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THE EVOLUTION, RESILIENCE, AND FUTURE OF BOLÍVAR'S DREAM:

Reevaluating Regional Integration in a Post-Liberal, Post-Hegemonic Latin America



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Reevaluating Regional Integration in a Post-Liberal, Post-Hegemonic Latin America

Submitted to the Department of International Studies of Allegheny College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

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I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

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ABSTRACT

The goal of this study is to contextualize Latin America's long, complex experience with regional integration. Specifically, I will analyze contemporary, fourth wave regional structures in a post-liberal, post-hegemonic Latin America (2001-Present). Since Simón Bolívar initially proposed a Spanish-American Union, similar, albeit less profound, regional attempts have been made. First, it is important to unravel and interpret the complex history of regional movements, referred to as waves, of which many scholars are hesitant to do. From this historical analysis, characteristics and trends of previous integration can then be used to explain and understand the current state of the Latin America's regional system. In the final analysis, I examine twenty-first century regional schemes, identified as "fourth wave," "post-liberal" and "post-hegemonic." I contextualize Latin America's "Pink Tide," experienced in the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with September 11, 2001 and the subsequent US-foreign policy shift away from Latin America, as features of the fourth wave period. During this time, Latin America has been left without the predominating presence of a foreign hegemon, arguably for the first time in centuries. This motivated the founding of several Latin American-centered and US-exclusionary regional schemes which aimed at re-integrating the region (politically, economically, socially, and culturally), solving regional issues in the absence of the United States, and creating a unified regional voice to be heard on the world stage. Nearly 15 years since the turn of this new wave, current integration in Latin America is considerably inflated, overlapping, and ineffective. I argue that current Latin American leadership lacks both the political will and capability to commit to substantial, sustainable regionalisms. I as well suggest that hemisphere regional thought may no longer be helpful or relevant. Finally, following this grim interpretation, I contemplate several recent events which I believe signal the beginnings of a fifth wave of regional integration.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABC Pact	Argentina-Brazil-Chile Pact
ACS	Association of Caribbean States (*Asociación de Estados del Caribe*, AEC)
AEC	*Asociación de Estados del Caribe* (Association of Caribbean States, ACS)
ALADI	*Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración* (Latin American Association for Integration)
ALALC	*Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio* (Latin American Free Trade Association, LAFTA)
ALBA	*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América* (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples' of Our America)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATPDEA	Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China Later BRICS following inclusion of South Africa in 2010.
C-4	Central American Four
CACM	Central American Common Market (*Mercado Común Centroamericano,* MCCA*)*
CAF	Corporación Andina de Fomento
CAFTA	Central American Free Trade Agreement (*Tratado de Libre Comercio*, TLC).
CALC	Cumbre de América Latina y Caribe sobre Integración y Desarrollo (Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development)
CAN	*Comunidad Andino* (Andean Community, AC)
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CARIFTA	Caribbean Free Trade Association

CELAC	*Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños* Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEPAL	*Comisión Económica para la América Latina* (UN) (Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLAC)
EEC	European Economic Community
EE.UU.	Estados Unidos de América
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
FEONJV	Fundación del Estado para la Orquesta Nacional Juvenil de Venezuela
FESNOJIV	Fundación del Estado para el Sistema Nacional de las Orquestas Juveniles e Infantiles de Venezuela
FMSB	Fundación Musical Simón Bolívar
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IAS	Inter-American System
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IIRSA	*Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana* Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America
ILAFA	Latin American Iron and Steel Institute
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Association
MCCA	*Mercado Común Centroamericano* (Central American Common Market, CACM*)

MERCOSUR	*El Mercado Común del Sur* (Southern Common Market)
MILA	*El Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano* Integrated Latin American Market
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States (*Organización de los Estados Americanos,* OEA)
ODECA	*Organización de los Estados Centroamericanos* (Organization of Central American States)
OEA	*Organización de los Estados Americanos* (Organization of American States, OAS*)
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OLAS	Organization of Latin American Solidarity
OPANAL	*Organización para la Prohibición de Armas Nucleares en América Latina* (Organization for the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons in Latin America)
OPS	*Organización Panamericana de la Salud* (Pan-American Health Organization, PAHO*)
ORIT	*Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores* (Inter-American Regional Workers' Organization)
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organization
PAU	Pan-American Union
SACN	South American Community of Nations
SELA	*Sistema Económico Latinoamericano* (Latin American Economic System)
SICA	*Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana* (Central American Integration System)
SPF	São Paulo Forum *(Foro de São Paulo, FSP)*

TIAR	*Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca* (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)
UN	United Nations (*Organización de las Naciones Unidas,* ONU)
UNASUR	*Unión de Naciones Suramericanas* Union of South American Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (*La Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura)*
UNSC	United Nations Security Council *Naciones Unidas Consejo de Seguridad*
U.S.	United States of America (*Los Estados Unidos de América, EE.UU.)*
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

Defining Regions and Integration

The topic of regional integration has been repeatedly studied and written about to the point of boredom and exhaustion. Among the vast literature surrounding this broad topic, the primordial and true definitions of the phrase are often distorted, and misunderstood. In order to substantially contribute to the development of this field, regional integration must be defined beginning with its most fundamental characteristics. From an anthropological perspective, *regions* are mediums through which human beings coexist and interact. Correspondingly, Björn Hettne provides five levels of *regioness* seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Björn Hettne's five levels of regioness (28).

Regional space	A geographic area, delimited by more or less natural physical barriers
Regional complex	Implies ever-widening translocal relations between the human groups.
Regional society	Can be either organized or more spontaneous, and this can be cultural, economic, political, or military fields.
Regional community	Takes shape when an enduring organizational framework (formal or less formal) facilitates and promotes social communication and convergence of values and actions throughout the region, creating a transnational civil society.
Regional institutional polity	Has a more fixed structure or decision-making and strong actor capability.

In this definition, region, or *regioness*, exists in forms beyond solely geographical identity. Indeed, geography is the most basic level of the term, deepening in meaning and complexity based on degrees of interaction between human groups. In fact, Hettne maintains that as

regional spheres deepen, they move further away from geographical associations. In this sense, he suggests that region, or regioness, exists more profoundly, encompassing other common associations such as political, economic, cultural, or societal commonalities. This definition can be applied to the Latin American sphere, which has encountered and developed different levels of regional thought and understanding since independence[1]. In the words of Bull and Bøås, "regions are always in the making, constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed through social practice and discourse" (258). Similar to regional identity, the term regional integration, or regionalism, maintains comparable variations and complexities which are subject to clarification.

In its most basic form, regional integration describes the "process of bringing or combining parts into a whole" (Korobonski, 342). Ultimately, through this combining process there exists some level of sovereignty relinquishment, motivating scholars like Dabène and Haas to focus on the sociology behind why, how, and when states integrate (Haas, 1970; Danène, 2008). In the realm of international relations, scholars have studied this topic through an economic lens, defining integration as "The voluntary linking in the economic domain of two or more formerly independent states to the extent that authority over key areas of domestic regulation and policy is shifted to the supranational level" (Mattli, 41). Economically, regional integration is considered a strategy for promoting trade, investment, and economic development within a given regional space.

Economic integration is perhaps the most tangible and experienced form of regionalism, particularly during the post-WWII period. Within the broadness of economic integration, there are various levels of depth and intensity. At its most basic form, free trade

[1] Some scholars hold that regional study can be extended before independence, identifying Spanish viceroyalties as a sect of regional groupings. This study, however, will begin following Latin America's independence in attempt to make sense of contemporary regional structures.

areas are established to eliminate intra-regional trade tariffs. Further deep, is the formation of customs unions, meant to harmonize common external tariffs (CETs). More deeply is the realization of a common market, allowing the free movement of people and labor. Most profoundly is the forming of an economic union, which maintains a common central bank, monetary policy, and common currency. Perhaps the most notable and profound case of contemporary economic integration is the European Union (EU), which is often considered a role model for the rest of the world.

While economic integration is most common in contemporary international relations, other regional forms have been experienced in Latin America. Specifically following the end of the Cold War, new regional thought emerged, holding that "economic factors alone are insufficient to explain regionalism's causes and consequences and that political factors are centrally important" (Goméz-Mera, 5; Mansfield and Solingen, 145). Accordingly, Karl Deutsch saw regional integration as the "attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population (5).

Taking all of the aforementioned into consideration, Olivier Dabène a clear, comprehensive definition of regional integration, which I use as the foundation of this work. For him, regional integration is defined as:

> A historical process of increased levels of interaction between political units (subnational, national, or transnational), provided by actors sharing common ideas, setting objectives, and defining methods to achieve them, and by so doing contributing to building a region" (Dabène, 10).

Additionally, as will be examined in Chapter Four, recent cultural and societal regional solidarity has arisen in Latin America, signaling a new paradigm shift in the field of regional studies.

This thesis aims at revisiting Latin America's longwinded experience with regional integration. The time period of the following analysis will span a whopping 200 years of history, beginning during Latin America's era of independence, and continuing up until the present day. Since the days of Simón Bolívar's proposition of hemispheric unification, regionalism in Latin America has been repeatedly revisited and considered a means of developing the region (economically, socially, culturally) through cooperation and solidarity.

This thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first, I offer an immense historical analysis of Latin America's integration experience spanning nearly 200 years (Indepednence-2001). I begin with pre-contemporary cases of security-based and defensive regionalisms. Given foreign pressure from both Spain and the United States, regional structures during this time were primarily focused on solidifying and protecting the region from foreign invasion. As the region fell into internal conflict during the later half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Latin American states rejected previous models of integration, resulting in an era of internal isolation. Following the end of WWII, regional integration was rejuvenated, both in Latin American and the rest of the World. Initially, US-sponsored Pan-American schemes were constructed in attempt to fortify Washington's grip on the hemisphere. Additionally, throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Latin American-sponsored Bolivarian regional ideals were institutionalized in a period of several waves. In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine Waves 1 (1950-1960s), 2 (1970-1980s), and 3 (1990s), appropriating them into the historical context of the time. This analysis is important for two reasons. Firstly, in examining Latin America's cross-cultural experience with regionalism, common themes and trends will emerge, which can be used to explain the current state of integration. Secondly, given the geo-political circumstances through which the three waves existed, I will demonstrate

how foreign hegemon, i.e. the United States, impacts and influences regional schemes in Latin America.

In the second chapter, I will introduce the fourth wave of regional integration (2001-Present), laying out its descriptions and characteristics. The fourth wave can be characterized as post-liberal, post-trade, and post-hegemonic, a unique experience for Latin American integration. Specifically, Latin America's "Pink Wave" and the subsequent ideological shift away from US-centered neoliberal policies of the 1990s, explain the turn towards post-liberalism. Continually, many fourth wave schemes intended to move away from previous economic-centered models, focusing instead on political, social, and even cultural integration. Finally, Latin America's ideological and diplomatic shift away from the United States, as well as Washington's similar foreign policy shift away from the region post-9/11, render themes of post-hegemony. Not only have many Latin American States denounced and rejected previous US-domination in the region, but also, the U.S. has grown increasingly uninterested with and unwilling to deepen hemispheric relations. Ultimately, this chapter sets the scene for a critical analysis of contemporary fourth wave regional schemes in Latin America.

Chapter three will serve as a critical analysis of current Latin American integration. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) serve as the primary fourth wave schemes under analysis. In addition to these groups, other important integrative projects will be analyzed, for example the revitalized Organization of American States as well as former integrative projects which continue today. First, triumphs and successes of these post-liberal, post-hegemonic groups will be examined. Later, specific hindrances, shortcomings, and barriers of the current regional state in Latin America will be

explored. From my analysis, I will question the effectiveness and sustainability, as well as the future of regional integration in Latin America.

Fourthly, with regards to the post-trade characteristic of the fourth wave, I will provide a cultural analysis of *El Sistema*, the complex youth music education system in Venezuela. I argue that El Sistema serves as a significant model of development for Latin America. Further, I identify several of its characteristics which situate it within the fourth wave. From the analysis, I will suggest that perhaps regionalism in Latin America is moving towards the realm of societal and cultural solidarity, seen through the success of El Sistema.

In completing this cross-historical analysis, I hope to determine the sustainability and longevity of Latin American integration, which many suggest may have reached its peak. Given its incredible survival throughout Latin America's history, I find this topic both fascinating and relevant. More interestingly, in the epilogue, I will present recent political occurrences in Latin America that have occurred during the completion of this project: the democratic reversal of progressive governance, Brazil and Venezuela's fall into chaos and crisis, and the Obama administration's warming of hemispheric relations. These events signal, perhaps, the beginnings of a new shift in the inter-American regional system. These happenings further prove the relevance, as well as my interest, in this topic.

CHAPTER ONE

Historical Interpretations: Unraveling the Complexities of Latin American Integration (Independence–2001)

It is a grandiose idea to think of consolidating the New World into a single nation, united by pacts into a single bond. It is reasoned that, as these parts have a common origin, language, customs, and religion, they ought to have a single government to permit the newly formed state to unite in a confederation.

SIMÓN BOLÍVAR (Carta de Jamaica, 1815)

Suggested originally by Latin American revolutionary Simón Bolívar, regionalism has been infinitely experimented with throughout Latin America's existence. Pre-Modern interpretations of integration took form as a response to invasion and conquest by both Spain and the United States. Schemes during this time were basic, focusing primarily on defense and security. As external threat waned and Latin America delved into conflict, regionalism was abandoned as Spanish America sought to deepen its sovereignty and independence. In the wake of the second world war, regionalism was revisited, promoted by the U.S. as a mechanism to foster socio-economic growth and development. This was enhanced during the rise of communism, heavily maintained and enforced by the United States, leader of the democratic world. During this Modern era, integration developed further than it had ever before, solidifying and institutionalizing into impressive projects and organizations. This chapter aims at laying out Latin America's complex history with regional integration, contextualizing it within the world affairs of the time. It will examine both pre-contemporary and contemporary regionalist structures up until the twenty-first century, a daunting task not often endeavored, encompassing nearly 200 years of history. This chapter divides regional integration into various eras, and waves, in attempt to make sense of the complexities and countless examples of integration that exist. This understanding of regionalism will aid in the

later analysis of contemporary regional schemes in chapter three, serving therefore as a tool of comparison. Before delving into historical interpretation, it is important first to define key terms and definitions surrounding regional integration which are often misused and misunderstood.

Theoretical Clarifications: Pan-Americanism vs. Bolivarism

It is first important to differentiate two schools of thought regarding regional integration in the Western Hemisphere. Pan-Americanism and Bolivarism maintain similar attributes which often cause confusion and misinterpretation. The way in which they were executed, however, has been quite different. Distinction is therefore necessary before examining the evolution of integration in the Americas.

Washington's Pan-Americanism: Instrument of Yankee Imperialism

In the wake of independence, an adolescent United States sought to stabilize itself and find its place within the global order. George Washington held that the U.S. should cut ties with European powers, untangling itself from 'Old World' conflict (Smith, 18). Particularly, US leaders feared an English or French presence in the hemisphere, while instead favoring Spanish control, as Spain at the time was not seen as much of a threat (Smith, 17). In the end, however, it was concluded that hemispheric independence from all European control would ultimately benefit the long-term goals and aspirations of the United States (Smith, 19). In the words of Thomas Jefferson in 1808, "We consider their [Latin America] interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere" (Smith, 19). As Spanish America was freed by the great *libertadores* in the south, Washington sought to extend its influence over the region, attempting hegemonic leadership over the Americas. This culminated with the signing of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, proclaiming that the American continents "are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future

colonization by any European power." (Smith, 19). Smith describes this as "an assertion of *realpolitik*" in which the United States would proclaim itself as the "guardian" or leader of independence and democracy throughout the hemisphere, one of its foundational tenets (Smith, 21). This cooperative, defensive ideology became the foundation for Pan-Americanism.

It is important to note the distinction between true Pan-Americanism and that which has actually been carried out. According to Joseph B. Lockey, the principles of traditional Pan-Americanism are as follows: "the independence and equality of the American nations; community of political ideals; non-intervention; the settlement of inter-American disputes by amicable means; no conquest; and cooperation to achieve the common aim" (234). He mentions the danger, however, of the most powerful American states, i.e. the United States, not abiding by said policies. In this sense, he makes the distinction between Pan-Americanism and Imperialism, claiming that "one is expressly intended to create and maintain a community of equal, cooperating nations; and the other is intended, presumably, to create and maintain an empire" (Lockey, 234). The United States has defined its hemispheric policy as "Pan-American," when in reality it resembles imperial empire. In the words of early twentieth century Peruvian thinker, José Carlos Mariátegui, "the most obtuse minds can easily see in Pan-Americanism a robe covering U.S. imperialism. Pan-Americanism does not manifest itself as an ideal of the continent; rather, it is expressed clearly as a natural ideal of the Yankee empire" (Vanden, 282).

The term Pan-American, in most of the following cases, describes U.S. imperialist measures to manipulate and control the hemisphere in order to benefit its unilateral interests. These policies have been masked by the term Pan-American, misleadingly implying equality and multilateralism.

Bolivarism: Foundations of Latin American Regionalism

The mere mention of the name "Bolívar" strikes inspiration and pride throughout much of Latin America. Simón Bolívar, one of the most notable and influential revolutionaries during the Spanish-American Wars of Independence, acquiring the title *El Libertador*, vowed to fight until the death ("*guerra a muerte*") against foreign domination with the objective of establishing of a free, unified Hispano-America[1] (Zeuske). For him, regional integration was the formula for hemispheric security as well as political and economic stability (Smith, 83). The "Bolivarian Dream" was the first case and attempt at regional integration in Latin America. According to Frank Mattheis, "Bolivarism referred to an agenda that aimed at a Hispano-American political confederation based on cultural affinities such as religion, language, jurisprudence, and ethnicity" (Mattheis). Unfortunately for Bolivar, Latin America leaders at the time were not yet convinced of a threat from Spain nor the United States, and subsequently fell into internal conflict, splitting into independent states. Despite initial failure, the ideals of Bolivar have been repeatedly rejuvenated throughout Latin America as US hegemony has risen. Through this rejuvenation, Simón Bolívar became, in the words of Michael Zeuske "a mythical figure, a religious symbol, and the personification of a political philosophy known as Bolivarism" (Zeuske).

In this context, the practical differences between Pan-Americanism and Bolivarism become clear. Despite near identical goals and objectives, the way in which they were executed epitomizes the global geopolitical power structure. Subsequent regional integration projects attempts fall into these two categories as either Washington or Latin American-centered.

[1] Interestingly, Bolívar excluded Brazil as well as English colonies in his dream, focusing rather on those of Spanish descent.

Pre-Contemporary Era: Defensive Regionalism (Independence-1945)

Regional integration during the pre-modern era, spanning from independence through the end of World War II, can be characterized as basic, elementary integration that focused primarily on security and defense. The two factors that influenced and promoted integration during this time period were the Spanish empire and the threat of re-conquest, and the United States and its growing hegemonic ideology of Manifest Destiny. Although no organizations or institutions were officially established during this time, it serves as a historical backdrop for the broader regionalist theme, which later blossomed following World War II.

Simón Bolívar and the Evolution of Bolivarism (1800s)

Amid Napoleonic conflict in the Iberian Peninsula in the early nineteenth century, Simón Bolívar commenced his campaign for the independence of Spanish-America in 1808 (Arana, 139). Credit should be given to similar Spanish-American revolutionaries who also fought for liberation such as Francisco de Miranda in Venezuela, Juan José Castelli and José de San Martín in the *Río de la Plata* region, Bernardo Monteagudo in northern Peru, and Martínez de Rozas and Juan Egaña in Chile (Stoetzer, 5). Much of the ideology behind these revolutions was, ironically, rooted in European Enlightenment philosophies such as reason, progress, and liberty (Arana, 30). Gaining mass support throughout the region, Bolívar achieved his first major victory at the Battle of Carabobo in 1821, effectively liberating the new state of Venezuela from Spanish control (Arana, 374). Soon thereafter, Bolívar helped establish the first union of independent Latin American nations, Gran Colombia, which included territories of present day Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela (Arana, 247). As President, he led subsequent military missions, liberating, and annexing, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia (Arana, 270). It was then that his "Bolivarian Dream" took form as he mentioned a few years earlier in a letter to Argentine chief of state, Juan de Pueyrredón, in 1817: "An America thus united, if

heaven grants us this favor, will call itself the queen of nations, mother of all republics" (qtd. Arana, 205). Years later, he avowed:

> My hope is that our republics—less nations than sisters—will unite according to the bonds that have always united us, with the difference that in centuries past we obeyed the same tyrant, whereas now we will embrace a shared freedom (qtd. Arana, 205).

Despite this ultimate goal at hemispheric unification, he understood the implications and impossibility of this dream, continuing, "but this is not possible. America is separated by climatic differences, geographic diversity, conflicting interests, and dissimilar characteristics (Smith, 83). He instead settled for the formation of three Spanish American federations, explained by Smith as "Mexico plus Central America; northern Spanish South America, including Peru and Bolivia; and southern South America (Smith, 84). This act of unification is arguably Latin America's first experience with regionalism.

Amid rising regional threat, primarily from a growing concern that Spain, in cohort with the Holy Alliance,[2] would attempt to re-conquer its American empire, Bolívar sought to institutionalize his dream of hemispheric unification. In 1824, as President of Gran Colombia, Bolívar called for a Latin American conference to be held in Panama for the purpose of discussing and establishing a Spanish-American union (Smith, 84). Finally, in 1826, the first Congress of Panama was held in Panama City of which four states participated: Mexico, Gran Colombia, Peru, and the Central American Federation (Smith, 84). It should be noted that both Brazil and the United States were invited, despite Bolívar's personal objection, however, neither attended (Smith, 84). The four states successfully struck a broad treaty "to uphold in common, defensively and offensively, if necessary, the sovereignty and independence of all and

[2] The Holy Alliance was a powerful coalition comprised of the royal monarchies of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, following the fall of Napoleon, intending to restrain republicanism and sectarianism in Europe, thus opposing Bolivar's cause in the New World (Arana, 174).

every one of the confederated powers of America against all foreign domination" (Smith, 84). This success was short-lived, however, as Spanish threat waned, fear of the United States had yet to emerge, and individual state nationalism among Spanish America grew. Ultimately, Gran Colombia was the only nation to sign the treaty (Smith, 84). Throughout the following years, Gran Colombia was dissolved, fissuring into separate states and forcing *El Libertador* into exile where he would soon thereafter die. This first conference, despite overall failure and non-acceptance, was an important milestone for regionalism in Latin America. As argued by Smith, the Panama Conference was successful and meaningful in bringing together regional leaders from all parts of Spanish America, reaching mutual defensive pacts, and, if nothing else, bringing the idea of hemispheric unification to the table (Smith, 84). Beyond its institutional failure, The Panama Conference should be considered seed planted by Bolívar which would later sprout into contemporary Latin American regional integration (Stoetzer, 9).

During the mid to late-nineteenth century, beyond the days of Bolívar, Spanish influence began to fade, and US hegemonic pressure expanded, pressuring Latin America to rethink regional integration. Amid cautionary declarations from US leadership, an "American Union" was proposed again as a strategy against yankee imperialism (Smith, 84). These fears culminated during Washington's Manifest Destiny-oriented conquest of Mexico in 1846. The imperialist intentions of the United States soon became clear, spreading fear throughout Latin America, seen in Mexico City's daily newspaper, *El Universal, in it*s claim in 1853 that "North Americans are the 'Islamites' of the nineteenth century… that can be stopped only by an alliance of all peoples of Hispanic origin"[3] (Smith, 85). This growing fear triggered a second regional gathering, the First Congress of Lima in 1847-48, also referred to as the "American

[3] This analogy refers to the Islamic conquest of Hispania in 711 and the subsequent 770-year re-conquest by the Spanish Christian Kingdoms (Arana, 20).

Congress," of which Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru attended, while Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, declined (Stoetzer, 9). A similar defensive pact was derived; however, much like the treaty 20 years prior, it was ultimately not signed (Stoetzer, 9).

In 1856, the Continental Congress of Santiago was sparked by North American William Walker's infamous conquest of Nicaragua in which a continental treaty was approved "to respect the integrity of national territories, to refrain from hostile acts, and to adopt uniform procedures for trade and commercial law," later observed by Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru (Smith, 85). Above all, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance, vowing to unite against potential future US invasion (Stoetzer, 9).

Throughout the next decade, Latin America experienced several external pressures which again fostered a fourth meeting to take place in Lima in 1864-65 (Smith, 85). In 1861 Spain reconquered Santo Domingo and later the Chinca Islands off the coast of Peru in 1864, sparking wars against both Chile and Peru. Further north, the Mexican elite welcomed the rule of Austrian Emperor Maximillian I. Similarly, the United States continued to annex lands that were once northern Mexico (Smith, 85). In reaction, Chilean patriots established the "*Sociedad de la Unión Americana de Santiago"* through which they published a two volume set of documents once again calling for regional unified (Smith, 85).

Regional denouncing of the U.S. occurred, which, according to Francisco Bilbao:

> Extends more each day the predatory hunt which it has already undertaken. We see fragments of America falling into the Saxon jaws of the voracious serpent. Yesterday, Texas. Soon, northern Mexico will accept a new sovereign,' and, eventually, all of Spanish America could be reduced to a US protectorate (Smith, 85).

Representatives met from Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela, while Argentina and Brazil again declined invitation (Smith, 85). Again, none of the treaties were ratified (Stoetzer, 10).

As Latin America continued through time, its individual states grew more different. The Second Lima Conference of 1864-65 was the final regional meeting to take place for several decades. O. Carlos Stoetzer describes these regionalist attempts as "sporadic and ad hoc" in that treaties were signed with enthusiasm to unify, while later fizzling away as soon as threat dissipated (Stoetzer, 11). Through the end of the nineteenth century, Latin America was engulfed by internal wars such as the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) fought between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay against Paraguay, and the Pacific War (1879-1883) fought between Chile against Bolivia and Peru (Stoetzer, 10). Regional solidarity was the last thing on Latin America's agenda and Bolivarian ideals were suppressed until the mid-twentieth century.

Further Noteworthy Integration Attempts

Midway through the nineteenth century, a new, post-Bolivarian conception of regionalism was proposed by Argentine intellectual and politician Juan Bautista Alberdi. Alberdi saw regional cooperation as a development strategy and envisioned a Latin American Union, much like Bolivar, this time accepting of Brazil (Gardini, 52). Specifically, his regional union would oppose the North American Monroe Doctrine, a growing Pan-American weapon, while also promoting continental peace and economic cooperation (i.e. removal of trade barriers and promotion of a common currency) (Gardini, 52). In this sense, his proposal was more comprehensive than previous strategies in that it encompassed aspects of defense, diplomacy, and economic development. Ultimately, however, due to continuous internal conflict, Alberdi's neo-Bolivarian dream failed.

At the turn of the century, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile worked towards establishing a trilateral peace and diplomatic agreement in 1905 referred to as the ABC Pact (Gardini, 54). Much like previous attempts, this plan fell apart due to strong ties between Buenos Aires and Washington, as well as growing North American opposition. Washington feared and sought to

suppress the rise of sub-regional blocs as it alleged they could foster hostilities towards the U.S. throughout Latin America (Gardini, 54). Nearly four decades later, in 1940-41 Brazil and Argentina made moves at establishing a customs union in which interested countries would be invited (Gardini, 54). While interest existed, plans were put aside due to increased conflict in the Pacific as well as Brazil and Argentina's entrance into the second world war. This proposal would be the final pre-modern attempt of regional integration. After 1945, Latin American integration would reignite and institutionalize for the first time ever.

The Contemporary Era: The Resurgence of Latin American Integration (1945 and Beyond)

The following examples fall into the contemporary era of Latin American regional integration. These schemes are notably the first cases of institutionalized regionalism, hence the use of the term contemporary, beginning at the end of the second world war and developing throughout the second half of the twentieth century. During this time frame, Latin American integration has been experienced in four waves (1950s-1960s, 1970s-1980s, 1990s, and 2001-Present), each of which maintains unique characteristics contingent on historical context. Apart from Latin American integration, other Pan-American attempts should be noted as Washington heavily revisited hemispheric integration as a means to protect its interests and combat communism in the Americas. The remainder of this chapter will examine waves 1, 2, and 3 as well as further Pan-American schemes.

Resurgence of Pan-Americanism: TIAR and the OAS

One of the first institutionalized cases of regional integration falls under the umbrella of North American Pan-Americanism. In the words of Gian Luca Gardini, "Regionalism of [this] time focused on the continental level, with attempts to construct a solid Western political and military bloc which could not be penetrated by the Soviets" (56). As East-West conflict loomed in the horizon, the United States sought to extend itself over the hemisphere,

epitomized by the implementation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947.[4] The culminating projects of this category were TIAR (The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) of 1948 and the OAS (Organization of American States) founded in the same year.

Commonly referred to as the Rio Treaty or the Rio Pact, TIAR was a hemispheric defensive agreement which held that an attack against one is to be considered an attack against them all (Gardini, 56). This hemispheric defense doctrine was promoted by the U.S. in its attempt to fortify an anti-communist bloc in the Western Hemisphere. The true, unilateral intentions of this pact became clear throughout much of the Cold War, used as a military instrument by Washington whenever it deemed fit. Most notably, TIAR was invoked during the Cuban Missile Crisis to support a multilateral naval blockade of the communist island (Morgenfeld, 30). The fraudulent nature of this pact was exposed during the Falkland War in 1982 when the United States favored the United Kingdom, despite signing TIAR before NATO, arguing that rather than the U.K., Argentina was the aggressor[5] (Morgenfeld, 45). This demonstration was considered the final failure of the treaty to many in Latin America, despite bombastic US attempts at re-invoking the pact following September 11, 2001 (Morgenfeld, 46).

The most obvious example of institutionalized Pan-American unification is the Organization of American States (OAS). Founded in 1948, the OAS established a set of policy and diplomatic guidelines for the states of the Americas, specifically aimed fostering anti-communist ideals and capitalist governments (Gardini, 56). The OAS was, and remains to some today, the core of the so called inter-American system, a set of continental political,

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[4] Under the Truman Doctrine, the U.S. pledged to fund countries, economically and militarily, in their fight against communism. This Doctrine would later lead to the foundation of NATO in 1949 (Hughes, 2006).
[5] In 1982, Argentine forces invaded the British-owned Falkland Islands (*Islas Malvinas)* in attempt to reestablish sovereignty which was lost in 1833 when they were conquered by Great Britain. This has been a continuous topic of dispute between Argentina and the U.K. for nearly 200 years (Speranza and Cittadini).

economic, and human rights institutions founded after the end of the second world war (Gardini, 74). Initially, the OAS was established with the intention of fostering peaceful dialogue among American States, while later evolving into a North American tool for protecting US interests during the Cold War. This was evident in the 1962 expulsion of Cuba from the OAS following increased Cuban-Soviet relations, particularly the attempt to install Soviet nuclear defensive missiles on the island[6] (Gardini, 75). The OAS was thereafter denounced by much of Latin America and remained greatly inactive until the 1990s. There is little doubt that twentieth century OAS was strongly influenced by the U.S. which used it as a political tool for promoting its western, anti-communist ideology.

Initially, Latin American states largely embraced these initiatives, hoping they would lead to limited US intervention. Latin America would soon learn, however, that these projects were disproportionately Pan-American in nature, and served solely for the purpose of Washington's agenda.

Waves 1 & 2 (1950-60s, 1970-80s): Dependency Theory, ISI, and Closed Regionalism

During the 1950s and 1960s, international awareness regarding economic development became a primary focus. Specifically, the U.S. saw economic development as a strategy to strengthen inter-American relations and protect western-ism throughout the region. Regional integration projects during this time were therefore focused heavily on economic development.

During the mid-twentieth century, the dependency theory became a leading development model in Latin America and among developing world countries. Of course, the theory is the idea that poorer countries are poor given their dependence on rich and powerful countries (Gardini, 57). From this came the notion of internal industrialization as a

[6] It is now commonly accepted, however, that this action was largely a response to US placement of similar missiles in USSR-neighboring Turkey a few years earlier (Hughes, 2006).

replacement of dependency on foreign imports, defined as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Domestic industrialization was thus promoted and financed by many Latin American states. In regards to regional integration, subsequent projects were interested in regional industrialization and diversification of markets. in 1948, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC)[7] was established in attempt to carry out this goal. This broad economic integration group made recommendations aiming to mature Latin American markets while protecting them from stronger markets of the developed world (Gardini, 57). Particularly, ECLAC set high trade barriers on foreign imports in order to stimulate internal market expansion (Gardini, 57). This sense of internalization and south-south development fostered subsequent regional cooperation, leading to the first and second waves of modern, institutionalized regionalism in Latin America. It is argued that the European Economic Community (EEC) inspired these waves of economic regionalism (Rivarola-Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz, ix). The following projects have been labeled as "closed" for their promotion of intra-regional trade and ISI model of development.

The first wave of contemporary regionalism took place between the 1950s-1960s and was inspired largely by ECLAC recommendations that regional integration can foster industrialization and development. First and second wave integrative projects were developmentalist in structure, aimed at fostering intra-regional trade. In 1960, the Treaty of Montevideo was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, establishing the first Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) (Gardini, 57). This initiative had high ambitions of establishing a free trade area (FTA) throughout all of Latin America, which ultimately was not achieved (Gardini, 57). The following year, a similar initiative was enacted with the signing of the Treaty of Managua between Guatemala,

[7] Initially UNELCA, The Caribbean was later included in 1984, then becoming ECLAC.

Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador,[8] establishing the Central American Common Market (CACM) (Gardini, 57). CACM similarly sought to promote deep political and economic cooperation between Central American states as a means for economic development (Gardini, 57). Despite initial enthusiasm, however, this initiative was eventually disbanded in 1969 following war between Honduras and El Salvador.

The second wave of regional integration took place during the 1970s and 1980s, with similar goals and objectives as the former. The Andean Pact (later the Andean Community) was founded following the signing of the Treaty of Cartagena in 1969 by Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and Chile.[9] This scheme was established with the goal of creating a common market between Andean states (Gardini, 57). Much like the former, this project was largely unsuccessful until it was rejuvenated, albeit under different circumstances, in the 1990s (Gardini, 57). Even the small Caribbean bloc followed suit, founding the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1973.

While some economic progress came from the above initiatives, in sum, closed regionalist attempts seen in the first and second waves ultimately did not produce desired results. Many equate these failures with institutional contradictions and problems among the treaties and member states (Gardini, 58). Due to widespread disappointment regarding previous free trade initiatives and industrialization models of development during the first and second waves, many of the aforementioned regional groups downgraded their ambitions and took a softer stance on previous goals (Rivarola Puntigliano, ix). For example, LAFTA was replaced by the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) after the former did not produce economic benefits it had promised (Rivarola Puntigliano, ix). Additionally, the Latin

[8] Costa Rica would later join in 1963.
[9] Venezuela would later join in 1973, and Chile would withdraw in 1976.

American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA) in 1975 and the Rio Group in 1986, were halfheartedly formed as new second wave regional political and economic forums (Rivarola Puntigliano, ix).

Many equate the failure of wave one and two with lack of necessary political will, in which many leaders preferred to maintain large degrees of economic and political sovereignty, thus not fully committing to regional integration (Gardini, 58). These sentiments were only intensified during the subsequent crises that occurred during the 1980s. These failures illustrate the severity of dependency as well as the shortcomings of ISI policy. Some equate this failure with inadequate access to capital needed for industrialization, forcing Latin American economies to rely on foreign capital, essentially re-iterating the dependency issue (Gardini, 58). Further, during this time Latin America also lacked the proper resources necessary to foster productive integration. In other words, the funds were not available to match the large ambitions that initiated these regionalist projects (Gardini, 58). Lastly, given the products manufactured by Latin American markets, cooperative integration was not feasible given the competitiveness that came from producing the same goods (Gardini, 58). Despite their shortcomings, however, the first and second waves of regionalism, if nothing else, demonstrate the first examples of concrete institutionalization of integration in Latin America, an accomplishment that took more than a century to achieve.

Wave 3 (1990s): Crisis, Neoliberalism, and Open Regionalism

This era was marked by three major occurrences: the waning of East-West conflict and the culminating fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the collapse of dictatorship and the democratization of much of Latin America; and the surge of crises that came to be known as Latin America's "lost decade." The term open regionalism was derived from the objective of

opening up regional markets to the global economy and avoiding regional isolation, like that which occurred during the previous two waves.

Post-1989, the United States rose as the sole superpower in the world, as did its model of development. Throughout much of the developing world, attempts were made at mirroring the US model, i.e. promoting political democracy and free market economy as ingredients of economic development (Gardini, 59). Particularly, Latin American states were strongly persuaded to follow neoliberal policy guidelines that were presented through the Washington Consensus (Gardini, 59). In general, the majority of Latin America, excluding Cuba, paved the way for functioning liberal democracies, while also implementing neoliberal reforms such as trade liberalization (beyond Latin America), privatization, and fiscal discipline. In addition to neoliberal reform, Latin America encountered the growing phenomenon of globalization, described as "the process of greater interconnectedness and interdependence among different regions of the world in the political, economic, cultural, social, and environmental domains" (Gardini, 59). In this context, it was strategic for Latin America to integrate their markets in order to compete on a global scale. However, in the midst of continental crisis, Latin America struggled to allocate the proper resources for integration, which was therefore largely stunted during this time. However, most notably in 1991, Argentina and Brazil were able to found arguably one of the most successful integrative cases of regionalism in Latin American history.

Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) - 1991

Southern Cone relations were strained throughout much of the dictatorial years of the 1970s and 1980s, including Argentine-Brazilian disagreement over the Paraná River's water resources, and Argentine-Chilean border disputes. Likewise, Paraguay and Uruguay, being smaller and more malleable, were swayed back and forth between this regional power struggle (Gardini, 61). Military regimes often centered themselves around geopolitical competition and

security based foreign policy, and tended to steer away from integration (Gardini, 61). Finally, however, Brazil, in the face of economic stagnation and resources scarcity, and Argentina, in the face of growing crises with Chile and domestic sociopolitical turmoil, sought out peace and cooperation.

In 1979, Argentina and Brazil took the first steps to stabilize bilateral relations, which would later serve as the framework for the establishment of Mercosur. In July of 1986, as democracy had swept the continent, Buenos Aires and Brasilia sought to deepen bilateral integration and produce the Buenos Aires Act which described 24 protocols to increase integration (i.e. lift regional trade barriers produced by military regimes) (Gardini, 62). In 1988, the Argentina-Brazil Treaty of Integration declared an FTA between the two nations. As the continent, especially Argentina and Brazil nosedived into crisis, neo-liberal leaders Menem and Collor saw the benefits of widespread trade liberalization and market openness as a strategy of competing on the global stage. In their eyes, a unified, open regional market would both attract foreign investment and give Latin America, particularly the Southern Cone, a strategic position on the world stage (Gardini, 62).

Finally, in 1991, southern cone leaders convened and produced the Treaty of Asunción, marking official plans of a common market to be implemented by 1995, officially named Mercosur (Gardini, 62). Mercosur was founded on the principals of democratic consolidation, subregional solidarity, and economic prosperity. Currently its members include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, while Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Suriname maintain observer status (Gardini, 62). Since inception, Mercosur has produced results never before seen in terms of regional cooperation. Politically, it has shown several successes. In 1996, Mercosur effectively suppressed a *coup d'état* attempt in Paraguay by General Obiedo. Moreover, in 1998, members introduced a 'Democratic Clause' to its

constitution which made democracy a requisite for membership (Gardini, 63). Additionally, Mercosur expands South Americas clout among the world order.

Mercosur's economic progress, however, has not been as apparent. 20 years since its creation, South America remains largely unintegrated and cannot truly be defined as a common market, as Mercosur's name suggests. Instead, it lingers on the border between a FTA and incomplete customs union (Gardini, 63). In spite of these shortcomings, some argue that Mercosur's "lack of definition" has proven beneficial for the region in dealing with extreme crises, as seen in the case of Brazil in 1997-99 and Argentina in 2001-02 (Gardini, 63). Moreover, since Mercosur's creation, foreign investment has increased as well as intra-continental trade, both deepening regional economic modernization (Gardini, 63). Further analysis will be given to this integrative scheme in chapter 3, as its significance and functionality continue today. While Mercosur remains the most prominent and powerful case of third wave Latin American integration, other smaller attempts should be noted.

Central American, Caribbean, and Andean Integration: SICA, ACS, CAN

In the wake of CACM, the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) convened in 1991 and signed the Protocol of Tegucigalpa, in attempt to deepen integration surrounding peace, political freedom, democratic institutions, and economic development (O'Keefe, 244). With this, the Central American Integration System (SICA) was born, including Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.[10] Within SICA, however, fractions have formed such as the Central American Four (C-4), including El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, in addition to The Northern Triangle, including Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which both aim at

[10] Belize gained full membership in 2000 and the Dominican Republic in 2013.

deepening political, economic, cultural, and migratory integration among members (O'Keefe, 250). SICA has achieved several successes, such as solving diplomatic crisis among members, primarily the Honduras-Nicaraguan Crisis of 1999[11], creating common institutions such as a common currency, justice system, and criminal court, and also earning international recognition seen in its affiliation with the United Nations (O'Keefe, 249). Despite a promising start, SICA's goals and progress has been hindered. SICA has yet to successfully implement a customs union, encompassing FTA, common market, or free movement of persons (Papageorgiou, 21). As a consequence of globalization, SICA members have been pressured to lower trade tariffs, subsequently re-creating previous ISI models of development, thus hindering SICA's integrative progress (Papageorgiou, 21). Further fragmentation and sub-regional schemes within SICA ultimately have destabilized the project which has again been unable to achieve full integration (Papageorgiou, 21).

Similar to the aforementioned, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) was signed in 1994 between 25 Caribbean nations with the objective to further regional trade, develop infrastructure, foster tourism, and unify in the face of natural disasters (Serbin, 64). This subregional group, a product of the twentieth century CARICOM, attempts to solidify itself in the modern world, and eliminate legacies left from its colonial past (Serbin, 65). ACS seeks international recognition and insertion, maintaining a particular interest in facilitating relations with NAFA, EU, and ASEAN groups (Serbin, 70). On a subregional level, ACS poses as an opportunity for the Caribbean Basin to interact on a global scale with the United States, European Union, and beyond. However, given ACS's all-inclusiveness, many Spanish speaking

[11] In November 1999, diplomatic conflict arose between Nicaragua and Honduras amid disputed claims over continental shelf off the Central American coast. Secretariat General of SICA, Ernesto Leal, intervened, declaring his commitment to finding a peaceful resolution (*La Nación*, 1999).

Caribbean states are caught between sub-regional solidarity and Latin American unification, a divide that may ultimately impede ACS progress and development (Serbin, 78).

Following its creation in the 1970s, the Andean Pact would be largely dysfunctional throughout the 1980s. In the context of neoliberal reform of the early 1990s, the pact was revisited and transformed into the Andean Community (CAN) (Gardini, 72). In 1995, CAN established a FTA among member states as well as a common external customs tariff (Gardini, 72). CAN has successfully unified, enabling singular communication with other global blocs. Specifically, in 1998, CAN successfully negotiated a FTA with Mercosur. In face of these initial successes, the growing competition between CAN and Mercosur, seen in Chile and Venezuela's flip-flop between the two, in addition to internal conflict, hindered intensive development and integration. Between the two blocs, there exists multiple cases of cross-membership which threatens the future of both groups. Further discrepancies among members regarding relations with the United States has caused increased division (Gardini, 72). These divisions continued throughout the end of the century and even into the twenty-first century.

Pan-Americanism in the Neoliberal Age: FTAA and NAFTA

Two examples of third wave Pan-American regional projects include the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). They are examples, particularly in the case of NAFTA, of comprehensive regional schemes that maintain Pan-American tendencies in that they are products of the overarching neoliberal, free-trade oriented US ideology of the time.

The FTAA project was the grandiose dream proposed by Washington in 1994 to establish hemispheric economic cooperation, spanning from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego (Gardini, 70). This project was the pinnacle of the US neoliberal agenda in the Americas.

However, it eventually fell apart due to a diminishing interest among Latin American states. Since then, Washington has largely moved away from this grand scheme, focusing rather on separate bilateral FTA agreements such as NAFTA.

Unlike Mercosur, which sought to create new, non-existing partnerships, NAFTA aimed at deepening already existing trade patterns between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico (Gardini, 67). Given both its economic weight and longevity, it serves as a worthy example of integration. Initially, Mexican President Carlos Salinas proposed the agreement as an extension of the already existing FTA between Canada and the U.S. With FTAA in mind, Washington warmly embraced the partnership. In 1992, the NAFTA constitutive treaty was signed, and officially ratified in 1994 by the three largest economies of North America (Gardini, 68). Beyond trade liberalization, NAFTA held true further neoliberal ideals such as investment regulation, liberalization of the service sector, defining intellectual property rights, as well as a strategic resolution procedure should conflict arise regarding the above agreements (Gardini, 68). NAFTA stirred up issues regarding Mexican identity and its role in Latin America. Following the agreement, Mexico has largely moved away from its southern counterparts, growing closer to Washington throughout the end of the twentieth century (Gardini, 68).

Indeed, there existed winners and losers on both sides of the border. While the Mexican technology and manufacturing industries have boomed following the agreement, the equivalent industries in the U.S. have lost out. Further, while US farm industries profited substantially from NAFTA, Mexican farmers were left unable to compete. In this context, it is easy to focus exclusively on the negatives, causing parties on both sides to denounce the agreement; however, a fair assessment should be given. Regardless, the placement of NAFTA within the third wave Pan-American context is important. Albeit not initially proposed by the United States, the ideological framework behind NAFTA fits into the broader neoliberal, free

trade-oriented US model of this time. Further, the improved US-Mexican relations that resulted from this agreement, demonstrate, if nothing else, the US model of cooperating with and integrating the region. Perhaps it can therefore be characterized more as *neo-Panamerican*.

Further, this new characterization can be correspondingly seen in the Organization of American States post-Cold War

Rebirth of the Organization of American States (1990s)

Again in the context of Latin America's dramatic shift towards democracy, the role of the OAS, once seen as an imperialist tool of Washington, was revisited. In 1991, OAS members signed the Santiago Commitment which aimed to promote human rights and democracy (Gardini, 75). Specifically, Resolution 1080 gave member states the right, and commitment, to act if the democratic institutions of a member state were jeopardized at any given time, an unthinkable commitment during the Cold War (Gardini, 75). Further, the Washington Protocol replaced the initial OAS Founding Charter, and gave member states the power to counter, following a two-thirds majority vote, any illegitimate governments that arose in the region through a non-democratic process, i.e. *coup d'états* (Gardini, 75). Even further, the 1993 Managua Declaration charged member states to consciously maintain strong and stable democracies, focusing on the protection of human rights and minority groups (Gardini, 75). Most successfully, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, was established as an OAS department to monitor elections throughout the Americas, and has been seen largely as a legitimate body (Gardini, 75).

Despite this dramatic, seemingly hopeful change of OAS vision, the organization remains largely underfunded and weak. This was seen in its inability to effectively stop the Haitian *coup* between 1991-1994, the Peruvian *coup* in 1992, or the attempted *coup* in Paraguay in 1996. It has become clear, as will be discussed later in chapter three, that other regional

groups such as MERCOSUR, UNASUR, and CELAC have played greater roles in fostering peace and promoting democracy throughout the region. Today, the OAS remains stained with its Cold War reputation, and many argue that its true intentions still lie in upholding the unilateral agenda of the United States.

Wave 4 (2001 and beyond): Post-Liberal, Post-Hegemonic Regionalism

At this point in time, Latin American integration has grown and evolved throughout centuries, very much influenced by world events. Since the days of independence, regional integration has morphed and evolved, fulfilling the needs of the region or sub-region depending on historical context. Nineteenth century Latin America, largely underdeveloped, fractionalized, and in danger of invasion, was unable to produce coherent integrative schemes. At the very least, regional leaders convened a few times in reaction to said invasions, however, abandoned all plans upon threat dissipation. As Bolívar faded, so did his ideology of hemispheric unification. Latin America would delve into internal war and conflict, until the mid-twentieth century when regional integration would again prove its relevance. As the Cold War loomed in the horizon, regionalism was seen as both a defensive and developmental strategy, that was suggested and executed by much of the developed world. Most notably, the democratic nations of Western Europe would form the European Union, often considered a beacon of integration that has caused imitation throughout the developing world. This, in addition to strong, often forceful, North American persuasion, would convince Latin America to reconsider integrating as a means of defense and socio-economic development. In general, regional projects were therefore a product of, or a reaction to, a growing North American hegemon. Ultimately, however, regional schemes throughout the twentieth century, for the most part, were unsuccessful in achieving their ambitious goals and objectives. A few cases

such as the post-Cold War OAS, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA were seemingly the most successful, comprehensive cases of regionalism ever experienced.

As the twentieth century came to a close, Latin America entered an unprecedented era of non-intervention and progressive governance. The events that unfolded in the twenty-first century would forever change the regional landscape of Latin America. In this context, a fourth wave of regional integration has arisen that can be characterized as post-liberal and post-hegemonic. Perhaps, this unprecedented experience of Latin America may foster successful regional blocs, which have never been seen. The following chapters will examine the factors and characteristics that define fourth wave regionalism, in addition to the future and sustainability of both contemporary regional schemes as well as older ones that remain today.

CHAPTER TWO

The Fourth Wave of Regional Integration: The Case of Post-liberal, Post-Trade, Post-Hegemonic Latin America (2001–Present)

How should we think about world politics after the end of the cold war, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, after the September 11 attacks, with the onset of the War on terror? My answer is simple: ours is a world of regions.

PETER J. KATZENSTEIN (2005)[12]

The early twenty-first century was marked by great hemispheric optimism that this century would be one of great development, peace, and cooperation. For centuries, the role of the United States in the region has been overbearing and intrusive, as Washington has repeatedly pursued its unilateral agendas. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were marked by North American manifest destiny through which the U.S. expanded its imperial, neo-colonial influence throughout the world, particularly in Latin America. As the era of imperialism ended in the mid-twentieth century, a growing ideological conflict arose between the democratic west and the communist east. As a measure of national security, Washington carried out numerous interventions throughout the region in the supposed name of democracy (i.e. propping up right wing military regimes, funding and promoting military coups against leftist leaders, and escalating proxy conflict in much of the hemisphere). When the Soviet Union and its communist bloc collapsed in 1991, it was no longer necessary or relevant for the United States to impose its influence on its southern neighbors, given that much of the region

[12] (qtd. in Goméz-Mera, 1)

had achieved democratization. With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, Latin American leaders grew hopeful as he acknowledged the importance of forging hemispheric alliances.

Several features and events characterize the fourth wave of regional integration, labeled as "post-liberal," "post-trade," and "post-hegemonic" regionalism. Rejection of the Washington Consensus and neoliberal models of economic development are exemplified in the phrase "post-liberal." At the turn of the century, it became clear that the neoliberal era was ending and Latin American governments began to question and reject such policies (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 10). This ignited a shift away from economic regional thought, moving more towards political, and even cultural integration. Post-liberal sentiments, in conjunction with economic crisis, led to the leftist political movement known as the "pink tide" which swept the hemisphere throughout the early twenty-first century. These new progressive governments began to reject traditional regionalist views towards the United States. In other words, new democratically elected leftist leaders began experimenting with US exclusion as a strategy of regional integration and solidarity. This strategy, in addition to the US War on Terror that followed the attacks of September 11, are associated with the characteristic "post-hegemonic." Not only had much of Latin America rejected US influence and hegemony, but Washington had additionally become uninterested in its southern neighbors, a dramatic result of its foreign policy shift to the Middle East and Asia. More importantly, there was decreasing geo-political rationale for the U.S. to involve itself in the region.

This chapter intends to identify how the above factors contributed to the shift of fourth wave regionalism, post-liberal, post-trade, and post-hegemonic by definition. Once these characteristics are illustrated, examples of contemporary regional integration projects will be introduced, setting them up for analysis in the final chapter.

Latin America's "Pink Tide"

The "pink tide" describes the contemporary political shift of Latin American governments from predominately center-right neoliberal, to more progressive, post-neoliberal. This leftist political shift was sparked by Venezuela in 1998, followed by Brazil in 2002, Argentina in 2003, Uruguay in 2004, Bolivia in 2005, Ecuador in 2006, Paraguay in 2008, and more recently Peru in 2011 (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 1). According to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, leftist Argentine President from 2007-2015, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, and Evo Morales of Bolivia were the "three musketeers" of Latin America's pink wave (qtd. Noel). Post-liberal governance holds the belief that there are divergent paths from the traditional neoliberal political economic structures of 1990s. Chiefly, the re-nationalization of industries, increased emphasis on social progress and mobility, liberation from international supervision such as the IMF, World Bank, etc., and the redistribution of wealth were the primary objectives of these new "pink-tide" leaders (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 1). Further, unlike the trade-focused "new-regionalist" projects that took place during the 1990s, integration schemes of the twenty-first century instead focus more on political cooperation, and in some instances, cultural integration.

At the start of the twenty-first century, several frustrations lingered surrounding the policies of the Washington Consensus: lack of economic development, and the continuous dominative, interventionist actions of the United States. These frustrations greatly impacted the inter-American domain and made way for a wave of democratically elected leftist leadership throughout the hemisphere.

Rejection of the Washington Consensus

The first factor that contributed to Latin America's political transformation of the twenty-first century was the increased dissent and dissatisfaction with neoliberal policies, most

notably experienced through the "Washington Consensus", a term coined by American economist John Williamson in 1990. In the wake of Latin America's "lost decade" of the 1980s, the leading international financial organizations of the developed world (i.e. the IMF, World Bank, Federal Reserves Bank, US Treasury, among others) crafted ten broad recommendations for Latin America in order to stimulate economic development: fiscal discipline; a redirection of public expenditures focusing more on primary education, health care, infrastructure investment, etc.; tax reform (i.e. broadening the tax base while lowering marginal rates); establishing a more competitive foreign exchange rate; liberalizing trade; opening up to increased foreign direct investment (FDI); privatizing state owned enterprises (SOEs); deregulating 'red tape' of private business sectors; and securing property rights (Williamson, 1990). In the words of Williamson, "the three big ideas here are macroeconomic discipline, a market economy, and openness to the world (at least in respect of trade and FDI)" (Williamson, 1990).

Critics maintain that the Washington Consensus produced several shortcomings, causing refutation by a number of Latin American heads of State. Nearly two decades of Washington Consensus policies have left legacies of uneven growth, inequality, social conflicts, and lackluster democracy (Grugel, Riggirozzi, and Thirkell-White, 507). Joseph Stiglitz, former economist of the World Bank and leading critic of the IMF, illustrates these flaws in his book, *Globalization and its Discontents*, observing key issues specifically with fiscal conservativeness, trade liberalization, and rapid privatization in the case of Latin America (Chestnut and Joseph, 2005).

Firstly, Stiglitz comments on the fiscal policy of raising interest rates and decreasing government spending. This policy was intended to promote personal savings, lessen reliance on government programs, and in turn, strengthen countries' foreign exchange rate (Stiglitz,

30). He observes, however, that by raising national interest rates, the financial institutions of emerging markets were left vulnerable to collapse, due to a devalued currency (Stiglitz, 32). He reminds us of the Keynesian theory that government intervention is key to stabilizing economies in crisis and that government spending in the developing world is the only source of capital able to prevent market stagnation (Jahan, Mahmud, Papageorgiouet).

Secondly, Stiglitz condemns the Consensus recommendation of opening markets and promoting free trade, which was intended to grant emerging economies access to global markets (Chestnut and Joseph). According to Stiglitz, this policy fails to recognize the mono-cultural, single resource nature of many Latin American economies. When exposed to global markets, Latin American economies are left vulnerable and dependent on levels of international demand for their respective resource (Izquierdo, Romero, and Talvi, 2007). As Stiglitz mentioned in the *Harvard International Review* in the Spring of 2003, "Developing countries could attract firms to extract their natural wealth—provided they gave it away cheaply enough…worse still, much of the money was speculative – hot money – coming in while the going was good, but fleeing the moment matters looked less rosy" (Stiglitz, "Dealing with Debt"). This boom-bust trend has repeated itself throughout Latin America and much of the developing world, worsening greatly during the rise of globalization.

Finally, Stiglitz brings into question the rapid privatization of SOEs and its correlation with corruption and income inequality. He argues that when governments sell state owned industries, there is often temptation to offer priority to high level business people and bureaucrats, which is an obvious formula for political corruption (Chestnut and Joseph, 2008). Furthermore, Stiglitz relates rapid privatization with Latin America's growing income disparity, an opposite consequence of its original intention. He offers a comparison to the United States, which maintains numerous observatory organizations such as the SEC, FCC, IRS, and

congressional oversight committees, to monitor the private sector for similar corruption (Stiglitz, 49). Given that these institutions did not exist in Latin America, rapidly privatizing SOEs was naïve and left much of the region's political economy unequal and corrupt.

In face of these economic downfalls, many in Latin America grew concerned and guarded with relation to the recommendations of the Washington Consensus. These reservations were key contributors to the "pink tide" movements that swept twenty-first century Latin America. From the economic turmoil that resulted from aforementioned policy recommendations, democratically elected regime change took place.

Following nearly two decades of neoliberal reforms and the Washington Consensus, Latin America seemed to be slipping back into similar patterns seen in the 1980s. Amid hemispheric dissent, populist, leftist leadership arose thorough much of Latin America. As indicated, a key contributor to their rise was frustration over the economic environment.

Discontent with US Domination

A final contributor to Latin America's leftist resurgence of the twenty-first century was the growing concern and discontent among many Latin Americans regarding US domination. As illustrated in the previous chapter, US-Latin American relations have historically been characterized by authority, intervention, and, in extreme cases, invasion by Washington in its attempts to establish hemispheric hegemony, the type of which being contingent to the given time period (i.e. political, ideological, and later economic). The Chávez and Castro regimes were initially among the most critical of US hegemony over the hemisphere, both of whom accused Washington of assassination attempts. Anti-American sentiments were exacerbated when Bush sought to execute his Doctrine of anti-terrorism throughout the world. As the United States invaded Afghanistan and later Iraq, despite strong opposition among the Latin American and international communities, Latin American shifted away from Washington,

focusing, instead, on regional political. This was the final contributor to the political transformation and the resurgence of the Latin American left. Further, these populist, progressive governments gained control through free and fair elections, something that could not be contested even by the United States (Smith, 342).

September 11, 2001: Washington's Foreign Policy Shift

The early twenty-first century was exceptionally peaceful and bright in terms of inter-American relations. Latin America had mostly cleansed itself of dictatorship and civil conflict, experiencing waves of free and fair democratic elections. A decade following the Soviet collapse, Washington was once again gaining legitimacy and leadership in the region, seen, for example, in the OAS regaining relevance and validity (Diehl, *Washington Post*). The era of Yankee imperialism seemed to have ended and it was no longer applicable for Washington to impose itself over the region. Instead, Washington aimed to cooperate with its neighbors, solving contemporary hemispheric issues such as migration, violence, and drug trafficking. From his election in 2000, President George W. Bush vowed that "the twenty-first century is the century of the Americas," intending to put Latin America at the top of his agenda (Bush, "Remarks"). For the first time in centuries, things were looking up in the realm of inter-American relations.

This optimism was short-lived, however, and following September 11, 2001, the landscape of inter-American relations would radically change. After the United States was shocked by terrorist attacks, Latin America stood in solidarity with its northern neighbor, as many Latin Americans had too lost their lives in the attacks (US Department of Health). OAS members unanimously denounced the September 11 attacks, vowing to fight terrorism and take action "when appropriate" (Smith, 319). Disputes arose, however, concerning when exactly it was appropriate to take action and many Latin American leaders did not hesitate to

express their anti-war sentiments (Smith, 319). Venezuelan Hugo Chávez was the most outspoken and critical towards the US "War on Terror." US military intervention was further discussed and debated among both Latin American and international communities. While the majority of the region opposed immediate US action, favoring instead further planning and invitation, Washington took unilateral action, circumventing approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and launched military invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively. From this point forward, George W. Bush lost the respect and legitimacy of hemispheric leaders, epitomized by the subsequent array of anti-US demonstrations that took place in major Latin American cities—La Paz, Lima, Bogotá, Santiago, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Mexico City (Smith, 319). In wake of growing anti-*yanqui* sentiments throughout the Americas, it became clear that any hope for "the century of the Americas" was quickly fading.

In the context of the US War on Terror, several themes and events can be used to explain the post-hegemonic era. Contemporary regional integration projects are a direct product of this post-liberal, post-trade, and post-hegemonic period. The following sections intend to portray this era through the perspective of the United States. In other words, why has Washington abandoned attempts at regional cooperation and hemispheric integration? Further, how does Washington approach the topic of regionalism in the context of its recent foreign policy shift and its War on Terror?

US-Mexican Relations and Failed Immigration Reform

Vicente Fox, Mexico's first democratically elected leader in decades, assumed the presidency in 2000 with aims of improving US-Mexican relations. Fox, a conservative himself, and Bush easily got along, planning to continue the diplomatic momentum following the signing of NAFTA six years earlier. US immigration was at the top of the agenda, offering

political benefits for both parties. At the turn of the century, there were approximately 25 million Mexican descendants living on US soil, 10 million of whom were immigrants, and 4.5 million of which were undocumented (Smith, 320). Fox pushed for "the whole enchilada," as stated by Mexico's foreign secretary Jorge Castañeda, which included immigrant amnesty as well as a guest-worker program for Mexican migrants in the U.S. (Smith, 321). A week before the September 11, 2001, both Fox and Bush planned to solidify said plans, indicated in Bush's proclamation that Mexico is his most important bilateral partner in the world (Smith, 321). In a matter of days, these words were discarded, as US land borders closed and were increasingly militarized (Smith, 323). This day greatly diminished the possibility of immigration reform as the US fight against terrorism perpetuated a growing fear of outsiders throughout the United States. In fact, a few years later, US Congress took action to criminalize illegal immigration[13], and set plans to construct a wall along the southern border, a $1.2 billion megaproject supported by an overwhelming bipartisan majority of the US legislature (Smith, 324).

Vicente Fox eagerly denounced said actions as "a violation of the immigrants' rights to liberty" (Smith, 323). To put it lightly, Fox declared in May 2002 that "Latin America seems to have been abandoned to its fate" (Smith, 323). The United States, as it so often has in the past, demonstrated that ultimately it is not interested in multilateral, regional cooperation, and that above all it will resort to unilateral action based solely on its independent agenda.

US-Sponsored Economic Regionalism as Defensive Strategy Post-9/11

Smith connects the realm of international economics with that of geopolitics, observing deep correlations between trade and political relationships (Smith, 325). In other words, he maintains that as countries benefit economically, they are more likely to work

[13] Despite initial momentum towards criminalization, it ultimately did not happen. Its proposition, however, serves as a description of the anti-immigrant, isolationist mentality that resulted from September 11.

towards political partnerships and cooperation. Much like during the Cold War, during this Age of Terror Washington has sought to solidify regional relations by advocating for hemispheric Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) as a measure of national security (Smith, 325). Following the signing of NAFTA in 1994, Bush pushed to establish similar coalitions in Central America, with the end goal of a hemispheric free trade agreement, called the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). While the US would benefit politically from FTAs, many Latin American economies would benefit economically through gaining access to international markets through free trade with the United States. In this context, the Bush Administration ramped up its campaign of establishing bilateral FTAs throughout the region. By mid-2006, ten countries had established, or were in the process of establishing, FTAs (see Table 1): Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru (Smith, 339). These ten countries accounted for approximately 49 percent of the regions' GDP and 50 percent of its population (Smith, 327). Ten countries, five of which were of substantial size and importance, remained in opposition (see Table 1): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, accounting for approximately 47 percent of Latin America's regional output and 50 percent of its population (Smith, 327). As Washington sought to solidify its regional alliances, it seemingly rewarded Latin American governments for good behavior (i.e. center-right leadership, support, or rather non-opposition, of US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq) in compensation for FTAs. In this regard, Latin America has become fractionalized regarding their respective economic policy towards the United States.

Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 2.1, there is a peculiar relationship between participation in FTAs and economic growth during this time period. Interestingly, the largest levels of growth took place in countries that had not established free trade agreements with the

United States (i.e. Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela). This brought into question the relevance and supposed necessity of free trade. Others argue, instead, that this growth was primarily a result of increased commodity based trade. Either way, it became clear that economic growth was possible, as seen in Table 2.1, without reliance on US economic agreements (Smith, 340).

Table 2.1 Economic Growth: Latin America and the Caribbean, 2001-2006

	GDP Growth Rates, as %			
Country	*Average* 2001-2003	2004	2005	2006
FTAs with U.S.				
Chile	3.2	6.2	6.3	4.4
Colombia	2.4	4.8	5.2	6.0
Costa Rica	3.5	4.1	5.9	6.8
Dom. Republic	2.3	2.7	9.2	10.0
El Salvador	2.1	1.8	2.8	3.8
Guatemala	2.2	2.7	3.2	4.6
Honduras	2.9	5.0	4.1	5.6
Mexico	0.7	4.2	3.0	4.8
Nicaragua	2.1	5.1	4.0	3.7
Peru	3.1	5.2	6.4	7.2
No FTAs with U.S.				
Argentina	-2.2	9.0	9.2	8.5
Bolivia	2.3	3.6	4.1	4.5
Brazil	1.2	4.9	2.3	2.8
Cuba	2.5	5.4	11.8	12.5
Ecuador	4.4	7.9	4.7	4.9
Haiti	-0.3	-3.5	1.8	2.5
Panama	2.3	7.5	6.9	7.5
Paraguay	2.0	4.1	2.9	4.0
Uruguay	-4.1	11.8	6.6	7.3
Venezuela	-4.4	17.9	9.3	10.0
Latin America and Caribbean	0.5	5.9	4.5	5.3

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. (Smith, 339).

The War on Drugs in the Age Terror

During the rise of Colombian and Mexican drug empires throughout the late twentieth century, drug trafficking was one of the chief issues on the inter-American agenda. Post-9/11, Washington adapted the "war on drugs", a phrase emphasized by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, into the context of its contemporary, international war against terror (Smith, 327). According to the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, "the disruption of production and transportation of illicit substances 'contributes to the Global War on Terrorism, severing the links between drug traffickers and terrorist organizations in countries such as Afghanistan and Colombia, among others" (Smith, 327). Despite a growing domestic demand for illegal narcotics, Washington continued to battle sources of supply, of which Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela were identified as the largest producers (Smith, 328).

After years of cooperation, Colombia and the U.S. had developed a strong working partnership in combatting narcotrafficking. Since the collapse of Colombia's mega Cali and Medellin cartels in the 1990's, Colombian cocaine production and distribution was carried out by smaller cartels and guerilla organizations such as the FARC and ELN (Smith, 328). During the 2000's, Colombian President Uribe and Bush undertook joint operations and cooperatives in Colombia. In fact, between 2000 and 2005, the number of extraditions to the U.S. climbed from 13 to 134 (Smith, 328). During this time, the drug situation in Mexico worsened. In the early twenty-first century, Mexico supplied 30-40 percent of heroin entering the U.S., 70-90 percent of the cocaine, and had become the leading supplier of methamphetamines (Smith, 328). Despite increased narco-activity, Fox and Bush maintained a strong working relationship.

The case of Venezuela is quite different, however important in understanding the regions' shift away from Washington. According to the Bush Administration, Venezuela served as "a key transit point for drugs leaving Colombia" (Smith, 329) These accusations exposed the

deeply rooted anti-American sentiments of President Hugo Chávez. Tensions grew on both sides, and diplomatic relations were severed. In the context of its War on Terror, the Bush Administration denounced Venezuela as a country that had "failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to its obligations under international narcotics agreements" (Smith, 329). It was later admitted by US drug officials, however, that Venezuela was not responsible for large quantities of production of cocaine, and that the Chávez government effectively found and seized several export shipments, while also combating domestic demand of illegal substances, something the United States has failed to do (Smith, 329).

In this context, the few remaining US-Latin American partnerships were overbearingly focused on the US fight against terror. US attempts of solidifying regional security dramatically impacted issues such as immigration, trade, and narcotrafficking. Many of the promised made by Bush during his campaign were thrown away and revised to fit his fight against terrorism. In failing to pass a coherent immigration reform, causing region fracture in terms of economic trade agreements, and escalating the war on drugs throughout the hemisphere, the United States has greatly lost the trust and respect of many Latin American leaders, sparking a new wave of regional solidarity. In conjunction with the pink tide of progressive governments, an air of *anti-yanqui* attitudes has spread throughout much of the hemisphere. Within this context, Latin American leaders have experimented with and revisited the "Bolivarian Dream" of integration through which the U.S. has largely been overlooked and excluded.

Post-Liberal, Post-Trade, Post-Hegemonic Regional Integration Projects

Nearly two centuries since the days of Bolivar's proposal for hemispheric unification, the theme of regional solidarity continues in Latin America. Given this, subsequent projects and organizations have evolved and built on past structures. As mentioned, twenty-first century schemes can be characterized as post-liberal, post-trade, and post-hegemonic. These

projects have largely moved away from the trade-driven economic regionalism on the 90s, although some economic projects remain such as the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) and the Pacific Alliance. In general, integrative projects of this era are focused less on economics and more on collective political, societal, and cultural issues. In the context of post-hegemony, many contemporary projects do not include the United States, and serve as a counterweight to North American hegemony. One example of a contemporary project is the Chávez inspired Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which encompasses issues such as security, migration, and trade (Rivarola-Puntigliano, Briceño-Ruiz, x). Other examples are the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) which focus more on issues such as defense, security, infrastructure, and the environment (Rivarola-Puntigliano, Briceño-Ruiz, x). ALBA and UNASUR represent a unique form of regional integration, or rather sub-regional integration, in that they are not all encompassing like the OAS, CELAC, or even the Bolivarian Dream. The following sections will briefly introduce the aforementioned regional and subregional integrative organizations, setting them up for analysis in the final chapter.

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) - 2004

ALBA was created in 2004, following the signing of its agreement by Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro ("ALBA-TCP"). Its foundations were based on anti-neoliberal, anti-American sentiments of the Venezuelan and Cuban governments, which sought a "political, economic, and social alliance in defense of the independence, self-determination and the identify of the peoples comprising it" ("ALBA-TCP"). As seen in its name, ALBA sees itself as a revitalization Bolivar's vision of hemispheric unification as a strategy against foreign powers. Ideals of José Martí are also present in the tenets of ALBA illustrated in "Our America,"

referring to the famous anti-imperialist work of the Cuban Writer ("ALBA-TCP"). Current member countries include Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, as well as Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia ("ALBA-TCP"). ALBA sees regional solidarity not only as a security measure, but also as a way to develop and insert the region onto the world stage ("ALBA-TCP").

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) - 2010

CELAC was created in February 2010 in attempt to overcome Latin America's growing dilemma of sub-regionality, encompassing all 33 nations of Latin America, representing roughly 600 million people. CELAC's primary objectives included promoting regional integration (political, economic, social, cultural, defensive), establishing a unified voice for the region to be represented on the global stage, protecting democracy, and establishing political stability (Llenderrozas, 130). This organization is not entirely Bolivarian in that it holds the maintaining of national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Llenderrozas, 131). It does, however, challenge the United States, in offering Latin America regional autonomy. Currently, the only forum for US-Latin American dialogue is the OAS and Summit for the Americas, both North American inventions. CELAC, therefore, offers Latin America a forum of regional collaboration through which it could interact as a unified voice with the United States, and other regions of the world (Llenderrozas, 143).

Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) - 2011

UNASUR was established in May 2008, and officially ratified in March 2011. Similar to CELAC, UNASUR's goal is, in it's words, "to build integration in the cultural, economic, social, and political areas while respecting the current situation of each of our member nations" ("¿Quiénes Somos?"). Specifically, the organization aims "to eliminate socioeconomic inequality, achieve social inclusion, increase citizen participation, strengthen democracy, and

reduce existing asymmetries" ("¿Quiénes Somos?"). UNASUR is derived of all 12 South American nations and similarly restricts US-involvement. Additionally, UNASUR offers the nations of South America a unifying voice on the global stage.

CHAPTER THREE

The Latin American Paradox: Between Ideology and Pragmatism
Analysis of Fourth Wave Regionalism, the Resurgence of Neo-Panamericanism, and the Future of Latin American Integration
(2001–Present)

"Speak regional, act unilateral, and go global"

ANDRÉS MALAMUD and GIAN LUCA GARDINI (2012)

This chapter intends to examine the progress of fourth wave regionalism, roughly a decade and a half since the transition from trade focused schemes of the third wave to more post-trade, post-liberal, post-hegemonic groupings. The contributing factors of this shift include Latin America's pink tide and the rise of leftist leadership, the growing importance of globalization and global interconnectedness, and September 11 and the subsequent US War on Terror. During the rise of neoliberalism, the Latin American left convened by means of the São Paulo Forum (SPF) to discuss the future of leftist political though amidst the collapse of global communism. The group convened throughout the 1990s and 2000s to discuss policy alternatives to neoliberalism, particularly through reconsidering regional integration (Dabène, 17). As Latin America experienced a dramatic shift to the left throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a new concept of southern solidarity occurred and was defined as a defense of regional sovereignty, promotion of anti-imperialism, and creation of regional policies deepening democratic principles (Dabène, 17). Through the fourth wave, integration sought to develop beyond trade, towards the ultimate convergence of regional politics, societies, and even cultures (Dabène, 17). From this thought, new schemes emerged at the turn of the century in an attempt to define new measures for Latin American integration.

The most prominent fourth wave groupings are ALBA (2004), UNASUR (2008), and CELAC (2010), which have each, in their own way, attempted to redefine southern solidarity and partnership through unique, and often differing, means. Among these new post-trade, post-liberal, post-hegemonic groupings, legacies of the past remain active and relevant in the Latin American political structure. Given the post-trade focus of fourth wave cases, third wave groups remain active and serve to fulfill the trade requirement of integration. Most notably, Latin America remains economically split between Mercosur, CAN, and SICA, each with differing visions of scope and degrees of economic integration. In addition to these Latin American schemes, US-led projects such as NAFTA and DR-CAFTA continue today as robust trade agreements with North America. Furthermore, other schemes should be examined such as the Pacific Arch or Alliance, an integrative project of the fourth wave that maintains third wave trade-focus tendencies. Finally, the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas have recently regained some legitimacy by morphing into a new fourth-wave context and offering developed infrastructure, international recognition, and equal distribution of power throughout the hemisphere.

This chapter will examine initial successes of fourth wave projects. Then, neo-Panamericanism will be analyzed through reinvestigation of the OAS. The analysis will then shift back to fourth wave schemes, focusing on their shortcomings and the obstacles that threaten their future. Finally, the future of Latin American integration will be pondered, presenting observations and predictions for the future.

Triumphs of post-trade, post-liberal, post-hegemonic Latin America

In the early 2000s, the tide began to turn again to pro-integration political thought supported by a new wave of political leadership in South America.

ALBA: setting the framework

As Chávez rose to power, Venezuela took a harder stance against foreign dominion and imperialism, specifically against Washington. Following the Venezuelan coup attempt in 2002, essentially considered to be US-supported, Chávez revisited integration as a mechanism for regional security against invasion (Vulliamy, 2002). Particularly, he aimed for Bolivarism, mentioning the *Patria grande*, and called for the reinstitution of regional solidarity (Rivarola-Puntigliano, Briceño-Ruiz, 43). Chávez institutionalized his populist, anti-*yanqui* rhetoric through the formation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) in December of 2004 (Rivarola Puntigliano, 43)[14]. ALBA was created as a retaliation to Washington's FTAA proposal which aimed at lifting trade barriers throughout the hemisphere, excluding those between the U.S. and Cuba ("ALBA," 2010).

Specifically, its agenda included a new, non-conventional conception of trade, seeing trade as fundamental for increasing the peoples' welfare and social mobility through integration (Dabène, 2012; Rivarola Puntigliano, 2012). Chávez has defined ALBA as "a flexible model for the integration of Latin America that places social concerns in the forefront" ("ALBA," 2010). Specifically, ALBA focused on "solidarity based exchanges" through barter between state-owned bi-national companies which were seen as an alternative to capitalist market economics (Dabène, 22). Particularly, Venezuela and Cuba sought to create a forum of equal exchange and cooperation that would be mutually beneficial but did not rely on typical market exchanges. Through ALBA, Chávez aimed at increasing oil exports in exchange for goods such as medical supplies (Cuba), soybeans, and cattle (Bolivia). In this context, ALBA trade exchanges go beyond capitalism and market driven economics, serving, therefore, as a

[14] The two original members were Cuba and Venezuela, now also with Nicaragua, Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Ecuador, Commonwealth of Dominica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (R. Puntigliano, 43).

legitimate alternative to the free trade model ("ALBA," 2010). In addition to market exchange, ALBA as well focused on social aspects such as education, healthcare, poverty eradication, etc. (Dabène, 22). For instance, Cuba and Venezuela are working on a collaborative education and health exchange, *Barrio Adentro*, in which more than 15,000 Cuban medics have been sent to Venezuela to fix the latter's lack of substantial health care ("ALBA," 2010). This example shows the social nature of the ALBA initiative, which aims at mutually addressing the socioeconomic needs of member states.

In its prime, ALBA successfully established an international Latin American credit union, in order to deepen financial integration between member states. Further, attempts were made at establishing a common currency, the *Sucre*, in order to foster equal trade based on value and necessity, rather than market prices ("ALBA," 2010). Despite initial successes, ALBA was soon overshadowed, following the founding of the more encompassing, less ideological, formation of the South American Community of Nations (SACN) in 2004 and later UNASUR in 2008. ALBA was often seen as a bilateral agreement, disguised as a multilateral organization, that served primarily the interests of Cuba and Venezuela. Further, the fact that it relied so heavily on Venezuelan oil, as Venezuela's main trade item, it proved instable and unsustainable. If nothing else, it serves as a preliminary, initially successful example of anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist integration that focused on southern solidarity, cooperation, and complementarity, despite ideological differences between members (Rivarola Puntigliano, 2).

UNASUR: an impressive alternative to US-dominated OAS

Since its inception, UNASUR has achieved unprecedented success in solving several complicated diplomatic and political crises. Born in 2008, it was immediately faced with high tensions throughout the region, particularly amidst Bolivia's domestic crisis of 2008 (Dabène,

22). UNASUR was uniquely not trade centered, but rather emphasized "political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing, and environment" throughout South America (Dabène, 21). Just weeks after its ratification, Bolivia spiraled into political unrest as the country's eastern departments demanded more autonomy and voice in national political structure. Violence ensued, resulting in the death 30 and dozens more injured (Dabène, 22). As a state of emergency was called, UNASUR stepped in, facilitating political dialogue held in Santiago de Chile. UNASUR members successfully converged, expressing on the September 15, 2008 "their fullest and decided support for the constitutional government of Evo Morales, whose mandate was ratified by a wide margin in the recent referendum" and warned that "its respective governments energetically reject and do not recognize any situation that implies an intent of civil *coup d'état*, the rupture of institutional order, or that compromises the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bolivia" (Dabène, 22). This statement, referred to as the Moneda Declaration, was largely respected and aided in calming tensions. This was a giant leap forward for political integration as members of UNASUR successfully expressed a unified voice against instability and regime change. This event was also important in that it added to UNASUR's agenda the unanimous protection of democracy (Dabène, 22). Similarly, two years later, Ecuador was engulfed by political unrest when the National Police attempted a coup against democratically elected president, Rafael Correa. The leaders of South America unanimously voiced through UNASUR their denouncement of opposition forces, stating that South America cannot tolerate democratically elected governments being threatened or pressured by opposition groups that do not wish to lose their privileges ("Comenzó"). From this crises, UNASUR solidified its democracy clause.

As tensions rose between Colombia and Venezuela, UNASUR again proved its usefulness. In 2010, following Colombian accusations by part of president Álvaro Uribe that

Venezuela was providing a safe heaven to FARC guerillas, diplomatic relations were frozen between the two nations, referred to as the Colombian-Venezuelan diplomatic crises of 2010. UNASUR effectively arranged diplomatic meetings between Chávez and Juan Manuel Santos, newly elected president of Colombia, ultimately cooling the crisis (Baer, 2015). It should be noted that the OAS, including both Colombia and Venezuela, was ineffective, due in large part to strong US opposition to Venezuela's government. Instead, UNASUR, given its lack of US presence, was able to unbiasedly intervene and reduce tensions. More recently, diplomatic relations between the two countries have again been severed, as Venezuela complained of an influx of smugglers and illegal currency exchanges by Colombians along the border (Baer, 2015). Fed up with Colombian compliance and inactivity, in august of 2015, Nicolás Maduro closed the border after Venezuelan soldiers were attacked by Colombian smugglers. Further, thousands of Colombian migrants were deported from Venezuela and both governments retracted their ambassadors on both sides (Baer, 2015). Initially, the OAS proposed a resolution, however it was rejected by Venezuela, whose ambassador to the OAS stated, "my government does not support debating this issue in the OAS due to its regrettable and frustrating history with complex situations among member states" (Baer, 2015). Both heads of state have agreed to UNASUR's proposal for bilateral talks, signaling another success for the southern regional group.

UNASUR is considered, to some, a significant, sustainable regional project that can counter the influence of large external forces. The group convenes once a year, in all member states based on alphabetical order, to eliminate an uneven regional balance (Baer, 2015). The group serves as a successful mechanism for tackling issues such as regional defense, social development, science and technology, finances, education, and combatting drug trafficking (Baer, 2015). This, in addition to UNASUR's forbiddance of US participation, makes it more

attractive and supported among countries of South America, in promoting fairness and equality among members, even in the face of conflict, something the OAS historically has been unable to do (Baer, 2015). Despite its sub-regional structure, UNASUR offers the foundation for successful conflict resolution, and regional cooperation in promoting the unified goals of South America.

CELAC: beyond sub-regionality in Latin America

Perhaps the most impressive, worthwhile, fourth wave regional project is the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), founded in February of 2010. CELAC is the product of the convergence of the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), maintaining the general objective of deepening political, social, and cultural integration of the Americas, beyond sub-regionality, in order to serve the well being of all citizens of the hemisphere (Llenderrozas, 129). In this respect, CELAC includes 33 Latin American and Caribbean States, excluding both the U.S. and Canada. CELAC provides a heterogeneous structure following three guiding strategies: moving beyond traditional divisions between South and Central America; coexistence of different political ideologies between the members of Latin America; and the acceptance of economic diversity with regard to different models and levels of development (Llenderrozas, 129). Among its organizational tenants are creating a unified voice to be represented on the global stage, protecting hemispheric democracy and political stability, all the while preserving national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and preventing intervention (Llenderrozas, 131). In this regard, CELAC offers a unique opportunity for Latin America in granting it international recognition. CELAC has been considered by many to potentially replace the OAS hemispheric structure, removing Washington's strong influence from regional affairs. Its structure will eventually serve as the all encompassing regional device through which

integration projects will be facilitated. Moreover, the founding of CELAC does not ignore the shift towards sub-regionality, but rather embraces it, supporting that sub-regional functionality will exist within the CELAC structure. This hemispheric perspective offers a revitalization to continental integration in Latin America.

Given that it is barely half of a decade old, it is difficult to measure the results of CELAC initiatives thus far; however, it remains an interesting comparison to examine a few of its most recent projects. Among its successful developments include unifying around issues such as: humanitarian relief in Haiti; Guatemalan genocidal proceedings; the issue of the Malvinas Islands; ending the US trade embargo on Cuba; countering terrorism; pushing for international nuclear proliferation; Colombian peace process; and the more recent ZIKA epidemic (Llenderrozas 2014, Rosa Elvira 2016). In this instance, CELAC members have effectively unified their voices, despite vast political, economic, and ideological differences, in order to improve the lives of all peoples of the Americas (Llenderrozas, 137). Despite initial optimism, there exist setbacks and reservations about the future and sustainability of CELAC which will be identified later in this chapter.

Neo-Panamericanism: the reemergence of the OAS

There is little doubt regarding the initial intentions of the OAS throughout the twentieth century, seen predominantly as Washington's attempt to legitimize its fight against communism, with little concern for the plight of Latin Americans (Stoetzer 1993, Rosenberg 2001, Diehl 2016). Following several devastating US transgressions such as its intervention in Guatemala in 1954, its attempted counter of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the subsequent Bay of Pigs invasion in 1962, and its invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, the top-down interamerican model collapsed. As Washington became tangled in Korea and Vietnam, it lost both the ability and interest to support panamerican integration. Meanwhile Latin America

grew increasingly reluctant to accept such top-down policies (Rosenberg, 83). Many twenty-first century scholars argue that new organizational tendencies and distribution of leadership suggest a revitalization of the OAS, signaling, perhaps, the rise of neo-panamericanism which describes a North American integration strategy through fostering relationships with the existing integrative blocs that exist throughout Latin America (Ríos, 3). This rejuvenation occurred in December 1994, when US president Bill Clinton initiated the Summit of the Americas, which, for the first time in decades, invited (US-considered democratically elected) hemispheric heads of state to discuss and solve hemispheric issues (Rosenberg, 80). This new forum signals a paradigm shift in the OAS structure in which the Summit of the Americas has emerged as the "primary vehicle of interamerican relations" (Rosenberg, 80). Therefore, while the OAS serves as the overarching multilateral political organization of the Americas, the Summit of the Americas has come to be the institutional forum for which leaders of the hemisphere can engage in dialogue. I would argue that the post-Cold War OAS is a legitimate multilateral governing body which should not be discarded, as many in Latin America are quick to do. Instead, it should be rightfully acknowledged that this neo-panamerican OAS has the potential to multilaterally solve the complex, wide-ranging political, economic, and social issues throughout the hemisphere.

Recently, the OAS has proved itself as a legitimate supervisory group through its monitoring of elections and solving border disputes throughout the hemisphere. Recently in 2015, amid Venezuelan corruption and election fraud scandal, the OAS, under leadership of new secretary general, Uruguayan-born Luis Almagro, has taken action in the name of hemispheric democracy. According to Almagro, his mission as OAS secretary general is "to leave this position with a clean record—that any time there was a human rights violation or

democracy was not working, I did not shut up" (Diehl, 2016). Regarding the Venezuelan case, Almagro wrote to a public letter to Caracas stating that:

> We have seen the power of the State used to silence and harass the opposition, violations of the checks and balances designed to ensure the separation and independence of powers, the opportunistic appointment of judges, and the interferences in different branches of government, all amounting to … erosion of democracy (Diehl, 2016).

As a result, Caracas was forced to accept the election results. In addition to this case, Almagro has rallied the OAS against Haiti's election crisis, corruption scandal in Guatemala, and attempted to facilitate a border dispute between Colombia and Venezuela (Diehl, 2016). Moreover, the interamerican system showed success again through facilitating, and demanding the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana during the spring and summer of 2015.

Given this recent activity of the OAS, this twentieth century regional scheme should be reconsidered. It does not fit into the fourth wave era, but rather exists and was reborn in it, morphing its objectives into cooperation with current regional schemes. Given its developed infrastructure, many Latin Americans are unwilling to throw it away completely and commit to an underdeveloped fourth wave group, for example. It is true that a strong inter-American relationship is necessary in solving certain hemispheric issues, leaving Latin America to utilize this forum as a means of communication with Washington. However, there is still fear, particularly among the Latin American left, that neo-panamericanism is nothing more than a contemporary strategy of Washington to assert is hegemony through means of economic dependence and political subordination (Rohca 2003, Ríos 2005). These sentiments threaten the future of the OAS and the inter-American system itself. Moreover, although the new OAS structure offers a forum for communication between Washington and Latin America, it fails to provide the region with a uniquely Latin America voice, as does CELAC for example.

Contemporary Integration: Shortcomings, Hindrances, and Causes for Concern

In spite of initial success and triumph experienced by many contemporary regional schemes, there have been several shortcomings and failures, which leave many to assume that regionalism in Latin America "has peaked" (Malamud 2012, G.L. Gardini 2012). Specifically, instead of comprehensive hemispheric regional groupings, as Bolívar would have desired, contemporary cases have become more sub-regional and decentralized. Moreover, current Latin American integration resembles severe institutional inflation and overlap, so much as to hinder completely their effectiveness and significance. Finally, several barriers exist, which will further prevent integration from succeeding, ultimately threatening its existence.

Sub-regionality and Decentralization

According to Alan Milward, contemporary regionalism began as "a protective maneuver by states that [could not] by themselves secure their own interests" (Milward, 1992). Specifically, Europe unified as a defense strategy (militarily, economically, ideologically) as a communist threat loomed to the east. As noted in chapter one, this was also the case for Latin America post-independence. By the time contemporary regional schemes were derived in the Americas, however, there was no lingering threat for which regional defense was necessary. This, in turn with lackluster economic development, encouraged economically focused regionalist attempts, rather than defensive or security based ones (Malamud, 119). The European case serves as an interesting comparison, demonstrating successful convergence which occurred throughout the mid-twentieth century. For example, during the 1960s, differing economic blocs (i.e. European Economic Community (EEC) and European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA)) competed for the backing of western European states. However, as the Soviet Union and its communist bloc rose as a credible threat to the western world, compromise occurred and western Europe largely rallied behind the EEC, seen then as a

necessary economic convergence towards a common ideological goal (Malamud, 120). This absolutely has not been the case in Latin America, where regional groups of differing beliefs and ideologies compete for hegemony and have been left unable to achieve any common, baseline integration. Figure one illustrates country membership in several of Latin America's most relevant regional groups today. Figure 1 demonstrates the severity of contemporary integration in that not one country is involved in even half of the top groups.

Malamud and G.L. Gardini argue that "every time a new block is born, it does so by excluding neighboring countries and by intentionally differentiating itself from other (sub) regional organizations" (Malamud, 121). Tussie continues that fourth wave regionalism has shown "many coexisting and competing projects with fuzzy boundaries" (Tussie, 170). Given the sub-regional nature of contemporary integration, Latin America lacks a central governing core, delegitimizing existent projects and impeding any possibility of any meaningful integration.

Figure 3.1: Latin American Regionalism: Decentralized and Overlapping



In reading order from top left: (1) OAS (2) CELAC, (3) ALBA, (4) NAFTA, (5) SICA, (6) UNASUR, (7) MERCOSUR, (8) Andean Community, (9) Pacific Alliance.[15]

Multi-level, Region Inflation, and Overlapping Regionalism

Latin American leadership, particularly post-Cold War, remains romanticized by Bolivarian ideals of Spanish-American cooperation and solidarity.[16] This idolization has manifested itself through twentieth and twenty-first century regional governance schemes, in which anything less would be considered a disappointment to the great *Libertador* (Malamud and G.L. Gardini, 2012; Sanchez Bajo, 1999; Sanhuja, 2009). Hugo Chávez, for instance, on many occasions mentioned his intention of establishing a unified confederation of Latin American republics. This vision was institutionalized through the founding of ALBA. This

[15] Figure inspired by Malamud and Gardini, "Has Regionalism Peaked?" and recreated through *Wikipedia* images.
[16] Now embracing Brazil within the Latin American identity.

project deepened the contemporary issue of "regional inflation," through which numerous regional schemes attempt to similarly integrate the region. This inflation goes hand in hand with non-exclusivity, leaving many Latin American states subject to double loyalties (Malamud and Gardini, 122). Such regional schemes have proven both unproductive and inefficient in terms of effectively integrating Latin America. Malamud and Gardini provide three negative effects inflation has on the sustainability and success of regional integration: lack of a common denominator, susceptibility to national swings and nationalist agendas, and internal friction.

Latin America today hosts multiple integrative groups which further split the region between differing political, economic, and ideological visions of development. South America, for example, is split between Mercosur, ALBA, and UNASUR affiliations. These groups have differing perspectives such a how to deal with the U.S., leadership, and development strategies. For example, ALBA is strictly anti-Washington and does not hesitate to denounce it; whereas Mercosur, though not as radically anti-*yanqui*, is often considered a counterweight to US FTAs throughout the hemisphere; meanwhile UNASUR, encompassing all South American states, remains divided to the point of dysfunction (Malamud and Gardini, 123). Regarding organizational leadership and foundational objectives, ALBA aimed to promote Chávez's socialist, anti-imperialist agenda throughout the region. Mercosur and UNASUR, largely influenced by Brazil, compete for Brazilian attention as Brasilia remains torn between the two (Malamud and Gardini, 123). Lastly, the aforementioned groups are unable, and unwilling, to converge around a single model of development. ALBA remains anti-free trade, while favoring instead a 'compensation and barter' economic structure, whereas Mercosur aims at establishing regional FTA and open economies, all the while UNASUR hosts members from both fields of thought (Malamud and Gardini, 123). These discrepancies continue to rip South America apart, retrograding their integrative intentions.

Given Latin American organizations' intergovernmental nature, or rather the lack of a supranational governing body, they are often susceptible to national swings and idealists. Unlike the European model, they lack a coherent regional bureaucracy, resulting in regional organizations centering around the aspirations of singular leaders, instead of a common regional vision. Chile, Colombia, and Peru, for example, favor FTA with the U.S. and have adopted low trade tariffs, therefore, it is not beneficial to conform to Mercosur (through which trade tariffs would be higher) (Malamud and Gardini, 123). As for Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, FTA with the U.S. would be unthinkable due to political and ideological opposition and, moreover, these states tend to follow more statist models. Argentina and Brazil, lie somewhere in the middle of these two groups. Latin America's inability to unify around a common trade policy may prove detrimental to the survival of future regionalism (Malamud and Gardini, 124).

Finally, multi-level and overlapping membership often creates regional friction and intensifies disputes, fostering fractionalization rather than unification. Malamud and Gardini identify the parallel between "ideology and pragmatism," as seen, for example, with Venezuela. Since Chávez, Venezuela has been the regional leader against capitalism, free trade, and *yanqui* imperialism, seen in its regional creation, ALBA. In 2006, Chávez denounced and abandoned its participation in the Andean Community for its proposal of establishing a FTA with the United States. Paradoxically, Venezuela participates in UNASUR, while also working towards membership in Mercosur (Malamud and Gardini, 124). Venezuela's *Chavista* outspokenness serves as a hindrance to the future of UNASUR and Mercosur integrative projects. Similarly, Nicaragua maintains ALBA membership, while also participating in the US sponsored DR-CAFTA (Malamud and Gardini, 124). Ecuador, an ideological ally of Venezuela, has many times denounced FTA with the U.S., while, however, simultaneously benefiting from US trade

through a different pact, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) (Malamud and Gardini, 124). Bolivia, on the other hand, despite participation in the FTA-seeking Andean Community, has opted out of such an agreement, further fragmenting and delegitimizing the group (Malamud and Gardini, 124).

Latin American Integration and Unilateral Hidden Agendas

Malamud and Gardini discuss the selfishness and unilateral nature of contemporary regionalism, claiming that ultimately regional groups are highly dependent on unilateral national visions and foreign policy. Brazil exemplifies this statement. Arguably, Brazil utilizes Mercosur as a mechanism to foster relations with its neighbors, more so than a meaningful economic bloc. For other members like Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, Mercosur has high economic significance in that they gain access to rich Brazilian markets (Malamud and Gardini, 125). UNASUR, also a Brazilian creation, was arguably created in order to retain its southern sphere of influence, as opposed to achieving any broader, Latin American one. For its Bolivarian associates such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, UNASUR has a greater political significance in promoting autonomy and anti-U.S. intervention while lacking a comprehensive economic commitment (Malamud and Gardini, 125). Similarly, Chile maintains associate status in several blocs, Mercosur and the Andean Community for example, as not to jeopardize its economic policy, but reaping both political and diplomatic benefits in participating. The Andean Community struggles with legitimacy as its members constantly move in and out of membership depending on national circumstances and diplomatic disputes (i.e. Chile, Peru, and Venezuela) (Malamud and Gardini, 125). Additionally, ALBA was a Venezuelan intention aimed at spreading the neo-Bolivarian message of anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, etc., however its members are seemingly less interested in this and more so, as suggested by some, access to Venezuelan Oil (Malamud, G.L. Gardini, 2012; Dabène, 2012). Through the twenty-

first century, ALBA has grown largely discredited and illegitimate for its ideological and discordant nature (Malamud and Gardini, 125). On a different spectrum, the Pacific Alliance between Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, exists as an economic bloc with an interest in connecting select economies to foreign markets (largely in Asia) (Malamud and Gardini, 125). As can be seen, the vast majority of contemporary regional groups exist at the will of individual leaders, largely for the purpose of promoting their unilateral, or sub-regional, interests. In this context, contemporary fourth wave regional integration is used as a legitimate political force to promote the agendas of individual leaders in gaining international attention, domestic support, access to foreign markets, etc., instead of for the purpose of achieving substantial integration between the countries of Latin America.

Mercosur, IIRSA[17], UNASUR, and CELAC all demonstrate Brazil's political intention to demonstrate its leadership in Latin America, as it played a key role in each of the aforementioned creations. Mercosur was a third wave attempt at regenerating regional trade and economic cooperation. IIRSA was proposed to foster support for regional infrastructure, of which Brazil would benefit greatly. UNASUR was a Brazilian invention meant to allow for its political leadership role in South America. Once its Southern hegemony was fortified, Brasilia sought to establish hemispheric hegemony, through an all encompassing Latin American integrative forum, forming later the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2010 (Dabène, 20).

Contemporary Barriers to Integration

Malamud and G.L. Gardini present a grim observation that Latin American regionalism may be experiencing its peak, of which may be unsurpassable. Several obstacles or hindrances

[17] Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America

exist which only further this point, and until they are overcome, regional integration may no longer be possible, or relevant, in contemporary Latin America.

Geographic barriers

At a most basic level, integration is best achieved through geographical inter-connectedness and efficient infrastructure within regions. This is the case for Europe in which countries share relatively close proximately to one another, in addition to undemanding geography and efficient transportation infrastructure. The case is much different in Latin America which is not only greater in size, but also contains the harsh colossal Andes and Amazonian regions that impede interconnectedness. One would not dream of traveling across the South American continent by car or train, for example, as easily as they would in Europe. Similarly, it is both a daunting and expensive task to ship goods intercontinentally as the region has yet to produce a coherent cross-continental infrastructure system. Mega projects such as the Inter-Oceanic Highway System, the Brazilian Trans-Amazonian Highway, and more recently, the Twin Ocean Transcontinental Railroad have been attempted, often with foreign assistance. These projects, however, have ultimately failed, causing devastating social and environmental repercussions (Ortiz, 2015). The fact that Latin America has been unable to produce a significant transport intercontinental system can be related to its progress towards regional integration. Not only is intra-regional trade difficult and inefficient, but, in comparison to percentage of total trade, Latin America's intra-regional trade is lackluster, demonstrating a precarious trend for the future of regional integration.

Extra-regional trade patterns

At the most basic level, regional integration is intended to foster economic growth through combining regional economies into a single market. Hurrell describes integration as a basic economic phenomenon which can be understood as "specific policy decisions by

governments designed to reduce or remove barriers to mutual exchange of goods, service, capital, and people" (Hurrell, 43). The EU, for example, achieved this during its early stages of integration development (Malamud and Gardini, 125). Throughout the twentieth century, intra-regional trade was considered a tool for fostering economic development, whether as a strategy of lessening foreign dependence, as seen in the 1960s, or as a stepping stone to propel regions into the global economy as was suggested in the 1990s (Malamud and Gardini, 126). Despite this, however, the data does not show this to be the case. In comparison to intra-regional trade among EU states (more than 60 percent of trade) and NAFTA countries (more than 50 percent of trade), between 2000 and 2006, Latin American figures fall short, not even totaling 20 percent of the region's trade (ECLAC, 2008). This is largely in part to the region's non-complementarity nature through which it is more profitable for Latin America to export its raw resources extra-regionally than it is intra-regionally (Malamud and Gardini, 127). Much of Latin America produces similar goods and it is not relevant nor profitable to trade among itself. Historically, intra-regional trade has not been organic, but rather forced by contemporary regional schemes aiming to foster development through trade. While the EU and NAFTA sought to deepen already existent intra-regional trade patterns, LAFTA, CAN, CACM, and Mercosur, for example, formed new intra-regional trade routes and limited extra-regional ones (Malamud and Gardini, 126). More recently, regional groups have moved away from this twentieth century model, focusing more on extra-regional trade, signaling, perhaps, a major pitfall of previous regional integration structures.

Emergence of issue-based blocs versus geographic partnerships

Another limit to Latin American integration is the growing tendency towards issue-based initiatives rather than region-based ones. In contemporary international summits and forums, it is becoming more frequent and effective to rally behind common goals and

objectives, as opposed to geographic relativity. Malamud and Gardini affirm that "at the multilateral level there is no forum of regions or regionalisms. Global issues are not handled by regions but by multilateral organizations or other coalitions of states where regional bonds are secondary at best" (Malamud and Gardini, 128). ALBA, IIRSA[18], and MILA[19], for example, are not based on regional proximity, but rather on common goals and objectives. The members of ALBA, for instance, do not share one common land border. This leaves many to believe that it is no longer efficient nor viable for Latin America to unify regionally, given the deep divergence of levels of development, economic preferences, political ideologies, etc.

Lack of leadership and political commitment

Another aspect that hinders integration is the lack of a strong leader, or "paymaster," that is both politically and financially able to plan, fund, and support regional integration. In the Pan-American system, the U.S. assumed this role. In the European structure, funding is bureaucratically divided among its members. Latin America does not have a willing leader, nor a comprehensive bureaucracy, through which leadership could be fostered. Initially, Venezuela reignited regionalist thought at the turn of the century with the founding of ALBA. Despite this passion for regional solidarity, much of the region is unwilling to follow behind radical *chavista* rhetoric, and its leadership is largely not desired throughout the region. Many see Mexico as a potential regional leader, given its economic influence. However, both its geographic and political proximity to Washington have left left many in Latin America wary of Mexican leadership, seeing instead a direct pipeline to Washington. Brazil, given both its geographic and economic size, is often considered the most willing and able candidate for regional leadership, yet it lacks both the political will and the legitimacy to do so (Malamud and

[18] Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America
[19] Integrated Latin American Market

Gardini, 128). Despite its participation in the creation of Mercosur and UNASUR, Brazil has not committed financially, or even politically, to the success of these organizations, thus resulting in their stagnation. Historically, Brazil has been excluded from the Latin American identity given differences in language, culture, and colonial past. This, perhaps, hinders any possibility of Brasilia assuming a leadership position in the region. Furthermore, since 2015, Brazil has spiraled into political and economic turmoil, leaving many wary of its leadership abilities.

Bilateralism over Region

In the context of globalization, fourth wave regionalism aimed at inserting Latin American interests into the global discourse. In general, however, global powers are typically not interested in working with Latin America as a singular body, but rather with sub-regions or single nations (Malamud and Gardini, 129). This is due in part to the vast political, economic, and social diversity that exists throughout the hemisphere. China, for example, is particular about with which countries it conducts business or political discussions.[20] Similarly, India only conducts trade agreements with certain strategic Latin American countries. Further, international blocs of emerging markets such as BRICS and IBSA, highlight and favor Brazil over Latin America. Even the EU, longtime advocate of regional cooperation, has moved beyond this and established bilateral partnerships with key economies around the globe, including Brazil (Malamud and Gardini, 129). This paradigm shifts signals that regionalism may no longer be relevant in the globalized age.

[20] Perhaps favoring those that are more cooperative and able to fuel its need for raw resources.

Rhetoric, inflation, disorder

Malamud and Gardini describe contemporary Latin American integration as a "spaghetti bowl" which contains "complications and idiosyncrasies" (129). Firstly, cross-membership is a formula for complicated situations regarding political and economic loyalties among Latin American states. Ecuador and Bolivia belong to both ALBA and CAN, and Nicaragua participates in both SICA and DR-CAFTA. Large scale integration continuously proves sustainable due solely to political rhetoric and grandiose in addition to the region's high tolerance for noncompliance and un-fulfillment (Malamud and Gardini, 129). Particularly in the twenty-first century, Latin American regionalism has "mushroomed" into countless organizations, forums, and summits which increasingly stretch and drain regional agendas and budgets (Malamud and Gardini, 129). Contemporary regionalism is augmented by grandiose rhetoric with "ill-defined commitments, loose rules, incomplete legislation, patchy implementation, and high levels of infringement" (Malamud and Gardini, 129). The current situation leaves regionalism bursting at the seems, spiraling further into disarray and inefficiency. To many, this signals that regionalism in Latin America has peaked.

Concluding Observations

Nearly two decades since the rise of fourth wave regionalist thought in Latin America, the realization of current integrative attempts remains unclear. At first glance, the twenty-first century integrative aspirations and actions of Latin American states is admirable. Latin American leadership took advantage of US withdrawal from the hemisphere to jumpstart its campaign of post-hegemonic regional unification. However, this ambition was so great that it overestimated and surpassed the hemisphere's capacity to support said multilateral integration. This is not to suggest that regional integration is no longer relevant, but rather that its current inflated, multi-verse state is both unsustainable and ineffective. Indeed, the idea of post-

hegemonic integration offers Latin America an opportunity to unify and produce a common voice to interact with both the U.S. and other global powers. This has been experienced in several of the aforementioned contemporary cases. However, the inflated, overlapping state of which integration has become hinders its potential. Further, it has been suggested by some, that traditional, hemispheric unification may no longer be useful or achievable given the hemisphere's current political, economic, and social state. Through its 200 years of existence, Latin America has grown radically different in terms of socioeconomic development, political ideology, international relations, etc., leaving many to support the formation of sub-regional schemes in attempt to unify the region based on common goals, rather than sole geographic relativity. This has been experienced in the majority of contemporary regional groups, making hemispheric structures, like the OAS or CELAC, difficult to carry out. The Summit for the Americas demonstrates a potential future form of hemispheric integration in offering all countries of the hemisphere a forum of dialogue and cooperation, while not committing to any hemispheric agreements, pacts, cooperatives, etc. Proponents of CELAC would agree, suggesting that it serve as a hemispheric facilitator through which sub-regional groups would work within its structure. Trends towards sub-regionality as well as the region's reluctance to submit to a hemispheric regional structure, suggest that this may be the future of integration. Lastly, the shift towards post-trade projects has been exercised, though also rebelled against, as seen in the Pacific Alliance which is sub-regional bloc aimed at fostering extra-regional trade initiatives with extra-Latin American countries of the pacific. This initiative shows that despite the trend away from trade, it is not unanimously supported.

With respect to post-trade regional thought, the following chapter will carry out a cultural analysis of *El Sistema*, the notorious Venezuelan youth music education program that aims at fostering socio-economic mobility through music performance. This project has been

replicated both regionally and internationally, and has gained widespread recognition as a significant, potentially post-trade regional strategy.

CAPÍTULO CUATRO

Buscando una armonía latinoamericana: Análisis cultural del Sistema Nacional de Orquestas Juveniles e Infantiles de Venezuela como un modelo formidable de la integración regional cultural

Cuando cada joven tenga acceso a la cultura, el mundo será mucho más tranquilo y maduro.

GUSTAVO DUDAMEL
Director de la Orquesta Sinfónica Simón Bolívar

El término 'integración regional' ha evolucionado y cambiado mucho a través de la historia de regiones, apropiándose en el contexto histórico de la época. Básicamente, el regionalismo se puede definir como un proceso de convergir partes diferentes en un único cuerpo (Korobonski, 342). Además, en términos de política internacional, se puede definir como la convergencia de países de la misma región con fines de promover e1l comercio, la inversión, la seguridad y el desarrollo económico. En este sentido, los partidos integrados, rinden alguna soberanía para establecer una identidad más profunda, que representa una región determinada (Haas, 610). Más adelante, algunos académicos, como Olivier Dabène, describen la integración tradicional como una estrategia para pacificar la esfera internacional (Dabène, 6). En términos lejos de la economía política, otros académicos, como Karl Deutsch, se concentran más en la sociología y definen la integración como el logro regional de una 'sensación de comunidad' para resolver un problema social dentro de una esfera regional (Deutsch, 5). De manera similar, Donald Puchala consideraba la integración regional como una mezcla de pueblos hacia una cultura o sociedad transnacional. De todos modos, es evidente que los académicos a través de la historia han intentado definir cómo es, y cómo funciona la integración, demostrando su importancia. Rick Fawn defiende que las regiones están en todas

partes del mundo y son crecientemente fundamentales para la función de todos los aspectos de las relaciones internacionales (Fawn, 19). Además, aclara que la integración regional existe tanto en las instituciones de gobernación y en las políticas como en la sociedad civil y la esfera cultural (Dabène, 7). También, hay que señalar que este aspecto social dentro del estudio de la integración no había sido investigado mucho.

El objetivo de este ensayo es investigar la esfera cultural dentro de la integración regional en América Latina. El Sistema Nacional de Orquestas Juveniles e Infantiles de Venezuela (*El Sistema*) posee muchos de los aspectos más notables de un típico proyecto de integración así que puede servir como un modelo formidable para desarrollar la región, ganar reconocimiento internacional y establecer una identidad transnacional común. Desde los años de Bolívar, América Latina ha estado buscando formas de establecer su autonomía, el desarrollo económico y una identidad cultural supranacional (Rivarola-Puntigliano, Briceño-Ruiz vii). La región ha intentado lograr esto a través de la integración regional. En términos culturales, aunque no conduce directamente a la unidad económica ni política en la región, la integración regional definitivamente la facilita. De esta manera, se puede argumentar que El Sistema venezolano, aunque no la garantiza, proporciona y fomenta una unidad económica y política latinoamericana que puede ayudar a desarrollar la región.

Primero, es necesario entender la historia y evolución de la integración regional a través de la historia de América Latina. Con esta interpretación, se puede entender más la época contemporánea que se refiere como la Cuarta Ola del regionalismo (2001-presente). Luego, ilustraré las características de este periodo en relación con el contexto sociopolítico de América Latina durante el siglo XXI. Después, voy a introducir al proyecto cultural de Venezuela, El Sistema. Después de un breve resumen del programa, señalaré cómo el Sistema se sitúa en la Cuarta Ola, ilustrando los componentes del programa que coinciden con los de este periodo.

Con esta descripción, será evidente que este proyecto se puede considerar como un ejemplo de integración regional latinoamericana, por su relación en la Cuarta Ola tanto como su potencia de promover el desarrollo socioeconómico y crear una identidad cultural latinoamericana. De esta manera, se puede argumentar que la integración regional en América Latina puede lograrse mejor si utiliza modelos y perspectivas culturales como el Sistema de Venezuela.

Breve resumen sobre la historia de la integración en América Latina

Típicamente, la historia de la integración regional del periodo contemporáneo existía en varias etapas, u olas, con respecto al contexto histórico donde existía. En la época pre-contemporánea (independencia hasta la Segunda Guerra Mundial), la integración regional existía en la visión del Libertador Simón Bolívar como una reacción a la invasión y la conquista por España y los Estados Unidos. Proyectos durante esta época fueron básicos, se enfocaron principalmente en la defensa y la seguridad de la región hispanoamericana[21]. Mientras la amenaza española disminuía, América Latina caía en el conflicto, y el regionalismo era fundamentalmente abandonado mientras los nuevos estados latinoamericanos buscaban fortalecer su independencia y establecer la soberanía.

Un siglo después, tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la integración regional era reconsiderada como un instrumento para fomentar el desarrollo socioeconómico. Para los líderes occidentales del mundo desarrollado, predominantemente, Europa y los EE.UU., el regionalismo fue y promovido en sus esferas. Así se produjo la integración regional contemporánea en América Latina, la cual pasaba a través de cuatro periodos u olas. El primer (los 1950-1960) y segundo (los 1970-1980) periodo de integración latinoamericana existían en el contexto de la Teoría de dependencia, el modelo de la política de sustitución de

[21] Durante esta época, Brasil ni las colonias ingleses, francés o holandeses no fueron aceptados en la ancha identidad latinoamericana.

importaciones (ISI) y el cierre de los mercados regionales. La tercera etapa (los 1990) se enfrentaba con las políticas neoliberales, la apertura de los mercados regionales y la crisis continental. Muchos proyectos de integración durante esta etapa fueron influenciados por parte de Washington, que surgía como la única superpotencia en el mundo después de la caída soviética en 1989. Algunos proyectos de este periodo incluyen: al Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), el Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA), la Asociación de Estados Caribeños (AEC) y la Comunidad Andina (CAN). Aparte de la integración dentro de América Latina, coexistían ejemplos de orígenes afuera de la región como los tratados de libre comercio (TLC), por ejemplo el TLC entre Canadá, EE.UU. y México (TLCAN), además de estructuras políticas como la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA).[22] Cuando terminó el siglo XX, las circunstancias políticas cambiaron el concepto de la integración regional en América Latina.

La Cuarta Ola del regionalismo: post-comercial, post-liberal y post-hegemónica

Al principio del siglo XXI, América Latina se enfrenta a una época distinta en relación con la integración regional, conocida como la Cuarta Ola del regionalismo. Varios factores contribuyeron a este cambio de paradigma: la Marea Rosa y el aumento de gobiernos progresivos; la creciente importancia de la globalización y la interconexión internacional; sin olvidar los ataques del 11 de Septiembre y la subsiguiente Guerra norteamericana contra el Terrorismo. En este contexto, se define la integración durante este periodo como post-liberal, post-comercial y post-hegemónica.

Con respeto al primero, post-liberal, este cambio se puede ver como una reacción a las políticas de los noventa, a través de las cuales América Latina se encontró frente a la ideología norteamericana del neoliberalismo. Bajo esta ideología, Washington presionó a América Latina para que cambiase su forma de gobierno, reflejando los recomendaciones de política del

[22] Fundada en 1948, pero fue revitalizada drásticamente durante los 1990, así que se puede ubicarla en esta época.

Consejo de Washington. Específicamente, las ideas más elementales fueron la disciplina macroeconómica, la promoción de una economía de mercado y la liberalización del comercio y la inversión extranjera directa (IED) (Williamson). A pesar de estos cambios políticos y de la crisis económica de los 1990, muchos en América Latina acusaron y rechazaron al consejo norteamericano. Esta reacción negativa era fomentada mientras la política latinoamericana cambió dramáticamente a la izquierda, comenzando en 1999 con la elección del socialista, nacionalista venezolano, Hugo Chávez. De este cambio, denominado como la Marea Rosa, similares lideres anti-neoliberales asumieron la presidencia democráticamente en muchos países de la región. En reacción, estos líderes aprobaban leyes y políticas contra el neoliberalismo, por ejemplo la re-nacionalización de industrias claves, el aumento de los aranceles y las barreras comerciales con el fin de proteger los mercados internos y, sobre todo, la re-atención en el Estado para asegurar la igual distribución de bienes y servicios al pueblo latinoamericano. Por otra parte, los esquemas de integración durante este periodo reflejan esta mentalidad socialista, o sea el foco en el Estado y la promoción de la igualdad para el pueblo latinoamericano.

El término post-comercio sirve como una extensión de la ideología post-neoliberal ya mencionada. Durante los noventa, las políticas acerca de la integración regional fueron predominantemente enfocadas en el comercio, como un mecanismo para desarrollar la región. Proyectos de este periodo, por ejemplo Mercosur, SICA, AEC y CAN se centraron exclusivamente en el comercio. Líderes de la Cuarta Ola se alejaban de esta mentalidad y creían que había otra manera de lograr el progreso socioeconómico regional además del comercio. Por lo tanto, proyectos integrativos durante esta época se centraron más en la integración política y, en algunos casos, en la cultural. Por eso, muchos de los proyectos durante la Cuarta Ola creen que el desarrollo se puede lograr eficazmente en la sociedad, el pueblo y la cultura.

La última característica de los esquemas de integración regional de la Cuarta Ola es la post-hegemónica. Tras muchos años de dominación por poderes extranjeros (España y luego los EE.UU.), además con el cambio de la política exterior norteamericana pos-9/11 lejos del hemisferio occidental hacia Asia y el Medio Oriente, América Latina, consecuentemente, se encontraba sin una hegemonía o dominio por la primera vez en su historia, lo cual había manipulado e influido la esfera política interamericana durante siglos. Tanto como el movimiento de Washington lejos de las Américas, con relación con los nuevos lideres de la Marea Rosa, durante esta época había un cambio de paradigma en el sentimiento hacia los EE.UU., convirtiéndose en gran medida hostil. Durante estos años, había un aumento de los sentimientos anti-imperialistas y anti-yanqui en una gran parte de América Latina, lo que indica un importante eje de las relaciones interamericanas. La huida estadounidense y el cambio regional hacia el anti-imperialismo, surgía una nueva etapa de integración regional. Organizaciones como la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) y la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos (CELAC) son algunos ejemplos de integración con atributos y tendencias post-hegemónicas.

El Sistema Nacional de Orquestas Juveniles e Infantiles de Venezuela

Durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX, el economista y músico venezolano, José Antonio Abreu, tenía la gran visión para aumentar socioeconómicamente al pueblo pobre de Venezuela. Con una perspectiva interdisciplinaria, él entendió la grave situación socioeconómica en su país durante esta época y creía que la música podía producir movilidad social con fines de cambiar la sociedad virtuosamente (Mora Brito, 1). Entonces, Abreu fundó un programa de educación musical para jóvenes del pueblo venezolano en 1975, específicamente, se dirigía a los jóvenes desamparados y empobrecidos (Mora Brito, 1). Particularmente, un 63 por ciento de los beneficiarios del programa se ubican en las dos

regiones más pobres del país, y un 81 por ciento incluía regiones económicamente media-bajas (IADB, 2007). Abreu mantenía la misión de facilitar la práctica colectiva de la música a través de orquestas sinfónicas y coros, para que ayudaran a los niños a alcanzar su pleno potencial (Mora Brito, 1; FESNOJIV, 2011).

Al principio, el programa era privado, solo mantenía ocho estudiantes. Además, las orquestas sinfónicas más importantes del país estaban predominantemente compuestas por músicos profesionales extranjeros (Borzachini, 2004). En este contexto, Abreu defendía que una transformación institucional era necesaria para reestablecer la soberanía venezolana de la música clásica. Obviamente, esto no es un proceso inmediato, sino que requiere un cambio de base en el país, los jóvenes. Abreu buscaba músicos jóvenes dentro del país, reclutando de todas partes de Venezuela. Su primer logro era la fundación de la primera orquesta nacional juvenil, La Orquesta Nacional Juvenil Juan José Landaeta en abril de 1975 (Mora Brito, 7). Esta orquesta tuvo gran éxito, completando una gira a varios países latinoamericanos y participando en el Festival Internacional de Orquestas en las Escocia (Mora Brito, 7). Además, durante esta época, la ONU estableció un Centro para los Estudios Superiores Musicales, que mantuvo su sede en Venezuela (Mora Brito, 7). Este éxito inicial era sólo el comienzo de lo que se convertiría en uno de los más reconocidos sistemas de música en el mundo.

A la luz de este reconocimiento internacional, el gobierno venezolano tomó nota y nacionalizó el programa durante la mitad de los setenta. A causa de este conglomero estatal, el Sistema experimentó una profunda expansión. Inmediatamente, el programa aumentó de 15 a 300 beneficiarios en menos de un año y comenzó a establecer los centros, denominados "núcleos," a través del país (Mora Brito, 7). Poco después, el programa evolucionó a una institución profunda y compleja, conocida como la Fundación del Estado para la Orquesta Nacional Juvenil de Venezuela (FEONJV) y cambiando en 1996 en la Fundación del Estado

para el Sistema Nacional de Orquestas Juveniles e Infantiles de Venezuela (FESNOJIV). Esta institución se convirtió en una estructura sumamente compleja y enorme que incluía la actividad de casi 790 orquestas y 3.500 maestros y empleados, todo financiado por el Estado venezolano (Mora Brito, 8). Actualmente, el Sistema engloba más de 290.000 estudiantes de 3 a 19 años, y 237 centros musicales a través del país (Mora Brito, 6). Hasta ahora, 40 años después de su fundación en 1975, se estima que dos millones de personas se han beneficiado del Sistema (Mora Brito, 1).

Estructura y currículo

La estructura del Sistema está basada simplemente en aprender cómo tocar un instrumento y como tocar harmónicamente en una orquesta sinfónica. Al principio, por algunos meses, los estudiantes de cinco o seis años entran en el Sistema, comienzan a aprender la teoría básica y leer música por un tiempo muy corto. En el documental, *The Promise of Music*, la violinista principal de la Orquesta Sinfónica Simón Bolívar contó cuando entró en el Sistema. Tenía seis años de edad, y sólo pasaba seis meses aprendiendo las habilidades fundamentales hasta que ingresaba en su primera orquesta. En un contexto socialista, el Sistema enseña a los jóvenes cómo funcionar y vivir en un grupo, para que trabajen juntos, en igualdad. La igualdad es un principio fundamental del Sistema, como en el Socialismo. No importa de donde vengan los jóvenes ni sus clases socioeconómicas, ni sus raíces, religión. Todos los estudiantes comienzan en un plano de igualdad, con la conexión predominante de que todos quieren tocar. En *The Promise of Music,* la flautista principal dijo que el Sistema le dio un instrumento sin costo, y si no hubiera sido así, ella no podía habérselo permitido. En el mismo sentido, un percusionista nos contó la realidad de que no podía pagar para su viaje para estudiar y tocar al mismo tiempo. Teniendo en cuenta la movilidad social, el Sistema no solo ofrece una oportunidad de enseñar la música a los jóvenes, sino también provee un escape a la

realidad brutal. Es decir que si quieres escapar, el Sistema te da la oportunidad de hacerlo sin costo.

El currículo del programa es clave para explicar el éxito. Particularmente, el Sistema no sigue modelos educativos tradicionales, sino más bien un modelo que se adapta a las condiciones específicas regionales donde se aplica (Sánchez, 67). Según Freddy Sánchez, profesor del Instituto Universitario de Estudios Musicales (IUDEM) en Caracas, en un macro-nivel, el Sistema sigue el propósito fundamental de "formar humanistas e integralmente la personalidad de los venezolanos" (Sánchez, 67). En este modelo, él continúa de ilustrar tres efectos que tiene el Sistema: "insertar socialmente niños en abandono, pobreza, incapacidad y drogadicción; consolidar la idiosincrasia cultural de cada región; y beneficiar al mayor número de niños, jóvenes y familias" (Sánchez, 67). Por estos intentos, quedan claras las similitudes entre el programa y un proyecto de integración regional. Como los proyectos multilaterales, el Sistema se adapta a la situación presente, para proveer al pueblo con lo que necesita. En este sentido, es parecido a un esquema sub-regional de la Cuarta Ola, que existe para servir al propósito contemporáneo de alguna región específica. Este aspecto se puede ver en la estructura de los núcleos, los que, según Sánchez, no son homogéneos (Sánchez, 67). En general, los núcleos a través del país tienen la misma estructura básica, tienen centros académicos para ensenar la teoría y tienen orquesta para practicar (Sánchez, 67). Según Henry Zambrano, a pesar de estas similitudes, cada núcleo es distinto al adaptar la dinámica específica de la región en que funciona (Borzacchini, 72).

Reconocimiento internacional

El éxito experimentado por el Sistema ha atraído la atención de varios grupos como agencias internacionales de desarrollo, organizaciones multilaterales, instituciones culturales y varios gobiernos (Borzacchini, 2004; FESNOJIV, 2006; IADB, 2007; Mora Brito, 2012). Según

Mora Brito, esto demuestra que el Sistema es un buen mecanismo alternativo para "aumentar la participación cultural, democratizar el arte y vitalizar la música clásica," esto funciona como un instrumento sostenible y efectivo para estimular el cambio social a largo plazo (Mora Brito, 13). Principalmente, la Orquesta Nacional Juvenil Juan José Landaeta, y luego la Orquesta Nacional Juvenil Simón Bolívar,[23] ganó mucha de su fama por las giras internacionales. Esta exposición internacional dio legitimización a la Orquesta Nacional, y subsiguientemente al Sistema (Mora Brito, 2012; FESNOJIV, 2011). Durante los últimos 20 años, específicamente después del crecimiento explosivo tras su nacionalización estatal por Chávez[24], el Sistema ha ganado varios premios: el Premio Internacional de Música por la UNESCO (1993); el Premio Interamericano Gabriela Mistral de la OEA (1996); el Premio para la Experiencia Exitosa en Combatir la Pobreza por la PNUD[25] (1998); el Premio Internacional de Arte por la ONU (2004); y varios más incluyendo muchos gobiernos internacionales (Suecia en 2001; Japón en 2006 y 2008; Italia en 2006 y 2007) (Mora Brito, 2012; IADB, 2007; FESNOJIV, 2011). Los reconocimientos más notables en términos de instituciones internacionales latinoamericanas han sido la Orquesta Sinfónica Juvenil Iberoamericana en 1997, la Orquesta Juvenil de las Américas en 2000 y el reconocimiento y replicación por la OEA, la UNESCO y Mercosur (Mora Brito, 2012; FESNOJIV, 2006). Estas formaciones eran interesantes porque incluyen músicos juveniles de países diferentes de América Latina, así que sirve como un ejemplo concreto de integración cultural. De estos proyectos surgía la Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) que actualmente continúa estableciendo y financiando la replicación del Sistema a través de la región andina (CAF, 2011).

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[23] Esta orquesta es la más impresiónate, prominente e importante, y está considerada como el "sueño final" de todos los estudiantes del Sistema. Específicamente, está dividida en dos grupos, la primera es la Orquesta Nacional Juvenil Simón Bolívar y la segunda es la Orquesta Sinfónica Simón Bolívar, la cual está dirigida por el director famoso venezolano, Gustavo Dudamel.

[24] Chávez llegó al poder en el febrero de 1999.

[25] Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo.

Además de instituciones internacionales, el Sistema ha recibido elogio de músicos muy importantes del mundo de la música clásica. En el documental *Tocar y Luchar*, algunos directores prominentes contaron sus experiencias de dirigir la Orquesta Nacional Juvenil Simón Bolívar, específicamente los famosos Claudio Abbado y Simon Rattle. Después de dirigir la Orquesta Nacional Juvenil como director invitado, Maestro Rattle, uno de los directores más influyentes del mundo y más conocidos por dirigir la Orquesta Filarmónica de Berlín, contó: "si alguien me preguntara dónde está pasando algo importante para el futuro de la música clásica, simplemente tendría que decir, aquí en Venezuela (*Tocar y luchar,* 2006*)*. En la misma situación, el famoso Maestro Abbado, bien conocido por dirigir la Orquesta Sinfónica de Londres y luego la Orquesta Filarmónica de Berlín, explicó: "Encuentro que desde el punto de vista musical, humanitario, social, cultural y político, es excepcional" (*Tocar y luchar,* 2006). Abbado utilizaba como ejemplo el Sistema venezolano para evolucionar sus propias instituciones musicales juveniles, por ejemplo la Orquesta Juvenil de la Unión Europea y la Orquesta Juvenil Gustav Mahler. Este reconocimiento y elogio internacional demuestran la importancia del Sistema tanto como su sostenibilidad y la eficacia como un exitoso programa social.

La reproducción del Sistema en los Estados Unidos

En 2009, José Abreu fue nominado para un premio particularmente impresionante de "TED," una organización sin afán de lucra dedicada a presentar y exhibir las "*ideas worth spreading*" (Tunstall, 129). Abreu usó la ceremonia de premiación para promover su proyecto pidiendo, estratégicamente en inglés, el siguiente a la comunidad internacional: "*I wish that you would help to create and document a special training program for fifty gifted Young musicians, passionate about their art and social justice, and dedicated to bringing El Sistema to the United States and other Countries*" (Tunstall, 134). Con esta solicitud en la mente, varios personas han utilizado el Sistema

venezolano y replicado el modelo a través de varios países. Todos de los siguientes casos mantienen la creencia que la música es una estratégica bastantemente útil para combatir los problemas socioeconómicos. Específicamente, Abreu creía que un resultado de la pobreza es la falta de la autoestima y respeto individual, por lo tanto, mantenía la creencia que la música puede ofrecer a los pobres una sensación de importancia y rol en la sociedad. Consecuentemente, en enseñar la confianza personal desde una edad joven, Abreu ha intentado impactar la sociedad y revertir los impactos negativos de la pobreza. Esto es la mentalidad que algunos han reproducidos en varios países diferentes. El caso más importante es la réplica en los Estado Unidos.

Durante la década noventa, Mark Churchill, el decano del Escuela Preparatoria del Conservatorio de Nueva Inglaterra, experimentó el Sistema venezolano y tuvo una visión para el establecimiento de un modelo similar en los Estados Unidos (Tunstall, 135). Más profundamente, él tuvo la gran aspiración establecer un sistema educativo musical panamericano, imitando una estructura similar que vio entre carios estados asiáticos (Tunstall, 135). A través de una conexión en Venezuela, él propusó la idea al Abreu quien entusiastamente la aceptó. Churchill admiró al sistema venezolano y creó sinceramente que los sistemas de orquestas estadounidenses podrían aprender mucho del caso venezolano.

Inicialmente, él formuló la Orquesta Juvenil de las Américas, una réplica panamericana del Sistema venezolano, con el fin de fomentar integración transcultural y combatir los problemas sociales a través todo el hemisferio (Tunstall, 135). Ambos la Orquesta Juvenil de las Américas y la Orquesta Juvenil del Conservatorio viajaron al Caracas para participar en una colaboración con la Orquesta Juvenil Simón Bolívar. Esta gira norteamericana forjó una asociación y alianza duradera entre los dos sistemas. Más notablemente, esta alianza demuestra el poder de la integración cultural de superar las fronteras geopolíticas predeterminadas.

Históricamente, las relaciones diplomáticas entre Caracas y Washington han sido tensas a causa de algunas diferencias políticas e ideológicas. El viaje a Caracas de las Orquestas norteamericanas, tanto como la buena acogida de José Antonio Abreu y la Orquesta Simón Bolívar, demuestra la importancia de la cultura en términos de integración y cooperación regional.

Aproximadamente al mismo tiempo, una réplica concurrente estaba surgiendo en Los Ángeles. Deborah Borda, la presidenta del Filarmónica de Los Ángeles, quedó impresionada por Gustavo Dudamel, el director principal de la Sinfónica Simón Bolívar. Ella también siguió esta interés y viajó a Caracas en 2006 para experimentarla directamente (Tunstall, 137). Inmediatamente, ella fue sumamente inspirada por el Sistema y cometió a replicar su misión en Los Ángeles. Después de su viaje, ella se dio cuenta algunas faltas en el actual programa educativo y utilizó el modelo de Abreu para mejorarlo. Entonces, a través del departamento de Educación y Asuntos de la Comunidad de la Filarmónica, surgió el compromiso de establecer una red profunda de Orquestas Juveniles a través de Los Ángeles, inspirada completamente por El Sistema (Tunstall, 139). Además de enseñar los jóvenes como producir la música, esta web intentó combatir la desigualdad social y la pobreza extrema a través de la región. Socialmente, Los Ángeles sostiene un gran problema acerca de la desigualdad social, considerablemente relacionada con las divisiones racionales entre los blancos y los raíces minorías. Entonces, en la misma manera de ha hecho el Sistema, el programa de Los Ángeles intentó acercarse a los jóvenes desamparados cuales tradicionalmente no tendrían acceso a la música clásica. Continuamente, este programa se convirtió en la gran institución se llama, YOLA (La Orquesta Juvenil de Los Ángeles). Profundizando la relación con el Sistema, poco después, Gustavo Dudamel, el producto más exitoso del Sistema venezolano, fue designado como el director principal de YOLA (Tunstall, 142). Este nombramiento fue fundamente

significativo, señalando una de las reproducciones más exitosas, complejas y formidables del Sistema venezolano.

Más profundamente, el Sistema ha influido mucho el sistema de educación musical estadounidense. Específicamente, la Liga de Orquestas Americanas, la red norteamericana de orquestas juveniles, refleja mucho el parecido proyecto venezolano. En la misma manera del Sistema, la Liga, particularmente su División de las Orquestas Juveniles, sirve como el base de todas las orquestas juveniles en los Estados Unidos. La Liga fue inspirado mucho por el Sistema y considera la importancia de la música en creando el cambio social. Con esta visión, apoya Orquestas Juveniles, como la de Los Ángeles, en todas las partes de los Estados Unidos.

Esta adaptación del Sistema en los Estados Unidos es fundamente significativo en términos de las relaciones internacionales del hemisferio occidental. El gran éxito por su replicación norteamericana indica el cambio de modelos del pensamiento hemisféricos. Como experimentó a través del Sistema, se puede entender la cultura como un instrumento de promover relaciones políticas, resolver problemas sociales regionales y, además de todo, establecer una identidad común entre los países americanos. De esta forma, la cultura se puede ver como una estrategia regional, la cual potencialmente puede resolver la incapacidad de estados americanos de sostener la integración regional.

El Sistema en la Cuarta Ola: examinando la posibilidad de la integración cultural

Hay similitudes entre el Sistema venezolano y las características ya mencionadas de la Cuarta Ola del regionalismo. Específicamente, el Sistema tiene tendencias post-liberales, post-comerciales y post-hegemónicas, que pueden ilustrar la conexión entre ambos grupos. Después de ilustrar las similitudes, sugeriré la posibilidad de la integración regional como movimiento lejos de estrategias políticas o económicas y presentarlo como algo cultural, como es el caso del Sistema.

Hacia el post-liberalismo

En términos de post-liberalismo, el Sistema se ubica dentro de la profunda ideología del Socialismo venezolano. En reacción al gran fracaso de las políticas neoliberales, promovidas por Washington durante los años 1990, algunos países reaccionaron contra estas políticas. Particularmente, en Venezuela, Hugo Chávez comenzó este cambio a la izquierda en sus funciones dentro de su país después de 1999. Como ya he mencionado, cuando Chávez asumió la presidencia, él tomó nota del exitoso programa social de Abreu, e inmediatamente lo asumió estatalmente, transformándose en uno de los productos del socialismo más importantes y exitosos en América Latina. Entonces, especialmente después de su nacionalización chavista, el Sistema se transformaba en un esquema de socialismo muy importante, ubicándose en el grupo post-liberal.

En relación con la ideología socialista, el Sistema mantiene mucha de las mismas características que ilustran su ubicación en la categoría post-liberal. Primero, uno de los principios más importantes de la ideología es la igualdad socioeconómica. El Sistema, a través de sus principios fundamentales, demuestra el progreso socioeconómico para todos. Desde el primer día de existencia, el Sistema ha intentado aumentar socioeconómicamente al pueblo venezolano mediante la música clásica. Fundamentalmente, el Sistema acepta músicos de todas partes de Venezuela, con respeto a sus orígenes, etnicidades y clases socioeconómicas con el fin de enseñarles cómo tocar la música clásica. Se puede ver esto en la estructura del Sistema, o sea, la importancia dada al elemento de la orquesta sinfónica. La orquesta es mucho más que un grupo de músicos leyendo notas y tocando instrumentos; más profundamente es una representación figurativa de la visión socialista venezolana. De otro modo, el Sistema no solo produce músicos, sino seres humanos que sepan como compartir, cooperar y funcionar juntos

e igualmente en la sociedad. En este sentido, el Sistema está buscando y enseñando a la gente producir armonía, literal y figurativamente.

Hacia el post-comercio

Como ya he mencionado, la idea del post-comercio es una extensión de la característica post-liberal. Como han cambiado los focos de organizaciones regionales durante el fin del siglo XX (lejos del comercio y estrategias políticos-económicas; más hacia la cooperación social y cultural), el Sistema también demuestra este cambio. Durante esta transformación de paradigma, los líderes regionales creían y promovían que habría otra forma de lograr el progreso socioeconómico en la región, además del comercio. Estas ideas rompieron la estructura tradicional de la integración, que anteriormente estaba fundamentalmente enfocada en las relaciones económicas y en el comercio. En vez de esto, América Latina ha experimentado que las estrategias no económicas, como las culturales, pueden funcionar y lograr todas las cosas que han intentados los esquemas anteriores. Organizaciones e instituciones como El Sistema han demostrado que pueden funcionar como exitosos cuerpos integrativos.

A través de la historia de América Latina, los Estados han fallado al establecer una estructura integrativa funcional, a pesar de muchísimos intentos. Con respecto a las políticas y las economías, hay una inmensa diversidad a través del continente, lo que puede causar dificultad en integrarse a causa del temor regional de perder la soberanía o la independencia político-económica. Sin embargo, se ha hecho evidente que no es así para las cuestiones culturales. En realidad, es evidente que América Latina está mucho más dispuesta y es más capaz de unificarse alrededor de una identidad común cultural. El Sistema, la institución venezolana y la idea figurativa de utilizar la música para promover el desarrollo socioeconómico, ha convertido en muchas variedades, una identidad latinoamericana. Esto se

puede ver tanto en el reconocimiento internacional (por los premios, las giras, los directores invitados, etc.) como en la réplica del sistema educativo a través de América Latina y el mundo. De hecho, el Sistema ha sido utilizado y adaptado en aproximadamente 25 países en el mundo (Mora Brito, 14). Esta duplicación demuestra su sostenibilidad y éxito así como su potencia como una estrategia integrativa post-comercial.

Hacia la post-hegemonía

La última característica de la Cuarta Ola, y quizás la más evidente en términos de la integración regional, es la post-hegemonía. Con respeto a la política regional con los esquemas integrativos, la Cuarta Ola experimentaba una salida de la hegemonía norteamericana. Esta salido ocurrió después de los ataques del 11 de Septiembre y el subsiguiente cambio de la política extranjera estadounidense para combatir el terrorismo. Esto además de una denuncia hemisférica contra la dominación norteamericana cambiaba el esquema de presencia estadounidense en América Latina. En al ámbito cultural, El Sistema mantiene características que demuestran una lucha contra la hegemonía típica acerca de la música clásica.

Esto se puede ver claramente en las giras internacionales de la Orquesta Sinfónica Simón Bolívar, el producto pináculo del Sistema. En el documental *The Promise of Music*, seguimos la Orquesta durante su viaje a Alemania en 2007. Para algunos de los jóvenes, fue su primer viaje fuera de Venezuela. La Orquesta se preparó para su primer debut internacional en el Festival de Beethoven. Más importante, este festival fue organizado en el *Beethovenhalle* en Bonn, Alemania, la ciudad donde nació. Como era un festival de Beethoven, la Orquesta preparaba un repertorio específicamente sobre la tercera sinfonía de Beethoven, "Heroica." Esta sinfonía fue escrita en 1804, Beethoven la escribió como una dedicación al (luego infame) Napoleón Bonaparte, antes considerado un líder de ideales democráticos y anti-monárquicos de la Revolución Francesa (Sipe, 1998). Sin embargo, cuando se auto-coronó emperador

francés, Beethoven retractó su dedicación. Después de su muerte, Beethoven señaló que la sinfonía fue escrita en homenaje al Napoleón anterior, al que lucha para la democracia y la independencia.

En este contexto, es increíblemente significativo que la Orquesta Sinfónica Simón Bolívar tocara esta sinfonía. Al tocar esta obra, con sentimientos revolucionarios, en el continente colonizador por excelencia era un acto completamente post-hegemónico. Cuando completó la sinfonía técnicamente difícil y emocionalmente dura, la audiencia europea reaccionó con inmenso entusiasmo, dando una ovación de pie a la orquesta sinfónica. Inmediatamente después, salía Dudamel y se apagaban las luces. Cuando se encendieron de nuevo, los músicos habían cambiado sus ropas, ahora usando las chaquetas típicas de Venezuela, las que usaban Chávez y ahora Maduro. Mientras seguía la energía intensa por la audiencia, Dudamel reasumió la posición enfrente de su orquesta y comenzaba a dirigir "Danzón No. 2", escrito por el famoso compositor mexicano Arturo Márquez. Después de tocar una de las sinfonías de Beethoven más conocidas, un acto sumamente significativo, la Orquesta Sinfónica Simón Bolívar comenzó a tocar un repertorio latinoamericano en frente de un audiencia europea. En este sentido, se rompía la forma tradicional del concierto sinfónico por tocar estos sonidos latinoamericanos. También, se rompían la tradicional hegemonía europea en la música clásica a través de tocar, prácticamente impecable, una de las sinfonías más conocidas en toda la historia. El Sistema, a través de los conciertos de la Orquesta Sinfónica Simón Bolívar, continúa combatiendo contra esta hegemonía, bien vista en su representación de los grandes compositores a través de Europa (más notables: La tercera de Beethoven en Alemania (2007), la segunda de Mahler en Inglaterra (2007), la décima de Shostakóvich en Inglaterra (2011), además de las giras europeas anuales). Entonces, a través de su orquesta principal, la Sinfónica Simón Bolívar, el Sistema está actuando post-

hegemónicamente, desafiando la dominación tradicional europea de la música clásica, lo cual ubica el programa en la Cuarta Ola.

Observaciones finales

En las palabras de Gustavo Dudamel, "cuando cada joven tenga acceso a la cultura, el mundo será mucho más tranquilo y maduro" (*The Promise of Music*). Él añade que la música se hace más sensible, y el mundo necesita más de esto. Tal vez, aunque probablemente no tenía la misma intención, Dudamel resume bien el camino donde va la integración regional latinoamericana. Con respecto a la Cuarta Ola, la integración se está moviendo hacia modelos post-liberales, post-comerciales y post-hegemónicos. Proyectos integrativos durante esta ola mayormente se enfocan más en la política o la sociedad, y menos en la economía o el comercio. Más adelante, algunos están encontrando estrategias no tradicionales para fortalecer la integración en la región latinoamericana, por ejemplo unificando alrededor la cultura. En este modo, El Sistema Nacional de Orquestas Juveniles e Infantiles de Venezuela ha demostrado bien esta forma de integración. Principalmente, como he señalado, el Sistema se ubica entre la Cuarta Ola, manteniendo las características más importantes (post-liberal, post-comercio y post-hegemonía). Además, hay algo en relación con la sostenibilidad y el éxito del programa. Yo creo que el hecho de que el Sistema venga de la región latinoamericana, ha permitido su prosperidad y su longevidad, una característica que no tienen otros proyectos históricos de integración. Con respecto al último grupo, la mayoría de estos esquemas han sido impactados e influidos por los Estados Unidos (dependiendo del contexto histórico). Hasta los proyectos de la Cuarta Ola todavía existen como una reacción contra los EE.UU. (en este caso, la ausencia de una fuerza hegemónica). Sin embargo, en términos culturales, históricamente a los EE.UU. no le importaba tanto la idea de latinoamericanos tocando música clásica. Por este punto de vista, la unificación o replicación cultural no está considerada como un amenaza para

el mundo occidental. Por esta razón, sugiero que si al se integrara culturalmente y estableciera una identidad común cultural, podría lograr lo que ha intentado durante toda su existencia.

Sin embargo, algunas precauciones deben tomarse con esta declaración. En un estudio adicional, será interesante investigar más la Orquesta Sinfónica Simon Bolívar, específicamente durante lo años más recientes. Hay algunos que proclaman que, a pesar de ser el producto más importante del socialismo venezolano, hay aspectos del grupo que representa más el capitalismo norteamericano. Por ejemplo, Dudamel, el beneficiario más exitoso del Sistema, se está beneficiando de las estructuras neo-capitalistas (está visto en su contrato de publicidad con *Rolex*; sus conciertos en Las Vegas y, más recientemente, en la *Super Bowl*, dos pináculos del consumismo norteamericano). Estos pensamientos ilustran los desafíos del socialismo, especialmente en relación con la inevitabilidad y la atractabilidad del capitalismo consumista. En este contexto, no estoy insinuando que el Sistema sea otro fracaso de integración latinoamericana, sino más bien que quizás la integración socialista se está volviendo extinta.

EPILOGUE

Towards a Fifth Wave of Regional Integration?

It is time, now, for us to leave the past behind. It is time for us to look forward to the future together—una futura de esperanza. We can make this journey as friends, and as neighbors, and as family—together. Si se puede. Muchas gracias.

US President BARACK OBAMA
(In Havana, Cuba in March 2016)

Nearly 15 years since the beginning of Latin America's fourth wave of regional integration, overall observations remain rather grim. As noted, the current hemispheric regional system has grown inflated and multidimensional with differing regionalist projects, each maintaining different missions, objectives, ideologies, and none having a coherent infrastructure. This leaves many scholars in the field to suggest that regional integration in Latin America has peaked, arguably beyond the point of repair. In my opinion, these observations are melodramatic and focus too heavily on the failures of contemporary projects, while not giving justice to their substantial progress and successes. For me, there are several factors which signal that Latin American integration has not peaked, but rather has the potential to be resurged in a future circumstance.

Firstly, the aforementioned successes of current projects such as UNASUR and CELAC, demonstrate both the potential and the commitment of regional leaders to promote integrative models of development. Both of these groups have shown their ability and effectiveness in serving as a supranational regional body, particularly in the face of crisis. Further, pessimists suggest that regionalism is peaking due to its sub-regional nature. They suggest that hemispheric integration is no longer obtainable, nor relevant, given the divergence of development that has occurred between Latin American states. Many maintain that sub-

regionality threatens the possibility of a hemispheric regional structure. In this context, I would argue that CELAC is a robust solution to this problem. Since its conception, it has both recognized and respected sub-regionality, instead proposing a new concept of inter-American integration. In this regard, CELAC would serve as the all encompassing structure, under which sub-regional groupings would function. Instead, it would maintain the basic, unilateral goals and objectives of the region, such as promoting democracy, protecting human rights, fighting violence, etc., while leaving the economic and political ideological differences to be divided among respective sub-regional grouping. In this sense, this model would be multi-versatile: respecting and encouraging the continuation of sub-regionality throughout Latin America, while also providing the region with the strength, and legitimacy to interact with the U.S. and other world powers. This suggestion, however, does not solve CELAC's issue of insufficient funding or underdeveloped infrastructure, seen by many as great limitations to its future. In order to surpass these hurdles, Latin American leaders must commit to the convergence around certain common goals and objectives. As mentioned previously, regional leaders have been unwilling to commit singularly to a particular regional body, thus causing the current Latin American quagmire. If leaders are able to reach a basic agreement, perhaps converging and committing singularly to CELAC, I believe Latin America may be able to finally achieve its regional dream.

Secondly, in recent years there has been a dramatic shift regarding the relationship between Washington and the hemisphere. Particularly, the Obama Administration has committed wholeheartedly to warming relations with Latin America. Most notably, throughout the past year great strides have been made in improving historically tense relations between Washington and Havana. In April of 2015, Cuba reentered the inter-American community for the first time in decades, after Raúl Castro was invited to the Summit of the Americas

conference in Panama. The historic meeting between the Castro and Obama paved the road for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in June 2015, when embassies were reopened in both Havana and Washington D.C. More recently, In March of 2016, Obama took a historic trip to Havana, once again restoring hope to the Latin American community of a peaceful, cooperative future. Since the momentous meeting between the two leaders in Panama nearly a year ago, US-Cuban relations have dramatically improved, seem furthermore in Obama's call to end the US trade embargo as well as lifting the travel ban to the island. In terms of regional integration, these recent events are monumental. What was before one of the biggest stains of the US record in the eyes of Latin America, has become a new beacon of hope for future hemispheric peace and cooperation. Throughout his presidency, Obama has demonstrated extensively his commitment to improving relations and fostering cooperation with the hemisphere. Many in Latin America remain cautious, however, as they await the outcome of the US presidential election later this year.

Several other recent events are worth noting and have the potential to impact the future state of regional integration throughout the hemisphere. As seen in Chapter Three, initial leaders of the "Pink Wave", as well Latin America's shift towards inwardness and anti-imperialist solidarity were Brazil and Venezuela. The current internal political state in both countries signals, perhaps, an end to their regional leadership as well as subsequently their regionalist creations. Both countries, now lead by Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, have experienced incredibly low approval rates, resulting from extreme economic and political turmoil. The fall of leading pink tide leaders signals that this political wave may be ending. Moreover, in November of 2015, right-wing candidate Mauricio Macri, won the presidential race in Argentina. Similarly, center-right oppositionists swept the Venezuelan legislative elections in December of 2015. More recently in 2016, Dilma Rousseff

faces impeachment trials following major corruption scandals regarding one of Brazils largest state owned petroleum firms, *Petrobas* (Caistor, 2015). Chávez, Rousseff, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (former Argentine President) were among the most vocal in promoting progressive values as well as denouncing the United States. The fact that their administrations are losing substantial amounts of power and popularity, signals to many an end of the "Pink Wave". As seen with Macri, post-pink wave leaders may be more interested in improving relations with the United States. Following Obamas historic trip to Cuba earlier this March, he continued to Buenos Aires, Argentina, a country he would not dare travel to four months prior, to reestablish diplomatic relations with his newfound ally, and friend, Macri. The aforementioned events are fascinating and worth acknowledging due to their recentness.

As Brazil continues to spiral internally, it as well loses international legitimacy. This worth noting given that just a few years' prior, Brazil was considered one of the most important emerging economies in the world, seen for example in its inclusion in the BRICS and IBSA groups. In October of 2015, however, Goldman Sachs ended its BRICS investment fund, following disappointing and lackluster economic growth rates (Timmons, 2015). This, in conjunction with corruption scandal and political chaos leave many questioning Brazil's importance to the international community. Its expected disastrous performance during the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro this upcoming August may be the final straw regarding Brazil's international clout. With regards to Latin American regionalism, it is worth predicting that Brazil may be forced to reconsider and recommit to regional integration, of which it has largely abandoned in recent years. This, however, assumes that it maintains any legitimacy left among its regional neighbors.

I believe that the aforementioned regional events signal a paradigm shift of both regional governance and hemispheric relations. Given the reversal of pink tide ideals in much

of the region, as well the warming of US-Latin American relations, I would suggest that a new wave, a fifth wave, of regional integration is emerging. In this new period, old regional structures of the fourth wave have developed and proved themselves as robust regional schemes. They have the potential, like CELAC for example, to move away from ideology, and instead serve as an umbrella integrative model which respects and promotes Latin America's vast political, economic, societal, and cultural diversity. Perhaps, as seen in my analysis of El Sistema, cultural projects and schemes may characterize this fifth wave. In this context, Bolívar's dream of unification, or even traditional integration, is no longer possible nor relevant. Instead, as the Latin America has diverged throughout time, perhaps a neo-Bolivarian concept of regional integration is more relevant, embracing the vast diversities that exist throughout the region, instead of converging them. This encompassment does not threaten Latin America's regional identity, but rather deepens it. This neo-Bolivarian concept of regionality offers Latin America a legitimized regional voice, characterized by vibrant diversity, something I think Simón Bolívar himself would admire.

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