 percent per year, the population is set to double within approximately 30 years" (Arias, Brearley, & Damais 3). So much of the country's labor force goes towards the agricultural sector because of the amount of people who inhabit rural areas, but there is often not enough work for all of them to do.

Half the country's overall population live in what is termed extreme poverty (with the poverty line set to the classic amount of $1 a day or below). Of the people living in poverty, fifty eight percent of them live in rural areas where they are most likely to be employed in some part of the agricultural sector versus only twenty percent of people living in metropolitan areas, who are much less likely to be working in a field related to agriculture (Arias, Brearley, & Damais 2). Based on these numbers, one is likely to question why people in rural villages do not simply pack up and move to more metropolitan areas. The simple answer is that many people lack the skill set to seek employment outside of farming.

According to UNICEF, literacy rates in Haiti fall very far below averages for many other Latin American countries. Adult literacy rate is only 48.7%, while the average for most other Latin American countries is about 90%. If Haitians under eighteen are included in literacy statistics, these numbers go up a bit but not by much. Overall literacy rate is 64.3% for males and 57.3% for females based upon counts from 2012 (UNICEF). The education system in Haiti, especially in more rural areas, suffers from lack of funding as well as shortages of qualified teachers. This means that many Haitians in rural areas never get the chance to even learn to read, let alone attend enough school to be able to market themselves as viable employees. They find themselves working the same land that their families have worked for generations, never breaking away from life in their small villages. Just glossing over the statistics, one can see that those living and working in areas of agricultural production are much more likely to be struggling for survival just by planting subsistence crops to keep their families fed. There is almost no way that they could be enticed to plant and tend to coffee trees that would not yield fruit for years and years.

As Haiti has entered the new millennium, some steps have been taken to attempt to resurrect the dying coffee trade, but none of these attempts have yet to prove fruitful in rescuing the Haiti's coffee farms. One of the main issues associated with coffee production in this age is the sheer amount of time it takes to yield a profitable crop from a coffee plant. Unlike a food crop such as yams or legumes, which can yield an edible crop within a year or so, coffee takes much longer to mature. A coffee plant can take up to four years to produce a full harvest that would benefit the farmer, which is just too long for many small domestic farmers (Watkins 53).

That is not to say that many foreign aid providers have not tried to nurture the dying coffee trade in Haiti. Reviving the once profitable farms has been a pet project of foreign aid workers for as long as the industry itself has been a problem. The market for "fair trade" and other similar sorts of coffee has become very popular in the past few decades as Americans have grown to care about where their products are coming from. To some, the story behind the production of their coffee is almost as or more important than the taste and quality. In theory, this means that there is money to be made by encouraging the production of high quality coffee in Haiti, for both the farmer and the exporter who is purchasing their goods. This "single origin" coffee comes from a single farmer or a group of farmers working in the same region. It can be sold in smaller quantities than a tub of coffee from the grocery store and it can be sold for three or four times the price of that same tub of Maxwell House (Watkins 49).

Efforts have been made by many NGOs to educate domestic producers of coffee in the best ways to plant and tend to their coffee farms, one of the most notable being the U.S. funded training programs of the 1990s. Between 1990-95, nearly five million dollars in U.S. funded programming was spent to educate Haitian farmers in planting, production, harvest, and many other aspects of farming, but it did little to stop the decline of the coffee market in Haiti (Watkins

50). Much of this education emphasized the growing of high quality coffee for exporting rather than growing lower quality coffee to be sold on the domestic market. Though the intentions of these programs were probably well-meant, the way they went about offering aid money was not well thought out. Efforts to reestablish the coffee industry in Haiti on the part of NGOs can be analyzed by applying William Easterly's theories of Planners and Searchers in the field of foreign aid.

A more in depth exploration of Easterly's theories on Planners and Searchers may be found in chapter one. Searchers are described as those who share Easterly's way of thinking, one who "admits he doesn't know all the answers in advance; he believes that poverty is a complicated tangle of political, institutional, and technological factors" (Easterly 6). Easterly defines a Planner as the opposite of a Searcher, an aid organization or individual that follows Sachs' way of thinking about aid in that they only look at the big picture, and they do not take the time to consider each individual village or region. Planners are "distracted by simultaneously doing the other 448 interventions", a reference to the 449 total interventions prescribed by Planners to end world poverty, that they do not have time to gather basic information. Easterly also states that they are very likely to be lacking other site-specific information because they are unlikely to have someone on the ground at each site (6). Easterly would most likely identify the NGOs who have tried to revitalize the Haitian coffee market as Planners based upon their actions. Instead of focusing upon each coffee growing community on a case by case basis, many of these aid gifts were more along the lines of something that Jeffrey Sachs might suggest. Planners would not see each individual coffee farm in Haiti as its own unique entity that has its own strengths and weaknesses, but instead each farm would be seen to have the same general problems that could all be fixed by applying the same blueprint of a plan. That is to say that they

attempted to utilize the same basic plan in each community rather than offering services and items that would aid each individual community of rural coffee farmers. For example, the aid organizations gifted much of the equipment rather than offering it on a small loan basis. Because of this, Haitian coffee farmers did not have as much reason to maintain the equipment because it was given to them free of charge.

On the other hand, if the Planner-like aid organizations in Haiti had acted more like Searchers, Easterly would have most likely thought that their plans would have been more successful at revitalizing the coffee trade. For example, had the aid organizations offered small loans to help cover the costs of machinery and equipment, they would more than likely have had some incentive to keep everything up and running. They would have made an investment, no matter how miniscule, in the coffee production endeavor and then would have had some incentive to make sure the farms continued to produce at the highest possible level. In other cases, much of the gifted equipment was much better suited to the large scale coffee farms in Brazil and other Latin American countries, rather than small farms of less than five acres. Many of them simply cost too much to operate for the small amounts of coffee that was being produced. The high costs and small scale production made it almost impossible for the farms to even break even without the help of even more aid money (Watkins 51). Perhaps if the aid organizations had done more to anticipate the needs of individual farms or if they had kept in contact with each farm or group of farms during each step of the process, they would have been able to see that some of the aid would just go to waste.

Instead of expensive machines that would only cost more to run than they were worth, perhaps establish some sort of system that would provide the Haitian farmers with better educational resources to eventually run the farms themselves and no longer be dependent upon

aid money. Some aid money was spent on educating the farmers, but they did not have much incentive to keep to the practices they were taught. Too much focus was placed on the more expensive practice of growing coffee for export rather than growing coffee for the domestic market. The market for "designer coffee" is a fast growing one, with an estimated average annual growth rate of 30 percent in the 2000s according to the National Coffee Association (NCA) (Arias, Brearley, & Damais 15). However, world market prices for a good like coffee are not stable, which adds another risk to the already uncertain business of farming coffee to export for profit.

Exporting a produced good to the world market is, in nearly all cases, only done if the country doing the exporting is able to turn a profit from its efforts. If farmers can produce a good that is wanted and as well as offer it at a price where they are able to make money, and a foreign buyer is willing to pay, then it makes economic sense that the exporting farmers would continue to produce the good so long as it was worth their time. It is a basic economic idea that no one, be it an individual or an entire nation, would invest all of their time and resources long term into an investment that did not have a decent chance of at least letting them break even if they did not manage to turn a profit. In the case of Haitian production, it can be several years before any saleable good comes to literal fruition if farmers take the risk and plant coffee crops instead of food crops. If anything happens that allows them to hold their farm but devalues their investment, they have fixed costs that make it difficult for them to just walk away from their investment. They would have theoretically put in time, any extra money they had to survive on purchased rather than grown foodstuffs over the time they tended the coffee crop, as well as any tools they purchased for this fairly specialized crop. Coffee tends to deteriorate at a fairly quick rate depending on how it is processed, so they would not be able to just hold on to their crop

until the market evened out. With the fixed costs they had, the most likely outcome would be that they sold their crops for a loss while retaining the farm and hoping for better times or they would have to completely gut their fields after harvest to plant food crops and basically destroy any work they had put in on their coffee farm.

One of the major pitfalls of participating in export activity on the world stage is that a product's price can be extremely volatile. If farmers in another country manage to produce the same good that a Haitian farmer produced, perhaps on a larger scales with lower costs, they will be able to lower the price of their good. This in turn will cause the world market price to change in response to a flooding of goods into the market. The primary export country might be producing on a smaller scale might lose money if it does not export its goods at whatever price it previously thought that it would receive, but it will also struggle to find a buyer if does do not adjust its prices accordingly. This tale in part explains why Haiti's coffee production for export has continued to drop in the past hundred years or so. While the market boomed in the middle of the last century, it has been dropping rapidly partially due to the volatility of foreign market pricing and the fact that most Haitian producers farm on such a small scale they do not have any extra income to cushion them if there is a bad season for export and they have to make up the difference.

Haiti's economy has fallen quite far in the past few centuries. The collapse of plantation culture in the early eighteen hundreds spelled the beginning of the end for the once wealthy colony. In a country plagued by disasters both natural and manmade, it is difficult if not impossible to imagine a future where the economy will be able to recover on its own. Foreign aid has a near constant presence in the lives of many Haitians in today's world, in some cases being their only source of income. Some aid projects try to promote the reinvigoration of the once

promising export coffee sector in Haiti, but they tend to go about it in the wrong way. Acting like Planners, many aid organizations in Haiti offered up aid in a way that did not work for many poor farmers. Educating poor farmers about coffee growing practices sounded great in theory, but many of the coffee farmers stuck to the less risky practice of selling on the domestic market. Gifted aid also tends to take away incentive to invest in things like farming equipment when it goes bad, so many of those resources will ultimately go to waste. Coupled with the volatility of a cash crop like coffee that is directly tied to world market prices, it is no wonder that a Planner-like mentality would not work to revitalize a dying sector of the Haitian economy. It is impossible to say if a Searcher-like approach would have definitely done a better job of revitalizing the Haitian economy, but many of Easterly's theories seem to address issues that actually occurred when aid organizations attempted to apply the same large scale plan to many small villages.

Chapitre 3: L'aide internationale, le choléra, et l'ONU

A la suite d'une catastrophe naturelle, il n'est pas une surprise que les indigènes essaient des points positifs de leur situation. Ils ont besoin de trouver une raison de continuer avec leurs vies après une tragédie. Après les catastrophes naturelles, l'idée d'une "nouvelle vie" est souvent un outil des organisations non gouvernementaux (ONGs). Ces organisations dépendent des donations, comme l'aide internationale. Ils ne peuvent rien accomplir sans les donations d'individus ou d'autres organisations. Souvent, les ONGs promettent au monde des grandes actes d'aide pour inspirer les individus de donner l'argent aux organisations non gouvernementaux. Ces grandes actes d'aide servent à inspirer les donations parce que les bienfaiteurs de l'aide internationale peuvent imaginer ces choses qui peuvent aider les victimes des catastrophes naturelles.

Un bon exemple de cet état d'esprit est le séisme d'Haïti. En janvier 2010, il y avait un le pays un grand séisme près de la capitale de Port-au-Prince. Des milliers d'habitants sont morts à cause de cette catastrophe et le séisme a détruit presque toute la capitale. Très rapidement, les travailleurs humanitaires sont arrivés en masse. Ils sont venus de beaucoup de pays du monde pour aider les victimes du séisme. Ils étaient étudiants d'université, célébrités, gens normales et aussi politiciens. Un homme qui essayait d'aider les efforts des ONGs n'était pas un étranger sur le devant de la scène. L'ancien président des Etats-Unis, Bill Clinton et sa femme Hillary, étaient très francs sur le sujet de la catastrophe du séisme. Brièvement, il a reconnu que le séisme était un événement catastrophique, mais il était plus occupé avec l'idée d'une renaissance pour Haïti. Clinton dit: "This country has the best chance to escape its past than it's ever had...As horrible as this is, it gives them a chance to start again" (Biquet 2).

Il a vu la situation en Haïti comme une chance pour une renaissance. C'étaient des gens comme l'ancien président Clinton qui s'étaient adressés au public du monde après les catastrophes comme ce séisme en Haïti. Les mots de Bill Clinton servaient à inspirer les donations des gens du monde. L'argent donne était pour essayer d'améliorer les répercussions du séisme. Comme un phénix légendaire, ce pays pourrait s'élever des cendres de la catastrophe et il deviendrait plus fort que jamais. Aux yeux du monde qui ont simplement regardé les répercussions à la télé, le bon côté du séisme était une chance pour une renaissance en Haïti. Ils donnaient aux ONGs de l'argent et d'autres donations comme la nourriture, les matériels médicaux, et les vêtements pour aider les victimes. Les ONGs ont fait de grandes promesses aux victimes du séisme, partiellement parce que ces promesses servaient d'inspirer les grandes donations de gens du monde.

Des problèmes ont émergé quand les Haïtiens ont entendu les mêmes promesses. Ils croient qu'ils vont recevoir les choses, mais ils sont déçus par les actions des ONGs. Pendant les mois juste après le séisme, il existe un slogan qui a le but d'inspirer la reconstruction en Haïti. On peut tracer à l'origine du slogan, "Build Back Better" à la Fondation Clinton, une association à but non lucratif de Bill Clinton et sa femme Hillary Rodham Clinton. Mais, certains observateurs, comme Dara, un organisme indépendant évaluant la réponse des donateurs au tremblement de terre que le fameux "Build Back Better" n'a rien été d'autre qu'un slogan" (Biquet 3). Pourquoi? Beaucoup de projets pour améliorer les vies de victimes du séisme restent incomplets quelques années après le séisme même si Haïti continue d'avoir besoin d'aide internationale. Après le séisme, près de soixante pour cent des hôpitaux de la zone sinistrée étaient détruits (Biquet 2). Trois années plus tard, quelques nouveaux hôpitaux que les ONGs ont promis à Haïti n'existent pas.

Ces promesses violées sont une raison qu'il existe une tension entre les travailleurs humanitaires et les haïtiens. Les travailleurs humanitaires sont des étrangers qui restent en Haïti quelques années après le séisme mais ils n'aident pas toujours les victimes comme ils leur ont promis. Les gens qui habitent à Port-au-Prince ont décrit leur ville comme une "république des ONGs', plein de travailleurs humanitaires qui semblent rester en Haïti pour toujours. Une source dit qu'il "n'est pas rare que des voitures des humanitaires, identifiables par leurs fanions et autocollants aux couleurs de l'organisation soient, caillassées" (Biquet 3). Dans d'autres pays qui souvents ont des problèmes avec les ONGS, il est peut-être un problème avec la distribution des donations, mais en Haïti le problème de méfiance entre les travailleurs humanitaires et les haïtiens est plus grave.

En octobre 2010, juste six mois après le séisme catastrophique en Haïti, il y avait un deuxième événement tragique. Il y avait une épidémie de choléra qui s'est propagé rapidement dans le pays. En décembre 2010, juste trois mois après les premiers cas du choléra en Haïti, plus de 200,000 personnes étaient infectés et vers de 4,000 personnes étaient morts (Biquet 4). Quelques mois après les premiers cas, il a existé la spéculation que l'introduction du choléra était la faute de l'ONU. En réponse aux allégations, l'ONU a commandé un rapport officiel pour trouver la source du choléra en Haïti. Ce rapport a trouvé que l'épidémie avait quelques causes, comme les conditions sanitaires insuffisants à un camp des soldats népalais qui étaient les soldats de paix de l'ONU et le fait que les haïtiens n'avaient pas une immunité naturelle au choléra. On comprend aisément que les Haïtiens étaient très fâchés avec le rapport officiel de l'ONU. Six ans après les premiers cas du choléra, l'ONU a finalement admis sa faute dans l'épidémie du choléra, et l'ONU a promis aux Haïtiens une fin du choléra en Haïti. En 2016, L'ONU a promis aux haïtiens et aux monde un grand plan pour construire les infrastructures pour améliorer les

systèmes sanitaires d'eau en Haïti entre autres choses. C'était un rêve noble, mais aujourd'hui ce plan reste un rêve à cause de manque de fonds.

Pour cette analyse d'articles de journaux, j'ai utilisé un journal qui s'appelle *Haïti en Marche*. Ce journal existe depuis 1986, la même année que l'ancien dictateur d'Haïti, Bébé Doc Duvalier, a évincé de ce pays. Aujourd'hui, *Haïti en Marche* publie des articles sur de nombreux sujets, comme les actualités. Ce journal publie aussi beaucoup d'articles sur le sujet des élections en Haïti, qui sont plein d'analyse et des spéculations. On peut déduire que le gouvernement haïtien a une assez bonne relation avec *Haïti en Marche* parce que ce journal publie des articles politiques et le gouvernement ne semble pas de censurer ces articles. Ils y ont deux bureaux pour ce journal, un bureau à Port-au-Prince, Haïti et il y a aussi un bureau à Miami, Floride aux Etats-Unis. Presque tout ce journal est en français, mais il existe quelques articles que ce journal sont réimprimés en anglais ou des articles qui tirent des origines à d'autres publications anglaises.

En 2011, l'épidémie était liée à l'ONU par plusieurs parties comme le gouvernement haïtien, mais l'ONU n'a pas pris la responsabilité pour cette épidémie. Cette épidémie devenait un sujet très important au journal haïtien, peut-être plus important que les répercussions du tremblement de terre. Les journalistes haïtiens avaient besoin d'une raison pour une deuxième tragédie dans la même année que le séisme, et ils ont exprimé leurs opinions fortes dans leurs articles. Les journalistes d'*Haïti en Marche* étaient très ouverts avec leurs opinions des actions de l'ONU après l'épidémie de choléra et aussi le fait que l'ONU a joué un rôle dans l'introduction du choléra en Haïti. Il y avait des rapports du choléra en Népal en septembre 2010, un mois avant que les soldats de paix de l'ONU népalais soient arrivés en Haïti, mais les soldats népalais n'ont été pas examinés pour le choléra.

Un article qui a paru dans *Haïti en Marche* en 11 Mai 2011 a le titre “La Science pour cacher la vérité. A l’origine, cet article est une émission de radio de la station *Mélodie 103.3 F.M., Port-au-Prince*, qui est une partie du même entreprise qu'*Haïti en Marche*. Cette transcription a été imprimé après son émission à la radio. *Haïti en Marche* n’attribue pas cette transcription à personne, mais tous les animateurs radio de *Mélodie 103.3 F.M., Port-au-Prince* viennent d'Haïti. On peut assumer que d’opinions de l’article va prendre parti pour des haïtiens. Le titre de l’article et une photo d’un enfant à l'hôpital sont sur la couverture de cette édition de ce journal. On peut théoriser juste de son titre que cet article va être plein d’opinions cinglants de son auteur. On doit continuer à lire pour découvrir qui essayait de cacher la vérité et de qui? Pour attirer l’attention des lecteurs, cet article était à côté d’une photo qui existe pour susciter les émotions et les compassions fortes des lecteurs *d'Haïti en Marche*. Sur la photo, il a quelques très jeunes haïtiens dans plusieurs lits râpés, sans draps ou oreillers. Ils ont les jambes et les bras très minces, et ils semblent presque émaciés. La légende sous la photo des enfants a dit “Des petits malades du choléra dans une clinique à Carrefour, banlieue sud de la capitale haïtienne.” (“La Science pour cacher la vérité” 6) Il est intéressant de noter que la clinique est à Carrefour, une banlieue près de Port-au-Prince où une ONG a promis un hôpital en 2010. Cet hôpital n’existe pas trois ans plus tard en 2013. (Biquet 3) Il n’est pas parfaitement clair, mais il semble que l'hôpital de choléra sur la photo est simplement une tente. Si l'hôpital de choléra est juste une petite tente, la photo indique aux lecteurs d'*Haïti en Marche* quelques choses sur les haïtiens qui habitent près de cette région. D’abord, une tente plutôt qu’un hôpital avec les quatre murs suggère que cette région est trop pauvre pour avoir un hôpital ou de reconstruire un hôpital après le séisme en janvier 2010. Il peut également suggérer que même si cette région a un hôpital, trop de gens sont malades du choléra. Il y a une autre suggestion sous-jacente la

deuxième supposition s'il n'y pas assez de capacité pour tous ceux qui sont malades. Avec la deuxième supposition, il existe l'idée que le choléra peut se répandre comme une traînée de poudre. Cette photo peint les enfants haïtiens comme les plus touchés de l'épidémie du choléra. L'ONU, une organisation qui est censé protéger les gens qui sont les plus opprimés est responsable pour les morts et les douleurs des enfants pauvres et sans défenses.

En réalité, l'épidémie du choléra touche beaucoup des jeunes enfants en Haïti. Selon d'un rapport de 2013 par CIDRAP (Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy), les statistiques des enfants qui ont moins de 5 ans sont choquants. Au total pour les enfants, ils sont 78,938 cas du choléra (13.1% du total de cas du choléra), 34,394 hospitalisations (10.4% du total), et 580 enfants sont morts (7.8% du total). (Roos) Pour une si petite tranche d'âge, ces statistiques montrent que beaucoup des victimes étaient des enfants. Un rapport d'OCHA (The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs) offre une hypothèse pour expliquer ces statistiques. Le rapport dit que beaucoup d'enfants haïtiens, près de 75% d'enfants de plus de cinq mois, prennent la formule empirique au lieu de ou en plus de l'allaitement. En Haïti, la formule empirique est mélangée avec de l'eau et l'eau contaminé est souvent la source du choléra. (OCHA 4) Les enfants sont morts à cause de l'eau contaminée et ils étaient les victimes du choléra.

Avec juste le titre de cet article, l'auteur donne aux lecteurs ses opinions sur le sujet des informations de l'épidémie de choléra en Haïti. Il a dit que l'ONU a utilisé un rapport scientifique pour cacher la vérité de leur rôle dans l'épidémie de choléra. Les haïtiens qui sont malades de choléra sont les victimes de l'ONU. Quelques jours après la publication de cet article, l'ONU a publié un rapport sur le sujet du choléra en Haïti. Dans le rapport, l'ONU a trouvé que:

> Les souches de l'épidémie [de choléra] sont génétiquement identiques, ce qui signifie que l'épidémie en Haïti n'a qu'une seule source[...]très similaire aux souches du choléra en Asie du Sud, ce qui confirme aussi que la bactérie du choléra présente en Haïti n'est pas originaire du pays." ("La Science pour cacher la vérité 6)

Ici, l'auteur reconnaît que l'ONU fait un rapport en réponse aux allégations que l'ONU est responsable pour l'introduction du choléra en Haïti en octobre 2010. L'auteur fait à référence à quelques études qui ont précédé le rapport de l'ONU. Ces études, l'auteur écrit, ont trouvé que les premiers cas du choléra en Haïti peuvent remonter à l'origine d'un camp des soldats de la paix népalaise près de la rivière Meye, un affluente du grand fleuve Artibonite à cause des déchets contaminés.

Dans le deuxième paragraphe, l'auteur demande aux lecteurs "Que faut-il de plus?" Aux yeux de l'auteur, c'est clair que l'ONU est en faute dans cette situation mais il ignore la responsabilité. Il pense que les deux parties dans la situation, l'ONU et les gens d'Haïti, ont toutes les informations pour arriver à une conclusion du problème de l'origine choléra en Haïti. Dans leur rapport officiel, l'auteur écrit, les "experts de l'ONU" ont écrit que "les conditions sanitaires [au campe népalais] n'étaient pas suffisantes pour éviter une contamination fécale de la rivière." L'auteur fait attention de souligner l'idée que le rapport officiel de l'ONU et ses experts "admettent que c'est la base des népalais qui nous a transmis le choléra." (6) Il fait attention aussi aux mots qu'il utilise pour s'adresser à ses lecteurs. Il utilise le mot "nous" pour décrire les gens qui sont les victimes de l'ONU. Il s'adresse à ses lecteurs dans une façon qui peut créer un sens de camaraderie contre l'ONU. Ils habitent en Haïti pendant une époque de tragédies, mais ils sont ensemble comme une nation. A ce point dans l'article, l'auteur dit que l'ONU admet un petit peu de faute avec leur admission de pauvres conditions sanitaires dans leur camp. Mais "pas

si vite!" dit l'auteur parce que l'ONU dit aussi dans ce rapport que la souche du choléra en Haïti est similaire mais pas identique au souche en Asie du Sud. Dans l'avis d'auteur "c'est un pas en avant ou deux pas en arrière". L'ONU essaie de sauver sa peau avec ce rapport, il ne veut prendre aucune responsabilité pour la situation. Si la situation n'était pas déjà assez mauvaise, l'ONU continue pour couronner le tout. Le rapport de l'ONU blâme quelques choses qui ne sont pas les problèmes de l'ONU pour la propagation du choléra en Haïti. Ce qui suivant est une citation directement du rapport de l'ONU réimprimé dans cet article en *Haïti en Marche.*

> 'L'introduction de cette souche du choléra en raison de la contamination entière des travailleurs agricoles à l'eau d'irrigation du fleuve, les mauvaises conditions en matière d'eau et d'assainissement en Haïti et l'absence de la population haïtienne au choléra.' (6)

Le rapport officiel de l'ONU essaie en partie de blâmer l'absence d'immunité naturelle pour l'épidémie répandue. C'est comme si les américains qui sont les descendants des colons européens blâme toutes les morts des amérindiens dans leurs absences d'immunités naturelles aux maladies européens comme la variole. Dans presque tous les livres d'histoires dans les écoles aux États-Unis et en Europe, les amérindiens étaient les victimes de colons européens. Ils sont morts à cause des colons, ils ne sont pas morts à cause de l'absence d'une immunité naturelle. Il est un défenseur très cruel, mais l'ONU utilise cette défense pour sauver sa peau. L'auteur me partage cette idée. Il dit "De nous faire porter aussi le chapeau, de nous faire partager aussi les torts en raison de nos carences certes révoltantes. Mais, comme on dit, c'est une autre histoire." (6) Les actions de l'ONU sont dégoûtants, il pense, a parce que le rapport de l'ONU essaie de blâmer un pays très pauvre pour ce manque d'argent et d'infrastructures.

L'auteur dit qu'il y une expression en français pour cette action: "essayer de noyer le poisson." C'est plus facile pour le rapport de l'ONU d'essayer de confondre tout le monde plutôt

que de prendre ses responsabilités pour l'épidémie du choléra en Haïti. L'auteur dit que "après avoir constaté toutes les indications confirmant que le choléra n'est pas un simple produit de la pauvreté et de la misère qui sont le lot du peuple haïtien […] le choléra n'a pu venir que de l'extérieur." Aux yeux de beaucoup de gens au monde, Haïti est un pays en plein de pauvreté et des maladies à cause de la couverture médiatique après le séisme en janvier 2010. La couverture médiatique est souvent négativement biaisée envers les victimes pendant les catastrophes comme le séisme de 2010 et l'épidémie du choléra. Cette couverture sert à souligner les souffrances des victimes et à souligner les donations et les actes généreux des ONGs. Avec la suggestion que l'épidémie du choléra est lié à la pauvreté en Haïti, l'ONU peut mettre cette idée aux avis du tout le monde. Cette idée soutient déjà la perception d'Haïti dans les médias populaires au monde. S'ils croient que l'ONU n'est pas le vilain dans cette situation, l'ONU ne perd pas sa crédibilité au monde. En revanche, les haïtiens perdent peut-être leur crédibilité au monde. Ils sont les gens qui essayent de critiquer r un ONG qui, aux yeux du monde, aide tous les gens.

L'auteur continue avec son critique de l'ONU quand il dit que le rapport de l'ONU ne réussit pas sa mission. Il écrit avec un ton très sarcastique quand il fait attention au fait que le rapport de l'ONU essaie d'éviter sa mission.

> "Après tout ça, que les experts prennent une courbe à 180 degrés pour s'appesantir maintenant sur les déficiences du système d'adduction d'eau (qui dans la majorité des cas n'existe même pas d'ailleurs) le manque d'assainissement ou la carence de soins de santé en Haïti...et nous n'en sommes pas fiers, c'est bien aimable à eux, mais ce n'est pas la question qui leur a été posée." (6)

L'ONU a une mission, il doit trouver l'origine du choléra en Haïti, mais au lieu de faire un rapport honnête, l'ONU essaie de sauver sa peau. Il blâme le manque d'infrastructure dans

une façon que l'auteur pensait être cruel. C'est presque comme si l'ONU, une organisation qui essaie d'aider le monde, se moque du plus pauvre pays en l'hémisphère occidentale. Comme l'auteur dit dans un ton très sarcastique, "c'est bien aimable à eux", mais en réalité c'est très cruel. Ce n'est pas la faute d'Haïti que le pays est très pauvre, mais le rapport de l'ONU semble montrer que cette pauvreté est la raison que l'épidémie du choléra existe. L'auteur argumente que l'ONU continue à "noyer le poisson" pour confondre tout le monde. Il dit que les haïtiens ne peuvent pas accepter les actions de "noyer le poisson." "Nous ne tomberons pas dans ce piège du: qui se ressemble s'assemble" (6), il utilise encore le mot "nous" pour créer peut-être un sens d'unité nationale pour tous ses lecteurs. L'ONU peut essayer de confondre les autres, mais les haïtiens ne tombèrent dans ce piège de l'ONU. Les haïtiens vont continuer à exiger que l'ONU admette son rôle dans l'épidémie du choléra en Haïti après le séisme de janvier 2010.

L'auteur mis fin à son article avec une idée où il donne à l'ONU l'opportunité de se racheter. Il dit que "nous sommes d'accord sur un point: l'épidémie n'est pas la faute ou l'action délibérée d'un groupe ou d'un individu." Auparavant dans cet article, l'auteur blâme l'ONU pour l'introduction du choléra en Haïti, mais il ne l'accuse pas de le faire délibérément. Il reconnaît que l'introduction du choléra était un accident tragique. Ici, l'auteur dit essentiellement à l'ONU que la balle est dans ton camp. Il est possible de réparer nos relations, mais d'abord, vous devez reconnaître votre rôle dans l'épidémie.

Avec le dernier paragraphe, l'auteur renforce l'idée que l'ONU doit faire ses excuses aux haïtiens et arrêter de "noyer le poisson." Il dit que la situation entre les haïtiens et l'ONU est comme "un accident de parcours. Mais nous ne pouvons être à la fois l'accidenté et l'auteur de l'accident! Voire en payer le coût moral en complexe de culpabilité!" Mais cette scénario semble comme l'objectif de l'ONU! Les haïtiens sont le plus affectés par l'épidémie du choléra,

mais le rapport de l'ONU blâme aussi la pauvreté et le manque d'infrastructures comme les systèmes d'adductions pour l'épidémie. Arrêtez de blâmer les victimes pour sa situation, l'auteur semble écrire. A l'avis d'auteur, l'ONU a une responsabilité minimum aux haïtiens. L'ONU doit se montrer respectueux aux victimes du choléra avec l'admission de la vérité de la source du choléra en Haïti.

Contrairement à l'article "La science pour cacher la vérité", qui montre les opinions de son auteur ainsi que des informations du rapport officiel de l'ONU, il y a un deuxième article à la même page dans le même numéro d'*Haïti en Marche* qui est moins biaisé contre l'ONU. Ce deuxième article est un article par une autre publication qui est réimprimé en français pour *Haïti en Marche.* Cet article était originellement en partie de l'*Associated Press,* une publication américaine qui se décrit comme une publication à but non lucratif. Il se décrit aussi comme une agence coopératif et non constitué en société. Ce journal a son bureau à New York, New York aux Etats-Unis, mais il fait un compte rendu des événements internationaux au même temps. L'article de *l'Associated Press* qui est imprimé dans *Haïti en Marche* au titre "Plusieurs facteurs ont causé l'épidémie de choléra en Haïti" par journaliste Anita Snow. Selon sa Twitter, elle est une correspondante d'Amérique latine pour *l'Associated Presse* et une ancienne correspondante d'Amérique latine pour l'ONU. Il est un article plus factuel et aussi moins plein d'opinions que "La science pour cacher la vérité". Une journaliste pour une agence de presse, elle n'est pas liée à Haïti comme l'autre auteur qui écrit pour *Haïti en Marche.* L'article de *l'Associated Press* dit aux lecteurs les faits de l'épidémie du choléra en Haïti sans beaucoup d'émotions. Le premier paragraphe de son article dit simplement le nombre de victimes du choléra et aussi un petit sommaire du rapport de l'ONU comme une description de la contamination du fleuve Artibonite.

Mais au même temps, elle renforce l'idée que l'ONU est impliqué dans l'introduction du choléra en Haïti :

> "même si plusieurs ont attribué l'épidémie du choléra en Haïti a des casques bleus de l'ONU originaires d'Asie du Sud, le rapport du comité d'expert refuse d'en faire porter le blâme à un groupe en particulier, affirmant que l'épidémie est le résultat d'une "'confluence de circonstances'" (6)

Elle n'accuse pas entièrement l'ONU, mais elle renforce cette idée parce qu'elle présente l'idée que les autres gens au monde pensent que l'ONU n'est pas entièrement innocente. A la même page que l'article plus polémique, l'article d'Anita Snow continue à soutenir l'idée que l'ONU essaie peut-être de cacher la vérité dans son rapport officiel. On ne doit pas oublier qu'Anita Snow n'écrit pas avec les opinions moins fortes que l'auteur Haïtien. Elle rapporte simplement les faits qui lui sont accessibles pour créer un article assez objectif. Il est important de remarquer qu'elle n'utilise pas son article pour blâmer complètement l'ONU. A première vue, elle utilise le langage objectif et elle ne se fait pas d'opinions sur le sujet de l'épidémie du choléra en Haïti. Elle n'écrit même pas que ces événements sont très tragiques, elle écrit les faits des événements pour donner aux lecteurs des informations objectives. Mais, on ne peut pas ignorer son choix de mots. Elle dit que les experts de l'ONU "refus[ent] d'en faire porter le blâme à un groupe en particulier" (6). Le mot "refuse" n'est pas un mot neutre, c'est un mot avec un sens sous-jacent d'accusation. On doit reconnaître ses méfaits avant d'assumer ou d'ignorer le blâme. Si un individu ou une organisation a refusé d'admettre quelque chose, il a déjà reconnu qu'il y a un problème. Dans le contexte de l'article, l'ONU n'est pas un parti neutre qui est simplement ignorant du problème. L'ONU reconnait le problème du choléra en Haïti et il

fait un choix d'ignorer la situation. Le mot "refuse" insinue aux lecteurs qu'il y a un problème, et ils peuvent inconsciemment devenir plus compatissants aux haïtiens.

Dans l'article, encore et encore, elle écrit quelquefois "selon les experts" et elle écrit aussi "affirment les experts" quand elle décrit le rapport de l'ONU. Pour cet article, elle n'a pas de point de vue très ouvert, elle a juste les faits à utiliser comme des outils pour partager les informations. Mais, on ne peut pas oublier qu'elle utilise le mot "experts", un mot qui a un sens d'autorité. Il est possible que Snow choisit simplement un mot, mais ce mot a beaucoup de pouvoir. A cause de ce mot, on peut penser que les experts de l'ONU possèdent de solides connaissances sur le sujet de la pathologie. Ils sont peu susceptibles de faire des erreurs pendant un rapport pour l'ONU. Selon des experts, le choléra en Haïti est "le résultant d'une 'confluence de circonstances.'" (6) Il est possible que Snow ou peut-être la rédaction d'*Haïti en Marche* choisit ce mot pour marquer un point. Les experts, qui ont peut-être la confiance du monde à cause de ses titres, auraient pu trouver l'évidence qui aurait incriminé l'ONU. Il est possible les experts ne chercheraient pas pour toutes les évidences ou ils manipulaient les évidences pour aider la réputation de l'ONU. Dans cette situation, l'ONU a payé les experts pour faire le rapport et les experts sont devenus des employés de l'ONU. Si le choléra était la faute de l'ONU, les experts qui ont eu les connaissances pour identifier les évidences auraient pu mentir dans le rapport. Dans une telle situation, il est possible que les experts étaient aussi coupables que l'ONU. La suggestion d'un germe de suspicion peut discréditer l'ONU aux yeux des lecteurs d'*Haïti en Marche*. Quelqu'un d'autre a pris cet article et quelqu'un d'autre a traduit cet article pour le réimprimer dans *Haïti en Marche*. L'article originel n'a pas une voix qui attribue les crimes du choléra à l'ONU, mais on doit reconnaître que l'éditeur d'*Haïti en March*e ne met pas cet article à la page avec l'autre article par coïncidence. Les deux articles existent à la même

page d'*Haïti en March*e pour la raison que les deux articles aident à s'équilibrer les uns et les autres.

Ces deux articles ont été publiés dans *Haïti en Marche* en 11 Mai 2011, et cela n'a fait que commencer. La semaine suivant, en 18 Mai 2011, *Haïti en Marche* a publié un troisième article sur le sujet du choléra en Haïti et les fautes de l'ONU. Il y a un autre article où l'auteur a des émotions fortes et des avis tranchés sur le sujet de l'ONU et son rapport officiel du choléra en Haïti. Dans cet article, l'auteur se fait ses opinions et blâme l'ONU pour son partie de l'épidémie.

Dès le début de cet article, c'est clair que l'auteur attribue l'épidémie du choléra à l'ONU. Le titre de cet article est "Choléra: nier l'évidence.*"* On doit assumer que l'auteur de l'article est anonyme parce que *Haïti en Marche* n'attribue pas cet article à personne. Avant que les lecteurs commencent à lire cet article, ils peuvent prédire le sujet de cet article. Le titre sert comme une accusation avant que l'auteur commence à écrire ses opinions sur le sujet. Cet article commence presque de la même manière que l'autre article, "La science pour cacher la vérité," avec un petit sommaire du rapport de l'ONU. La plus grande différence entre les deux premiers paragraphes est que "Cholera: nier l'évidence" remarque aussi d'un deuxième rapport qui n'est pas fait par l'ONU. Le gouvernement haïtien a commandé le deuxième rapport en même temps que le rapport de l'ONU. Même avant la publication du rapport de l'ONU, le gouvernement haïtien n'avait pas confiance à l'ONU.

> "Deux rapports publiés à quelques jours d'intervalle, confirment ce dont on se doutait déjà: l'épidémie du choléra qui a éclaté en Haïti l'automne dernier tire son origine d'une base de soldats népalais appartenant à la force de stabilisation de l'ONU." ("Choléra: nier l'évidence" 11)

L'auteur fait référence aux informations qui sont les connaissances publiques, le fait que l'épidémie du choléra peut tirer son origine du camp népalais, quand elle dit que les informations dans les deux rapports sont déjà connues. C'est comme le rapport officiel de l'ONU ne donne pas aux gens d'Haïti aucune information nouvelle. L'auteur continue à écrire que les deux rapports utilisent les mêmes informations pour étudier les origines du choléra en Haïti. Ce journaliste d'*Haïti en Marche* écrit aussi un petit sommaire du rapport de l'ONU, comme le fait que le rapport de l'ONU blâme plusieurs circonstances pour l'introduction et la propagation de l'épidémie. Les auteurs du rapport qui n'est pas par l'ONU prennent une position plus forte et ils disent avec confiance que l'épidémie est la faute de l'ONU. L'autre rapport a été "réalisée à la demande du gouvernement haïtien." L'auteur dit que les auteurs du rapport de l'ONU "sont plus timorés" que les auteurs de l'autre étude parce que les experts de l'ONU ne blâment pas un groupe ou individu pour l'introduction du choléra quand l'autre étude blâme les népalais. Les experts de l'ONU écrivent "avec diplomatie", dit le journaliste d'*Haïti en Marche,* mais il est clair que cette citation n'est pas un compliment. Ils sont plus timides et ils essayent de sauver la peau de l'ONU dans cette situation. Après que l'auteur d'*Haïti en Marche* insinue que les experts de l'ONU sont des lâches, il a une question pour ses lecteurs. Avec un ton très sarcastique, l'auteur d'*Haïti en Marche* dit aux lecteurs:

> "Une devinette: laquelle de ces deux études a été réalisée à la demande de l'ONU? Cette dernière évidemment. L'ONU s'en est servie pour affirmer que les Casques bleus [un autre nom pour les soldats népalais] n'y étaient pour rien dans l'apparition de l'épidémie et que n'importe qui d'autre aurait pu introduire la terrible bactérie en Haïti." ("Choléra: nier l'évidence"11)

Il est clair que l'auteur pense que tous les lecteurs partagent les mêmes opinions que l'ONU est responsable pour l'introduction du choléra en Haïti. Le rapport officiel du l'ONU est un peu cruel aux haïtiens parce que le rapport attribue la propagation du choléra à la pauvreté en Haïti. L'auteur pense peut-être que l'ONU a vu un pays très pauvre et l'a transformé en bouc émissaire. Les deux rapports tirent les origines du choléra au camp népalais, mais en même temps l'ONU n'admet pas ses fautes. L'ONU ne peut pas dire qu'un lieu très proche au camp népalais est l'origine du choléra et aussi continue à refuser une partie de l'introduction du choléra. L'ONU a ses "experts" pour faire un rapport du choléra, mais qui leur a donné ce titre? Les vrais experts sont les haïtiens qui vivent pendant l'épidémie, les gens qui voient les horreurs de l'épidémie tous les jours. L'auteur d'*Haïti en Marche* écrit aussi que le rapport par le gouvernement haïtien campe népalais est dans un "lieu reculé" et que "aucun autre étranger ne s'y trouve de l'apparition des premiers cas du choléra" (11). Il est un fait enregistré que les premiers cas du choléra en octobre 2010 sont les premiers cas du choléra en Haïti depuis au moins un siècle.

A ce point dans l'article, l'auteur introduit un deuxième bout d'information sur le sujet du camp népalais en Haïti. Juste après les rapports des premiers cas du choléra en Haïti, l'auteur écrit, "des travaux ont été soudainement réalisés au système d'égout de la base népalais." ("Choléra: nier l'évidence"14) L'auteur pense que c'est suspect parce que l'ONU dit que le système sanitaire au camp népalais n'est pas suffisant après l'épidémie. Si l'ONU ne fait pas ces travaux pour arrêter le propager du choléra, pourquoi? Il n'existe pas une réponse parfaitement claire, mais l'auteur demande aux lecteurs "A-t-on [l'ONU] voulu cacher quelque chose [de la propagation du choléra]?" Clairement, l'auteur ne fait pas confiance aux mots de l'ONU. L'opposé est vrai, l'auteur d'*Haïti en Marche* est ouvertement méfiant de l'ONU. Ensuite,

l'auteur encourage ses lecteurs de poser des questions à l'ONU. "Quelle est la part de mensonge dans les dénégations de [l'ONU]." (14) On ne peut pas oublier qu'il y avait une épidémie du choléra à la même ville où les soldats népalais avaient habité quelques semaines avant d'arriver en Haïti. L'ONU a fait passer un test de dépistage de choléra aux soldats népalais qui avaient les symptômes du choléra mais plus de 70 pour cent de gens qui ont le choléra n'ont pas de symptômes (Danto). Il semble irresponsable que l'ONU n'ait pas faire passer un test de dépistage de choléra à tous les soldats népalais quand le coût de ce test n'est pas cher.

Avant l'épidémie du choléra en Haïti, les haïtiens se méfiaient déjà des étrangers qui arrivent avec les ONGS. Les relations entre les haïtiens et les étrangers à Port-au-Prince sont assez tendues, un rapport dit qu'il "n'est pas rare que des voitures des humanitaires[...] soient caillassées." (Biquet 3) Cet état d'esprit est le plus probablement un effet secondaire d'un pays qui était une colonie plein des esclaves. L'auteur dit que les actions de l'ONU ont "alimenté la méfiance que les haïtiens nourrissent déjà à son endroit [pour les étrangers]." ("Choléra: nier l'évidence"14) L'auteur d'*Haïti en Marche* admet qu'il comprend que l'ONU " a voulu les protéger [les népalais]." (14) Le climat social et politique en Haïti après l'épidémie du choléra était imprévisible et les haïtiens étaient déjà méfiants des étrangers comme les népalais. Pour un petit moment, l'auteur d'*Haïti en Marche* essaie d'être objectif quand il étudie les actions de l'ONU. L'auteur fait l'avocat de diable pour un moment pour souligner le sérieux des actions de l'ONU. L'ONU a voulu protéger leurs soldats népalais, mais pour le faire, l'ONU a choisi de "maquiller la réalité" des haïtiens. (14) L'auteur peut comprendre l'idée de la protection pour les soldats népalais, mais pas aux dépens d'un pays en entièreté.

Dans le dernier paragraphe de "Choléra: nier l'évidence", l'auteur exprime des opinions fortes de l'ONU. L'auteur pense que l'ONU est égoïste aux dépens d'un pays très

pauvre. L'auteur écrit que “l’ONU préfère faire l'autruche et se contente d’appeler les Haïtiens à tourner la page.” (“Choléra: nier l'évidence”14) Il est plus facile pour l’ONU de rejeter les responsabilités aux Haïtiens que les haïtiens qui doivent vivre leurs vies dans un pays du choléra. Mais, aux yeux de l’auteur, le pire crime de l’ONU est peut-être un crime moral. “Elle se prive de tirer des conclusions pour prévenir la répétition d’incidents semblables. Et surtout, elle prive les haïtiens des plus élémentaires excuses auxquelles ils devraient.” (14) Parce que l’ONU ne veut pas prendre la responsabilité pour l’introduction du choléra, l'auteur dit qu’il est possible que les événements comme l'épidémie du choléra peuvent se répéter dans d’autres lieux. Il est possible que cette idée est un tactique d’intimidation, mais l’auteur utilise cette idée pour détruire un peu la réputation de l’ONU aux yeux des lecteurs.

En août 2016, *Haïti en Marche* a rapporté que l’ONU finalement a reconnu sa responsabilité dans l'épidémie de choléra. Un article “L’ONU reconnaît sa responsabilité dans l'épidémie de choléra et après?” qui est publié le 24 août 2016. Cet article dit qu’avant que l’ONU a donné aux haïtiens une apologie, “Les Nations Unies refusent d’admettre la vérité.” (“L’ONU reconnaît sa responsabilité dans l'épidémie de choléra et après?” 4) Après l’apologie, l’ONU dit qu’il a l'immunité juridique pour sa responsabilité dans l'épidémie du choléra. Haïti a essayé d’attaquer en justice l’ONU pour son rôle dans la propagation du choléra, mais l’ONU a gagné le dossier. L’article d'*Haïti en Marche* dit que les haïtiens ont perdu le dossier, mais le dossier était “une première étape révolutionnaire vers la justice.” (4) Pour la première fois, ils ont eu l'opportunité de raconter leurs histoires de souffrance. L’auteur écrit finalement que “le véritable test est ce qui vient ensuite. L’ONU doit joindre le geste à la parole.” (4) Après l’apologie, l’ONU a promis aux haïtiens beaucoup de choses pour améliorer la situation mais l’argent reste un problème.

The New York Times a rapporté en octobre 2016, six ans après les premiers cas du choléra en Haïti, que au moins 9,500 haïtiens sont morts et des centaines de milliers de gens étaient malades pendant l'épidémie. L'ONU a proposé un plan pour aider Haïti qui va couter vers de $400,000,000, mais l'ONU n'a pas l'argent. (Sengupta et Katz 1) Les officiels de l'ONU n'ont pas décrit ce plan en beaucoup de détails, ils ont dit que la moitié de l'argent va aller aux familles des victimes et l'autre moitié d'argent va aller aux villes pour améliorer les systèmes de sanitations en Haïti. En décembre 2016, *The New York Times* a rapporté que "Whatever they use it for, they need the money first. Of the estimated [money], only $500,000 has been raised so far." (Sengupta 4)

Un troisième article de *The New Times* qui a été publié en mars 2017 dit que l'ONU continue à avoir des problèmes concernant l'argent pour Haïti. Le plan vague a reçu un nom qui est aussi vague, "The New Approach". C'est comme les slogans de La Fondation Clinton, qui a promis de "Build Back Better" après le séisme en janvier 2010. Mais les mots ne sont pas les actions, et les mots n'arrêtent pas la propagation du choléra en Haïti sans l'argent pour payer les promesses *The New York Times* a rapporté que juste $2,000,000,un pour cent de l'originel $400,000,000 que l'ONU a promis aux haïtiens, a été amassée. (Gladstone 1) L'ONU a promis aux haïtiens de charité, mais l'ONU n'a pas l'argent pour faire ses actions d'améliorer la situation en Haïti.

Sept ans après 2010, une année qui était en pleine de catastrophes pour les gens d'Haïti, le pays reste en chaos. Près de 2,000 cas du choléra étaient annoncés en janvier et février 2017 et l'ONU n'avait pas d'argent pour son plan. (Gladstone 3) L'ONU a reconnu sa responsabilité aux haïtiens, mais les mots ne sont pas les actions. Beaucoup de gens sont malades ou morts à cause des actions de l'ONU et la grande organisation non gouvernemental continue à promettre les

choses vagues. Les haïtiens demandent la justice, mais la justice n'est pas une réalité aujourd'hui. Ils ont dû attendre sept ans pour l'ONU de faire ses excuses, alors combien de temps attendent-ils une solution?

Conclusion:

In a world where the distribution of wealth between people living in different nations is so uneven, foreign aid certainly has its place. The most difficult part is determining how and when to distribute this aid. Poorly allocated foreign aid money can lead to aid dependency issues if it is more profitable for aid recipients to passively receive money instead of working to become aid independent. In more serious circumstances, aid organizations can also cause unintended damage that breaks the trust between donors and those living in countries that receive aid. A prime example of this is the cholera epidemic that began in Haiti ten months after the 2010 earthquake. Several reports linked the cholera outbreak back to a U.N. camp of Nepali peace-keeping soldiers in 2011, but it took until late 2016 for the U.N. to openly address their fault in the epidemic. The U.N. released a plan to combat the epidemic with estimated costs of $400 million dollars that was vaguely stated to be for the installation of improved water sanitation in Haiti as well as some sort of reparation fund for the victims of the epidemic. As of March 2017, the U.N. had only raised about two percent of the money they needed to pay for their proposed plan, which does not help them to rebuild trust with the people of Haiti. Examining the theories of Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly, one can start to understand the ways that foreign aid is currently being distributed.

Jeffrey Sachs is the author of the 2005 book *The End of Poverty,* in which he proposes a possible solution to ending the "poverty trap". He states that those living in the world's poorest nations are buried so far in poverty that they are not able to break the cycle without outside aid from donor organizations. With each additional generation, a family will fall deeper and deeper into poverty. Every cent they have is spent on survival, so they are unable to save any money to put towards investments in the future like school tuition for their children or equipment to make

their farms more productive (Sachs 248). Outside aid will allow for additional money to enter the pockets of poverty struck individuals, so they will be able to invest a bit in their futures. Sachs states that eventually enough money will enter the poor economies to break the cycle of poverty, though he does not say when this point will be reached. Sachs' theories are heavily influenced by economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, who proposed the "Big Push" model in 1943. Essentially, the "Big Push" model states that economically depressed nations require outside aid to overcome obstacles that they face due to lack of infrastructure, and that it is impossible to tackle any one project like opening a factory without first establishing infrastructure to transport and sell goods. (Bura) Those who follow Sachs' school of thought propose large scale projects to tackle all of these issues at once, but many critics of this style state that it is impossible to keep track of aid when applying one large plan to many individual villages who may have different issues.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is economist William Easterly, who has been openly critical of Sachs' proposed theories (Easterly 6). Easterly is the author of *The White Man's Burden,* a 2006 book where he proposes his theories to end poverty and suffering one project at a time. He directly states that he does not believe that the "Big Push" theory has any basis in fact, and that it is a sure fire way to waste aid money. Easterly believes that small scale aid projects are much better suited to ending poverty because they allow donors to address site-specific issues and track where there may be bumps in the chain of aid distribution. In his book, he describes two types of developmental aid workers. Planners, who follow a Sachs'-like school of thought, and Searchers, who follow Easterly's theories on aid distribution. According to Easterly, Searchers are more likely to follow a project from start to finish on site, as well as establish some sort of incentive system to encourage aid recipients to actively take part in the project. If they

are incentivized to take part in the project, they are much more likely to become aid independent in the examples given by Easterly.

Haiti is a nation that seems to have been plagued by every factor that has ever been listed in an economics textbook as a possible cause of economic depression or stagnation. The country has not seen a stable government in decades, it seems to be destroyed by a new hurricane or catastrophic natural disaster every few years, and even aid workers have unintentionally brought death into the nation they wished to help. Short term foreign aid may have aided many Haitians in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, but many foreign aid workers never left. The country is also still struggling to combat cholera, a disease that went from not existing in the country to becoming endemic to the country in less than a decade.

After the 2010 earthquake, the world pledged more than $9 billion of aid to Haiti. This $9 billion only encompasses in-cash aid, while donations of material goods would be referred to as in-kind aid. In 2012, aid to Haiti accounted for nearly a third of worldwide aid funds. Looking at the state of the country today, many people wonder where all of this money went. More than 350,000 people still live in camps with nothing but tents to protect them from the elements. Of the measurable in-cash aid, only about $2.5 billion of it actually arrived in Haiti, reported NPR. It also reported that about 93% of that money went to the U.N. or other NGOs, with a large portion of that going towards paying to send aid workers and peacekeeping troops to Haiti. (Beaubien) There is no shortage of reports trying in vain to trace the distribution of aid money that was pledged to Haiti, but it is nearly impossible to account for such a large amount of money that was dispersed to so many different organizations. Even if every organization was required by law to publish spending from this period in Haiti, it would be almost impossible to compile an accurate report.

In comparison to Haiti, foreign aid worldwide has not been much more successful. Short term humanitarian relief aid that strives to keep as many people alive as possible in the aftermath of a natural disaster or tragic bombing is not the issue. The issue lies with developmental aid that often does not reach its intended targets. Distribution often comes in the form of a "top down" approach, meaning wealthy countries give large amounts of money to aid organizations or directly to recipient countries, who in theory should then make sure them money gets to the poorest of its citizens. Many economically depressed nations tend to suffer from corrupt governments, meaning that any aid that is given to the government might simply line the pockets of the already wealthy instead of feeding the poor. Current aid practices that often come in the form of writing a check to an agency or the financing of a large project make it easy for the money to be embezzled away rather than in the form of smaller projects that require face to face interaction with the poorest of the poor. In *The White Man's Burden*, Easterly raises an important question about current aid practices: "But if rich people want to help the poor, they must face an unpleasant reality: If it's so easy to end the poverty trap, why haven't the Planners already made it history?" (Easterly 10) The fact remains that there is no easy fix for ending world suffering by raising money because the current chain of foreign aid distribution is broken.

Seven years and over $9 billion after the devastating earthquake that destroyed much of Haiti's infrastructure and took hundreds of thousands of lives, Haiti is still counted among the poorest nations in the western hemisphere. Humanitarian relief aid certainly saved many lives in the aftermath of the earthquake, but many people still live in deplorable conditions with little more than tents for protection. Perhaps it is time to take a hard look at the way the world currently looks at foreign aid distribution. It seems that current practices have not done as much as one would like to hope they could have accomplished for an economically depressed nation

like Haiti. Looking at the attitudes of mistrust towards many aid organizations as seen in the world of Haitian journalism, repairing these relationships may be one of the first steps to reworking foreign aid practices. Working with people, much like the theories of William Easterly suggest, rather than simply writing large checks and not tracking their distribution, could be the future of foreign aid. However, current foreign aid practices have been in effect for a century, and only time will tell what sort of changes may occur and whether or not these changes aid or hinder the nations whose suffering foreign aid is meant to help.

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Appendix: English Summary of Chapter 3

Due to social media and online news outlets, is not uncommon to learn about a natural disaster or catastrophic event from across the ocean just minutes or hours after it occurs. Aid organizations can be on the ground in countries struck by disaster in the time it takes to book a ticket and fly there. Short-term humanitarian relief aid saved the lives of many Haitians in the hours and days following the earthquake, but at some point this relief aid ceases to be a way to keep as many people alive as possible in the aftermath of a disaster and it instead becomes a long-term project.

The 2010 earthquake in Haiti is a prime example of aid agencies from around the world coming together to aid a nation in need. News agencies were quick to send reporters to the island nation, broadcasting images of broken bodies and crumbled buildings to show the rest of the world how damaging the earthquake had been. World new outlets quickly took that stance that Haiti was in trouble and would need all the help it could get to repair the damage caused by the earthquake. By portraying Haiti as a poor island nation that had been hit by a devastating natural disaster, news outlets both helped and harmed the nation. The devastating images that dominated news coverage of post-earthquake damage served to inspire large donations. There is something about an image of a person in need that can connect them to someone who sees it from half a world away, even if that potential aid donor has never before thought about the affected country. On the contrary, portraying Haiti as the victim of a disaster discredits the nation in future endeavors. If world perception of a nation due to media coverage is poverty and death, Haiti becomes yet another poor nation that should be grateful to receive aid.

Many aid agencies also tried to put a positive spin on the 2010 earthquake. It became quite popular for agencies to passively acknowledge that it was a devastating event while putting

more emphasis on the idea that the disaster could be used as a time of rebirth for the country. These agencies noted that there had been a lot of death and destruction of buildings and other infrastructure, but the influx of aid money and other donors willing to support new projects meant that there were new resources available. Addressing potential donors and the world at large, many agencies made large promises about what they wanted to do with aid money in Haiti. Issues emerged when Haitians heard many of these same promises that never yielded any actions. Many of the proposed projects were either started but never completed, or they never moved past the planning stages. Several hospitals in Port-au-Prince were damaged during the earthquake, so several donor countries pledged funds to build or repair hospitals in the capital city. As of 2013, most of these proposed hospitals only exist on paper. (Biquet 3).

One famous non-profit agency that preached the importance of focusing on the future rather than living in the past was the Clinton Foundation, run by former president Bill Clinton and his wife Hillary Rodham Clinton. Their slogan "Build Back Better" implied that Haiti could benefit from aid money. Emphasis was on the positive changes that could be made due to the efforts of foreign aid donors and non-governmental aid agencies. Clinton himself stated that the earthquake was "the best chance to escape its [Haiti's] past than it's ever had." (Biquet 2) Grand promises are one way that aid agencies have inspired many individual donors to contribute money to the causes of certain nations like Haiti, and while donating to nations that are in need is often done out of the goodness of one's heart, many Haitians do view aid agencies as wholly benevolent forces. One reporter remarked that some Haitians viewed Port-au-Prince as a republic of nongovernmental organizations, a place where aid workers moved to but never left (3). Instead of focusing upon solving issues related to the earthquake in a timely manner, many foreign aid bodies instead made a business out of moving to Haiti. Some aid workers are seen as

living fairly lavish lifestyles compared to many of the people they arrived in the country to help, so many natives are mistrustful of them for seeming to take advantage of the business of foreign aid.

Less than ten months after the devastation of the 2010 earthquake, Haiti was struck by another deadly disaster. By October of 2010, the first cases of cholera in what would later becoming a raging epidemic were reported to hospitals in rural villages near the Artibonite River. This river, as well as many of its tributaries, served as the sole source of fresh water for many Haitians in rural areas. Eventually, a strain of cholera was linked to a U.N. camp that housed peacekeeping soldiers from Nepal. These soldiers came from a city in Nepal that had experienced a large spike in reported cases of cholera in September 2010, but it was later reported that only those who were actively showing symptoms were tested before they were sent to Haiti. Cholera is highly infectious, but it is also important to note that up to seventy-five percent of those who carry the disease do not show symptoms right away or at all (Danto).

In 2011, the U.N. commissioned a report to find the source of the cholera strain that was spreading like wildfire across Haiti. The report essentially stated that the epidemic could not be linked to any one party group, and it blamed a confluence of circumstances including lack of proper sanitation systems in rural Haiti and the fact that Haitians do not have a natural immunity to cholera even though the disease had not been seen in the country for at least a century prior to 2010. By looking at Haitian newspapers from this same period, I was able to get a sense of Haitian public opinion concerning the U.N. and their role in the cholera epidemic. I used the Haitian paper *Haïti en Marche* to get a sense of Haitian views.

The first article I looked at was published soon after the U.N. report that basically stated the U.N. could not be directly blamed for the epidemic. “La Science pour cacher la vérité”,

which translates to something like “The Science for Hiding the Truth” was essentially a call to arms for the Haitian people not to just sit back and accept the U.N.’s report. The author cites several studies commissioned by bodies outside the U.N. that found the U.N. to be at fault for the epidemic. The author was also quick to point out that the U.N. accepted the fact that the strain of cholera could be traced to the Nepalese camp, but the report was quick to place blame on Haiti’s infrastructural issues instead of the U.N. *Haiti en Marche* asked how much more proof would the U.N. need before they finally accepted their part in bringing a deadly disease to Haiti. The author of this article was also sure to use the word “we” to address the readers as to convey a sense of “us” versus “them” in the issue of cholera. “We”, the Haitians, were both the victims and the scapegoats of the U.N. The perpetrator, the U.N., was an outside body that brought a deadly issue and instead of admitting fault attempted to place the blame on factors that Haitians largely could not control.

The sense of distrust between outside agencies and native Haitians was very apparent throughout the article, especially towards the end when the author accused the U.N. of attempting to lead the public on a wild goose chase. The author used the French phrase “noyer le poisson” or “to drown the fish”, an idiom that essentially means that they were trying to lead the public’s opinion all over the place as to avoid placing the blame for the epidemic on themselves. In the eyes of the author, this was their worst offense as they would not even acknowledge that they had been at fault which was essentially the same as ignoring the pain and suffering that they had caused in Haiti.

A second article that appeared in the same issue of *Haïti en Marche* was a reprinted French translation of an English language article that was originally published by the Associated Press by report Anita Snow. The article’s title was a direct quote from the U.N. report, “Plusieur

facteurs ont causé l'épidémie de choléra en Haïti" or "Several factors have caused the cholera epidemic in Haiti." On the surface, her article seemed to be much more objective than the preceding article that was produced by a Haitian, but a closer reading finds that she may be more sympathetic towards Haiti than she was towards the U.N. Several times, she used the word "refused" to describe the actions of the U.N. This word has implications all its own, as the U.N. would not be able to refuse to take responsibility for something that they did not understand their part in. The U.N. would only be able to refuse to take responsibility or to hide their part in the cholera epidemic if they first recognized that there was an issue and then they actively decided to cover it up. It is probably no coincidence that the editor of *Haïti en Marche* chose to reprint this article because it also seems to take the side of the Haitians in the ongoing issue of who was at fault in the cholera epidemic.

A third article published the following week on May 18th, 2011 was titled "Choléra: nier l'évidence" or "Cholera: denying the evidence". The author of this article is quick to point out that both the U.N. and the government of Haiti commissioned reports to find the source of the cholera epidemic, but that they came up with two very different answers. Sarcastically, the author asks the reader what report do they think was written by which party and then states that clearly the report that finds that the U.N. is not at fault was commissioned by the U.N. The author notes that it is understandable that the U.N. would wish to protect the lives of the Nepalese soldiers who most likely brought the disease to Haiti, but that it cannot be done at the expense of denying justice for an entire nation. The mistrust of foreigners is shown at the end of the article where the author states that the U.N. would prefer for the entire issue to just disappear rather than acknowledge their part in the epidemic. The author ends by saying that by denying

the Haitian people a simple apology or acknowledgement for their suffering, the U.N. is denying them a basic human right.

After almost six years of facing pressure from the world at large as well as an attempt by Haiti to sue the U.N. for reparation payments for victims of the earthquake, the U.N. finally admitted some level of fault in causing the cholera epidemic. However, any acknowledgements were fairly vague and carefully worded to avoid any further legal pushback. A series of articles written by various contributors of the New York Times highlighted the rather vague plan as well as the troubles currently facing it. The U.N. finally admitted some fault in a statement in August of 2016, but it was several months before any details of plans to fix the situation were reported. In October of 2016, one article gave the first details of the plan. The U.N. had pledged $400 million dollars to Haiti, with half to be spent on direct reparation payments and the other half to go towards improving the water and sanitation systems in Haiti to combat the spread of cholera. This was a lofty goal on the part of the U.N. and it can also be argued that it was just another way to push off taking responsibility for the epidemic. It does not cost anything to pledge money to a country, but it is a way for the U.N. to save face in the eyes of the world community. At the time of pledging this money, the U.N. did not actually have the money to give. As of March 2017, a second New York Times stated that the U.N. had barely raised two percent of the money they had pledged to Haiti (Gladstone 1). At the same time, hundreds of new cases of cholera were being reported each week as of late February 2017. It is unclear what they U.N. plans to do as far as raising the rest of the pledged funds aside from several other vague statements on the subject.

A final article that appeared *Haïti en Marche* in mid-2016, several months prior to the first details of the U.N. plan. The article “L’ONU reconnaît sa responsabilité dans l'épidémie de

choléra et après?" or "The U.N. recognizes their responsibility in the cholera epidemic and after?" questioned what the U.N. would do next. An acknowledgment was the first step towards justice for many Haitians, but most wanted to know what action they would see on the part of the U.N. Many thought that the U.N. had already wasted ignoring their part in the cholera epidemic or actively dodging their responsibility. The author of the last article stated that the final test for the U.N. was what they did next. After actively denying their role in the epidemic, the U.N. had to prove that they would follow through with their proposed plans. The tone of the article was neither optimistic nor hopeless, it simply stated that the people of Haiti are waiting to see what comes next on the part of the U.N.

As of March 2017, the state of the U.N. plan to eradicate cholera in Haiti is unclear. Many Haitians wait to see if the U.N. will follow through with their promise of $400 million dollars, but current reports indicate that the U.N. is struggling to raise even a small portion of the original pledged amount. It is clear that many people are expecting action rather than more empty promises, but the U.N. is funded by donations. If member nations do not contribute to the fund to aid Haiti, the proposed plan to eradicate cholera will remain a promise. The U.N. must actively seek to repair its relationship with Haiti, but one can safely assume that the longer Haitians are forced to wait for action, the more strained the relationship will become.

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Bethany Bauer is an Economics and French double major. As a freshman, she joined the Eta Beta chapter of Alpha Delta Pi Sorority. She spent the spring semester of her junior year studying abroad in Angers, France. While abroad, she discovered her passion for travel and cannot wait to return to Europe. During her senior year, she was inducted into the Allegheny College chapter of Omicron Delta Epsilon, the International Economics Honor Society. Upon graduation, Bethany plans to pursue a career with an international company that will allow her to travel abroad.