By the election of Nov ~~6~~ 18~~xx~~60 A L became president-elect of the ~~the~~ U.S. ~~three~~ ~~[illegible]~~ four months however ~~he could do nothing towards~~ for before he ~~would~~ had via the ~~power~~ opportunity to exercise any direct influence on the affairs of the country. ~~A Democratic administration in sympathy with the South was in power. It might aid the South in the the making good its threat of secession if it would. L. could not~~

If the South tried at once to make good its threat of secession ~~in~~ he could do nothing ~~for 4 months~~ to stop them. They did try at once. ~~The president-elect could do nothing to prevent it. The news~~ with the very ~~of his election had hardly reached~~ The ~~[illegible]~~ telegraph brought him L. ~~before~~ ~~be there came~~ began to receive there came from the South declaration after declaration. The Union had begun to go to pieces. ~~Sitting in his~~ Every morning's paper ~~almost every hour the telegraph~~ brought the president-elect reports of some new ~~catastrophe~~ defection. On Nov 10 the U.S. Senator from S.C. resigned and 5 weeks later

~~At~~ with the election returns
Mr L. received news of Southern revolt

2

the state passed an ordinance of secession and ~~organized~~ began to organize an independent government. On Nov 18 Ga appropriated 1,000,000 to arm the state. All over the south militia companies were forming, arms were preparing. ~~Morning after morning Lincoln saw the organized force of the South gaining strength.~~

By the end of ~~Janu~~ December So Carolina had in her possession all the Federal property in the state save ~~the~~ the forts in her harbor ~~and the~~ ~~Mr Buchanan refused to strengthen the small garrison which held these~~ and their commander Major Anderson was obliged to abandon the weaker Ft Moultrie and retire to the one which commanded the harbor Ft Sumter. The only remnant of ~~Federal~~ Federal authority remaining in So Ca. at the end of 1860 was ~~the~~ a small band of soldiers [illegible] commanded ~~on~~ at Sumter.

Morning after morning L. saw the ~~power~~ organized power of the South in~~crease~~. While these [illegible] was going on [illegible] Conventions were called in Nov by Ga & Miss to act on secession. In Dec, Florida & Louisiana called similar conventions. In January five states seceded and on Feb 1 Texas joined them

By the end of ~~December~~ December the only remnant of Federal authority in So Ca was a small garrison of commanded by Major Anderson occupying Ft ~~Moultrie~~ Sumter, the remaining ~~[illegible]~~ forts & batteries of the harbor, the light-house tender, the Arsenal Post-office & Custom House everything in short in the state ~~over~~ which the stars & S. ~~[illegible]~~ had floated were now under the palmetto banner

In the ~~gulf office in~~ ~~[illegible]~~ read of the legislatures ~~Each called~~ of a convention after convention called to consider secession and in January [illegible] ratified four states — Miss Jan 9 Fla 10 Ala 11 Ga 19 La 25 — go out. They were quickly followed on Feb 1 by Texas. The six states united in a general convention at Montgomery Alabama on Feb 4 Some newspapers told how seriously & intelligently they formed a new ~~[illegible]~~ calling it the Southern Confederacy, framed for it a constitution, & civil officers e through the period of enforced waiting

He saw these states steadily preparing ~~On Feb These states met in Montgomery Alabama and there formed a Southern Confederacy While Legislating themselves out of the Union the states were preparing~~ to defend their course by arms if need be. On Nov 18. Ga appropriated 1000,000 to arm the state and wherever Georgia ~~s[illegible]~~ seized Forts Pulaski and Jackson & the U.S. arsenal, Georgia

2 Alabama seized arms, munitions of war, a revenue cutter belonging to the federal government. Louisiana appropriated all the federal property in her borders even to the mint & custom house & the money they contained.

When the new government was formed at Montgomery it promptly took up the question of defending its life was obliged to sit helplessly by watching the dismemberment of the Union he was elected to govern

and taking note of all the Federal property in its borders

Mr Lincoln saw not only that the South was going out, but that the ~~#~~ administration which he was to succeed was doing nothing to prevent the catastrophe. Indeed all through Nov. & Dec proofs accumulated that members of ~~the~~ Mr Buchanan's cabinet had been systematically working ~~fo~~ throughout 1860 to prepare the South for resistance to federal authority in case of Mr Lincoln's election.

See McClure ser.

Arms had been transferred South, ~~the~~ the greater part of the navy sent into foreign waters, every effort made in short to disarm the North & equip the So for the emergency. Day by day proofs of ~~crime~~ to ~~them~~ ~~they~~ ~~correspondence~~, ~~by interviews~~ by ~~frauds~~ revealed to the public that while he could do nothing to stop secession, the administration would not.

From Springfield came etc

" Pittsburg N. & H. V. 3. p. 128.

The loyal men of the navy

4

Dismay filled the North at this rapid course of events. It must be stopped. Secession must be [illegible] There must be a compromise. The republicans must yield enough of their platform to satisfy the Southern states & save the Union. A furious clamor broke on Mr Lincoln's head. His election had caused this strife what would he do now to quell it – to restore peace & bring back trade

4.

The knowledge that the South was actually accomplishing secession ~~aprising dismay in the North~~ filled the North with dismay. There was a general demand for some compromise which would satisfy her and ~~preserve the Union~~ restore her confidence in the Union. Congress, the press, thousands of individuals set themselves at devising schemes of adjustment – ~~The Republicans were among the most earnest and fertile in this work but as they knew any plan of theirs which~~ Mr Lincoln's approval ~~of these schemes~~ was of course of paramount importance and he was beset for his opinion. Did he believe in compromise? Would he throw the weight of his authority for this or that plan? ~~The~~ Conservative Democrats ~~press~~ who ~~sympathizing to a degree with the~~ [illegible] believed the South had not been treated fairly by the North & which was anxious to ~~see~~ satisfy her now beset him to ~~give~~ give for a public expression of his opinion of what should be done in the crisis. This press was best represented by the

How much of the Republican press agreed
of his views was undetermined he gave it
on every side

N.Y. Herald which in a series of able and deeply serious editorials pled with Lincoln almost daily for two months to announce himself in ~~it~~ some form of compromise. for "If Mr L. aimed carrying on government according to the principles of the Chicago platform ~~Rep party~~ wrote the Herald in Dec. etc. and the documents of the Republican National Committee, etc.

Dec 10.

promising any compromise
A word from him would allay the fears of the South.

summarize L's view.

~~But~~ To the pleas of the press were added the pressure of thousands of letters & the personal appeals of scores of visitors. He refused all such appeals "I know declared the Herald

He was a "sectional president" who out of 4,700,000 votes cast had received but 1,850,000. The South had had no part in electing him, regarded his election as a declaration of war.

~~It was only to the general public however that he refused to express himself. To the many leading republicans who alarmed at the danger which threatened the Union turned all their efforts to conciliation Lincoln spoke freely and most often.~~

This refusal to speak was not because he was himself ~~in any way~~ uncertain about ~~his~~ future then policy. It was not a method for gaining time, for ~~a~~ allowing events to develop and then when his day arrived agilely adapting himself to the situation. ~~He was perfectly clear as to his own position on compromise and~~ to a ~~compromise and~~ to the Republican leaders whom he trusted he expressed himself freely and fully as to [illegible]

[illegible] he might say would be judged by his determination not to change a single plank of the Rep. platform or of his past professions

Thus at the opening of Congress the House had appointed a committee of 33 (one from each state) to

epist. he wrote to a correspondent
4 days after his election
See L. & S. (Smith) p 654, Vol I.

The clamor became so loud that even the Times under Henry J. Raymond asked him to give them his views. He refused, and gave Raymond what he called a "demonstration" of the correctness of his position
quote p 656 of Vol I. N & H.
Raymond
"On the 20th inst (Nov) etc.

But

-- "If Mr Lincoln intends to carry on the government according to the principles laid down in the Chicago platform and the documents issued under the authority of the Republican "national" committee, the inevitable tendency of his administration will be to encourage servile insurrections and to make the Southern states still more uncomfortable within the Union than they could by any possibility be without it; -- If the next President recognises the fact that he is not bound by the Chicago platform - the people having repudiated it; -- if he comes out and tells the people that he will govern the country according to the views of the majority, and not to serve the purposes of the minority, all may yet be well. -- Mr Lincoln must throw his pledges to the ~~the~~ winds, let his party go to perdition in its own way, & devote himself to the service of the whole country. It is Mr Lincoln's bounden duty to come out now & declare his views."

6.

and when ~~the~~ South had had no part in electing ~~him~~.

See copy.

7.

It was not only the the opposition press which urged Mr Lincoln to offer some kind of compromise, many frightened Republicans added their voices, the pressure of thousands of letters and the personal appeals of scores of visitors were added to the arguments of the press. Lincoln, however, refused to express his views anew. "I know,

"I know

8.

and now self-respect demands of me and of the party that has elected me that when threatened I should be silent".

(13

the justness of my ~~views~~ intentions" he told an interviewer in Nov. "and the utter groundlessness of the pretended fears of the men who are filling the country with their clamor. If I go into the Presidency they will find me as I am on record, nothing less, nothing more. My declarations have been made to the world without reservation. They have been often repeated

Post. Nov. 19.

consider "the present perilous condition of the country". Illinois was represented on the committee by a republican (?) Wm. Kellogg. The republicans on the committee, wanted to know what Mr L. would yield and Wm Kellogg wrote him. His reply ~~was~~ (dated Dec 11) was ~~[illegible]~~, succinct & ~~intelligent~~ (?) unmistakable

"Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery. The instant you do they have us under again all

p. 657. N & H, Vol. I.

[illegible] propositions N & H V3 p 434

While the Committee of 33 groped for ~~a method of~~ a settlement in the House, a committee of 13 was busy in the Senate in the same search. On this committee was Wm H. Seward. ~~He [illegible]~~ most of the leaders of his party was anxious to arrive at some conciliatory measures and in December, when ~~[illegible]~~ Thurlow Weed who was ~~also~~ so concerned over

Washburne . 658

8

the situation that he went himself to
talk with L. Seward asked Weed to
bring back from the president elect
a suggestion to guide the repub-
lican members. ~~the~~ Lincoln
~~prepared such a suggestion~~ &
~~Mr Seward presented it~~ but they
it did not satisfy the majority of the
~~consideration~~ the committee of
~~[illegible]~~ mighty majority of 33 in the House
13 ~~as~~ ~~[illegible]~~
never came to any agreement.
In the meantime Thurlow Weed
was considering on his own
responsibility a convention of
governors of several states
all in the interest of com-
promise & he sought an
~~expr.~~ L's views in conference to present to
them

Should the convocation of
governors of which you speak
seem desirable to know my views

Ni. L&S. p. 459. V. 1.
(Weed.)

so short a time – the [illegible]
[illegible] speech from the
Seward papers.

Business was brought almost to a stand-still throughout the North, ~~at this pass~~ by the prospect of disunion and numbers of prominent men of wealth urged the President-elect to say something conciliatory for the sake of trade! -

"I am not insensible to any commercial or financial depression that may exist" he wrote to one gentleman ~~in reply to such~~ an appeal.

See Letters & Speeches Vol. I. p. 654

And to Henry J. Raymond the editor of the N. Y. Times he ~~wrote~~ gave in answer to a request for his views ~~on affairs~~ what he called a "demonstration" of ~~his~~ the correctness of his judgment that he should say nothing for the public just now: -

"On the 20th inst" (November), he wrote "Senator Trumbull etc

Letters & Speeches. p. 656. Vol I,

While refusing to express himself at all for the general public at this time Lincoln ~~commented~~ wrote & talked freely to the Republicans leaders about his ideas of compromise. Almost all of ~~these~~ whom were engaged busy with one or another ~~[illegible]~~ scheme for adjusting the distracted country ~~At the opening of the Congress the House had appointed and~~ and naturally sought his ~~Mr Lincoln~~ criticisms and advice

On the opening of congress a committee of 33 had been appointed by the House to consider "the present perilous condition of the country" and the Republican members wished to know what Mr Lincoln would yield. The Hon Wm Kellogg the Illinois member of the committee wrote him. His reply dated Dec 11 is unmistakeable

See Page 657. of Letters & Speeches

While the committee of (33) groped for a settlement in the House, a Committee of (13) was busy in the Senate in the same search. On this committee was Wm. H. Seward and he too sent to Mr Lincoln for a suggestion. In reply the president elect sent Mr Seward, by Thurlow Weed, a memorandum of his views. This document has been lost and no record of its contents is known. That ~~but he~~ it was ~~undoubtedly the~~ direct and clear in its statements ~~for Seward who was intent at the moment on conciliation~~ we can judge from Mr Lincoln's letter to the Hon. E. B. Washburne written about the same time. — ~~and for the purpose of giving Mr Lincoln an idea of what was being done by the Republicans in Congress in the way of compromise~~

Page 256. of Letters & Speeches, copy letter to Washburne, These expressions were all made in December before while secession was still in its infancy. The alarming developments of December did not cause him to waver!

"What is our present condition" he wrote the Hon J. T. Hale on January 11 – "We have just carried an election" etc.

See Letters & Speeches. p 664.

It was by no means the North alone which appealed to Mr Lincoln to compromise; the Unionists of the South urged him for an explanation which they might present to ~~the~~ the people as proof that there was nothing to fear from his election. Lincoln had no faith that any expression of his would be heeded. Yet he did confidentially express himself frankly to many Southerners who came to see him in Springfield and there are two letters of his in existence ~~which~~ show how ~~completely~~ he grasped the essential differences between the North & South & ~~was~~ with what justice and kindness he put the case to ~~those who disagreed with him~~. The first of these letters was to John A Gilmer ~~of~~ No Carolina, a member of Congress from ~~that state who was~~ who desired earnestly to preserve the Union but not unless the rights of the South were considered. Mr Gilmer had written Mr Lincoln asking his position on certain questions. Lincoln replied.

Copy Letter to Gilmer p. 658 of Letters & Speeches

#

A week later he wrote to A. H. Stephens of Georgia in reply to a note in which Stephens had said, "The country is certainly in great peril, and no man ever had heavier or greater responsibilities resting upon him than you have in the present momentous crisis." —

(Copy letter to Stephens. p. 660. Letters & Speeches)

The uproar which raged about Mr Lincoln soon became quite as loud ~~over [illegible]~~ as over compromise. Each passing week made conciliation more difficult, saw new elements of disunion realized. What was to be done with the seceding states? What was to be done about the forts & arsenals, custom houses post-offices they were seizing?

If Mr Lincoln would not compromise was he going to let the states & the federal property go, or was he going to compel them to return? Did he propose to coerce the South? ~~of~~

Though the president-elect refused to give any ~~public~~ expression of opinion on the subject to the country it was not because he was not perfectly clear in his own mind. Secession he considered impossible. "My opinion is" so he wrote Thurlow Weed on Dec 17 "that no state can in any way lawfully get out of the Union without the consent of the others; and that it is the duty of the President and other government functionaries to run the machine as it is".

When Greeley ~~came out with his~~ advocated letting the "wayward sisters go in peace" Lincoln said nothing though in Springfield it was believed that he considered the policy "dangerous & illogical"

He certainly was only amused at Fernando Wood's scheme to take New York city out of the Union & make it a free city – another Hamburg. "I reckon" he said to a New Yorker in February in discussing the subject, "that it will be some time before the front door sets up housekeeping on its own account."

As to the forts and other federal property seized by the out-going states he seems to have felt from the first that they ~~are~~ were to be retaken. In this matter he sought guidance from Old Hickory. For less than a week after his election a correspondent of the Evening Post found him engaged in reading the history of the nullifiers of 1832 and of the summary way in which Andrew Jackson squashed the revolt. In December he wrote his friend E. B. Washburne who had just reported to him an interview with General Scott.

the commander-in-chief of the army on the dangers of the situation

"please present my respects to the general and tell him, confidentially that I shall be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can to either hold or retake the forts as the case may require, at and after the inauguration."

And the very next day he wrote the following letter, which has only recently been discovered and never before printed.

Confidential

Springfield, Ills. Dec. $\overset{22}{22}$, 1860

Major David Hunter
My Dear Sir:

I am much obliged by the receipt of yours of the 18th. The most we can do now is to watch events, and be as well prepared as possible for any turn things may take. If the forts fall, my judgment is that they are to be retaken. When I shall determine definitely my time of starting to Washington, I will notify you.

Yours truly
A. Lincoln.

From the above letters it will be seen that Mr Lin-who had stripped the
verbiage
questions of the day of all verbage and non-essentials and reduced them to a series of simple propositions. ~~self evident pro~~

(1) Slavery is wrong & must not be extended.

(2) Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery.

(3) No state can in any way lawfully get out of the union without the consent of the others; it is the duty of the President & other government functionaries to run the machine as it is.

(4) If the forts fall my judgment is they are to be retaken.

To these simple statements he stuck unyieldingly this period of confusion and distress refusing to allow them to be obscured by words & passion. [illegible]
and

Making then his pride in the work of preparation for his inauguration. Three things occupied him especially in this preparation. (1) Getting acquainted with the men he was to be associated with in the administration; (2) His Cabinet; (3) His Inaugural.

¶ The first letter Lincoln wrote after his election was to Hannibal Hamlin, the vice-president elect, asking for an interview. The two gentlemen met at the Tremont House, Chicago on Nov. 23. Mr Hamlin once gave to a friend, Mr C. J. Prescott of New York, an account of this meeting which ~~and~~ Mr Prescott has written out for this article; —

See Copy

struggle ~~to get~~ up in the world. He had worked on a farm, chopped logs, taught-school, studied law at night, turned in short with cheerful eagerness to any job which would help him to realize his ambitions. Like Lincoln ~~he~~ Hamlin had gone early into politics and like him he had ~~had~~ with his party in 1854 to join the Republicans There was the same kind of Democratic feeling in the two men - both "marched with the boys" and both were eminently companionable, Hamlin telling a good story as well as Lincoln did and telling almost as many and with the same quaint- ~~[illegible]~~ ways of putting things. ~~Since the nomination Hamlin had rendered~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~Lincoln a service to which the latter was not likely to forget.~~

¶ A great many other men were summoned to Springfield by Lincoln in order that he might learn their views more perfectly. Among those who came either by his direct or indirect invitation were Edward Bates, Thurlow Weed, David Wilmot, A. K. McClure, Geo. W. Julian, E. D. Baker, Wm. Sweeney, Horace Greeley, Carl Schurz

With ~~most~~ many of these ~~persons~~ men Lincoln did not hesitate to talk over the Cabinet. Thurlow Weed says that when he visited the president-elect in December, he ~~did not hesitate~~ introduced the subject of the Cabinet by saying that "he supposed I had had some experience in cabinet-making, that he had a job on hand and as he had never learned that trade, he was disposed to avail himself of the suggestions of friends. "The making of a cabinet" he continued, "now that he had it to do, was by no means as easy as he had supposed; that he had even before the result of the election was known assuming the probability of success fixed upon the two leading members of his cabinet, but that in looking about for suitable men to fill the other departments he had been much embarrassed partly from his want of acquaintance with the prominent men of the day and partly he believed because that-while the population had greatly increased, really great men were scarcer than they used to be".

The two members of his cabinet on whom Lincoln fixed so early were Seward and Chase. "It, from the day of the nomination at Chicago" has been my purpose, he wrote Seward on Dec 8, when he asked permission to nominate him as secretary of state "to assign etc =

See Letters & Speeches. p 657.

Seward took 3 weeks to consider and finally on Dec 28 wrote that "after due reflection & much self-distrust" he had concluded it was his duty to accept.

Lincoln did not approach Chase on the subject of the cabinet until some 3 weeks after he had written Seward. Then on Dec 31 he wrote him a brief note! —

"In these troublous times I would much like a conference with you. Please visit me here at once". Chase reached Springfield on the evening of Jan 3 and Lincoln in his informal way went to the hotel to see him. ~~He went him at once though he had sent for him.~~ Chase afterwards described the interview in a letter

#7 24

Gideon. p 344

to a friend:-

"He said he had felt bound to offer the position of Secty of State to Mr Seward as the generally recognized leader of the republican party intending if he should decline it, to offer it to me. He did not wish that Mr Senator Seward decline it & was glad that he had accepted, & now desired to have me take the place of Secretary of the Treasury"

Chase did not promise but accept, only to think it over - and so the situation stood until the appointment was actually made in March.

It was Pennsylvania & the Senate which gave (L) the greatest trouble. "Pa" he told Weed "any more than New York or Ohio, cannot be overlooked. Her strong Republican vote, not less than her numerical importance entitles her to a representative in the Cabinet"

After a careful "balancing of matters" as he called it; Lincoln concluded to appoint Simon Cameron as the Pennsylvania cabinet member and on Dec 31, he gave Cameron who had been for 8 days in Springfield discussing the situation, the following letter: —

See p 642. Letters & Speeches.

Cameron had scarcely reached home with his letter before those opposed to him in Pennsylvania had frightened Lincoln into believing that the lack of trust in Cameron's honesty which and existed throughout the country would do much to destroy faith in the new cabinet and he withdrew the nomination. Later he assured Cameron that the withdrawal did not spring from any change of his views as to the ability or faithfulness with which he would discharge the duties of the place and he also promised not to make a cabinet appointment for (Pa) without consulting him and giving all the weight to considbility could to his views and wishes and there the matter remained until in March Lincoln went back to his first judgment and named Cameron.

Among conciliatory Republicans there was a strong desire that L. find as soon as possible a member of his Cabinet in the South & that he make his choice known. It was believed that such an act would ~~act as~~ be taken as a proof that the new president intended to consider the claims of the South. Lincoln did not believe the idea practical and he showed the difficulties in the way very shrewdly by causing to be inserted in the "Illinois Journal" a paper popularly called his "organ," the following short editorial: —

See p. 458. Letters & Speeches.

The demand for continued, however, Weed told Lincoln in December that in his opinion at least ② of the members of the cabinet selected from the South. Lincoln was doubtful if they could be trusted. "There are men in Maryland Virginia, North Carolina & Tennessee", replied Weed, for whose loyalty under any circumstances and in any event, I would vouch"

"Well" said Lincoln "Let us have the names of your white-black birds". ~~Lincoln~~ Weed gave him 4 names. Mr Seward a little later suggested several and Mr Greeley likewise sent him a list of five southerners whom he declared it would be safe to take into the official family. Of all named Lincoln preferred John A Gilmer of No. Ca. and he invited him to come to Springfield for an interview. As late as January 12. he wrote Seward:— "I still hope Mr Gilmer will on a fair understanding with us, consent to take a place in the cabinet — I fear if we could get we could not safely take more than one such man — that is, not more than one who opposed us in the election, the danger being to lose the confidence of our friends."

Mr Gilmer did not ~~g~~ accept Mr Lincoln's invitation to Springfield however and nothing ever came of the approach made him. The nearest to the South which he Lin- came in his cabinet — was in appointing Edward Bates of Missouri. He was one of the men whom L. had decided upon as soon as he knew of his election and he was the first — after Seward to be notified. A representative from Indiana was ~~wanted~~ desirable and Caleb Smith was put in the slate provisionally. It was necessary, too, that New England have a place in the Cabinet. Mr Lincoln had three candidates of all of whom he thought well: ~~Mr~~ Tuck of New Hampshire, Banks of Massachusetts, Gideon Welles of Connecticut. Of these one he wanted he seems to have selected as soon as elected & which in spite of all clamors he carried to Washington.

The writing of the Inaugural.

About the middle of January 1861. Lincoln began to prepare his inaugural. A more desperate situation than existed at that moment it would be hard to imagine. Every peace measure had failed so far and every day the endless discussions of press and senate chamber were increasing the anger and the bewilderment of the people. Four states had left the Union and the South was rapidly accepting the idea of separate nationality. The North was desperate and helpless. All the bitterness and the confusion centered about Lincoln. A thousand things told him how serious was the situation; the anxious faces of his townsmen of southern sympathies, the warnings of good men who sought him from north & south, letters threatening him with death, sketches of gibbets and ~~[illegible]~~ stilettos.

Yet in spite of it all when they thought it time to write the document which ~~[illegible]~~ the country would expect to offer a solution for the problems he calmly locked himself up in an upper room over a store across the street from the State House where he had his office and there with no books but a copy of the constitution, Henry Clay's Speech of 1850, Jackson's Proclamation against Nullification & Webster's Reply to Hayne, he wrote the Inaugural. Wishing a few extra copies of it he went to the General Manager of the Illinois State Journal, Major Wm. H. Bailhache, now of San Diego, Cal, to arrange it. Major Bailhache has prepared for this article a statement of the incident: —

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