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Submitted to the Department of Political Science of Allegheny College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

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Table of Contents

Introduction…….6
Chapter 1: The Imperial Era…….9
Chapter 2: The Cold War Era…….27
Chapter 3: The Contemporary Era…….49
Chapter 4: Content Analysis…….64
Conclusion…….78

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Introduction

Understanding the way that countries use power can be beneficial when trying to understand the way that countries interact with each other. However, the power that is used by countries can come in many forms. In order to correctly identify the types of power and what purposes they serve, it is important to separate them into different categories.

Before the terms hard and soft power were used for describing the differences of power that was used by a country, there were no distinctions between uses of force and using power in order to win the hearts and minds of people. However, this all changed when Joseph S. Nye coined the terms hard and soft power. Nye is an influential figure in political science and a leading figure in his area of work. At their most basic forms, Nye describes the difference between these two forms of power as, “Hard power is push; soft power is full,” (20). Soft power is when there is an attempt to persuade others in order to obtain a goal. It is used to win the hearts and minds of the people that are going to be affected. This is typical associated with concepts such as institutions, ideas, values, culture, and perceived legitimacy of policies (Nye 21). Hard power, on the other hand, is typically described by the use of force. This can come in many forms such as money or the use of military (Nye 21).

By using American intervention in Nicaragua as a case study, there are many different circumstances that can show the differences between the uses of hard and soft power. Examining these different uses is important in understanding the types of power that were used, as well as the situation in which they are employed. The way that the United States intervened in Nicaragua throughout the years consisted mostly of hard

power. There are a few reasons that I believe caused this. Firstly, it had a lot to do with the idea that the United States wanted Nicaragua to be an ally and a resource for them. One would think that they would be able to obtain this through the means of soft power and persuasion. On the contrary, the United States mainly attempted this through the use of threats and force. Secondly, the United States would only be able to achieve some of their goals with Nicaragua through the use of hard power. A lot of hard power that was used by the United States was a result of the changing leadership in Nicaragua. With this being the case, it would have been very difficult to keep Nicaragua on the same page as the United States if they were to attempt soft power. With hard power, it is up to the aggressor to ensure that they objectives are being met. In other words, they hold their own fate in their hands. Through the use of soft power, there is not always a guarantee that both sides will be able to come to an agreement and that it will work. Lastly, by studying the uses of hard and soft power can show the differences in uses of power between American Presidents. By using the case study of American intervention, we can see different American Presidents shift their focuses and uses of power by what was going on in the international realm.

By breaking up American intervention in Nicaragua by different eras, the shifts of hard and soft power can be seen between different time periods. The Imperial and Contemporary Eras showed glimpses of soft power that was used by the United States. However, the Cold War era was a time of strict hard power, due to the war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Analyzing the use of hard and soft power by the United States towards Nicaragua can help to understand the way that the United States has used power towards other

countries throughout history. If nothing more, it should allow political leaders to understand the way that the United States have acted in the past, through the use of power, and learn from it. There had been numerous times throughout the history of American intervention when the type of power that was used towards Nicaragua did not work. It is important to understand the situation that the country was in when attempting to understand why the United States used the type of power that they did.

Chapter 1: The Imperial Era

For my purposes, I have the Imperial era of American intervention beginning in 1850 with the United States' first act of power towards Nicaragua, and ending in 1947. During this era, the United States used much more hard power than soft. I believe this had to do with the United States wanting to become a major international figure. Once this was established later in the era, the United States needed to keep their reputation and continued to use hard power in order to get what they wanted. However, there were glimpses of soft power that was used throughout the era. It is important to understand the situation that the United States and Nicaragua were in during this era when each types of power was used by the United States in intervening in Nicaragua.

After gaining their independence from Great Britain in 1776, the United States of America knew all too well the aspects of imperialism. The people living in America at that time knew what it felt like to live under imperialistic rulers. The founding fathers of the nation fought for their freedom as a country and as individual humans. It seemed, at the time, as though the country as a whole was against imperialistic tendencies. However, once they were able to provide for themselves and gain power, the United States began to interfere in global issues.

The first action that the United States took in contributing to Latin American affairs came in 1823 when political leaders in Washington introduced the Monroe Doctrine. The United States wanted to separate the Old World from the New World. Additionally, it put the United States in a position of looking over the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine stated that the western hemisphere should be free of imperialistic acts from the Old World. This was the first use of soft power by the United

States, which was still a relatively newly independent country. It set the tone for the rest of American history in the grand scheme of things. By playing the role of the protector of countries in the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine allowed the United States to be seen as a country that was looking out for others. It would not take long for the United States to begin expanding their territory and use hard power for the first time to do so.

A term coined by John O'Sullivan in 1845, Manifest Destiny, was the justification for the United States expanding towards the western part of North America. Believers in Manifest Destiny felt that it was God's will that they should take over the rest of the area towards the west in North America. In order to do this, they had to take over the land from many Native Americans that had been living there for a long time. Americans at that time believed that the Native Americans were lower class and did not have any right to the land because God told them it was the destiny of the United States to have it (Hietala). This was the first act by the United States using hard power. Shortly after, The United States began to show interest in other countries and use hard and soft power towards them in order to gain more power. The long history between Nicaragua and the United States began in 1850 with the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer Act.

By 1838, Nicaragua had gained their full what was known as the Federal Republic of Central America. However, it did not take long for the United States to take advantage of the newly independent country. In 1850, the United States entered into a written partnership with Great Britain, known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, regarding a canal in Nicaragua.

Signed on April 19,1850, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was an agreement between the United States and Great Britain promoting a Central American canal to be built in

Nicaragua. It stipulated that both parties had to refrain from any territorial acquisition, as well as not exerting any political control in the area (Van Alstyne 149). Although both signing parties agreed to the treaty, there was no agreement made by Nicaragua. This treaty was the result of fear, by both signing parties, for the potential clash between the United States and Great Britain over mutual interests in the region (Van Alstyne 149). With the United States' rapid expansion across the North American continent, it was searching for a sufficient trade route to accommodate both the east and west coasts of the United States. Britain, similarly, held interest in creating a sufficient trading route. The intended canal route would run from San Juan, at the mouth of the San Juan River on the east, to the Bay of Fonseca, on the west (Van Alstyne 149).

The two men that were chiefly responsible for the treaty were Sir Henry Bulwer, British Ambassador to Washington, and John Clayton, United States Secretary of State. Bulwer had intentions of defusing the tensions between the two powers by attempting to hold power for a canal in Central America (Maurer and Yu 40). He had previous experience in this line of work about 20 years prior. In 1838, Bulwer played a key role in creating the Treaty of Balta-Liman, which opened up the Ottoman Empire to British trade, as well as a free transit route through the region for Britain. Bulwer's counterpart, John Clayton, was an advocate for building of the canal. However, he firmly believed that the property should not be owned by any single nation (Maurer and Yu 41).

With the Monroe Doctrine still fresh in the minds of the leaders in Washington at that time, Bulwer knew that the United States did not want to have a confrontation with Great Britain over the occupation of the territory. The British ambassador to Washington drew up a draft for the treaty including the promise that the British government would

not, “occupy, or fortify, or colonialize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America,” as long as the United States vowed to do the same (Maurer and Yu 41). Clayton gave his approval to Washington and the treaty was quickly ratified as it passed through the Senate, thus serving as the first act of soft power by the United States. Now that the United States had a significant investment in Nicaragua, policymakers were deeply concerned with the country as well as the government that ran it. With the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty ratified, Washington wanted a president in Nicaragua who would be willing to work with them. When this was not the type of leader that took power in Nicaragua in 1893, Washington’s concern for that region grew.

The United States has a reputation for instigating and invoking political change in countries that are not its own. When the United States saw a leader that would not promote the ideals of the United States, there tended to be either direct or indirect attempts to remove them from power. Nicaragua was no exception to these actions. The United States began using this type of power with Jose Santos Zelaya when he was elected as the President of Nicaragua in 1893.

Zelaya took power in Nicaragua following a military coup. He was a dictator that fully believed in promoting the country of Nicaragua on a nationalistic front. The United States government had a problem with the fact that Zelaya was trying to get more foreign investments in Nicaragua that were not from the United States. President Zelaya was a liberal that found a lot of opposition from the conservative leaders in Washington. The first action taken by the Nicaraguan President that caught the eyes of conservative leaders in the United States was when he began negotiating with Japan to construct a canal that

would compete with the United States waterway (US State Department). Following the news of this intended partnership between Nicaragua and Japan, the United States began supporting a rebellion against the Zelaya government.

The United States got directly involved in the situation in Nicaragua when two United States citizens, who were serving in the rebel army, were captured and executed by Zelaya's forces. After this news reached Washington, they sent United States Marines to the coast of Nicaragua and stifled a liberal victory. Although this would be the first direct use of hard power in Nicaragua by the United States, it is important to remember that this would not be the last. The United States government was not pleased, to say the least, to have a Nicaraguan leader in power that did not share their ideals, but the direct harm that was inflicted on two United States citizens called for direct intervention. After the liberal loss in Nicaragua in 1909, Zelaya resigned from office and was temporarily replaced by rebel leader, Juan Estrada. For the time, it seemed that the United States had gotten what it wanted. However, the victory was short lived, and more intervention in Nicaragua by the United States was in the near future.

The United States government agreed to recognize the Nicaraguan government under rebel leader, Juan Estrada. However, a few conditions had to be met (US State Department). Firstly, the prosecutions of the people involved in the execution of the two American citizens must be upheld. Secondly, the United States demanded that a presidential election had to be held within the next six months. Finally, the establishment of a commission to resolve any claims for property damage during the rebel revolt be commenced. Estrada agreed to these terms and assumed the role of President of Nicaragua. However, it did not seem that Estrada had a grasp on the government and

country that he was running. The United States began to fear that opposition to Estrada's presidency was growing. Once again, the United States would intervene to keep a man in power that was willing to work with the United States. With this intended response, Washington sent Thomas C. Dawson to Nicaragua as a special agent (US Department of State). Dawson previously worked on the United States' intervention in the Dominican Republic. Dawson did not have good news for Washington about the political stability of Nicaragua under the Estrada government. With the overwhelming feeling that Zelaya's liberal forces would still win an election in Nicaragua, the United States government was in fear of another uncontrollable leader in Nicaragua. Dawson was correct that the ideal successor would not be able to win an election. However, the winner of the election was Adolfo Diaz, who welcomed the intervention of the United States and almost immediately began a partnership, with no regard to the citizens of Nicaragua.

With the support of Adolfo Diaz, the United States was able to hold a firm grasp on Nicaragua. In 1911, Nicaragua and the United States signed a treaty that essentially gave the United States control of the banks in Nicaragua, as well as handing over the Nicaraguan national rail company to a United States-backed company. It seemed as though the United States government was successfully intervening in the Nicaragua. However, in the same year that the treaty was signed by the two parties, the United States Senate did not ratify the treaty. Many United States' senators at the time did not agree with the Taft Administrations power over large corporations. Now that Nicaragua had a cooperating partner in Diaz, opposition in Washington attempted to limit the amount of interventions in Nicaragua.

A year later, Diaz's political rival and Minister of Defense, Luis Mena, began a rebellion in order to take over as President of Nicaragua. Interestingly enough, Mena had already won an election by this time to succeed Diaz as president. Mena was skeptical of the United States being so involved in Nicaragua and their government. In typical fashion, Diaz asked the United States to intervene on behalf of the property of the United States citizens and policymakers responded with immediate action. The United States directly intervened with their military and was able to keep Diaz in power. Mena, on the other hand, fled the country. With the United States still concerned about the stability of Nicaragua, it kept 100 Marines in Nicaragua until 1925.

This ended the first bulk of American intervention in Nicaragua. During this time, the United States government justified its actions in Nicaragua by stating that it was attempting to remove a dangerous dictator, as well as, preventing local mismanagement of resources (US State Department). Similar to many other countries after they have had a superior power that directly intervenes in the internal affairs of their country, the people of Nicaragua took a more nationalistic tone. This was evident with the rebellion groups that grew stronger as the intervention by the United States continued. The second major intervention in Nicaragua by the United States would occur in 1925.

Following the hard power used by the United States in Nicaragua with the manipulation of leaders in the country in the beginning of the 20th century, the United States felt that the direct intervention had succeeded. With the United States military still in Nicaragua for "stability", the United States felt that they should go about securing Nicaragua and all that it had to offer the United States in a different way. By the time

1914 rolled around, the United States turned to soft power in order to have a stronger foothold in Nicaragua. They did this by introducing the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.

The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was signed between United States Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and Nicaragua's Washington Minister, Emiliano Chamorro, on August 5, 1914. However, the United States Senate did not ratify this treaty until February 18, 1916. The treaty had multiple components that served to benefit the United States and they only had to pay a single dollar amount in exchange. For three million dollars, the United States gained a 99-year lease of Great Corn and Little Corn Islands, the right to establish a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, and most importantly, the exclusive right to build an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua, with the details and arrangements of the canal to later be discussed later. Although it seems that the United States gained a lot from this treaty, the signing of it baffled many. The treaty that allowed the United States exclusive rights to build a canal in Nicaragua was signed the same year that the Panama Canal was built, owned, and completed by the United States. However, the United States' use of power was used in a similar fashion as before in Nicaragua, in the face of competition.

As the United States did when Nicaraguan President Jose Santos Zelaya entertained the idea of Japanese assistance in building a canal, the United States simply got rid of the chance of that happening. At any hint of outside parties trying to intrude on what the United States believed to be theirs, they immediately intervened. Unlike with Zelaya and the Japanese, when the United States used hard power, Washington decided to create the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in fear of German intervention. Many saw the treaty as simply a way to providing a guarantee that no other nation would have the right to

build a rival canal in Nicaragua (Smith 66). During the negotiations for the treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, the US State Department was informed that the Nicaraguan President, Adolfo Diaz, had been approached by German officials concerning their interest in a canal. According to Robert Freeman Smith:

> According to this report, the German official had stated that the United States' offer for a canal option was too low and had indicated that Nicaragua could obtain a much better price through negotiations with European governments, Germany being the obvious point of reference. (63)

With the Nicaraguan government confirming that there had been German interest in a canal in Nicaragua, William Jennings Bryan used this information to try to sell it to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, according to Robert Freeman Smith, historians of US-Latin American relations have not been able to fully validate that Germany had an interest in the canal (Smith 64). Nevertheless, Smith leaves us with two possibilities. Either the reported conversation between Nicaragua and Germany was inaccurate, or Diaz and Chamorro were trying to manipulate the rivalry between the United States and Germany in order to get as much as they could for the canal rights in Nicaragua. Ultimately, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was ratified in 1916.

On paper, the United States gained area for naval bases, rights to a canal, and two small islands through the treaty. In reality, the United States did very little with what they were granted. The proposed naval base was never established by the United States. Furthermore, the Corn Islands remained under Nicaraguan jurisdiction, except for a small area that was used by the United States to build a lighthouse. Later on, we will examine what happened with the 99-year lease for the United States to build a canal in Nicaragua. This use of soft power by the United States seemed to add on to a trend of the United States intervening, whether through hard or soft power, in order to block other nations

from moving into the region. The United States wanted to keep their foothold in Nicaragua and relatively all of Latin America. Between 1912 and 1925, the United States and Nicaragua worked together quite well because of the conservative leaders that were in power. However, peace and tranquility in Nicaragua was short lived.

By 1925, the United States still had a significant number of troops in Nicaragua. On January 1, 1925 another conservative took the presidential office in Nicaragua, Carlos Solórzano, along with his liberal Vice President Juan Bautista Sacasa. At this point, the United States was ready to begin withdrawing troops from Nicaragua. There had not been any major problems in the past couple of years, so Washington thought it was about time to pull out. However, upon Solórzano's request, the United States agreed to keep the troops in Nicaragua in order to help build a Nicaraguan National Guard. This only lasted for a few months and in August 1925 the United States pulled their troops out of Nicaragua. The events that transpired following the removal of the American troops in Nicaragua boosted the ego of the United States government more than ever.

While Solórzano served as president of Nicaragua, he got rid of the majority of liberal politicians in his government. However, this did not stop a conservative rebel group from removing Solórzano from power and replaced him with Emiliano Chamorro, who had previously served as president from 1917-1921. The overthrow of Solórzano happened only months after the United States removed their troops. It is without doubt that the United States began to worry about the stability of the country that they had a significant interest in because of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty that had been signed a decade earlier. With this in mind, and a fear of liberal-conservative violence erupting, the United States sent Marines back to Nicaragua in May 1926.

Before Washington sent Marines back to Nicaragua in 1926, the United States occupied Nicaragua from 1912 until 1925. During this time, there were as many as 2700 Marines that helped occupy the country. Beginning in May 1926, the bulk of direct intervention in Nicaragua for the second time began. By February 1927, there were more than 5400 American Marines in Nicaragua that were occupying all of the major cities in the country (Jennings). The number of troops that the United States sent to Nicaragua during this second period of occupation is certainly indicative of how Washington felt about the liberal-conservative violence going on there. Although leaders of the United States constantly justified the intervention in Nicaragua by saying that it was protecting people and helping to create a stable country and government, it cannot be denied that the United States always had intended winners and losers before they stepped foot onto Nicaraguan land.

On January 10, 1927, President Calvin Coolidge addressed Congress on the matter of the United States intervention in Nicaragua. The speech was particularly interesting because of the way that he framed the intentions of the United States. Coolidge explains:

> The proprietary rights of the United States in the Nicaraguan canal route, with the necessary implications growing out of it affecting the Panama Canal, together with the obligations flowing from the investments of all classes of our citizens in Nicaragua, place us in a position of peculiar responsibility. I am sure it is not the desire of the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of Nicaragua or of any Central American republic. Nevertheless, it must be said that we have a very definite and special interest in the maintenance of order and good government in Nicaragua at the present time, and that the stability, prosperity, and independence of all Central American countries can never be a matter of indifference to us.

In examining the uses of hard and soft power in Nicaragua by the United States, it has been a constant theme that the leaders of the United States attempt to justify their actions

by the use of appealing to the American citizens. Not only that, but they constantly tried to make themselves out to be the neutral peacekeeper with no material incentives. Throughout the history of American intervention in Nicaragua, they clearly had intentions to intervene in order to force an outcome that favors the United States. Coolidge ended his address to Congress by saying:

> Consequently, I deem it my duty to use the powers committed to me to ensure the adequate protections of all American interests in Nicaragua, whether they be endangered by internal strife or by outside interference in the affairs of that republic.

President Coolidge did a good job in the speech of reiterating the fact that the interventions in Nicaragua were for the people of American and to protect their stakes in the country. It has always been important for leaders in America to justify their actions in order to get Americans behind them. His speech needed to frame the actions taken by the United States in Nicaragua in a way that would convince the American people that this was in their best interest, as well as for Nicaragua.

Although the United States had sent Marines down to Nicaragua to regain stability in the region, violence resumed when former Vice President Juan Bautista Sacasa returned from exile to reclaim his rights to the presidency. Following the typical American routine, Washington sent someone to mediate a peace agreement between the parties at war. Henry L. Stimson was sent to Nicaragua in April 1927. Within a month, Stimson formed a peace treaty that was signed by Nicaraguan President Diaz and the leader of one of the liberal rebel forces, General Jose Maria Moncada. The treaty was known as the Pact of Espino Negro. It stated that President Diaz would finish his term as president and allow the United States military to remain in Nicaragua to maintain stability and supervise the 1928 elections. The treaty also called for disarming the liberal

rebel forces and the government. However, two other liberal rebel groups refused to sign the treaty by orders of their respective leaders, Augusto Cesar Sandino and Juan Bautista Sacasa.

Following the rejection of the Pact of Espino Negro by Sacasa and Sandino, Sacasa left the country. Sandino, on the other hand, stayed in Nicaragua to continue the fight against American intervention in Nicaragua. Sandino was heavily involved in the liberal rebellion against the Nicaraguan government, as well as the United States. After the signing of the peace pact, Sandino reorganized his group of rebels to form the Army for the Defense of Nicaraguan Sovereignty (Ejercito Defensor de la Soberania de Nicaragua-EDSN). The EDSN would continue the guerrilla warfare against the United States troops in Nicaragua. Sandino got widespread recognition and support for his fight against the United States. He wrote a manifesto on July 1 1927 in which he explained his hatred from American intervention. Sandino wrote:

> Come, morphine addicts, come and kill us in our own land. I await you before my patriotic soldiers, feet firmly set, not worried about how many of you there may be. But keep in mind that when this happens the Capitol Building in Washington will shake with the destruction of your greatness, and our blood will redden the white doom of your famous White House, the cavern where you concoct your crimes (LatinAmericaStudies.Org).

He continued to make people aware that the intervention by the United States still had a lot to do with the canal rights in Nicaragua:

> The world would be an unbalanced place if it allowed the United States of America to rule alone over our canal, because this would mean placing us at the mercy of the Colossus of the North, forcing us into a dependent and tributary role to persons of bad faith who would be our masters without justifying such pretensions in any way (LatinAmericanStudies.Org).

Following the significant damage that had been done by Sandinos forces in Nicaragua and the undeniable feeling that the violence could not be tamed, the United States attempted to create peace in a different way. They created the Nicaraguan National

Guard, which would be nonpartisan, in an attempt to control internal conflicts within the country. After the United States felt as though it had basically formed the country to the way they wanted it to be, the American troops left Nicaragua in 1933. With the American troops invading Nicaragua being the main cause of violence for Sandino and his EDSN, Sandino agreed to have discussions with newly elected President of Nicaragua, Juan Bautista Sacasa, who returned to the country in order to participate in the elections.

With American troops leaving Nicaragua in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt that it would be necessary to speak about the American actions in Latin America. Although President Franklin Roosevelt talked about the Good Neighbor Policy in his inaugural address, President Herbert Hoover coined the term after a trip to Latin America. President Hoover said in 1928, "We have a desire to maintain not only the cordial relations of governments with each other, but also the relations of good neighbors," (DeConde 18). The idea behind the Good Neighbor Policy was to create better relations with Latin American countries following the use of hard power intervention in Nicaragua. The United States had intervened in Nicaragua for a long time before leaders in Washington started to think it was not a good idea. On March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt gave his inaugural speech and addressed the idea of the United States being a good neighbor. President Roosevelt said:

> In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor – the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others – the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors (The American Presidency Project).

This was a big step for the United States as the new president was explaining the Amerians' new attitude towards Latin America. However, after stating the idea of the Good Neighbor Policy, he made it clear that it was what the people wanted in America.

Not only that, but he goes on to insinuate the idea that America needs to make up for the wrongdoings that were done in Latin America, and especially Nicaragua. He continues:

> If I read the temper of our people correctly, we now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take but we must give as well; that if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline, because without such discipline no progress will be made, no leadership becomes effective (The American Presidency Project).

Even though this is a massive change in direction for Washington concerning intervention in Latin America, there is one thing that has stayed the same between what different American Presidents have said when addressing Latin American intervention. They continually stress the idea that the United States needs to work towards a common good. It is almost as if Roosevelt is not saying that intervening won't happen, but rather, when America does, there needs to be better reasons to do so. Constant justification by American leaders concerning Latin American intervention has been a trend throughout history. Although American troops were out of Nicaragua by this time, the United States still had an interest in Nicaragua and it would not be long before Nicaragua was on the minds of all leaders in Washington. With the American troops gone, political change was in the works in Nicaragua.

President Sacasa offered Sandino amnesty, land, and guards in order to end the violence. However, after a meeting at the presidential palace with Sacasa and Sandino, Sandino was taken by members of the National Guard and executed. These orders came from the leader of the National Guard, Anastasio Somoza Garcia. This would end up being a key strategic move for Somoza that would lead himself, and his family, to controlling the country of Nicaragua for more than the next four decades.

With Sacasa's declining popularity in Nicaragua and Somoza's ability to bring together the National Guard and the Liberal Party, Somoza was able to win the presidential election in 1936. Somoza beat Sacasa by an unheard of margin of 107,201 to 108 votes (Merrill). He resumed his role of chief director of the National Guard and combined it with being President of Nicaragua. This began his control of a military dictatorship in Nicaragua.

In the beginning of his presidency, Somoza gained his power through three main sources: "the ownership or control of large portions of the Nicaraguan economy, the military support of the National Guard, and his acceptance and support from the United States" (Merrill). Many of the political elite in the United States were fond of Somoza in the beginning because of his grasp on the English language and his favorable personality. However, it was undeniable that Somoza was capable of, and pursued, being a heavily feared dictator. Nonetheless, the United States condoned the leadership of Somoza because he was willing to support the United States.

In less than two years after Somoza was elected, he used the power that he held to extend his term as president. In 1938, he created an assembly made up of his constituents that gave the president full authoritarian power as well as electing him for another eight-year term (Merrill). By this point, it would seem to be impossible for the United States to not recognize that Somoza was abusing his power. The United States had been notorious for removing these types of leaders in the past. Therefore, it was not out of the realm of possibility that one would think that the United States would do something about this. However, it was also known that the United States wanted nothing more than to have

leaders in power of other countries that were willing to serve and support the United States, and that was exactly what Somoza did.

With the onset of World War II, President Somoza became a supporter for the Allies, and more importantly the United States. Nicaragua became of big source of raw materials for the Allies and in return, a vast amount of money was given to Nicaragua for their economy and military capabilities. It was during this time, that more than 90% of Nicaragua's exports were going to the United States (Merrill). By the end of World War II, Somoza had personally acquired about $60 million American dollars.

Although Somoza had gained a lot of currency during the war, there was also growing opposition internally, as well as internationally, towards Somoza's dictatorship. Now that the war was over, the United States got what they needed from Somoza, they were ready to realize what Somoza was doing to his country. By 1944, Somoza had plans of running in the election. This was openly opposed by the United States. The widespread opposition to Somoza was too obvious for him not to notice. His solution was to create a puppet government for him to rule from behind the scenes. He chose an elderly Leonardo Arguello because he believed that he had the power to control him. There was a lot of support for Arguello's competitor, Enoc Aguado. However, in typical Somoza fashion, he rigged the Electoral College by using the government and the National Guard to ensure an Arguello victory. Somoza remained the chief director of the National Guard while Arguello took office on May 1, 1947. This was an interesting time for this transaction to occur because this was when the Cold War was just beginning.

Between the years of 1850 and 1947, which for my purposes I am calling this the Imperial Era, there were many interactions between the United States and Nicaragua.

Beginning with the soft power of the Clayton-Bulwer Act and ending the era with the beginning of the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, there were many examples of the use of hard and soft power by the United States towards Nicaragua. The relationship between the two countries varied throughout this Imperial Era, mainly due to who the leaders were throughout the era. The controversy with the intended canal in Nicaragua had a lot to do with the interactions between the two countries. Although the Panama Canal had been built and owned by the Americans, it did not stop them from wanting to keep the rights to the possibility of creating a canal in Nicaragua in the future. This caused the United States to enact a lot of soft power by using treaties and doctrines in order to keep the rights to using Nicaragua. The hard power came from the United States not agreeing with certain leaders in Nicaragua. Starting in 1909 with Zelaya, the next couple of decades were filled with Presidential transitions in Nicaragua by the use of American Marines. Following the Imperial Era, we move into the Cold War Era. With the use of both hard and soft power used by the United States in the Imperial Era, we will see if there are any transitions in the use of hard and soft power in the Cold War Era.

Chapter 2: The Cold War Era

The Cold War Era is commonly known as being between the years 1947 and 1991. Although the Cold War is mainly known as tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, both nations were fighting to gain more allies around the world. For the United States, they would do anything to prohibit more countries from joining the Soviets and becoming communist. I think that the Cold War era was a very interesting time for the United States because the use of hard power was used heavily. Political leaders in Washington were doing everything in their power in order to keep countries from siding with the Soviets. In Nicaragua, during the Cold War era, there were many changed in presidents. This caused the United States to constantly worry about whether Nicaragua would side with them or the Soviets.

By 1947, the United States realized that Somoza was a dictator and they feared that he would join the communist trend. Even though Somoza was not officially the President of Nicaragua at this time, they still knew that he was running the show from behind.

With Somoza's approval ratings dropping significantly, he put Leonardo Arguello in charge. Arguello was sworn in on May 1, 1947. Although Somoza retained his position as the Chief Director of the National Guard, he was still pulling the strings for Arguello as he was being used as a puppet. However, Arguello did not see himself in the role that Somoza wanted him to play and began to challenge him. With Somoza being in command of the National Guard, he quickly staged a military coup and overthrew the Arguello government. Following the coup, Somoza appointed a family friend to the presidency, Benjamin Lacayo Sacasa.

With the constant changes of leadership in Nicaragua, President Harry S. Truman decided to withhold diplomatic recognition from the new Nicaraguan government in an attempt to stabilize the country. Somoza knew that the support of the United States was imperative in order to have a legitimate government and country. In order to regain the favor of the United States Somoza assigned a Constitute Assembly to write a new constitution. Thus, the Constitution of 1947 was strongly worded with anti-communist rhetoric in an attempt to win back the United States. Unfortunately for Nicaragua, the United States continued their lack of support for the government in Nicaragua even after the constitutional change. Following the signing of the constitution, Somoza appointed his uncle, Victor Roman Reyes, as president.

Even with the large amount of anti-communist rhetoric in the new Nicaraguan constitution, it seemed as though the government was trying to win the favor of the anti-communist Americans, as well as the communist party in Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Nicaraguese). In an attempt to gain the favor of the PSN, the government enhanced liberal labor policies. Between 1947 and 1950 it seemed as though the Nicaraguan government was attempting to please all sectors of the political spectrum during the onset of the Cold War. By 1950, Somoza was elected as President again in general elections. In typical Somoza fashion, Congress amended the constitutional law in order for him to be reelected for another term in 1955.

Throughout Somoza's multiple reigns as President of Nicaragua, there had been many people/groups that opposed him. During his final stint as president, Somoza was very insecure about the safety of himself and his family (US Library of Congress). He created a more secure compound around his residence, as well as more bodyguards that

were outside of his usual protection, the National Guard. However, on September 21, 1956, Anastasio Somoza Garcia was shot and fatally wounded while attending a PLN party in Leon to celebrate his nomination for presidency. Rigoberto Lopez Perez, who was a twenty-seven year old Nicaraguan poet, had managed to slip through Somozas security had shot Somoza. Somoza died only eight days later.

Although this was the end of the reign of Somoza Garcia, it did not stop his family from taking over the family business. His eldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, succeeded him as President of Nicaragua in 1956. As for the National Guard, Somozas other son, Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza Debayle, took the reign. Interestingly enough, both sons had been educated in the United States. Luis was a United States-trained engineer, while Tachito graduated from West Point.

Following the assassination of his father, Luis Somoza turned the Nicaraguan government into a repressive regime. The government in Nicaragua, under Luis Somoza, tortured and imprisoned political opponents, imposed press censorship, and suspended many civil liberties. By 1957, the Conservative Party refused to participate in elections in protest of the lack of liberties that were given to the citizens of Nicaragua. It seemed as though the two Somoza brothers, one that was President of Nicaragua and the other the leader of the National Guard, learned a lot from their father's time as President. They decided to create a puppet opposition in order to create the facade that the elections would be democratic. Luis Somoza Debayle won the presidency in 1957 and ran the government from 1957 to 1963. During these six years, Luis made some changes in order to please more of the citizens in Nicaragua. He provided more freedoms to citizens,

raised hopes for even more liberalization, as well as restoring the constitutional ban on reelection.

During the presidency of Luis Somoza Debayle, countries around the world were beginning to take sides with the Cold War heating up. Like his father, Luis continued the anti-communist rhetoric within the government. This led to a favorable stance with the other elites in the Nicaraguan government, but more importantly, it won the favor of the United States. Nicaragua was also one of the first countries to outwardly speak out against the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro's communist revolution. In fact, Luis Somoza Debayle's government played a key role in helping the United States execute the Bay of Pigs in 1961.

On April 15, 1961 a group of Cuban exiles took off from Nicaraguan bases to invade Cuba. The Bay of Pigs was constructed under the supervision of the new American President, John F. Kennedy. The ones that actually took part in the Bay of Pigs were Cuban exiles that did not agree with the Cuban Revolution that was occuring in their home country. In order to execute the operation, the American CIA trained and equipped the exiles. With President Debayle of Nicaragua openly discouraging the communist revolution at the time, he offered to help in the Bay of Pigs. For the United States, this was a massive gesture. Countries were either siding with the communists or the anti-communists. Although the operation did not go quite as planned for the Americans, it was still seen as a sign of friendship between the two countries. Although the President and government of Nicaragua were against the Communist revolution, it did not take long for communist groups in Nicaragua to begin to form.

The main communist group that had formed in Nicaragua was known as the Frente Sandanista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). According to Idean Salehyan:

> The FSLN was formed in 1961 out of a number of leftist organizations, including the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, the Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth, and the Frente Revolucionario Sandino, and received inspiration from the recent success of the Cuban Revolution. (Miranda and Ratliff 1993)

The FSLN, also known as the Sandinistas, got their name from Augusto Cesar Sandino, who opposed conservative leaders in Nicaragua during the 1920's and 1930's. Sandinistas believed in ending the political and economic ties with the United States, as well as advocating for economic reforms in order to compete with the wealth inequality that was in Nicaragua (Salehyan 126). Although the FSLN was formed in 1961, initial attacks by the communist group against the Nicaraguan government did not begin until 1970.

Between the years 1963 and 1967, trusted friends of the Somoza family held the presidency. During the 1967 election in Nicaragua, Luis Somoza Debayle was not able to run because of his poor health. However, it did not stop the Somoza family from taking back the presidency. Luis' brother, Anastasio Somoza Debayle won the election and became President of Nicaragua, as well as retaining his role as the Director of the National Guard. Two months later, Luis Somoza Debayle died of a heart attack. Now that the newest President of Nicaragua from the Somoza family had complete control over the government and military, there were opposition groups that began to form on the basis of corruption and the use of force by the government. It made sense that the FSLN began to directly attack the government during his time as president.

Besides the political asspects that were controlling the attention in Nicaragua at the time, a meeting between the Managua and Washington in 1970 would have a large

impact for the future. With the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty still in effect from 1914, Nicaragua wanted to get rid of the American rights to building a canal in Nicaragua. It had been over 50 years that the United States had held the rights to the unbuilt canal and had not done anything with it. The meeting took place between the two capitals and they were able to agree to abolish the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. Although it did not have much of an impact right away, it would have an influential impact in a little less than 40 years in the future.

The Sandinistas began attacking in the early 1970's. They did this in response to the new Somoza government that "engaged in a campaign of repression, including censorship of the media, the arrest of political opponents, and widespread torture and executions", (Salehyan 126). Growing opposition towards Somoza was continuing. However, he was not ready to give up his leadership when his term came to an end in 1971. In response, he amended the constitution in order to stay in power another year. With strong opposition to Somoza from competing parties, as well as within his own, he signed a political agreement to allow a bi-party system to rule Nicaragua, known as the Kupia-Kumi Pact (Jorge Le Blanc 209). Beginning in May 1972, until 1974, the bi- party junta led the Nicaraguan government.

With another election in 1974, Anastasio Somoza Debayle saw the chance to take back his power in Nicaragua. Following the power and money that the Somoza family had gained from the earthquake that stuck Nicaragua in 1972, Somoza was ready to run in the election despite the opposition from much of the country, including his own party. Anastasio increased the amount of intolerance to his opposition, as well as censorship of

the press and media. Nevertheless, Somoza, once again, won the election of 1974 and became President of Nicaragua.

During the years between 1975 and 1978, the FSLN split into three different sections because of their differences in ideology and strategy. Author John A. Booth describes the main differences between the different factions:

> This schism stemmed from several factors: (1) the heavy military pressure applied by the government after the imposition of a state of siege in 1974, which made communication among the different operational fronts difficult; (2) necessary strategic and tactical differences imposed by the distinct operating environments of the isolated fronts; and (3) ideological divergence brought into the FSLN by its rapid growth in the 1970s, and nurtured by the increasingly broadly based opposition elements that fed the FSLN with recruits. (180)

With the FSLN growing in numbers due to the repression of the government, it made sense that it would be difficult for the entire group to have a united front. However, if the world thought that the FSLN was growing in numbers during this time, they had no idea what their numbers would look like by the beginning of 1978.

The assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal on January 10, 1978 united the different FSLN factions against the Somoza government. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal was the editor of the newspaper *La Prensa*. Pedro wrote an article in *La Presna* about the operations of Plasmaferesis, which was a business that was partly ran by Somoza's son, Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero. This business was taking the blood of poor Nicaraguans and selling it to the United States for huge profits. In retaliation for printing the article, the leaders of the business had Pedro shot. Fifty thousand people protested the actions by the Somoza regime and the assassination. This is frequently seen as the turning point for the FSLN and gave them to power and numbers to organize as a single unit against the Somozas.

On July 17, 1979 Anastasio Somoza fled the country of Nicaragua fearful for his life from the overwhelming amount of support for the FSLN. Two days later, the FSLN itself became the governing body of Nicaragua. It did not take long for the FSLN to show how they felt about the Somoza regime. Only one day after taking over the government, the FSLN took away all of the Somoza's property, revoked the current constitution, and formally dissolved the government that Somoza ruled (Henighan 227). This was just the beginning of the changes that were made in Nicaragua when the FSLN took over. Within the next month, the financial system and foreign trade were nationalized, the death penalty was abolished, and a bill of rights was passed (Henighan 227). This bill of rights was known as the Estatudo de Derechos y Garantia de los Nicaraguenses (Statute of Rights and Guarentees of the Nicaraguans). Miraculously, the FSLN seemed to be doing everything that they advocated for before they were in charge of the country. These changes did not stop. One of the main aspects of life that the FSLN wanted to change was the standard of living for the citizens of Nicaragua. The FSLN accomplished this by making university education free, passing a law to combat unemployment, and strictly controlled rent prices (Henighan 227). The Sandinista Peoples Army was also formed relatively soon following the FSLN takeover and consisted of the guerilla forces that fought for the FSLN. Humberto Ortega was the leader of the New Nicaraguan Army. In the beginning, the United States, under the Carter administration, was on peaceful terms with the new Nicaraguan government (Henighan 227).

During the Carter administration the United States was on good terms with Nicaragua and their new government. However, there were still people in Nicaragua that still held loyalty to the Somoza regime. The people that opposed the new government of

the FSLN united to become a group that was known as the Contras. The Contras were mainly made up of members of the old National Guard. However, there were still people that became part of the contra group that had initially fought for the FSLN to gain power in Nicaragua. Peasants that were living in the rural areas of Nicaragua that had previously fought for the FSLN were turning against them because of their radical reforms to the country (Salehyan 127). Although many believe that the Contras were being backed by the United States from the beginning of their creation, this is not true. As stated before, the Carter administration actually favored the FSLN government in the beginning. Initially, after the FSLN takeover, Carter was sending financial aid to the Sandinista government in order to try to keep them away from aligning with the Soviet Union (Salehyan 127). However, this relationship did not last for long.

During this era, the United States were mainly concerned with countries turning to the Soviet Union for help and becoming communist countries. The main threat that seemed to turn the United States against the FSLN government was when the United States realized that Nicaragua was sending weapons to El Salvador for the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) (Henighan 227). The problem that the United States had with this was the fact that the FMLN was a communist group in El Salvador. Members of the FSLN saw this as their duty to help the revolution and to support the rebels. With the election in the United States happening in 1980, we saw a vast change on where Nicaragua stood with the United States as the Carter administration was replaced with newly elected President, Ronald Reagan.

One of Ronald Reagans' first act as president was to cancel a delivery of $15 million in economic aid to Nicaragua that was ordered by Jimmy Carter (Henighan 228).

This first act towards Nicaragua by Reagan certainly set the tone for the stance that the United States would take under the new president. Not only did the United States stop supporting Nicaragua, but also they shifted their support to the Contras. With the support of the United States behind the Contras, the FSLN began to fear that they could be an actual threat. This drove the FSLN to deepen their ties with other powerful communist countries, like Cuba and the Soviet Union. This would lead to Nicaragua being a key figure during the Cold War era.

President Reagan began to further his actions towards Nicaragua by doing anything he could to stop money being sent to the country. In 1981, the Reagan administration pressured the Inter-American Development Bank to withhold loans that they were going to be sending to Nicaragua (Henighan 228). With the country in trouble with fighting between the Contras and the FSLN, Nicaragua was looking for money to repair the country. Although the Inter-American Development Bank approved the loans to Nicaragua, which added up to $500 million, the United States used their veto to deny the money going to Nicaragua and the FSLN.

Even though Reagan was trying to bring down the FSLN for siding with the communists, the FSLN had been making a lot of changes in order to support the lower classes in Nicaragua. In 1980, they ran a National Literacy campaign and officially labeled the year as “Literacy Year” (Booth 181). In 1981, the sheer number of primary school teachers had tripled and for the first time in Nicaragua’s history, most of the children were attending school (Henighan 288). The next year, in 1982, former members of the National Literacy Campaign worked together in order to go across the country to educate people on the dangers of polio and the prevention of it. However, the same year,

Ronald Reagan approved a $19 million aid package to the Contras to combat the FSLN in Nicaragua (Henighan 229). Although the Nicaraguan government was actually doing a lot of good for their citizens, the Reagan administration only saw them as communist and would do anything in order to stop them.

Although the Contras had the support of the Reagan administration, it was difficult for them to operate in Nicaragua with the FSLN in charge. With this being the case, the Contras relied heavily on neighboring countries to harbor the Contra fighters. The two countries that helped the Contras were Honduras and Costa Rica. These strategic bases were important for the Contras when fighting against the FSLN. With Costa Rica and Honduras bordering the top and bottom of Nicaragua, it was as if the Contras were surrounding the country. Furthermore, it allowed the Contras to recruit anyone fleeing the country because of the FSLN. As a result of these bases on the borders of Nicaragua, most of the fighting occurred around the bases.

Within the first term that Ronald Reagan held the presidency in the United States, he made it very clear that he was in support of the Contras. However, between 1982 and 1983, elites in Washington began to express their displeasure with the amount of military and monetary support that the rebels were getting from the United States. On December 8, 1982, there was a unanimous vote within Congress to prohibit the Pentagon or the CIA from arming and training the Contra rebels (Henighan 230). This bill was known as the Defense Appropriations Act 411-0. With little regard to Congress, the Reagan administration continued to send money down to the Contras in Honduras.

With the Reagan administration openly going against the ruling of Congress on the topic of supporting the Contras, leaders in Washington that opposed Reagan's

handling of the Contras decided there needed to be amendments added to the Defense Appropriations Act in order to further the restriction of American support for the Contras. Edward Boland was a Democrat Congressman that purposed the first Boland Amendment. This was an effort to limit the possibility of there being a war between Honduras and Nicaragua (Hayes 1566). The problem was that the Contras, which were being supported by the United States, were largely held on the border of Honduras and Nicaragua. There was fear in Congress that the United States would be responsible for the possible emergence of a war by supporting the Contras. The first Boland Amendment prohibited the Department of Defense and the CIA from using their appropriated funds for the fiscal year of 1983 to support any military or paramilitary group whose purpose was to overthrow the government of Nicaragua (Hayes 1566).

With the failure of the first Boland Amendment, the next three years would be filled with revising the amendment and would include six more versions. Most of the problems with the previous amendment attempts had to do with the wording about what amount, if any, of American money should be sent to the Contras. By October 1986, the Boland VII was implemented. This final attempt would allow the United States to continue with military aid and humanitarian assistance (Hayes 1569). However, Congress divided the categories of aid into humanitarian and non-humanitarian. This allowed for a lot of leeway for the United States to interoperate as they wished. Boland VII also included the need for Congress to oversee any expenditure. Overall, the Boland Amendments did not amount to much in the way of restricting the United States from intervening in Nicaragua.

Although the Boland Amendment prohibited the United States from supporting the Contras, it did not stop them from getting money and training by the United States. With that help, the Contras were growing even stronger. Although this was a problem for the FSLN, this was not the only major challenge for the government in Nicaragua. In 1980, the FSLN agreed to assume Somoza's national debt when they took over his power. With the national debt being very high for Nicaragua, the United States would constantly block economic aid to Nicaragua and fighting the Contras was severely hurting the economy of Nicaragua. However, this did not stop the FSLN from fighting the Contras with everything they had and not allowing them to enter Nicaragua. For the first time, since the United States began intervening in Nicaragua, the Contras were not able to establish a foothold within the borders of Nicaragua (Henighan 230).

Once again, in 1983, Nicaragua and the FSLN were doing something great for the country and their people, yet the United States felt that they needed to intervene because of Nicaragua's connection to communism. 1983 was the year that the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) declared Nicaragua an international model in the field of public health (Henighan 231). This upset the United States greatly because the United Nations were recognizing a communist country for the good that they were doing within their country. To make matters worse for Washington, Nicaragua won a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council. With this new power, they were able to pass a bill in May stating that prohibited foreign intervention in Central America (Henighan 231). Reagan, however, did not abide by these rules and decided to continue his efforts to bring down the FSLN. He did this by implementing an operation called Big Pine II.

The operation under the name Big Pine II was in direct defiance of the United Nations' agreement to prohibit intervention in Central America. The purpose of the operation was to stimulate the United States intervention in Honduras to help the Contras make their way into Nicaragua. Operation Big Pine II lasted from August 1983 to January 1984. Within that time span of 5 months, the United States sent "nineteen ships, over two hundred jet fighters, and twenty thousand personnel" to Honduras (LeoGrande 317). In fact, the author, Henighan states that this was the largest military presence in Central America to date (231). With this amount of support from the United States, the attacks on Nicaragua began to take a toll on the country.

On October 10, 1983, a CIA-trained unit used speedboats and helicopters to blow up the country's oil supplies in the town of Corinto, on the coast of Nicaragua (Henighan 231). Within the next few days, the CIA ordered a pipeline in Nicaragua to be blown up in Puerto Sandino (Henighan 231). These were the main attacks that occurred during the Washington-backed Big Pine II operation. This strategic use of hard power by the United States was used in the same fashion as when Reagan used his power to create a blockade of financial aid to the FSLN and Nicaragua. Blocking resources to communist countries seemed to be a trend within the American government, similar to the embargo that was placed on Cuba that began in the 1960s. Even though the Big Pine II officially ended in January 1984, in February 1984 the CIA mined Nicaragua's ports (Henighan 231). With the United States disregarding all bills and restrictions towards intervention in Central America, the United States began to gain more enemies during an era that they needed as many allies as possible.

Although Nicaraguan elections were set to be held in 1985, the FSLN strategically moved them two days before the United States presidential elections in November 1984. The Nicaragua government decided to do this, "so that a reelected Reagan … would have a harder time justifying an attack on Nicaragua" (LeoGrande 370). Daniel Ortega was on the ticket as the representative of the FSLN. With the elections being certified as fair by international observers, Ortega won with 67% of the vote and won 61 out of 96 seats in the National Assembly (Henighan 232). Even though there were international observers to make sure that the elections were as fair as possible, this did not stop the United States media from claiming that the elections were fraudulent. To make matters worse, the United States Secretary of State, George Schultz claimed in United States media that the Nicaraguan elections were, "Sham elections on the Soviet model" (LeoGrande 375). The media propaganda against the FSLN within the United States media only intensified following the FSLN presidential election win of Daniel Ortega.

Brad Roth believed that the propaganda in the United States media was successful in obscuring the minds of the American citizens on what was happening in Central America during this time. Roth wrote:

> In subsequent years, the US media would allow Administration spokespersons and supporters to make uncontradicted references to Nicaragua's government as unelected, and to compare Nicaragua unfavorably to 'the four Central American democracies' to which it was an alleged menace. (353)

The United States media was doing their best to try to persuade the American people that the United States should be doing everything in their power to bring down the FSLN because of the trouble that they were causing within the region. Even Hollywood movies in the United States began to create propaganda against the FSLN, as a type of

continuation of the red scare. The movie *Red Dawn* (1984) was actually about the United States having to fight off a Nicaraguan-Soviet invasion (Henighan 233). By boosting the idea that the FSLN should be brought down within the United States media, it helped the Reagan administration to continue to justifiably support the Contras.

The last few years of the 1980's were filled with United States congressional debates on whether Washington should be funding the Contras. The problem was that none of the peace agreements were working to end the violence within Central America because of the Contra-FSLN violence. In 1986, the Reagan administration was given $100 million from Congress and an additional $100 million from the Senate to fund the Contras (Henighan 233). 1986 would end up being a very important year for the United States and Nicaragua, as this was the year that the Iran-Contra scandal began to break out and it was also the year that Esquipulas Peace Agreement had been started and would end up being an important plan.

With regards to the peace agreements that would come about in the 1980's, it was made pretty clear that getting the FSLN and the Contras to come to an agreement to end the fighting would be difficult. At this point, it was not possible for there to be a peace agreement without the participation of surrounding Central American countries. With the United States, and the Contras, using the countries that surrounded Nicaragua as part of their strategy for taking over the FSLN, these countries that were being used were a very large part of the process. Overall, the peace process would take place within two major phases. The first attempt at creating a peace plan came in January 1983 and was known as the Contadora process. The Contadora plan was actually brought to the table by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama, who pressured El Salvador, Guatemala,

Nicaragua, and Costa Rica to meet because of their growing worry about a regional war and the influence of the United States in the region (Salehyan 132 & 133). The fact that countries that were not even involved with the fighting speaks volumes to how countries in the region felt about not only the war, but also the majority feeling in the region to the amount of United States intervention.

The Contadora plan originally laid out twenty-one objectives within the document. These objectives attempted to accomplish a few main problems that the region was witnessing, including; a halt to the Central American arms race, the prohibition of military interference by actors outside of the region, democratization, and most importantly, stopping the support for insurgent groups in neighboring countries (Salehyan 133). Although Washington gave rhetorical support for the plan, it was only expressed that the United States agreed with the plan because otherwise it would have looked like they were trying to continue the war within the region. Within the Reagan administration, the agreement was seen as not being in the United States' interests at all. This was because it would give legitimization to the FSLN government, and took away the power of the United States to intervene in Central America (Salehyan 133).

With the United States not being fully on board with the original Contadora plan, they decided to intervene with the document and make some alterations that would benefit them. The United States knew that their allies that held the Contras on the borders of Nicaragua ha d a lot of leveraging that they could use during these negotiations. Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador were basically working for the United States within the negotiations of the Contadora plan. Although the United States was not officially invited to the talks, they gave the three countries the ideas of how to get what

they wanted out of the peace agreements. The United States had the three countries try to make the plan as difficult and demanding for the FSLN to sign as possible. They wanted them to decline the plan and put them in a negative light internationally (Saheyan 133).

The final draft of the treaty provided the final points to the document. These final points included Nicaragua expelling all Soviet military advisors, stopping all arms imports, reducing the size of Nicaragua's army, end Nicaragua's support for the guerrillas in El Salvador, hold multiparty elections, and allow external advisors to make sure there was compliance with these points (Salehyan 133). The United States believed that this would be too much for the FSLN government to agree to and that the United States would be able to get their way once again. However, this plan completely backfired. On September 21, 1984, Nicaragua accepted the terms of the Contadora plan. With the United States shocked by this result, they claimed that the agreement was just a bunch of talking points and was not a finalized document to be adhered by (Salehyan 134).

Needless to say, this draft of the Contadora plan did not succeed at all. Over the next couple of years there were different revisions, and none of them worked. The third and final draft of the Contadora plan was proposed in June 1986. Once again, the parties could not come to an agreement because of the failed support in Nicaragua due to the stipulations of foreign support for the Contras. This would end the attempts at using the Contadora as the document for peace. As a result of the failed peace agreement, the Reagan administration used it as a way to overcome the objections in Congress for support of the Contras and was given $100 million in military and logistical aid to the Contras (Salehyan 134). Although this was a failed first attempt, it would only be the first phase of agreeing to peace within the region.

The real turning point in peace negotiations within Central America came throughout the year of 1986. Although the United States was not formally invited to the agreement process with the Contradora, they certainly made an impact on the way the peace negotiations would go in the years to come. On June 25, 1986, the International Court of Justice in The Hague found the United States guilty of being an aggressor state towards Nicaragua and ordered the United States to pay Nicaragua for all damage that was caused by the Contras and the CIA (Henighan 234). However, up to this time, anytime that the United States was ordered to take responsibility for their actions within Nicaragua they did not comply. This was no exception to history. The United States refused to reconcile with Nicaragua for the damage that was caused. Although Nicaragua made constant efforts to open a dialogue with the United States, the Reagan administration refused, unless the FSLN recognized the Contras as a legitimate opposition (Henighan 234). This act by the United States would further the distance that was building between Washington and the rest of the Central American governments.

The final straw for the Central American governments that were willing to work with the United States was the outbreak of the Iran-Contra Scandal. Not only that, but it was the most profound example of the United States interfering in the Nicaraguan War with the Contras. It became an international scandal because it involved a third party into the mix. In 1985, Iran was in a war with Iraq. Iran came to the United States in an attempt to buy weapons in order to fight the Iraqis. With President Reagan still trying to do everything he count to support the Contra efforts, he felt that there would be a way that this could benefit them. With the Boland Amendment becoming very strong and doing everything that it could to stop the American support for the Contras, the sale of

weapons to Iran would be a way for the United States to cover up sending money to the Contras. This is exactly what the United States did. The scandal would go on for a couple of years and a lot of speculation over who was to blame. In the end, Ronald Reagan was never convicted of any crimes, however, many others were. I believe that the whole scandal is a true example of the lengths that the Reagan administration was willing to go through in order to support the Contras, even if it meant breaking laws.

The next phase towards a peace agreement within the region was signed in August 1987 and was known as Esquipulas treaty. The Presidents of Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala signed this treaty. Similar to the Contradora, Esquipulas was an agreement between the governments within the region and excluded the Contras. One of the most important details that were added to this new peace plan was the abolishment of external rebel bases (Salehyan 135). Along with that, the plan also included national reconciliation commissions within each country, free elections, and an international monitoring mission under the United Nations. Not surprisingly, the United States did not like this peace agreement either. At this point, the countries in Central America had been doing everything in their power to act in accordance with the United States. However, the support for the United States had been slipping quite quickly by this time. With this being the case, the countries that were involved with Esquipulas believed that it was time to take an independent stand and figure things out on their own and do what would benefit them, not the United States. Although the signing of Esquipulas did not bring an immediate stop to the fighting within the region, it was used as a stepping-stone towards the right directions. The process was slow and would require new provisions in the coming years, but it was the first step in

creating a peace agreement in the region that would bring an end to the fighting in Nicaragua.

Although the Esquipulas agreement was a large step in leading towards regional peace in Central America, one of the largest changes that made a difference came with the new President of the United States, George H.W. Bush. Throughout Reagan's time as the President of the United States, he continually supported the Contras. Even if he was ordered by Congress or outside forces to not continue the intervention in Nicaragua, he continued his support. When Bush took office, it was unclear as to how he was going to handle to Contra situation in Nicaragua.

Without the consultation of the United States, five Central American presidents met in El Salvador and agreed to get rid of the Contras in exchange for greater democratization in Nicaragua. Washington was shocked by this agreement. Less than a month later, Bush bargained with Honduras to allow the Contras to stay in the country until the Nicaraguan presidential elections in February 1990. Honduras agreed and was compensated generously. With Bush knowing that the Contras would be in Honduras until the next elections in Nicaragua, he sent $4.5 million a month to the Contras for "humanitarian" aid (Snarr 1). However, Congress retained the right to end any of the aid if there were any offensive military actions by the Contras. On March 24, 1989, Bush said, "We do not claim the right to order the politics of Nicaragua. That is for the Nicaraguan people to decide," (Snarr 2). This was a big change for Washington on the stance towards American intervention in Nicaragua. It was clear that Bush was beginning to move away from the previous Reagan stance on the topic.

On May 30, 1990, the final peace agreement was signed between the Contras and the President of Nicaragua (Salehyan 143). The Managua Protocol on Disarmament was the final agreement between the two sides. By July, a majority of the Contra fighters has handed over their weapons and returned to Nicaragua. Although this did not totally eradicate the Contras, this did bring more peace and stability to the country, in terms of war at least.

This would end the majority of the American intervention in Nicaragua during the Cold War Era. Unfortunately for Nicaragua, this was also a time that the country was beginning to realize that their economy was not doing well. This problem will leak over into the Contemporary era of United States-Nicaragua relations. During the Cold War Era, the United States used a lot of hard power in order to fund the Contras, as well as their own men within Nicaragua. Interestingly enough, some of the money that would be sent to the Contras would be framed within the idea that they were using soft power by trying to help with humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, especially during the Reagan administration, it was almost always the use of hard power.

Chapter 3: Contemporary Era

Throughout the Imperial and Cold War Eras, the United States focused a lot of their attention on Nicaragua. During the Imperial Era, it was in order to gain a foothold within Central America. During the Cold War Era, it was in order to keep Nicaragua from turning to the Soviet side of the war. Within the Contemporary Era, there were long stretches when the United States lost interest in Nicaragua. For the most part, this was due to the fact that the FSLN had been defeated, and the United States felt that it was a good place to leave the country. However, this did not last throughout the era.

Following the height of the FSLN in the 1980's, there was a downfall within the Sandinista party that crippled it when the 1990's came. As agreed upon, the free elections would occur in 1990. The FSLN believed that they would be able to prevail because of the Contras' inability to penetrate Nicaragua and the FSLN government. However, the Nicaraguan economy was not doing well and people were beginning to question their loyalty to the party. With the Contra efforts being diminished by multiple outside factors and peace agreements, the United States decided to go about ousting the FSLN by supporting a candidate for the President of Nicaragua that would benefit them. This was not the first time that the United States interfered with the Nicaraguan elections in this way.

With the election of 1990 coming up, the United States knew, once again, that they did not want Daniel Ortega to be leading Nicaragua. With this being the case, they began to support Violeta Chamorro, who was running against Ortega. As Alejeandro Bendana, founder and president of the Center for International Studies based in Managua, stated, "The choice, as framed by the U.S. government, was between continued war and

resistance with the Sandinistas on the one hand, and an end to war and aggression on the other," (NACLA). On February 25, 1990, the people of Nicaragua elected Violeta Chamorro for President, making her the first woman president in the Americas.

Although Chamorro won the election in February 1990, she did not take office until April of that year. While the FSLN was in power during those two last months, they granted property titles to thousands of low-level loyalists of the FSLN in order to keep them on their side and from being homeless (Henighan 426). The FSLN did this strategically because they did not believe that this would be the last time that they would be running the country. In addition to those motives for the FSLN, they also did this because they believed that if Chamorro tried to reverse these property titles, it would be seen as an act of aggression and would cause more problems for the Chamorro administration.

Unfortunately for the Chamorro government, they had their work cut out for them in attempting to rebuild Nicaragua. The way that they went about trying to rebuild did not benefit many people, and in some cases made things much worse. One of the most important decisions that Chamorro made was her decision to abolish public schooling. This denied thousands of poor Nicaraguan children education because, in many cases, their families were not able to afford the schooling due to the downward spiral of the economy. On the same note, under Chamorro, the new Minister of Education, Humberto Belli, ordered all of the textbooks that were printed during the Sandinista era to be thrown away (Henighan 247). The United States agreed to replace these books by sending monetary aid for the purchases of new books that got the approvals from Washington.

Although this benefited the United States and it seemed that the relationship between the United States and Chamorro was working well, Nicaraguans in both America and Nicaragua expected Chamorro to make changes that never came. Many of Chamorro's supporters in the United States and Nicaragua were under the impression that she would reverse the property titles that were given to the FSLN loyalists by the former government. However, Chamorro decided to charge the people that lived on these properties more if they lived on land with more than 100 meters of space (Henighan 428). This lost her a lot of the United States aid that she was promised. The United States was under the impression that the properties would be given back to people that had fled Nicaragua following the FSLN coup. With Chamorro not getting rid of everything that the FSLN had done while in power, the United States felt that she was betraying them. Following the news of this information, the Helms-Gonzalez amendment was added to the Foreign Assistance Act. This amendment "required the US government to suspend aid to Nicaragua and vote against loans to the country by international organizations on the grounds that President Chamorro had 'seized the property of US citizens,'" (Henighan 428). The only way that the United States was allowed to pass this amendment on this basis was because many of the Nicaraguans that were supporters of Somoza fled to Miami, Florida following the FSLN coup and became American citizens. This ruined the relationship between the United States and Nicaragua. The United States aid that was promised under George H.W. Bush was made illegal following the Helms-Gonzalez amendment. This would end the United States' focus on Nicaragua. When Bill Clinton was elected President of the United States in 1992, he switched the nations' focus from Latin America and moved it towards the Middle East and the Balkans.

Ironically, when the United States began to forget about Latin America, and specifically Nicaragua, the downward spiral that Nicaragua was already in the middle of worsened. Chamorro previously had the support of the poor Nicaraguans that were dismayed with the FSLN during the 1990 elections. However, because of the free social programs that Chamorro took away, that were established under the FSLN, the poor began to protest against the current government. By taking away the free social programs, Chamorro had inadvertently widened the division of social and economic classes within Nicaragua. The lower class began protesting in the streets against the Chamorro government.

The next election for the Presidency of Nicaragua would be held in 1996. Chamorro made a risky decision that had previously gotten a lot of Nicaraguans upset in the past by trying to make her son-in-law her successor. This was against the Nicaraguan Constitution since Somoza regime continued to manipulate the presidency in the past. The two front running contenders in the 1996 Nicaraguan elections were Daniel Ortega, of the FSLN, and Arnoldo Aleman, of the Liberal Party (PLC). Ortega was trying to bring back the loyalty and support that the FSLN once had less than a decade ago. On the other hand, Aleman was running a completely anti-Sandinista platform. Aleman ended up defeating Ortega with 51 per cent to 38 per cent of the votes (Henighan 431). Although Aleman won, the 1996 elections were seen as being manipulated and not done in a professional, democratic manner.

Arnoldo Aleman was firmly against the FSLN and everything that they represented. His father worked in the government under the Somoza regime. When the FSLN took over Nicaragua, Aleman was working for an investment firm and was soon

arrested by the Sandinistas for suspicion of counter-revolutionary activity (Gale Group). Aleman promised that he would work for the poor people of Nicaragua and make their lives better than they were under Chamorro. He also promised to create more radical anti-Sandinista legislation that Chamorro had promised, but did not deliver. Although he was staunchly against any socialist ideals, as the FSLN had, he did manage to build more schools and health centers that were previously destroyed by years of war within Nicaragua (Henighan 431). The huge problem came in 1998, and it would break Nicaragua down once again.

Between October 26 and November 4, 1998, Hurricane Mitch struck Central America. With the death toll reaching over 11,000, it is considered the second worst hurricane that has hit the western hemisphere (National Climate Data Center). Even with Aleman building the new schools and health centers, his approach towards addressing the damage from Hurricane Mitch did not go over well with the people of Nicaragua. Within the country itself, there were over 3,000 people killed and hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans were left homeless. The main problem for the people of Nicaragua was that the hurricane ruined a lot of the soil that they used to make their livings and feed their families. With this being the case, Aleman focused on meeting agricultural production rates rather than trying to dealing with the environmental damage that had been done to the country. In fact, Aleman decided to create a distraction for the people of Nicaragua by creating a national celebration for the reopening of a McDonalds franchise in Managua (Henighan 431).

The devastation that hit Nicaragua in the form of Hurricane Mitch actually brought the country back onto the radars of the leaders in Washington, and especially

President Bill Clinton. President Clinton made it known that the United States would work with Nicaragua until they were fully recovered from the hurricane damage. Four months following Hurricane Mitch, President Clinton went down to the Central American countries that had been hit. One of his main stops was in Nicaragua. He made a number of promises to the Nicaraguan people. President Clinton said that he would lower some trade barriers to make it easier for the country to sell their goods, as well as trying to get a relief aid sent to Nicaragua (BBC News).

The next elections for President of Nicaragua would be held in 2001. With Aleman not being able to run again for President, he chose his Vice-President, Enrique Bolanos, as his successor. Without much surprise, Bolanos had a very similar set of ideals and background as Aleman. Bolanos was heavily anti-Sandinista because his land was taken away in the 1980's by the FSLN and was later jailed by them, similar to Aleman (Henighan 432). Running against Bolanos, once again, was Daniel Ortega, representing the FSLN. Interestingly enough, the Nicaraguan elections took place only two months after the September 11 attacks on the United States. With the United States worried about attacks and looking out for any enemies, the United States ambassador to Nicaragua warned the people that the election of Daniel Ortega would result in Nicaragua being put on the terrorist state list (Henighan 432). Bolanos defeated Ortega with 56 percent of the votes, while Ortega brought in 42 percent.

One of the first actions that President Bolanos took after taking office was to proclaim that his new administration would be running on an anti-corruption platform (Henighan 433). With this being put into place, President Bolanos began his campaign against corruption by taking former President Aleman to court. Arnoldo Aleman was

found guilty of stealing over $100 million from the government and putting it into his own bank account, along with other lesser crimes (Henighan 433). He was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Although Aleman spent most of his time under house arrest in his home, he would be the first Latin American President to be imprisoned for corruption, as well as being named the ninth most corrupt President in the world since 1945 by Transparency International. Interestingly enough, the prosecution of Aleman actually brought the attention of the United States back to Nicaragua.

With the United States electing a new president 2001, Washington turned their focus back to Nicaragua. George W. Bush became president in 2001 and reappointed a lot of the officials that were in power in Washington in the 1980's when the FSLN were in charge of Nicaragua. During the prosecution of Aleman in Nicaragua, President Bolanos and the FSLN were working together on the matter. When Washington got wind of this information, the United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, quickly flew down to Managua to instruct Bolanos to end all dealings with the FSLN (Henighan 433). Although the Contra War had been over for over a decade by this point, Washington officials that were hardliners against the FSLN would not let them gain any power in Nicaragua under any circumstances.

When the 2004 municipal elections in Nicaragua took place, the Sandinistas won twenty-five out of the forty-two seats. With the Sandinistas gaining power following the municipal elections, United States Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfield flew to Managua in order to get President Bolanos to promise to destroy all of Nicaragua's surface-to-air missiles before they fell into the hands of the FSLN (Henighan 433). With the Contras not being effective in the 1980's against the FSLN, it seemed as though the

United States could not bear to lose to them again. The idea of the US-backed fighters not being able to take down an opponent severely hurt Washington leaders. Right before the 2006 elections in Nicaragua, the Bush administration proclaimed that if Daniel Ortega was elected as President, Nicaragua would face the same fate as Iraq (Henighan 433).

However, right before the Nicaraguan elections took place in 2006, a very important piece of legislation came into effect in 2005. The United States wanted to make a variation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) by creating a similar trade pact with the countries in Central America. They did this through the creation of CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement). George W. Bush formulated the idea in 2002. By the time that CAFTA came into effect, the legislation was signed between the United States and six Central American countries including El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic (American Society of International Law 350 & 351). CAFTA consisted of twenty-two articles and three annexes, which loosely reflected those within NAFTA. This was seen as a way for the United States to get back on good terms with Central American countries. However, it came at a very interesting time for the United States and Nicaragua because it came into effect so close to the Nicaraguan elections. Although George W. Bush had thought of the idea about 3 years earlier, he was not able to predict what would occur during the elections of 2006.

On top of the elections that would take place in 2006, President Bolanos made a bold move by releasing his plans to build a new shipping canal through Nicaragua. This was a massive shock to the world because the Panama Canal was already within the region to connect the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. However, the Panama Canal was

quickly coming up on its 100th year since completion in 1914. Ships had changed quite a lot since then, and the canal had not kept up with being able to accommodate these new ships. With the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty being abolished in 1970, the rights to building a canal were back in the hands of Nicaragua. Initially, President Bolanos claimed that his intended canal would cost around $18 billion and take around 12 years to complete (BBC News). This happened right around the time that the President of Panama, Martin Torrijos expressed his interest in a project he called the Panama Canal Expansion Project. The Panama Canal was getting very old, and was not capable of satisfying the needs of the newer and bigger ships that needed to pass through the canal. While the Panama Canal Expansion Project was underway, there were a lot of setbacks that kept affecting the completion date back. Unfortunately for the idea of a Nicaraguan Canal, there was a massive halt in the creation due to a change in leadership.

Daniel Ortega won the presidency in the 2006 elections and took over for Enrique Bolanos. After years of trying to work his way back into power with the FSLN behind him, he was able to regain his spot as President of Nicaragua. However, Ortega's new regime was different than it was the first time he was in power about two decades ago. This time, there were not as many youthful supporters that had the passion that there was in the 1980's. On top of that, there did not seem to be many policy ambitions for the new administration, other than consolidating power to become more powerful over the country and on an international scale. Ortega began aligning himself with new allies across the world. These new allies consisted of President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Fidel Castro of Cuba, and Colonel Gaddafi of Libya (Henighan 435). This certainly raised eyebrows in Washington because these were the enemies of the United States at

the time. Although Ortega approved of the free trade agreements with the United States, he still believed that President Bush had imperialist intensions (Henighan 435).

One of President Ortega's first actions as president was to re-establish the free public education that had been abolished by President Chamorro in the 1990's (Henighan 435). Additionally, within his first term, Ortega was able to raise the percentage of homes that had electricity from 55% to 70% (Henighan 435). Nicaragua was beginning to separate themselves from the rest of the Central American countries in terms of their economy and amount of safety in the country. While the rest of the region was being devastated by the Mexican drug cartels, Nicaragua was able to keep them out.

While the Bush administration in Washington was firmly against the Ortega regime in Nicaragua, tensions were lessened when President Obama was elected in 2008. President Obama got rid of the anti-Sandinista officials in Washington that had such negative feelings towards Ortega and the FSLN. With the anti-Sandinista sentiment out of Washington, it began a time of tranquility between the United States and Nicaragua. After being elected in 2006, Daniel Ortega won his seat back as president in a landslide victory in 2011 for another five-year term.

Although former President Enrique Bolanos came up with the idea of building a canal to connect the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans in 2006, he was unable to fulfill his plans because he had lost the election. President Ortega did not immediately continue with these plans. In fact, it was not until 2013 that the Nicaraguan Congress approved a new proposal to begin working on the construction of the canal.

By the time that the new proposal for the Nicaraguan Canal was passed, it had been just about 100 years since the completion of the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal

was beginning to deteriorate and was not be able to accommodate the new ships that were being used to transport cargo between the two major oceans. Ships had changed a lot since the Panama Canal had been completed and many believed that it was time to create a new canal to accommodate the new necessities.

In 2006, Panamanian voters passed a bill to expand the Panama Canal. In 2006, the Panama Canal consisted of two shipping lanes that could handle up to 965 feet long and 106 feet wide (Fountain). With the expansion of the Panama Canal, which was estimated to cost a little over $5 billion and be finished by 2014, it would add a third set of locks and be able to hold ships that were 25% longer and 50% wider (Fountain). At first, it seemed as though this would fix the problems that were occurring with the Panama Canal being able to accommodate the newer and bigger ships. However, by the time that 2014 came around, the expansion of the canal had not been going as planned. The expansion was about three-fourth of the way done and was already costing too much. In fact, the workers were threatening to stop their work (Margolis). Sacyr, the Spanish-led company that won the rights to build the expansion of the canal, were over a billion dollars over the estimate and wanted to be paid for that sum. They blamed the Panamanian government for giving them misleading geological studies for the expansion, which led to the underestimating for the project. The two sides began to dispute over who would be paying for the extra money that it would take to finish the project. This led the Nicaraguan government to take action on the new Nicaraguan Canal plans.

The revival of the idea for the Nicaraguan Canal came about with the new interest from a Chinese billionaire named Wang Jing. Jing gained his money by becoming the largest shareholder of Xinwei Telecom, a Chinese telecom company that supplies

Nicaragua with cellphone and Internet services. With having previously done business in Nicaragua, it made sense that Jing would want to expand his power within the region. When the proposition passed in Nicaragua to build the canal, Wang Jing created the HKND (Hong Kong Nicaraguan Canal Development Investment Company) Group. The intended canal would cost about $50 billion and stretch about 172 miles to connect the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans (Stargardter). The construction of the canal began in December 2014 with a 50-year renewable permit that was given to the HKND Group.

With one of the main purposes of the Nicaraguan Canal being that it would rival the Panama Canal, the United States was worried that China was attempting to make a major move to enhance their power within the Latin American region. When the United States Embassy found out about the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal, they immediately voiced their dismay. Their first and foremost problem with the canal was actually with Wang Jing himself. The American Embassy was not convinced that Jing was getting the money for the project where he said he was. Jing repeatedly exclaimed that the project was only being done by the HKND Group and that it was completely separate from the Chinese Government. However, Jing continues to be very secretive about the sources of the finances behind the project. The United States was very skeptical on the whole idea because of the amount of ambiguity on the part of Wang Jing about where the money will be coming from for the project.

On top of the American skepticism, there was a lot of opposition from within the country. Months following the beginning of the construction of the canal, there began to be protests by locals that felt that they were being exploited by the government by the construction of the canal. It seemed as though the Nicaraguans that were going to be

impacted by the canal thought that President Ortega was selling Nicaragua to the Chinese. Although the canal was intended to rejuvenate the Nicaraguan economy, the protesters felt that there were larger negative environmental impacts and would force thousands to lose their land.

The most important environmental impact that the canal would have is that it will be going through part of Lake Nicaragua. Lake Nicaragua is the largest lake in Central America. One of the most important impacts of Lake Nicaragua is that it is a source of drinking water for a lot of people. By building a canal through the lake, it would ruin the water for those purposes. Not only that, but it would also ruin the ecosystems within the lake.

In addition to the negative environmental impacts that would come along with the Nicaraguan Canal, it also heavily impacts many indigenous groups that live along the intended route. Within days of breaking ground for the construction in 2014, there were protests by the indigenous groups that will be affected by the canal. During the protest, at least 21 people were injured during the clashes of protesters and police (Stargardter). With a lot of the indigenous groups living along Lake Nicaragua, a lot of their sources of food and water come from the lake. The Nicaraguan Canal would ruin these group's abilities to be able to survive on their own. Although many of the indigenous people do not have much power within Nicaragua, there have been many attempts by environmentalist lawyers to fight for their rights against the canal. The lawsuit actually made its way to the Supreme Court in Nicaragua. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lawsuits were not valid because the bill for the construction of the canal passed the National Assembly by a wide majority, and that took precedence over the negative

environmental impacts (Liedel). In fact, many of the opposition groups to the Nicaraguan Canal believe that the ruling in the Supreme Court was because it is being controlled by the Sandinistas.

Overall, the Nicaraguan Canal plan is widely supported by most of the Nicaraguan population. The canal is reportedly supposed to bring tens of thousands of jobs to the second-most poor country in Central America (Billing). The main opposition groups to the plan include many environmentalists and the groups of people that would be displaced by the Canal.

The difference within Nicaragua's government between the beginning of the Contemporary Era and how it is today is vast. Although the FSLN was ousted in the beginning of the era, the United States did not plan on the FSLN coming back into power. Washington certainly did not anticipate the Sandinista government go have the overwhelming support within Nicaragua that is continues to get. The party wins elections by wide margins and continues to run the country. Throughout the era, there were large spans of time that the United States took their attention away from Nicaragua. This typically occurred while the FSLN was not in power. It did not matter what the FSLN was doing for the Nicaraguan citizens, simply because of the connotation and reputation of the FSLN, the United States wanted to dismantle them.

With the resurrection of the Nicaraguan Canal project, things became complicated between Nicaragua and the United States. Even though the United States had given back their rights to the project, they were very skeptical of the idea and voiced their opinions on it. Even though the United States has no formal part of the project, they manage to

have an impact of it. With the canal not finished yet, it will be interesting to see the role that the United States plays in the future.

Chapter 4: Content Analysis

Determining the different uses of hard and soft power that the United States used while intervening in Nicaragua can explain a lot of things. It is interesting to see the situations that the United States have been in and whether they decided to use hard or soft power. In fact, the uses of hard and soft power by different American Presidents can say a lot about how they felt about Nicaragua and who was running the government at the time.

One of the most important aspects that came out of analyzing the use of hard and soft power is the amount that was used by the United States had to do with what was going on in the international realm. When the United States was intervening in Nicaragua purely based on ways to benefit themselves, there were short glances of soft power that was being used by the United States. However, when there was a larger global issue at hand that the United States wanted to take care of, it was almost exclusively through the use of hard power.

Throughout the Imperial Era, I argue that the United States intervened in Nicaragua through the use of soft power twice. These uses of soft power include the negotiations that the United States used to persuade the Estrada administration to gain recognition by the United States, and the way that the American Presidents during this time justified intervention in Nicaragua.

Between 1893 and 1909, Jose Santos Zelaya was the President of Nicaragua. During this time, Zelaya had made an enemy out of the United States by aligning himself with other foreign powers. When Zelaya lost the election in 1909, Nicaragua was not on the best terms with the United States. However, the United States was happy that a leader like Zelaya was out of power. Now that someone else was going to be in charge, they

believed that this was their opportunity to create an ally out of the country. Juan Estrada took over as President of Nicaragua and was promptly met by the United States with a deal. Washington agreed to recognize the new Nicaraguan administration, if a few conditions were met. These conditions included the prosecution of the men involved in the killing of two American citizens, new presidential elections to be held within the next six months, and to establish a commission to resolve any property damage that was done during the rebel revolt.

Joseph Nye describes the use of soft power as, " the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes," (21). I believe that the way that the United States were able to offer their recognition to Nicaragua, have their conditions met, and still get Nicaragua to agree in order to gain the recognition was the first use of soft power by the United States in Nicaragua. The United States used the power of their recognition to persuade the Nicaragua government to do as they said. I believe that this was the first successful execution of this type of power. Although there was hard power that was used by the United States right before and after the fact, the soft power did allow the United States to get what they wanted out of the new Nicaraguan government without the direct use of force.

With the first use of soft power that was used by the United States coming in 1909, the next use of this type of power would not begin occurring until 1927. However, it is important to realize that before 1909 and between then and 1927, the use of hard power was the main force that the United States used while intervening in Nicaragua. The

United States began their intervention in Nicaragua through the use of hard power in 1850 with the creation of the Clayton-Bulwer Act.

Through the Clayton-Bulwer Act, the United States actually gained the right to build a canal through Nicaragua, without the consultation of Nicaragua. The United States and Great Britain entered into this partnership without the involvement of Nicaragua. The use of hard power can give a lot of power and control to the country that is implementing this strategy. This is exactly what it gave to the United States. They did not attempt to negotiate or persuade Nicaragua to allow them to do this; they simply took what they wanted. This would be the beginning of a long history of hard power that the United States used towards Nicaragua.

Towards the end of the Zelaya administration in Nicaragua, the United States had had enough of the leader that had been distancing his country from the United States. At this point, the United States began to send marines to Nicaragua to obtain their main objective at the time, get Zelaya out of office. This would begin a strategy of hard power that the United States would continue to deploy.

Nicaragua has a history of having a lot of changes that occur with the presidency. Whether it was through rebellions or elections, there were a lot of changes in the position throughout history. With this being the case, the United States would consistently try to be involved in the process of getting Nicaragua new presidents. When Nicaragua would gain a new president that was not willing to work with the United States, or opposed their positions, the United States would typically use hard power in order to coerce them to change their minds, or simply send troops and aid rebellions in order to oust such a president.

Since American troops landed in Nicaragua in 1909 to stifle the Zelaya administration, there was a constant American military presence in Nicaragua. Up until about 1925, there were constantly American military personnel in Nicaragua in order to keep the stability of the nation. In 1925, the United States had pulled out a majority of troops, but kept 100 marines in the Nicaragua because of Washington's concern of the stability of the nation. By August 1925, the United States felt that Nicaragua was under a respectable government under Carlos Solórzano. This was the first time in 16 years that there was not a presence of the United States military in Nicaragua.

The reason that the United States pulled out the troops was mainly because Solórzano was a conservative leader. Previously, the United States had trouble working with liberal leaders and would actively try to replace them with conservatives. However, when the American presence was gone, there began liberal-conservative violence that worried the United States. With this being the case, the United States sent marines back to Nicaragua in 1926. While the United States was using hard power through the use of marines in Nicaragua, leaders in Washington began to use soft power with the American citizens when there began to be opposition to Washington's use of intervention in Nicaragua.

Beginning in 1927, President Calvin Coolidge began to address Congress on the amount of intervention that the United States was deploying in Nicaragua. When he spoke to Congress on January 10, 1927, President Coolidge did his best to justify the amount of military that the United States had sent to Nicaragua. For the most part, Coolidge's response to the intervention in Nicaragua was to secure American interests in the region. During this time, the United States still had the rights to a canal to be built in

Nicaragua. On top of the interests that the United States had regarding the Nicaraguan Canal, Coolidge also attempted to appeal to all American citizens by explaining that it was the duty of the United States to create stability and encourage independence to all countries in Central America. In order to do this, Coolidge believed that the United States needed to directly intervene in order to allow Nicaragua to prosper independently. This was the next use of soft power by the United States.

One of the main aspects of soft power is that it is used to win the hearts and minds of the people that are being affected. This was exactly what leaders in Washington were attempting to do by justifying the hard power that was being used in Nicaragua at the time. It was important to get the American citizens behind the actions that the United States were taking in Nicaragua. By living in a democracy in the United States, it is important for elected officials to justify their actions to their constituents in order to be perceived in a good light.

However, violence would continue in Nicaragua and American troops would stay until 1933. The troops left because the United States military that was there had created the Nicaraguan National Guard. This was the new attempt by the United States to control the internal violence that was occurring in Nicaragua. The new National Guard was a non-partisan group that was trained, equipped, and aided by the United States. After the National Guard had been established in Nicaragua, the American troops that had been there for the second stint of military occupation of Nicaragua had left.

With the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the United States made another attempt at soft power by creating the Good Neighbor Policy. I believe that this was the best use of soft power that the United States employed throughout the Imperial Era.

Through the Good Neighbor Policy, President Roosevelt explained to the American citizens that the hard power that was used in Nicaragua in the past might have not been in the best interests of all parties. He explained that there needed to be a give and take relationship between the countries in Central America. In fact, during President Roosevelt's speech on March 4, 1933, he explained that he has created the policy because of the mentality of the American people. He acknowledged that there was opposition to the interventions in Nicaragua and addressed them within his speech.

Throughout the Imperial Era, there was a majority of hard power that was being used during the interventions within Nicaragua. For the most part, the era was filled with direct intervention of hard power through the use of sending American troops to Nicaragua. For a good part of about 30 years, there were American troops occupying Nicaragua. The interesting part is that American Presidents would use soft power towards the American people in order to justify the hard power that was being used.

There were a lot of motives for the United States to frame intervention in Nicaragua around the use of hard power. The United States, during this era, were primarily focused on working with conservative presidents in Nicaragua because they were willing to work with the United States. Many liberal leaders that took office in Nicaragua were against the amount of influence that the United States had in their country. Although political leaders in Washington justified intervention in Nicaragua by trying to create stability within the country, it was always in order to keep an American foothold in Nicaragua. This is precisely the reason that the United States wanted to keep their rights to building a canal in Nicaragua. By the time that the United States gained those rights, the Panama Canal had already been finished. Keeping the rights to the new

canal project was simply to keep out other countries from intervening in the region. The use of hard power to keep the foothold that the United States had in Nicaragua was the only true way for the United States to keep its power there. Soft power would only be able to go so far with people that would be willing to work with the United States. With the use of soft power, there needs to be a degree of give and take that each party is willing to be lenient about, in order for it to be effective. However, the United States were not willing to try this too often with the possibility of it not working. Through the use of hard power, it allowed the United States to control to the outcome, for the most part. Even though the United States attempted some acts of soft power in regards to their intervention in Nicaragua, the onset of the Cold War Era would eliminate any possibilities for the United States to consider soft power as an option to obtain their objectives in Nicaragua.

When the Cold War began, the United States took a hard stance on its allies and enemies. For the United States, if a country was not on their side during this period, it meant that they were an enemy. With the new President of the United States being Harry S. Truman, he withheld diplomatic recognition from Nicaragua, which was under the presidency of Benjamin Lacayo Sacasa. President Truman did not favor the new Nicaraguan government because Sacasa gained his presidency through Somoza because he was a family friend. However, Somoza knew that going against the United States in the tense time would hurt Nicaragua more than help it. With this in mind, Somoza actually used soft power in order to gain the favor of the United States. He decided to create a Constitute Assembly in order to create a new constitution. The purpose of this constitution was to add anti-communist rhetoric. Somoza was attempting to appease the

leaders in Washington. However, Truman did not believe that the constitutional change was legitimate and continued the lack of diplomatic recognition of Nicaragua.

Following the assassination of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, his son, Luis Somoza Debayle, took office. He continued the anti-communist rhetoric that his father attempted in order to gain back the favor of the United States. Unlike his father, Luis was able to show the leaders in Washington that he was willing to openly go against the communist countries. The new Nicaragua government played a key role in helping the United States to execute the Bay of Pigs in 1961. President Debayle openly spoke out against the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro. With that mindset, he accepted President John F. Kennedy's offer to help in the Bay of Pigs. This gesture showed leaders in Washington that the Nicaraguan government could be trusted and could align themselves with the United States during the Cold War. With this mentality, there was a lack of any intervention by the United States in Nicaragua. However, this changed when the FSLN gained control of the government and the Contras formed.

Initially, the Carter administration in Washington began to use hard power by sending money to the FSLN government to keep them from aligning with the Soviet Union. Each time that there had been a transition in power in the Nicaraguan government during the Cold War era, the United States would use hard power in an attempt to keep the country away from the Soviets. However, under the FSLN, Nicaragua began to loosen its ties with the United States and shifted its interests towards the Soviet Union.

When Ronald Reagan won the presidency in the United States, he made his opinion on Nicaragua clear through the use of continuous hard power in many forms. He began by stopping the aid that was being given to the FSLN. Instead, he started giving the

money to the Contras. President Reagan went so far as to go to the Inter-American Development Bank to withhold any loans that were being given to Nicaragua. In Reagan's mind, the use of soft power was never going to work. After being in the Cold War for over three decades, President Reagan believed hard power through the Contras was the only way to defeat the communist threat that was the FSLN.

The amount of money, equipment, and assistance that President Reagan gave to the Contras was so vast that Congress began having to create new bills in an attempt to limit the amount of hard power that was being used to fund the Contras. Even with laws, such as the multiple Boland Amendments, the Reagan administration would continue the assistance to the Contras.

Interestingly enough, in regards to the American people, there began to be media propaganda showing up in America around this time. Likewise, as when Calvin Coolidge would speak to the American people about why the United States should continue the intervention in Nicaragua in the 1920's, the media was aiming to mold minds. The entertainment industry would create movies that framed Nicaragua and the FSLN as the main enemies in their movies. Once again, the use of soft power within America in order to gain approval from citizens was very important to elected officials.

I believe that one of the most important validations of the amount of hard power that the Reagan administration had been giving to the Contras was the verdict that found the United States guilty of being an aggressor state towards Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice. Although I understand that the Cold War had been going on for a long time when the Reagan administration was doing this, but it had been the biggest use of hard power that had been used in the history of American intervention in Nicaragua. With

soft power not even attempted towards Nicaragua during this era is a little curious to me. The worst aspect of the amount of hard power that was used during the Cold War was that none of it really made much of an impact. The Contras never obtained their goal of taking over the FSLN. All of the money and assistance that was used to bring down the FSLN ended up being a failure. The Cold War was such a tense time for the United States that they were willing to do anything in order to keep territories out of the grasp of the Soviet Union. However, the use of soft power did not seem to be an option for the United States at the time.

With the FSLN not in control of the Nicaraguan government, by 1990, the United States, for the most part, stayed out of the affairs on Nicaragua. In the early 1990's, the United States turned their focus away from Central America and towards the Middle East and the Balkans. I think it was the mentality that the FSLN was out of control of Nicaragua, as well as the Cold War being over that the United States felt that the country was in a stable place to leave it on its own. As we have seen before, I do not believe that the United States would leave Nicaragua if there were any incentive for them to stay. At this point, I feel as if they felt that they had finally succeeded in destroying any opposition within the country and saw this as a time to focus their efforts on other parts of the world that would benefit them.

The next act of power that the United States would take, regarding Nicaragua, would come in 1998 with the onset of Hurricane Mitch. The result of Hurricane Mitch had a lot of negative impacts on the country of Nicaragua. President Clinton went down to Nicaragua following the hurricane and offered to help the country in a few different ways. He offered to lower some of the trade barriers that had been set on the country, as

well as sending economic aid to support the impacted victims. Joseph Nye describes one of the main aspects of hard power is the use of money. However, I believe that this was an act of soft power by President Clinton. Although money is typically associated with the use of hard power, one of the aspects of soft power is attempting to win the hearts and minds of the people. Additionally, hard power is used to push, while soft power is used to pull. In this case, I believe that the monetary aid that was sent to Nicaragua was an act of soft power, showing the people of Nicaragua that they still had the support of the United States. With that, I believe it was also the fact that the United States wanted to make sure that Nicaragua was still willing to work with the United States. The last thing that the United States wanted was for Nicaragua to flip, once again, and go back to their old ways under the FSLN. I think that the money that was sent to help support the victims of the hurricane was strategically planned to keep Nicaragua on good terms with the United States, through the use of soft power.

With the next election in Nicaragua to take place in 2001, it came at a very interesting time in the United States' history. They were going to take place after hearing about the September 11 attacks on the United States. With that in mind, the United States began to actively suppress any enemies that may attempt to go against the United States. One of the candidates for the presidential elections in Nicaragua was Daniel Ortega. The United States actively used hard power when they heard that he was running for president, once again. The Ambassador of Nicaragua to the United States had orders to threaten the people of Nicaragua that if Daniel Ortega was to be elected that Nicaragua would be put on the terrorist state list and be an enemy of the United States. During this time, there was no incentive for the United States to use soft power in order to keep

Ortega out of office. Hard power through the use of threats was the only way to keep him out of power and keep the FSLN away from ruling the Nicaraguan government. In this case, Ortega lost the election and it had seemed that this type of hard power that was used by the United States had worked.

The next election would occur in 2006. Once again, Daniel Ortega was running. By this time, the United States had entered into a war in the Middle East. The Bush administration attempted to use the same type of hard power that had worked during the last election. They did this through the use of threats of economic sanctions. However, with a lot of the American resources being used in the Middle East, the use of soft power was attempted.

The United States attempted to use soft power by creating an institution that would pull Nicaragua closer to the United States. By doing this, the United States believed they it would have greater control over the country, as well as being able to use them for more resources in a time of war. The Bush administration had created CAFTA as a way to incorporate various countries in Central America to become bigger trading partners with the United States. The creation of institutions is an important aspect of soft power because it allows countries to become much closer. In the case of CAFTA, it allowed Central American countries to boost their trading with the United States. I think it was important for the United States to look as if they were trying to create closer ties with the Central American countries, as well as boosting their economies by trading with them. However, even through the use of soft power through CAFTA, and hard power of threats, Daniel Ortega won the presidency and the FSLN was back in power in Nicaragua.

Although the United States does not have a direct link to the Nicaraguan Canal that is under construction by a private Chinese company, it did not stop the United States from voicing their opinion on the project. I think it is important to note that the United States embassy in Nicaragua openly opposed the project because of the Chinese company that was involved. This is the closest aspect of hard power that the United States has used in regard to the canal. With the United States being a major international power in today's society, political leaders in Washington must believe that what they say can have an impact. By openly going against the Nicaraguan government's decision to build the canal, it is almost the first step to threatening the FSLN government against the project. Whether the United States will do anything to follow up with their disproval of the canal is yet to be seen. Interestingly enough, with the changing of the President and leaders in Washington soon, I think it will be interesting to see the stance that political leaders in Washington takes after the changes.

Throughout the history of American intervention in Nicaragua, I think it is important to notice why there is seldom the use of soft power. The use of soft power during the Cold War Era was practically not seen. It was during a time that the United States was a major player in a war. More importantly, it was an ideological war that was based on the amount of allies one strategically had on their side. With that in mind, the United States was not willing to take any risks by using soft power to get what they wanted. The only soft power that was used during this era was towards the American citizens in order to persuade them to think like the government and go against the FSLN.

With the use of hard power, I believe that the reputation that the United States may have a lot to do with the amount that is used. The United States has the largest

military in the world. With that being the case, it is a lot easier for the United States to use hard power in order to obtain objectives. Even if the hard power that is used by the United States is a simply threat, that goes a long way because countries know that the United States is willing and capable of following through with their threats. It is also known that the United States has the resources to continue the use of hard power even if the hard power is not working, like with the Contras. Nevertheless, the United States showed more likeliness to use hard power in a majority of the intervention in Nicaragua, rather than soft power.

Conclusion

Power can be a very powerful thing. The problem that often comes with power is the question of how to use it. Throughout the history of American intervention in Nicaragua there has been vast amounts of power that was deployed by the United States. However, it is important to distinguish what type of power was used, what the intended outcome was, and what the actual outcome was.

With every use of power that the United States used towards Nicaragua, there were distinct outcomes that the United States had planned on. Unfortunately, for the United States, these outcomes did not always come to fruition. The greatest example of this would be the United States' contributions to the Contras. By aiding the Contras, the United States believed that they would be able to infiltrate the FSLN and get them out of power in Nicaragua. In reality, the Contras were never able to get a foothold within Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the United States sent unheard of amount of money, equipment, and manpower in order to achieve their goal. The main problem was that this lasted for years and years. It should have been abundantly clear that the use of power that was being deployed by the United States was not working.

I would be willing to accept that the hard power that was used with the Contras was an isolated failure, but it was not. Throughout American history, there have been numerous events that did not end up the way that the United States had intended through the use of hard power. At some point, the leaders of our country need to look back at our history and our uses of power in order to determine how we move forward as a nation.

At this point in history, it is almost as if the United States is expected to use hard power all of the time. With out reputation of deploying hard power, we have built up the

reputation that the United States is willing and capable of executing any type of hard power that we see fit. However, the question still remains as to the best way to go about using power.

After examining the use of hard and soft power that has been deployed throughout the history of American intervention in Nicaragua, I have come to the conclusion that the United States is too quick use hard power. Unless we are being attacked, I think the first attempt to get what the United States wants should be through the use of soft power. Although I think that we should be using hard power in response to being attacked, I think that the way we go about it needs to be different. There needs to be more accountability for the leaders at the top that are deciding to use hard power. The use of soft power has the possibility of accommodating multiple parties, if done correctly. The use of hard power typically has a winner and a loser in the end.

If the use of soft power does not work and the parties are not willing to negotiate, I believe that the consequences of using hard power needs to be considered on a greater scale. I think that too many leaders in Washington look too narrowly when deciding how to use different types of power, in order to look out for themselves. However, I think it is important to take into account the possibilities of what could happen to the country in the distant future.

The history of American intervention has not always been a good story. However, I think that analyzing the uses of hard and soft power that was used can bring a lot of insight to the way that the United States has worked with other countries in the past, and we can better understand the reasons that the United States does things today.

"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

- John Dalberg-Action

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