ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

History 610
Senior Project

The Mouride Confrérie: Origins and Evolutions of Political Power (1880s-1960)

Simon Swanson

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Department of History

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(1880s-1960)

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents ii.

Acknowledgements iv.

Abstract v.

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Origins of the Mouridiyya and its Path from Contestation to Cooperation, (1880s-1927) 11

Image 1: Amadu Bamba before the Private Council of Senegal 11

Map 1: Jolof Empire's Peak 13

Map 2: Map of Senegal 14

Image 2: Cheikh Amadu Bamba Mbacké 17

Map 3: Mouride Expansion, 1912-58 25

Chapter 2: The Mouridiyya and the Growth of Indigenous Senegalese Politics (1927-1960) 33

Figure 1: Timelines of the Deputies to the French National Assembly and of Mouride leadership 38

Image 1: Blaise Diagne 39

Image 2: Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké 41

Image 3: Galandou Diouf 42

Image 4: Lamine Guèye 43

Image 5: Léopold Sedar Senghor 45

Chapter 3: Continuity and Rupture in the First Decade of Senegalese Independence (1960-1970) 70

Conclusion 71

Appendices 75

Appendix 1: Tijaniyya 75

Appendix 2: Important Figures 84

Appendix 3: French Role in Manipulating the First Succession Conflict 88

Appendix 4: Important Mouride Marabouts 90

Appendix 5: Geographic Expansion under Mamadu Mustapha 91

Appendix 6: Important Senegalese Political Parties 93

Appendix 7: Guèye and Senghor Media Polemic 94

Bibliography 96

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Abstract

Founded by Cheikh Amadu Bamba in the late 1880s, the Mouridiyya *confrérie* is a dynamic Muslim brotherhood that plays an enormous role in Senegalese politics. Emerging during the height of French conquest of West Africa, the Mouridiyya was seen as rebellious and Bamba, its founder, was exiled to Gabon in 1895. This hostility gradually decreased, and by the late 1920s, there were strong relationships of cooperation between the Mouridiyya and the French Administration. Although many scholars have attempted to understand the historical origins of the Mouride confrérie and characterize the roots of its political power, many important questions remain. Building on the vast literature of the Mouridiyya, I chart the historical development of the Mouridiyya from its origins in the late 1880s to the first decade of Senegalese independence, ending my discussion in 1970. I argue that the driving force between the Mouridiyya's relationship to the French Colonial Administration, to Senegalese politicians, and the post-colonial government is its economic dynamism and internal structural power. Through their political relationships, the Mouridiyya were able to translate their moral authority and economic force into tangible political power.

Introduction

As millions of Senegalese Muslims gathered in the holy city of Touba for their yearly celebration, the Magal of Touba, on August 19, 2024, a convoy of black SUVs drove through the streets and passed an elaborate white and green mosque.[1] The first car of the convoy turned right through a gate, entering a courtyard populated by security officers and gendarmerie. As the car came to a stop, dozens of men lined up, some dressed in white, gold, and light green kaftans, and others wearing military uniforms. A security officer opened a passenger door of the SUV and out stepped Bassirou Diomaye Faye, the newly elected President of the Republic of Senegal, dressed in a brilliant white kaftan. After a long period of political uncertainty in Senegal, which had seen Faye and his political mentor Ousmane Sonko imprisoned by the previous regime, he won the Presidency in March, 2024 with 54% of the vote, making him the youngest elected African leader in history.[2]

After warmly greeting the line of men who formed to salute him, including government officials and prominent Muslim clerics, President Faye and his wife were ushered inside. They were led to a small room, already bustling with cameramen and observers. The majority of those in attendance were seated on the floor, with select chairs around the periphery of the room for government ministers and members of the local territorial administration. Faye and his wife sat on a large, ornate couch in the center of the room as cameramen and observers swirled around them. With his hands peacefully crossed, the President engaged in a very common Senegalese

[1] "En Direct de Touba: Visite du président Bassirou Diomaye Faye chez Serigne Mountakha Mbacké," Youtube live stream, August 19, 2024, Mourides TV HD, 1:37:12. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JxF8hoxc39I.
[2] "Senegal Votes in Election That Will Decide If President Can Carry out the Reforms He Promised | AP News," accessed November 19, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/senegal-election-bassirou-diomaye-faye-pastef-52d97319ade0efc750ea3bc5f50877f6.

activity: waiting. For a substantial duration, the President of the Republic sat and waited for his host to occupy the armchair beside him, his eyes idly flitting about the room.

After more than 15 minutes, a door opened and his host was ushered in, one of the only men in Senegal who could make the President follow his time-table. An older man with stark white eyebrows and a small beard, wearing large dark sunglasses under a flowing white hood, Serigne Mountakha Mbacké was led to his seat beside the patiently waiting President. Serigne Mountakha Mbacké is the *Khalife General* (highest leader) of the Mouridiyya *confrérie*, the most active and dynamic Muslim brotherhood in Senegal. As the grandson of the brotherhood's founder, he lays claim to his grandfather's spiritual wisdom and power, and leads millions of disciples in this centralized religious organization. Once seated, Faye and Mbacké leaned across the large armrests between them to exchange pleasantries. Both were respectful and warm, leaning in close to hear the other in the loud and chaotic room. After speeches by various *marabouts*, a term used in Senegalese parlance to refer to Muslim leaders and spiritual guides, the President delivered a short speech demonstrating his respect for the *Khalife*.[3] His bearing was gentle, respectful and deliberate, and he spoke quietly, signaling humility and submission to this influential *marabout*. He expressed his kind wishes for the sacred festival of the Magal of Touba, highlighting the government's continued support for the Mouridiyya brotherhood (*confrérie* in French) and acknowledging the importance of this event in Senegalese spirituality and culture.[4] Through his symbolic demonstration of reverence for the Mouridiyya, the President thus demonstrated the substantial political power of the organization, and continued a long

[3] As the President delivered his speech in Wolof, of which my level is low intermediate, I was unable to draw out the fine nuances of the speech. I employ my best understanding of the general aims of his discourse and present observations about his general bearing, and do not claim to present a fully accurate presentation of his ideas.
[4] "Magal de Touba 2024 | Le Président Bassirou Diomaye Faye Souhaite une Célébration Riche en Bénédictions," RTS Officiel, accessed November 19, 2024, https://www.rts.sn/actualite/detail/a-la-une/magal-de-touba-2024-le-president-bassirou-diomaye-faye-souhaite-une-celebration-riche-en-benedictions.

tradition of close relations between the political establishment and the Muslim authorities which extended back to French colonialism.

This relationship must be understood within the framework of Senegal's broad historical development and Senegalese Islam. Senegal, which gained its independence from France in 1960, is located on the Western-most point of Africa, where it has been a point of contact with North Africa and the Western world for centuries. Of a population of 18 million, 94% percent practice Islam, 5% practice Catholicism, and 1% practice traditional African religion, known as animism.[5] The large Muslim majority is divided into four Sufi *confréries*, the Mouridiyya (accounting for 31% of population), the Tijaniyya (49%), the Qadiriyya (8%) and the Layeniyya (6%).[6] Although these groups arose through different historical conditions, they are similar in modern practice and belief, stressing internal spiritual development with the assistance of a *marabout*, or spiritual guide. During the 1800s, the Tijaniyya had a reputation for violence, as many Tijani *marabouts* waged armed jihad against non-Muslim rulers and resisted French colonial incursion. However, by the early 1900s, French military power proved too powerful to resist by military force, the militant strategy of *jihad* subsided, and the leaders of the Tijaniyya developed friendlier relationships with the French (see Appendix 1). As the Tijaniyya *confrérie* became more accommodationist in its relationship to the French, the Mouridiyya arose in the late 1880s as a new symbol of resistance on non-violent grounds, drawing its unique power from its far reaching ideological appeals. In Senegal today, there is little discord between the *confréries*, and members are free to move from one *confrérie* to another at will. Although all four have

[5] "Senegal Population 2024 (Live)," accessed October 18, 2024, https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/senegal.
[6] "Khadres, Layenes Mourides et Tidianes , Au Sénégal, Tous Les Chemins Mènent à Dieu," accessed October 18, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/culture-et-arts/khadres-layenes-mourides-et-tidianes-au-sénégal-tous-les-chemins-mènent-à-dieu-/529498; "Sénégal: les médias confériques musulmans se multiplient," La croix international, January 30, 2023, https://international.la-croix.com/fr/afrique/senegal-les-medias-confreriques-musulmans-se-multiplient.

influenced historical developments, the Mouridiyya in particular has played a central role in Senegal's political development from the late 1800s to the modern day, infusing the state with political stability and tolerance, and contributing to Senegal's status as a model of democracy in West Africa.[7]

Of the four *confréries*, I select the Mouridiyya for examination because of its unique economic and political power, and its dramatic historical trajectory from resistance to cooperation with French rule. Prizing the submission of a *taalibé* (disciple) to a *marabout* (spiritual guide), the Mouridiyya channeled these social relations into the economic sphere and used them to benefit from the French peanut cash-crop economy. While the other *confréries* engaged in the peanut economy, the Mouridiyya was particularly successful and vigorous in its territorial expansion, and thus had a greater impact on post-independence politics. This economic role gave the Mourides an important role in the colonial and post-colonial systems, and laid the foundation for their structural dynamism and political power. Additionally, in contrast to the Tijaniyya, which is divided into branches with different founders, the Mouridiyya has remained relatively unified. Despite divisions between Mouride leadership when questions of succession arose, the organization has successfully reconciled these divisions and consolidated the organization each time. Because the unified and dynamic Mouridiyya was more effective in mobilizing followers and resources than the other Senegalese *confréries*, researchers of Senegalese Islam have long focused on this *confrérie.* As a result, there is much more scholarship on the Mouridiyya than on the other *confréries*.

The scholarly conversation with regards to the Mouridiyya began during the colonial era, and thus was colored by colonial imperatives of power. The first source to discuss the Mouridiyya, *Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba* by Paul Marty, was published in 1913. Written as a

[7] This characterization emerged as a common theme from my extensive informal political conversations in Senegal.

report to the General Government of *Afrique Occidentale Française* (French West Africa), Paul Marty provided policy advice to the government about the fledgling *confrérie*, writing from his experience as a French colonial administrator and expert on Islam in the French colonies. Marty argued that the *Mouridiyya* was merely a "confused expression of patriotism,"[8] and that the belief in the cult of saints, expressed through the elevation of the *marabouts* to positions of political, religious, and economic power, was a primitive element of African culture that was now revived to create a community with a false sense of collective identity.[9]

Marty's work, despite its fundamental flaws of paternalistic colonial bias, remained the academic consensus on the Mouridiyya until the late 1960s,[10] when a number of scholars began to reexamine the Senegalese *confréries* through the lenses of sociology and political science.[11] These authors examined the social and historical foundations of the *confrérie*, aiming to understand the political power of the *confrérie* in their post-independence moment. They effectively demonstrated how the Mouridiyya arose from the social crises of 19th century Senegal (a discussion which I draw on heavily in chapter 1), and the movement's nature as a response to social collapse allowed it to carry traditional social relations into this new religious structure.

This generation of scholars examined the role of the Mouridiyya in the economic processes of the early peanut trade, with specific interest in their continued potential to participate in the peanut-based agricultural development strategy of the post-colonial

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[8] Paul Marty, *Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba: Rapport à M. le Gouverneur Général de l'Afrique Occidentale*, Collection de la Revue du Monde Musulman (Paris, 1913), 125.
[9] Marty, 125.
[10] Cheikh Tidiane Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides: Un Essai sur L'islam au Sénégal* (Présence Africaine, 1969), 4. Marty's view was further developed by other colonial era scholars working under the aegis of the Centre des Hautes Etudes pour l'Afrique et l'Asie (CHEAM), but they largely adhered to his foundational racist and patronizing perspective.
[11] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*; Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Lucy C. Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970).

government. Although these authors view the Mouridiyya as gaining its strength from its ability to propose a new alternative to replace the destroyed traditional social order, and thus see it as a dynamic force at the time of its founding, they argued that it was in decline as the late 1960s.[12] Seeing the Mouridiyya as an initially resistant force to French rule, many of these authors argued that through the process of engagement in the colonial system they were gradually corrupted by the French and thus lost their effectiveness.

In 1980, Christian Coulon continued this school of thought with another macro-level analysis of the Mouride *confrérie* from its origins to the moment of his writing. With respect to the question of resistance and collaboration, he argued that the relationship between the French and the *marabouts* developed from a fear of the *confréries* to a pragmatic acceptance of their use as political tools of the regime, thereafter establishing a system of "exchange of services."[13] He argued that over time the French realized the futility of containing the *confréries* by force, and instead adopted a policy of using the *marabouts* to fill "in effect, the role of auxiliaries of the Administration."[14] I argue that this view ultimately undervalues the inherent power of the Mouridiyya, solely attributing them power that is given to them by the French. It does not acknowledge the power that was inherent to the movement, derived from the mass popular support, that pushed the French to acknowledge their far-reaching authority and cede them an autonomous space in the political sphere.

David Robinson, writing in the 1990s, brought a more balanced approach to the study of the resistance/collaboration debate.[15] He argued that while the Mouridiyya served French

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[12] Cottingham, "Traditional Society, Change, and Organisational Development," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 11, no. 4 (1973): 679.
[13] Christian Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince: Islam et Pouvoir au Sénégal*, Éditions A. Pedone (Paris: Institut d'Études Politiques de Bordeaux: Centres d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, 1981), 146.
[14] Coulon, 179. Translation by author.
[15] David Robinson, "Beyond Resistance and Collaboration: Amadu Bamba and the Murids of Senegal," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 21, no. 2 (1991): 149–71, https://doi.org/10.2307/1580803; David Robinson, "The Murids: Surveillance and Collaboration," *The Journal of African History* 40, no. 2 (1999): 193–213.

interests as a form of indirect rule, the founder Ahmadou Bamba was a powerful resistance symbol for his followers, and this gave him significant power.[16] Robinson argued that the traditional dichotomy of resistance and collaboration is overly simplistic, and that the relationship was rather shaped by simultaneous relations of collaboration and antagonism. Robinson stressed the agency of the Mourides and of Bamba in their relationship with the French, and argued that because of the conditions of the time, Bamba was able to retain his legitimacy with his followers even as he cooperated with the French.

Robinson further argued that the transition from relations of resistance to accommodation with the French rulers allowed the "*marabouts* and *confrérie* to develop considerable autonomy in the religious, economic, and social spheres while surrendering the political and administrative domain to the French."[17] This view demonstrates that Bamba was not sacrificing his own goals in this cooperation with the French system, but rather it was a pragmatic adaptation to the power infrastructure of French rule and a way of inscribing an autonomous internal haven of religious, economic, and social autonomy in the Senegalese interior. He argues that the historical periodization of the early Mouride movement should be understood as a continuous pattern of simultaneous "close surveillance by the French, constant communication between the two sides, and collaboration in the economic development of the peanut basin" and this relationship was established in the early 20th century and continued for the rest of his life.[18] Robinson's view does not radically shift that of Behrman and Coulon's "exchange of services," but it does present a more nuanced interpretation of this collaboration, stressing the aims of autonomy, which on a cultural and social plane were quite resistant to the French model. Additionally it takes into

[16] Robinson, “Beyond Resistance and Collaboration,” 168.
[17] Robinson, “The Murids,” 193.
[18] Robinson, 194–96.

account the internal power of the movement generated by Bamba's symbolism as a resistance figure.

After the 1980s, the scholarship on the Mouridiyya has become more micro-focused, often examining one aspect of the movement, such as its participation in modern political movements or trends of urbanization.[19] These works rely on the macro-level scholarship produced by the scholars of the 1960s through early 1980s, which have not been updated in the past 40 years. By taking a macro-level perspective of the Mouride *confrérie*, this paper will evaluate the same information and sources as earlier scholars with an extra 40 years of historical distance.

Examining similar questions as these authors, such as the relationship of the Mourides to the French colonial government, their evolving political role with the introduction of indigenous Senegalese politics, and their connections to the government and its economic development policies in the post-independence era, this paper argues that the core of Mouride power was their ability to translate their social and economic dynamism into political power through their relations with the political establishment. This process of power negotiation happened first with the French Administration, then with both the French Administration and a rising Senegalese political elite and finally with the independent Senegalese government after 1960. In order to understand the dynamics of Mouride power, which evolved in relationship to these different authorities, it is necessary to chart the Mouridiyya through these three critical periods of its history, examining the internal forces and their external manifestations.

[19] Muriel Gomez-Perez, Marie-Nathalie LeBlanc, and Mathias Savadogo, "Young Men and Islam in the 1990s: Rethinking an Intergenerational Perspective," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 39, no. 2 (2009): 186–218; Momar Coumba Diop, "Fonctions et Activités Des 'Dahira' Mourides Urbains (Sénégal) (Functions and Activities of the Murids' Urban 'Dahira' in Senegal)," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 21, no. 81/83 (1981): 79–91.

Throughout this paper, I include terminology from the French and Wolof languages which allow me to express more nuance between concepts and stay more true to the concepts in their original languages. I use the term Mouridiyya (noun) to refer to the *confrérie* as a whole, the word Mouride (adjective) to mean affiliated with the organization, or Mouride (noun) meaning someone who is a member of the organization. Because Wolof has no widely used spelling system, other variations of these words may appear in primary sources (ex. Murid, Muride, Mouridisme). In brief mention of Tijaniyya, I will also use a set of terms, including Tijaniyya (noun), Tidjane (adjective, also appears Tijani, Tidiane), or Tidjane (noun, follower of Tijaniyya). Additionally, other terms and names used throughout may vary in spelling in primary sources (ex. Cheikh Amadu Bamba Mbacké or Shaikh Ahmadou Bamba M'Backé), but I choose one form as a standard form throughout my discussion. To refer to the Muslim brotherhoods, I use the French translation *confrérie* (noun) because of its widespread use in Senegal, but primary sources may use the terminology *tariqa* (Arabic translation). On occasion, I use the word *confréric*, which is the adjective form of *confrérie*.

Chapter 1 of this paper examines the period between the 1880s and 1927, when the translation of Mouride social and economic power into political power happened gradually with the movement from resistance toward French colonialism to accommodation. During this period, the French gradually recognized their inability to beat the Mouridiyya by repression, and began efforts to harness its economic dynamism. In Chapter 2, I examine the period from the 1920s to Independence in 1960, in which a new Senegalese political class emerged, altering the political opportunities available to the Mouridiyya. Because of divisions in the Senegalese political field and in Mouride leadership, actors from both sides were able to instrumentalize their political relationships to augment their power. I argue that this led to a more politically engaged

Mouridiyya, which also allowed it room for maneuvering in its relationship with the French. Chapter 3 charts the relations of the *confréries* to the post-colonial government in the first ten years of Independence (1960-70), during which political power was consolidated in the hands of a one-party state. Because of these developments, friendly relations with the political authorities ceased to provide the Mourides political autonomy, thus forcing the Mourides to look elsewhere for autonomy to shape Senegal's newly forming state. I argue that through their implementation of government economic development policy, the Mouridiyya used their economic and social power to exert a force on the ground in rural areas while retreating from contestation in "top-down" politics.

1. Origins of the Mouridiyya, and its Path from Contestation to Cooperation, (1880s-1927)

On the morning of September 5, 1895, the Private Council of the Colonial Administration gathered in session in the city of Saint-Louis, attended by the Governor General, the Commissioner of the Colonies and various other Administrative officials. The Director of Political Affairs, Martial Merlin, opened the tribunal (see Figure 1) with a discourse discussing a major threat to French rule: "Several weeks ago, the Administrator of the Circle of Saint-Louis was informed by the [regional chief], by the President of the Confederation of Cayor and his various agents of reconnaissance, that a [Muslim cleric] of the name Amadou Bamba held a considerable influence in all of Lower Senegal, threatening, by his actions and those of his followers, to trouble the tranquility of the region."[1] Drawing on recent memory of militant Islamic jihads in the region, Merlin argued that "it appears that even if we could not find any clear proof of efforts to incite holy war on the part of Amadu Bamba, his attitude, his actions and above all that of his principal students are all points of suspicion."[2] Predicting an imminent attack, he advised that the Governor General "remove Amadou Bamba, not only from the region where his action makes itself the



Image 1: Amadu Bamba before the Private Council of Senegal on September 5, 1895.
Alpha Walid Diallo, *Ahmadou Bamba devant le Conseil privé*, in *Ahmadou Bamba face aux autorités coloniales (1889-1927)*, ed. Oumar Ba (Dakar, Senegal: Imprimerie de la SIPS, 1982), 62.

[1] Martial Merlin, "*Séance du 5 Septembre 1895,"* Proceedings of the Conseil Privé, Senegalese Colonial Tribunal composed of colonial administrators, 5 September, 1895. In *Ahmadou Bamba face aux autorités coloniales (1889-1927)*, ed. Oumar Ba (Dakar, Senegal: Imprimerie de la SIPS, 1982), 62. Translation by author.
[2] Martial Merlin, 62.

most strongly felt, but from Senegal itself, and to intern him at least for several years in a distant country, such as Gabon, where his fanatic exhortations will have no effect."[3] The Private Council unanimously voted to adopt the conclusions of his report.[4] Bamba was brought before the tribunal, where he learned of his formal exile to Gabon. He would spend the next 15 years in Administrative limbo, experiencing multiple exiles and repatriations.


By 1913, however, the relationship between Bamba and the French Administration had fundamentally changed. The Governor of Senegal wrote that "our relations with Amadu Bamba have entered a normal path, and the attitude of the Murids has in general been very proper."[5] Members of Bamba's entourage developed close relations with the Government at Saint-Louis, the Murids provided many recruits for the French colonial army during the First World War and as a symbol of their friendly relations, the French gave Amadu Bamba an honorary Cross of War in 1918.[6] This seeming reversal of relations raises many questions about the nature of Mouride power during the early period of French control (1880s-1920s), as well as questions of resistance and collaboration.

This chapter examines the emergence of the Amadu Bamba's Mouridiyya in the 1880s and the evolution of its relationship with the French Administration until Bamba's death in 1927. As a reaction to the ideological, political, and social challenges that faced traditional Wolof society in this period, the Mouridiyya built its base of internal power on the fragments and discontents of the previous social order. Harnessing spiritual belief, a highly centralized

[3] Martial Merlin, 65. Translation by author.
[4] Martial Merlin, 65.
[5] David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation : Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920*, Western African Studies (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000), 223, https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=e000xna&AN=67476&site=ehost-live&custid=s8879152. Translation of author.
[6] Robinson, 223. Cheikh Amadu Bamba in fact refused the Cross, citing its Christian symbolism and his renunciation of early possessions. He demanded instead a paper certificate of the award as a reminder of his loyalty to France, and the French took back the Cross.

organization and vast economic power, the *confrérie* quickly developed into a socio-political force which the French could not ignore. As the emerging peanut trade created a convergence of interests between the French and the Mourides, the French gradually shifted from its policy of repression to a policy of co-optation. This chapter posits that the internal power of the Mouridiyya was the driving force in its evolving relationship with the French, who gradually realized the futility of repression and shifted toward a policy of co-optation. However, despite the French intentions of control, the Mouridiyya's internal power allowed it to remain relatively independent and autonomous, and through a continuing negotiation process of overt friendship and covert battle of interests, it was able to inscribe and protect its vision for Senegal's future despite the constraints of French colonialism.

In the first section of this chapter, I examine the socio-political context of Senegal in the 1880s to understand the initial emergence of the Mouridiyya as a socio-political phenomenon. In the second section, I discuss the structural organization and internal roots of Mouride power, highlighting the foundational beliefs of the movement and their implications for social and economic relations. Finally, in the last section of this chapter I chart the evolution of French policy and the relations between the Mouridiyya and the Administration, discussing the connections of internal Mouride forces and its external relations.



Map 1:
Jolof Empire's Peak: XV Century, in *For Takrur: West Africa During the Atlantic Slave Trade: Archaeological Perspectives*, by Cheikh Khadim Rassoul D. (United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 20.

Socio-Political Background

Ruled by numerous successive kingdoms such as the Empire of Ghana and the Empire of Mali, the territory of modern Senegal was incorporated as the Jolof Empire between 1150 and

1350 CE (see Map 1). This kingdom split in the 16th century into the competing Wolof States of Walo, Cayor, Baol, Sine, and Saloum, which persisted until the mid-19th century. Following the arrival of Europeans in the region in the 15th century, the French gradually expanded their presence on the Senegalese coast, establishing the city of Saint-Louis in 1659 as the the capital of their West African territories. They further incorporated the cities of Rufisque, Dakar and the Island of Gorée (see Map 2) to their West African territories, through which they established a trade in enslaved Africans, gold, and gum arabic. In 1854, Louis-Léon-César Faidherbe was appointed as the Governor of Senegal, and began a massive campaign to conquer the Senegalese territory. By his retirement in 1865, he had conquered much of the territory and established a trade economy of peanut cultivation and export. The French consolidated their control with the construction of railroads in 1879, connecting Dakar to Niger (completed in 1923), and to the main areas of Cayor.



Map 2:
Map of Senegal, Les Quatres Communes du Sénégal, accessed October 20, 2024, https://edmondfortier.org.br/fr/les-quatre-communes-du-senegal-saint-louis-rufisque-goree-e-dakar/.

The Trans-Atlantic slave trade and French conquest provoked a number of social and political crises in 19th century Senegal, creating the conditions for the Mouridiyya to arise.[7] The European slave traders often turned to the Wolof traditional rulers to provide slaves in return for

[7] This is a point of relative consensus in the literature. The following discussion of social crises draws on this view as presented by the following authors: Lucy C. Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970); Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Momar C. Diop, "L'État, La Confrérie Mouride et Les Paysans Sénégalais," *Labour, Capital and Society / Travail, Capital et Société* 17, no. 1 (1984): 44–64; Christian Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince: Islam et Pouvoir au Sénégal*, Éditions A. Pedone (Paris: Institut d'Études Politiques de Bordeaux: Centres d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, 1981); David Robinson, "Beyond Resistance and Collaboration: Amadu Bamba and the Murids of Senegal," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 21, no. 2 (1991): 149–71, https://doi.org/10.2307/1580803; Cheikh Tidiane Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides: Un Essai sur L'islam au Sénégal* (Présence Africaine, 1969).

goods and arms, which led to an upward spiral of intrastate and interstate slave raids and war.[8] In the atmosphere of insecurity that this brought to the region, peasant villages were subject to common raids and pillaging by the warrior class of the traditional rulers.[9]

In this context of increasing peasant grievance, a new class of powerful Muslim *marabouts* (the Senegalese term used to describe Muslim clerics) arose to challenge the traditional Wolof rulers and protect the peasantry.[10] With masses of peasants flocking to join their contingents, these *marabouts* engaged in armed *jihad* against the traditional rulers. Famous warrior *marabouts* such as El Hajj Umar Tall, Ma Ba Diakhou, and Madiyanke brothers waged war throughout the Senegambia and Sahel region, attempting to conquer the traditional animist Wolof rulers, and "undermine the very basis of traditional Wolof social and political organization."[11] The division between these two leadership classes continued to grow through the 19th century, pitting traditional leaders and their warriors against the *marabouts* and their disaffected peasant followers. With neither side gaining a decisive advantage, internal war and instability became the norm.[12]

With French conquest and implantation of the Colonial Administration, this instability rose to a climax. Starting at Saint-Louis, the French expanded eastward along the Senegal river to create a gum arabic trade, conquering the state of Walo by the mid 19th century. They additionally expanded southward along the coast into Cayor, and in hopes of establishing a peanut cash crop economy, they pushed into the states of Jolof and Baol (late 1850s-early 1890s).[13] In the 1886 Battle of Dekkilé, the French decisively beat the army of Lat Dior, the

[8] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 60.
[9] Robinson, "Beyond Resistance and Collaboration," 150.
[10] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 60.
[11] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 13.
[12] Cruise O'Brien, 14.
[13] Robinson, "Beyond Resistance and Collaboration," 153.

Damel (King) of Cayor, thus defeating the last bastion of armed resistance. By 1890 the French controlled the entirety of Senegal.

When the French took power, they undertook an administrative restructuring that provoked a profound social crisis in the Wolof states. The French dismembered the traditional political structures into smaller units,[14] placing weakened traditional leaders at their heads. The traditional elites were either beaten in war or swore fealty to the French, so those that the Administration placed in the new positions found themselves acting as "auxiliaries of the French."[15] Because their traditional sources of power were disrupted, they were entirely dependent on the colonial system for authority and lost all legitimacy. The French took control of the real levers of power, using the discredited chiefs for smaller tasks and local administration while limiting their ability to gain the support of the peasantry.[16]

By destroying the traditional Wolof political hierarchy, this caused a social crisis and disrupted the traditional social and religious systems that underlaid it.[17] As traditional leaders became vassals of the French, there arose a vacuum of political leadership which shook this very hierarchical society. As traditional rulers were turned into local administrators, the French disbanded their courts of nobles and warriors, leaving these groups without a social niche in the new system. Social relations were further confused as the warriors of the king's army, the low-caste clients of the nobility and slaves were all forced to pick up agriculture and grow cash crops.[18] This massive dislocation of the top and bottom strata of society fueled the growth of the *confréries*, as these dispossessed people flooded to the new religious movements in mass. As a “means of reconstituting the old social order on a new, religious basis,"[19] the Mouride structure

[14] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 101.
[15] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 26.
[16] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 102–3.
[17] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 26.
[18] Cruise O’Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 14.
[19] Cruise O’Brien, 15.

reintegrated those who were displaced and Mouride *marabouts* stepped into the roles of the traditional leaders.[20]

The economic changes that French colonialism brought also disrupted the Wolof social system, as subsistence agriculture was replaced by a cash crop peanut trade economy. By the end of the 19th century, they had a substantial peanut trade centered in Cayor, which began to spread to other regions of the interior. This agricultural shift disrupted traditional social relations of agriculture, in which family units were organized under the authority of a family chief, and would work the majority of their time in common fields growing subsistence crops. When the peanut trade expanded, individual plots of land became valuable as spaces for peanut cultivation, and the power of the family chief was eroded by an individualistic model.[21] The shift from an economic model designed for one's needs to an economy based around the interests of the colonizer[22] led to the "collapse of traditional solidarities."[23] The push factors of the peanut trade encouraged expansion to new lands, putting them in contact with other populations




Image 2: Cheikh Amadu Bamba Mbacké
Giulia Paoletti, *Amadou Bamba (Diourbel),* in *Études sur L'Islam au Sénégal*, by Paul Marty, 1917A, 222. In *Searching for the Origin(al). On the Photographic Portrait of the Mouride Sufi Saint Amadou Bamba,* by Giulia Paoletti, 2018. Cahiers d'études africaines 230, no. 2 , 323–48, https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesafricaines.22096.

[20] Cruise O'Brien, 15.
[21] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 26–27.
[22] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 103.
[23] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 71.

with different social, geographical, and ethnic origins.[24] This exposure to new people and populations led to a further erosion of traditional social systems and relations, which were replaced by *maraboutic* communities.[25]

This massive reconstruction of traditional social relations was enabled by Cheikh Amadu Bamba Mbacké, the founder of the Mouridiyya (see Image 2). Born in 1850 in Baol, he hailed from a family of influential Wolof *marabouts* and his father was a highly renowned Muslim leader in the Wolof states.[26] His father was the personal educator of the children of Ma Ba Diakhou, a prominent warrior *marabout* who waged a widespread *jihad* in the 1860s, and he enjoyed close relations with Lat Dior, the *Damel* of Cayor.[27]

Ahmadou came of age in his father's village, acquiring a substantial reputation for knowledge and piety, and like his father he became associated with the court of Lat Dior.[28] After the Battle of Dekkilé in 1886, Ahmadou Bamba fled with his friends and disciples into the region of Baol, settling in 1888 at the village of Darou Salam. His following rapidly increased, with disciples organizing collective groups to work the fields, grow food and perform a wide range of tasks.[29] These new disciples were largely from the dispossessed classes of Cayor warriors, slaves and other partisans of the *Damel,* all who sought a new leader in Amadu Bamba.[30] In contrast to Bamba's disciples before the battle of Dekkilé, who largely sought religious education, the new arrivals to Darou Salam sought engagement with a new social order.[31] With this rapidly growing core of followers, the Mouridiyya swiftly emerged as a dynamic organization.

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[24] Coulon, 71.
[25] Coulon, 72.
[26] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 104.
[27] Sy, 104–5.
[28] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 40; Khadim Mbacke, "La Tariqua Des Mourides," *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell'Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente* 53, no. 1 (1998): 102.
[29] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 41.
[30] Cruise O'Brien, 40.
[31] Cruise O'Brien, 40.

Internal Dynamism

Through its combination of religious belief, hierarchical social relations, organizational structure and economic activity, the Mouride *confrérie* that formed during the lifetime of Amadu Bamba possessed an incredible internal dynamism that gave it tangible political weight in its relations with the French. This section provide an overview of the Mouridiyya, outlining the major characteristics and organizing principles that laid the groundwork of its political power.

Like the vast majority of Senegalese Islam, the Mouridiyya falls within the tradition of Sufism. Rather than a sect of Islam, Sufism is a tradition of religious practice followed by Muslims (mostly of the Sunni sect) in many parts of the world, including West Africa, South Asia and the Balkans.[32] Sufism is unique in Islam for its distinctive organizational structure, the *confrérie* (*tariqa* in the Arabic), which often centers on the group's founder who serves as the spiritual guide for his disciples[33] and is given Saint status.[34] As a mystical tradition emphasizing introspection, meditation, recitation of divine verses and the intonation of the name of Allah,[35] Sufism often entails the renunciation of worldly things, inward attention and purification of the soul.[36]

The Mouridiyya of Amadu Bamba embodied many traditional Sufi qualities, with notable innovations. One large difference between the Mouridiyya and typical Sufi *confréries* lies in the Mouridiyya's beliefs about submission, which formed the foundation of its social structure. At the core of Mouride religious belief is the notion that disciples (called *taalibé* in Wolof) must give full submission to a Muslim cleric who serves as their spiritual guide (called *marabouts* in

[32] "Sufi Islam: What You Need to Know – DW – 11/25/2017," dw.com, accessed November 12, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/sufi-islam-what-you-need-to-know/a-41532401.
[33] "Sufi Islam."
[34] "Sufi Islam."
[35] "Sufi Islam."
[36] Megan Specia, "Who Are Sufi Muslims and Why Do Some Extremists Hate Them?," *The New York Times*, November 24, 2017, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/world/middleeast/sufi-muslim-explainer.html.

Wolof and *cheikh* or *shaikh* in Arabic). In Mouride theology, formed by the writings of Cheikh Amadu Bamba, it is believed that "attachment to a *shaikh*, together with complete submission of his will, is the only certain path to paradise," meaning that the intermediary of a *marabout* is essential to a *taalibé's* path to heaven.[37] *Marabouts* are seen as holding spiritual power that allows them to serve as an intermediary with Amadu Bamba, who can himself connect the *taalibé* to the Prophet and then Allah.[38] Additionally, as the concept of a Mouride *marabout* is intertwined with traditional African religion, the *marabout* is also attributed supernatural powers to protect the *taalibé* from evil spirits and unseen forces, contextualized in Islam through the concepts of *jinn*.[39] Despite the primacy of submission in Mouride theology, *taalibé*s are still expected to fulfill their other Islamic obligations, such as praying five times daily, fasting during the month, learning some of the Quran, and learning some of Cheikh Amadu Bamba's religious poems.[40] Although other Sufi *confréries* include ideas of submission, the Mouridiyya employs a concept of these relations that is more extensive in its demands on the *taalibé,* which contributes to the *confrérie's* unique internal dynamism.[41]

The social relations that flow from this submission are the core building block of the Mouride organization. *Marabout-taalibé* relations are formed through an initiation ceremony where a *taalibé* presents himself before the *marabout* on his knees and says "I submit my body and my soul to you. I will do everything you order me, and abstain from anything you forbid me."[42] Initiation to the *confrérie* happens either through this act of submission or by marriage, as women cannot formally make the pledge but are considered attached to the *marabout* through

[37] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 84.
[38] Cruise O'Brien, 84.
[39] Cruise O'Brien, 83.
[40] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*.
[41] Cruise O'Brien, 83.
[42] Cruise O'Brien, 85.

their husbands.[43] A *taalibé* can only pledge submission to one *marabout*, and if he wants to be initiated with another, he performs the submission ritual again and voids his relationship with his first *marabout*.[44] The relationship of submission and social hierarchy of *marabout* and *taalibé* is also to be expressed physically by the disciple, who remains on his knees in his *marabout's* presence, without headwear or footwear, and sits with his head inclined forward and his eyes directed to the ground.[45]

The *marabout-taalibé* relationship also includes certain obligations, such as contributions by the *taalibé* and services by the *marabout.* The Mouride *taalibé* is expected to give regular contributions to his *marabout*, either in the form of money, resources, or labour.[46] Although there is an expectation that *taalibé* would contribute, the *confrérie* has no means of physical coercion, and contributions are freely given by the *taalibé* in hopes of spiritual reward. Material contributions include donations to the poor, gifts to one's own *marabout* or contributions to higher *marabouts* in the Mouride hierarchy.[47] The element of *taalibé* contribution is far more regular and expansive in Mouridism than in other *confréries,*[48] which bolsters its economic power. The *marabouts* also act as a form of collective insurance for their *taalibés,* redistributing donations and resources in situations of crisis.[49] They also provide general services to their communities, distributing resources to elderly, sick or disabled people and offering cheap loans to their followers.[50]

Marabout-taalibé social relations are the dominant structuring force at the local level and led to the unique social and economic systems that emerged. Local Mouride organization is

[43] Cruise O'Brien, 85–86.
[44] Cruise O'Brien, 88.
[45] Cruise O'Brien, 88.
[46] Cruise O'Brien, 89.
[47] Cruise O'Brien, 91.
[48] Cruise O'Brien, 93.
[49] Cruise O'Brien, 96.
[50] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*.

based on the concept of a *daara,* which over time evolved into *maraboutic* villages. A *daara* is a community of young men and boys (12-20 years on average) who live with a *marabout* who is tasked with their Quranic education. Although the model was originally purely educational, it developed over time into a core Mouride economic structure wherein the *taalibés* both worked the *marabout's* fields and learned the Quran.[51] Over time, as the *taalibés* grew older, formed families and settled around the *daara*, a full village would grow and continue the work of cultivation. In these *maraboutic* villages, *marabouts* held large communal fields that their former *taalibés* would work some days of the year, but much of the land was given to the *taalibés* to work as their own.[52] With the development of the peanut trade, these villages rapidly multiplied and became the core local manifestation of Mouride influence.[53]

The intermediate rank of the *confrérie* was composed of Bamba's main lieutenants, his brothers and main disciples. Reflecting the limitations on Bamba's power, Marty says that this intermediate level did not always obey the founder, "especially… his brothers who were far from having complete confidence in his divine mission."[54] Over time this structure evolved into a hierarchical and centralized system, with lower *marabouts* paying respects to higher *marabouts* in a pyramid structure. As the disciples of Bamba passed away in later years, this middle tier of Mouride power was occupied by regional *Khalifes*, major *marabouts* who oversaw large regions of *maraboutic* village groupings. As of the 1980s, there were 20 regional branches of the Mouridiyya with one *Khalife* per group,[55] the majority of whom were descendants of Cheikh Amadu Bamba or one of his early disciples.[56] *Khalifes* are instated by the vote of a council of

[51] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 124.
[52] Coulon, 125.
[53] Coulon, 123.
[54] Paul Marty, *Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba: Rapport à M. le Gouverneur Général de l'Afrique Occidentale*, Collection de la Revue du Monde Musulman (Paris, 1913), 57.
[55] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 121.
[56] Coulon, 121.

lower *marabouts*, although the proposal of candidates is decided based on traditional Wolof succession rules, which dictate that either the oldest son or oldest surviving brother are to inherit the position.[57]

At the top of the Mouride pyramid was the founder, Amadu Bamba, who Paul Marty called the "only master and the one on which the whole edifice of the order stands."[58] He drew on the support of his lieutenants, who were able to draw on the network of lower *marabouts* and their *taalibés*. After Bamba's death, this centralized position of control continued with the creation of the position of the *Khalife General*. Grouping the regional *Khalifes* under his authority, the *Khalife General* is the highest power in the *confrérie.* A council of the regional *Khalifes* and other dignitaries are formally responsible for instating the *Khalife General* on the death of his predecessor, and all *Khalife Generals* have been direct descendants of the founder.

Because of the limitations on the power of the *Khalife General*, divisions in the Mouridiyya often led the *confrérie* to behave as a non-unitary actor, with its external actions flowing from a number of conflicting interests within the *confrérie*. These divisions of interest tended to be only about leadership, and for the most part, Mouride *marabouts* pushed for the same economic goals in a uniform way. Because of an overall alignment of aims between these different sources of Mouride power, the organization was able to present a cohesive approach to external relations and held a generally unified conception of its interests and beliefs, despite its divisions.

In this religious structure, there is one significant outlying branch, called the Baay Fall, who are known for their eccentric dress, behavior and distinct predilection for work. This wing of the Mouridiyya follows the teachings of Cheikh Ibrahima Fall, one of the Cheikh Amadu

[57] Coulon, 122.
[58] Marty, *Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba*, 57.


Bamba's first and most active disciples.[59] Fall was a fervent supporter of the founder, and worked to spread Bamba's reputation during the early phases of the movement.[60] He instilled in his followers the idea of absolute devotion and submission to a *marabout*, which became widespread in the whole *confrérie*.[61] Following Fall's teachings, the Baay Fall do not observe a number of the core practices of Islam, such as praying and fasting, and they also smoke tobacco and drink alcohol[62] which has led to them being viewed as heretical by other Muslims. For the Baay Fall, these traditional Muslim obligations were replaced by a religious ethic of work, which became the primary organizing norm of the Baay Fall. They believed that a *taalibé* can demonstrate his religious devotion to his *marabout* and to God through his work, an idea which greatly influenced the *confrérie* at large. By fusing religious ideas and ethics of work, the Baay Fall formed a dynamic contingent of the Mouridiyya which spread this idea to other branches despite their relative isolation from non-Mourides.[63]

This religious work ethic of the Baay Fall infused the rest of the organization, and translated into massive economic wealth and power for the *confrérie* at large. Often compared to the Protestant work ethic, the Murid conception of work saw labor as occupying the mind and body and protecting them away from temptation.[64] As a redemptive and religious act,[65] work was seen by the Mourides as playing a pivotal role in personal salvation.[66] Paired with ideas of submission and the duties of *taalibés* to contribute to their *marabouts*, this religious work ethic empowered the Mouride engagement in the peanut trade, making it a dynamic economic force that the French could not ignore.

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[59] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 141.
[60] Cruise O'Brien, 141.
[61] Cruise O'Brien, 141.
[62] Cruise O'Brien, 150.
[63] Cruise O'Brien, 150.
[64] Cruise O'Brien, 90.
[65] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 225.
[66]Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 82.

Through the expansion of the French railroads and growth of the peanut trade, the Mouridiyya began a rapid spread throughout the interior of Senegal. As expressed in a colonial political report in 1926, the *confrérie* "has completely conquered the Baol region, and spreads slowly and steadily in the neighboring regions, Thiès, Sine-Saloum, Louga and above all Cayor, which according to the Commandant of this Region will be completely won within ten years, if there does not arise some element of nature to bar the route of its extension."[67] This expansion (see Map 3) took place through the expansion of pioneering *daaras* into uncultivated lands, which would then gradually develop into villages in the orbit of the Mouride *confrérie*. This territorial expansion allowed the Mouridiyya to build its economic base and pose itself as a major power in the rural interior. [68]In the movement to the "Terres Neuves" (New Lands), often called the "March to the East," different regions were given to each of Bamba's primary lieutenants, and all village groups that formed in those regions remained in their zones of influence.[69]



Map 3:
Mouride Expansion, 1912-58 (and density in 1958), in *The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood,* by Donal B. Cruise O'Brien (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 76.

In this forming and expanding territorial organization of the Mouride agricultural economy, the city of Touba emerged as the central pole. Founded in 1988 by Amadu Bamba as his holy city, Mouride leaders have worked to make Touba a city of reference for religious

[67] *Extrait du Rapport Politique Sénégal - Année 1926*, Archives du Sénégal 19G4, no.1. In *Ahmadou Bamba face aux autorités coloniales (1889-1927),* ed. Oumar Ba (Dakar, Senegal: Imprimerie de la SIPS, 1982), 166.
[68] Marty, *Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba*, 112. Marty, with his clear colonial biases, described this expansion as a derivative of "the Holy War, the apostolate, the military and religious conquest, all the virtues of expansion of Islam are transformed by the Wolof Mouridism. They become: the appropriation of the available lands, the more intense cultivation of the fields, the conquest of the markets of the ports, and the invasion of all the branches of the local production." (translation by author). Marty is unable to conceive of a peaceful Islam, so he transfers it into his understanding of Islam as a conquering force.
[69] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 123.

science and practice, and a social and economic refuge for its followers.[70] Organized around the Grand Mosque of Touba, the city grew outward to integrate other smaller satellite villages, and has grown to be one of the largest cities in Senegal today.[71] With all these changes, the Mouridiyya became an economic powerhouse with incredible internal dynamism.

Another major pillar of Mouride organization was the Magal of Touba, a pilgrimage and celebration held annually in the city of Touba. The first precedent of this celebration was organized by Bamba as a yearly pilgrimage and festival two months after the aïd-al-kebir (*tabaski* in Wolof), which was first celebrated in 1926. After his death in 1927, his son Mamadu Mustapha changed the date to the 19th of October, the anniversary of his fathers death, to inscribe the festival with a symbolic grief and meditation for his father's memory.[72] After Mamadu Mustapha's death, his brother Falilou Mbacké modified the date to match the anniversary of Bamba's departure for exile.[73] Throughout its history, this festival has served as a strong unifying force for the movement, strengthening collective Mouride identity by bringing together all of the Mouride followers in one crowd of millions of followers.

Since its early days, the Magal of Touba also served as a major annual political landmark. During French rule, a wide variety of government functionaries and ministers of the French Administration, including the Gouverneur Général, attended the Magal and expressed gratitude to the Mourides for their contributions to the country.[74] The Gouverneur often even sat beside the *Khalife* as he presided over the ceremonies.[75] As displayed in the Introduction, this political role

[70] Cheikh Guèye, *Touba: La Capitale des Mourides*, Hommes et Sociétés (Paris, Dakar: Karthala, 2002), 15–17.
[71] Guèye, 17–18.
[72] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 219.
[73] Sy, 219.
[74] Sy, 222.
[75] Sy, 223.

of the Magal of Touba has continued with post-independence governments and powerful Senegalese politicians still attend the Magal to show their support to the *confrérie*.[76]

These political manifestations at the Magal highlight the complicated dynamics of French engagement with the dynamic Mouride *confrérie,* which formed the roots of post-colonial political engagement. The following section examines how the internal dynamism of the Mourides and their economic predilection was a driving force in their relationship with the French, translating their economic and internal dynamism into political power.

Evolutions in Mouride Relationship with French

The social and organizational aspects outlined above made the Mouridiyya a dynamic force that the French could not ignore. This internal dynamism was the driving force of the evolution of their relationship with Administration, forcing the French to reckon with their presence. As the internal power of the Mouridiyya proved too substantial to handle through repression, this led to a shift of French policy toward co-optation, strategy which was itself motivated through recognition of the economic dynamism of the *confrérie*.

Because of the recent memory of multiple Islamic *jihads* in Senegal during the 19th century, the French approached the newly forming Mouridiyya with distrust and hostility. The Colonial Administration feared the mass convergence on the village of Darou Salam, noticing that the ex-warriors and supporters of former resistant militant leaders were among those who joined Bamba.[77] Although Amadu Bamba made efforts to show his fealty to the French, the Administration was unconvinced. Martial Merlin, the Director of Political Affairs in Senegal, saw this a diversion like that made by Ma Ba Diakhou and other famous warrior *marabouts* of

[76] Sy, 222.
[77] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 42–43.

the 19th century, masking Bamba's true intentions.[78] The French dispersed Bamba's followers, but they swiftly returned, proving the strength of their belief and devotion to the *marabout*. Glimpsing the fervent depth of Mouride beliefs and ideas, the French grew increasingly anxious. Merlin stated of Bamba that he was "a very intelligent man, well advised, capable to avoid compromising himself, and whose spirit of hostility, projects of conquest and dreams of ambition are certain and are pursued with an obstination that, even if it denotes a level of spirit far superior to that of his peers, is for that only more dangerous to our influence."[79] This demonstrates the fear that the leader himself inspired in the French Administration, as they recognized his intelligence and personal charismatic appeal. Upon his recommendation, Cheikh Amadu Bamba was exiled to Gabon in 1895.

This approach to the early Mouridiyya mirrored French Islamic policy in the late 19th century, which opposed Islamic States and movements that aimed to create them, and sought to contain militant Muslim elements such as the Tijaniyya, using peaceful *marabouts* to encourage other Muslims to renounce armed *jihad.*[80] At this point the French mis-evaluated the religious fervor and organizational dynamism of the Mouridiyya as a militant power, which motivated their early policy of repression towards them. After 1900, the French Islamic policy complexified as new organizations were created and staffs expanded to carry out large scale surveillance and intelligence gathering on Muslim groups in the colonies.[81]

Despite Bamba's exile in Gabon, which lasted from 1895 to 1902, his movement continued to grow in Senegal.[82] When his lieutenants finally secured his return, by soliciting the

[78] Martial Merlin, "*Séance du 5 Septembre 1895,"* In *Ahmadou Bamba face aux autorités coloniales (1889-1927)*, 64.
[79] Martial Merlin, 65.
[80] David Robinson, "French 'Islamic' Policy and Practice in Late Nineteenth-Century Senegal," *The Journal of African History* 29, no. 3 (1988): 416.
[81] Robinson, 416.
[82] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 43.

newly elected French Deputy of Senegal, Bamba arrived back in Senegal to great jubilation.[83] The French promptly realized their mistake as the movement flourished after his return. Nervous of his growing power and the evident strength of Mouride religious fervor, the French authorities once again exiled Bamba. This time they sent him to Mauritania to stay with a peaceful *marabout,* who they hoped would be able to push Bamba toward less contestatory relations with the French. [84]

Despite his distance, Bamba's disciples made mass pilgrimages to visit him in Mauritania, further contributing vitality to this burgeoning movement. Realizing that their efforts to distance him from his followers were ineffective, the French decided in 1907 to allow him to return to Senegal.[85] He was then kept at a remote village in Jolof under close surveillance, and in 1910 was allowed to return to Baol and live in the village of Diourbel.[86]

Recognizing throughout the 1910s that their approach was not sufficient to effectively repress the Mourides, the Administration began what Cheikh Tidiane Sy called a period of "channeling and using the *maraboutic* forces" between 1920-1957.[87] This reflected a pragmatic recognition by the French of the productive power of the Mourides, and a growing trust in the passivity of the *confrérie*. Recognizing the economic dynamism of the Mouridiyya in the peanut trade[88] and the weaknesses of their own governance system, they adapted their strategy to mirror their "pacification" strategy used in Mauritania. Through this strategy, they sought to empower peaceful *marabouts* to spread peaceful forms of Islam and sideline more radical *marabouts*.[89]

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[83] Cruise O'Brien, 44.
[84] Cruise O'Brien, 44.
[85] Cruise O'Brien, 45.
[86] Cruise O'Brien, 45–46.
[87] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 203. Translation by author.
[88] Sy, 208.
[89] Sy, 208.

As the French adapted to the dynamism of the Mouridiyya, attempting to instrumentalize it for their interest, the relations between the Administration and the Mourides became far friendlier. In 1910, Amadu Bamba published a letter, which stated that "the French government, thanks to God, has not opposed the profession of faith but on the contrary has been friendly toward Muslims and encouraged them to practice [their religion]."[90] He continued that "the truth is that I am sincerely attached to the French and always satisfied to live in the place in their land which they will designate for me, knowing how happy are those that live with them and in peace."[91] This letter was likely published at the request of the French, and it helped to convince the Administration of the nonviolent intentions of the movement.

Tensions gradually eased between the French and the Mourides, as the French decided that the best way to handle this powerful organization was to harness its economic power. As a French political report reflected in 1926, "all of [Bamba's] conduct in these past years denotes that he has definitively accepted without ulterior motive the situation that has been made for him, and has fully appreciated the liberalism we have shown towards him."[92] Recognizing the economic dynamism of the Mouridiyya, Paul Marty said of the *confrérie* in 1913 that the government need not fear the Mouridiyya, but should "exercise its surveillance on this commercial and agricultural expansion, and watch that the ardor of the Mourides does not impinge on the rights of other parties, and provoke agrarian conflict by their brazeness."[93]

In this period, relations between Bamba and the French markedly improved. Bamba even provided hundreds of followers as recruits to fight for the French in World War I. The French from this point on tolerated the geographic expansion of the Mourides, likely with the intent to

[90] Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 222.
[91] Robinson, 222.
[92] *Extrait du Rapport Politique Sénégal - Année 1926*, Archives du Sénégal 19G4, no.1. In *Ahmadou Bamba face aux autorités coloniales (1889-1927),* ed. Oumar Ba (Dakar, Senegal: Imprimerie de la SIPS, 1982), 166. Translation by author.
[93] Marty, *Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba*, 112.

make use of the Mouride leadership as means of securing cooperation from its massive base of followers. After the end of the War, the railroad from Thiès to Bamako was completed and opened new areas for peanut cultivation in the East.[94]

Inside of the Mouridiyya, this growing cooperation with the French was driven by Cheikh Amadu Bamba's closest lieutenants, including his younger brother Cheikh Anta Mbacké, his son Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké and his devoted disciple Ibrahima Fall. While the founder was an ascetic figure who distanced himself from Colonial politics, these lieutenants forged relationships with the French and growing Senegalese political elite (see Chapter 2), and thus harnessed the economic power of this organization for political goals. According to Paul Marty, Cheikh Anta Mbacké dealt with politicians, businessmen, and merchants on his brother's behalf, and was known for being very wealthy and being the businessman of the entourage.[95] Ibrahima Fall, a zealous follower of Bamba who founded the Baay Fall branch of the Mouridiyya, spent a lot of time and money to buy the services of people well placed to defend Bamba's interests.[96] He cultivated connections with notable families in Saint Louis whom he supported in politics, and in return they interceded in his favor before the local government.[97]

Bamba lived quietly at Diourbel under French surveillance until his death, studying and meditating while his followers flocked from across Senegal to bring offerings in frequent pilgrimages, and his movement continued to grow. The last years of his life were dedicated to the construction of the Grand Mosque of Touba, which started construction in 1924. He died at Diourbel on July 19, 1927, and was succeeded as *Khalife* (leader of a Sufi brotherhood) by his eldest son Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké.

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[94] Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation*, 224.
[95] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 194.
[96] Coulon, 194.
[97] Coulon, 194.

Conclusion

An examination of the formation and evolution of the early Mouride *confrérie* demonstrates that the Mouridiyya's power was first and foremost an internal power. Arising from the social crises in the Wolof states in the 19th century, the organization arose as a reconstruction of the previous social order within a new, non-militant organization. This nature as a societal revitalization movement allowed the organization to draw on the power of traditional social structures in order to generate a new ideological response to French colonialism. Under the leadership of Amadu Bamba, whose family connections to the ruling class allowed him to draw on the dispossessed classes of Wolof society, the organization grew rapidly. Through the power of their ideology of submission to a *marabout*, which had incredible implications for the social structure of the organization, the Mouridiyya formed a hierarchical, cohesive and adaptable organization that allowed them to rapidly expand peanut cultivation. The relations of submission, along with their strong religious work ethic, made the Mouridiyya an undeniable authority in Senegal which the French could not avoid reckoning with. Although French rule did impose serious limitations on the Mouridiyya, because its internal power was the driving force of its power and evolving relationship with the French, the Mourides were able to retain autonomy in the social and economic spheres and continue to act to serve their own interests. In this context, the Mourides gained substantial power by maneuvering within the limitations of French domination to find opportunities to translate their internal dynamism into external influence.

2. The Mouridiyya and the Growth of Indigenous Senegalese Politics (1927-1960)

On the evening of July 19, 1927, the son of Amadu Bamba, Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké, arrived at the residence of the Administrator of the Circle of Diourbel and delivered news of his father's death.[1] As a French report later explained, "the marabout passed without witness in the course of the day of July 19th, at an undetermined hour; he was discovered sprawling lifeless in the sand of a hut where he liked to take his medications, by his son Mamadou Moustapha."[2] Fearing the instability that Bamba's death could cause, the Administrator waited until the cover of night and transported the body in secret to be buried in the village of Touba.[3] The Lieutenant Governor of Senegal wrote on the 29 of July 1927 that "measures [were] taken immediately to avoid any trouble or disorder that this event could have provoked."[4] When his death was announced the next day, Mouride pilgrims flocked to Touba to peacefully mourn the founder. Paranoid of any possible disorder, the French decreed that the pilgrims could remain at the tomb for up to 24 hours, which the pilgrims obeyed without resistance. [5]

During the last years of Bamba's life, the French Administration believed that the movement would dissolve without his leadership, a belief largely informed by Paul Marty. In his 1917 report on the Mouride *confrérie*, Marty reassured the Administration that the Mouridiyya "subsists today, without hardly progressing, by the presence and virtues of its founder," without

[1] Lieutenant Governor of Senegal to the Governor General of French West Africa, Saint-Louis, July 29, 1927, Political Bureau n. 338, in *Ahmadou Bamba face aux autorités coloniales (1889-1927),* ed. Oumar Ba (Dakar, Senegal: Imprimerie de la SIPS, 1982), 170-171.
[2] Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, 170. Translation by author.
[3] Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, 170–72.
[4] Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, 170. Translation by author.
[5] Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, 172.

which the *confrérie* would lose its vitality.[6] He stated that "his brothers and lieutenants envy one another too much to grant the supremacy of one of them after his death. As each of them is currently the recognized chief of his village and his *taalibés*, it is very likely that the disappearance of Amadou Bamba will bring the disintegration of his Mouridism and its division into as many factions as there are powerful Cheikhs."[7]

However, far from dissolving under the stress of succession struggles, the Mouridiyya continued to grow as a dynamic economic and political force throughout the first half of the 20th century. A week after Bamba's death, a family council instated his eldest son, Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké, as the first Khalife, the leader of the Mouridiyya, and although divisions did arise, they did not tear the confériе apart. In fact, these succession disputes led the Mouride leaders to engage with a newly emerging Senegalese political elite and thus laid the foundations of their crucial role in electoral politics.

This chapter charts the evolution of the political power of the Mouride *confrérie* in the years between Bamba's death and Senegal's independence (1927-1960) by examining the relationship between the new Mouride leadership and the emerging Senegalese political elite. I argue that because both the Mouride *confrérie* and fledgling Senegalese political leadership were divided along binary rifts (constituting 4 viable political actors), the relationships that formed between the two forces were characterized by strategic alliances, with all players attempting to leverage the divisions of the other side to their advantage. Additionally, as these relationships were formed in a context of French rule and domination, the marabouts and politicians built these alliances as a means of developing alternate wellsprings of power and legitimacy outside of the French system that could be used to improve their position in relation to the French. These

[6] Paul Marty, *Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba: Rapport à M. le Gouverneur Général de l'Afrique Occidentale*, Collection de la Revue du Monde Musulman (Paris, 1913), 126–27. Translation by author.
[7] Marty, 126–27. Translation by author.

dynamics of connection and strategic maneuvering intensified during the late 1940s and 1950s, when the extension of citizenship and voting rights to rural populations, including the vast population of Mouridism disciples, pushed the Mouride leaders into the foreground of the electoral contest. Through this process of relationship formation and intensification, the Mouride leaders established themselves on the eve of independence as a critical point of reference for the politics of the new country and played a decisive role in the political contests of the 1950s which decided the country's post-independence leadership.

My discussion begins with a short discussion of the broad social and political developments in Senegal during the late 19th and early 20th century which laid the foundation of the relationship of the Mouridiyya to the Senegalese electoral sphere. In the following sections, I chronologically chart the developments and evolution of these relationships, briefly discussing the origins of these relationships during the lifetime of Amadu Bamba, and then moving through the years after his death. In these sections I delineate the main developments and divisions in both the Mouridiyya and in electoral politics, and demonstrate how these factored into the evolution and growth of Mouride influence in the Senegalese political sphere. This discussion culminates with the ascendency of Léopold Sedar Senghor in the political sphere during the 1950s, the crucial role of the leaders of the *confréries* in securing his victory and the political developments that led to Senegalese independence in 1960. Finally, in my concluding section, I attempt to evaluate similarities and differences between these new political relationships and those formed between the Mourides and the French Administration.

The Emergence of Senegalese Electoral Politics

A number of social and political shifts occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that laid the foundation for the relationships that developed between the Mourides and the

political elite after Amadu Bamba's death. The first of these major developments was the creation of the *Quatres Communes* (Four Communes) in Senegal, from which emerged a new Western-educated Senegalese social and political elite. By the turn of the 20th century, the main points of French influence in the territory were the island of Saint-Louis, the island of Gorée, Dakar, and Rufisque, of which the latter three were located on or near the Cape Verde Peninsula. These four urban centers were granted special status and voting rights as French Communes in the 1870s and 1880s, although Gorée and Saint-Louis were given suffrage as early as 1848 because they paid "the blood tax" of fighting in the colonial army.[8] These voting rights allowed the populations of the *Quatre Communes* to elect candidates to the French National Assembly, as well as various other political positions in the French government and colonial Administration.[9]

In 1895, France underwent an administrative reorganization process of its West African colonies, combining the territories of Senegal, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Soudan into a colonial federation called Afrique-Occidentale Française (French West Africa, AOF). The creation of the AOF brought many notable political changes to Senegal, including further integration into the colonial system. The capital of the organization was established at Saint-Louis in Senegal, making Senegal the new administrative center of the AOF, with the governor of Senegal serving as the Governor-General of the organization. In 1902, the capital was moved from Saint-Louis to Dakar (the current Senegalese capital), where the General Government was established. As a result of its centrality in the French Empire, the populations of the Senegalese coast became the most integrated into the French system of any of the subjects of the AOF, and from this milieu emerged a new class of Senegalese political elites.

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[8] Mamadou Diouf, "The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of the Originaires of the Four Communes (Senegal): A Nineteenth Century Globalization Project," *Development and Change* 29, no. 4 (1998): 673–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.00095.


[9] Encyclopædia Universalis, "Afrique-Occidentale Française (AOF)," Encyclopædia Universalis, accessed October 20, 2024, https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/afrique-occidentale-francaise-aof/.

In contrast to the traditionally educated elite which prioritized Islamic study, the populations of the *Quatres Communes* attended French schools, which began to proliferate in the early 20th century, and were thus shaped by French culture and values.[10] This new elite, which would provide the Senegalese political candidates from 1902 onward, melded traditional Senegalese and French cultures to create a new hybrid identity, expressing pride for their African roots while assimilating aspects of French identity and metropolitan values.[11] Because of its integration into the colonial system and understanding of French culture, this elite was well-poised to engage in the growing indigenous electoral politics in the *Quatres Communes*.

During the first half of the 20th century, there was a movement of Senegalese elites into the political sphere, forming a distinctly Senegalese form of electoral politics and with a cycle of opposition and replacement. Centering on the electoral contest for the Deputy to the French National Assembly, this pattern consisted of periods of dominance by one political figure and the rise of a prominent opposition candidate, who in turn became the dominant figure in the next period to be challenged by a new opposition candidate (Figure 1). This pattern continued throughout this period with the dominance of Blaise Diagne from 1914-1934 and the rise of Galandou Diouf as an opposition figure, then the dominance of Diouf from 1934-1941 and the rise of Lamine Guèye as an opposition figure, and then the election of Guèye and his lieutenant, Léopold Sedar Senghor in 1945 (see Appendix 2). This was followed by the subsequent rupture between the two figures and Senghor's rise as an opposition to Guèye, eventually overtaking him and securing a long period of dominance throughout the 1950s and later becoming the first

[10]John L. Esposito, Tamara Sonn, and John O. Voll, "Senegal: Democracy and the Postcolonial State," in *Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring*, ed. John L. Esposito, Tamara Sonn, and John O. Voll (Oxford University Press, 2016), 0, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195147988.003.0006.
[11] Esposito, Sonn, and Voll.

Figure 1. Timelines of the Deputies to the French National Assembly and of Mouride leadership.



[1]Léopold Senghor served as a Deputy to the French National Assembly from 1945-1959, as President of the inter-territorial joint political party of the (P.F.A.) of the Mali Federation in 1959-60, and as President of Senegal from 1960-1980.
[2]I have chosen to list Amadou Bamba's entire life, as it is difficult to pinpoint a starting date of his influence.
[3]Between 1941 and 1945, due to the rule of the Vichy regime in France, there were no deputies elected to the National Assembly from Senegal.

*Timeline is not to scale.

president of the post-colonial Senegalese state. The following section will discuss the formation of relationships between the Mouride *confrérie* and Senegalese politicians in the years of François Carpot and Blaise Diagne.

Early Mouride Involvement in Electoral Politics

Although the Mouride leadership would become far more important in electoral politics after Bamba's death, and even more so after the Second World War, the initial relationship between the *confrérie* and the political elite was formed in the early 19th century when Senegalese elites moved into the political sphere. The populations of the *Quatre Communes,* including French, Métis (mixed race) and Senegalese people, participated in the electoral system, but until the early 20th century, all elected representatives were white Frenchmen. This gradually shifted after 1902, when François Carpot, a Métis (mixed-race) from Saint-Louis, was elected as a Deputy to the French National Assembly.[12] During his term in office, Carpot formed strategic relations with the Mourides in an attempt to benefit from the immense moral authority they had with much of the Senegalese population. Upon his election in 1902, he interceded on Amadu Bamba's behalf to secure his return from



Image 1: Blaise Diagne, the First Black Deputy to the French National Assembly. Agence de presse Meurisse Agence photographique, "Diagne, Député Du Sénégal et Ht Commissaire Du Congrès Pan Noir : [Photographie de Presse] / Agence Meurisse," image, Gallica, 1921, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9054147p.

[12] "François Carpot - Base de Données Des Députés Français Depuis 1789 - Assemblée Nationale," accessed October 20, 2024, https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/fiche/(num_dept)/1461.

exile in Gabon. After Bamba was exiled again, Carpot continued to advocate for him to the French Administration and secured his return from exile once again.[13] In return for his assistance, the Mourides made large donations to support his political campaigns.[14]

In the election of 1914, Carpot was beaten by Blaise Diagne, a native of Dakar who became the first black Deputy to the National Assembly (Image 1). Continually re-elected until his death in 1934, Diagne played an enormous role in shaping all subsequent Senegalese politics[15] and was responsible for pushing a law through the legislature that extended French citizenship rights to the populations of the *Quatres Communes.*[16] Continuing Carpot's strategy, he interceded on behalf of the Mouridiyya during the Tallerie Affair, in which the Colonial Administrator of the region of Thiès signed a fraudulent contract for the Grand Mosque of Touba with the Mourides. Diagne's advocacy for the *confrérie* in this instance was also in part due to the implication of his main political rival, Galandou Diouf, in this affair.[17] Diagne also helped to ease the tensions between the Mouridiyya and the French Administration and created a more reassuring image of the *confrérie* in the colonial eye. In return for his assistance, the Mourides helped Diagne recruit soldiers for the first World War by providing Mouride recruits, which earned him the position of the High Commissioner of the Republic in West Africa in 1918.[18] This relationship between Diagne and the Mouridiyys would take on even more significance in the years following Bamba's death due to internal Mouride divisions.

The First Mouride Succession Conflict (1927-1939)

[13] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 73.
[14] Christian Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince: Islam et Pouvoir au Sénégal*, Éditions A. Pedone (Paris: Institut d'Études Politiques de Bordeaux: Centres d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, 1981), 195.
[15] G. Wesley Johnson, "The Ascendancy of Blaise Diagne and the Beginning of African Politics in Senegal," *Africa* 36, no. 3 (July 1966): 235–53, https://doi.org/10.2307/1157681.
[16] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 192.
[17] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 73; Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 197.
[18] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 197.

Following Amadou Bamba's Death in 1927, three family members arose to claim the position of *Khalife* and inherit Bamba's mantle. Cheikh Anta Mbacké, Bamba's oldest surviving brother, Ibra Faty Mbacké, his younger brother, and Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké, his eldest son, all rose to claim the position.[19] Cheikh Anta argued that since he was the oldest surviving brother, the natural successor according to Wolof custom, he should inherit his brother's position. Ibra Faty staked his claim to the *Khalifate* on the grounds that he was the most loyal servant of Amadu Bamba, though he shortly after withdrew his claim and gave his support to Mamadu Mustapha. The latter claimed that he inherited the *baraka* (spiritual power) of his father and argued that he was his father's intended choice.[20] Backed by the French because they viewed him as manipulable (see Appendix 3), Mamadu Mustapha became the first *Khalife* of the Mourides, a position he held until his death in 1945 (Image 2). Although Mamadu Mustapha was instated as the *Khalife* within a week of Bamba's death, Cheikh Anta refused to acknowledge Mamadu Mustapha, and instead presented himself as the true Khalife. He gained the support of Bamba's second son and Mamadu Mustapha's younger brother, Falilou Mbacké (see Appendix 4).[21]



Image 2: Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké, the eldest son of Cheikh Amadu Bamba and the first Khalife of the Mouridiyya. Mourides Tv HD Serigne Touba Rek - L'actualité Du Mouridisme. Accessed October 19, 2024, https://www.mourides.com/cheikh-mouhammadou-moustapha.

This inter-*confrérie* division created a new dynamic in relations with the political elite, as the conflicting forces in the Mouridiyya began instrumentalizing rivalries in the political sphere

[19] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 61.
[20] Cruise O'Brien, 61.
[21] Cruise O'Brien, 62.

to gain leverage in their own dispute. They found the perfect opportunity in the political divide between Blaise Diagne and Galandou Diouf.[22] Although Diagne was continually reelected to the National Assembly from 1914-1934, this period saw the emergence of a rival faction under the leadership of Galandou Diouf, a teacher turned politician from Saint-Louis and Diagne's early political mentor (Image 3).

In order to garner support for his claim to the *Khalifate*, Cheikh Anta supported the opposition leader Galandou Diouf, providing him financial support for his campaigns.[23] The French decried the alliance of Diouf and Cheikh Anta, whom they considered radicals, and bolstered Mamadu Mustapha. Backed by the Administration, the *Khalife* formed an alliance with the incumbent Blaise Diagne in order to bolster his power in relation to Cheikh Anta. Despite Diouf's attempts to lean on Muslim solidarity against the Catholic Diagne, he lost the elections of 1928 and the French exiled Cheikh Anta to Soudan.[24]



Image 3 Galandou Diouf, main opposition to Blaise Diagne, and Deputy to the French National Assembly (1934-41). "Galandou Diouf - Senegaldates.Com," accessed October 20, 2024, https://senegaldates.com/personnages/galandou-diouf.

The cycle of opposition and replacement in Senegalese electoral politics continued, leading to a new shifting of factions, although the Mouride divisions remained the same. Upon Blaise Diagne's death in 1934, Galandou Diouf took his place as a Deputy to the National

[22] Diouf established himself as a major political figure in the Commune of Rufisque and the main competitor of Diagne in the elections for the French National Assembly. Elected as a representative of Rufisque at the Conseil General (General Council) of the General Government of the AOF in 1909, he was the first black person elected to any office under French colonialism. In 1919 Diouf was elected mayor of Rufisque, one of the *Quatre Communes,* and would become the first Muslim deputy to the National Assembly.
[23] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 73.
[24] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 197.

Assembly. The first Muslim to hold the office, he held the position until 1941[25] and was well-known for defending African equality and fighting against discrimination. After his election, he quickly secured the return of Cheikh Anta, which reignited the Mouride leadership tensions.[26] Although Mamadu Mustapha was firmly planted as the *Khalife* of the Mourides (see Appendix 5), Cheikh Anta remained in opposition to his rule and continued to leverage his relationship with Diouf.[27] Although he relied less on relations with politicians during this time because he was on better footing with the French,[28] Mamadu Mustapha formed a new alliance with a rising opposition politician, Lamine Guèye, in order to counter the influence of Cheikh Anta and his faction. A primary lieutenant of Galandou Diouf in the 1928 elections, Guèye broke off and became the political director of the newly established Senegalese branch of the French Socialist Party (SFIO), and grew to be the main opposition figure of the time (Image 4).[29] Galandou Diouf successfully defended his position against Guèye in 1934 and 1936 elections, but the SFIO gradually gained ground and proved itself a formidable political force (see Appendix 6).[30]



Image 4: Lamine Guèye, president of the SFIO (Senegalese Socialist Party), and Deputy to the French National Assembly (1945-51). "Amadou Lamine Guèye - Base de Données Des Députés Français Depuis 1789 - Assemblée Nationale," accessed October 21, 2024, https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/fiche/(num_dept)/4314#prettyPhoto/0/.

[25] Coulon, 193.
[26] Coulon, 197–98.
[27] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 73.
[28] Cruise O'Brien, 73.
[29] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 198.
[30] "Lamine Guèye | Senegalese President, Political Leader, Independence Activist | Britannica," September 4, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lamine-Gueye.

Unlike French expectations that the *confrérie* would dissolve under the stress of the succession struggles, Mouride leaders eventually acquiesced to the rule of Mamadu Mustapha, with Falilou recognizing his claim in 1929, and Cheikh Anta eventually doing so in 1939.[31] Despite the power struggles within its leadership, the Mouride *confrérie* had grown rapidly during this period, continuing its territorial expansion under the leadership of the new Khalife. During his *Khalifate*, Mamadu Mustapha organized the first Magal of Touba in 1928, a pilgrimage and festival of Mouride disciples in remembrance of his father, through which he established his position as the leader of the Mourides and associated himself with his father's powerful symbolism.[32] He also began construction of the Grand Mosque of Touba to house the tomb of his father, an effort which mobilized vast amounts of *taalibés* and funds, and served as a vital unifying force for the *confrérie*. Mouride disciples from across the country flocked to assist in construction, donating their labor or giving financial donations.[33] The geographic expansion of Mouride villages and peanut cultivation also resumed under his *Khalifate*, as Mouride talibés established many new agricultural villages and settlements and opened new territory to cash-crop agriculture. Despite its leadership disputes, the *confrérie* remained a dynamic and powerful force at the beginning of the Second World War.

Galandou Diouf remained in the National Assembly until 1941, when the Vichy government in France suspended political activity in West Africa and ruled by administrative appointments.[34] During the War, Mamadu Mustapha helped with French recruitment drives, providing *taalibés* to fight with the French.[35] The Mourides continued to bolster the economy through peanut production during the war, expanding their agricultural enterprises, and

[31] Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*, 63.
[32] Cruise O'Brien, 63–64.
[33] Cruise O'Brien, 63–64.
[34] Cruise O'Brien, 73.
[35] Cruise O'Brien, 74.

additionally won favor with the French by praying publicly and frequently for French victory.[36] As of his death in July 1945, Mamadu Mustapha had prevented the disintegration of the Mouride *confrérie* by frequent and close cooperation with the French Administration,[37] and as a result of the political rivalries and succession divisions, he had established crucial relationships with the political elite that would lay the groundwork for future politics.

Post-War Politics and Independence

After the end of the Second World War, there were a number of important socio-political shifts that made the Mouride leaders even more influential in Senegalese politics. In this period, there was massive population growth in rural areas, and political consciousness began to spread to the interior.[38] This was paralleled by the rapid development of urban areas, especially the capital of Dakar, which rode a wave of new industrialization that led to a rising syndicalist movement. Additionally, the influx of people from villages into the cities led to the emergence of a substantial class of African functionaries who were from rural areas rather than the *Quatres Communes* aristocracy, and they pushed against assimilation and strove for autonomy.[39] In rural areas, change arrived with new lines of communication and transportation connecting them to the



Image 5: Léopold Sedar Senghor, Deputy to the French National Assembly (1945-1959) and President of Senegal (1960 to 1980). "Léopold Sédar Senghor," The Poetry Foundation, accessed October 19, 2024, https://beta.poetryfoundation.org/poets/leopold-sedar-senghor.

[36] Cruise O'Brien, 74.
[37] Cruise O'Brien, 74–75.
[38] Cheikh Tidiane Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides: Un Essai sur L'islam au Sénégal* (Présence Africaine, 1969), 212.
[39] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 199.

coastal cities, which facilitated the flow of new ideas and urban ways of life into the villages. The Mouride marabouts were keenly aware of these structural changes to Senegalese society, and began to look to politicians as a means of keeping up with this change.[40]

The main figures in the political field following the war were Lamine Guèye, the leader of the Senegalese Branch of the French Socialist Party (SFIO), and his political protégé Léopold Sedar Senghor (Image 5). The incumbent, Galandou Diouf, died in 1941, allowing for Guèye and Senghor to be elected in 1945 as Deputies to the National Assembly under the banner of the SFIO. Guèye was elected as the representative of the French citizens of Senegal, and Senghor was the representative of non-citizen populations. Senghor broke off from the Socialist party in 1948, criticizing its timidity on questions of colonialism and independence, and formed his own party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalaise (BDS),[41] in support of decentralization and autonomy of the French overseas territories.[42] These two political parties were central to developments in the 1950s, as Senegalese politics coalesced into a stark division between Lamine Guèye's SFIO and Senghor's BDS.

The Post-War period in Senegal saw an intensification of strategic maneuvering between the marabouts and the political sphere, as political developments pushed the *confréries* (and the Mouridiyya in particular) into the center of political life. In 1946, Lamine Guèye successfully pushed a law through the legislature which extended French citizenship to all the populations of the AOF.[43] Although universal suffrage did not directly follow the extension of citizenship rights, the late 1940s and early 1950s saw the expansion of voting rights in rural Senegal and universal suffrage was fully extended as of 1956.[44] This development opened electoral politics to

[40] Coulon, 199.
[41] Esposito, Sonn, and Voll, "Senegal."
[42] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 200.
[43] Universalis, "Afrique-Occidentale Française (AOF)."
[44] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 198.

previously excluded rural populations, which massively increased the political influence of the Muslim marabouts. The Senegalese interior, the hinterland of Mouride power, was now open to electoral competition and thus made the Mouride leaders central courtiers of political power.[45] Recognizing the massive influence of the marabouts, Guèye and Senghor (under the auspices of their political parties, the SFIO and BDS respectively) began a race for the rural interior in an attempt to prove themselves to religious leaders, who largely had full influence over their *taalibés'* votes.

In an attempt to cast their candidate as the best protector of Muslim interests, both the SFIO and BDS party platforms and propaganda placed a heavy emphasis on religion, support for Islam, and desire to help the marabouts (see Appendix 7).[46] Guèye and Senghor made frequent trips throughout Senegal to meet with the *Khalifes* of the *confréries* and other powerful marabouts, and advocated for causes to which marabouts were sympathetic. As such, they campaigned on platforms of increasing Arabic instruction in Senegal, establishing an Institute of Arabic at University of Dakar, and at one point Senghor spoke in favor of creating muslim tribunals instead of secular ones.[47] They also advocated for a better organization of the pilgrimage to Mecca, and for construction of more mosques.

Second Mouride Succession Dispute

As Senghor and Guèye engaged in this rush for support of religious leaders in rural Senegal, the Mourides underwent a second succession dispute, which again became intertwined with the rivalry in the political sphere. When Mamadu Mustapha died in 1945, his son Cheikh Mbacké attempted to wield his influence to prevent the appointment of his uncle Falilou Mbacké

[45] Coulon, 191.
[46] Lucy C. Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 85.
[47] Behrman, 86.

from being instated as the new *Khalife*, creating a rift which divided the *confrérie* into the 1960s. Despite his opposition, Falilou became the second *Khalife* of the Mourides in 1945 and led the *confrérie* until 1968. As before, the divisions in the *confrérie* once again became enmeshed with political rivalries and played a role in the highly consequential political outcomes of the 1950s.

Cheikh Mbacké found a ready ally in Lamine Guèye and the SFIO, born out of his father's close alliance with Guèye against Galandou Diouf in the earlier succession dispute.[48] Cheikh Mbacké attempted to use the political sphere to revolt against Falilou's authority and thus demonstrate his influence and importance within the *confrérie*.[49] The SFIO supported Cheikh Mbacké, even acting like the small separate Magal of Touba that he organized was the real pilgrimage and celebration.[50]

Falilou formed alliances with Senghor and his BDS party, and additionally gained the support of the French. Similarly to Mamadu Mustapha, the French believed that Falilou would be amenable to their rule, so supported his bid for the *Khalifate*.[51] Because of the clear alliance between Guèye's Socialist Party and Cheikh Mbacké, Falilou turned to the BDS to build support. Both Senghor and Falilou benefitted from their alliance, as Senghor succeeded in ending Cheikh Mbacké's monopoly on works of the Grand Mosque of Touba, and Falilou turned out to have more support within the *confrérie* and was able to bring this weight to bear for the benefit of Senghor's electoral campaigns.[52] It is important to note that in their relations with the *marabouts*, neither politician was able to move with ease and publicly declare their opposition, and they both attempted to keep their relations friendly with the opposing marabout in order to keep their bridges open.[53]

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[48] Behrman, 74.
[49] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 213.
[50] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 204.
[51] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 72.
[52] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 203.
[53] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 77.

Path to Independence

Senghor emerged from the contest for the rural interior as the clear winner, gaining the support of the Khalifes of the Mourides and the Tidjanes, the two most influential *confréries*, as well as many other local *marabouts*. Senghor won to his side the incredibly influential Falilou Mbacké, Abubacar Sy, Cheikh Tijane Sy, Saidou Nourou Tall, and a network of lesser *marabouts*.[54] Although Guèye was able to win the support of some *marabouts*, these figures were not as influential as Senghor's allies. Senghor proved more successful in demonstrating his care for questions of peanut cultivation and trade which appealed to the *marabouts*.[55] In contrast, Lamine Guèye allied more with the unpopular territorial canton chiefs who rivaled the *marabouts* and thus failed to build a credible appeal. This allowed Senghor's BDS to gain political currency in calling out the abuses of the chiefs against the rural populations, and make enormous electoral strides into rural areas.[56] Additionally, because of his background in the bourgeois, westernized environments of the *Quatres Communes*, Guèye was far less comfortable in the rural areas than Senghor, who was born in a rural area and who comported himself in a way that was familiar to peasants.[57]

Lamine Guèye additionally suffered in this contest due to his alliance with Cheikh Mbacké, who proved to be a rash and unpredictable ally, who ultimately commanded less respect and authority than the *Khalife*. In 1952, Cheikh Mbacké ordered his *taalibés* to attack Falilou's compound, which greatly tarnished his image and his ally, Lamine Guèye, with him.[58] Senghor and his party publicized this incident and blamed the SFIO for its ally's actions, and Falilou also condemned the attack, which was seen as support for the BDS. This incident discredited Cheikh

[54] Behrman, 88.
[55] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 202.
[56] Coulon, 203.
[57] Coulon, 202–3.
[58] Coulon, 204.

Mbacké, and as a result he was expelled from the Council of Murid Administration.[59] Despite losing his influence, he remained hostile to the leadership of Falilou and the BDS until the early 1960s, making only a surface-level show of reconciliation in 1956.

By the early 1950s, the balance of power between the parties had shifted dramatically and Senghor emerged as the predominant political figure, revealing the vast influence of the *marabouts*. Riding on the support of his powerful allies, Senghor and the BDS dominated the political contest throughout the 1950s and rapidly undercut the SFIO's electoral base. Senghor secured a landslide victory in 1951 and was reelected to the National Assembly by a substantial margin, winning everything but the *Quatres Communes*.[60] In the 1952 elections for the Territorial Assembly, the BDS once again secured a conclusive victory, further marginalizing Lamine Guèye and the Socialist Party. BDS dominance was particularly dramatic in regions of Mouride strength such as the Diourbel-Touba region.[61] Through the 1950s, the BDS continued this trend, winning 76.1% of the vote in the legislative elections in 1956, and 78.1% of the territorial elections of 1957.[62] The SFIO was drastically reduced in power, winning only 11% of the vote in the 1957 territorial election,[63] and in 1958 it merged with BDS to form the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS).[64] This new party was led by Léopold Senghor, his assistant Mamdou Dia, and other BDS leaders.

Throughout the 1950s, Senegalese political aspirations shifted away from citizenship and assimilation into the French system and moved towards a nationalist independence movement inspired by movements throughout Africa and Asia. In 1956, in response to pressures for more self-governance, the French passed the Loi-Cadre, a law which increased the level of self rule in

[59] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 75.
[60] Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 211.
[61] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 202; Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 75.
[62] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 202.
[63] Coulon, 202.
[64] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 75–76; Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 206.

its African territories and universal suffrage to the entire population. Although Senghor advocated African independence, he opposed the Loi-Cadre because he believed that its territorial focus would lead to a "balkanization"[65] effect, creating a proliferation of small and unviable states drawn along colonial borders, which he saw as disadvantageous for Africa's future development.

In response to increasing pressure throughout Africa for independence, General Charles de Gaulle announced that referendums would be held throughout France's African territories in 1958 on the question of independence. He made a tour throughout France's colonies in Africa, encouraging the colonies to vote "Yes" for the new Constitution of the 5th Republic, which would reorganize the French colonies into a new entity, the Communauté Française. Through this body, France attempted to reform its Empire and grant more self-rule to the colonies while retaining power over most of the system. In order to elicit a strong "Yes" vote to continue colonial relations with France, the French put immense pressure on Senegalese voters by spreading extensive propaganda that encouraged voters to vote "Oui à la France!"[66]

Although in support of independence, Senghor advocated for a "Yes" vote to the new constitution, as he believed that immediate independence would be detrimental to the country. He hoped that a larger federation of West African states, formed along the lines of the former AOF, would prevent the territorial atomization of African power. However, within Senghor's UPS, the newly formed merger between the SFIO and the BDS, the left wing took a firm pro-independence stance and drafted a resolution to this effect.[67] This effort was short-circuited, however, by the *Khalifes* of the *confréries* who announced their strong support of continued

[65] Benyamin Neuberger, "The African Concept of Balkanisation," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 3 (1976): 523–29.
[66] "Indépendances - Le Référendum de 1958 En AOF [Muet] - Ina.Fr," Indépendances, accessed October 21, 2024, http://fresques.ina.fr/independances/fiche-media/Indepe00118/le-referendum-de-1958-en-aof-muet.html.
[67] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 210.

relations with France. They feared that independence would rupture relations with France and hurt the peanut trade, so they allied with De Gaulle and advocated for his position.[68] The *Khalife* of the Mouridiyya, Falilou Mbacké, was amongst those who supported De Gaulle and voiced hope that Senegal would remain closely linked with France.[69] In order to avoid damaging their relationship with the *marabouts*, the UPS responded by announcing their support for De Gaulle and the *marabouts*. This reversion of position of the dominant political party on the grounds of protecting their relationship with the *marabouts*, clearly demonstrates the enormous influence that the *confréries*, and the Mourides in particular, had on Senegalese politics at this point.[70]

With this coalition of support for the "Yes" vote, there was an overwhelming victory in the referendum, which led to the creation of a new autonomous Republic of Senegal and approved its membership in the Communauté Française. Meanwhile, Senghor prepared his government to enter a federation, along with Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Soudan that would seek independence at a later date. This grouping, the Mali Federation, was founded in January 1959 under the Communauté Française and was granted independence in June, 1960 after Senghor made a speech appealing to De Gaulle for independence. Because of French pressures against this entity, only Senegal and Soudan (modern-day Mali) entered the Federation. As a result of leadership tensions, the Mali Federation was short-lived, dissolving in August of 1960. Senegal formally withdrew and declared its independence on August 20, 1960, and Senghor was elected as the first president of the independent Senegalese state on September 5, 1960.[71]

Conclusion

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[68] Coulon, 211.
[69] Coulon, 212.
[70] Coulon, 212; Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides*, 214.
[71] "M. Senghor est Élu Président de la République du Sénégal," September 6, 1960, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1960/09/06/m-senghor-est-elu-president-de-la-republique-du-senegal_2107423_1819218.html.

In evaluating the nature of Mouride power in this period, it is important to understand the nature of the relationship between the Mourides and the political elites, and the relation of these two actors to the dominant French Administration. I posit that the relationships formed between the two were significantly different from those the *confrérie* formed with French administration. Although the similarity of State attempts to instrumentalize the *confrérie* after independence and the French attempts at indirect rule were similar, the relations formed before independence were very different. Rather than a model of a dominant political force negotiating with the weaker *confrérie*, the Senegalese political elite interacted with the *confréries* as relative equals in the context of shared domination by the French. While the French relationship was more shaped by colonial policy of co-opt and rule in which the French attempted to bolster internal cohesion and manipulate the single leader,[72] that with Senegalese politicians attempted to use the internal divisions within the Mouridiyya for leverage in the rivalries of the political sphere, and to give them leverage in their relations with the French.

Following the death of Amadu Bamba, the Mouride *confrérie* did not dissolve under the stress of succession struggles as the French had predicted. Rather, they continued their rapid geographical expansion, boosted their agricultural activities, and established themself as a central force in the political sphere. As a result of the creation of the *Quatres Communes* and the emergence of a new Senegalese electoral politics, the Mouridiyya found new powerful figures that could be used to their benefit in the form of Senegalese politicians. With the elections of François Carpot and Blaise Diagne in 1902 and 1914, Senegalese elites began to gain control of the representative organs of power, beginning a pattern of opposition and replacement that remained until independence in 1960. In this nexus, there emerged relationships between

[72] Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, "Le «contrat social» sénégalais à l'épreuve," *Politique africaine* 45, no. 1 (1992): 10, https://doi.org/10.3406/polaf.1992.5541.

marabouts and politicians which attempted to manipulate the political rivalries or Mouride divisions to their benefit. Through these processes, Mouride power continued to grow through this period and set the stage for their crucial role in the post-1947 electoral politics, when the political maneuvering between the two groups was intensified.

3. Continuity and Rupture in the First Decade of Senegalese Independence (1960-1970)

When it took power in 1960, the UPS government inherited an enormous burden. The territory of Senegal had not been unified under African rule since the Empire of Jolof in 1350, leaving no clear political precedent but the French colonial state. Faced by the vast inequalities in Senegalese society as shaped by colonial policy, the UPS government faced multiple groups with divergent interests, including the rural peasantry, *confréries*, urban traders from the Westernized coast, French business interests, and a growing urban working class. Additionally, the UPS was itself divided between the radical socialist wing of Mamadou Dia and the more moderate and conservative wing of Léopold Senghor. Inheriting the institutional and economic structures of the French Administration, the UPS government attempted to remedy the nefarious effects of colonialism on the poor rural populations through a sweeping program of economic, institutional and social reforms. On the political field, the 1960s also saw the solidification of Senghor's dominance, as he consolidated nearly authoritarian power under a one-party UPS state. This all happened in the context of a series of political crises in 1958, 1960, 1962 and 1968, which had dramatic effects on Senghor's power and the power of the marabouts.

The *confréries* were instrumental in each of these crises, and the nature of their interventions reveals much about their power and perception of their interests during this critical period in Senegal's history. As forces of opposition subsided to leave Senghor the main political figure (the French, the leaders of Soudan in the Mali Federation, and Mamadou Dia), there no longer existed the binary rifts in the political sphere which the Mourides had traditionally

manipulated in relations with Senegalese politicians, and their ability to vocalize opposition to Senghor gradually decreased, despite their continued importance a source of legitimacy for the Senghorian regime. In addition, because they often saw Senghor as aligning with their interests, they rarely wielded their power against him. Through an examination of the crises that afflicted the new state, it is evident that the ability of the marabouts to effectively maneuver in the political field and exert an independent political vision decreased across the late 1950s and 1960s as President Senghor consolidated and centralized power. Although they retained their legitimating role in politics, they had little opportunity to push their own interests at that level as the power structure was centralized. Despite this decrease in space allowed for their political participation at the national level, they adapted to these changing conditions and translated their power onto the ground level through their interaction with government economic development policy, thus ensuring the continuation of traditional Senegalese values and social structures in the new state.

This first section of this chapter examines the political crises of the late 1950s and 1960s, examining the roles of the marabouts and how these roles reflected their ability to openly engage in top-down politics. The second section discusses the engagement of the *confréries* with the state agricultural development programs and how this allowed them to assert political power on the ground level. Finally, the third section briefly places this discussion within the scholarly conversation, arguing that the relationship between the *confréries* and the State was more complicated than the traditional clientist portrayal captures, and that power of the *confréries* should be understood on the ideological plane as well as the economic. It should also be noted that because of the similar role played by all of the *confréries* during this period, this chapter will discuss them collectively and highlight when an aspect is specific to the Mouridiyya. Although

it was the most powerful *confrérie* and most actively engaged with the State's economic policy, isolating the Mouridiyya for discussion here would misrepresent the reality of the vast participation of the other *confréries* in shaping the political crises and development policy.

Political Crises and Limitations of *Confréries* in Politics

In 1958, on the eve of independence, the major Senegalese marabouts had played a critical role in deciding the results of Charles de Gaulle's referendum, asserting their own agenda contrary to that of the ruling UPS. The *confréries* at this point saw a divergence of interests with the UPS, and after their success in reshaping UPS policy, many leaders felt empowered to organize a unified political movement.[1] Through their formation of the Comité d'Organisation Islamique in late 1957, an organization with the intention of "saving the destinies of the Muslim religion," a group of major Senegalese marabouts formed a political alliance and attempted to push their own political agenda.[2] After the 1958 referendum, they continued this attempt to claim a larger space in the political formation of the new state by transforming the Comité into the Conseil Supérieur des Chefs Religieux, an institution with the goal of instilling Islamic values in the new state institutions and defending Senegalese Muslims. The Conseil strove to control and verify the new Constitution that would be passed for the new state, in the interest that it provide total liberty to Islam and positively serve the interests of the country's large muslim population.[3]

The formation of this group and attempts at political action demonstrate the intentions of the Mouride leaders, along with other prominent marabouts, to shape the formation of the new state on the basis of their political vision in a capacity as a mediator between the State and Muslim populations.[4] This attempt at unified political action gradually dissipated, as the

[1] Christian Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince: Islam et Pouvoir au Sénégal*, Éditions A. Pedone (Paris: Institut d'Études Politiques de Bordeaux: Centres d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, 1981), 210.
[2] Coulon, 211. Translation of author.
[3] Coulon, 213–14.
[4] Coulon, 213–14.

government refused to negotiate with them as a unified entity, and pursued negotiations with the leaders individually, stoking divisions which led to the end of the attempt at political unity, and by 1960, all marabouts had returned to the fold of the government.[5]

The major marabouts were able to play this autonomous political role in 1958 because they were able to rely on the support of the French, an alternate source of power which they could leverage against the UPS. As discussed in Chapter 2, the marabouts appealed to de Gaulle and collaborated closely with him during the referendum, and in the attempts at political organization in the following year, they attempted to draw the French into the conflict as well. After the UPS passed a new constitution on January 24, 1959, the Conseil sent a telegram to de Gaulle, demanding "respectfully that you use the powers that are conferred to you" to protect their interests from the State.[6] Possibly due to increasing disengagement of the French and the growing autonomy of Senegal, the marabouts were not able to effectively maneuver against the government, and ended up returning to the fray.

In the political crisis of 1960, when the Mali Federation was fracturing into Senegalese and Soudan contingents, the marabouts stood with the UPS. They gave the government their unanimous support, despite the presence of a strong alternate power that they could use to maneuver. The marabouts saw a fundamental threat to their expansion and social status in the Modibo Keita and the leadership of Soudan, whom they perceived as uncompromising socialists.[7] They feared that if Keita were to take power over Senegal, his rigid socialist ideology would leave no place for the hierarchical relations of *marabout* and *taalibés*, and would spell the end of the marabouts' influence. Although the marabouts supported Senghor, at this point it

[5] Coulon, 214.
[6] Coulon, 215.
[7] Lucy C. Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 98.

appears that they did have the power to publicly and vocally resist the UPS, but they chose not to because this would have been contrary to their best interests. Unlike the earlier political patterns of marabouts instrumentalizing divisions in the political structures to their benefit, in this case they found supporting the status quo to be in their best interest.

In the critical 1962 crisis, the marabouts played the same role of supporting Senghor despite the divisions of the power structure and the potential for them to maneuver, and through this support resulted in a major reduction in their political role. In this crisis, Leopold Senghor, the President and Secretary General of the UPS, was pitted against Mamadou Dia, his former assistant who grew to control the government and administration as President of the Council of Ministers.[8] Both men feared that the other would eclipse his power, but Dia took the first step to ignite this conflict.

Dia, representing the more orthodox socialism of the left wing of the UPS, had more extensive plans for modernization and reform than Senghor, which had traditionally earned him hostility from the Mourides and heads of the *confréries*. Although Dia and his left-wing faction had the support of much of the country,[9] he faced substantial opposition from the French and traditional elites, who all sided with the more moderate Senghor. In order to counter these resistive forces, and recognizing the massive role of the *Khalifes* as kingmakers in Senegalese politics, Dia attempted to win the *marabouts* to his side by making a trip through Senegal to speak with them while Senghor was traveling abroad.[10] He stressed questions of Islam and attempted to lean on Islamic solidarity, but this strategy was ultimately unsuccessful.

When Senghor came back to Senegal, he was immediately informed and took action to neutralize Dia. He secured a declaration of the full support and friendship of Falilou Mbacké,

[8] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 218–19.
[9] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 99.
[10] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 219.

and in an attempt to ensure the support of the *marabouts*, he campaigned for their support on the basis of economic grounds.[11] Senghor ultimately outmaneuvered Dia, retaining the support of the vast majority of the prominent *marabouts*,[12] and came out on top of the conflict. On December 17, 1962, the Assembly voted to censure Dia, the army rallied to Senghor,[13] and Dia was arrested with his lieutenants the next day. Senghor called Dia's maneuvering an attempted coup d'état, and through Dia's elimination he established his sole control over the UPS and State organs of power.

Although this crisis rattled the people of Senegal and led to unrest,[14] Senghor was able to establish himself as the main power by virtue of the *marabout's* support, especially the Mouride *Khalife*. This crisis demonstrated once again the strong alliance between Senghor and the Mourides and *confréries*, although they could have conceivably shaped Senegal's political future by siding with Mamadou Dia. As in 1960, the *marabouts* had the ability to maneuver and manipulate binary political rifts to their advantage, yet they continued supporting Senghor because they feared Dia's intentions to democratize social structures of the rural world and his alliance with the intransigent socialist leaders of Soudan.[15] Thus at this stage, the *marabouts* were making an autonomous political choice to support Senghor, whose policies they believed aligned more with their political visions. Because Senghor would come to define the political era and be immensely powerful, it is easy to see the *marabout's* continued support of him as a sign of powerlessness. However, the support of the *marabouts* for Senghor was an immensely important political act which did constitute them wielding their "kingmaker" power against Dia.

[11] Coulon, 220–21.
[12] The only marabout to align with Dia was Abdul Aziz Sy, although he was not publicly vocal in his support.
[13] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 102.
[14] Behrman, 98.
[15] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 213.

This crisis is also incredibly important for understanding the changes of the Senegalese political structure, which led to increasing limitations on their ability to vocally engage in politics. In the period after Senghor's defeat of Dia, he consolidated his power, forming the Senegalese state into a hyper-presidential[16] one party state which would stand until the mid 1970s when he initiated gradual democratic reforms. The crisis of 1962 marked a definitive break from the divided Senegalese political sphere of the first half of the 20th century, thus narrowing the field of political engagement for the *marabouts*. Although they asserted a political force to resolve the crisis of 1962, this support in effect led to a decrease of their ability to affect top-down change at the higher levels of society.

This drastic shift was clearly displayed in 1968, when a massive student and syndicate movement threatened the stability of the Senghorian regime, echoing the student movements of May, 1968 in Paris. On this occasion, the *marabouts* once again sided with Senghor, calling for political stability and peace. In the post-1962 power structure, Senghor's hegemony left no space for political maneuvering, so the best option available to the *marabouts* was to maintain their friendly relations with Senghor and thus protect their space in society. Although the *marabouts* stood with Senghor in the crises of 1960, 1962 and 1968, the crisis of 1968 is distinct in that it was not an autonomous decision of a powerful actor choosing to bolster the candidate they see as representing their best interests. It was rather a reaction to adverse conditions where the *confréries* found themselves without viable political divisions to turn to their benefit. Although the post-1962 power structure left little space for the *marabouts* to engage in top-down politics, they did continue to grow their influence and power on the ground level.

***Confréries* and Implementation of Government Reforms**

[16] I draw this characterization of the Senghorian regime from informal conversations with my coworkers at the political think tank where I interned in Senegal.

When the UPS took over in 1960, it arrived with a number of ideological and political objectives. They called their ideology African Socialism, which aspired "to use the essential ingredients of African society in combination with elements of Marxian socialism,"[17] while removing Socialist concepts that clashed with Senegalese culture such as atheism and materialism. For Senghor, the community system was a core and beneficial organizing force of traditional African society, and he believed that these social relations should be promoted in the new state through mutual societies and cooperatives.[18] Although Dia and Senghor agreed on this basis, Dia was more radical than Senghor and additionally pushed the democratization of social structures[19] and the mobilization of the masses, seeing the *maraboutic* hierarchies as antithetical to socialist precepts. Pushed by his more radical force, the State took a very active role in organizing rural Senegal until 1962[20]

Through diffusion of this ideology, the State hoped to extend their reach into rural areas and thus bypass its confréric intermediaries.[21] The leaders of the UPS were acutely aware of the immense influence of the *marabouts*, which their own path to power clearly illustrated, and were unsettled by the meager penetration of State power beyond the coastal urban centers. Recognizing its lack of legitimacy with the rural peasantry, the State attempted to ideologically challenge the submission-based social relations of the *confréries* and transform the salient political identities of the peasants from disciples to individuals.[22] They hoped to proletarianize the peasantry by making them agricultural workers and introducing the unfamiliar concept of

[17] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 104.
[18] Behrman, 104.
[19] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 213.
[20] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 104.
[21] Momar Coumba Diop and Mamadou Diouf, "L'Administration, les Confréries Religieuses et les Paysanneries," in *La Construction de l'État au Sénégal*, Hommes et Sociétés (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2002), 37.
[22] Diop and Diouf, 30.

salary to the economic system of rural Mouridiyya.[23] As the base of *marabout's* influence was ideological and religious in nature, the State attempted to use ideological means to achieve the political end of closing the gap between the political center and periphery.

In the State's development strategy, economic arrangements were the intended vessel of ideological diffusion and social change, although economic development was a major objective of the government in and of itself. The economic policy of African Socialism entailed the agricultural modernization[24] of Senegal by heavily prioritizing the peanut sector, in which productivity would be empowered by farmer's cooperatives and State assistance. The early UPS state was very interventionist, nationalizing all of the peanut circuits in an attempt to have a closer hand in managing the economy. This policy was motivated by the State's desire to remove the critical peanut sector from the purview of private merchants, as they realized that because the economy was so dependent on peanuts, when this trade struggled the entire system was vulnerable to fluctuation.[25] In the context of these overarching ideological and economic development policies, the *confréries* found new sources of power. By co-opting state development policies through their economic dominance, they were able to shape the direction of development in a way that was beneficial to them.

One of the major pillars of the State's reforms was the cooperative system. The cooperative system structured the economy around farmer's cooperatives, which were responsible for credit distribution and marketing at the village level.[26] Although egalitarian in intention, the model that emerged saw enormous enormous fields in the hands of a few

[23] Momar C. Diop, "L'État, La Confrérie Mouride et Les Paysans Sénégalais," *Labour, Capital and Society / Travail, Capital et Société* 17, no. 1 (1984): 55.
[24] It is important to note that notions of modernization were considered within the framework of Western notions of development and modernization, and thus heavily prioritized economic growth and pushed to develop the Senegalese state in the image of the West.
[25] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 227.
[26] Operations Evaluation Department, "The World Bank and Senegal, 1960-1987," Document of the World Bank, August 31, 1989, 94–95.

marabouts with 100-200 of their *taalibés* grouped into 30-50 groups to cultivate the fields.[27] At the national level, the government created a plethora of institutions to serve as a framework for the cooperative infrastructure, including the Office National de Coopération et d'Assistance Pour le Développement (ONCAD), formed in 1966, which was the main marketing and input distribution agency.[28] Using the distributive system of the cooperatives, the State intended to provide the necessary resources for the growth of the peanut economy, and thus further commercialize agriculture (many peasants were engaged in subsistence agriculture at the time). The cooperative system was also a part of the State's attempts to mobilize and integrate the peasantry into the modernized system as part of its ideological goals.[29] As such, the cooperatives were the proposed means of participation in the state-building process for the peasantry.[30]

The *marabouts* saw both an immense threat and opportunity in the government's reform agenda. They feared the government's attempts to erode rural social hierarchies, establish direct control over the peasantry, and establish African Socialism, yet they stood to benefit from the State's heavy investment in the peanut economy which they dominated. Despite their qualms about the social and political implications of the program, they feared alienating their powerful ally Senghor and were thus limited in their ability to resist the reform.

The cooperative system inadvertently allowed the *marabouts* to gain direct control over the implementation of the reform agenda, and thus to increase their influence on the ground. They chose to follow the government's program without complaint, but simultaneously worked to co-opt the program. At the local level, *marabouts* were elected to nearly all positions of control and as they could count on their *taalibés* for votes.[31] This undermined the government's

[27] Diop, "L'État, La Confrérie Mouride et Les Paysans Sénégalais," 53.
[28] Operations Evaluation Department, "The World Bank and Senegal," 95.
[29] Diop and Diouf, "L'Administration, les Confréries Religieuses et les Paysanneries," 29.
[30] Diop and Diouf, "L'Administration, les Confréries Religieuses et les Paysanneries."
[31] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 228.

hopes that the cooperatives would promote equality and eroded any semblance of internal democracy in these organizations. In control of these bodies, the *marabouts* had full power to control the distribution of State-given agricultural materials and resources, which solidified the allegiances of rural populations to their *marabouts*, and strengthened the traditional social structure.[32] Additionally, cooperatives became based on *maraboutic* belonging rather than area of residence, as *taalibés* would travel large distances to join the cooperative of their *marabout*, eroding the communal objectives of the State.[33] As the intermediaries enacting State policy in rural areas, the *marabouts* were able to engage with and promote elements of State reforms that they wanted, such as peanut trade investment, while stripping out the ideological elements that they found threatening to protect the social hierarchies that support their power.[34] This translation of government policy to rural areas often emptied thes policies of their original intentions, and allowed the *confréries* to shape the policies to their will.[35]

More threatening to the *marabouts* was the government's *Animation Rurale*, a campaign of technical and political education that was intended to ideologically support the cooperative system. Through this program, the government provided education in modern agricultural methods to representatives of villages, called *animateurs*, who they intended to be ambassadors of socialist ideology and leaders of the reorganization of their communities into cooperatives.[36] Ideologically, this was intended to raise the collective consciousness of the *animateurs* and their home communities, causing the people to ”become aware of their role—historically, economically and politically; every citizen was involved and had to play his part in the work of

[32] Coulon, 228.
[33] Coulon, 229.
[34] Coulon, 228.
[35] Coulon, 225.
[36] Ben Mady Cisse, “Animation Rurale: Sénégal’s Road to Development,” *Community Development Bulletin* 15, no. 2 (1964): 43.

reform which had become imperative."[37] In their role as ambassadors, the *animateurs* were to "have new ways of dealing with people, a new 'style', in conformity with the socialist objectives of our development."[38] This movement, which created contacts between rural populations and the State, was thus intended to be the ideological and technical backbone of the cooperative system, spreading State ideology into the *marabouts'* domain.

Animation Rurale was understandably unsettling to the *confréries*, who saw the encroachment of socialist social relations and the political awakening of the peasantry as a danger to their established order.[39] Mamadou Dia was a much stronger proponent of *Animation Rurale* than Senghor, so after he fell from power in 1962, the fears of the *marabouts* were allayed somewhat, although Senghor did continue the program to a lesser degree. In order to avoid provoking the government, the *marabouts* did begrudgingly allow followers to go to trainings and seminars, but the State's socialist education had very minimal impact on the state of mind of the rural peasantry, who remained just as close to the *marabouts*.[40]

Although the State did have serious transformative ideological aims and worked to undermine the social base of the *confréries*, it was also quite pragmatic and recognized the need to maintain the political and economic support of the *confréries*. Because of its own limitations and the resistance of the *confréries*, the State was unable to successfully cause an ideological shift in the peasantry, and thus needed to continue to court the *marabouts*. They did this largely through their distribution of loans, which they used to further their political objectives, maintain their political system, and impose an indirect force of control over the peasantry.[41] Similar to earlier relationships with politicians, the major *marabouts* (especially Mourides) were thus

[37] Cisse, 42.
[38] Cisse, 44.
[39] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 229.
[40] Coulon, 230.
[41] Diop, "L'État, La Confrérie Mouride et Les Paysans Sénégalais," 49, 51.

brought into a somewhat clientelistic relationship with the government, who gave them vast loans in return for political support.[42] The Mouride *confrérie* was the main beneficiary of these loans, representing 20 of the 39 large producers approved by ONCAD in 1971, to which loans were given.[43] Of all government loans, those to large producers were roughly twice as many as those to all the small producers, reflecting a government intention to court *maraboutic* support and empower development through large-scale agriculture.[44] These loans also had a political dimension with the government, as many of them were given during the 1962-3 power struggle between Dia and Senghor, when Dia tried to use the loans to counterbalance Senghor's power bloc.[45] *Marabouts* often failed to pay back these loans, and from 1962 to 1967, the highest rate of repayment was a mere 50%.[46] The difficulty the government experienced in collecting repayment was largely due to the fact that the use of coercive force against the *marabouts* would have severely damaged their credibility in the eyes of *marabouts'* taalibés.[47] The *marabouts* were thus protected from the government by their sacred status, and they were somewhat free to use government funds to fulfill their interests.

The government's economic development reforms were largely a failure. After the initial phase of peasant mobilization in 1960-62,[48] a stagnation revealed itself, and by the end of the 1960s, the peasantry found itself in a deep economic poverty and structural indebtment.[49] This declining quality of life, aggravated further by droughts in 1968, 1970, 1972 and 1973, led to mass disillusionment with the government development programs, and by the end of the 1970s,

[42] Diop, 49.
[43] Diop, 50.
[44] Diop, 50.
[45] Diop, 51.
[46] Diop, 50.
[47] Diop, 50.
[48] Diop and Diouf, "L'Administration, les Confréries Religieuses et les Paysanneries," 42.
[49] Diop, "L'État, La Confrérie Mouride et Les Paysans Sénégalais," 61.

the government put in place measures to reduce State participation in the economy.[50] During the *Khalifate* of Abdul Ahad Mbacké (1968-1989), the cordial relations between the *confrérie* and the government were strained as a result of the declining rural quality of life, with Abdul Ahad vocalizing discontent with government policy and Senghor's rule, politely challenging Senghor that "les paysans sont fatigués" (the peasants are tired).[51] The economic policy, in submitting the "national economic activity to the objectives of social and political pacification… led to an enormous waste of public resources," and ultimately led to the failure of those economic programs.[52]

Characterization of Power and Relations

Many authors from the late 1960s to the 1980s have attempted to characterize the relations that formed between the *confréries* and the State after independence, largely arguing that the State carried on the political clientelism of the colonial Administration vis-à-vis the *marabouts*, and continued the exchange of services in place before independence.[53] They argued that the independence shifts traded a French administration for a French-modeled Senegalese version and maintained the Senegalese social contract,[54] which saw the *confréries* as trading legitimacy and political support for the government in return for material benefits.

[50] Momar Coumba Diop, "Réformes Économiques et Recompositions Sociales," in *La Construction de l'État au Sénégal*, Hommes et Sociétés (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2002), 64; Diop and Diouf, "L'Administration, les Confréries Religieuses et les Paysanneries," 46.
[51] Diop, "L'État, La Confrérie Mouride et Les Paysans Sénégalais," 55.
[52] Diop, "Réformes Économiques et Recompositions Sociales." Translation by author.
[53] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*; Cheikh Tidiane Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides: Un Essai sur L'islam au Sénégal* (Présence Africaine, 1969); Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*; Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
[54] This idea was first elaborated by Donal B. Cruise O'Brien with respect to the Mouridiyya. See Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*; Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, Momar Coumba Diop, and Mamadou Diouf, *La Construction de l'État au Sénégal*, Hommes et Sociétés (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2002); and Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975). This idea was extended to all of the confréries by Christian Coulon. See Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*.

I argue that although there was an exchange of services based on alignment of underlying economic goals, the categorization of the post-independence relationship as clientelism overemphasizes material resources and sees the religious actors as purely economically and politically motivated. These authors do not fundamentally mischaracterize the relationships which were often economic in nature, but they fail to account for the power of religious ideas. As demonstrated in this chapter, the *confréries* co-opted government development programs, and were thus able to assert an autonomous ideological force through economic means. While they assented to and reinforced Senghor's political dominance as the 1960s progressed, they transferred their resistive efforts onto the ideological plane in pushing for the conservation of traditional ideological and social configurations. The realities of the *confréries'* implementation of development policies demonstrate that their power did not flow primarily from above through clientelist channels, but rather it welled up from within, and even as they engaged in an exchange of services they exercised autonomy on ideological, religious and economic planes. Rather than the image of the lackey of the State that the conventional clientelist and instrumentalist understanding conveys, the *marabouts* were rather able to exercise tangible power on the government and its policies through this very system of clientelism. Because the government had dire need of its legitimating and mediating services, it was thus forced to sacrifice ideological components of its development program and focus rather on the economic aspects that the *marabouts* approved.

Conclusion

In response to the massive challenges it faced in 1960, the UPS State attempted to modernize the society and economy with the inspiration of Western industrial capitalist countries. This program of modernization entailed massive agricultural commercialization and

restructuring, which attempted to improve the penetration of State power in rural areas through ideological and economical means. The major *marabouts* of the *confréries*, recognizing the limitations on their power that Senghor's consolidation of power brought, rechanneled their efforts to shape the forming Senegalese state through their participation in the economic development program. Although they continued to play a crucial role of legitimizing the government, the *confréries* pragmatically sacrificed the overtly political sphere and instead moved to inscribe their vision of society in their territorial spheres of influence through co-optation of the cooperative system. Although the political role of the *marabouts* would continue to evolve after Senghor's 1967 democratic reforms, the 1960s demonstrates the power and limitations of the *confréries* in their efforts to shape the newly forming state.

Conclusion

In charting the relationship of the Mouridiyya with the political establishment from its formation in the 1880s to 1970, this paper has demonstrated the centrality of the Mouridiyya in Senegalese political life and explored many complex aspects of its political engagement. As a response to the social and political crisis that afflicted the Wolof States in the late 1800s, this religious movement used the shards of the traditional order to construct a new social structure and adapt to life under French colonialism. Drawing on fervent religious belief, which informed the Mouride concept of *taalibé* submission to a *marabout*, the Mourides were able to channel the energies of society into a massive organization with a dynamic economic model. As the French gradually realized the futility of repression, learned through their multiple unsuccessful exiles of Cheikh Amadu Bamba, they altered their strategy, attempting instead to co-opt the Mouride movement. This shift in French policy reflects the internal religious, social and economic dynamism of the *confrérie*, which is the true wellspring of its power. Although cooperation with the French increased in the later years of Amadu Bamba's life, the Mourides were able to retain an element of autonomy in the economic and social spheres and spread their influence throughout the Senegalese interior through geographical expansion.

In the period after Amadu Bamba's death in 1927, there emerged a pattern of succession conflicts and division within the leadership of the Mouridiyya, which resulted in a greater participation of the Mouride *marabouts* in politics. As a new Senegalese political elite arose from the *Quatres Communes* and began to dominate elected positions in the French government, a cycle of binary divisions emerged within the political leadership that mirrored divisions in the Mouridiyya, and created opportunities for political maneuvering on either side. Through this cycle of alliances, actors in both the Mouride *confrérie* and the growing Senegalese political

sphere leveraged the divisions of the other to provide alternate sources of support than the French. In this political arrangement of domination by the French but gradual opening of politics to Senegalese people, the *marabouts* and politicians found it beneficial to have an ally that could intercede on their behalf before the French.

After the Second World War, as the political sphere opened further and extended voting rights to the entire Senegalese interior, the Mourides were thrust into the very center of Senegalese politics. Because of their massive region of influence and their legitimacy with the rural electorate, they became a critical element in the political contest between Lamine Guèye and Léopold Senghor. Falilou Mbacké, the second *Khalife* General, ultimately gave his support to Léopold Senghor, leading to his dramatic victories over Guèye's SFIO in elections throughout the 1950s. During the referendum of 1958, the Mourides once again played a crucial role in asserting a strong voice against Independence, which swayed Senghor's UPS to its side. Through its early relationships formed with Senegalese politicians and the factional maneuvering, the Mouridiyya thus laid the foundations of its later political role and was able to translate its moral authority and economic power into the political sphere.

After the short-lived Mali Federation, Senegal received its independence in 1960, and through the next decade, it faced multiple political crises. Because of government efforts to divide them, the *marabouts* ceased to be a united force after the 1958 referendum. However, they continued to affect the crises of 1960 and 1962 as individual *marabouts* and *confréries*, and used their power to support Senghor's government. After the crisis of 1962, however, which saw the dramatic elimination of Mamadou Dia's political influence by Léopold Senghor, the political field became limited and the Mourides were forced to try to shape political developments through their control of the economic and social spheres. With the consolidation of power in

Senghor's hands and the creation of a one-party UPS state, there remained little space for the Mourides to do anything but legitimate the actions of the government.

They were able to continue to assert their power and control the developments on the ground through their implementation and co-optation of government economic development policy. As the government rolled out its ideology of African Socialism, nationalized the peanut trade and implemented the cooperative system and Animation Rurale, it attempted to stimulate the peanut trade while simultaneously eroding the social relations that gave the Mouridiyya its power. By democratizing the social structure, the government sought to remove the political intermediary of the *marabouts* and establish direct relations with the rural peasantry. Rather than actively oppose this policy, which was beneficial to them on economic grounds and harmful to them on an ideological plane, the Mourides actively engaged with the development programs, gaining control of the cooperatives and hollowing them of their ideological substance. By doing so, the Mourides demonstrated a substantial power to shape the development of Senegal despite the limitations to their formal participation in politics.

This paper has shown how the Mouride leadership formed and negotiated its relationships with the political establishment as a means of translating its economic and social dynamism into political power. While drawing substantially on the work of previous scholars, this paper provides an important contribution in highlighting the internal dynamism of the *confrérie* as the driver of the evolving relationship with political authorities. Culminating from myriad religious beliefs, economic arrangements and social relationships, this internal dynamism was the force that positioned the Mouride leaders to form political relationships in the first place. Although other authors invoke these various aspects of the *confrérie's* dynamism, this paper more explicitly identifies it as the wellspring of its power, which shapes its following relations.

Because of this internal dynamism, it was never fully dependent on the French to legitimate its rule, and could thus maintain relative autonomy. Unlike the local Senegalese administrators put in place by the French who drew all their power from above, the Mouridiyya drew from a deep well of Senegalese social and political traditions that gave them legitimacy in the eyes of their followers even as they cooperated with the French.

Drawing on this updated macro-level account of the *confrérie* from its origins to 1970, future scholars should look at the other Senegalese *confréries* through this lens of internal dynamism. This comparative approach would allow scholars to identify structural differences and qualities of each organization and draw connections to their different historical relations with the power structure. Because the *confréries* function somewhat similarly today, extensive attention should be paid to their subtle internal differences and the connections of these factors to their different political relationships. Through this fine-grained historical analysis, scholars can begin to understand the different levels of influence of each of the *confréries*.

Researchers would also benefit from continuing the chronological approach demonstrated by this paper to the rest of the 20th century. Although this paper demonstrates the political engagement and relationships of the Mouride *confrérie* from its origins to the critically important political transition of Independence, the *confrérie* has continued to adapt to the changing realities of Senegal since 1970, and the scholarly conversation would benefit from accounts linking this discussion to subsequent decades. Through such avenues of further research, scholars can contribute to a richer understanding of this dynamic religious institution, its relations to the evolving political establishment and its enormous impact on Senegal.

Appendix 1:

Tijaniyya

The Tijâniyya was founded by Ahmad al-Tijâni (1737-1815), an Algerian muslim teacher and scholar who established this new branch of Suf Islam in Fez in Morocco in the late 18th century. Ths *confrérie* was born out of the context of North African Sufi Islam *tariqa* system, which diffused down to Senegal through the Sahara. After a period of consolidation in Morocco, al-Tijâni's movement spread south to Mauritania via religious scholars there, such as Muhammed al-Hafiz,[1] who likely met Ahmad al-Tijani in the 1780s as he was passing through Fez.[2] Al-Hafiz returned to his native Mauritania with the authorization (known as *Ijaza* or the written authorization to transmit Islamic knowledge)[3] of al-Tijâni to establish his own branch of Tijâniyya there, which became known as Hafiziyya. He established a zawiya (a Sufi building of learning, worship, or which can function as a monastery in some cases) upon his return to his native region of Gibla and began his teaching. Al-Hafiz retained many of the traditional elements of Sufism (quranic sciences, hadith, fiqh, and science of language) and refused to proselytize others,[4] which allowed him to establish this new *confrérie* in this zone with little reaction from the more conservative religious establishment of the region.[5] One of al-Hafiz's disciples, Mawlud Fall, travels to Morocco with the hope of meeting the founder of the *confrérie*, but never meets al-Tijâni, yet along his travels he names many more *muqaddam-s* throughout West Africa, additionally traveling into parts of Senegal and Northern Nigeria, as well as in parts of East

[1] Jean-Louis Triaud and David Robinson, eds., *La Tijâniyya: Une Confrérie Musulmane à la Conquête de l'Afrique* (Paris: Karthala, 2000), 70.
[2] Triaud and Robinson, 80.
[3] Triaud and Robinson, 92.
[4] Triaud and Robinson, 83.
[5] Triaud and Robinson, 85.

Sudan.[6] Through this period, the Hafiziyya form of Tijaniyya spread throughout Mauritania and gathered a substantial following there. It shortly after took root in the Futa-Toro region of Senegal, located in the North-East of the country.

The next large branch to form in the Tijaniyya which contributed to its later success and diffusion in the territory of West Africa and Senegal was the Umariyya. Its founder, El Hajj Umar Tall, was born in the 1790s, and it grew out of likely cordial (sometimes tense) relations with the Hafiziyya. The Umarian branch of the movement engaged in armed jihad against the non-Muslim leaders of many West-African kingdoms.

El Hajj Umar Tall was a scholar, teacher, and "interpreter of the faith" who made the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj, thus the honorific title El Hajj added to his name), and visited many important Islamic centers in West Africa. Most importantly, he led his followers in an armed *jihad* against the non-Muslim regions of Western Sudan in the mid-1800s[7] Born in the Futa-Toro region in Northeast Senegal to the Tukulor ethnic group, he amassed an army of disciples at Dingiray in modern-day Guinea, and shortly thereafter took the war to the Bamana kingdoms of Western Sudan which he overcame and established a fragile government there under his son Ahmad al-Kabir. This was known as the Tukulor empire by the French, who saw in it a great threat.[8]

Umar Tall embodied the concept of *hijra*, a belief that Muslims should migrate from areas under dominant European presence to live in regions where Muslims were in control, thus taking his *jihad* east as French armies gradually gained territory in Senegal and on the West coast.[9]

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[6] Triaud and Robinson, 91–93.
[7] Triaud and Robinson, 102.
[8] Triaud and Robinson, 102.
[9] Triaud and Robinson, 103.

The "Tukulor Empire" established by Umar Tall was short lived, and faltered and disintegrated due to the neglect of creating institutions of an Islamic state, which created a feeling amongst the Empire's detractors and subjected populations that it was a merely political operation and that the religious dimension was a cover.[10] Additionally, it failed to integrate the populations or create a unified political entity, and as a result the conquered territories became more and more isolated from one another. The Umarian movement collapsed after 1862 after the invasion of the kingdom of Masina, a Muslim Fulbe (ethnic group) state that had supported pagan regimes, which causes division within Umar's ranks, and although they initially conquered the territory, the people of the kingdom shortly thereafter affected a revolt which overthrew the Umarians and killed Umar in 1864. For the next 20 years, in the Futanke-Masina conflict, the nephew of Umar Tall rallied survivors and enemies of the Masina to take over much of the middle Niger kingdom, but at the cost of 20 years of bloodshed between Muslims.[11]

A series of succession struggles amongst Umar's successors from 1869-1885 decreased the Tall family's legitimacy and leadership, and was followed by massive defeats of the Umarians by the French in Segu, Nioro, and Bandiagara (1890-3), which forced the Umarians to move east into the Sokoto caliphate (further east, above nigeria) as *hijra* (resistant retreat), although the forces divide at this point and some move back West to live under French control in Bandiagara.[12] Most of the Tall's sons died in the Masina conflict or the fight to control Nioro afterward, and many go East in the *hijra*, which leaves very few remaining (thus very weak leadership of remaining Umarian supporters)[13].

[10] Triaud and Robinson, 103.
[11] Triaud and Robinson, 103–4.
[12] Triaud and Robinson, 104.
[13] Triaud and Robinson, 108.

Although the area of Umar Tall's *jihad* was largely outside of modern Senegalese boundaries, many of his supporters and resources were drawn from his home province of Futa-Toro. These followers hoped in the possibility of an independent state to the East, but as French consolidated control in the Soudan colony and Senegal, they began to see the futility of this option and ceased to provide support to the forces in the East.j[14]Many of the conquered Umarians were sent back to the Futa Toro by the French, who clamped down on the territories won from the Umarians and evicted Umarians from the conquered territories of the "Tukulor Empire." French policy in this period was incredibly hostile to the Tijaniyya, as they manufactured the myth of the Tukulor Empire and closely supervised Tijaniyya communities in these areas. They additionally exaggerated Tukulor hostility, equating the Tukulor ethnic group with Tijâniyya, which were additionally conflated with the Umariyya and aggression.[15]

The Umarian leaders who went East with the *hijra* in the early 1900s keep going East after having a substantial impact in the Sokoto caliphate, but are ultimately pushed further and farther east until they lose relevance, and the Umarian leaders who accept French rule (Agibu Tall) are placed in power as puppet rulers with their hands tied, and cooperate with French rule. Although not able to substantively resist the French, leaders such as Agibu were able to preserve some small remnants of Umarian presence in the former garrison cities of the Tukulor Empire, even arguably creating a haven under the French domination for Umarian survivors to live and protect their family traditions.[16]

As the Umarians returned to the Futa-Toro, they returned with new prestige, and the movement became more led by the disciples of the Talls rather than the Tall family itself.[17] As

[14] Triaud and Robinson, 121.
[15] Triaud and Robinson, 109.
[16] Triaud and Robinson, 113–17.
[17] Triaud and Robinson, 122–23.

these experienced disciples come back from the war with memories of the French strength and destructive power, they stress the transfer of energies into more peaceful activities and forms of continuation of their beliefs through nonviolent means, such as through education.[18] At this point the Umariyya ceased to exist as a relevant political force, and settled into somewhat obscurity as a community nurturing their memories and making their way in a new colonial order.[19]

The significance of this was that it demonstrated the inevitability of French rule and forced Tijaniyya leaders to adjust to more accommodation approaches as they saw that their combined military might was not enough to stave off French rule. For the French, the significance of the Umarian episode was that it created an understanding of the Tijaniyya as inherently resistant and violent, and made it a perceived enemy of the colonial regime.

This association of the Tijâniyya with conquest and anti-colonial resistance was shifted dramatically by El Hajj Malick Sy, one of the most important figures in the Tijâniyya, who still has millions of followers today in Senegal. Sy was born in 1854 in the Dimar region (westernmost province of Futa-Toro), a region of heavy recruitment for the Umarian *jihad*. He was born to a Wolof family of presumably low distinction who were affiliated with the Umariyya through religious connections but were not involved with the *jihad.*[20] Although there was a large pastoral Pulaar speaking population, Malick Sy's family was a member of the sizable sedentary agricultural Wolof population. Sy's childhood was split between the home of his mother's family in Dimar in Futa-Toro and that of his father's family in the neighboring kingdom of Jolof, two regions which were central to a number of religious *jihad* attempts to topple the "pagan" states in the region. Two main *jihads* formed the backdrop of Malick Sy's youth, one by Ma Ba Diakhou in the 1860s and one by the Madiyanke brothers in the 1870s, both which failed to establish

[18] Triaud and Robinson, 122–23.
[19] Triaud and Robinson, 123.
[20] Triaud and Robinson, 202.

Islamic states but did result in the political destabilization of the region just as French forces were beginning to encroach in Senegalese territory.[21] The French had begun to wage war for control of the Walo kingdom in northwest Senegal, and following their conquering of this region, they began to compete with Umar Tall for control of the Futa Toro further east.

El Hajj Malick Sy began traveling widely to study law and theology in the 1870s, settling in the colonial capital of French West Africa, Saint-Louis, where he married into a prominent family and established close relationships with the local Muslim teachers and elite.[22] By the late 1880s, Sy had a substantial reputation for his wisdom and piety, had property in the city of Saint-Louis, and had established his own Tijâni *zawiya* there. [23]

During this phase of his life at Saint-Louis, he traveled extensively through the Senegalo-Mauritanian region seeking out Tijâni scholars, as well as spending the growing seasons in villages south of Saint Louis where his disciples cultivated the fields.[24] He made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1888-9, traveling by boat to France and down to Mecca by land. Boat travel of this sort was unusual at the time, and resulted in his increased prestige upon his return.[25] Upon his return, he lived continuously at Saint-Louis (1890-95) where he continued to climb the social hierarchy, marrying a second wife and acquiring new patrons and property, and his following grew considerably.[26]

Following this phase of "exploration," El Hajj transitioned to a phase of "consolidation"[27] in the village of Ndiarnde in the interior of Cayor, where he centered his activities from the late 1800s to 1900.[28] Dramatic changes swept French West Africa in the late 19th century as the

[21] Triaud and Robinson, 203.
[22] Triaud and Robinson, 204.
[23] Triaud and Robinson, 205.
[24] Triaud and Robinson, 207.
[25] Triaud and Robinson, 207.
[26] Triaud and Robinson, 207–8.
[27] Triaud and Robinson, 217.
[28] Triaud and Robinson, 208.

French government reorganized its colonial system into a general government with four territories of Senegal, Guinea, Soudan, and Côte d'Ivoire. The capital of the general government was moved from Saint-Louis, where it had been located since [insert year], south to Dakar on the cap vert peninsula in the Cayor region, where it remains the capital of Senegal today. In addition, the French government became more interventionist in the politics and economy of its colonies, and began to become more paranoid of the effects of "fanatic" marabouts such as Cheikh Amadou Bamba (who was deported by the French in 1895).[29]

In this context of French expansionism, it is possible that Sy's movement into the interior of Cayor at Ndiarnde was a retreat from the reach of French administrative control. In this period of consolidation, Sy invested heavily in training and teaching, as well as agricultural labor, which he encouraged with his teachings on the importance of work. As the French gradually transitioned the Senegalese economy toward a trade economy of cash crops such as peanuts, El Hajj Malick Sy likely gradually began to engage in the use of his *taalibé* for the cultivation of peanut fields to export.[30] At this stage, El Hajj Malick Sy's influence began to spread beyond into many regions of modern-day Senegal, as he had disciples deployed across the states of Cayor, Baol, and in the key colonial centers of Rufisque and Dakar, in positions closely linked to the colonial system such as teachers, imams, and judges.[31]

In 1902, El Hajj Malick Sy strategically moved back into the heart of the colonial system by moving all his activities to the village of Tivaouane, located halfway between Dakar and Saint-Louis along the rail line linking the Senegalese interior to Dakar, and in the heart of Cayor by the headquarters of the head Administrator of the whole older peanut basin, it was a very strategic move to place himself at the core of the new colonial economy, prepped for mass

[29] Triaud and Robinson, 208.
[30] Triaud and Robinson, 209.
[31] Triaud and Robinson, 210.

participation in this economy.[32] As the newly incorporated AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française) general government was finally moved to Dakar, this moved the economic center of the country further South, and in the Cayor the French moved toward more direct rule of the territory, dispensing with indirect rule through local elites after the death of Demba War, a previous warrior class leader who ruled under the French for 16 years in Cayor.[33]

During this period (1902-1910), El Hajj traveled extensively to visit communities of disciples across the Senegalese territory in Rufisque, Kaolack, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and western Futa, and he instituted the Gamou celebration of the birth of Muhammed, which remains today a crucial Tijiane celebration.[34] During this period, the French engaged in a policy of the "pacification of Mauritania," which entailed French collaboration with and support for the peaceful clerical class, who were dedicated to teaching, and took advantage of their divisions with the traditional warrior class to tip the scales in favor of these more peaceful elements. This technique made its way into the Senegalese territories, and El Hajj Malick Sy was the first to benefit from this "'North African' concept of collaboration and cooptation."[35] Due to his rather friendly relations with the colonial powers, his movement was very scarcely surveilled, in stark contrast to the Mourides, and he established himself as a "master teacher with a pedagogy that could function with the realities of the colonial order," with a wide network of connection with followers across the Senegalese territory.[36]

In the last decade of his life (he died in 1922), El Hajj Malick Sy began to engage in a more active relationship of cooperation with the French, which fully established the peaceful and non-confrontational reputation of the Tijâniyya, which he had always advocated for, successfully

[32] Triaud and Robinson, 210.
[33] Triaud and Robinson, 211.
[34] Triaud and Robinson, 213.
[35] Triaud and Robinson, 213.
[36] Triaud and Robinson, 213.

distancing himself from the Tijâniyya Tukulor, associated with the violence of Umar Tall and instead established a formidable yet pacifist Tijâniyaa Wolof.[37] During this phase, Sy made numerous public statements in support of the French, such as when the French distributed a letter about how the *jihad* of the sword is an inappropriate response to European conquest, and he delivered a sermon arguing to his followers that they should support the French.[38] Additionally, as the first World War loomed in Europe and France grew anxious about its authority in the European and Mediterranean theaters, Sy released a public statement fully endorsing the French saying that Senegalese muslims must live under the French and have confidence in them, as the French are friends of Islam and their protection has greatly helped the growth of the Tijâniyya and Islam in Senegal.[39] Sy also demonstrated his support for the French war effort by sending his son to fight and die in the war, he was consulted by the French during the war, and he was implicated in the French games for control in the Ottoman Empire during the War.[40] In return for his demonstrations of loyalty, Sy was granted the freedom to teach and train the dominant Senegalese muslims of the period, publishing numerous works of scholarship (with the help of the colonial government), and ensure the continual spread of his movement. [41] The post-war years are rather uneventful, but the French engage in increased surveillance of him at this time.[42]

[37] Triaud and Robinson, 202.
[38] Triaud and Robinson, 214.
[39] Triaud and Robinson, 215.
[40] Triaud and Robinson, 216.
[41] Triaud and Robinson, 216.
[42] Triaud and Robinson, 217.

Appendix 2:

Important Figures

Politicians

- François Carpot: The first métis (mixed race person) to be elected as Deputy to the French National Assembly in 1902. After his election, he interceded on Cheikh Amadu Bamba's behalf to secure his return from his first exile in Gabon.

- Blaise Diagne: The first black Deputy to the French National Assembly, he was elected in 1914. A native of Dakar and Catholic, he was re-elected until his death in 1934. He was and was responsible for pushing a law through the legislature that extended French citizenship rights to the populations of the *Quatres Communes.* He interceded on behalf of the Mouridiyya in the Tallerie Affair.

- Galandou Diouf: The first Muslim deputy to the National Assembly, elected in 1934 and holding office until 1941. A previous school teacher, he was Diagne's early political mentor turned rival, and was well-known for defending African equality and fighting against discrimination. An ally of Cheikh Anta, he procured his return from exile when he was elected to office in 1934.

- Lamine Guèye: Senegalese Deputy to the French National Assembly from 1945-51. Although he was a primary lieutenant of Galandou Diouf in the 1928 elections, he broke away from Diouf and became the president of the SFIO. He became the main opposition leader of the Diouf era, and was elected alongside Senghor to the National Assembly in 1945. In 1946, he successfully pushed a law through the legislature (named the Lamine Guèye Law after him) which extended French citizenship to all the populations of the AOF.

- Léopold Sedar Senghor: Deputy to the French National Assembly from 1945-1959 and President of Senegal from 1960 to 1980. As a political protégé of Lamine Guèye, he was elected to the National Assembly in 1945 with the SFIO, and then broke off in 1948 to form the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalaise (BDS). Senghor's BDS quickly became a major rival of Lamine's SFIO in the 1950s.

- Mamadou Dia: President of the Council of Ministers of Senegal from 1960-1962. A former assistant of Senghor, he grew to control the government and administration. He represented a more orthodox radical socialism than Senghor and had extensive plans for

modernization and reform, which earned him hostility from the confréries. After failing to rally religious leaders to his side, the Senegalese Assembly voted on December 17, 1962 to censure Dia, and he was arrested with his lieutentants the next day. Senghor called Dia's maneuvering an attempted coup d'état.

- Modibo Keita: Socialist leader from the Soudan Republic and the first President of Mali (1960-1968). He served as the President of the short-lived Mali Federation, and due to his rigid socialist ideology, he was distrusted by Senegalese marabouts.

French Officials

- Paul Marty: French Colonial Minister and Superior Officer. Born in Algeria, he died in Tunisia in 1938, having lived his whole life in the French colonies. He served as the Attaché for the Bureau of Indigenous Affairs in Tunis and Casablanca, and then he took over the Service of Muslim Affairs in 1912 in Dakar. He was a founding member of the Academy of Colonial Sciences (1922-1938), and was also a fervent Catholic.

- Louis-Léon-César Faidherbe: Governor of Senegal from 1854 to 1865, who oversaw the conquest of the Senegalese territory. He was appointed to this position upon the request of French merchants, who requested increased French military presence. By the end of his tenure, France had extended its control over much of Senegal's territory and established a trade economy based on peanut cultivation and export.

- Charles de Gaulle: French General who became the President of the French Fifth Republic. During the Second World War, he had led a resistance government against the Vichy regime from London and Algiers. He became the President of France in December 1958. He proposed the 1958 independence referendum, and successfully campaigned in Senegal for a strong "Yes" vote to inclusion in his French Community.

Mouride Marabouts

- Cheikh Amadu Bamba Mbacké (Alternate titles: Amadou Bamba M'Backé, Serigne Touba): Founder of the Mouride confrérie (1850-1927). A descendant of an influential Wolof maraboutic family, his father was a highly-renowned Muslim leader in the Wolof states. Because of his family connections to Ma Ba Diakhou, the warrior marabout of the 1860s, and with Lat Dior, the *damel* (king) of Cayor, Bamba was able to establish close relations with the Lat Dior as well. After the Battle of Dekkilé and Dior's defeat in 1886, Bamba moved to the Baol region and began his religious movement, attracting many of Dior's followers.

- Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké, (alternate spellings: Mamadou Moustapha, Mahmadou Mustafa): The oldest son of Cheikh Amadu Bamba, he was the first Khalife General of the Mouridiyya, from 1927-1945. His claim to the Khalifate was challenged by his uncle, Cheikh Anta Mbacké. He allied with Blaise Diagne and later Lamine Guèye in efforts to counteract his uncle's bid for the Khalifate.

- Cheikh Anta Mbacké: Amadu Bamba's oldest surviving brother. He refused to recognize Mamadu Mustapha's Khalifate until 1939. Allied with Galandou Diouf, he was seen as a radical by the French and was exiled to Soudan in 1928. Upon Diouf's election in 1934, he returned from exile.

- Ibra Faty Mbacké: Younger brother of Cheikh Anta Mbacké, brother of Amadu Bamba. He initially staked his claim to the Khalifate after Bamba's death in 1927, but he revoked his claim and supported Mamadu Mustapha shortly after.

- Falilou Mbacké: Younger brother of Mamadu Mustapha and son of Amadu Bamba. He was the second Mouride Khalife from 1945-1968. Although he initially opposed Mamadu Mustapha's claim to the Khalifate in 1927, he acknowledged his authority in 1929. He was opposed in his own claim to the Khalifate by his nephew, Cheikh Mbacké. In order to counter Cheikh Mbacké's influence, Falilou formed alliances with the French and with Senghor and the BDS. As the Khalife from the interwar period to the first decade of independence, he played a critical role in supporting the rule of Senghor, with whom he cultivated close relations.

- Cheikh Mbacké: Son of Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké, he opposed Falilou's Khalifate and led his own Mouride faction which divided the confrérie into the 1960s. He allied with Lamine Guèye and the SFIO, born out of his father's close alliance with Guèye. The SFIO supported Cheikh Mbacké, even pretending that Cheikh's small Magal of Touba was the real celebration.[43]

- Abdul Ahad Mbacké: Third Khalife General of the Mourides (1968-1989). Under his Khalifate, the amicability that characterized Falilou and Senghor's relationship was strained as a result of the declining rural quality of life. He vocalized discontent with government policy and Senghor's rule, politely challenging Senghor that "les paysans sont fatigués" (the peasants are tired).[44]

- Cheikh Ibrahima Fall: One of Cheikh Amadu Bamba's first and dedicated active disciples. Although very unorthodox in his practice of Islam, he was a fervent supporter

[43] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 204.
[44] Diop, "L'État, La Confrérie Mouride et Les Paysans Sénégalais," 55.

of Bamba, and worked to spread Bamba's reputation during the early phases of the movement.[45] Fall instilled in his followers the idea of absolute devotion and submission to one's *marabout*, as well as notions of work as a religious activity, which became widespread in the confrérie at large.[46]

Senegalese Political Figures of the 1800s

- El Hajj Umar Tall: Major leader of the Tijaniyya in the 1800s, he led a major armed *jihad* from 1854-1862, establishing what the French called the Tukulor Empire. His branch of the Tijaniyya, the Umariyya, waged war against the non-Muslim leaders of many West-African kingdoms, throughout regions of modern-day Senegal, Guinea, and Mali. His success in spreading militant Islam led to the French association of the Tijaniyya with violence and conquest.

- Ma Ba Diakhou (alt. Maba Diakhou): He was a militant Senegalese marabout who led a *jihad* in the 1860s, but failed to establish an Islamic state. His military campaign caused political destabilization of the region just as French forces were beginning to encroach into Senegalese territory.

- Lat Dior: The Damel (King) of Cayor, who resisted French conquest until his decisive defeat at the Battle of Dekkilé in 1886.

Tijani Contemporaries of Amadu Bamba

- El Hajj Malick Sy: Founder of the Tivaouane branch of the Tijaniyya, he was responsible for transforming the Tijaniyya into a peaceful confrérie. Born of a Wolof family of presumably low distinction, he gradually amassed followers throughout his life, and eventually led an enormous branch of the Tijaniyya. He had very cordial relations with the French Administration.

- Ibrahima Niasse: Son of the prominent marabout Abdoulaye Niasse, he was the founder of the other main branch of the Tijaniyya, centered at the city of Medina-Baye in Kaolack. He drew followers from across West Africa, including in Nigeria. He lived from 1900 to 1975.

[45] Cruise O'Brien, 141.
[46] Cruise O'Brien, 141.

Appendix 3:

French Role in Manipulating the First Succession Conflict

The French Administration was instrumental in securing the appointment of Mamadu Mustapha over Cheikh Anta. Shortly after Bamba's death, the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal wrote to the Governor-General that "it seemed to me desirable that the liquidation of the succession be entrusted to a person particularly capable and of an honor above all suspicion. I therefore asked Monsieur the Administrator of the Circle of Diourbel to see to the members of the Council of the family."[47] This in effect entailed advocacy for the installation of Mamadu Mustapha as Khalife, who the Administration viewed as amenable to its interests and easily manipulated. As Paul Marty stated of Mamadu Mustapha in 1913, "he is at an age where his receptivity is still great and will be more docile to our enterprise. He realizes that if he wants to be something later, he can only do so with our help" (translation by author).[48] The French considered him primarily materialistic and motivated by wealth, which they figured they could use to direct his decision making.[49] Additionally, French had considerable experience and comfort with Mamadu Mustapha, who had served as an important intermediary between the confrérie and the French on behalf of his father. During the council of Mouride dignitaries that convened shortly after Bamba's death, Governor-General Jules Carde interceded on Mamadu Mustapha's behalf, and he was instated as the first Khalife.

The French also manipulated this succession struggle to their interests by marginalizing Cheikh Anta, the largest obstacle to Mamadu Mustapha's claim. The French were very distrustful

[47] Oumar Ba, *Ahmadou Bamba face aux autorités coloniales (1889-1927)* (Dakar, Senegal: Imprimerie de la SIPS, 1982), 172.
[48] Paul Marty, *Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba: Rapport à M. le Gouverneur Général de l'Afrique Occidentale*, Collection de la Revue du Monde Musulman (Paris, 1913), 134.
[49] Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 62.

of Cheikh Anta, whom they considered "too intelligent," believing that he could not be fashioned into an implement of indirect rule like Mamadu Mustapha.[50] The Governor-General Jules Carde had a particular personal hatred for Cheikh Anta, and was instrumental in imprisoning him for eight months and exiling him for ten years.[51] This in essence gave Mamadu Mustapha all the support he needed in eliminating his rivals and clearing the path toward his appointment as Khalif.[52]

During this period, there was an increase in cooperation between the Mouride leadership and the French Administration. The French aimed to use Mamadu Mustapha's leadership as a form of indirect rule, using him as a puppet to keep the rural members of the brotherhood under French authority and discipline, and simultaneously expanding the cultivation area of cash-crop peanut agriculture. They favored a centralized brotherhood with a loyal subject at its head, as they believed that would make it easier for them to administer, and this would allow them to use Mamadu Mustapha as a bridge of legitimacy for hard-to-reach rural populations.[53] This led to a more hierarchical and centralized authority structure in the developing confrérie, as the French eliminated the rivals of the Khalife and created conditions for him to exercise more total control.[54] Under Mamadu Mustapha, the Mourides cooperated with the French in order to overcome conflicts with other lower authorities, and they helped maintain the French economic structure by keeping Mouride followers submissive, encouraging them to work for French, and in return the marabouts were rewarded with land, machinery, seed and credit to help them with agricultural enterprises.[55]

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[50] Cruise O'Brien, 61.
[51] Cruise O'Brien, 71–72.
[52] Cruise O'Brien, 72.
[53] Cruise O'Brien, 63.
[54] Cruise O'Brien, 69.
[55] Cruise O'Brien, 69–71.

Appendix 4:

Important Mouride Marabouts[56]

Mbacké Family, Generation of Cheikh Amadu Bamba
-Cheikh Anta, Cheikh Amadu Bamba's oldest brother
-Cheikh Thioro, brother of Cheikh Amadu Bamba
-Ibra Mbacké, brother of Cheikh Amadu Bamba
-Balla Mbacké, brother of Cheikh Amadu Bamba
-Mbacké Bousso, cousin of Amadu Bamba, head of a Mouride branch, known for scholarship

Early lieutenants of Cheikh Amadu Bamba
-Cheikh Ibrahima Fall
-Yassa Diene
-Balla Fall

Mbacké Family, Generations After Cheikh Amadu Bamba
-Mamadu Mustapha Mbacké, oldest son of Amadu Bamba, First Khalife General
-Falilou Mbacké, son of Amadu Bamba, and heir of Mamadu mustafa
-Bassiru Mbacké, son of Amadu Bamba, heir apparent to Falilou
-Abdul Ahad Mbacké, son of Amadu Bamba, successor to Falilou
-Sokhna Muslimatou, youngest daughter of Cheikh Amadu Bamba
-Serigne Modou Bousso, son of Mbacké bousso
-Cheikh Awa Balla Mbacké, cousin of Falilou Mbacké
-Modou Mustafa, son of Falilou Mbacké
-Cheikh Mbacké, son of Mamadu Mustapha, challenges Falilou's claim to Khalifate

[56] Lucy C. Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 183.

Appendix 5:

Geographic Expansion under Mamadu Mustapha

The Mourides expanded southeast from their heartland in Baol, toward eastern Saloum and the region of Tambacounda. Although some talibés started to move into cities and settle there, the majority of these settlements were in the rural interior.[57] This expansion was facilitated by the completion of the Touba-Diourbel railroad in Baol and the Louga-Linguère rail-lines (from northern Kayor to Jolof) by the French, and demonstrated how the confréries accommodated to the unavoidable elements of French domination and turned these elements of colonialism to their own benefit.[58]

In this period of expansion, there often arose tensions with other sources of leadership, such as the marabouts of the Qādiriyya and the Tijāniyya, and the administratively appointed territorial chiefs. Inter-confrérie tensions arose after the death of El Hajj Malick Sy in 1922 and the conversion of many Tidjianes to the Mouridiyya, after which the Tidjiane leadership attempted to turn the French against the Mourides. In order to ease tension, Mamadu Mustapha restricted Mouride proselytization in established territory of the other confréries, which helped to improve relations with these other confréries.[59] In Mouride dominated zones, the local chiefs often held less authority than the Mouride marabouts, and were sometimes even talibés themselves. In many cases they secured their appointments as chiefs through the assistance of local marabouts who had a lot of control at the local level for who was placed in vacant regional chief positions, which made chiefs dependent on maraboutic support to stay in power.[60] The new

[57] Cruise O'Brien, 66.
[58] Cruise O'Brien, 65.
[59] Cruise O'Brien, 69.
[60] Cruise O'Brien, 66–67.

Mouride leadership also often leveraged their relationships with elected politicians of the *Quatres Communes* and their relationship with the French to overcome obstacles from conflicting sources of leadership.[61]

[61] Cruise O'Brien, 66.

Appendix 6:

Important Senegalese Political Parties

-SFIO: Senegalese Branch of the French Socialist Party (SFIO)
-BDS: Bloc Démocratique Sénégalaise, Senghor formed this party after splitting from the SFIO in 1948
-UPS: Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, the 1958 merger of the BDS and the SFIO
-PS: BDS became the Parti Socialiste (PS) in 1976, and was the ruling party until 2000

Appendix 7:

Guèye and Senghor Media Polemic

This competition also played out within the party newspapers, and in the early 1950s there was a fierce media polemic between the two figures on the question of Islam. In a strategy similar to that of Diouf in his attacks on the Catholic Blaise Diagne (cf. …), the Muslim Guèye attacked the Catholic Senghor for his religious beliefs in an attempt to frame him as an enemy of Islam. The SFIO accused Senghor of pandering to Muslims and manipulating them for political support, and attempted to frame him as a figure of militant Catholic clericalism.[62] In response, the Senghor and BDS argued that Senegalese Christians and Muslims were not divided and had never had a problem being ruled by politicians of the opposite religion, and accused the SFIO of weaponizing religious differences against the BDS.[63] Further, they accused the SFIO of profaning Islam by using it as a political tool and thus questioned the sincerity of Guèye's faith, and further pointed out that Guèye chose to marry a Christian woman.[64]

In contrast to the urbanite Guèye, a lawyer from Saint Louis and French citizen by virtue of birth in one of the *Quatres Communes*, Senghor stood out as a political figure more aligned with rural populations, and who had earned his French citizenship through his studies in France. Senghor was born in Joal, a rural village in the Thiès region, and although his studies carried him deep into the French academic world of literature and poetry, he retained a more rural appeal than did Guèye, and he tended to be more in tune with the effects of colonialism on rural populations than was Guèye.[65] Senghor himself stated that he searched for approval of the religious forces throughout the country because "it is a secret for no one that the colonial

[62] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 201.
[63] Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, 87.
[64] Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, 201–2.
[65] Coulon, 199.

administration always served its own interests through the influence of the marabouts and catholic leaders," and he attempted to continue this political strategy.[66]

[66] Cheikh Tidiane Sy, *La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides: Un Essai sur L'islam au Sénégal* (Présence Africaine, 1969), 212.

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