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Morena: Emergence and Consolidation of Left Parties in Mexico

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MORENA: Emergence and Consolidation of Left Parties in Mexico

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I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.



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Abstract

On July 1st, 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the general elections in a historic election in modern Mexican history. This democratic process revealed a long history of the Mexican left in a country that is still considered in transition to liberal democracy. In this paper, I examine how left parties emerged in Mexico and what processes took place to consolidate these parties within the Mexican system. Through a comparative study between two left parties: The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the Party of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), we see how the national context and the personality of the candidates can change the emergence and consolidation dynamics. Moreover, the most influential left leaders on the Mexican left are Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (PRD) and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (MORENA). Lastly, I conclude that the PRD demonstrated successful emergence during the Single-party system but did not reach consolidation during the transition to democracy period. On the other side, MORENA presents the same emergence characteristics of its predecessor, the PRD, and achieves partial consolidation in the Mexican party system.

Introduction

On December 1, 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, former mayor of Mexico City and three-time presidential candidate, took the presidential sash. As the newly elected president, he declared that the so-called "Cuarta Transformación". According to Obrador, this fourth transformation proceeds three significant moments in the nation's history: The Mexican Independence Movement, The War of Reforms, and the 1910 Mexican Revolution.[1] Such narrative flows naturally from discourses concerning the political development of Mexico, emphasizing profound moments during the nation's history. What remains undiscussed within this story, perhaps purposely, is an equally significant issue of concern: the emergence of the Single Party System attached to the corporatist state. More specifically, Mexican elites developed a stable regime characterized by one-party dominance within the confines of a corporatist state. As purveyors of this development, former presidents Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–1928) and Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) enter the story as figures initiating and facilitating the noted mechanisms in which Mexico would pave its political future.

One such mechanism, Elías Calles's National Revolutionary Party (PNR), laid the foundations for both a national party system and the importance of a stable head of state. More specifically, Calles argued that caudillos ought to guide the politics of Mexico as the vanguard of the revolutionary cause. Additionally, to support the former argument, Andrew Selee highlights that, "Plutarco Elias Calles formed the PNR to bring together the various leaders of the Mexican Revolution who were in constant conflict."[2] Of course, this view would prove taxing as the

[1] Yolanda Meyenberg Leycegui. 2018. *Votar en tiempos de cólera*. Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, D.F. vol. 80: 951.
[2] Andrew Selee. 2011. "Municipalities and Policymaking*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 104.

preeminence of the caudillo system gave way to frequent succession crises. Nonetheless, Calles sustained that a strong caudillo-led political party provides for a more peaceful legislative process and for more meaningful implementation of legal institutions. The contrasting view, espoused by Lázaro Cárdenas, maintained that parties ought to be guided by popular classes – a resolution which would, in due time, transform the PNR from a "party of parties" to a "party of sectors." In this area, Cárdenas facilitated the creation and political incorporation of the major classes of Mexican politics, and listed by Paul Gillingham; peasants, workers, accessible classes, and the military.[3] Cárdenas asserted that these sectors would provide essential support for state initiatives, and would further broaden popular political participation and enhance government legitimacy; additionally, such groups were representative of both the broader Mexican public as well as the nation's 1910 revolution – areas of concern for the legitimation of the party. Once in power, the noted sectors would be used by the party to incentivize and cultivate relationships among regional elites as well as popular classes, affecting greater voter turnout come election season.

In summary, Calles advocated for a strong executive throughout four successive generations of presidents – a period called the "Maximato."[4] Cárdenas, by contrast, offered a popular alternative to executive power. He asserted that long-term stability and development depended on successfully confronting entrenched interests and responding to public demands. Forcing Calles into exile, Cárdenas used the aforesaid popular sectors to counterweight elite resistance. Later, Cárdenas' Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) made use of its hegemonic reach to rule the country in accordance with Calles's approach. The PRI would later alter the spirit

[3] Paul Gillingham. 2011. "Mexican Elections, 1910-1994: Voters, Violence, and Veto Power*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 57.
[4] Giliomee, Hermann, 1999. *The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers: 9

of Cárdenas' party sectors to accommodate an arguably less egalitarian form of corporatism; this shift took place against the project of Cárdenas, who believed that this corporate structure carried revolutionary prerogatives. Indeed, little they know how vital these two mechanisms will get attached to modern politics. The PRI was the central representative entity in Mexico and was challenged by opposition parties who met with different challenges to defeat the regime in 2000.

Thus, this intervention explores the role of political parties, mainly leftist parties, during the era of the Single Party System in Mexico. This discussion raises profound questions regarding the nature and development of political parties, and their consequence for the Mexican state: namely, the conversation considers (i) how a political party can construct public approval in pursuit of a broader agenda, and (ii) how a party can emerge and consolidate authority. These matters, inform the forthcoming conversation and shed light on the meaning of the Single Party System for the broader Mexican body politic. Surveying the historical development of leftist parties in Mexico, this research explores insurgent partisan movements and the conditions conducive for the emergence of parties. Furthermore, this discussion explores the essential dynamics and elements necessary for party development; as such, the first chapter is principally concerned with the party system and its components. Thus, the paper analyzes western democracies in which similar party systems have taken place. In addition, the paper employs the relevant theory in recognition of the political figures and institutions involved in the construction of a party system. Then the paper considers the factors constituting the theory of emergence and consolidation, which addresses party emergence as a broad political phenomenon characteristic of modern democracies. Once the theoretical foundations are established, the paper surveys the moments that are relevant to the emergence of the current political circumstance of the country: The Single Party System and the period of Democratization.

In Chapter 2, the conversation turns toward the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). This case study is particularly essential when considering the dynamics which undermined the dominance of the PRI. This paper weighs how the PRI machine began to implode amid internal factionalism. Such sectional divisions were affected by different events such as the National Liberation Movement, a pro/Cuban movement, the crisis of the oil madness, which caused an economic crisis that changes the economic panorama, and the sudden emergence of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of Lázaro Cárdenas. Cuauhtémoc is particularly essential when accounting for the multi-faceted nature of the left in Mexico, characterized by broad political movements such as Democratic Current and the National Democratic Front. This case study underscores the challenges of the consolidation process and helps ascertain the consolidation state of the PRD.

Lastly, Chapter 3 turns toward the Party of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). MORENA, similar to the PRD, was created under the charismatic presence of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. In this chapter, Obrador emerges as a leading light of MORENA presents a challenge to PRD preeminence. In the first part of the chapter, the paper explores the period of Mexican democratization, as well the phenomenon known as Party Fragmentation - the process whereby open and increased partisan contestation becomes tenable. Then I will analyze the rise of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Such an exploration will help situate Obrador's challenge against the consolidation process of the PRD and will contextualize the emergence of Obrador as a legitimate candidate for the Mexican presidency. As such, it would be remiss to disregard the 2006 elections and 2012 elections, which saw the growth of MORENA. Thus, with this comparative research based on the Emergence/Consolidation theory, along with a historical framework of the PRD, this paper will engage the discussion with the recognition of MORENA as a consolidated party in Mexico.

Chapter 1: Party formation

I. Introduction

In this first chapter, I will introduce some basic concepts that are needed to understand the left-leaning parties in Mexico Politics, the country of southern North America, and the third-largest country in Latin America. First, I will describe a western democracy to compare Mexico's authoritarian single-party system, and its subsequent multiparty system. Moreover, I want to encompass the political actors who participate in the Mexican party system and even outside of it, such as citizens, independent voters, activists, among others. This approach will help us to understand the Mexican voting behavior and introduce the model of Kathleen Bruhn, where she takes into consideration different factors that allow a party to compete in the electoral arena during its first years until its forms a greater coalition.

Subsequently, the national context section will compare two periods of the Mexican political system: The Single Party System and The Democratization Era. In the first place, conditions that allowed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to maintain a hegemonic regime in Mexico for 71 years, making an environment for the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) to emerge. Then, I will describe the national context for the democratization era or, as Willibald Sonnleitner calls “party fragmentation period.” This period is known due to the establishment of a multiparty system by three traditional parties, the PRI, PRD and PAN (the National Action Party), and the subsequent increasing competition of new parties.

II. Party system

Richard Katz says that in western democracies, it is reasonable to understand party systems “as a network of individuals who are selected to compete as candidates within free and fair

elections."[5] Furthermore, democratic societies possess specific defining characteristics. In essence, they have a different number of players, a distinct amount of resources to acquire recognition, and indeed, an apparatus of legal protections for free exchange and discourse. Such societies also possess players engaged in competition and lastly, as Richard Katz reflects, how the candidates by virtue of competitive elections, contribute an array of values to the broader political system. He strengthens his argument, saying that, "A nation's claim to be called democratic rests as much on the freedom of its elections as on the existence of parties."[6] Indeed, a nation that claims to be democratic will need political parties to compete. Without parties—and without their function in linking local, state, and federal institutions with voters—the outcomes of political processes can prove problematic for the solvency and potency of a given democracy.

Thus, it is essential to understand that voters tend to respond to incentives differently as a consequence of disparate circumstances. This fact lends insight to the nature of voter behavior, their reaction to political events, and the outcomes they seek to obtain; this fundamental truth also shows that parties normally win elections when they persuade voters to support their endorsed or nominated candidate(s). However, are prevailing parties functioning in a manner that is consistent with democratic values and institutions? An optimal party system will depend extensively on the quality and character of its democratic institutions (i.e., the functioning of its political institutions, the nature of the interests represented by the party member, and clearly, their influence among other members). Also, the party system should have the capacity to solve some of the broader concerns of society-at-large. Therefore, a party system serves as an intermediary institution in which political players overcome collective action problems (for example, the issue of selecting

[5] Richard Katz. 2007. *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press: 1
[6] Ibid 1

party leaders). Concerning this point, it has been elucidated within recent scholarship, and explained by Herbert Kitschelt that, "parties may help to overcome collective action problems by reducing voters' costs of information gathering, and candidates' costs of information distribution in the run up to the electoral choice."[7]

The current party system in Mexico is a multiparty system that consist by 4 political parties nowadays: The PRI, PAN, PRD and MORENA. Similar to other democracies, mainly Latin-Americans, Mexico is considered a transitional democratic republic that allows citizens to vote for their representatives in general elections, to conform the federal government and their three branches of power (Executive, Legislative and Judicial). Also, the territory of Mexico consists of thirty-one sovereign states, with a similar republic form to vote for governors and local authorities. Besides that, and similar to other Latin-American countries, there was a current called "Presidencialismo" where the executive power had a bigger power in the society and within other institutions across the country. During the Single-party system, the hegemonic party had an extreme power in all the society. Currently, the multiparty system has 4 leading parties, along an increasing creation of new parties contesting for power. The main electoral institution is The National Electoral Institute (INE), formerly called the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE).

III. Principals and Agents

Herbert Kitschelt develops a categorical scheme of political parties involving principals and agents. Principals are the citizens who vote in the party system; they have different goals within the system, including candidate support, or the detection of major issues. On the other hand, agents are the political actors (such as politicians, party candidates, partisans) competing for

[7] Herbert Kitschelt. 2009. "Party Systems" *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics,* ed. Carles Boix. Oxford University Press: 3

electoral positions and illustrate possible solutions to major issues. Their way to act is strategically: they attempt to gather information about the preferences of principals (that is, the voting public) and take into account the challenge presented by opposition parties and political adversaries. Moreover, agents have the objective of offering ideas that can resonate with principals to strengthen their party. Kitschelt emphasizes this point saying that "politicians seek reelection to political offices as the baseline objective, whatever other goals they may pursue beyond that."[8] Principals and agents are essential for these systematic processes which undergird and sustain democratic governance.

The importance of principals and agents in this work is essential to understand a functional party system or, by contrast, a dysfunctional system. Also, the coexistence of principals and agents helps the party system to act cohesively, since citizens will see with their own eyes that parties will have the power to translate their mandates into practical action. If the agent's performances are ambiguous, principals may not know how to punish or reward them in the polls. Under a party system, principals are represented as a consequence of demand and supply forces (within the political sphere, that is).

IV. Emergence vs consolidation

The entry of new parties is not provincial: it is a phenomenon that is not unique to Mexico, or any other country, for that matter. Herbert Kitschelt lends theory in this area, and he provides examples such as the struggle of ideologies and the role of the political environment affecting the present and future actions of political actors. Other agents can wait until better socioeconomic conditions that would allow them to engage in the existing party competition. Also, it is essential

[8] Herbert Kitschelt. 2009. "Party Systems" *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics,* ed. Carles Boix. Oxford University Press: 2

to mention that in party formation, the trigger must affect potential organizers at the same time as potential supporters. From that perspective, Kathleen Bruhn uses a model of party emergence-consolidation wherein the processes of detachment and realignment; new parties can reach a state of consolidation.

Emergence-consolidation holds that "party consolidation refers to the construction of stable norms and expectations for cooperation, decision making and conflict resolution in five key relationships listed by Bruhn: 1) among activists, 2) with voters, 3) with civil society organizations, 4) with other parties, and 5) with the state."[9]. In Mexico, during the emergence of the party system, there were common threads, such as the emergence of these new parties located in the right or left of the political process (although Alberto Olvera would likely note that such parties acted more as Catch-all parties without ideological predisposition). Also, those parties emerging could be successful or unsuccessful at the moment to become a more robust movement that ended in the origin of a party.

Kathleen Bruhn takes into consideration three approaches in her model of emergence and consolidation: Ideological Emphasis, Tactical Attitude Toward Other Actors, and Arena of Action. According to Bruhn's approaches, a new party requires a charismatic leader to attract principals and agents because such a leader can bring about greater voter and political interest within the party fold. Also, a new party involves a challenge to the current relationships and alliances between opposition parties, coalitions, clientelist bonds, among others. In this regard, the party becomes an important mechanism whereby principals can mobilize support and engage the political process. Lastly, the new party, through these mobilizations and confrontations, can work in a social arena

[9] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 13

of action, such as plazas, institutions, public foundations, streets, to attract people and a stronger political voice.

Following the theory of Kathleen Bruhn, after the emergence of a party comes new challenges in the consolidation period. A consolidated party will retain more considerable influence in the political process. Agents obtaining congress seats would be able to focus on more substantive issues and pave the way through specific policies by what the leader promises will be accomplished. Unlike new parties, charismatic leaders will not be necessary if the principals do not receive payoffs that make them committed to the party. While the new party is in charge of confronting current relationships, a consolidated party needs to establish new relationships with principals and agents. Thus, it will create new tactics to engage in specific issues and events that require a coordinate work with opposition agents. It is important to denote that these new relationships require stable, constructive, and independent bonds, without depending on corporate relations. Thus, the party can compromise on delivering outcomes to their population, working in the institutional arena and governmental institutions.

V. Detachment and Reattachment

According to this model, two political processes must occur for successful state consolidation: Detachment and Reattachment. Detachment is the mechanism where principals lose their political identity, or agents lose the support of their first party. The detachment of principals can happen due to considerable dissatisfaction with prevailing parties and their role in leading the government. Also, monopolies and corruption can raise resentment of the population, triggering political alienation. Another fact is the economic development and sudden conjuncture crisis. For example, in Mexico, the financial crisis that broke out during the seventies, and had financial repercussions during the eighties, caused general discontent, impossible debts to pay,

the enforcement of freezing wages, and the implementation of broad budget cuts affecting the social classes through this austerity programs. This crisis allowed the people to observe the incompetence of the politicians managing the crisis and the general corruption of the incumbent party.

On the other hand, the cause of the agent detachment may occur for other factors—for example, the implementation of new policies. After the decline of the oil world price by 1981, the incumbent administration implemented a rough austerity program, based explicitly on neoliberal policies, that marginalized some elites and experienced politicians within the system. The neoliberalism implementation caused agents to believe that the incumbent party was against the roots of the party and moving away from the traditional ideologies. Also, agents may lose their loyalty to their original parties when the current government is unwilling or unable to protect their voting vital blocks. Taking into consideration two members of the "Corriente Democrática" (Democratic Current; antecessor of the Party of the Democratic Revolution PRD); Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, detached themselves from the PRI since there were an increasing confrontation and polarization within that ruling party. These facts made it impossible to receive the president's blessing or, in other words, "El dedazo" (the informal power of the president to choose the next candidate). Moreover, agents can see if their parties are not focusing on new social actors that are bringing a social decline in other social actors in which their party or coalition relied upon support. Bruhn highlights that, “In the Mexican case gradual erosions of ruling party support contributed to detachment of voters, with facilitated new party formation; but conjunctural factors dramatically accelerated this process and triggered the detachment of elites who organized the new left coalition.”[10]

[10] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 15.

The detachment process can show us how principal and agent lost their political identities; however, it does not explain how they could acquire a new political identity, and even less to attach themselves to an emergent party. For that, the reattachment process is essential to principals and agents to develop a new political identity and, of course, their loyalty for a longer time. This process of reattachment can be achieved by a shared worldwide and political goals as well. Bruhn explains different linkages that can be used in the reattachment process, such as social linkages (friends, families), self-interest linkages, where the principal or agents receive a direct benefit, pay-offs, or incentives (prestige, participation, and power). Also, there may be a psychological linkage, where voters start with strategic or idiosyncratic reasons in short term elections until they feel attached to the new party. Also, a continued protest against the incumbent party can reattach voters to the new party.

This detachment and reattachment process can help a party to reach a consolidated state. In Bruhn's analysis, the detachment and reattachment processes demonstrated three key implications. First, a successful party can use multiple linkages, whether social, self-interest, or psychological linkages. Second, the manipulation of institutional and environmental characteristics can shape linkages to consolidate party loyalties. Finally, a new party can take time to reach its final form, and the habituation to those emergent parties takes time as well. During this time, electoral competitors can achieve a one-time electoral win due to rewards and pay-offs, however, this act does not secure the reattachment of the bought voters, much less credibility if the new party cannot deliver promises or future pay-offs. In the Mexican case, existing parties can affect the consolidation process as well as Bruhn emphasizes that "Existing parties can interrupt

the new party consolidation though different ways: Shifting ideological position, fraud, interference in payoffs, manipulation, among others."[11]

VI. National context: Single Party System

Certainly, from 1929 to 2000, Mexico passed for a period denominated single-party system. We can depict single-party systems as modern authoritarian systems that have systematic incumbency advantages against opposition parties in a competitive electoral system. Moreover, they have the balance of power within the party; absolute control of electoral institutions, a balance between the executive power and the presidential cabinet (secretary of government) as well as clientelist networks within state governors and corporate sectors (corporatism). Hermann Giliomee mentions that "these regimes are the political product of sociopolitical events, such as revolutionary turmoil, decolonization process, or insurgencies against communist regimes."[12]. Besides that, even if single party system is considered authoritarian, authors believe that there is a deep ideological meaning of progress. For example, according to Samuel P. Huntington one-party systems might be a needed mechanism to hold together the society which would fall apart due to the lack of organization and leadership.

The Mexican Revolution was caused by the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz which lasted 31 years, from 1876-1880 and 1884-1911. To defeat the dictatorship, people was leaded by different caudillos, such as Francisco I Madero and Emiliano Zapata, in order to take up arms and fight in the war. The aftermath of the revolution was an unstable country, a weak government and a high dispersion of power through several years until the government of Plutarco Elias Calles by 1929

[11] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 20.
[12] Hermann B. Giliomee, 1999. *The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers: 3.

and the creation of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR). As stated above, the struggle of power ended with the emergence of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) – Later renamed Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) and finally as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

The background of the PRI dominance follows the anarchy that arose during seven years of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917), a bloody civil war caused by the 30-year-old dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. As a consequence, and noted by Joy Langston, Mexico passed through a decade of political instability (1918-1929).[13] With a chaotic decade, the PRI arose to centralize the federal government power, rebuild the economy, and restrict the political ambitions of regional strongmen (referred to as caudillos) and revolutionary generals. Hermann Giliomee highlights the character of the former revolutionary general and former president of Mexico, Plutarco Elias Calles. He created the PRI to stop violent outbreaks and military rebellions, in addition to end the deadly struggle among political leaders.[14]

The hegemonic PRI had the presence of different mechanisms that allowed them to fake legitimacy and to maintain control in the elections. First, there was a great strength within the party and the loyalty of their members in the first years. Mainly in the internal organization of power between three organizations: The executive power, the secretary of governance and the National Executive Committee (The party's headquarters). Also, between these three organizations, they balanced their influence through state governors and local representatives. Clearly, as an authoritarian government, another fact that allowed them to stay in power was a high level of corruption. With social repression, the corrupted electoral reforms, and the use of party and federal

[13] Joy Langston. 2002. *Breaking Out is Hard to do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime*. Latin American Politics and Society: 32.
[14] Hermann Giliomee, 1999. *The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers: 9.

resources (to maintain the hegemonic party united and to subdue opposition parties), the PRI achieved a perfect balance of power.

Two other mechanisms allowed the PRI to maintain power, which I will highlight in this chapter: the role of opposition parties and corporatism. First. The Party of the National Action (PAN) was founded in 1939 by Catholic activists, businessmen and professionals whose, as Joseph Klesner describes, "their principal grievances against the regime were the loss of the Church's rights; the struggle for religious liberty, including freedom or Catholics to educate their children in parochial states."[15] On the other hand, the PAN had been the most significant and lasting opposition party of the PRI regime. Their main objectives were to obtain concessions of the PRI through the elections of deputies. Also, they emphasized the importance of religious philosophy and how to educate the principals and other agents about democracy. It was until the economic crisis of the eighties were business people from the north were obligated to take a greater role in politics, and the fear of rising fame of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. The second party was the Party of the Democratic Revolution, but I will talk about that party in Chapter 2.

The PRI allowed the participation of opposition parties to show legitimacy during its regime. During this period the PRD and the PAN did not represent a threat to the regime and there were other small parties or also known as "Satellite parties"[16] that acted as subordinated political actors within the hegemonic party. Finally, the PRI regime worked under a corporatist model. Alberto Olvera describes the corporatism in this way, "the society was integrated into the state by means of state-controlled social corporations, which were at the same time the main components

[15] Joseph L. Klesner. 2005. *Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico:* Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 47, no. 2: 129.
[16] These parties were mainly left parties without registry that tend to obtain concessions from the PRI.

of the sole official party."[17] The PRI were supported by the workers, peasants and popular corporations, promoting a culture of clientelism and a fragmented application of rights.

This authoritarian government survive for a long time due to its organization and the ideological foundations by the Mexican Revolution. Indeed, a one-party system cannot survive the course of time without keeping the original goal or circumstances in which these systems arose. For example, Dorothy J. Solinger shows other party systems (such as the KMT in China and the UNMO in Malaysia) and demonstrated that these parties had specific territorial goals. The goal of the KMT was to resist communism from China, or conversely, the UNMO to control Malaysia while the party focused primarily on removing the colonial legacy of Britain.[18] Mexico's PRI could not afford to leave aside the commitment to restore order after its revolutionary turmoil. As Clement H. Moore mentions "Unless the Mexican PRI, for instance, can continue to justify itself as the institutional embodiment of the Revolution, Mexico will acquire a multi-party system.[19] I will fully explain these four conditions in next part. Thus, with the control of these conditions, they became a key factor, not only to maintain the regime in power, but rather to maintain a façade of legitimacy.

For the first condition, I want to explain how the PRI achieved an internal organization between the president, the PRI headquarters and the secretary of government. Scholars argue that in the short run, an authoritarian regime can be useful if the main party is weak; for instance, some authoritarian countries will use the army to maintain a sense of stability. However, Huntington says that in the long run, "the authoritarian regime will, in large measure, depend on the strength

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[17] Alberto Olvera. 2010. *The Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutions, and Civil Society in Mexico*." Latin American Research Review, vol. 45: 82
[18] Dorothy J. Solinger 2001. *Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico*. Journal of Democracy: 32.
[19] Samuel P. Huntington and Clement Henry Moore. 1970. *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*. New York: Basic Books: 50.

of its party."[20] The PRI demonstrated that in order to survive, the party needed delegate their political authority between three main political organisms: The president (Executive power), the secretary of Government (President's cabinet) and the National Executive Committee (National Party leaders). It was practically impossible for the president of Mexico to coordinate and make decisions by himself. Indeed, this system of delegation of power was implemented to maintain the government dynamics working smoothly.

The secretary of government was the political actor in charge of the President's cabinet. They were responsible for managing the relations between the executive power, and other branches of the government. Also, this cabinet must lead the legislative branch, as well as ties with civic associations and religious organizations. Finally, as Langston points it out, the secretary had two primary obligations, to maintain control of mass media (radio, television, and print media), and to operate a system of information retrieval, called the Center of Investigation and National Security.[21] Since they had a closer connection with the president, they were likely to be selected by the president to compete in elections for a chance to govern.

Although the PRI was a strong actor in the political environment of Mexico, it is wrong to assume that the PRI had the total control of the government. In fact, the selection of candidates by the executive power may start between members of the party to distrust the loyalty of the new government. Also, if party members would not see benefits like economic resources and concessions, this could create internal splits. Undeniably, the party and their headquarters were a factor to be taken into account. The executive power and members of the bureaucracy, in order to

[20] Samuel P. Huntington and Clement Henry Moore. 1970. *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*. New York: Basic Books: 9.
[21] Joy Langston. 2002. *Breaking Out is Hard to do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime.* Latin American Politics and Society: 42.

avoid internal divisions, helped the party to maintain a reliable source of economic resources. According to Joy Langston "The PRI and the Federal Government were often confused with one another."[22] In other words, they share resources that allow them to manage candidates, to organize rallies, and above all, to reduce social unrest utilizing clientelist exchanges and access to government programs. For this reason, even though scholars argue that the party had little to do with the structure of the government or making policy, they agree that the party was a bridge between the government and the people, and a strong presence in the election ballot as well.

While executive power was in charge of facilitating a strong relation with the secretary of government and the party's headquarters, the second condition is entrenched with state governors and local caciques. They were the local representatives of the federal government throughout the Mexican territory. Scholars argue the state governor played a significant role as administrator of the president's policy programs. Each Mexican president knew for sure that each state executive had a close relationship with political institutions, corporate sectors, and relations with the president's cabinet. More precisely, state executives had profound ties to civil society which allow them to maintain a strong presence with the general public and guide them through general and local elections.

Due to these ties between governors and the public, the executive power used three instruments to keep down state governors influence. These three reasons were: First, the National Executive Committee, with the president's approval, named the PRI's gubernatorial candidates. Second, the president had power over the Secretary of the Treasury, so almost all the expected budget for states depended directly of the president's desires. And significantly, the president and

[22] Joy Langston. 2002. *Breaking Out is Hard to do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime.* Latin American Politics and Society: 46.

his cabinet had, as Langston stresses "the informal prerogative to dismiss governors who did not perform well."[23] In other words, if the governors did not comply with the decisions of the president, they will be replaced with more obedient followers. As a result, governors could not go against the one-party system, and most of them decided to follow the regime.

Additionally, one of my authors, Alejandro Quintana, explores the figure of Maximino Ávila Camacho, state governor of Puebla, and brother of the former president Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946). This governor is the representation of the significant power that state executives held during the one-party regime. He relied on the monopolization of power, sponsored by the PRI, to accumulate wealth at the expense of the people. However, this fact did not affect his political image; in fact, he built secure connections with union leaders, businesses groups, and caciques (local strongmen). His political career was promoted by the PRI, and the secretary of government, as they could trust him to win elections –provincial and federal- in the state.

Furthermore, governors had the power to control the approx. 2,400 municipalities in the 31 states dominated by the PRI. To do this, state executives can rely on small leaders called caciques or strongmen. In contrast with national leaders, these strongmen used corruption, repression, and social injustice to keep down small factions of opposition, and protestors in check. Since the governors had power in local congresses and they could replace state judges and prosecutors, local leaders had total liberty to either bring people to the cause or stamp out small sparks of opposition. Also, governors had the power to replace local representatives in small towns or municipalities, when they did not follow their indications.

[23] Joy Langston. 2002. *Breaking Out is Hard to do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime.* Latin American Politics and Society: 49.

As I mentioned earlier, one-party systems need to show that they are under a disguise of legitimacy. In other words, they need to show that they are fostering democratization in the country. An excellent way to accomplish this goal was to allowed an electoral competition, specifically, allowing the registration of other parties. This fact is noted by Kenneth Greene, "The PRI's long-time dominance is surprising because it occurred in the context of regular elections with meaningful contestation."[24] The role of the opposition was a key point for the longtime survival of the one-party system. The opposition had two sides, the weak parties, and the Satellite parties. One of them was the National Action Party (PAN) representing the right wing since 1939 and the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) representing the left wing since 1989.

The other types of opposition parties were the satellite parties whose leaders, according to Langston "they were paid by the party to offer a non-competitive alternative to the PRI."[25] These parties generally consisted of Communist parties, although they were following different goals than their counterparts in communist countries. Scholars argue that the PRI's headquarters often used party and federal resources to maintain these parties loyal to the regime, even if their ideology was different. However, they kept their Marxist roots, shaping their ideas to fit alongside their obvious subordination to the PRI, and their financial dependency on the larger party. For instance, instead of fighting for communist political practices, the Mexican communist party primarily sought to eliminate class conflict and support for the national bourgeoisie. William A. Booth

[24] Kenneth F. Greene. 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press: 2.
[25] Joy Langston. 2002. *Breaking Out is Hard to do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime.* Latin American Politics and Society: 60.

stresses that "Mexico provides an extreme case of Left subordination to popular-nationalist ideology."[26]

There was a significant similarity between the PAN, PRD and the satellite parties. They were weak parties that did not have a chance against the dominant party. According to Kenneth F. Greene, the single-party dominance and its correlation with opposition parties had two advantages: resource advantages from the dominant party, and how this party could shape the cost of political participation. Greene lays the next example: the PRI could invest more federal resources for big rallies to overshadow the image from the PAN and the PRD, while investing resources to their satellite parties, supporting their national bourgeoisie campaign. Also, they could use patronage goods in their corporate sectors to help themselves and blur the image from the opposition parties.[27]

For the last condition, I used the corporatism in Mexico. Joy Langston stresses that the corporate sectors were the mass pillars of the PRI regime "In return for certain clientelist and policy benefits, the leaders of the sectors promoted labor peace, restricted demands from their base, and publicly supported government policies."[28] In other words, corporate leaders, in exchange for these benefits, were expected to control their rank-and-files workers, maintain a clear and well-supported view of the regime and above all, to make sure their members voted during elections periods for the dominant party. Thus, members in return will receive benefits, promotions or economic resources throughout the electoral season.

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[26] William A. Booth. 2018. *Hegemonic Nationalism, Subordinate Marxism: The Mexican Left, 1945-7.* Journal of Latin American Studies: 31

[27] Kenneth F. Greene. 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press: 5.

[28] Joy Langston. 2002. *Breaking Out is Hard to do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime.* Latin American Politics and Society: 53.

In Mexico, the most important sectors were: The National Confederation of Peasants (CNC), The National Conference of Popular Organizations (CNOP), The Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and the Bureaucrat's Union (FSTSE). These sectors relied on massive resources from the federal government, thanks to the incumbent policies toward coalitions. Regina Trevino notes that "the single-party regime used these labor unions under the control of state governors and local authorities to increase or reduce their welfare for the incumbent's policies."[29] As a result, with the use of state resources provided by the Secretary of the Treasury, or in other words, the president's cabinet, these interest groups were left to the regime's mercy.

Union leaders gained a more considerable increase in their benefits while the poor people had the promise of a better future if they follow the regime's plan. The PRI regime knew clearly that opposition parties and protestors from anti-regime groups could disrupt the authoritarian system. For this reason, the corporatist sectors were, without a doubt, one way to accomplish the regime's goals with the incorporation of large organizations, interest groups and society itself to the cause. "A corporatist organizational structure and a clientelist network had enabled the PRI to maintain a seven-decade power monopoly." [30] The one-party regime of the PRI undoubtedly was able to develop a significant mechanism of control with these four past conditions (The executive power, the state and local governors, opposition parties and corporatism).

VII. National context: Party fragmentation

The PRI had a complex system that allowed them to be in power for 71 years. However, the system started to crumble with the rise of personalistic candidates, and clearly, the extreme

[29] Regina Trevino. 2011. *Coalitional Approach: An Analysis of Mexico's Political Change*. Comparative Economic Studies: 150.
[30] Ibid: 159.

tiredness of principals facing an economic crisis in the eighties alongside the decreasing standards of living. The opposition parties, once considered weak parties, became strategic players in the new national context after the crumbling of the PRI. The PAN was able to compete and win two presidential terms, and the PRD became the largest movement of left parties thanks to the increasing popularity of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. The period after the defeat of the PRI is called the "Democratization era or simply, Mexican transition to democracy" by several authors such as Alberto Olvera and Willibald Sonnleitner. This period is crucial in this research (and better explained in Chapter 3) due to the fragmentation of the electoral geography.

James McCann describes the new national elections as a different period of "increasing contestation, public engagement and the emergence of new patterns of mobilization and voting choices"[31] Indeed, after the PRI defeat in the ballot box in 2000 against the PAN, a multiparty system started to gain influence across the country. This multiparty system started with a divided two-party system between the north and the south between the PRI and the PAN - PRD. Alberto Olvera describes this period with the competition between PAN and PRI in the north, and PAN and PRD in the south. On the other hand, the center of Mexico had a three-party system where the traditional parties PRI, PAN, and PRD were the most influential in the contestation of power. However, this period did not last due to the increasing party formation, and the demise of the traditional parties. Willibald Sonnleitner calls this reconfiguration of the Mexican democracy as "Fragmentacion partidista" (party Fragmentation).

According to Sonnleitner "the Party fragmentation follows the demise of the traditional political identities – particularly those the arose during the revolutionary nationalism—and the

[31] James Mccann. 2011. "Changing Dimensions of National Elections in Mexico*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 500.

decomposition of the new party system – that rise up during the most recent transition period"[32]. However, instead of adopting a static and holistic three-party system, the Mexican electoral stage continues to fragment in all the levels across the length and breadth of the national territory from 2000 to 2018. It is an interesting view since these new parties became more essential actors in the Mexican politics. Thus, according to Sonnleitner and Olvera "Small parties not only win hundreds of seats in town councils and local congress buildings, they also govern thousands of citizens in a municipal context, they achieve state governorships, and they are preparing to compete, under the leadership of an independent candidate, for the very presidential race"[33] In brief, these small parties are becoming strategic political actors in the current electoral Mexican stage.

Unlike other countries where each party has a defined ideology, Mexican parties act as "Catch-all parties," which means that the ideological spectrum of left and right is not clear in each party. They try to appeal to different causes if it can help them to detach and reattach principals to their parties. These catch-all parties had caused citizens to use their votes not only to choose the more credible candidate but to use it as a means to punish and reject other parties. Moreover, the Mexican stage has reached a new level of mistrust toward political parties, one more about frustration and social disappointment. In 2000, 86% percent of the citizens participated in the electoral campaign, in 2015, barely 30% percent participated in the electoral battle.[34]

From a three-party system of the democratization era, it seems that the national context is directed to a more fragmented party system. A context which the new parties have a more unstable and unequal national presence. Most parties appear and disappear within a matter of months, and

[32] William Sonnleitner. 2017. *Rastreando las dinámicas territoriales de la fragmentación partidista en México (1991-2015).* América Latina, Hoy, 75: 24.
[33] Ibid: 25.
[34] Ibid: 26

the consolidation seems like an impossible assignment. According to Sonnleitner, five tendencies demonstrate the currently fragmented suffrage. First, the decline of the three main parties that dominate the democratic transition period. Second, the use of strategic votes during electoral campaigns also called “Voto útil” (Useful vote). Another one is the increasing importance between circumstantial alliances with forces of limited relevance. Fourth, the slow but steady growth of political parties, differing from the traditional parties (PRI, PAN, PRD). Finally, the profound transformation of the social/regional electoral participation. Later in chapter 3, we will analyze how these tendencies helped the emergence of MORENA.

VIII. Conclusions

In the first part of this chapter, we worked with the concepts of Richard Katz and Herbert Kitschelt about western democracies, and the ordinary course of a party system. In these concepts, I borrowed the concepts of Principals (citizens who vote in the party system) and Agents (such as politician, party candidates, partisan). I found important to denominate them like that since it will facilitate the use of just two main concepts throughout my research. Likewise, the model of emergence-consolidation will be essential in this project. The analysis of Bruhn with the incumbent party, the role of their leaders, their actions in a social and institutional space, as well as their capacity to create alliances, will be a starting point to analyze emergence and consolidation of the PRD and MORENA. On the other hand, working with the concepts of principals and agents, we can work with the mechanisms of detachment and reattachment. These two mechanisms will be important to understand the voting base in which a consolidated party will strengthen its establishment. Also, with the detachment mechanism, we can understand why some principals and agents risk their careers to create a new party, and if that is the best way to reattach these same actors within the new party.

After the Mexican Revolution and to restore the political system in Mexico, the single-party system contributed to the pacification of the revolutionary turmoil. However, the PRI did not allow opposition parties to occupy high positions in the institutional levels. In my research, I highlighted four conditions that enabled the PRI to maintain themselves in power. First, the coordination of the executive power, the secretary of government, and the headquarters of the party. Second, the full power between states and municipals across the territory. The third condition was keeping opposition parties in check, allowing them to exist with the mere excuse of legitimizing the regime. Finally, the situation of a corporative system in which only the PRI benefited during an extended period. At the end of chapter 1, I analyzed the national context of the single-party system and the democratization era. These two national contexts will allow us to understand better how Cuauhtémoc Cardenas started his political career and his opportunity to challenge the system with the PRD. Lastly, during the democratization era, I found it essential to understand how the traditional parties (PAN, PRI, and PRD) were keeping a three-party system. Nevertheless, this party system did not achieve to keep a stable system and their constant failures created an increasing fragmentation of parties, dividing the people, creating catch-all parties without a clear ideological view.

Chapter 2: PRD foundation

IX. Introduction

The foundation of the Party of the Democratic Revolution was in 1989. However, the party has a long history behind its emergence. After being the unchallenged party, the PRI had a system that allowed it to maintain a one-party system that it was undoubtedly corrupt, and there was a little chance to confront the PRI. However, in its pursuit to demonstrate its legitimacy, it allowed the formation of opposition parties that worked under challenging situations and various difficulties to consolidate themselves as parties. A few events throughout the last decades of the 20th century was responsible for the fragmentation of the single-party system and the subsequent democratization era. In this chapter, I will evaluate those movements that allow the PRD to emerge during an authoritarian context and the figure of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as the main political actor of the PRD.

Through the chapter, I will analyze the polarization within the party between two main wings: the Cardenistas and the Alemanistas, among other political players such as the Técnicos and Políticos. Also, I will talk about the National Liberation Movement (MLN) that will expose the authoritarian regime that governed Mexico. Moreover, during this chapter, I will take into consideration the internal split in the hegemonic party that produced as a consequence a Cardenista movement guided by the son of Lázaro Cárdenas, Cuauhtémoc. Indeed, the lack of possibilities to challenge the hegemony within the party made possible internal defections that were strengthened by an economic crisis in the 1980s and the neoliberal measures used to confront the crisis. Once the cardenista movement saw that it was impossible to counterbalance the power of the PRI, they

created, together with a coalition of left parties, the National Democratic Front, which rapidly became the main challenger to the PRI establishment.

Once these movements are clear, I will analyze the emergence of the PRD and the subsequent events that affected the consolidation of the new party. This chapter will explore the PRONASOL program created by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and I will explain how it became an obstacle for the PRD. In the last paragraphs, I will return to the conditions laid down by Kathleen Bruhn, such as the ideological emphasis, the political arena, and the attitude toward other actors. These conditions will be essential to understand the strengths of the FDN and the conflicts within the PRD. In the end, Cárdenas will become a caudillo of the left parties and will be displaced for another "rising star" during the end of the single-party system by 2000.

X. Internal Splits within the PRI

The PRD was founded in 1989 under Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. However, its roots had a history that lies in the division between two wings among the hegemonic party: The *Cardenistas*[35] and the *Alemanistas*[36]. Kathleen Bruhn details both groups as follows: The Cardenistas stressed equal opportunities, radical redistributive policies, and state intervention in the economy, all of this to promote the welfare of working classes. On the other hand, the Alemanistas stressed economic growth and a capitalist state, thus favoring the private sector and intervening in the economy to protect national capital and promote capitalist development.[37] These gaps were widened during 1987, when the administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982 – 1988) focused its

[35] After former Lázaro Cárdenas (1934 – 1940)
[36] After former president Miguel Aleman (1946 – 1952)
[37] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 43.

efforts toward the "técnicos"[38], displacing from the political discourses another group denominated "políticos"[39] among the PRI ranks. This direct support to the técnicos did create some splits in the hegemonic party since the Cardenistas believed that this group, according to Bruhn, "lack the political skills required for handling conflicts among large, autonomous groups, and between the states."[40] What is more, políticos believed that técnicos did not stress human and social problems that knowledge in social and human sciences would resolve.

XI. The National Liberation Movement

Not only was the PRI was suffering from an internal division of ideologies during 1987. The Mexican left was starting to regain strength across the country. The PRI allowed the existence of other opposition parties such as the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) founded in 1919, the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) in 1948, Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) in 1987, among others. However, these parties never gained national recognition (most of the time, they were overshadowed by the PRI and forced into subordination as satellite parties). Basically, the leftist opposition was a melting-pot of grass-roots popular movements, the weak communist left, and later, the cardenistas. On August 5, 1961, the left gained support and national recognition with the foundation of the National Liberation Movement (MLN). Kathleen Bruhn believed that this movement is the real predecessor and inflection point of what would be the "Corriente Democratica alliance," the ideological predecessor of the PRD.

[38] Técnicos were the agents specialized in disciplines like economics and engineering and followed administrative career paths.
[39] Políticos were specialized in disciplines like law and social sciences and followed careers that included experience in parties and electoral politics.
[40] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 44.

The National Liberation Movement was an important event for the left opposition. It started as a nonelectoral pressure group to support the government of Fidel Castro. This movement, in which a young Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was beginning his political career, search for nongovernmental organizations in Latin America to take a pro-Cuba stance. Then, this organization founded a chapter in Mexico, where the main objective was to pressure the authoritarian regime led by the PRI. The main purposes of the MLN chapter in Mexico, according to Bruhn, were listed as; "support for municipal autonomy, proportional representation in Congress, decentralization, an active state role in economic development, agrarian reform, democratization and autonomy for unions and peasant organizations, and absolute independence with respect to the International Monetary Fund."[41]

Although this movement was one of the first events where the left was organized with specific values and more organized objectives, the campaign was sporadic. The Communist Party and Cardenistas had several ideological conflicts between them due to tension around particular reforms and policies such as the agrarian reform and the attempt of the communist party to build an independent peasant organization to divide the union labor organizations. Also, the government saw a challenge in this movement and accused them of trying to divide the country and promote communist ideas to implement in the nation. Later most of the original members disappeared or were jailed. Nevertheless, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was seen as a promising political actor. In 1967, after a rally in Las Balsas, Michoacán (the region where Cuauhtémoc would gain an enormous base of followers, thanks for being the state home of his dad Lázaro) and his sporadic participation in the weakened MLN, he joined the PRI.

[41] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 50.

The MLN did obtain a high relevance during the sixties and was proof that the hegemonic party was starting to experience the upsurge of opposition parties. Thus, the PRI implemented two mechanisms to perpetuate power. First, they needed to concentrate on the legitimization of their movements to maintain themselves in the center of the political spectrum, thus maintaining their key voting blocks. Second, although legitimizing the regime was important, it was clear that the PRI did want to keep hegemonic power. Through legal channels, they granted concessions to opposition parties, some municipal offices, and few rewards, all of this, while being cautious that any opposition movement does not represent a threat to the regime. However, while the hegemonic party was aware of external agents, there was an increasing dissatisfaction within the party.

XII. Oil Madness

The economic crisis of the eighties was a fatal shot towards the regime. Kathleen talks in his book "Taking on Goliath" about how this crisis in Mexico was due to a major decline in the world price of petroleum.[42] By the year 1981, the main source of dollars came from oil exportation, and particularly the oil revenues paid with dollars, that was directed to pay the foreign debt. The administration of López Portillo[43] adopted risky strategies of raising short-term borrowing instead of cutting expenditures of significant development projects. They expected that world oil prices could recover soon. However, the oil did not improve its value at the time expected, and Bruhn says that the foreign-debt raised from 1.5 billion to 11 billion at the end of 1981.[44] The rising international rates and the obligations to pay the debt, made the government run-out of dollars. The Mexican government had to appeal to Washington for more loans, making difficult to repay

[42] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 71.
[43] Former president José López Portillo (1976 – 1982)
[44] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 72.

its foreign debt, but also the instability of the economy created higher interest rates and encouraged capital flight and inflation.

The administration of Miguel De La Madrid (1982 – 1988) came into a difficult position. To overcome the crisis, De la Madrid adopted an aggressive austerity program. They cut expenditures in the department of health care, and they eliminated investment in social programs and popular subsidies. These popular subsidies are illustrated by Bruhn, "basic goods like tortillas, fuel and water were eliminated or reduced, undermining the living standards of the poor."[45] Additionally, the administration started to privatize many enterprises and drop wages in order to reach lower inflation and a more stable investment environment. The trade liberalization was meant to attract potential foreign investors with agreements between sectors and cheap labor. This last factor affected the standard of living of thousands of Mexicans, which the Cardenista wing saw as a betrayal to the original purpose of the PRI, to be a party of the people. This event not only affected the Mexican middle class and its rising disapproval, but it also gave the leftist wing the best opportunity to challenge the hegemonic power in his arena: the electoral stage.

Between 1950 to 1980 different events started to provoke dissatisfaction within the PRI ranks: a growing economic dissatisfaction within the middle class, a media controlled by the hegemonic party, an economic crisis and student movements that ended as tragedies. For example, on October 2, 1968, during the term of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964 – 1930) and with a higher influence of the military in national security decisions, occurred the Tlatelolco Massacre. Todd A. Eisenstadt describes this event, "in which hundreds of students were attacked and killed by police

[45] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 73.

and other government authorities."[46] This event marked the history of Mexico. The media controlled by the PRI covered the event less violent, although there was multiple evidence, with pictures and testimonies, about thousands of dead students laying on the streets. All of these incidences influenced the administration of De La Madrid to take a different direction during his presidency. Therefore, adopting more neoliberal policies, giving more emphasis to the técnicos views in projects of privatization, and an ideological fight within the party started to crumble the roots of the PRI. The Cardenista faction saw the revolutionary principles being stomped upon, and De La Madrid ignored their proposals and demands. The ideological polarization was impossible to stop, and the hegemonic party already had a split led by Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, Rodolfo González Guevara, and most notably, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.

XIII. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was fundamental to the democratization period in Mexico. Symbolically, his name represents two well-known characters. "Cuauhtémoc" as the last Aztec Tlatoani, who was the last man standing in Tenochtitlan (The capital of the Aztec Empire) at the end of the Spanish conquest. On the other side, "Cárdenas," it's the last name that he inherited from his father, Lázaro Cárdenas, who was considered one of the most popular and progressive presidents in Mexico. Lázaro was admired for his land's reforms and the nationalization of the Mexican oil industry. Although being nominated by the left and socialist parties of those times, Cuauhtémoc followed a populist ideology instead of a socialist one. During his political career, he showed a severe and humorless complexion at that moment to deliver his speeches. He always maintained the example of his father, building a personal relationship with the citizenry. As a

[46] Todd A. Eisenstadt. 2011. "Ulysses, The Sirens, and Mexico's Judiciary: Increasing Precommitments to Strengthen the Rule of Law*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 217.

person, he detested doing appearances in front of the media and according to Andrew Reding, in the heat of his home, "He smiled and laughed frequently, gamely downed shots of tequila at fiestas, beamed and waved as townsfolks showered confetti on him."[47] His peculiar behavior built through the example of his father, shaped his political career and the Mexican left.

XIV. Corriente Democrática

After his sporadic presence in the MLN, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas joined the PRI and was a significant challenger to José López Portillo. However, the informal power of the former president José Luis Echeverria (1970- 1976) called "el dedazo"[48] did not offer him any chance to run as a presidential candidate. However, Portillo saw in Cárdenas a promising political agent and awarded him a Senate seat, then a position as undersecretary of agriculture and wildfire, and finally, with his efforts and the party acknowledgment, the governorship of Michoacán in 1980. Kathleen Bruhn illustrates one of the first conflicts of Cárdenas with the regime in 1985, when the president Miguel de la Madrid "announced that Mexico would seek entry to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – reversing nearly half a century of protectionist economic policies."[49] Upon the entering into GATT, De la Madrid pushed forward a neoliberal project that would benefit foreign enterprises and hurt the Mexican worker. Consequently, Rodolfo Gonzalez Guevara, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas initiated meetings to discuss the effects of the neoliberal policies of De La Madrid, and these conversations resulted in the creation of the Democratic Current.

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[47] Andrew Reding. 1997. *Aztec Sun Rising: The Cárdenas Challenge*. World Policy Journal, vol. 14, no. 3. 65

[48] El dedazo (finger tap) it was the informal power of the executive power to designate a successor without any democratic selection.

[49] Kathleen Bruhn. 2011. "The PRD and The Mexican Left*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 188

The Democratic Current started as a small movement within the hegemonic party to pressure the neoliberal policies of De La Madrid. Through existing institutions, they began to demand a more democratic selection of the next presidential candidate. Later, with more members from the Cardenista and progressive agents from the current, the CD defined itself, as noted by Bruhn, as a nationalist and democratic group determined to contribute to the gradual transformation of the country through resolute political action in favor of the historical constitutional project.[50] The CD highlighted threats to national sovereignty, such as deterioration in the standard of living of the population, the increasing displacement of productive national capital by foreign capital, and indications of political alienation within principals and agents. The CD was excluded from any internal discussion in the Presidential cabinet (Secretary of Government) where all the policy-making was done. After seeing that De La Madrid did not have any intention of sharing power, not even hearing their demands, besides of the inclination of De La Madrid to nominate Carlos Salinas de Gortari, a chief architect of market reforms, they finally raised their voices. Thus, they challenged the party while they pushed Cárdenas to run as an independent candidate.

Cuauhtémoc was already known among the left parties, and after he was expelled from the PRI, three organizations, according to Bruhn, saw him as a possible candidate: The parastatal parties (small collaborationist parties), the unified independent left (especially the Mexican Socialist Party) and most of organized civil society outside the PRI.[51] The electoral law specified that several parties could nominate one candidate without losing their independent registry, and all of these organizations shared four traits that pushed them to challenge the hegemonic party. First,

[50] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 80.
[51] Ibid 104.

these organizations felt that if they continued to associate with the PRI's policies, this could hurt their chances of winning enough votes to keep their registry[52]. Second, they feared that the hard-pressed PRI was no longer willing to save its smaller allies from losing its registry; in other words, they believed that their clientelist networks were already fragmented. Similar to Cárdenas, they found that the PRI had chosen the worst possible candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who would continue the policies of De La Madrid. Finally, they believed that Cárdenas offered them a golden opportunity to boost their vote without going too far away from the system. Thanks to these choices, Cárdenas formed an umbrella organization called The National Democratic Front to coordinate his presidential campaign.

XV. The National Democratic Front and the 1988 election.

The FDN boosted the image of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. People from different sectors, affected by the austerity programs, saw in Cárdenas a chance to express their hostility toward the PRI. Not only did the economic depression leave a bitter taste in the mouths of the middle class, but it also mobilized an enormous mass of people. Indeed, the 1988 elections contributed to a historic moment during the single-party system: The perception that the PRI hegemony was in danger. The FDN had high expectations to crush the PRI in the general elections. In most states, the FDN was able to hold big rallies and convince more agents to the increasing fame of the coalition. Furthermore, some places detested Salinas in contrast with Cárdenas. For example, Bruhn tell us that one day, in the Central region of Mexico City, in La Laguna, the Salinas campaign was received with stones, oranges, and shouts of "Cárdenas." The next day Cuauhtémoc received a spontaneous outpouring of affection.[53] Among his supporters, there was the perception

[52] To maintain registry, they needed 1.5 percent of the general votes.
[53] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 129.

that the image and the eloquence of Lázaro Cárdenas were transmitted to his son, as a long-awaited destiny.

Surprisingly, Cárdenas obtained some support from sectoral leaders as well, such as Fidel Velázquez and his Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM); the most significant Mexican Labor Federation, and Joaquin Hernández Galicia, a longtime president of the Petroleum Union. These corporate leaders saw in Salinas and his possible austerity programs a danger for their patron-client relationships, and for that, they encouraged their workers to vote for Cárdenas. Certainly, a vast majority joined the campaign of Cárdenas and were ready to vote on July 6, 1988. However, the pressure of the government and lack of control of the electoral ballots by the opposition contributed to the electoral fraud in 1988. Bruhn assure us that "the evidence clearly shows that substantial electoral fraud benefited Salinas and that Cárdenas was the chief victim."[54]

Several pieces of evidence could prove fraud. First, a study by the National University of Mexico (UNAM) found out that 23 percent of the voter registry was altered. Adding to this, the PRI had control in the elaboration of the list, and it was easier to eliminate opposition votes and add "phantom" voters. Second, opposition parties (PAN and the FDN parties) reported armed robbery of ballot boxes. During the next days, there were citizens reporting thousands of burned ballots along rivers and in alleys. Also, Fidel Velázquez at the last moment said that all of his workers voted for the PRI candidate. As Bruhn wrote in his book of Taking On Goliath, "It seemed as though the PRI machine had met the expectations of Fidel Velázquez."[55] Finally, the most sound fact was a strange computer crash reported by the government where the "brand-new system" crashed and they had to shut it down for a week. After all these inconsistencies, the PAN and the

[54] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 140.
[55] Ibid 141.

FDN parties started conversations to refused the results. Later, the PAN accepted the results: if the PRI accepted the defeat, that would mean a Cárdenas victory. The PAN is a right-wing party; thus, they couldn't appeal to any alliance with the more lefty ideas of Cárdenas. Regrettably, the PRI policies were close to the PAN ideologies.

Finally, the last straw that ended the FDN coalition was the internal division. Cárdenas intended to fight fiercely for a call to legality; however, parties inside the FDN, who had won more legislative seats, understood that their new positions could be in danger if they went to the "new winner." Instead of following a direct challenge towards the PRI, these parties decided to go back as satellite parties, and the FDN was brought to an end. Besides that, there was already ideological conflicts within the FDN. In the Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics, Kathleen Bruhn declares that "the FDN's disorganization, its ideological diversity, and its lack of common interests…made it difficult for Cárdenas to negotiate with the PRI."[56] Afterward, the PMS was the only party that stuck together with Cárdenas. Later, Cárdenas realized that the FDN had significant limitations, and disorganization within principals and agents, making the consolidation impossible. Thus, working with the PMS, on October 21, 1988, he called for the formation of a new party: The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).

XVI. The emergence and conflicts of PRD consolidation.

Cárdenas movement became a formal party on May 5, 1989. Kathleen Bruhn talks about how the establishment was supported by Cárdenas followers and loyal agents and principals and that "their unprecedented and enthusiastic support for Cárdenas encouraged PRD founders to believe that 'finally, the foundations were set for a party with strong ties to social movement and

[56] Kathleen Bruhn. 2011. "The PRD and The Mexican Left*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 192

with the potential to articulate them politically"[57] From the Corriente Democratica to the foundation of the PRD, Cárdenas had been striving to establish a party able to confront the PRI; however, its establishment represented a more meaningful transition, from an emergent state to a consolidation one. In the first years of becoming a formal party, the PRD agents realized how difficult it was to keep the boat afloat. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the set of conditions from emergence to consolidation are ideological emphasis, tactical attitude toward other actors, and arena of action.

The FDN had a great reception within the Mexican population; however, this may be due to the ignorance and absence of precedents. The FDN did so well because it didn't have a turbulent past where principals could not vote for them as a way to punish them. On the other hand, the PRD had the FDN lost in its record; that defeat in the 1988 general elections became a stain in the career of Cárdenas. Challenging the PRI was not enough to convince corporate sector leaders to detach themselves from joining the new party cause. What is more, the PMS donated its registry to the Federal Electoral Commission (CFE), barely giving the PRD its registry. Besides, the PRD was ill-equipped to fulfill promises or pay-offs. Not only that, Cárdenas keep protesting about the fraud of the general elections, making him a constant target of all agents of the PRI. Confronting existing networks made them famous during the FDN; however, close to the 1994 elections, the PRD did not develop strong relationships with other political actors who could give them a social reinforcement. Besides, under the PRD statutes and explained by Tina Hilgers "the party refused to use corporatist processes to organize its memberships"[58]

[57] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 210.
[58] Tina Hilgers. 2008. *Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective.* Latin American Politics and Society. vol. 50, no. 4. 130.

Another base of support of Cárdenas was all the principals that following him. Indeed, his ideology and the large affection of citizens toward him, kept him afloat in the arena of action. Nonetheless, Carlos Salinas's administration had realized how powerful the FDN moved the middle class and threatened their regime. Kathleen Bruhn noted that Salinas understood that in order to challenge Cárdenas, he needed to win popular support again, thus "in his first official act as president, Salinas announced the creation of a new social development fund called National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) to win back popular support and divide the left."[59] This program was the leading federal investment with a budget of one billion that grew to 6.8 billion in 1992. Later that year, half of the public investment and social development was accounted by the Salinas program. PRONASOL responded to voter demands, and although the PRI had lost great support, it maintained principals as independent voters. Also, since the PAN was close to his right-wing ideology, the PRI was willing to accept the "panistas" proposals. Therefore, the PRI was able to channel independent votes toward the PAN, otherwise, far from the PRD. Cárdenas tended to depend more on his methods to mobilize citizens. By the general elections of 1994, the PRD had lost its first place in polls to a mere third position.

The neoliberal economic policies and the PRONASOL did not ease the burden of new social movements and collective action groups. On January 1, 1994, an armed indigenous population took over seven towns in the central and eastern Chiapas. Under the leadership of Subcommander Marcos, they declared the war over the Mexican government, presenting themselves as the Zapatista National Liberation Army named for the revolutionary caudillo Emiliano Zapata, who fought the Mexican Revolution for peasant and land rights. This movement

[59] Kathleen Bruhn. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 219.

had first the clear objective to criticized the autocratic nature of the PRI and the lack of transparency in governmental institutions. Also, they fiercely fight against the NAFTA agreement, which affected mainly the most impoverished areas, predominantly indigenous regions. The PRI repressed this rebellion violently in Chiapas. Although the PRI did not exercise extreme military power, Jordi Diez exposes an interesting point about the PRI regime, "the violation of human rights was not part of the military's formal policy, and in most cases, it was the result of the various tasks and operations assigned to armed forces by the civilian authorities."[60] However, these military operations did not end well, and subsequently, indigenous groups were massacred by the Mexican army.

These repressions damaged the PRI, and the PRD perhaps could take advantage of this new movement. By mid-1995, the EZLN had shifted more of their demands toward greater autonomy and focus on increasing awareness of the indigenous roots of the movement. The PRD was made up largely of social movement leaders. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas saw an opportunity to create new relationships with the EZLN and to debate with new policies that may help to fulfill the demands of the EZLN. After all, it seems like a perfect strategy for a new party. The EZLN represented a social movement emphasizing opposition toward neoliberal policies, criticism toward the NAFTA, and defense of a poor sector, such as the indigenous sector. However, Cárdenas did not understand one of the principles of the EZLN; its mistrust toward political parties. Shannan Mattiace discuss that their demands for greater autonomy "became synonymous with the rejection of all government aid, political parties, and electoral activity in Zapatista-controlled regions."[61] In October 1995,

[60] Jordi Díez. 2011. "Civil Military Relations in Mexico: The Unfinished Transition*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 270
[61] Shannan Mattiace. 2011. "Social and Indigenous Movements in Mexico's transition to Democracy*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 402.

EZLN leaders called for a boycott of municipal elections, unfortunately, ensuring the victory of PRI candidates throughout Chiapas. The PRD was never fully recovered from this event.

This event was a significant failure for the PRD; however, Cardenas learned of it. Alberto Olvera explains to us how Cardenas in Mexico City "tried with limited success to create new models of the relationship between civil actors and government."[62] Certainly, the PRI couldn't equate to the increasing demands of new groups demanding more transparency, such as the student movements and the EZLN, responding with violent repression that would infuriate the Mexican society. The PRD could embody the needs of social movements and collective action groups; however, they could not be the possible solution at the end. The reattachment process shows the necessity to create specific policies that could reattach principals or agents to the new party to reach a consolidate party. Nevertheless, and despite the PRD's expending political capital to defend the EZLN demands, the PRD did not recover the lost confidence of the indigenous groups toward political parties, and they could not prove that they were capable of governing in a national level. As a result, the reattachment could not be done.

Lastly, Cárdenas was still the central leader of the PRD and achieved, for the first time, the major position of Mexico City in 1997, making history in the most important city in the country; its capital. After their loss in the elections of 1994, they started to use their advantage to displace PRI governors, between 1995 and before the midterm elections of 1998. However, the PRD had a new star that became the president of the PRD: Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Unlike Cárdenas, Obrador came from a more radical wing of the PRD and looked for support from popular sectors, the urban poor, workers, and peasants. The rise of this "second central caudillo" polarized the PRD

[62] Alberto Olvera. 2010. *The Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutions, and Civil Society in Mexico*. Latin American Research Review, vol. 45. 96.

even more. As Tina Hilgers points out "Cárdenas was no longer the unquestioned central leader of the PRD, as a second pole had developed around López Obrador."[63]

XVII. Conclusions

In 1989 the PRD was founded; however, its party had a history since the internal polarization from two wings within the party: Cardenistas and Alemanistas. Besides, multiple events such as the economic crisis of the oil increased the awareness of the authoritarian regime of the PRI, and the movement of MLN became the cornerstone of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as a promising politician. Also, the economic crisis by 1981 suggested that the PRI did not have the willingness to adopt policies to protect the Mexican workers and looked for a neoliberal project to attract a potential investor to exploit Mexican lands and human labor. The De La Madrid administration took risky policies to walk away from the economic crisis, supporting neoliberal projects and boosting the image of the técnicos, those who favored more mathematic methods to reach economic growth goals.

Their policies infuriated the cardenista faction, mainly Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who believed that the hegemonic party betrayed the PRI principles toward the goals of the Mexican revolution and their promise to put their people first. First creating "Corriente Democratica," he thought to become a counterweight factor within the hegemonic party. Seeing their efforts fruitless compared to the great advantage of the PRI establishment, Cárdenas and a coalition of small left-wing parties created the FDN, giving the first significant opposition to the single-party system.

[63] Tina Hilgers. 2008. *Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective.* Latin American Politics and Society. vol. 50, no. 4. 132.

The FDN represented the emergence of a new party where the mobilization of people, the refusal of clientelist networks, and the charisma of the candidate were fundamental for its success.

However, the elections of 1988 expose the PRI corruption and the lack of transparency in the Mexican electoral arena. In order to attract independent voters, Carlos Salinas focused his efforts to PRONASOL, where social spending favored the image of the PRI among independent voters and enhanced the social panorama. Cárdenas, losing control of the FDN, motivated the emergence of the Party of the Democratic Revolution in the search for party consolidation. However, the consolidation process revelated the lack of loyalty within the FDN, the need for strategic relationships in a corporate state, and the mobilization of people became a secondary fact since principals view their lives becoming more stable during the Salinas government. Additionally, Cárdenas and the PRD could not reach an agreement with some collective groups such as the EZLN, who proved that the PRD was still too young to govern a country. Besides that, after the huge decline of the PRD in the 1994 general elections, the PRD arose again divided by a new caudillo, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who became the new star of Cárdenas' party, and in 2006, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was displaced as a candidate and central leader of the PRD, becoming the moral figure of the Mexican left.

Capítulo 3: Emergencia de MORENA

XVIII. Introducción

El contexto nacional del PRD durante su formación fue dentro de un régimen autoritario de un único partido. MORENA tuvo uno diferente. Su contexto es basado en la transición democrática hasta un periodo al que se le denomina "Fragmentación Partidista." En la primera parte explicaré el proceso que llevo a la política mexicana de un sistema tripartidista a uno más volátil con la emergencia de diferentes actores políticos, entre ellos el partido que analizaré MORENA. Una vez explorado este contexto, me enfocaré en observar a Andrés Manuel López Obrador que surgió como la segunda estrella del PRD y tuvo una emergencia similar a la de Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Analizaré el panorama social y como AMLO (como se le llega a nombrar) logró varias victorias con el PRD y darle una más fuerte presencia nacional. En los siguientes subtemas, es preciso recordar que principales son todos aquellos que votan en un partido y que no tienen una posición en el partido (como ciudadanos, activistas) y los agentes, son aquellos encargados de atraer votos y obtener puestos políticos (políticos, partidarios).

Después analizaré la contienda del 2006 y cómo ayudó a AMLO a generar una mayor expectativa a su agenda política y a su presencia como político populista. Esta contienda tiene hechos históricos-legales que muestran que la transición a la democracia no ha sido un evento fácil en la política mexicana y ha tenido graves problemas para mostrar una mayor transparencia y una menor corrupción. La contienda también generó cierta identidad partidista que empujaría a los ciudadanos hacia diferentes lados del espectro político, o simplemente convertirlos en ciudadanos independientes de una ideología política y que prefieren ir por el mejor postor. También esta contienda dará paso a entender por qué AMLO perdió la siguiente campaña electoral del 2012, por

su recurrente actitud inestable; obstinado de formar alianzas con grupos conservadores u opositores.

Finalmente, quiero concentrarme en momentos más actuales desde la contienda del 2012 y el gobierno de Enrique Peña Nieto. Con esta investigación del periodo 2012 al 2018 espero entender las causas que hicieron a AMLO cambiar de partido y arriesgarse a crear un nuevo partido. Este análisis podrá darnos a entender la inmensa ventaja que MORENA tuvo durante este periodo, a diferencia de su contraparte el PRD. También, sin salirnos del tema, quiero volver a reiterar las condiciones de Kathleen Bruhn que ejemplifican a un partido emergente y a uno consolidado. Así, podemos descubrir si MORENA cumple con las condiciones de un partido consolidado, con observaciones modernas y con movimientos colectivos, y las reacciones de AMLO ante su llamada Cuarta Transformación.

XIX. Fragmentación partidista

Ciertamente, la victoria en el 2000 por parte del PAN es considerado un hecho histórico por el simple hecho del remplazo del partido hegemónico: PRI. Setenta años en el poder y la misma fragmentación dentro de sus filas, hizo inevitable el camino hacia una transición a la democracia. Sin embargo, no podemos tan solo considerar que este cambio se debió a hechos meramente económicos como los ocurridos en los ochenta, que ayudaron a su vez al frente democrático de Cárdenas. Ciertamente, como Joseph L. Klesner menciona: "La economía mexicana estaba experimentando un notable crecimiento en el 2000 y el presidente Ernesto Zedillo disfrutaba de altos índices de aprobación."[64] De esta manera, podemos entender que el voto ocurrido en el 2000 tenía que ver más con la fuerza política de los partidos políticos y sus decisiones estratégicas a la

[64] Joseph L. Klesner. 2005. *Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico:* Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 47, no. 2: 104 (translated by me)

hora de conseguir nuevos partidarios y ciudadanos a sus filas. Esta búsqueda para obtener a principales en sus filas llevó a una descomposición de incentivos. Así como en el pasado la oposición trataba de posicionarse en un área del espectro político (Izquierda-Centro-Derecha) terminó convirtiéndose en una borrosa posición en el espectro. Esta nueva estructura forzó a los partidos a actuar, como Klesner describe "Catch-all Parties" (Partidos de multicontenidos).

Estas nuevas estrategias optadas por los partidos de oposición, principalmente por el PAN y el PRD, tenían por objetivo desplazar al PRI. El PRD, aunque había perdido su primer lugar en el fraude del 88, se había mantenido a flote en la campaña electoral. Por el otro lado, el PAN había luchado por incrementar su reconocimiento regional y consolidar votos en municipios. Estos trazos de desarrollo competitivo entre la oposición y la hegemonía unipartidista desembocaron en la división de la democracia en México en dos sistemas bipartidistas: en el norte los Priistas contra el PAN, y en el sur contra el PRD. Citando a Joseph Klesner: "México puede tener un partido tripartidista en el congreso y a nivel nacional, pero a nivel distrital, la mayor competición esta entre dos de los tres partidos, más específicamente, entre el PRI y uno de los otros dos."[65]

En este nuevo contexto sociohistórico, Willibald Sonnleitner destaca esta descomposición en un periodo de la transición llamado: Fragmentación Partidista. En las palabras de Sonnleitner: "Esta se deriva del declive de las identidades políticas tradicionales – y de la descomposición del nuevo sistema de partidos – que surgió durante el periodo más reciente de transición."[66] Esta fragmentación terminó con la idea de un estable sistema partidista de tres partidos (PRD, PRI y PAN) y demostró, a diferencia de la época unipartidista, que ahora hasta los partidos más pequeños

[65] Joseph L. Klesner. 2005. *Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico:* Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 47, no. 2: 109 (translated by me).
[66] William Sonnleitner. 2017. *Rastreando las dinámicas territoriales de la fragmentación partidista en México (1991-2015).* América Latina, Hoy, 75: 24.

podían ganar puestos en los congresos locales y gobiernos municipales. Es tal su importancia que han logrado ganar candidaturas estatales, y tenemos la prueba en las elecciones del 2018 con Jaime Rodríguez "El Bronco" ganando el 5% del voto popular siendo un candidato independiente. Aun siendo un pequeño porcentaje, su recolección de votos muestra el cambio político que en épocas unipartidistas hubiera sido imposible. Es más, estos nuevos partidos han ganado tanta importancia que MORENA (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional), siendo un partido nuevo, logró bajo la candidatura de López Obrador una victoria aplastante.

También Sonnleitner, para explicar la fragmentación partidista, toma en cuenta el indicador del *Numero Efectivo de Partidos Electorales* (NEPEL) que según León Ganatios: "es el índice que permite apreciar cuantos partidos compiten electoralmente, y toma en cuenta el número de partidos reales que consiguen al menos el 10% de los votos."[67] Así, este indicador toma en cuenta las probabilidades estadística de los contendientes a la hora de acaparar zonas socio-territoriales; es decir, 300 distritos legislativos, que conforman la geografía electoral mexicana. Los agentes políticos podrían al conocer bien la zona socio-territorial, siendo de cualquier partido, separar principales e integrarlos a su propia ideología. Por otra parte, la identidad partidista durante la transición democrática fue descomponiéndose. Por ejemplo, en el 2000 se había alcanzado un sorprendente 86% de confianza en los institutos electorales, como el IFE, y se desplomó al 28% en el 2015. Como lo vimos en los pasado capítulos, los procesos "democráticos" en el pasado eran solo para el uso de legitimar a los gobernantes. Paradójicamente, los principales de la democracia del PRI no elegían a sus gobernantes, solo lograban legalizarlo. Por esta razón, es fácil entender

[67] León Ganatios. (2013). *Competencia espacial y calidad personal de los candidatos: Un análisis de las elecciones presidenciales de 2006 y 2012 en México*. Andamios, 10(23): 13.

porque durante la transición, los principales como ciudadanos, activistas, etc., no confiaban en los esfuerzos de las instituciones de crear un ambiente más transparente y democrático.

Esta desconfianza llevó a la democracia a sufrir un desencanto ciudadano. De acuerdo con Sonnleitnner, hay 5 tendencias que demuestran la fragmentación partidista, así como la miríada de fuerzas de desigual presencia territorial. La primera es el declive de los partidos tradicionales, es decir; el PRD, el PAN y el PRI. Esto lo demuestra el autor con una estadística de voto útil entre 1990 y 2015, donde el voto útil alcanzo el 92% de participación ciudadana, pero para el 2015 hubo un declive en la suma de votos hasta el 64%. En segundo lugar, los partidos se han enfocado más en el uso del "voto útil" donde se busca la participación de votadores independientes, donde el proceso de separación y realineación (detachment and reattachment) no es necesario, ya que ellos apelan al partido más cercano a sus preferencias y no tienen una inclinación política. Claramente, Vicente Fox usó de este voto útil para sacar al PRI del poder en el 2000. Otro ejemplo de su uso, seria sobre las elecciones del 2006 con el PAN liderado por Felipe Calderón y el PRD por López Obrador. Sus ideologías buscaban establecer fuertes relaciones en sus respectivas regiones y buscar votos decisivos entre votadores independientes. Un problema que se añade a esta tendencia es el pensamiento que tal vez los votantes están votando "en contra" de candidatos indeseables.[68]

La tercera tendencia es la aparición de nuevos partidos que toman fuerza debido al descontento hacia los tres partidos tradicionales. Los partidos que han alcanzado votos nacionales son: El Partido Verde Ecologista Mexicano (PVEM), el Partido del Trabajo (PT), Partido del Movimiento Ciudadano (MC), Partido de la Nueva Alianza (PANAL) y Partido del Movimiento

[68] William Sonnleitner. 2017. *Rastreando las dinámicas territoriales de la fragmentación partidista en México (1991-2015).* América Latina, Hoy, 75: 28.

de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA).[69] En el 2015, al juntar las cifras de sufragios de estos partidos, sorprendentemente recolectan el 35% del voto válido, rebasando las mismas cifras del PRI. Estos partidos desembocan en la cuarta tendencia que es: la creciente importancia de alianzas con fuerzas de menor relevancia con estos partidos. Para entender la importancia de estas alianzas, para el 2012, el expresidente Enrique Peña Nieto logró una victoria contra el candidato López Obrador por solo 5.7 puntos porcentuales. El PRI ganó con el 38.2% donde su partido solo obtuvo el 33.5%. Así como Sonnleitner nos asegura: "Sin estos 2,8 millones de sufragios, la contienda se hubiese cerrado considerablemente, ya que AMLO sumo a su vez el 32,4% del voto valido."[70] Por último, la quinta tendencia es el cambio socio-territorial de la participación electoral, donde ciertas regiones son dirigidas por respectivas fuerzas del espectro político. Ya sean los grupos más pobres movilizados por grupos de izquierda, o regiones más fuertes económicamente movilizados por la derecha. Interesantemente, desde la caída de la hegemonía priista, ha habido cambios en los distritos rurales y aquellos de densa urbanización.

Hablando detalladamente del porque hay más partidos, tenemos que observar las variables demográficas del país ya que estas logran explicar la mitad de la varianza de la fragmentación partidista. Estas tasas se sitúan positivamente en ocupantes de una vivienda, aquellos con acceso al ISSSTE,[71] y sujetos entre los 18 y 64 años. También estas tasas demográficas representan la sociedad con índices de urbanización, machismo y residentes o población nacida en un mismo distrito. Solo los hablantes indígenas no figuran en estas variables demográficas pues no alcanzan un nivel significativo sociodemográfico. Otro dato importante del autor es que: "los partidos no

[69] Sonnleitner menciona también al Partido Humanitario y del Encuentro social, sin embargo, para el 2018 perdieron su registro al no conseguir los votos requeridos.
[70] William Sonnleitner. 2017. *Rastreando las dinámicas territoriales de la fragmentación partidista en México (1991-2015).* América Latina, Hoy, 75: 20.
[71] Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales del Trabajador del Estado.

incrementan en los lugares más urbanos, sino en aquellos distritos con mayores tasas de inmigrantes y de poblaciones en edades productivas, con mayor participación en el sector público, y con patrones de residencia más concentrados y feminizados."[72] Esto es el periodo fragmentado en la política mexicana, del cual Andrés Manuel López Obrador tuvo que crecer durante su tiempo en el PRD y durante la fundación de MORENA.

XX. López Obrador y panorama social

Andrés Manuel López Obrador nació el 13 de noviembre de 1953 en el estado de Tabasco, México. Su carrera política comenzó cuando se volvió presidente del PRI en el estado de Tabasco. Siguiendo una ideología Cardenista, y perdiendo las elecciones de Tabasco en 1988, decidió unirse al movimiento de Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas y su nuevo partido el PRD. Su carismática actitud y su fuerte convicción por la ideología izquierdista lo llevó a convertirse en presidente del PRD entre 1996 a 1999. Para estas fechas como Tina Hilgers menciona, AMLO comenzaba a volverse una figura central del partido, desplazando a Cárdenas a segundo plano. Para el 2000 logró ser alcalde de la ciudad de México y se postuló para ser el candidato para las elecciones del 2006. Su actitud mostraba una fuerte conexión con los sectores más pobres, y durante su gobierno como alcalde llevó varias reformas, para el mejoramiento de infraestructura y apoyo financiero a pobres, gente sin hogar y mayores de edad. También, a diferencia de Cárdenas, apoyaba un modelo semi-corporativo donde permitía la adición de personas ajenas del partido, para traer consigo beneficios, principales y agentes a su causa.

[72] William Sonnleitner. 2017. *Rastreando las dinámicas territoriales de la fragmentación partidista en México (1991-2015).* América Latina, Hoy, 75: 39.

La presidencia de Ernesto Zedillo trajo a la mesa dos eventos que incrementaron el descontento con el régimen y consigo la reforma electoral de 1996, que por primera vez, bajo las palabras del autor Alberto Olvera; "dio verdadera autonomía legal y política para la entidad encargada de organizar elecciones, el Instituto Federal Electoral, o IFE."[73] Esta ley aparte de proveer más transparencia y desapego de la hegemonía priista, también autorizó un nuevo financiamiento público para todos los partidos públicos, que limitó severamente el uso de donaciones privadas de parte del PRI. Esta nueva reforma ayudó a que Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas logrará su victoria en 1997 en la ciudad de México. Aparte de la reforma, la transición democrática trajo consigo el miedo por parte de agentes del PRI por la radicalización de sectores populares los cuales les otorgaban fuerza electoral. Esta radicalización fue propiciada por los efectos de la crisis económica de 1995 "el error de Diciembre" y por la reciente emergencia del Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, o EZLN.

El descontento del público hizo que Zedillo comenzará a pactar con el PAN para más libertad de los gobiernos estatales, y que, en la cámara de senados, tuviera más alianzas internas para alcanzar los 2/3 del senado para decisiones grandes; principalmente reformas. En el ámbito judicial, tuvo que minorizar los monopolios políticos y cambios en las cortes para permitir nuevos casos y juicios orales que, aunque lento, promovía la eliminación del sistema corrupto. Aparte de eso, como Olvera detalla, se implantaron nuevos derechos que favorecían a las mujeres, indígenas y jóvenes; también nuevas reglas hacia el acceso a la información y ayuda a estas instituciones para promover la transparencia. Un golpe definitivo al régimen fue una nueva ley de medios comunicativos que, según Olvera, estableció una efectiva regularización publica de medios de

[73] Alberto Olvera. 2010. *The Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutions, and Civil Society in Mexico*. Latin American Research Review, vol. 45. 84. (Translated by me).

difusión la cual afectó a unos de los cimientos del ahora decadente unipartidismo del PRI. Para finales del 2000 como León Ganatios menciona: "México a finales de los noventa, mejora sus indicadores y distribución económicos y logra una movilización política que le permite fundamentar el principio de una fuerte estructura en su sistema de partidos."[74]

Esta nueva configuración del sistema político mexicano, trajo consigo una más acentuada transición democrática en México, sin embargo, no se puede decir que los viejos sistemas clientelistas fueron terminados. Aparte que el PRI aún tenía mayoría de gubernaturas estatales y una amplia ventaja en municipios, sus maneras de crear relaciones fueron utilizadas por otros partidos. Entre ellos el PRD. Indudablemente, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas estaba en contra del uso de estos mecanismos en su partido, pero como vimos en el capítulo 2, no le ayudó a consolidarse una vez que su partido comenzó a ganar reconocimiento. Fue Andrés Manuel López Obrador, quien, con la excusa de usarlo en pro de los menos favorecidos, tuvo que adoptar exmiembros del PRI para avanzar sus propias ambiciones dentro del partido. Las políticas sociales de Obrador fueron populares principalmente entre los sectores más pobres, sin embargo, también logró captar la atención de sectores de la clase media, no temerosos de sacudir el sistema político.

Obrador no solo representó un nuevo enfoque en la izquierda mexicana, si no un cambio en el partido. Sin la mancha de las pérdidas por parte de Cárdenas, AMLO estaba dispuesto a fortalecer la presencia nacional de su partido mediante el uso de alianzas con políticos tanto internos como externos al PRD. Aunque este pensamiento dividió el PRD de Cárdenas, es indudable el éxito electoral en el que se convirtió su "operación franquicia."[75] Al permitir miembros no originarios del PRD, o también llamados "no-perredistas", logró que actores que

[74] León Ganatios. (2013). *Competencia espacial y calidad personal de los candidatos: Un análisis de las elecciones presidenciales de 2006 y 2012 en México*. Andamios, 10(23): 14.
[75] Término acuñado por Tina Hilgers.

tenían una significante carrera política pudieran ser contendientes bajo el estandarte del PRD. Es más, las conexiones de estas figuras fueron muy importantes para incrementar la presencia del partido. Tina Hilgers acredita este pensamiento al decir que: "Los políticos se volvían candidatos electorales del PRD en retorno de unirse al partido y trayendo a sus seguidores con ellos."[76] Este mecanismo adoptado por Obrador, logró que expriistas se alzaran victoriosos en elecciones estatales, en los estados de Zacatecas, Tlaxcala y Baja California sur hacia 1998. También se les invitó a panistas adoptados por el PRD en tener victorias ya sea por la presidencia en la cede estatal del partido u otras victorias como la de Guerrero por Narciso Agundez Montano. Esto demuestra que López Obrador no tenía problema alguno con agentes fuera de su partido y con una diferente ideología.

Los principios anti-corporistas propuestos por Cárdenas eran eclipsados por el puro deseo de inclinar la balanza hacia ellos, y con esto, establecer que no importaban los principios o las redes clientelistas, tan solo importaban las calculaciones para ganar la elección. Antes de las elecciones del 2006 se convocó al octavo Congreso Nacional del PRD donde líderes del partido acusaban de ignorar los principios bajo el cual el PRD se había formado, de fomentar el clientelismo y la corrupción internamente. Aunque las discusiones buscaban regular las actividades recurrentes, fue imposible llegar a significativos resultados debido a las crecientes ventajas que las redes clientelistas concedían. Aunque las regulaciones buscaban una estabilización del partido a largo plazo donde se construiría la confianza ciudadana y el trabajo hacia un mismo objetivo, esto no fue así. Así como Hilgers ejemplifica: "Los beneficios de

[76] Tina Hilgers. 2008. *Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective.* Latin American Politics and Society. vol. 50, no. 4. 132.

continuar con el camino establecido en vez de decisiones inmediatas, les parecía sobrepasar a la incertidumbre de las ganancias de largo plazo."[77]

Aun así, como Tina Hilgers menciona, las redes clientelistas del PRD eran diferentes a las usadas por el PRI, aquellas vinculadas con la compra del voto y la corrupción. Daban fuerza presencial al partido y es indiscutible que las propuestas, tanto por Cárdenas como de Obrador, lograron cambios significativos. Tina Hilgers pone de caso de estudio al distrito federal, por alta densidad demográfica y que daba un punto de partida para otras gubernaturas estatales y municipales. Cárdenas logró en el distrito crear programas para la reorganización y la mejora de servicios civiles. También de alentar a los ciudadanos a denunciar corrupción y confiar en las instituciones judiciales y en la fuerza policíaca. También Cárdenas empujó el favorecimiento de la educación y centros de salud, así como aliviar el desempleo y revitalizar el centro histórico.[78] Subsecuentemente, y en el mismo párrafo, Hilgers contrasta los siguientes pasos de López Obrador, agregando a la agenda subsidios para gente mayor, herramientas para el uso escolar, centros de salud principalmente para sectores vulnerables de la sociedad. También impulsó el financiamiento de subsidios para la vivienda y a la formación de alianzas para reconstruir el distrito financiero.

XXI. Las elecciones del 2006

Las elecciones del 2006 fueron el evento auge del partido a nivel nacional desde el Frente Democrático Nacional de Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. De manera anticipada, el PRD había dejado al hijo del general Lázaro Cárdenas por Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Partidarios del PRD vieron

[77] Tina Hilgers. 2008. *Causes and Consequences of Political Clientelism: Mexico's PRD in Comparative Perspective.* Latin American Politics and Society. vol. 50, no. 4: 133.
[78] Ibid: 135.

en Obrador una prometedora victoria contra los otros dos contendientes. Por parte del PAN, el pasado ministro de energía y expresidente del partido, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa. Por parte del PRI y en su segunda elección primaria presidencial, a Roberto Madrazo, gobernador de Tabasco entre 1994 y 2000 y expresidente del partido. Madrazo ganó en las primarias contra Arturo Montiel, quien fue acusado de corrupción, lo cual dio una mala imagen general a la organización del PRI.[79]

No solo las elecciones del 2006 fueron las más importantes para la primera candidatura de López Obrador, sino que también su imagen como líder popular amenazó a los grupos de derecha, en este caso la administración de Fox, y agentes del PRI. Estos miedos fueron impulsados por la atención de medios comunicativos hacia videos de cámara oculta en el 2004 llamado "video-escándalos."[80] Donde mostraban corrupción entre partidarios del PRD. Aparte de que más adelante, por el 2005, la administración de Fox responsabilizó al jefe del distrito federal López Obrador de violar una orden judicial que exigía la suspensión de un proyecto y la suprema corte de justicia ordenó el pago estratosférico de este lote urbano expropiado. Esto llevó a un proceso de desafuero[81] que tenía la intención de llevar a López Obrador a juicio y así evitar su postulación de candidato. Aunque las acusaciones eran injustas, los partidos opositores vieron una oportunidad de deshacerse de él. Pero, como Alberto Olvera resalta: "este movimiento resulto un serio error de cálculo, porque la mayoría de los ciudadanos vio esto como una ilegitima manera de forzar al líder izquierdista fuera de la competencia presidencial."[82]

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[79] Jorge Domínguez. 2011. "Mexico's Campaigns and the Benchmark Elections of 2000 and 2006*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 535 (translated by me).
[80] Alejandro Moreno. 2011. "Who is the Mexican Voter?*" The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp. New York, Oxford University Press: 590 (translated by me).
[81] Desafuero sería similar al proceso de Impeachment en los Estados Unidos.
[82] Alberto Olvera. 2010. *The Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutions, and Civil Society in Mexico*. Latin American Research Review, vol. 45. 90. (Translated by me).

Estas elecciones, después de este hecho histórico-legal, fueron competidas principalmente entre Felipe Calderón y López Obrador. Si las elecciones del 2000 tuvieron un gran recibimiento por parte del país, las del 2006 solo trajeron desconfianza y miedo hacia la corrupción política que recordaba aquellas del tiempo autoritario. El PAN por su parte buscó mantener una agenda similar al del entonces presidente Vicente Fox: mantener una ideología pro-vida, favorecer la privatización del sector de energía, expandir el comercio con Estados Unidos y combatir la pobreza por medio de invertir en la sociedad y responsabilidad individual. Por parte del PRD, ellos buscaban la proelección, mantener la propiedad pública sobre el estratégico sector de la energía y respaldar nuevos programas sociales para acatar las necesidades de los pobres con mayor responsabilidad para el gobierno.

Por parte de las relaciones con Estados Unidos, el PRD se mantuvo callado y no buscó alejarse de los tratados con el vecino del norte[83]. Ciertamente el 2006 ambos partidos eran separados por sus propuestas y discrepancias entre ellos, y el intento de desafuero solo ayudó a impulsar más la figura carismática de López Obrador ante un sistema ilegal y "corrupto." Y aunque Obrador lideraba las encuestas, Felipe Calderón supo cómo manejar la idea del izquierdismo con temores hacia el socialismo y comunismo latinoamericano. Como Lorenzo Meyer apunta: "Calderón mezcló de manera muy efectiva propuestas positivas y miedos, pues apelaba a viejos temores contra la izquierda arraigados durante la guerra fría."[84] A López Obrador no le ayudó que su figura fuera difundida junto a otros populistas como Hugo Chávez en Venezuela y Evo Morales en Perú.

[83] Kathleen Bruhn and Kenneth F. Greene. 2007. *Elite Polarization Meets Mass Moderation in Mexico's 2006 Elections*. Political Science & Politics, vol. 40, no. 1: 36.
[84] Lorenzo Meyer. 2015. *Felipe Calderón o el infortunio de una transición.* Foro Internacional, vol. 55, no. 1: 20.

La competida elección fue ganada por un pequeño margen del 0.56% de la cual el PRD y López Obrador declararon como un "robo de elección." El PRD había perdido las elecciones, pero su partido había crecido inmensamente, según Alberto Olvera: "El PRD ganó ocho millones de votos adicionales, un histórico incremento del 18% en solo 6 años.[85]" Sin embargo, aunque parecía que el PRD pronto alcanzaría un nuevo estatus como partido político, su carismático candidato no reconoció las elecciones y ocupó las calles de la ciudad de México por un largo tiempo. Durante los tres meses donde se disputaron los resultados de las elecciones, López Obrador tomó juramento como presidente legítimo y hasta nombró a otros altos agentes del PRD como oficiales en este gobierno en rebelión.

Esta decisión no solo le costó el apoyo popular, debido a las movilizaciones que afectaban el día a día de ciudadanos ordinarios, si no que su coalición formada por senadores y diputados de su partido; miembros del partido del trabajo y convergencia, fueron afectados por la radical y permanente actitud anárquica de López Obrador. AMLO al llamar al gobierno de Calderón ilegitimo solo alteró el orden de la ciudad. El PRD seguía sufriendo los mismos problemas de consolidación. Así como en el tiempo de Cárdenas y como Alberto Olvera describe: "La mayor fuerza y debilidad del PRD eran la misma: López Obrador."[86] Su carismático discurso logró unir a los agentes del PRD que se encontraban polarizados, pero a su vez la extrema personalidad de Obrador solo profundizó la falta de institucionalización del PRD, su falta de compromiso y su propia asolación de la sociedad civil.

De acuerdo a mis autores como Lorenzo Meyer y Albero Olvera, es en el gobierno del PAN donde las posiciones entre el PRI y el PRD cambian. Debido a que el PRD se rehúsa a

[85] Alberto Olvera. 2010. *The Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutions, and Civil Society in Mexico.* Latin American Research Review, vol. 45: 91. (Translated by me).
[86] Ibid: 91. (Translated by me).

cooperar con el PAN, el PRI se vuelve el principal aliado del gobierno entrante, lo que le permite mantenerse como el tercer pivote de la sociedad. Por el otro lado, el PRD tuvo que confrontar dos eventos que afectaron su posición. Primero, el PRI y el PAN accedieron a cambiar al presidente del IFE, Luis Carlos Ugalde, por exigencias del PRD. Esto sedimentaba un presente negativo sobre que el gobierno podía interferir en un órgano independiente como el IFE, amenazando la autonomía de las próximas elecciones. A principios del 2008 un fraude en las elecciones internas del PRD para el nuevo presidente hizo ver al PRD como un grupo de agentes en busca del poder a cualquier costo. Estos hechos, donde el PRD no reconocía la victoria del PAN llegando a apoyar la ilegal destitución del presidente del IFE y la propia corrupción dentro del partido, tan solo puso en peligro las instituciones democráticas de transición y su propia consolidación.

XXII. Candidatura del 2012 y gobierno de Enrique Peña Nieto

Para las próximas elecciones, con un PRD que se sustentaba tan solo en el carisma de AMLO y con la catastrófica "campaña agresiva" contra el narcotráfico junto el movimiento de soldados y la marina por territorio nacional, el PAN y el PRD no estaban bien instituidos para la contienda del 2012. Para la contienda del 2012, no es una sorpresa que el candidato Enrique Peña Nieto haya logrado obtener el mayor porcentaje con principales centristas. Peña Nieto era el candidato más cercano al centro del espectro político. También su campaña se enfocó a la disminución de ataques a sus adversarios, y enfocar más una publicidad de logros durante su gobierno en el estado de México. Esto estableció una clara ventaja ante Josefina Vásquez Mota, candidata del PAN y 6 puntos porcentuales sobre el nuevamente candidato AMLO. Esta vez, AMLO denunció que la campaña de Peña Nieto fue injusta debido a que le dieron más tiempo en medios informativos.

El gobierno de Peña Nieto fue caracterizado por ser el presidente con el índice de probación más bajo siendo uno de los presidentes en México más impopulares de los últimos 20 años. También de acuerdo con Edwin Atilano Robles: "un débil desempeño económico, alta inflación y un peso devaluado atrajo críticas de las decisiones económicas y fiscales del gobierno en turno."[87] Aun cuando había pruebas de bajos índices de desempleo debido a diferentes reformas laborales y de impuestos, para el 2017 el crecimiento económico había disminuido del 2.7% al 2.3%. Por otro lado, la sociedad tenía también múltiples problemas. Para enero del 2017, el Secretariado del Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Publica había registrado el 2017 como el año más violento con 25,339 homicidios intencionales, llegando a una tasa de homicidios de 20.5 por cada 100,000.[88] También la poca información relacionada con la desaparición de los 43 estudiantes de Ayotzinapa, en Guerrero había solo contribuido a la baja popularidad del presidente en turno. También escándalos como la casa multimillonaria de la entonces primera dama Angelica Rivera y dos terremotos que hicieron estragos en septiembre del 2017[89] solo inundaron las intenciones del PRI para ser el partido favorito para el 2018.

Por otro lado, la emergencia de MORENA, había tomado provecho del bajo rendimiento económico bajo Peña Nieto, argumentando, como Robles dice: "Que las aproximaciones a las políticas neoliberales fallaron y se advocaba por un mayor rol del estado en la economía."[90] No solamente MORENA tomó ventaja de esto, el gobierno para satisfacer a organismos financieros de calificación crediticia, tomó medidas fiscales para satisfacer los estancados ingresos fiscales.

[87] Edwin Atilano Robles. (2018). *Mexico 2017: Incumbent Disadvantage Ahead of 2018.* Revista de Ciencia Política: 304. (translated by me).
[88] Ibid: 311.
[89] Los terremotos del 7 y 19 de septiembre, sacaron a la luz la profunda corrupción del gobierno y el bajo interés por parte de oficiales de la ciudad de México, en la deplorable infraestructura de las construcciones.
[90] Edwin Atilano Robles. (2018). *Mexico 2017: Incumbent Disadvantage Ahead of 2018.* Revista de Ciencia Política: 309. (translated by me).

Estas medidas contribuyeron a un crecimiento en la deuda pública, afectando a su vez a los niveles del PIB (producto interno bruto). Por otra parte, durante el gobierno de Peña Nieto se distinguió una subida en el índice de corrupción. De acuerdo a *Transparency International* y su Índice de Percepción de Corrupción (CPI) reportó que hubo un incremento en la corrupción: "De los 180 países incluidos en el índice, México fue clasificado en el 135th, junto a los peores ofensores y a lo largo de países como Honduras, Paraguay, Rusia, y Kirguistán."[91] Este índice toma en cuenta cuan abierto es el gobierno, su rendición de cuentas, si permite la libertad de expresión, la transparencia, la integridad de los sirvientes públicos y el acceso de justicia.

XXIII. Emergencia de MORENA

A raíz del fracaso del 2012 y a la posible alianza de su partido PRD con los otros partidos, sobre todo con el PRI. El catalizador que hizo que AMLO rompiera sus lazos con el PRD fue, como Falomir expone: "la firma en 2012 del Pacto por México entre el presidente Peña Nieto y líderes de distintos partidos políticos como Gustavo Madero (PAN) y Jesús Zambrano (PRD).[92] A sabiendas que el PRD no lo elegiría nuevamente, López Obrador tomó la decisión de formar un nuevo partido, con los objetivos que más preocupaban al mexicano promedio desde el 2014: la corrupción, la pobreza y la inseguridad.[93] En el capítulo dos observamos que el PRD se formó bajo la consigna de liberar al país del yugo Priista. Ahora, con un contexto democrático y de partidos en plena fragmentación, el Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA) tiene un nacimiento diferente al del PRD. De acuerdo con Jaime Aragón Falomir, las tres teorías de la

[91] Edwin Atilano Robles. (2018). *Mexico 2017: Incumbent Disadvantage Ahead of 2018.* Revista de Ciencia Política: 317. (Translated by me).
[92] Jaime Aragón Falomir. 2019. *Las elecciones de 2018 en México y el triunfo del Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA)*." Estudios Políticos (Medellín), no. 54: 294.
[93] Yolanda Meyenberg Leycegui. 2018. *Votar en tiempos de cólera*. Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, D.F. vol. 80: 951.

formación de MORENA se derivan de: las condiciones institucionales, la dinámica de los agentes y la importancia de los cambios socio-estructúrales.[94]

En primera instancia, la transición democrática del unipartidismo a un modelo multipartidista cambió las reglas de la política mexicana, y también la debilidad en mantener un sistema tripartidista, provocó que nuevos partidos pudieran registrarse en el sistema. En el caso de MORENA, la fuerte presencia de AMLO en el Distrito Federal y en Veracruz le permitió incorporarse y tener campañas exitosas desde el 2015 (un año después de su emergencia) hasta el 2017. De esta manera, como Meyenberg menciona: "Morena obtuvo triunfos importantes en la Ciudad de México – donde ganó un tercio de las delegaciones- en el estado de México, en Veracruz y en Tabasco."[95]

La segunda condición de la aparición de MORENA está ligada con los principales y agentes, lo cuales hemos estado usando durante esta investigación. Falomir nos indica sobre una situación que aparece a lo largo de Latinoamérica; la proliferación de nuevos caudillos y "políticos sin partidos" con ideologías populistas. En México, la campaña de MORENA se preocupó más por centrarse en la figura de su líder moral y su capacidad para conectar con la gente. Esta estrategia se debió a que AMLO tenía una amplia historia con agentes y principales desde sus inicios en el PRI, y como seguidor de Cárdenas desde 1989. Se destacó como jefe de gobierno del DF, movió a mucha gente durante el intento de Fox para su desafuero e igualmente cuando impugnó un posible fraude en contra de Felipe Calderón. Esta conexión de largo tiempo con los principales, hizo a AMLO un político muy bien conocido en todas las esquinas de México. Además de eso, agentes

[94] Jaime Aragón Falomir. 2019. *Las elecciones de 2018 en México y el triunfo del Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA)*." Estudios Políticos (Medellín), no. 54: 291.
[95] Yolanda Meyenberg Leycegui. 2018. *Votar en tiempos de cólera*. Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, D.F. vol. 80: 951.

políticos del PRD y el PT, migraron con el candidato hacia su nuevo partido. Otros movimientos de agentes importantes apuntados por Meyenberg fue la adición del expresidente del PAN, German Martínez. Otros agentes clave que siguieron a López Obrador y que eran del PRD fueron los expresidentes Pablo Gómez, y Leonel Godoy; el diputado Víctor Hugo Romo, y senadores como Dolores Padierna y Miguel Barbosa. Estos rompimientos entre agentes situaron al PRD fuera de la contienda del 2018, no dándoles otra opción que aliarse a su más grande rival, el PAN, en su coalición "Por México al frente."

La última condición son los cambios socio-estructúrales para los comicios del 2018. Así como el Frente Democrático Nacional, MORENA comenzó como un movimiento social que luego devino como partido político. Estos cambios socio-estructúrales están conectados con la fragmentación partidista y con nuevos movimientos en contra de la inseguridad, la lucha contra la pobreza y de nuevos actores sociales. Ciertamente, en el momento en que el PRI perdió ante el PAN, se desencadenó una reformación política y social con la aparición de nuevos actores sociales; así como una mayor transparencia y divulgación informativa. Así como en las elecciones del 2006 y 2012, y el recorrido de AMLO a lo largo de México por casi 18 años, dio a AMLO una gran ventaja para las elecciones del 2018 y sobre todo a MORENA, que como Falomir concluye: "La crisis de legitimidad, el hartazgo frente a la corrupción y los niveles de violencia, es posible comprender como se favoreció MORENA de una estructura de oportunidades histórica para plantear una alternativa electoralmente creíble para los comicios del 2018."[96]

[96] Jaime Aragón Falomir. 2019. *Las elecciones de 2018 en México y el triunfo del Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA)*." Estudios Políticos (Medellín), no. 54: 296.

XXIV. Contienda del 2018

Para las elecciones del 2018 se perfilaban 4 candidatos: José Antonio Meade y su coalición "Todos Por México" (PRI, PVEM, y PANAL), Ricardo Anaya y su coalición "Por México Al Frente" (PAN y PRD), AMLO con "Juntos Haremos Historia" (MORENA, PT y PES) y Jaime Rodríguez Calderón como candidato independiente. Indudablemente, estas coaliciones tenían un propósito más pragmático; el conseguir votos. Por parte del PRI, aunque anteriormente se inclinaban por Miguel Ángel Osorio, secretario de Gobernación, se decantaron al final por José Antonio Meade con la estrategia de tener un candidato ajeno al electorado del partido y ministro de Finanzas. Aunque la estrategia fue distanciarse de la baja popularidad de Peña Nieto, nominando por primera vez a un candidato que no pertenecía al PRI, el descontento con la situación económica bajo el gobierno del PRI, hundió su campaña. Por el otro lado, el PAN decidió formar una alianza con el PRD quien había sido su mayor contendiente en comicios pasados, y nominaron al entonces presidente del partido del PAN, Ricardo Anaya. La intención de la coalición fue hacerle contrapeso a MORENA. Sin embargo, la estrategia de Anaya no dio los resultados esperados. Su campaña fue atacar mayormente al PRI y comparar a López Obrador nuevamente con líderes populistas latinoamericanos. Ciertamente, como Falomir menciona: "Las coaliciones para la elección presidencial del 2018 dieron muestras de un extremado pragmatismo, en el que se privilegió la obtención de votos más que la congruencia ideológica."[97] Por esto, el PAN y el PRD cambiaron a ser "catch-all parties".

MORENA por su parte, profundizó su alejamiento del PRD y formo su propia coalición. MORENA tampoco empleó de congruencia ideológica, debido a que el Partido encuentro Social

[97] Jaime Aragón Falomir. 2019. *Las elecciones de 2018 en México y el triunfo del Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA)*." Estudios Políticos (Medellín), no. 54: 298.

(PES) tiene una postura conservadora y religiosa. A diferencia de los partidos tradicionales, AMLO tuvo una estrategia diferente. Primero, su amplio recorrido por suelo mexicano lo hizo conocido por amplios sectores de la sociedad, tanto en el sur y en el norte (el cual siempre había favorecido mayormente los partidos de derecha). Segundo, AMLO evitó ataques frontales ante los ataques del PRI y PAN-PRD y prefirió centrarse en los problemas recurrentes de la población. Por ejemplo, como Robles menciona: "él dibujó una conexión entre las reformas económicas estructurales del PRI – aprobadas con el apoyo del PAN – y el pobre desarrollo económico y el continuo alto nivel de pobreza."[98] Finalmente, como menciono al principio, López Obrador estaba abierto a aceptar a cualquiera en su agenda política, aun si eran organizaciones que fueron hostiles hacia él. Por ejemplo, en estas reuniones cerradas con múltiples agentes (ya sean políticos, sociales, religiosos o empresariales), se reunió con Alfonso Romero, empresario mexicano y a la expanista Tatiana Clouthier para una alianza. Aun si este grupo fue abiertamente hostil a AMLO sobre todo en su gran aparición en el 2006.

Para julio, 2018, no fue sorpresa de nadie la abrumadora victoria de MORENA con el 53% de los votos ante el 22% de Ricardo Anaya, 16% de Meade y el 5% del "Bronco". Esta victoria también le dio un fuerte respaldo en el poder legislativo, ganando 252/500 curules en la cámara de Diputados y 59/128 escaños en el Senado de la República. MORENA obtuvo 19 gubernaturas estatales de 32 estados, incluyendo a la ciudad de México, lo cual desplazó al PRI de su mayor premio. Como un hecho histórico y con las mismas palabras de Shannan Mattiace: "Por primera vez en la historia democrática de México, un único partido y sus compañeros de coalición controlan la presidencia, la capital y el congreso."[99] En gráficas y porcentajes podemos observar

[98] Edwin Atilano Robles. (2018). *Mexico 2017: Incumbent Disadvantage Ahead of 2018.* Revista de Ciencia Política: 319. (Translated by me).
[99] Shannan Mattiace. 2019. *Mexico 2018: AMLO's Hour*. Revista De Ciencia Política, vol. 39, no. 2: 288. (Translated by me).

la gran popularidad de AMLO. Por ejemplo, López Obrador logró traer el 42% del voto de principales sin educación (los cuales preferirían al PRI en pasadas contiendas). También capturó 8 de cada diez mexicanos que se declaraban en la izquierda, y más de la mitad de votantes que se declaraban independientes de partidos políticos. Este hecho histórico contribuyó a la idea de un cambio significativo en la democracia mexicana que por 18 años se había sustentado en el PRI, el PAN y el PRD y que como Sonnleitner afirmó, la evidencia muestra una transición entre un sistema de partido único, después a uno tripartidista hasta "uno más volátil y fragmentado"[100]

XXV. Emergencia y consolidación

No cabe duda, que, si MORENA lograra para las elecciones de mitad de periodo mantener o subir sus puestos en los poderes legislativos, MORENA será un nuevo contendiente en la política mexicana. Sin embargo, la pregunta es ¿si podemos considerar a MORENA como un partido consolidado? Regresando a los puntos de Kathleen Bruhn, un partido consolidado debe ser capaz de enfocarse en desafíos específicos, así como políticas substantivas y recompensas hacia sus agentes y principales. También debe ser capaz de establecer relaciones estables y comprometerse con individuos fuera de la esfera de MORENA. Y por supuesto, que la movilización de gente ya no sea la herramienta para la arena de acción y poder trabajar en una arena institucional.

Como partido emergente, MORENA cumple con todas las características que el PRD bajo Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas tuvo con el FDN y subsecuente PRD, pero como sabemos, el PRD tuvo varios problemas al tratar de consolidarse. Ciertamente, como Mattiace menciona: "El PRD perdió su estatus como el tercer partido nacional para el 2018, aunque su declive fue visible para el

[100] William Sonnleitner. 2017. *Rastreando las dinámicas territoriales de la fragmentación partidista en México (1991-2015).* América Latina, Hoy, 75: 49.

2015."[101] En contraste con el PRD, podemos asegurar que MORENA fue capaz de consolidar su movimiento al transferirse de la arena de plazas a una institucional. Con la mayoría de constituyentes en el poder legislativo, MORENA representa una fuerza política deslumbrante. Esto lo respaldo con las palabras de Falomir, que dice: "López Obrador dispone de un fuerte respaldo en el poder legislativo, lo cual permite vislumbrar un poder ejecutivo fuerte y con un amplio margen de maniobra para desarrollar su agenda, sin muchas restricciones complejas con los partidos de oposición."[102] En este escenario, la oposición tendrá un papel marginal en la toma de decisiones y en el contrapeso hacia el gobierno.

Para las otras dos condiciones de consolidación, énfasis ideológico y actitud táctica con otros actores, es difícil decir a estas alturas que MORENA como partido esté consolidado. No cabe duda, que al mantener una fuerte presencia apoyando a AMLO, le ha permitido al partido enfocarse en su agenda de austeridad republicana. Uno de sus objetivos es bajar el índice de criminalidad y entre sus propuestas fue crear la Guardia Nacional, lo cual en su momento fue ampliamente valorado; ya que una fuerza civil proponía sacar al ejército, marina y policía federal de las calles, debido a que como Mattiace menciona: "Expertos han argumentado que en esos estados donde las fuerzas armadas intervienen, la tasa de homicidios crece significativamente."[103] Sin embargo, la guardia nacional también tiene el propósito de crear un mando único en la seguridad mexicana, lo cual puede afectar los experimentos locales de fuerzas autónomas comunitarias en defenderse de la criminalidad, principalmente en el estado este de Guerrero. Por otra parte, López Obrador ha enfatizado una política de "abrazos, no balazos" que expertos han probado como ineficiente. El 17

[101] Shannan Mattiace. 2019. *Mexico 2018: AMLO's Hour*. Revista De Ciencia Política, vol. 39, no. 2: 293. (Translated by me).
[102] Jaime Aragón Falomir. 2019. *Las elecciones de 2018 en México y el triunfo del Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA)*." Estudios Políticos (Medellín), no. 54: 303.
[103] Shannan Mattiace. 2019. *Mexico 2018: AMLO's Hour*. Revista De Ciencia Política, vol. 39, no. 2: 297. (Translated by me).

de octubre del 2019 se intentó atrapar al hijo de Joaquín Guzmán "El chapo", Ovidio Guzmán López. El fallido intento probó que la Guardia Nacional y el propio ejército mexicano no tuviera una estrategia concreta; causando que fuerzas armadas criminales tomaran la ciudad de Culiacán hasta la liberación de Ovidio. (Beauregard, 2019) Por otro lado, la masacre de la familia LeBarón provocó una acción colectiva llamada "Caminata por la Paz". (Pérez, 2020)

Hablando de la masacre de la Familia LeBarón, el presidente Donald Trump ha mostrado cierta colaboración con Obrador para el esclarecimiento del ataque y encontrar a los culpables. La relación con el vecino del norte es ahora diferente. En el 2017, el Gobierno de Peña Nieto había tenido encuentros difíciles con el vecino del norte debido a las nuevas condiciones para el TLCAN y a constantes ataques por Trump de traer empresas americanas en México de vuelta. Fue a tal grado que, el 2 de septiembre del 2017, Peña Nieto canceló una visita con Trump argumentando que: "el nuevo gobierno de Estados Unidos debería respetar los principios de soberanía, defensa de los intereses nacionales y protección de los inmigrantes, y que no aceptaría nada que fuera contra la dignidad nacional."[104] Aunque aplaudido en su momento, el entonces candidato AMLO, atacó a Peña Nieto por la falta de mano dura contra el mandatario estadounidense. Sin embargo, para el 2018, AMLO ha tratado de mantener una actitud conciliatoria con Trump. Aunque hubo un tiempo donde se oponía enérgicamente contra el TLCAN, ahora como Mattiace menciona: "frente a las amenazas de Trump para cancelar el TLCAN, AMLO se volvió un silencioso partidario."[105]

[104] Edwin Atilano Robles. (2018). *Mexico 2017: Incumbent Disadvantage Ahead of 2018.* Revista de Ciencia Política: 324. (Translated by me).
[105] Shannan Mattiace. 2019. *Mexico 2018: AMLO's Hour*. Revista De Ciencia Política, vol. 39, no. 2: 300. (Translated by me).

No solamente AMLO y su personalista partido han tenido problemas para mantener especificas políticas y obtener recompensas para agentes y principales. También, han tenido complicaciones para establecer relaciones fuera de su equipo. AMLO ha mantenido un discurso provocativo contra la prensa y los partidos de derecha. AMLO se ha esforzado en criticar a la oposición conservadora como los culpables del bajo rendimiento económico, también a la prensa de promover las llamadas "Fake News" (Noticias Falsas) y culpar gobiernos anteriores, principalmente el de Felipe Calderón y Vicente Fox, de la alta criminalidad en México. Estos ataques han promovido una más numerosa polarización en México. Por ejemplo, con la "Caminata por la Paz" la familia LeBarón fue acusada de promover la entrada de fuerzas americanas a territorio nacional, tratándolas como traidores debido a que Julián LeBarón, pidió a Estados Unidos que narcotraficantes fueran llamados terroristas, lo cual apoyaría una intervención del gobierno estadounidense. (Mancinas, 2019). También, López Obrador no logra tener un apoyo real con movimientos feministas. Es tanta la indiferencia de AMLO que el 9 de marzo con un sorprendente paro de las mujeres, AMLO decidió ese día para la rifa del avión presidencial, una de sus más grandes propuestas que describían su política de austeridad. Aunque después cambió el día, su apoyo con los movimientos feministas ha decaído bastante. (Lozano, 2020).

XXVI. Conclusiones

El régimen de único partido ofrecía una amplia ventaja al PRI, pero con la transición democrática y el comienzo de la fragmentación de partidos, hasta pequeños candidatos eran capaces de obtener una mayor relevancia nacional. Es más, la creciente aparición de partidos promovió coaliciones políticas que fueron de gran importancia en las elecciones generales del 2012 y 2018. También con el nuevo panorama, ya no se veía un hartazgo social de un régimen

priista; ahora se observa un descontento nacional con los partidos tradicionales, y se les culpa de la creciente corrupción, criminalidad y bajo desarrollo económico. Esta nueva estructura política se basa más en la búsqueda de votos en vez de la congruencia ideológica, lo que hace más difícil los procesos de "Detachment and Reattachment." Sin embargo, muestra también un cambio en la configuración mexicana que se sostenía de los partidos tradicionales, y con el ahora nuevo contendiente, MORENA.

También, fue de suma importancia comentar las elecciones del 2006, 2012 y el gobierno de Peña Nieto para entender la identidad partidista de los ciudadanos. MORENA presenta los factores de emergencia de Bruhn y también el cambio de MORENA a ser el partido de López Obrador. AMLO se ha convertido en la estrella de la política mexicana sin clara dirección ideológica y que usa métodos populistas para conducir su agenda política. Usando los errores de los partidos tradicionales, logró sacar provecho de estos eventos históricos para poder incrementar la presencia nacional de MORENA. Además, AMLO se ha caracterizado por ser un personaje contemporáneo en la política mexicana peleando por los derechos de los menos favorecidos y utilizar los medios necesarios, como son los corporativos, para alcanzar mayores metas y aceptar a distintos miembros de la política mexicana a su causa.

Así, podemos volver a reiterar las condiciones de consolidación donde apreciamos un factor importante: el reemplazo de la arena de acción social, a uno institucional con una fuerte presencia partidaria en la fuerza legislativa. Esto le da la oportunidad de no tener que entablar fuertes relaciones con las fuerzas opositoras. Sin embargo, esta misma razón debilita las otras condiciones para su consolidación. La agenda política de AMLO parece mostrar fallos a la hora de producir resultados en políticas substantivas como la criminalidad, y su esfuerzo de austeridad republicana le hace indiferente con acciones colectivas como es el caso de la masacre a los

LeBarón y movimientos feministas. También, AMLO demuestra aún su falta de crear relaciones amistosas con miembros opositores, lo cual provoca una mayor polarización social y un constante ataque a los medios tachados como conservadores, neoliberales y mentirosos. Aunque MORENA presenta una condición de consolidación, es difícil poder probar por el momento que su partido ya está consolidado.

Conclusion

Throughout this intervention, theories of emergence and consolidation acquire greater salience regarding the historical development of Mexico's political parties. As such, the first part of this research surveys and considers the essential components of the modern political party itself. The theory principals and agents, developed by Herbert Kitschelt, further elucidates the role of political actors across the party emergence phenomena. In addition, this chapter highlights the theory of emergence and consolidation elaborated by Kathleen Bruhn; more specifically, this paper explored the components inherent in Bruhn's theorization. Among those components, this paper considers the two essential terms in particular: attachment and reattachment. The attachment mechanism elucidates the process whereby political players decide to leave their original parties to participate and support other parties. Such was the case of the parastatal parties with Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, who were believed to have the most significant chance to defeat the PRI. On the other hand, Andrés Manuel López Obrador achieved the detachment of other political players through a period of frustration and loss of trust toward the traditional parties. Whatsoever, the reattachment process implied distinct concerns, mainly with the consolidation process.

The first chapter elucidated the Single-Party system associated with the PRI in Mexico. The PRI hegemonic regime arose in response to the high violence after the Mexican Revolution. What is more, it was impactful for my research to explain four conditions that allow the PRI to rule the country through seven decades, which in turn evolved the mechanism of Plutarco Elías Calles and Lázaro Cárdenas. Indeed, the PRI had an entire organization in which authoritarian tendencies could be disguised by a façade of legitimacy. However, these same conditions permitted opposition parties to create reasons to detach and reattach citizens tired of the regime. It was a consequence of opposition party organization and mobilization and their use of all available means

to emerge during the regime. Although the Single-party period implied more difficulties to emerging parties, after 2000, the party system started to fragment into different parties. This fragmentation period allowed the party of MORENA to become such a great movement, that in comparison with the PRD, I tried to determine its consolidation in the next two chapters.

When I started this project, I firmly believed that the PRD had achieved a state of consolidation, that it would help to understand if MORENA was similar in its development. However, it was not as easy as I thought. Although the PRD showed a strong emergence, its situation weakened through the following years. To explain this, I decided to work with a historical study about the roots of the PRD. These roots were attached to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of one of the most progressive presidents in Mexican history; Lázaro Cárdenas. Cuauhtémoc demonstrated being a rising young politician with big ambitions toward the country. The participation of Cardenas in the Movement of National Liberation (MLN) and the "Corriente Democratica" just emphasized the rising fame of Cardenas through the next years. He despised the neoliberal policies of Miguel De La Madrid, which affected Mexican workers and poor sectors. He understood that he couldn't be chosen to be the PRI candidate, so with other detached agents, he aroused the National Democratic Front (FDN). This movement allowed him to be the 1988 candidate through the conglomeration of several left parties. The FDN boosted his career and allowed him to almost defeat the PRI against Carlos Salinas. However, in 1988 there was an electoral fraud that ruined his chances to be president.

From the FDN, Cárdenas decided to emerge with a new party. The PRD was a good case study to determine the validity of the theory of emergence/consolidation. The PRD achieved emergence factors. For example, Cárdenas had moved from nothingness to a gigantic movement to the streets, raising their voices to multiple institutions to be a social force. Also, it achieved to

confront the existing relationships, fighting against clientelist associations, and fiercely attacking the neoliberal promises of the PRI and their agents. Besides that, Cárdenas emphasizes signs of change to the social environment, giving a more nationalist perspective. However, the PRD had several problems at the moment to achieve consolidation. First, the PRD had a couple of victories, and most of them were being elected as a head of government of Mexico City. However, the party couldn't change its social arena to an institutional one. Also, the problem with Cárdenas was that he despised clientelist relationships, which divided the party with other partisans more confident to use similar PRI mechanisms. Moreover, Carlos Salinas achieved with PRONASOL to maintain principals detached from political parties, making more independent voters that do not have a political ideology and vote for whoever is giving more rewards. Thus, Cárdenas could not achieve a state of consolidation, and with the PRD divided, later Andrés Manuel López Obrador would become the most prominent politician in the PRD ranks.

Surprisingly, in this research, I was expecting to clarify if MORENA can be considered a consolidated party. The answer that I got was yes and no. I arrived at this conclusion in chapter 3, explaining it through the Democratization period or also called the "Fragmentation party period." The past PRI and PAN administrations, and the PRD lack of achievements, created more independent voters in the country. This phenomenon caused a confusing increase of catch-all parties, where it was impossible to identify a party with solid proposals in the political spectrum. Additionally, the fragmentation of the traditional parties, created and the increasing emergence of political parties, among them MORENA. The growing fragmentation of parties divided more the Mexican voter, which in turn, made Mexicans believe that most parties were corrupt, and they arrived at a more frustrating conclusion; to vote for whoever that doesn't belong to the PRI, PAN, and the PRD.

This historical period was the perfect opportunity for Obrador to attract independent voters to his movement. In chapter 3, I explained the importance of the PRD and Obrador in his first election in 2006, where he almost won against the former president Felipe Calderón. Obrador was attacked in an unfair impeachment process (desafuero), and later, he accused the 2006 elections as fraudulent. Obrador's disapproval of the 2006 elections affected his image, and the PRD decided to follow him still, although it was more prejudicial than beneficial. In the next elections, the PAN was destroyed due to the increasing violence caused by the war against the drug dealers, giving to the PRI once again the presidential seat. However, the decreasing fame of Peña Nieto, and the emergence of MORENA as Obrador's party, allowed him to challenge for the first time the political environment. Thus, the 2018 general elections were driven by an exhausted PRD, the PAN damaged by past administrations, and the PRI with the most unpopular president in Mexican history.

Although Obrador became a prominent politician with the PRD, it was not until the emergence of MORENA, in which he had a real opportunity to win. The lack of promising candidates by the traditional parties, and Obrador's well-defined proposals against the corruption, the poverty, and the rising violence, allowed him to win the 2018 elections in a historical event in modern Mexican history. Now, talking again about its consolidation state, MORENA achieved one of the three consolidation factors: to change the confrontation from a social arena to an institutional one. With the majority in both chambers, senate, and deputies, Obrador has excellent support of the legislative power, giving him tremendous executive power. However, Obrador still has animosity toward opposition parties and conservative groups. Likewise, MORENA seems to have problems at the moment to create alliances outside of the party. Lastly, with the last condition, Obrador seems unrelated to issues of the increasing violence in the country and the stagnation of

the economy under his administration. He prefers to support the idea of "fake news" and being unconnected with collective action groups that they only search for a change in his security policies.

In conclusion, we can say the MORENA has partially achieved a consolidation state under the theory of Kathleen Bruhn. However, it is still too early to tell that MORENA will not make a total consolidation in the next few years. However, I found it essential to update the theory of Bruhn. When she wrote her book "Taking on Goliath," where the theory is written, Mexico was still living in the Single-party System. Also, there were even more people attached to the PRI and fewer political parties. In the next studies, it will be important to check different factors that can evaluate MORENA as a consolidated party. One of them could be a study focused on the Mexican corporatism. The party system in Mexico still depends on clientelist relationships throughout society. Obrador was open to accepting "no-perredistas" when he was a politician in the PRD. In his MORENA party, we can see several agents that are part of big corporations and opposition parties. Also, other factors of MORENA consolidation can be associated with the personalistic character that MORENA is adopting. It will be valuable to analyze what the agents of MORENA can do once Obrador steps out of the presidential chair. In conclusion, and unlikely with the PRD, MORENA achieved one of the three factors of the consolidation theory, so it is early to determine MORENA as a consolidated party. However, MORENA has performed more than the PRD and its subsequent demise.

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