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Understanding Race and Nation in Post-Dictatorial Haiti

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I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

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ABSTRACT

The goal of this study is to explore what has become of "the color question" in Haiti's contemporary period. Haiti's long history of color-based social stratification served as the basis for political instability and chaos for centuries, and color difference was the basis of François Duvalier's election to power in 1957. The fall of dictatorship in 1986, however, marked the country's transition to a period focused on economic development and progress, which politicized class instead of color difference. In this study, I therefore ask: how does the color question influence politics in Haiti's post-dictatorial period? I answer this question by exploring the history of Haiti through the prism of race and color and identifying the ways in which color has been politicized. I focus on Haiti's colonial and revolutionary periods, as well as its twentieth century politics and the rise of the Duvalier Dictatorship. I then consider the decline of color and the rise of class in political discourse since dictatorship. I argue that the (de)politicizations of class and color in Haiti depend on political elites' strategic use of those divisions as a means of gaining political power, and that politicization does not accurately reflect social divisions. I then argue that the influence of the color question on politics can best be seen in questions of nationalism. The disconnect between ethnic and civic nationalism in Haiti demonstrates the divisiveness of Haitian politics and the fundamental nature of the color question as an obstacle to unity and progress in the country.

INTRODUCTION

THE COLOR QUESTION

Haiti has been the subject of much writing. It is a popular subject in the media, and for good reason – a lot happens there. The country has received particular attention since it was struck with an earthquake in January of 2010. It has since been the scene of a cholera outbreak and fraudulent elections, which seem to have thrown the country into a frenzy of media coverage. Haiti is also quite often the subject of social science research, which generally casts it in the light of political instability, extreme poverty, or the failure of international and foreign aid. These are all subjects of immense importance to Haiti: they are enormous obstacles to the country's elusive progress. But what is often missing from these studies is a consideration of the internal and historical factors that are at play. It is true that Haiti has had a vast array of political failures, poverty, and issues of underdevelopment – but the more important question is: why?

It is my goal in this thesis to understand Haiti's history and politics through the prism of perhaps the country's most deep-seated issue: the color question. The color question in Haiti is one that fuses together notions of race with class, creating a system of social stratification based on both skin tone (or shade) and wealth. It is important to think of the color question in this dualistic way, even though for much of the country's history, the most salient social difference was the shade of one's skin. Social and political groups formed on this basis: François Duvalier – Haiti's most ruthlessly violent and nationalistic leader – used skin color as the basis of his political support and claim to power. The significance of the color question in Haiti's history is profound; but, as the abovementioned social science research displays, Haiti appears to have moved beyond notions of race or color since the fall of the dictatorship in 1986 and into a period fo-

cused more on economic development and the progress of the nation. So, I ask, what has become of the color question in this post-dictatorial period?

This is the central question of my research. The historical foundations of the color question and its influence over twentieth century Haitian politics inform the answer to this question, but would also provide very different answers if my research focused exclusively on those periods. Focusing on the post-dictatorial period reorients the implications of this research in two main ways. First, this research can respond to unanswered questions in other social science research on Haiti that does not focus on the internal social or political mechanisms behind Haiti's lack of progress. Second, examining the role of the color question at a time when color no longer appears politically salient in Haiti offers the country the possibility of shedding light on racial or ethnic politics across the globe. It is my hope that the impact of this research goes beyond the narrow implication of color politics in Haiti and can be extended to help understand politics in a broader way.

This thesis is divided into three chapters. In the first, I explore the historical and intellectual foundations of the color question in Haiti. Understanding the roots and origins of the color question during Haiti's period as a colony of Spain and France helps to clarify the Haitian conceptions of race and color. I explore how Haiti's position as a slave colony of France evolved over time to create the social groups that would come to be known today as Black and Mulatto. And lastly, I explore the intellectual and ideological movements that formed in Haiti and that were the bases of the politicization of color in the twentieth century.

It is important to note here that I very rarely refer throughout this study to the color question in terms of "race." The nature of the stratification during the colonial period requires a more specific terminology for the social divisions in the country. For this reason, I almost always refer

to "color," which more properly reflects the variation in skin shade which served as the basis for stratification. Though my "color" terminology in this case differs from much of the literature on racial or ethnic politics, it is still useful to think of color in Haiti as one might of race or ethnicity in other countries; they are the same insofar as they are phenotypical or primordial bases of identity or classification.

In the second chapter, I focus on twentieth century politics – from the U.S. occupation to the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship and the return to democracy – paying particular attention to the role of color in politics. It was during this period that color became most explicitly politicized, largely due to the Black Nationalist movement developed and promoted by Haitian dictator François Duvalier. I explore how color was used as a basis for political mobilization for Duvalier, and how he came to also depoliticize color in Haiti. Finally, I end the chapter by analyzing the return to democracy and the obstruction of color difference in political discourse by class difference. That color, such a deep-seated source of tension in Haitian society, came to be suddenly depoliticized is an interesting development in the country's politics, and is the subject of the third and final chapter.

In the last chapter, I use theories on racial and ethnic politics in order to explain both the politicization and subsequent depoliticization of color in political discourse in Haiti. I argue first and foremost that color became so highly politicized in Haiti due to political elites, who identified the salience and authenticity of color divisions in Haitian society, and sought to excite those divisions as a means of building political support and gaining access to political power. Establishing that color has not appeared to be politically salient since the fall of the dictatorship, I argue that the color question is still politically relevant in Haiti and can be seen in questions of nationalism. That Haitian politics continues to be dominated by social, economic, and political

elites and has failed to address the needs and demands of the masses has created a disconnect between ethnic and civic nationalism. It is in this disconnect, I argue, that the influence of the color question on politics can be seen because of the very nature of the color question: to speak of class in Haiti is inevitably to speak of color.

The color question in Haiti is one of the many issues with which the country struggles, but it is one of incredible importance and relevance in Haiti since it has served as the basis for division and instability in the country for so long. Hopefully understanding the influence of the color question and how it continues to present an obstacle to progress in Haiti will allow us to better address and grapple with the various problems that Haiti faces.

CHAPITRE UN

LES ORIGINES HISTORIQUES ET INTELLECTUELLES DE LA QUESTION DE COULEUR EN HAÏTI

La Vue d'ensemble

La question de couleur en Haïti est profonde. Pendant le colonialisme, la couleur de peau était une base pour la stratification sociale de la société haïtienne, et il y avait plusieurs identifications selon les « types » de couleur. Après l'indépendance, la nouvelle constitution haïtienne a déclaré que tous les Haïtiens – sans tenir compte de l'origine, de la couleur de peau ni de classe sociale – étaient noirs. La couleur était plus tard la base du pouvoir politique de François Duvalier, le chef d'Etat le plus extrême et le plus nationaliste d'Haïti. On ne peut pas ignorer l'influence de la question de couleur dans la politique en Haïti. Afin de comprendre son importance dans la société haïtienne contemporaine, il faut premièrement comprendre ses origines comme on la conçoit aujourd'hui. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudierons les moments et les développements clé dans l'histoire d'Haïti à travers la question de couleur. Nous considérerons premièrement les périodes de colonialisme et d'esclavage, et nous étudierons ensuite les idéologies de couleur en Haïti.

Esclavage et colonialisme

La société moderne d'Haïti est, comme celles de la majorité des pays du tiers monde, le produit de sa longue histoire difficile. Dans son livre bien célèbre et célébré, *The Black Jacobins*, C.L.R. James donne un compte-rendu passionné de l'arrivée des Espagnols sur l'île qu'on connaît aujourd'hui comme Haïti, mais que les Espagnols ont appelée *Hispaniola*. James résume l'histoire, disant que Christophe Colomb est arrivé premièrement aux Caraïbes dans « Le Nouveau Monde » en 1492 et a vite introduit le christianisme, le travail forcé, la maladie et le

meurtre. Après une courte période de quinze ans, la population des Indigènes en Haïti a été réduite de 500,000 personnes à 60,000. En 1517, Charles V, le roi d'Espagne, a approuvé l'exportation de 15,000 Africains à Saint-Domingue, lançant ainsi l'esclavage et la traite des esclaves (James 3-5). C'est ainsi que l'histoire d'Haïti a commencé, et c'est la base historique de la société contemporaine du pays.

La Découverte et le développement de l'île

Christophe Colomb est arrivé en 1492 sur l'île d'*Ayti* comme les Arawaks, les Indigènes de l'île, l'ont appelée. L'île était vite colonisée par les Espagnols. Comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné, la population indigène de l'île a presque été éradiquée, tuée ou mariée à des Espagnols peu de temps après la colonisation. Rien de distinctif de la civilisation indigène n'a survécu à la période pré-colombienne (Nicholls, *From* 19). Afin de maintenir l'existence de la colonie après la mort des Indigènes, les Espagnols ont commencé à importer des esclaves d'Afrique – mais cette entreprise ne s'est pas réalisée sans difficultés. Bartolomé de las Casas, un prêtre dominicain et le protecteur des Indigènes, s'est rendu compte des atrocités que l'Espagne commettait sur l'île, et a plaidé pour la fin de l'esclavage des Indigènes. Au lieu de cela, las Casas et Charles V ont commencé l'importation des africains « plus robustes » sur l'île en 1518 (Lewis 101). Durant cette année, 15,000 Africains sont arrivés sur l'île (James 4).

Des boucaniers français sont arrivés sur l'île en 1629, et ont débarqué au nord-ouest de l'île, où ils ont pu attaquer les Espagnols déjà établis sur l'île (Nicholls 19; James 4). Ils y sont restés, et comme le pouvoir espagnol déclinait, les Français ont pu acquérir la partie ouest de l'île en 1697 par le traité de Ryswick (Dupuy, *World* 11; Mintz 270). Après quelques années, les colons français ont commencé à arriver en grand nombre, et ils ont développé les plantations d'indigo, de sucre, de coton et de café, toutes sur la base de l'esclavage (Nicholls 19). Cette rela-

tion entre colonie et métropole a entraîné une dépendance de l'économie haïtienne sur celle de la France. On explique toujours le sous-développement du pays en ces termes, mais il faut aussi reconnaître le taux d'expansion énorme en Haïti : au commencement de la révolution en 1789, il y avait à peu près 790 plantations de sucre, 2,000 de café, 700 cultivateurs de coton et 3,000 producteurs d'indigo; Saint-Domingue a exporté 140 million de livres de sucres en Europe, et les exportations égalaient celles de toutes les colonies britanniques ; la population était constituée de 450,000 esclaves (Nicholls 19; Dupuy 21).

L'Importation des esclaves

Lorsque les Français ont commencé à importer les Africains comme esclaves au dix-huitième siècle, les Espagnols et les Portugais les avaient déjà précédés. Mais la demande d'esclavage n'est pas apparue jusqu'à ce que la production de sucre se soit étendue à grande échelle (Dupuy, *World* 20). La production agricole sur l'île s'est accrue de manière extrême à cause des avantages agricoles sur les autres îles des Caraïbes : un sol riche et un rendement plus haut que la moyenne (20-1). Le territoire de Saint-Domingue présentait donc une grande possibilité de production pour la métropole française. Pour rentabiliser ce grand potentiel, il fallait que les Africains soient importés pour remplacer la main-d'œuvre indienne qui avait péri après la colonisation espagnole de l'île.

Pour la métropole, le système d'esclavage a bien réussi et le numéro d'esclaves a par la suite augmenté. La transition à une économie de sucre et d'esclavage a causé plusieurs changements démographiques. Au milieu du dix-huitième siècle, Saint-Domingue recevait 72 pourcent des esclaves que la France transportait de l'Afrique. Dans les années 1770, Saint-Domingue en recevait 90 pourcent. En 1681, il y avait 4,336 Blancs et 2,012 esclaves Africains, et en 1720, il y avait 7,926 Blancs et 47,528 esclaves. En 1789, Saint-Domingue avait à peu près 40,000 Blancs,

28,000 Affranchis et 455,000 esclaves noirs (21). C'était de loin la plus grande quantité d'esclaves des Caraïbes, et cela se voyait dans la production. A la fin du dix-huitième siècle Saint-Domingue produisait plus que presque toutes les colonies françaises et britanniques réunies. Les autres colonies françaises, la Martinique et la Guadeloupe, avaient produit en moyenne 6 millions livres en 1788. Saint-Domingue, la même année, avait produit environ 200 million de livres, et la valeur moyenne des biens exportés en France de Saint-Domingue était de 250 million de livres (21). Saint-Domingue était donc une colonie très importante pour la France à cette époque. La production à grande échelle a lancé l'île dans l'économie globale capitaliste, et la demande d'esclaves africains a établi la démographie du territoire comme principalement noire, ce qui aura des implications importantes à travers toute l'histoire de l'île.

La Stratification sociale avant l'indépendance

À Saint-Domingue, à la fin du dix-huitième siècle, il y avait trois « castes » dans lesquelles on pouvait naître : on était ou blanc, ou affranchi ou esclave. Ces trois castes formaient une hiérarchie de pouvoir économique et social dans la colonie : à sa tête était la caste blanche comptant environ 40,000 personnes ; au dernier rang de la structure étaient à peu près 450,000 esclaves ; et au milieu il y avait vers 28,000 personnes noires libres, qu'on appelait les Affranchis (Nicholls, *Context* 23). Cette structure sociale est le résultat d'énormément d'années de colonisation, de racisme et d'idéologie raciste européenne[1]. C'est cette structure qui a formé la base de la société haïtienne à travers l'histoire.

En ce qui concerne le « type de couleur », comme Micheline Labelle l'appelle, la stratification de la société pendant le colonialisme était beaucoup plus spécifique à cette époque-là que pendant la période contemporaine ou moderne. Les gens sur l'île se reconnaissaient dans trois

[1] Nous utiliserons systématiquement le terme « idéologies racistes » pour faire référence aux idéologies qui reconnaissent des différences importantes entre les gens de races distinctes, et qui déterminent la supériorité et l'infériorité relatives sociales basées sur ces différences.

catégories principales : les Blancs, les esclaves et les Affranchis. Les Blancs concordaient assez simplement avec la caste à la tête de la hiérarchie à cause de leurs racines européennes et de leur lien avec la métropole. Mais les Blancs ont été divisés selon leur classe sociale en deux groupes principaux : les Grands Blancs et les Petits Blancs. Les Grands Blancs comprenaient des grands planteurs, la bourgeoisie marchande, les avocats, les représentants de l'Etat français et les planteurs de sucre qui vivaient en France. Ce groupe possédait la majorité du territoire et des moyens de production, et ils ont dominé le pouvoir et l'influence politique (Dupuy, *World* 26). Les petits Blancs comprenaient des classes moyennes et ouvrières qui étaient les propriétaires des plus petites plantations de coton, de cacao, d'indigo, et de café. Ces propriétaires n'étaient pas aussi puissants que les Grands Blancs parce que les plantations plus petites n'ont pas exigé autant de capital, et ils avaient donc moins de pouvoir économique (Dupuy, *World* 26; « Class » 8).

Le plus intéressant chez les Petits Blancs, c'est que ce groupe consistait non seulement en petits propriétaires blancs mais aussi en Affranchis prospères, dont la majorité était classée comme mulâtre, bien qu'il y ait eu aussi des Noirs libérés qui appartenaient à ces Affranchis. Les Affranchis amélioraient leur position sociale pendant les années 1750 et 1760, pendant la révolution dite « de café ». En conséquence de la discrimination raciale qu'ils ont subie, les Affranchis se sont réfugiés dans les collines et les espaces plus ruraux où ils ont pu acquérir des territoires non réclamés. C'est là qu'ils ont commencé à cultiver le café (et d'autres produits agricoles) pour l'exportation. Pendant ces décennies, le café est devenu la deuxième plus grande exportation de Saint-Domingue. Ils ont exporté 7 millions de livres en 1755 et 77 millions de livres en 1790. En 1789, la valeur des exportations de café égalait presque celle de sucre, et Saint-Domingue produisait vers 60 pourcent du café vendu dans le monde occidental (Dupuy, *World*

27; « Class » 8). C'est ainsi et pendant cette période que quelques Affranchis sont devenus plus forts et considérés comme des petits Blancs.

Comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné, la majorité des Affranchis ont été considérés mulâtre, mais il existait aussi une population noire qui faisait partie des Affranchis. On se réfère quelquefois aussi aux Affranchis comme le groupe de gens de couleur. Cette catégorie comprenait des gens de tout « type de couleur », de presque blanc à presque noir. La spécificité de la stratification à cette époque se manifeste dans les surnoms des gens selon le type de couleur: sacatra, griffe, marabou, mulâtre, quateron, etc (Annexe B). Ces identifications ont été basées sur le type de couleur, qui dépendait de la biologie et de la génétique de l'individu. Les membres de ce groupe ont été souvent appelés simplement mulâtre, jaune ou, plus simplement, les gens de couleur (Nicholls, *From* 23-4).

Le groupe en bas de la stratification était les esclaves qui se composait presque entièrement des Africains importés et de leurs descendants, bien qu'il y ait eu aussi un petit groupe de gens mulâtres dans cette catégorie. Jusqu'à la révolution, les esclaves étaient essentiellement condamnés pour toujours à l'esclavage. Il y avait pourtant l'opportunité pour quelques esclaves de s'enfuir des plantations et de vivre dans les collines comme hors-la-loi. Cette minorité de gens s'appelait les Marrons. Ils étaient distincts des Affranchis dans le sens où ils ne se sont pas enrichis pour pouvoir quitter les plantations ; ils se sont enfuis.

La stratification des gens pendant le colonialisme est souvent décrite comme des « castes » sociales. Le débat concernant la justesse du mot « caste » mis tout à part, il implique dans le contexte haïtien l'intersection de classe et de couleur. C'est-à-dire que la position sociale d'une personne dépendait non seulement de sa couleur, mais aussi de sa fortune et de sa position économique. Les Blancs, qui restaient à la tête de la société jusqu'à l'indépendance, occupaient

les postes les plus spécialisés : administrateurs, officiers de l'armée et grands propriétaires. Quelques Affranchis étaient considérés comme Petits Blancs, mais la vaste majorité faisait partie de la « petite bourgeoisie », ce qui comprenait les petits propriétaires, les marchands, les artisans et les soldats, mais qui était exclusivement composée de gens de couleur. Finalement, le groupe en bas de la hiérarchie était les esclaves (24). Le système de stratification était donc basé sur cette idée de « caste », l'intersection de classe et de couleur. Les trois groupes sociaux selon la stratification concordaient généralement avec les divisions selon le type de couleur – mais on sait que ce n'était pas absolu. Il y avait une certaine mobilité (vers le haut ou le bas) pour chaque caste.

Le colonialisme et l'esclavage ont produit à Saint-Domingue, comme dans la vaste majorité de pays colonisés et exploités, un grand mécontentement parmi les dominés. A Saint-Domingue, une des doléances les plus grandes était le racisme et la discrimination des européens envers les Mulâtres et les Noirs. Ces doléances s'envenimaient et ont débordé en 1789 quand les esclaves et les Mulâtres ont commencé à se révolter contre la dominance et la colonisation françaises. La révolution a concerné directement la métropole française, et a attiré son attention sur ces problèmes. Ainsi a commencé la révolution qui a produit la première république noire du monde.

La Révolte et la période post-indépendance

La révolte des esclaves a marqué un moment monumental dans l'histoire du monde. C'était non seulement la troisième révolution qui avait lieu contre une monarchie et la deuxième révolution contre le colonialisme ; mais aussi la première qui a défié la monarchie, le colonia-

lisme et le racisme européen[2]. Haïti est devenu la première république noire du monde en 1804, donnant de l'espoir à tous les pays colonisés du monde et surtout aux Noirs : Haïti est devenu un symbole de l'anti-colonialisme et de l'égalité raciale (Dupuy, « Class » 7; Nicholls, *From* 4). On ne peut pas exagérer l'importance de la révolution dans l'histoire du monde et du pays ; mais il faut aussi reconnaître que la révolution n'a pas résolu tous les problèmes de la société haïtienne.

La Révolution

Dans son livre *From Dessalines to Duvalier,* David Nicholls écrit qu'une des raisons pour expliquer l'émergence de la révolution à Saint Domingue et non pas sur les autres îles, comme la Martinique et la Guadeloupe, est la croissance rapide de la caste des Affranchis pendant les cinquante ans précédant la révolution (30). Cette croissance a certainement contribué à l'intensité des doléances à l'intérieur de cette classe moyenne à Saint Domingue. Il y a toujours eu une discrimination raciale envers les Affranchis qui n'avaient ni les même droits ni les même libertés que les Blancs, une tension qui s'est certainement intensifiée avec le temps et la croissance des Affranchis. Les tensions entre ces groupes ont explosé après que des négociations à la fin du dix-huitième siècle entre les Blancs et les Affranchis n'ont pas donné aux Affranchis la liberté et le pouvoir qu'ils voulaient. La Révolution haïtienne a donc officiellement commencé en 1791 quand les esclaves du nord se sont organisés et se sont soulevés contre l'esclavage et pour la liberté (Knight 112).

Il est intéressant de noter que la révolution française avait un impact direct sur ce qui est arrivé à Saint Domingue et a exposé les contradictions qui existaient entre les Blancs, les Affranchis et les esclaves. Les révolutions américaine et française ont encouragé les victimes de la discrimination raciale à exiger plus d'autonomie ou même l'indépendance de la France. Mais, tous

[2] Nous utiliserons aussi le terme « européen » ou « le racisme au style européen » pour faire référence à une perspective puritaine de la race, ce qui est semblable à la théorie « une goutte » – selon laquelle un individu qui n'a qu'une « goutte » de sang africain dans sa biologie ou sa génétique se considérait noir.

les Affranchis n'étaient pas unis en ce qui concernait la révolte esclavagiste. Quelques uns qui ont été alliés à la bourgeoisie marchande ont continué à soutenir l'administration coloniale. Ces Affranchis ont vu ici l'occasion de faire avancer leur lutte pour l'égalité avec les Blancs (Dupuy, « Class » 10-1). Mais, bien qu'il y ait eu une division à l'intérieur du groupe des Affranchis, ce qui est intéressant est le fait que les Blancs et les Mulâtres sont restés unis sur la question de l'esclavage : ils l'ont tous les deux promu. Ils voulaient préserver leur pouvoir socioéconomique, que la révolte des esclaves menaçait. Plusieurs tentatives des Français à apaiser les Affranchis ont échoué : lorsque les Affranchis se sont rendus compte que la seule manière d'obtenir la liberté de l'oppression raciale était de s'allier aux esclaves (10-12).

La France a complètement aboli l'esclavage à Saint Domingue en 1794, mais le mouvement contre le colonialisme était trop puissant pour être arrêté. L'abolition de l'esclavage a permis aux Affranchis d'exercer leur pouvoir contre les Blancs. Mais ce pouvoir social était pourtant de courte durée car l'arrivée en scène de Toussaint Louverture en 1794 a contrebalancé le pouvoir des révolutionnaires noirs (12). Après l'abolition officielle de l'esclavage, Louverture a consenti à s'allier aux Français pour lutter contre les Espagnols et les Anglais qui voulaient tous les deux acquérir le contrôle de la colonie et rétablir l'esclavage. Les Anglais et les Espagnols était aussi alliés aux Blancs dans la colonie qui espéraient mater la révolte. Avec une armée de 4,000 ex-esclaves bien armés et bien vétérans bien armés, Louverture a mené Saint Domingue à la victoire contre les Espagnols et les Anglais (Dupuy, *World* 48-50).

Louverture a écrit une lettre en 1801 à Napoléon lui disant qu'il était gouverneur-à-vie de Saint Domingue. Dans cette lettre Louverture n'avait pas déclaré l'indépendance de la colonie, mais les révolutionnaires savaient qu'en faisant sortir de force tous les représentants du gouvernement français et en saisissant le contrôle des postes clés de l'armée, Saint Domingue avait es-

sentiellement rompu ses relations avec la métropole et avait donc imposé son autonomie (53). Quand une force militaire française est arrivée en 1803 pour rétablir l'esclavage, Louverture n'a pas défendu la liberté des ex-esclaves, forçant Jean-Jacques Dessalines à mobiliser les Noirs et les Mulâtres pour vaincre les forces françaises. Louverture a été arrêté et déporté en France, et les Français ont été vaincus en 1803 par Dessalines (Dupuy, « Class » 16-7). Le premier janvier 1804, l'armée révolutionnaire a déclaré l'indépendance, et Saint Domingue a été renommé Haïti en hommage au nom original des Arawaks.

La Réussite et la valeur de la révolution

Dans son article « Class, Race, and Nation: Unresolved Contradictions of the Saint-Domingue Revolution, » Alex Dupuy démontre bien que la révolution haïtienne a été la première révolution moderne, selon la définition européenne qui a motivé les révolutions précédentes aux Etats-Unis et en France. Comme la modernité, dit-il, se définit comme la croyance en l'égalité universelle de la race humaine, la révolte haïtienne est donc la première révolution moderne de l'époque : les esclaves et les Affranchis ont lutté dans le but de garantir à toute l'humanité en Haïti les idéaux de liberté, égalité et justice que les Américains et les Européens ont réservés seulement pour les citoyens blancs et leurs descendants (6). De cette façon, la révolution haïtienne sert de symbole de l'égalité des races humaines et de la lutte contre le racisme européen. La révolution a aussi apporté pendant un court moment de l'unité entre les habitants non-blancs du pays.

Cette unité et l'importance de race sont bien évidentes dans la première Constitution du pays. Promulguée par Jacques Dessalines, l'empereur et un des pères de l'indépendance, la constitution a fait deux grandes déclarations importantes : premièrement, elle a proclamé qu'aucun homme blanc ne mettrait jamais les pieds sur le territoire du pays comme maître ou propriétaire,

et qu'il ne pourrait jamais les devenir dans le futur ; et deuxièmement, elle a répandu l'idée selon laquelle tous Haïtiens – sans tenir compte du type de couleur, et y compris des Allemands et des Polonais naturalisés – étaient noirs (Christophe et al; Nicholls, *Context* 24; Nicholls, *From* 5). Ces déclarations puissantes démontrent l'esprit de la révolution contre les idéaux du colonialisme et de l'esclavage. Elles représentent aussi une rupture symbolique par rapport à la stratification raciale qui existait pendant l'époque précédente puisqu'elles dépeignent le peuple racialement unifié contre les idéologies exploitantes et racistes du monde.

Cette image d'unité et de succès contre le colonialisme et le racisme était vraiment de courte durée. Bien que la révolte ait réussi et soit devenue un moment historique dans l'histoire du monde, plusieurs problèmes sociaux en ce qui concerne les questions de race et de couleur avaient persisté au-delà de la révolte : la question de la race – entre les Blancs et les Noirs – a été remplacée par une question de couleur comme l'enjeu idéologique et sociale du pays (Dupuy, « Class » 18). C'est-à-dire que les problèmes de couleurs qui sont survenus pendant le colonialisme entre les gens de couleurs et les Noirs restaient à résoudre après la révolution.

La Stratification de la société post-coloniale

La révolte des esclaves contre le colonialisme, l'esclavage et le racisme a bien résolu ces plusieurs grands problèmes auxquels Saint-Domingue faisait face à cette époque. Mais c'étaient des problèmes qui ont été imposés par l'Empire français, ce qui a laissé inchangés les problèmes et difficultés sociaux à l'intérieur du pays : la hiérarchie sociale entre les gens de couleur et les esclaves noirs nouvellement libérés. Tout comme il existait une hiérarchie qui mettait les gens de couleur libres au-dessus des esclaves avant la libération du pays, il existait une telle hiérarchie après, ce qui a produit de nouvelles tensions dans la société.

En 1794, l'esclavage a été aboli en Saint-Domingue, et les droits civils ont été accordés à tous les hommes sans tenir compte de leur couleur. Mais, en dépit de la grande importance historique de cette abolition et de la révolution qui a eu lieu en Haïti, elles n'ont pas pu résoudre les problèmes bien établis de couleur et de classe – la question de caste en somme. Les structures raciales basées sur la couleur ont persisté après la révolution, et par la suite, la structure de la société haïtienne n'a pas beaucoup changé.

Les plus grands changements dans la structure sociale après la révolution étaient dans les secteurs des blancs et des esclaves. Comme la révolution était une révolte contre la France et contre le racisme envers les non-Blancs, la quantité de Blancs sur l'île a diminué après la révolution. Mais, à cause de la hiérarchie bien établie dans le pays, les Blancs sont restés en tête de la société, en partie à cause de leur couleur, mais aussi et surtout à cause de leur position économique comme propriétaires. Deuxièmement, dans le secteur des classes défavorisées, les esclaves ont été complètement libérés de leur position de servitude. C'était un changement économique qui signifiait que les gens seraient payés pour leur travail. En réalité, ces « nouveaux libres » faisaient toujours partie des classes défavorisées.

La plus grande division dans la société était entre ce qu'on appelle les « Anciens Libres » (les anciens Affranchis) et les « Nouveaux Libres » (les anciens esclaves) (Nicholls, *Context* 24). Il convient de parler des deux groupes en termes de leurs identifications plus modernes. A cette époque-là, les « anciens libres, » comme ils sont venus du groupe des affranchis d'avant la révolution, se comprenaient pour la plupart des individus à la peau claire – les Mulâtres. Les « Nouveaux Libres » de l'autre côté comprenaient, comme ils sont venus du groupe des esclaves, des individus à peau foncée – les Noirs (24). Bien que ces deux groupes se soient composés pour la plupart de gens d'un des deux groupes de couleur (les Mulâtres aux Anciens libres et les Noirs

aux Nouveaux Libres), cela constituait vraiment une division entre les classes. Il y avait donc une minorité de gens à peau foncée qui faisaient partie des anciens libres, et il y avait aussi des gens à peau claire qui faisaient partie des nouveaux libres : dans ce cas, la division de classe a supplanté la division de couleur dans l'hiérarchie. Néanmoins, entre les anciens libres, la couleur a servi de base pour discrimination (Dupuy, « Class » 18).

Dans « Class, Race, and Nation : Unresolved Contradictions of the Saint-Domingue Revolution », Alex Dupuy s'intéresse aux complications et aux relations provisoires entre les races avant et pendant la révolution. Il explique qu'avant la révolution, les Mulâtres ne voulaient pas s'allier aux esclaves jusqu'à ce qu'ils se soient rendu compte que la seule manière d'acquérir la liberté de l'oppression des Blancs était de les libérer. Une fois que les esclaves ont été accordés la liberté, les Mulâtres pouvaient exercer leur pouvoir sur les Blancs (10-2). Cette lutte de pouvoir entre les Mulâtres et les Blancs était pourtant de courte durée : l'arrivée de Toussaint Louverture en 1794 a bien changé l'équilibre de pouvoir en faveur des Noirs et des Mulâtres.

Quant à l'histoire du pays depuis l'indépendance jusqu'à ce jour, Dupuy croit que la lutte dans la société était double : c'était premièrement entre les anciens propriétaires mulâtres et les propriétaires noirs d'une nouvelle classe moyenne émergente ; et deuxièmement entre cette classe moyenne et propriétaire, et les populations noires (12). Cette révolution historique et moderne a donc bien affronté les questions de l'esclavage et du racisme des Blancs contre les Noirs, mais elle a laissé à résoudre les deux problèmes cruciaux de la société : ceux de la classe et de la couleur (18-9).

Les Idéologies de couleur en Haïti

Comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné, la question de couleur existe en Haïti depuis l'arrivée des esclaves africains dans le pays pendant le colonialisme ; et cette question s'est ma-

nifestée dans la société d'une façon complexe. Il faut de plus non seulement reconnaître les manifestations de la couleur, mais aussi les clivages transversaux entre couleur et classe sociale, des problèmes enracinés depuis la période colonialiste. Néanmoins, les idéologies de couleur qui ont été les plus influentes en politique et qui ont témoigné de la tension entre la couleur et la classe pendant la période contemporaine sont nées pendant l'occupation américaine de 1915 à 1934. Il faut alors distinguer les trois idéologies coloristes d'Haïti : le mulâtrisme, l'indigénisme et le noirisme.

Le Mulâtrisme

Le mulâtrisme est une idéologie qui existe en Haïti depuis le colonialisme, et qui fait toujours partie de la société haïtienne. Le terme « mulâtre » réfère en général aux gens qui sont le produit du mélange entre les Européens (surtout les Français en Haïti) et les Africains. La base de l'idéologie est simple : toutes les sociétés civilisées dans le monde sont le produit du métissage racial, même les européennes, ce qui voulait dire que les Mulâtres étaient « plus avancés » que les noirs, qui ont été considérés arriérés (Dupuy, *World* 122-3). Selon cette idéologie, c'étaient donc les mulâtres qui ont été naturellement plus capables à gouverner le pays.

Dupuy fait une distinction entre l'idéologie mulâtriste en Haïti et l'idéologie raciste européenne: selon lui, le mulâtrisme a rejeté le concept de l'inégalité entre les races. Il a plutôt employé l'idée selon laquelle le métissage permettait de combiner toutes les bonnes qualités des races. Par contre, l'idéologie raciste européenne évitait toute notion de métissage racial pour préserver la blancheur et, donc, la civilisation (123).

Cette idéologie avait de grandes implications politiques dans le pays. Du point de vue de la classe sociale, les Mulâtres était beaucoup mieux représentés dans la bourgeoisie que les Noirs. Ils ont utilisé la logique mise en avant par le mulâtrisme pour accéder plus souvent au

pouvoir social, et au pouvoir politique (123). Mais en plus de ce qui est présenté comme l'idéologie mulâtriste, il y avait une revendication sociale sur le pouvoir politique : les Mulâtres, et leur Parti Libéral, soutenait souvent qu'ils devraient accéder au pouvoir parce qu'ils étaient les plus instruits et donc les plus capables. Cette idée était évidente dans le slogan d'un homme politique du Parti Libéral des Mulâtres : « Le pouvoir aux plus capables » (Trouillot 161). Leur éducation, leur position sociale et leur rôle historique dans le pays constituaient leur revendication à la légitimité, et donc au pouvoir.

L'Indigénisme

Il est impossible de parler du rôle contemporain de la couleur en Haïti sans mentionner le nom de Jean Price-Mars, un intellectuel et homme politique haïtien à qui la naissance du mouvement indigéniste est souvent attribuée. Son œuvre célèbre, *Ainsi parla l'oncle*, était une des premières tentatives pendant l'occupation américaine de revaloriser la culture africaine face à l'eurocentrisme et à la dominance de la culture française dans les domaines politiques et culturels. Il critique l'élite haïtienne pour son « bovarysme collectif », ce qui réfère à leur admiration de la culture européenne et surtout française (Kaussen 69 ; Price-Mars).

Le mouvement indigéniste en Haïti est né de l'idéologie de la négritude, qui s'est répandue à Paris pendant les années 1920 (« Négritude »). Ces deux mouvements sont semblables, et ils peuvent être compris comme deux mouvements régionaux des mêmes idées : la revalorisation de la validité de la culture africaine ; le refus de l'idée que les Européens étaient plus civilisés que les Africains et leurs descendants ; et le refus complet de l'idée qu'il y avait une différence fondamentale entre les races humaines (Nicholls *From* 164; Kaussen 69; Trouillot 166). Il faut aussi, pourtant, faire des distinctions. Le mouvement de la négritude avait une portée beaucoup plus grande, et s'appliquait au domaine entier de l'inégalité des gens, des religions et des cul-

tures, avec une orientation particulière envers les racines africaines (Trouillot 165). L'indigénisme, par contre, se concentre sur les racines africaines en Haïti, ce qui n'implique pas une application politique, mais qui est plutôt compréhensif (166).

Bien que les idées et les sentiments de l'indigénisme n'aient pas émergé pendant l'occupation américaine du pays, elle a cimenté les sentiments contre l'occupation et a poussé les intellectuels comme Price-Mars et Anténor Firmin à écrire leurs œuvres influentes. L'impact de l'occupation américaine dans le pays est compliqué. D'un côté, l'occupation a imposé une ségrégation comme les lois Jim Crow aux Etats-Unis, et la règle « une goute », ce qui met en avant l'idée puritaine qu'une personne est « noire » si elle n'a qu'une goutte de sang africain dans sa biologie (Kaussen 68). De l'autre côté, les mulâtres avaient une présence plus forte que les noirs dans le gouvernement pendant l'occupation à cause des notions américaines de gouvernance basées sur les idées européennes et occidentales : toute question de couleur mise à part, on disait que les plus aptes à gouverner, c'étaient les plus instruits : les mulâtres (Nicholls, *From* 163; Kaussen 67 ; Dupuy, *World* 139-40). Mais bien que ces divisions entre le peuple haïtien aient été soutenues par l'occupation, l'impact le plus fort, c'était le renouveau des sentiments de colonialisme, c'est-à-dire l'unification des Haïtiens contre l'occupation (Nicholls 163).

C'est dans ce contexte-là que l'indigénisme, comme il a été conçu par Price-Mars et Firmin, est né en Haïti pendant l'occupation. Il faut maintenant préciser : distinct des mouvements mulâtriste et noiriste, l'indigénisme ne reconnaissait aucune différence fondamentale entre les races humaines selon la couleur de la peau ; par contre, l'indigénisme mettait en avant l'idée que tous les gens du monde étaient égaux – ce qui est une distinction importante entre l'indigénisme et les mouvements mulâtriste et noiriste. Dans l'absence d'une appréciation de la culture africaine et haïtienne, Price-Mars et Firmin proposaient une revalorisation de la culture uniquement

haïtienne, y compris la culture africaine et le vaudou. C'est en réponse à une obsession avec la culture française qu'ils l'ont proposé, et c'est pour cela que Price-Mars a reproché à l'élite mulâtre en Haïti d'être trop « francophile » (France 643; Price-Mars).

L'indigénisme était un mouvement très important dans l'histoire haïtienne qui a influencé plusieurs autres penseurs de l'époque. Price-Mars et Firmin sont souvent reconnus pour leur contribution à la promotion des races en Haïti, bien que les autres dérivations de leur pensée ne soient pas si célébrées. Bien qu'il ait marqué la naissance d'une idéologie plus égale, l'indigénisme a inspiré la pensée du noirisme, qui était la philosophie qui a motivé la plus coloriste et radicale politique du vingtième siècle en Haïti.

Le Noirisme

Le noirisme était peut-être le mouvement le plus radical et le plus influent en Haïti au vingtième siècle. Comme le mouvement indigéniste, il a commencé à être influent pendant et après l'occupation américaine du pays. Le mouvement a été aussi commencé avec des intellectuels, y compris le futur dictateur François Duvalier. Et bien que le mouvement se soit inspiré du travail de Jean Price-Mars, il y avait beaucoup de différences entre eux.

Le mouvement noiriste est né comme une faction à l'extrême droite du mouvement indigéniste de Price-Mars. Les deux mouvements étaient pareils dans un sens général : les deux essayaient de promouvoir et de revaloriser la culture africaine, et non la culture française, ce que la bourgeoisie – constituée de Mulâtres et de Noirs – chérissait comme un symbole de leur supériorité sociale (Dupuy, *World* 148). Mais la différence entre les deux, c'était que le noirisme était une idéologie raciste, bien que l'indigénisme ne le fût pas : l'indigénisme ne reconnaissait pas d'inégalité sociale entre les races humaines. Le noirisme était alors une version extrême de l'indigénisme, et existait en contraste au mulâtrisme – une autre idéologie raciste (148). Une pré-

tention à légitimité du mulâtrisme était qu'un peuple noir ne pouvait pas s'autogouverner, non pas à cause de leur couleur, mais à cause d'un manque de civilisation (Hurbon, *Comprendre* 45). C'était donc contre ce type de pensée –basée sur des questions de couleurs et d'ethnicité – que le noirisme a réagi.

Pendant les années 1920 est apparu un groupe d'hommes jeunes qui se faisaient connaître comme les Trois D, dont deux étaient Lorimer Denis et François Duvalier. Les Trois D, qui étaient de la classe moyenne noire comme la grande majorité de Noiristes, se réunissait pendant cette période et ont formé en 1938 Les Griots, une revue littéraire et ethnographique pour analyser l'histoire du pays de leur perspective coloriste, et pour expliquer la contrainte sous laquelle le pays se trouvait (Nicholls, *From* 168; Kaussen 70-1). Leurs œuvres ont expliqué que le pays à cette époque-là existait sous une prolongation du colonialisme, et que la contrainte du pays devait être attribuée à l'égoïsme des Mulâtres (Nicholls, *From* 169; Dupuy, *World* 123).

Denis et Duvalier, les deux grands auteurs noiristes après la mort du troisième D, ont insisté sur la biologie des Haïtiens, disant que c'était la biologie d'un groupe racial qui détermine sa psychologie, qui à son tour détermine sa « personnalité collective ». De plus, ils ont insisté sur le fait que les races étaient fondamentalement distinctes ; et bien que le peuple haïtien soit le produit du métissage racial, c'était par la biologie africaine qu'il se caractérisait (Nicholls, *From* 169; Nicholls, *Context* 53). Le mouvement des Griots voulait alors créer une doctrine qui était spécifiquement haïtienne et qui reconnaissait que le peuple haïtien ne pouvait pas être seulement compris en termes de conflit de classes (56-9).

C'était de cette logique biologique et psychologique que François « Papa Doc » Duvalier a tiré son pouvoir : l'idéologie noiriste a déclaré qu'à cause de ces facteurs, c'était seulement un homme politique africain qui pouvait comprendre et diriger le peuple haïtien ; les Griots pen-

saient que les populations noires avaient besoin d'un « guide » capable et noir qui était « soudé aux masses par le vaudou… » (Hurbon, *Comprendre* 98; Nicholls, *Context* 59). On voit alors que le mouvement nationaliste des Griots était vraiment la revalorisation de la culture africaine, et que c'était centré sur le vaudou. Et bien que le noirisme et l'indigénisme soient pareils en termes de revalorisation de la culture africaine, l'indigénisme était dépourvu d'une implication explicitement politique ; le noirisme est en fait explicite en promouvant la légitimité des Noirs au pouvoir, et c'est de cette considération politique que Papa Doc a profité pour être élu président en 1957.

Conclusions

Jusqu'ici on a discuté des idéologies de couleur principales en Haïti pendant le vingtième siècle, mais il faut clarifier les identités politiques des Haïtiens à travers l'histoire. On peut comprendre les tensions sociales et politiques comme l'intersection entre couleur et classe, qu'on appelle une identification transversale. La couleur et la classe formaient les deux bases principales de l'identification et de mécontentement dans le pays. Et bien que les idéologies de couleur aient une perspective très bien racinée dans la discrimination raciste, les divisions sociales n'étaient ni claires ni rigides selon la couleur de la peau (Dupuy, *World* 143-9). Les divisions sociales datent de la période coloniale où il y avait plusieurs castes selon la liberté (esclave ou propriétaire) et la couleur. Il y existait donc des Noirs qui n'appartenaient pas au secteur esclavagiste : les affranchis (les gens de couleur libres) et les marrons (esclaves qui s'enfuyaient des plantations et qui vivaient dans les collines) (Nicholls, *Context* 23). Cette mobilité à l'époque entre les stratifications sociales a formé la base de la structure de la société contemporaine en Haïti.

Michel-Rolph Trouillot le dit le mieux : « La couleur n'opère jamais seule… » (Trouillot 149). L'intersection entre la classe et la couleur est bien évidente dans l'expression célèbre de

Jean-Jacques Acau, leader d'une armée privée et rurale du dix-neuvième siècle : « le Noir riche est Mulâtre ; le Mulâtre pauvre est Noir » (155). L'expression trouve un équivalent dans l'écriture de Gordon Lewis. Il écrit : « In American society, money 'talks' ; in Caribbean society money 'whitens' » (10). Alex Dupuy résume la dichotomie entre classe et couleur : il est faux de voir les divisions en Haïti en termes de couleur ; mais il serait également erroné d'argumenter que les clivages de couleur étaient plus décisifs que les conflits entre les classes (Dupuy, *World* 125). Bien que les divisions de couleur paraissent omniprésentes, il faut toujours considérer l'intersection de classe et de couleur.

Haïti est souvent convenablement reconnu dans l'histoire comme un symbole de la lutte contre le colonialisme, l'esclavage et le racisme. Mais, tragiquement, Haïti a été incapable de se libérer complètement des vestiges sociaux du colonialisme, contre quoi la colonie unie a lutté pour l'indépendance. La plus importante division de couleur qui a persisté en Haïti était celle entre les Mulâtres riches et les masses noires et pauvres. Pendant le dix-neuvième siècle, l'armée a plus ou moins mené la politique de l'Haïti, comme la nation peinait à s'autogouverner. La présence politique de l'armée a échoué a créer un système politique qui comprenait tout les Haïtiens, et a donc engendré la domination économique et sociale de la bourgeoisie et de la classe moyenne mulâtres. Au tournant du vingtième siècle, les tensions entre l'élite mulâtresse et les masses noires éclataient souvent en chaos politique, ce qui culminait avec l'invasion américaine en 1915. La dynamique entre la politique de couleur d'Haïti et les divisions de couleur au vingtième siècle – bien enracinées dans l'histoire coloniale du pays – est le sujet du chapitre suivant.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICS OF COLOR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY HAITI

Chapter Overview

Haiti's complicated history as a colony of France firmly established the color question as a fundamental issue in Haitian society. The divisions between the black and mulatto social groups were salient and excitable, making them a strategic basis for mobilization for political elites. In this chapter, I examine twentieth century Haitian politics and the course of the politicization of color. I will consider first the occupation of Haiti by the United States as a catalyst for Black Nationalism, which was influential in the struggle for power from 1934 to 1957 and was the basis of François Duvalier's rise to power as dictator. I will then examine the depoliticization of color during the dictatorship and the rise of class-based discourse afterwards. I argue in this chapter that color was most highly politicized under Duvalier as a result of his attempts to gain political power, and that the (de)politicizations of class and color in Haiti were and have been the results of political elites who excited social divisions as a means of building political support and gaining power.

The U.S. Occupation and Its Impact

The color ideologies presented in the preceding chapter were the products of Haiti's long history of internal struggle between color groups, but were catalyzed by the U.S. occupation of the country: the occupation by a white power gave fervor to sentiments of neocolonialism, and the United States deepened the political divisions between the black and mulatto elite. The culmination of these events led to political instability and factionalized struggles for power, which allowed for the politicization of color and the rise of François Duvalier.

The political period leading up to the U.S. occupation was marked by divisions between political elites based on color. For the most part, the black elite received its power from rural areas and the northern city of Cap Haïtien, whereas the power of the mulatto elite was centered in Port-au-Prince and in southern cities. The fall of President Antoine Simon in 1911 marked the beginning of a period of instability and unrest in Haiti. *Caco* uprisings (a peasant-based militia) made Haiti's rural areas ungovernable and the color question divided the political elite and middle classes, who were participating increasingly in the country's politics. In the four years following Simon's fall, Haiti saw the rise and fall of six presidents in rapid succession (Nicholls, *From* 142; Ferguson 22). It is important to note, however, that the animosity and unrest that characterized this period of time was not free from foreign influence.

By the turn of the twentieth century, a powerful German colony existed in Haiti which included marrying Haitian women to circumvent proprietary restrictions on white men, and the establishment of a German school in Port-au-Prince in 1912 to "Germanize" German descendants. In 1914, the U.S. State Department was informed that Germans controlled 80 percent of commerce in Haiti. This economic investment explains German concern at the outbreak of unrest in 1911 and the arrival of German troops in response (Nicholls 143). The United States, on the other hand, had a more strategic interest in Haiti. Though the United States had acquired Haiti's national bank in 1910, it would be erroneous, as David Nicholls points out, to consider these investments in terms of such narrow economic interest (145). U.S. investment in Haiti in 1915 was approximately 4 million dollars, compared to 220 million in Cuba and 1.7 billion in the whole of Latin America (Ferguson 24). Rather, Nicholls explains, the U.S. investment in Haiti – including the acquisition of the National Bank – can better be understood in terms of the prevailing Monroe Doctrine and the idea of Dollar Diplomacy, which sought to establish the U.S. sphere of

influence in the Western hemisphere and weaken the relations of other nations with Europe by creating economic dependence on the U.S. These motivations, paired with the U.S. desire to establish a military base in the Caribbean, explain the arrival of U.S. forces to the island in 1915 (Nicholls, *From* 145).

During its occupation of Haiti, the United States gave political preference to the mulatto elite. The United States decided to adopt a system of indirect rule in Haiti, and thus required a president who could command control from political elites but that would also collaborate with (and submit to) the United States. Many members of the elite saw the U.S. occupation as an opportunity to reestablish the political hegemony of the Mulattos, which had been waning in previous decades. The United States ultimately chose Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, the president of the Senate, and a mulatto. He was elected to the presidency by the national assembly, which was in turn "encouraged" by an armed Marine contingent (Ferguson 24; Nicholls 146-7). In 1918, a new constitution was promulgated, which removed the provision established by Dessalines that prohibited foreigners from owning land in Haiti – abolishing a symbolic vestige of the Haitian revolution.

In 1922, Dartiguenave was replaced by another mulatto president shortly after it became apparent to the United States that he was unpopular due to his association with the *corvée* – a system of forced labor with a draconian reputation that dated back to the post-independence era (Ferguson 24). Dartiguenave was replaced by another mulatto elite, Louis Borno, in only the second-ever constitutional transfer of power in Haiti's history. After growing unpopular and a series of demonstrations and riots, Borno was then replaced in 1929 with Mulatto Nationalist Sténio Vincent. The succession of mulatto elite leaders did not go ignored among the black political elite, who felt "politically ostracized" for nineteen years (29). But despite the favoritism to-

wards the Mulattos during the U.S. occupation, the European-style racism against those of African descent created resentment that paradoxically – though in keeping with the country's revolutionary history – united the black and mulatto classes in opposition to the U.S. occupation.

The racism espoused by United States was most evident in the establishment of Jim Crow-style segregation laws in the country against Haitians of all color. Americans lived in separate communities, attended separate churches, and avoided all social or private interaction with Haitians of color. Americans also belittled and attacked the cultural and religious practices of the peasant masses by prohibiting and destroying ceremonial objects of voodoo (Dupuy, *Haiti* 140). The presence of the United States in Haiti during this period was not, however, wholly driven by color; there were economic and political motivations as well. In retrospect, it is fair to acknowledge that the U.S. occupation brought relative stability, the creation of an army, and increased investment to the island. But the most lasting legacy of the occupation was the divisions and antagonisms felt by the black intellectuals and activists who were politically ignored during the occupation (Ferguson 29). This resentment, it turned out, came to define and impact Haiti's political course for the rest of the twentieth century.

Opposition to the U.S. occupation began to solidify and take important effect at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. The intellectual oppositional movement was most evident in Jean Price-Mars' *Ainsi parla l'oncle* (So Spoke the Uncle), published in 1928, and which promoted the uniqueness of Haitian culture, focusing specifically on African cultural and religious elements. A student strike in a rural town in 1929 broke out into a large urban strike, and discontent erupted when U.S. attempts to quell the strike resulted in Marines' firing into a demonstration of peasants, killing twelve Haitians (Ferguson 25). The election of Sténio Vincent in 1930 marked a departure from the previous puppet presidents chosen by the U.S. government.

Though he was a mulatto, Vincent positioned himself as an anti-occupationist, and tactfully stacked his administration with officials from both sides of the class and color divides (Smith 9-10). It was in this context that the U.S. marines, after nineteen years of occupation, finally left Haiti in 1934 (Ferguson 27).

Color and Class: Political Rivalries (1934-57)

The period immediately following the U.S. withdrawal from Haiti until the rise of François Duvalier is not one thoroughly covered in the scholarship on Haiti. One author, however, Matthew J. Smith, focuses extensively on this period in his book *Red and Black in Haiti*. Smith argues that this intermittent period is crucial in understanding Haiti's response to both the U.S. occupation and the underlying societal conflicts that had existed since the revolution, and that were exacerbated during the occupation. The competition for political power between the Black Nationalists and the Marxists created a political environment of instability. The result was a heightening of the politicizations of societal divisions by the political elites belonging to these groups in efforts to gain power, which then led to the rise of François Duvalier and the extreme, right-wing politicization of color difference.

Vincent's opposition to the occupation managed to unite all Haitians despite the historical racial tensions and the ideological prominence of the moment, but this unity was short-lived: once the common enemy was gone, the historical and deep-seated antagonisms reemerged and Haitian society was once again divided along its lines of political struggle (Nicholls, *From* 165). What is most significant and noteworthy about this period of Haiti's history are the political divisions that arose and the bases of political power. Whereas before the occupation divisions existed among political elites most prominently along color lines, the main political struggles during this

period were between Black Nationalists and Marxists, pitting color and class ideology against one another.

The Black Nationalists were those who subscribed to the Noiriste ideology and who thus sought a major shift in the status quo and in the distribution of economic and political power. Their basis for legitimacy and their claim to power were biological, and they made the hegemony of mulatto elites their opposition. Noiriste politicians accused the mulatto elite of using a "black mask" in order to betray the Haitian masses while they reaped the benefits of political power at the expense of the national interest – what the Noiristes called *la politique de doublure* (171). By placing their movement in opposition to the mulatto elite, the Noiristes were hoping to capitalize on the anger of the ignored black masses. The Noiristes thus tried to forge a relationship between the black masses and the emerging black middle class, from which most Noiristes descended.

The Marxists, or socialist intellectuals, descended largely from the mulatto elite, and sought to exploit class-based antagonisms as a means of gaining political power and, thus, exerting a mulatto political hegemony (165). Jacques Roumain founded the Haitian Communist Party in 1934, barely hesitating after the departure of the United States. The socialists of this period chose to frame Haiti's problems in terms of ownership of wealth, claiming that the true cause of the nationalist protest against the United States lay in the poverty and suffering of the masses, which were exacerbated by the U.S. military presence. Roumain claimed even further that color prejudice was the "sentimental expression of the opposition of classes," and that the color question was of great importance because it was the means by which political elites, both black and mulatto, were able to divert focus away from the class struggle (173).

These political and intellectual groups dominated the political opposition to the political hegemony by the Mulattos. But rather than uniting in a common cause against this hegemony,

the groups became embroiled in a competition for political power. While politics continued to be dominated largely by the Mulatto political elite during this period, these groups worked to mobilize support and became important actors in the politics of the time even when they themselves did not hold political power. The rivalries between and among these groups translated into political chaos and instability, which ultimately gave rise to François Duvalier.

Mulatto Presidencies

Sténio Vincent was elected in 1930 for his staunchly anti-occupation stance. After the United States officially left Haiti, however, Vincent became pro-American, likely due to the country's economic dependence on the United States: in the 1930s, the United States imported half of Haiti's coffee yield (Smith 13). Vincent also became increasingly authoritarian after the U.S. departure. When leftist and Marxist political organization began to take place, Vincent dissolved the legislature and replaced it with known supporters in order to avoid any possible insurrection. In the face of these political threats he also made use of the *Garde d'Haïti* to silence opposition with threats and imprisonment. In 1936, Vincent made two constitutional changes by popular referendum that would almost guarantee his reelection, and that would further his image as an autocrat. First, he had provisionary separation of powers removed from the Constitution; and second, he gained executive control of the appointment of senators (21). Vincent ran unopposed and was reelected in 1936.Vincent's rule was marked by his authoritarian turn, though this did not prevent Marxist and Black Nationalist political organization during his presidency.

Jacques Roumain and Max Hudicourt became two of the foremost leaders of Haiti's communist movement at the time. The two intellectuals abandoned the Black Nationalist movement of which they had previously been a part and began to organize instead on the basis of class issues. Because of their prominence, these two figures were often victims of Vincent's repres-

sion, and Roumain was even tried and imprisoned by Vincent's regime (18). By the end of his regime, Vincent had failed to completely vanquish the communist threat from Haitian politics. Marxist groups participated in protests that contributed to popular unrest at the end of Vincent's regime, and even began collaborating with non-Marxist groups in order to evade overt attempts to target and eradicate Marxist organization (33-6).

Black Nationalist groups also managed to organize under Vincent. The literary revue *Les Griots* was formed by the Three Ds in 1938 with the goal of rehabilitating the "black legend of the past" (Nicholls, *From* 116-7). The Noiriste movement evolved as a radical version of the Indigéniste movement, for which Jean Price-Mars is often credited. (Price-Mars was himself very critical of Noirisme, saying that such a radical racist ideology would simply create more cleavages, and would lead eventually to despotism [Smith 27; Trouillot 132].) The rise of *Noirisme* certainly created a cleavage between its followers and the Marxists. Noiristes did not view the class-based solutions of communism as solutions to the problems the black masses faced. Nonetheless, it was in the 1930s that Black Nationalism began to seep into the consciousness of the masses: political elites did not find the movement threatening like they did the Marxists. As Smith writes, "[i]t is telling that, unlike the Marxists, no members of the Griot movement were arrested or forced into exile" (27-8).

Sténio Vincent's slow and "flaccid" response to the slaughter of Haitians residing on the border of the Dominican Republic in 1937 prompted outrage from Haitian citizens and military officials (35). His rule after that incident until the end of his regime was characterized by social protest, attempted military coups, and general discontent. Nearing the end of his term, Vincent announced he would step down and allow a smooth transition of power. Though his regime was

violent, repressive, and authoritarian, it could not contain the political protest or the intellectual political organization of the Haitian people.

Haitians had a somewhat unfavorable view of Elie Lescot when he arrived to power in 1941 because of his ties to Vincent. Lescot, another mulatto, was elected after four deputies of the lower chamber – one of whom was Jean Price-Mars – claimed the country was in need of a black president, and that another president from the mulatto elite would lead to the abuse of un-checked power (41). These deputies were correct. Shortly after his inauguration, Lescot named himself the head of the military and tactlessly assigned white and light-skinned elites to major governmental posts. The goal of his administration was to decrease political instability caused by what he perceived to be radicalism by strengthening political and economic ties to the United States. His economic policy was characterized by U.S. investment in rubber production, which not only failed, but displaced thousands of peasants whose lands were expropriated (Dupuy, *World* 145). The Lescot regime is also often blamed for the emergence of the anti-superstition campaign pursued by the Catholic Church. The campaign sought to eradicate the superstitious tendencies of voodoo practices that, according to the Church, kept Haiti backwards (Smith 47-8; Nicholls, *From* 181-3; Trouillot *Haiti* 133). Though scholars disagree on the extent of Lescot's support for the regime, Smith argues that the fact that it occurred during his presidency was cause enough for resentment (50). Nonetheless, the most significant event of his presidency was the popular protests that took place from January to October of 1946 in which Noiriste and Marxist radicals colluded to overturn the Lescot administration and introduce radical programs on the national agenda (101).

The Marxist and Black Nationalist movements evolved very differently under Lescot. Marxists Roumain and Hudicourt both returned from exile and began to organize politically.

Roumain's calls for action were met with silence, however, even from Hudicourt who, like others, feared Lescot's retaliation as head of the military. This caused a split between communists (Roumain) and socialists (Hudicourt), which undermined the ability and strength of the class-based leftist movement (51-2). Overall, the weakened Marxists became much less threatening to the state under Lescot.

The Noiriste movement fared better: the spread of the Negritude movement in Europe and elsewhere served to validate the Griots; the intense opposition towards Marxists reduced the surveillance of the Noiristes and provided some freedom; and the anti-superstition campaign sparked a newfound appreciation for voodoo – all of which contributed to the rise in black consciousness (57-60). During this time, Daniel Fignolé became one of the most influential political Noiriste figures in pre-Duvalier Haiti. Fignolé criticized Lescot and said Haiti needed a strong black leader, dismissing Marxist and communist arguments, reducing struggles to one between the black masses and Mulattos (63). Overall, the Lescot presidency furthered the state's use of military repression, but the greater focus on eradicating the Marxist threat created an opportunity for the mobilization of Black Nationalists.

The Estimist Revolution

Though Marxists and Black Nationalists briefly united to overthrow Lescot, they were once again divided on the subject of the 1946 elections. Dumarsais Estimé, who presented himself as a Noiriste candidate, accused Marxist parties of subscribing to Western ideologies, and of not being able to bear "the thought of a Black man like Estimé becoming president" (92). Estimé won the plurality and became the first black president of post-occupation Haiti (97). The election of Estimé also marked the election of the first Black Nationalist leader, a change many referred to as the Estimist Revolution. Estimé overcame political divisiveness by putting together a coali-

tion cabinet that included communists, labor leaders, and Noiristes. Tensions between these groups, however, resulted in the resignations of his entire first cabinet. He replaced them with his own supporters and consolidated his Black Nationalist regime and influence. The rise of a Noiriste leader allowed Black Nationalist thought to become a larger part of national political culture, and allowed for the deepening of racial consciousness. The rise of Estimé also resulted in the coining of the term *Les Authentiques* (The Authentics) to refer to the black cabinet that considered itself the true inheritors of the revolution's legacy (108). Estimé's regime did make a conscious effort to address the economic and social problems, but its Black Nationalist rhetoric was not enough: the administration did not curb corruption within government bureaucracy. In the face of rising protest from the Marxist left, Estimé responded, as others did in the past, with repression; but the ties between Estimé's administration and the armed forces were not as strong as they were with other administrations, and Estimé was forced to resign (147-8).

The removal of Estimé by a military junta and the insertion of Paul Magloire, leader of the Haitian army, began the consolidation of military rule in Haiti during the 1950s. Magloire maintained the democratic and nationalist rhetoric of Estimé, but underneath was state-sponsored violence (153). Furthermore, Magloire committed himself to the containment of radicalism, which had contributed to Estimés downfall. Magloire saw the weakness in Estimé's cabinet stemming from radical divisiveness, and sought to remove those threats. According to Smith, Magloire's presidency was more of a shift toward "uncompromising" dictatorial rule than a return to the pre-1946 political order (161). By 1956, he faced widespread opposition and, after an attempt to remain in power was met with great opposition, he followed the "well-worn presidential path into exile" (Nicholls, *From* 193). The fall of Magloire in December 1956 was followed by nearly ten months of instability and chaos. In the midst of elections, many politicians came

forward as presidential candidates though only three were serious contenders: François Duvalier, Louis Déjoie, and Daniel Fignolé. Of the three, Duvalier had the strongest support from the black middle class. The electoral race was certainly competitive, but Duvalier ultimately prevailed, ushered in with the support of the military.

Duvalier was elected president in 1957. Thirty-three years of political instability and divisiveness among the political factions in Haiti institutionalized the use of state and military violence and repression in order to maintain order and power. This culture of repression and violence – engrained from this point forward in the country's political culture – was instrumental in the consolidation of Duvalier's power, ultimately allowing him to steer the course of color politics in Haiti. The Duvalier regime and the rise and fall of color politics in Haiti are the subjects of the following section.

The Rise of Duvalierism

The election of Estimé to the presidency in 1946 was a triumph for Black Nationalists. They saw for the first time a shift in political power from the mulatto to the black bourgeoisie. Black Nationalist rhetoric became part of his political discourse, and influenced the rise of black consciousness among the middle classes and the masses. In many ways, François Duvalier saw himself as picking up where Estimé left off. Duvalier, a known *Noiriste* and founding member of the *Griots*, moved swiftly and strategically in the consolidation of black power, placing black politicians and leaders in various positions of the state. After this consolidation of power, color began to become less salient in Duvalier's discourse, however. By the time his teenage son Jean-Claude succeeded him in 1971, color was depoliticized in Haiti. The course of the politicization of color under Duvalier is examined here.

The Consolidation of Black Nationalism

During the early years of his regime, Duvalier made several decisions that resulted in a greater insertion of Black Nationalism into the political culture of the country and thus a high degree of color politicization. One example is Duvalier's espousal of the Voodoo religion. Voodoo has always been a point of contention within Haitian society, typically between the black masses, who practiced it, and the elite, who were largely Catholic. For much of history, and even until the present day, Voodoo has been viewed in Western societies as a cult of black magic, rather than a civilized or legitimate religion, and was said to be part of the cause for Haitian "barbarity" or backwardness (Nicholls, *Context* 212). Nonetheless, Voodoo has often been practiced by the vast majority of the Haitian black masses. A revalorization of the religion began during the Indigeniste and Noiriste movements of the 1930s. The anti-superstition campaign during the 1940s also caused Black Nationalists to respond in defense of voodoo and legitimize it in Haitian society. It was thus a personal mission of Duvalier to incorporate voodoo into national political life.

One of the greatest reinforcements Duvalier made of Voodoo was his frequent self-portrayals as being divinely chosen, and as the living embodiment of the "five founders" of Haiti: Dessalines, Toussaint, Pétion, Christophe and Estimé. Furthermore, and most outlandish, was the insertion of his own name and references into the Lord's Prayer: "Our Doc, who art in the National Palace for life, hallowed / be thy name by generations present and future, / thy will be done in Port-au-Prince and in the provinces…" (Nicholls, *From* 232-3). Though in this instance Duvalier is inserting himself into Christian – not Voodoo – prayer, Nicholls points out that Duvalier's claims to be divine and possess supernatural powers must always be considered within

the context of Voodoo (234). Duvalier sought to capitalize on the widespread belief of the masses in Voodoo in order to strengthen his support from the masses.

The prominence of Duvalier's Black Nationalism was also evident and particularly salient in his decision to change the Haitian flag (Appendix D). In 1964, after much debate and controversy, Duvalier changed the Haitian flag to better represent the insertion of the Black Nationalist movement into politics. Most notably, the colors on the flag were changed from blue and red – blue representing Haiti's black population in the fight for independence and red representing the mulatto population – to black and red. He further changed the position of these two bands of color from horizontal, stacked bands to vertical, upright bands, implying a degree of equality rather than super- and subordination (Nicholls, *From* 234-5). Even though these examples do not describe Duvalier's actual policies, they demonstrate his effort to infuse the national culture with elements of African culture and Black Nationalism. The changes to the Haitian flag and the Voodoo religion were enacted in the 1960s before and soon after the consolidation of his power, and are symbolic examples of the politicization of color in Haiti.

The Consolidation of Black Power

Though Duvalier spoke often about the importance of Black Nationalism and completing the work of the Estimist revolution, he was most occupied with remaining in office and avoiding overthrow during the first several years of his presidency (Nicholls, *Haiti* 223). By 1959, Duvalier exerted nearly complete control over the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies: the senate relinquished to him the ability to rule by decree (Dupuy, *Prophet* 34). Within the first six months, Duvalier set out on a mission of dealing with his most urgent task: dealing with his political opponents from the 1957 presidential race, many of whom challenged the results of the election. A select few made attempts to overthrow the government, and in response Duvalier un-

leashed “a reign of terror hitherto unknown” (Dupuy, *World* 159). Duvalier arrested, tortured, killed, exiled or drove underground his political opponents and he established a private militia for his bidding (*Prophet* 34). Duvalier proved unshakable when in 1958 invaders and a small group of army officers took hold of the Dessalines army barracks and Duvalier led the successful resistance himself from the presidential palace (Nicholls, *From* 215).

In addition to warding off political opponents, Duvalier also faced the challenge of army leadership. In the years since the U.S. occupation, the army played a significant role in overthrowing regimes and interrupting the transfer of power in Haiti. Duvalier sought to prevent this fate for himself, and brought the army firmly under civilian control. The fact that the army facilitated the election of Duvalier would suggest warm relations between the military and Duvalier; but by the end of 1958 he had replaced the head of the army twice, and stacked the leadership with black officers (216). Duvalier was even so cautious as to replace officers and leaders that were loyal to him but who began to show signs of independence. He then promoted young Duvalierists in their place who took an oath of allegiance to him (Dupuy, *World* 160).

In addition to taming the military leadership, Duvalier created other forms of armed power that he could directly and personally control. He created the Presidential Guard and the dreaded militia originally known as the *cagoulards*, but known officially since 1962 as the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale, or *Tontons Macoutes* (meaning boogeymen) (Dupuy, *World* 160; Ferguson 40). The Macoutes were most often employed during the first few years of the Duvalier rule in order to eliminate the political opposition. They were recruited from all classes, though the majority came from the lumpen proletariat in the capital and from among peasants, voodoo priests, and section chiefs in the rural areas. All Macoutes were chosen by Duvalier and

reported to him directly, with the exception of those located in rural areas, who were under his indirect rule (160).

Also particularly impressive and important for the consolidation of his power were the decreased role of the Catholic Church under Duvalier and the insertion of his black supporters into influential positions of the Church. The Noiriste ideology of Duvalier was explicitly political, but it was not until the conflict with the Catholic Church that Duvalier fought his first ideological battle. The Church in Haiti had a predominantly French hierarchy, was conservative, opposed to the cultural values and practices of the masses, and supported the mulatto bourgeoisie. Duvalier began to expel all of the foreign members of the Church's hierarchy in 1959 and replaced them all with Haitian clergymen. Though the move caused Duvalier's excommunication in 1959 (rescinded in 1966), the insertion of Haitian priests – all of whom were loyal to and supporters of Duvalier – into the hierarchy of the church was part of Duvalier's reduction of mulatto hegemony in Haitian society. This helped him consolidate his control over one of the most influential institutions of civil society (Dupuy, *World* 159; Nicholls, *From* 221-8).

The rise of Duvalier threw Haiti into a period of violence and terror unlike anything it had seen before, though the tactics employed by Duvalier were not unique or original in comparison to past rulers. In particular, the political period between the end of the U.S. occupation and the rise of Duvalier was characterized by the state's use of military repression and violence; but the Duvalier period differs in its severe and indiscriminate use of violence (Dupuy, *Prophet* 35). Duvalier resorted to the use of terror and state violence as a means of establishing complete control over the apparatuses and institutions of the state, and thereby used that control to insert mostly black politicians into positions of power. By 1964, Duvalier had tamed the mulatto bourgeoisie, exerted control over the institutions of the state, and weakened the leadership of the military

and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church – all through terrorism. It was also in this year that he declared himself president-for-life (Ferguson 48-9).

By dominating the state and weakening the potential threats to his regime, Duvalier carried out the goals of the Estimist Revolution and the ideals of Noiriste ideology: he consolidated black power in Haitian politics. After this consolidation, however, Duvalier did not pursue the ideology he spent so many years developing and defending. It was under Duvalier, the country's most extreme Black Nationalist leader, that color paradoxically came to be depoliticized.

Duvalier: In*authentic?*

In the previous section, I explored the means by which Duvalier established his regime and his reputation in Haiti. Having descended as the successor of the Griots movement and declaring himself the continuation of the Estimist Revolution, it was thought during his rise to power that Duvalier's intent to realize his vision of black leadership in Haiti was clear, and that his claim to power was based on color rather than force. But after Duvalier secured his position as dictator, and removed even veiled claims of legitimate democratic rule, color seemed to decline in importance compared to securing the possession of power.

The largest and most significant gain that Duvalier made in favor of the black middle class and bourgeoisie was to shift the balance of power in their favor. An argument, however, can be made that after his consolidation of black power in the political sphere, Duvalier failed to realize the potential of the black middle class and masses by not shifting the economic balance of power of the country from which the mulatto bourgeoisie historically derived a significant portion of their political power. As Alex Dupuy argues, Duvalier did not seek to alter the class structure of Haitian society; the social and economic dominance of the mulatto bourgeoisie – which took root in the colonial era – persisted ("From"). As such, the anti-mulatto rhetoric that defined

the Noiriste movement and that characterized the Estimist Revolution and Duvalier's rise to power, cooled after Duvalier's consolidation of black power. The mulatto bourgeoisie recognized that Duvalier appeared singularly concerned with state power, and thus were able to share in the spoils of his corruption, and maintain their position atop the social and economic power structures.

The sudden shift in Duvalier's political discourse suggests that Duvalier's fervent use of color as a means of mobilizing political support and garnering votes was simply a means of gaining access to the political power formerly monopolized by the mulatto bourgeoisie. This is not to suggest that Duvalier's use of color and his Noiriste movement were spurious or a careless exploitation of color divisions as a means of gaining political power; these motivations cannot be known and are thus impossible to assert. However, that color became less salient in Duvalier's discourse and that Duvalier sought to consolidate his rule suggest that his exciting of color divisions was a strategy of gaining power rather than a genuine commitment to Noirisme or the Estimist Revolution.

One such indication is the appointment of certain members of the mulatto bourgeoisie in high government posts. The erosion of mulatto political hegemony certainly came as a consequence of the consolidation of black power: during the consolidation process, the mulatto bourgeoisie remained opposed to the Duvalier dictatorship (Nicholls, *From* 236-7). But once it became clear that Duvalier could not be overthrown, both Duvalier and the mulatto bourgeoisie were willing to compromise with each other. Duvalier stopped excluding Mulattos from his administration who shared his views and objectives, despite his former anti-mulatto ideology. Though the number of Mulattos in his administration was relatively small, several high-ranking Mulattos became in fact some of the staunchest supporters of the Duvalier regime (Dupuy,

World 157-8). The inclusion of select mulatto elites in his administration demonstrates that, despite Duvalier's obsession with Black Nationalism, political conflict in Haiti cannot be simply reduced to color difference.

That Duvalier sought to rule for so long is further evidence that his primary concern was not to realize the aspirations of the Estimist Revolution, but rather to retain and consolidate political power. Weakening the leadership of the military and the independence of the legislature were crucial in Duvalier's domination of the state and centralization of power in the hands of the executive; but another significant component of his consolidation was the clientelistic network that Duvalier established. His clientelism was characterized by inserting his loyal supporters from the black middle class into the state apparatuses that he had taken over during his consolidation (Dupuy, *Prophet* 33-4). It is important to note, however, that Duvalier reserved these patron-client relations for the black middle class, and did not extend these or other benefits to the urban working classes or black peasants, from whom he received no support (32). There are two important factors to consider here: first, that the clientelism toward the black middle class ensured that group's support of Duvalier; and second, that the clientelism toward the black middle class created – in opposition to the mulatto elite – a new political elite made up of the black middle class and bourgeoisie who dominated political power, and did not seek to serve the black masses.

In his book *Haiti in Caribbean Context*, Nicholls provides a vignette which helps to explain how Duvalier managed to remain in power for so long, and how he was able to maintain a disconnect between his policies and the nationalist and political rhetoric, which excluded the black masses from political life. Nicholls writes:

> An acquaintance of mine once returned to his house on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, after a day in the countryside, and could not find his servant. He called and eventually from behind some bushes at the end of the garden the man appeared. On being asked what he had been doing, the man replied '*létat té vini è m'caché*' (literally: 'the state arrived and I hid'). An army officer had arrived at the house, and the man's first thought was that this meant trouble. When European or North American newspaper reports predicted the downfall of François Duvalier's government on the ground that it had done nothing for the people, they manifested a misunderstanding of Haitian history. On the part of the mass of the people there has never been an expectation that the state will do any good for them. (220)

Nicholls' point – that the Haitian masses never invested any expectation for positive change in the Haitian government – contributes to the argument that the rise of Duvalier did not bring about a shift in power in favor of all black citizens in Haiti, but simply in favor of a newly empowered black elite and middle class. Thus, for Duvalier, the implementation of the Noiriste ideology was less about an honorable or legitimate claim to political power for black Haitians and their culture, but more of a veil over the intra-class struggles between black and mulatto elite and middle classes for power. Whether or not this transformation of the role of color was intentional on the part of Duvalier was intentional is unknown, and is frankly irrelevant.

The End of Color Politics in Haiti

At the time of François Duvalier's death in 1971, there was much concern over the transfer of power in Haiti and whether Papa Doc would be able to successfully hand over power to his son, then nineteen-year-old Jean-Claude, as president for life. Nonetheless, the transition went

off without a hitch: exile groups and opponents were kept at bay by the U.S. navy, and the Haitian military – known for its willingness to overthrow the state – was counterbalanced by the Tontons Macoutes (Nicholls, *From* 239). The rule of "Baby Doc," as journalists quickly and jokingly named him for his young age, was by and large a continuation of the Duvalierism developed by Papa Doc during the latter half of his regime. Baby Doc's rule was based on the economic ties with the United States. He took advantage of U.S. aid to the country in order to maintain the economic and social dominance of the mulatto and black bourgeoisie.

According to Nicholls, Noiriste and Black Nationalist rhetoric had a limited presence in the discourse of Baby Doc (240). Rather, Baby Doc's main objective as president was to implement the goal of economic development that went unfulfilled under his father (Dupuy, *Haiti* 168). The result was a true shift in the rhetoric and policies of Baby Doc, who was primarily concerned with alliances with foreign powers – namely the United States, France, Belgium, and other international aid agencies – to recommence aid programs to Haiti. Foreign aid grew substantially throughout his regime (169). Much like his father, Baby Doc shifted the balance of political power with his rise as dictator. The most notable and perhaps symbolically significant shift came about when Baby Doc abandoned the Black Nationalist ideology of his father's regime. The result was that Baby Doc would no longer aim to primarily derive power from the black middle class and bourgeoisie, but would expand his base of support to include the mulatto bourgeoisie. One example of Baby Doc's abandonment of the Noiriste cause came about in 1980, when he defied his mother in order to marry Michele Bennett, a member of the mulatto bourgeoisie (Dupuy, *Prophet* 44).

Aside from this ideological and rhetorical change, the inner workings of the Duvalierist state remained essentially the same: power was highly centralized in the executive; Jean-Claude

was highly autocratic; and he ruled mostly be decree. A new constitution in 1983 made Jean-Claude not only president-for-life but allowed him to appoint his successor-for-life (Dupuy, *World* 170). Nonetheless, by 1980, it was clear that Jean-Claude's plans for economic development had failed and would never materialize, despite the massive amount of foreign aid sent to the island. Political elites and those with whom the Duvaliers had clientelistic ties were the main beneficiaries of nearly thirty years of dictatorial rule.

Mass movements of opposition began to materialize in the 1970s, and particularly after an increase in repression in 1980. The Duvalier regime, which had proven itself to be strong and unshakable under Papa Doc, could not withstand the challenges to its dominance of the political space. François Duvalier consolidated his power and diffused the leadership and power of other threatening institutions of the state; Jean-Claude, however, did the opposite, strengthening the military and weakening the capabilities of the Tontons Macoutes. Furthermore, the shift in Jean-Claude's nationalist rhetoric also caused him to sacrifice the use of force against political opponents. Alex Dupuy explains that by broadening his base of support to include the mulatto bourgeoisie, Jean-Claude undermined his own base of support among the black middle class. He thus provided the space for the reemergence of divisions between these groups, who historically have always competed for political power. After abandoning Black Nationalism, Jean-Claude could no longer employ unrestricted violence justified by the cause against the "mulatto threat" (Dupuy, *Prophet* 53).

Down with Dictatorship

The rise of the masses and the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 was a watershed moment in Haitian politics. Not only did Jean-Claude's fleeing signal a new opportunity for democratic rule, but the popular overthrow allowed the masses to exert their influence on the

politics of the nation. Though color had long been on the decline in political discourse under the dictatorship, the rise of the masses created the space for new political articulations. New class-based interpretations of political struggles resonated with the masses who were exasperated by the dictatorship's economic policies. The struggles in the post-Duvalier period were thus between the masses and the Duvalierists, who wanted the corrupt patronage of the dictatorship reinstated.

Anti-Duvalier sentiment and organization began to mount in the 1980s due most notably to the organization and networks of the Catholic Church in Haiti. Haitian priests who descended from modest backgrounds began steering Catholic discourse towards ideas of social justice, mildly inspired by liberation theology that was adapted to the repressive nature of the country (Trouillot, *Haiti* 219). These messages were reinforced when John Paul II visited the country in 1983. From then on the Church was able to start appealing to the rural population using radio stations that had been established and expanded in the late 1970s. Radio stations of particular note were *Catholic Radio Soleil* and *Radio Haiti Inter*. These stations broadcast from the countryside about rural complaints towards Duvalier and his rule despite opposition from the government (Chamberlain 17). The stations were nonetheless effective in spreading the word of grievance in rural areas.

The use of Catholic radio stations to foment mobilization is part of what is known as the *Ti Legliz* (little church) movement. Ti Legliz consisted of small village groups for discussion, prayer, and self-help; they often served as a safe environment for voicing dissent and dissatisfaction with the regime because churches were the only places political gatherings could be held with impunity (18). Uprisings that threatened the political power of the regime began in 1984, particularly in the cities of Gonaïves and Cap Haïtien. Very little protest took place in Port-au-

Prince until Duvalier's overthrow was imminent because the capital was a symbol for the highly centralized state: while the capital remained calm during the 1984-6 period, protest and opposition mounted in rural areas.

Duvalier responded to the protests by often deploying the Tontons Macoutes and other forces to repress uprisings, and also by making "cosmetic concessions" – like small decreases in diesel prices – to placate the masses (Ferguson 109). These responses on the part of Duvalier may seem contradictory, but can be understood as Duvalier's attempts to quell disorder and reestablish his grip on the political power that was slipping away from him. Duvalier's power was undeniably threatened in 1986 when protests reached the capital, though they were not of the same scale or intensity as in smaller cities (114). The coup de grace for Duvalier was the United States' withdrawal of 26 million dollars of aid in protest of the government's use of violence (112). With massive protests throughout the country and a sudden financial drought, Baby Doc fled on 7 February 1986 aboard an American plane to France. In his place, a military regime was installed to ensure stability (Trouillot, *Haiti* 221; Ferguson 117-8).

The Quest for Dechoukaj

The departure of Baby Doc was met with a brief moment of joy, immediately followed by political instability which has since come to define Haitian politics in the post-Duvalier period. The period from 1986 to 1990, when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected, was marked by the rise and fall of four military governments with one brief intermission of semi-democratic rule. The political chaos of this period can be attributed to the struggles for power between the newly included lower class, and the Duvalierists – the bourgeois elite who benefitted under the dictatorship and who sought to reestablish complete control over the state apparatuses and exercise domination over the masses.

This period is often referred to as *operation dechoukaj*, which is Creole for "operation uproot." The dechoukaj was the quest of the newly included masses to rid the Haitian government of all Duvaliersits and to fight against what they saw as the status quo – the domination of the lower classes for the benefit of an elite few. The opposition of the masses took the form of mass protests, demonstrations, and riots. The demands of the popular classes were that the interim military government be replaced by a democratic civilian administration and that Duvalierists be excluded from positions of power and, if possible, brought to justice (Ferguson 125-6).

Shortly after the departure of Baby Doc, the Conseil National de Gouvernement (CNG) was formed in the hopes that it would appease both Duvalierist forces who wanted to retain power and the masses that demanded the uprooting of Duvalierists. The CNG was headed by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy and included two other military officers. The CNG pursued symbolic national changes, like reinstating the blue and red colors of Haiti's flag, but did not pursue the uprooting demanded by the popular classes (Dupuy, *Order* 50-3). The broad popular democratic movement that emerged after 1986 took many different political and organizational forms. The variety of organizations – from democratic coalitions and community-based religious groups to trade unions and an independent media – reflected not only a burgeoning civil society, but also the intensity and strength of the opposition movement.

In January 1987, a broad, left-of-center social democratic coalition was formed and was known by the acronym KONAKOM for its creole name for National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Organizations (54). KONAKOM was the most active opponent to the CNG and had as a goal the creation of a popular, progressive democratic government that sought to benefit the masses rather than the elite. The activism and determination of KONAKOM had a significant impact on the 1987 constitution, which was the most progressive constitution in Haiti's history.

It called for the creation of a parliamentary democracy, barred former collaborators of Duvalier from public office for ten years, and included agrarian reform. The most significant stride the 1987 constitution made was the recognition of Creole an official language of Haiti alongside French, which remained symbolic of the perceived sophistication of the elite and propertied classes (55).

The constitution also called for the creation of a system of check and balances, but this did not aid in the struggle for power between the emerging democratic opposition and the Duvalierists. Elections were held in November of 1987, but were aborted by the CNG who did not want power to elude Duvalierists. Elections were held again in 1988, and CNG-backed Leslie Manigat was elected (ushered in by the military). Manigat was ousted five months later in June when he failed to regain economic and military assistance from foreign donors. He was replaced by Namphy, who was in turn ousted in September and replaced by another military regime headed by General Prosper Avril, who ruled by decree. The Avril, regime, similar to the other military regimes during this period, was unable to meet the demands of the U.S. Congress in order to have economic aid reestablished, which significantly limited the power of the regime. This weakness provided the space for the democratic opposition to unite temporarily under the umbrella *Assemblée de Concertation* (the Unity Assembly), and to resist the violence and opposition of the Duvalierists trying to prevent their loss of political power. The unity of the democratic opposition and the chaos and internecine rivalry that plagued the elite paved the way for elections in 1990, and the rise of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Uncovering Class: New Articulations in Haitian Politics

The rise of Aristide marked a departure from not only dictatorship, but also from the use of color divisions as a means of gaining power in Haiti. As a result, the political discourse and

rhetoric employed by Haiti's most prominent leaders since the fall of Baby Doc, Aristide and Préval, have been characterized by the interpretation of Haiti's struggles in terms of class and class-based issues. Aristide, influenced by his background as a liberation theologian, capitalized on the uprisings of the black masses and the movements for egalitarian democracy to win the presidency in 1990. The rise of Aristide coincided with a new focus in Haiti on economic development. This new direction has allowed class and economic development issues to remain politicized throughout the presidencies of René Préval.

The Rise of Class

Aristide began his campaign for president in 1990, and formed a political movement known as *Opération Lavalas*, meaning "cleansing flood." The Lavalas movement was a broad popular front that sought to rid the country of the corrupt dictatorship and construct a democracy that prioritized the demands of the formerly excluded majority by including their voices in the decisions of the nation (Dupuy, *Prophet* 91). Lavalas was influenced by Aristide's background as a priest, and had its roots in the ecclesiastical communities and the Ti Legliz movement. Though the movement did not seek to exclude any individuals who wanted to a more democratic society, it received support predominantly from urban youths and the urban poor. Aristide established the focus of the movement as a transition from dictatorship to democracy: "The idea of Lavalas – the torrent that cleans everything in its path – was growing in the [peoples'] opinion: unity, the unraveling, the cleansing of a shameful past, eradicating the roots of the Macoute system. To unravel. To uproot. To be born again" (qtd. in Dupuy, *Prophet* 91).

Aristide's background as a priest and liberation theologian[3] certainly informed his class-based interpretation of the Haitian people's struggles. Even before Aristide presented himself as a presidential candidate, his rhetoric was full of class-based and Marxist language that framed Haiti's struggles in terms of corruption, imperialism, and exploitation. At a press conference in 1987, Aristide provided the following analysis of the political situation:

> In the Church, more so than in any other section of society, every person has an immediate responsibility and a decision to make: whether to let the Mactoues' corruption go on and on, or to take part in the historic movement to eradicate it. In other words, what is happening now is the resurrection of a whole people. […] Voluntarily, freely, we are rejecting the corrupt right and advancing towards a left where the strength and the depth of our faith makes it possible for us not to turn away from society, but to join in, without the danger of being sullied, and to fight for a socialist Haiti. This is the only way that offers a possibility for everyone to eat, and to believe in justice, liberty and respect.
>
> Without a socialist system – while we remain Christians – we can only consider ourselves a people condemned to die like dogs under the blows of imperialism and their local lackeys.
>
> To attain these objectives it is important to rise above barriers of class, colour and even political differences. Whatever political party people belong to, there must be a historic alliance that allows us to break out of the framework of the National Government Council and of the corrupt capitalist system that keeps it going. (Arthur 159-60).

[3] Liberation Theology is a Christian movement that interprets the teachings of Jesus Christ as liberation for the poor from unjust economic, political, or social suffering. It began as a movement within the Roman Catholic Church in the mid-twentieth century in Latin America, and can be understood generally as amoral reaction to social injustice.

Notions of class and democracy are clear in this speech and are in line with the demands of the Dechoukaj movement. While he acknowledges that it is "important to rise above barriers of class, colour and even political differences," Aristide is still exciting certain divisions in order to build support and overturn the Duvalierists. He refers to Haiti's lower classes as "dogs" subjected to imperialism and its "local lackeys" – a clear reference to the political elite who sought to reinstate Duvalierism and maintain the corruption and political patronage that existed under the staunchly capitalist Duvaliers.

This departure from the old order of Haitian politics was one of Aristide's significant contributions to Haitian politics. Alex Dupuy argues that the rise of the popular classes to overthrow Baby Doc made it impossible for political elites to use color ideology to gain power: the Duvalier dictatorship exposed the strategic use of color as a shield over the exploitation of power ("From"). Aristide thus removed the veil of color over Haitian politics to expose the dominance of common interests in terms of class, rather than color. This class-based rhetoric and interpretation of society supported the demand of the economically exasperated masses, and this in turn is what led Aristide to win in the 1990 elections with 67.48 percent of the popular vote (Dupuy, *Prophet* 94). By focusing on democratic change and the mobilization of the formerly excluded masses, Aristide made his claim to legitimacy the will of the people, rather than a form of entitlement.

The unveiling of class as a basis for commonality among Haitians is arguably the only positive contribution Aristide made to Haitian politics. Despite all of his democratic rhetoric and the hopeful possibility that he could actually bring about the change of which he spoke, Aristide's presidencies were characterized, like those throughout Haiti's history, by authoritarianism, state repression, and military coups. Aristide's overthrows in 1991 and 2004 were due respec-

tively to a struggle between the participation of the masses and the political and military elite, and Aristide's monopolization of state power and use of force to counter the opposition. The chaos and instability cannot be attributed solely to Aristide, for they have been present in politics throughout Haiti's history. Rather, this fact simply highlights the struggle most prevalent in Haitian politics: that among factions of the elite.

Onward with Class

René Préval first served in the Haitian government as prime minister during Aristide's first presidency, and was later elected president first in 1996 and again in 2006. His presidencies were not met with the same chaos and instability that Aristide's were, but he did not stray from Aristide's platform which prioritized the poor, and he drew support from the poor masses (Dupuy, "From"). Thus, like Aristide, Préval sought to use class as a basis for political power. In these respects, Aristide and Préval were very similar. However, as Aristide continued to lose legitimacy in Haiti during his presidencies, Préval smartly distanced himself from Aristide and his Lavalas campaign. As Haiti prepared itself for elections, the anti-Aristide bourgeoisie and middle class sought to prevent Préval's election by taking on a widespread defamation campaign that painted him as "Aristidism without Aristide" (Dupuy, *Prophet* 195-6). This campaign was potentially threatening to Préval since Aristide had become nearly completely discredited by the time of his second coup in 2004 (which lacked popular resistance unlike the coup against him in 1991).

Préval distanced himself from Aristide by running under his own *Lespwa* movement (creolization of the French *l'espoir*, meaning "hope") which did not differ greatly Aristide's Lavalas movement. In his campaign for the 2006 elections, Préval drew on his reputation as a former president from 1996 to 2001, and won wide support throughout the country, even in middle

class sectors that were hostile towards Aristide. Préval's presidencies have been characterized by his rhetorical focus on Haiti's impoverished, though he has been criticized as largely ineffectual.

Conclusions

The twentieth century was an eventful hundred years for the country of Haiti: a century characterized by instability, occupation, and the politicization of social difference. I examined in this chapter the evolution of color politics throughout this century and into the next, highlighting the key political developments which came to define the state of the color question in the contemporary political period. First, the U.S. occupation of the country catalyzed the sentiments of neocolonialism and gave rise to nationalist ideologies in Haiti divided by color. Second, the period following the occupation was characterized by the struggle for power between and among Marxist and Black Nationalist factions which engendered in the country a political culture of repression and violence that not only gave rise to François Duvalier, but allowed him to consolidate black political power. While it was under François Duvalier that Haiti saw color most politicized, the subsequent depoliticization of color under Duvalier exposed color as a veil over his quest to gain and consolidate political power and the wealth of the state. The use of social division as a means of gaining power explains not only the politicization of color, but also the rise of class-based discourse after the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship. How and why exactly this is so are the subjects of the following chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

COLOR AND NATIONALISM IN POST-DICTATORIAL HAITI

Chapter Overview

The overthrow of Baby Doc marked a number of new beginnings for Haiti: the beginning of a struggle for democracy and equality; the rise of class in political discourse and as a basis or political support; and the sudden inclusion of the black masses, who were excluded for so long and prevented from exerting their influence and voicing their demands in politics. In this chapter, I focus on the state of the color question in the post-dictatorial period. I argue first that color became depoliticized as a result of a shift in the articulations of political elites who no longer sought to use color as a basis for political support-building. I then argue that color – though depoliticized and largely absent from political discourse – is still present in and relevant to politics. The role of color in contemporary Haitian politics is most evident in the disconnect between ethnic and civic nationalism, which highlights that the politicization of class implicitly politicizes color due to the very nature of the color question.

Understanding the Depoliticization of Color in Haiti

It has been clear for some time now that color has declined in importance and influence in Haitian politics. I have mentioned in earlier sections and chapters how the processes of consolidation and support-building marked a shift in politicians' use of color as a means of mobilizing support and gaining power. I return in this section to the color question, seeking to explain not the ways in which color has become less politically salient (as I have in earlier chapters) but more importantly why it has become so. I draw on theoretical approaches to ethnic differences, parties, and conflicts and apply those theories to the case of Haiti. I propose that the role of color in Haiti's politics has been a product of the articulation of social differences by the political elite.

Furthermore, I argue that these changes in the political elite's articulation of social and color difference correspond to moments of change in twentieth-century Haiti.

Politicizing Color and Class

In Haiti, society has always been stratified according to the intersection of both color and class. The hierarchy has generally followed that lighter-skinned individuals were accorded more power in society than were darker-skinned individuals, according to both wealth and skin tone. The strata, however, were hardly finite. In his book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Donald Horowitz explains this intersection between class and color in terms of ranked and unranked ethnic groups[4]. Ranked ethnic groups are those in which color and class coincide and thus in which hierarchical super- and subordination are correlated to ethnic origin (Appendix C). Unranked ethnic groups, by contrast, or cross-class, and are united on the basis of common ethnic origin (Horowitz 22). Given these conceptions of ethnic groups, the social tensions in Haiti could easily be explained as defined by ranked ethnic groups. However, as Horowitz points out, these models of ethnic groups are presented in their most simplistic form and rarely reflect real social tensions. In the case of Haiti, color groups were certainly ranked, but the mobility afforded to individuals based on economic wealth – that is, based on class – created a more complex stratification predominantly determined by class, but reinforced by color (Appendix C).

In general, throughout Haiti's history, social tension was characterized by color and class difference and thus by ranked ethnic groups. Before independence, social hierarchy was constructed from the system of slavery that put whites and the *Affranchis* above the slaves, who were seen as their property. After independence, social hierarchy evolved from the colonial

[4] In discussing other authors' works, I will refer to ethnic and racial groups. In research and scholarship on Haiti, these traditional labels have not been applied due to the complexity of racial and cultural divisions in society. In discussing these theories, however, my use of "ethnic" or "racial" groups corresponds to the color divisions in Haiti based on skin "tone."

structure and placed wealthy elites – who controlled politics – above the poor black masses. Horowitz explains:

> Ethnic conflict…impedes or obscures class conflict when ethnic groups are cross-class, as they are in unranked systems. There is, under those circumstances, a strong tendency to reject class conflict, for it would require either interethnic class-based alliances or intraethnic class antagonisms, either of which would detract from the ethnic solidarity that unranked ethnic conflict requires. (32)

Horowitz' point, that ethnic (or color) conflict can obscure class conflict is correct in the case of Haiti, since the color divisions are cross-class. However, it is also important to note that the simplicity of this model of ethnic and class conflict limits its explanatory power in the case of Haiti. Social stratification was not rigid and allowed a degree of mobility and fluidity among both class and color, since they together formed a cross-cutting cleavage. This specification is particularly important to explain twentieth century politics.

One of the most notable shifts in Haiti's twentieth century politics was the emergence of the black middle class and rise of Black Nationalist politics in the post-occupation period. François Duvalier, well established in the Noiriste movement, mobilized political support among the black middle class to gain power. His focus on the black middle class is a perfect example of the intersection of color and class in Haiti: Duvalier aimed his rhetoric of Black Nationalism directly at the middle class, from whom he could receive political support. In keeping with Horowitz' ideas of ranked and unranked ethnic groups, it is necessary to conceive of each of Haiti's social strata as divided between the black and mulatto populations – with Mulattos better represented in the higher strata, and blacks better represented in the lower strata.

At the height of the Noiriste movement in the 1940s and 50s, Black Nationalism was highly politicized. But even at that point, the politicization of color was limited to a specific class of color group: that is, the elite and middle classes. This is helpful in terms of understanding the political chaos in Haiti at that time, and the ultimate demise of color politics in Haiti. Even though color was highly politicized, the struggles for power in Haiti were in fact an intra-class struggles divided by color: the mulatto and black elite and middle classes. Though his model is too simplistic to capture the political divisions of the time in Haiti, Horowitz' explanation above helps to explain the political struggles. In the case of François Duvalier's 1957 election campaign, his choice of color as a basis for political support "obscured" class, and can be understood as a form of "solidarity" among the black middle class in the face of an historic oppressor: the Mulattos. Duvalier recognized the color divisions in Haitian society – even contributed to them – and made use of them politically.

At that point in Haiti's history, the prevalence of color in politics made sense as an evolution of colonial color tensions: tension between the *Affranchis* and slaves eventually became mulatto-black tension, which characterized politics from independence until the U.S. occupation. The deep-seated nature of the color question in Haiti thus allowed it to remain highly politicized throughout its independence, and often obscured the politicization of class. However, when thinking of Haitian politics in terms of political participation, one can see how class was also, indirectly and inherently, politicized throughout Haiti's period of independence. Participation in Haitian politics was not, until very recently, close to being egalitarian. For the nearly two centuries since independence, politics was dominated and determined by the will and conflict among the elite classes. Thus, in order to participate in politics – in order to matter politically – one had to be of a certain economic class. In this sense, class was implicitly politicized, and was an as

important factor as color in terms of citizenship. Even though the black masses constituted a much larger portion of the population, Duvalier focused specifically on the black middle class because the individuals of that economic status were politically relevant.

Horowitz's explanation of ethnic conflict as existing between ranked and unranked ethnic groups helps to elucidate the intersection of color and class in Haiti. Though the reality of Haitian politics required a more specific modification to Horowitz' theory, the theory helped to explain exactly how color and class intersect, and how that intersection became politically relevant in the twentieth century. Duvalier's focus on mobilizing and deriving power from the black middle class emphasized that the direction of conflict or tension often existed in Haiti both vertically (inter-class) and horizontally (inter-ethnic), politicizing both class and color. The explanations for exactly why class and color became so much more and less salient are the subjects of the following section.

Why Color Was (De)Politicized

In his research on ethnic and identity politics in Africa, Daniel Posner has studied and put forth a theory on how and when ethnic difference becomes politically salient in societies. By studying the political salience (and lack thereof) of cultural cleavages between two ethnic groups on different sides of the Zambia-Malawi border, Posner arrived at the following conclusion: ethnic or cultural difference becomes politically salient when the ethnic groups are of a significant size relative to the voting or enfranchised population in a country. In these situations, Posner argues, ethnic divisions become influential in politics because political elites are able to excite the divisions as a strategic means of gaining political power ("Political" 530; *Institutions* 252).

Posner's argument applies to Haiti and helps to explain the use and decline of color in politics, as well as the rise of class. Color divisions in Haiti during the mid-twentieth century

were not only deep, but deep-seated, making them a natural basis from which political power could be derived. At the time of Duvalier's presidential campaign – the height of the politicization of color – the emergence of a new black middle class on the political scene was a reserve of power waiting to be tapped. In this sense, the politicization of the black middle class at the time can be understood in terms of political elites. Though color had long been a source of tension and conflict in Haiti's history, it was not until the rise of the Noiriste movement and subsequently Estimé and Duvalier that explicit color nationalism became a political platform. In other words, although color divisions existed and caused conflict in Haiti, it was not until the rises of Estimé and Duvalier that color became integrated into political discourse as a primary concern of politicians. The political salience of color divisions in Haiti were thus the results of elites' exciting those divisions to gain support and power.

In much the same way, the depoliticization of color difference and the rise of class were due to elites. After gaining power in 1957, Duvalier moved swiftly and ruthlessly to consolidate his power, clearing his administration of Mulattos and eliminating all potential threats to his regime. Once that was accomplished, Duvalier refocused his attention on foreign aid and the economic wealth of the state, allowing his Black Nationalist agenda to fall by the wayside. Black Nationalism officially became irrelevant under Jean-Claude after he married Michelle Bennet and allied with members of the mulatto bourgeoisie, prioritizing his personal wealth and prosperity. The Duvalier regime was toppled by the masses after the failure of the dictatorship to address their needs pushed them to economic exasperation. The toppling of Jean-Claude by the masses also signaled the emergence of the masses onto the political scene, making their needs and concerns suddenly available as a source of political support. The arrival of the masses corresponds to Posner's assertion that political context matters: whereas before, when the masses were excluded

politically, there was no political value in addressing their concerns. Political elites focused instead on the black middle class and the mulatto bourgeoisie. The rise of the masses in the 1980s, however, changed the political context and made space for new articulations in politics.

The sudden political salience of class-based grievance leading up to the 1990 elections can be understood as a result of Aristide's political discourse. Given his background as a liberation theologian, his preference for Marxist interpretations of social struggles is clear; but that his class-based articulations coincided with the emergence of the black masses who were dissatisfied with their economic despair supports Posner's theory. The salience of class in politics was the result of Aristide's use of class in order to gain political support and power, as well as the fact that class-based issues (like poverty) were suddenly a concern for the majority of the population, who happened to be formerly excluded from politics. The inclusion of the masses has shifted the focus of political elites, who from that point forward have been forced to consider their demands since they form an influential voting group.

Posner's theory thus helps to explain the peak and decline of color in politics as results of the instrumental formulations of political elites who sought to garner support from those groups who exercise a political influence relative to the enfranchised population. The role of color has also coincided with his idea of political context, which explains the shifts in Haiti's political articulations in correlation with the emergence of first the black middle class and second the black masses onto the political scene. The next section explores why exactly color politics failed, and how its failure paved the way for the emergence of class.

Why Color Politics Failed and Class Arose

In her book *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed,* Kanchan Chandra argues that ethnic parties[5] are most likely to succeed when there are competitive rules for intraparty advancement and when the ethnic group they seek to mobilize is larger than the threshold of winning an election (15). The central argument of her book does not apply to Haiti, mainly because political instability and weak democratic institutions have prevented any one party or individual – except for the Duvaliers – from consolidating political gains or advancement. Elements of Chandra's argument, however, help to shed light on Haiti's political situation as a developing country and help to explain why color failed to remain a salient political cleavage and why class emerged as a new force for mobilization.

Chandra supports her argument by saying that ethnic parties tend to arise in what she calls patronage-democracies: democracies in which the state monopolizes access to jobs and services, and in which elected officials have the power to distribute the vast resources of the state on an individualized basis (6). Chandra uses this term to describe developing countries because, while not the case for Haiti, it does highlight one important aspect of politics in developing countries: individuals and elites in developing countries are motivated politically by a desire for material goods. In a country such as Haiti, the state provides the sole avenue for improved livelihood. Chandra's theory has particular explanatory power in Haiti, where there is a history of political elites benefitting personally from the wealth of the state while economic policy fails to improve the lives of the masses. Thus, as Chandra puts forth, elites are motivated to run for public office because the state offers the means by which to improve the quality of one's life, not because ethnic- or color-based political identifications are inherently valuable (11).

[5] Definitions of what constitutes an ethnic party vary greatly. Chandra defines an ethnic party as one in which ethnicity is central to its strategy of mobilization. It is not fitting to discuss here the proper use of this term; what is important is the use of ethnicity – or color, in the case of Haiti – as a means of mobilization and support-building.

Since elites seek to gain (personally and perhaps for their constituents) from the benefits of the state, elites are indifferent to the political party or the platform that places them in power. Chandra argues that individuals will nonetheless support ethnic parties because individuals choose their affiliations based on how closely political parties present the individuals' interests (12). In the case of a patronage-democracy, the ethnic identification of the elites and the political support of the voters reinforce each other reciprocally through the system of patronage: elites in power will use the benefits of the state to favor its constituents, who will in turn continue to support the political party through voting. This, however, is precisely where the Duvaliers failed to maintain support for their party, intentionally or not.

For all of his Black Nationalist rhetoric, François Duvalier did not seek to advance the position of the black middle class or of the rest of the black population in Haiti. Rather, he sought to consolidate his power and remove any potential threats. Chandra's argument about the importance of patronage applies here: Duvalier sought to gain personally from the wealth of the state but did not extend that benefit to his constituents. Furthermore, the political violence for which Duvalier is known moved Haiti into an anti-democratic period which allowed Duvalier to further take advantage of the wealth of the state and ultimately reveal color as a veil over his struggle to gain power. Chandra asserts that for an ethnic party to succeed, elites and individuals must unite in their search for the benefits of the state, and in that way support each other. François and Jean-Claude, however, sought to only support the durability of their power and in the process undertook economic policies that exasperated the Haitian people. By consolidating his power, Duvalier did not and no longer had to appease supporters, which led to the decline of color in political discourse. The economic exasperation galvanized the masses of the lower classes who were angry over their economic position. This galvanization suddenly thrust the

masses onto the political scene, causing inequality and discontent to become the most strategic source of political power.

As Chandra's theories show, the depoliticization of color in Haiti is due in part to the failure of political elites to engage in some form of political patronage with the citizens, which would have allowed color to remain an effective way to derive power in Haiti. These arguments are not to imply that the depoliticization of color mirrors or was the result of the disappearance of color divisions in Haitian society. Rather, the transition from color to class was largely a result of elite articulations of color for various strategic reasons.

Brazil: Color Politics in Comparative Perspective

My assertion that the rise and fall of the politicization of color in Haiti is due to the role of political elites is not a wholly original one. Naturally, the theories on which I draw to explain this change in Haiti are based on case studies in other countries and continents, namely India (Chandra) and Africa (Posner). However, considering these questions of color and race[6] in relation to other countries with similar political contexts and histories can help to confirm and perhaps further elucidate the theories of the political salience of color in Haiti. I therefore consider in this section the history of racial politics in Brazil. Understanding the myth of racial democracy in Brazil helps to shed light on the influential role of political elites and post-colonial experiences of elite domination. As a case study, Brazil helps to confirm my theories on the depoliticization of color in Haiti.

Racial politics in Brazil stands in sharp contrast to Haiti. Whereas in Haiti color difference became politicized and was, for a significant period of time, central to the country's politics, race has not become a central focus of politics or politically salient in Brazil, despite deep

[6] Again, here I will refer to color or race depending on the context in which I speak about these social divisions. For the intents and purposes of this section, color and race can be viewed interchangeably as the lines of division within these societies based on skin color.

racial cleavages and discrimination. But similar to color politics in Haiti, the case of racial politics in Brazil highlights the influence of political elites in shaping the political salience (or lack thereof) of racial difference in a country. In Brazil, the efforts of political elites to preclude race as a basis for collective action in the political sphere has kept questions of racial difference out of national politics.

That the racial cleavage in Brazil has not been politicized is the product of a desire among elites to create a national political identity based on the idea of "racial democracy." There was a small quirk in Brazil's history that ultimately led to this desire. In 1807, Napoleon invaded Portugal, causing the royal family to flee to its colony, Brazil. Once Napoleon was defeated by the British in 1815, the Portuguese king returned home, but left his son Pedro behind, who declared independence in 1822 and named himself emperor. In 1888, slavery was peacefully abolished in a decree. In 1889, the Brazilian military overthrew the monarchy and gave power to political elites, who sought to consolidate their power (Samuels 25-6). In order to legitimate their rule, these new rulers constructed the national identity of Brazil as a "racial democracy": essentially, the idea that racism and racial discrimination did not exist in Brazil and that the Afro-Brazilian population was included as a valuable component of Brazil's national history (Hanchard, *Orpheus* 48-50; Samuels 30).

Many scholars on Brazilian race relations regard the idea of its racial democracy as a myth. Nonetheless, this construction of national identity is used to explain the absence of racially based political mobilizations in Brazil. In his book *Orpheus and Power*, Michael Hanchard notes that Brazil's 1980 census counts 138 million people in Brazil (44 percent) as being of African descent. The construction of racial democracy, he and many others argue, was thus a strategic use of rhetoric by political elites to consolidate the political power of white elites in Brazil, and

to preclude race as a basis for collective action in Brazil (5). This argument is used to explain the weak race-based mobilizations and lack of politicization of race from the turn of the twentieth century to the twenty-first. Michael Hanchard confirms the racial cleavage in Brazilian society by analyzing discrimination towards the Afro-Brazilian daughter of a governor. Hanchard summarizes the preclusion of race in Brazil as follows:

> This form of hegemony, articulated through processes of socialization that promote racial discrimination while simultaneously denying its existence, assists in the reproduction of social inequalities between whites and nonwhites while simultaneously promoting a false premise of racial equality between them. The specific consequences for blacks, I will argue, are the overall inability of Afro-Brazilian activists to mobilize people on the basis of racial identity… (*Orpheus* 6)

In this case, it is clear that the absence of race as an issue in national politics is the result of the strategic articulation of elites to avoid it.

The Brazilian case of race relations highlights two important ideas relevant to color politics in Haiti. The first and most obvious is the influence of political elites on the politicization of racial or color difference in these societies. In Brazil, elites made the conscious effort to avoid race-based political movements, knowing that the large Afro-Brazilian population in Brazil could constitute a significant threat to political power if political divisions corresponded to racial ones. An explanation for why race has remained a weak factor for mobilization in Brazil also relates to the simple fact that Brazilian political elites sought to include – rather than exclude – the Afro-Brazilian population in their construction of national identity. By doing so, elites also precluded race-based political disenfranchisement as a potential grievance towards the elite-dominated state. It is clearly demonstrated here that elites can be instrumental in guiding race relations.

The second parallel between the Brazilian case and the Haitian case is the importance of post-colonial transitions in affecting race or color relations. In Brazil, acquiring independence and the abolition of slavery were peaceful moments in the country's history. In Haiti, by contrast, those moments were violent and the pinnacle of struggle for the nation. Interestingly enough, the immediate post-colonial period for Haiti – though the black and mulatto groups were united in their opposition to colonialism and white racism and oppression – was defined by the struggle between color groups for power: the color question in Haiti is deep-seated and has always been politically manifest. In Brazil, the peacefulness that characterized these transitions contributed to the rhetoric of national unity and the construction of the racial democracy. Therefore, while political elites can be viewed as instrumental in affecting racial and color politics in Brazil and Haiti in similar ways, their histories can help to explain the differences in these countries' politics.

The case of Brazil helps to shed light on the role of elites in influencing racial and ethnic politics in various countries. Elites in both Brazil and Haiti played a significant role in identifying the racial and color divisions within society, and strategically exciting or precluding them as a means of consolidating political power. The contrast in politicization of race and color in Brazil and Haiti also highlights importance of considering history in the analysis of domestic race relations within a given country. While these are both post-colonial societies, the nature of colonialism in each country set it on a different path toward politicizing racial and color difference. Whether or not racial and color cleavages become politicized also impacts national and political culture and identity, which can in turn reinforce or diffuse race relations. The role of nationalism in understanding the political manifestations of the color question in Haiti is the subject of the following sections.

Color and Nationalism in Haiti

It is my argument in this thesis that the depoliticization of color and the politicization of class in Haiti since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship were due to the articulations of political elites who sought to mobilize political support by capitalizing on social divisions. Since the fall of the dictatorship, class has obscured color in political discourse. The absence of the color question from political discourse since the fall of Baby Doc does not, however, properly reflect the state of the color question in Haitian politics. I argue here that the influence of the color question on politics can best be understood in terms of nationalism. I will first consider theories of nationalism and how these apply to the case of Haiti. I then argue that processes of nation-building and the construction of nationalism in Haiti are incomplete, and that the disconnect between ethnic and civic nationalism properly reflects the color question as a fundamental obstacle to political competence and social cohesion.

Theories of Nationalism

Nationalism has been the subject of much political science research, but its abstract nature and country-specific quality have resulted in a variety of concepts, definitions, and ideas. In the broadest terms, nationalism can be thought of as the construction of large-scale, typically political identities on the basis of cultural, linguistic, territorial, historical, or racial claims as they pertain to a people (Calhoun 328). The expanse of this definition helps to expose the myriad ways in which individuals or groups of people can identify or distinguish themselves from others. In terms of political identity, it is useful to consider cases of strong national identity in order to understand variations in the nationalisms of different countries.

Classic theories on nationalism focus on what it means to be a citizen of a nation. In his book *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Rogers Brubaker examines these

countries as those that have developed strong yet distinct notions of what it means to belong. The nationalisms of France and Germany do not quite apply to Haiti, but Brubaker is able to generalize notions of strong national identity and citizenship: "[N]ational citizenship," he says, is the "distinctively modern institution through which every state constitutes and perpetually reconstitutes itself as an association of citizens, publicly identifies a set of persons as its members, and residually classifies everyone else in the world as a noncitizen, an alien" (xi). This concept of citizenship ties into the idea of nation-state: "a state is a nation-state in this minimal sense insofar as it claims (and is understood) to be a nation's state: the state 'of' and 'for' a particular, distinctive, bounded nation" (28). For Brubaker, these ideas of citizenship and nation were born out of the French Revolution, which formally delimited the citizenry and declared civil equality and political rights (35). Based on these ideas of revolutionary or modern values, a parallel can be found in the case of Haiti, whose revolution also declared equality – though among all the human races – and declared the entirety of the Haitian citizenry black. That this strong sense of identity among Haitians has not translated into a sense of nationalism is the topic of later discussion.

Theory on nationalism put forth by Brubaker is very political in nature. It is also important, however, to expand ideas of nationalism to include cultural notions of identity. A distinction must be made between civic and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism is understood to be rooted in the legitimate membership in a constituted state, meaning that members of a nation are identified first and foremost through their political identities as citizens. Much of what Brubaker discusses corresponds to this idea of civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is formed on the basis of cultural or ethnic criteria, such as language, art, music, literature, religion, etc. (Calhoun 329). Civic nationalism tends to be more inclusive than ethnic nationalism, which

is more inclined to identify outsiders. The distinction between these forms of nationalisms, I later argue, is significant for the color question in contemporary Haiti.

Other theories of nationalism strictly as it pertains to countries with racial or ethnic divisions and post-colonial societies help to explain Haitian nationalism. In her book *Nationalist Thought in the Colonial World*, Partha Chatterjee makes a distinction between Western and Eastern nationalisms. Western nationalism, Chatterjee describes, is a cultural phenomenon that took political form and that accepts the standards of developed national culture set by the West (1). French nationalism, as described by Brubaker, would fit this description. In contrast, Eastern nationalism, which is found in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, was defined by the search for a regeneration of the national culture, adapted to the requirements of progress, but retaining at the same time its distinctiveness (2). In these Eastern societies, the attempt to construct nationalism is deeply contradictory, both imitative and hostile to the nationalism established by those Western nations that set the standards:

> It is imitative in that it accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture. But is also involves a rejection: 'in fact, two rejections, both of them ambivalent: rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity.' (2)

This "search" for national identity, as Chatterjee calls it, is applicable to Haiti, which faces as its largest obstacle to a cohesive national identity the cultural division between the black masses, whose culture is viewed as less civilized and sophisticated, and the mulatto elite, who celebrate French culture as marks of their prosperity and sophistication. The dichotomy of Eastern and Western nationalism can be seen within Haiti in the contrast between mass Haitian culture –

which is stigmatized as primitive and backward – and the culture of the Haitian elite, which the elite considers sophisticated and civilized.

It is also useful to consider the idea of nationalism in a context where racial, ethnic, or color difference might present an obstacle to the construction of political identity. Anthony Marx explores this idea in his book *Making Race and Nation*, in which he concludes that there is something generalizable in analyzing the role of race in the process of nation-state building: states that enact formal rules of domination according to racial or ethnic distinctions reinforce racism and face challenges from subordinated groups (257). Given this dynamic, he notes that nation-building is a process that occurs from above (269). Therefore, states that encode or espouse discourse of racial or ethnic difference create a domination based on racial difference, which creates an obstacle to nation-building. Marx' work helps elucidate ideas of nationalism in Haiti, though his theories do and do not apply. In Haiti, the revolution abolished formal rules of race- or color-based domination, but the domination of the Mulatto elite over the black masses certainly persisted. That nation-building is a process that occurs from above, however, does explain the weakness of political national identity in Haiti: while political and economic domination was not formalized, its existence provided no incentive to elites to create a sense of political belonging, and was thus an obstacle to nation-building.

The various theories on nationalism demonstrate that nation-building is an individualized process. Ideas of civic and ethnic nationalism demonstrate the importance of both culture and citizenship in a society, and that the two may not necessarily coalesce into a broader, more complete sense of belonging in a country. Chatterjee's conceptions of Eastern and Western nationalism also help to describe the tensions between the elite and the masses in terms of both political and cultural identity. Haiti's momentous and epochal history gives the country a strong founda-

tion for national pride and identity; but the social, political, and economic divisions that are rooted in the color question and that have persisted unresolved in the country since the colonial era have prevented political elites from successfully constructing a sense of nationalism in Haiti. That this failure is representative of the color question is the subject of the following section.

Color in Nationalism

The color question as an issue of nationalism in Haiti is best observed when considering nationalism in two broad ways. First is the idea of civic nationalism, which can be thought of as political membership in a state. This elicits the notion that a state is determined by the people and that the state in turn exists to serve the people's needs. Second is the idea of ethnic nationalism, which is a sense of belonging and inclusion based on the history, race, ethnicity, language, religion, or culture specific to a people. Ethnic nationalism need not come from the state itself, but must be incorporated into the national identity of the state if political elites seek to create a strong and complete sense of nationalism. I argue here that there is a disconnect between civic and ethnic nationalism in Haiti, which is evident in the politics of the country. It is in this way that the influence of the color question in politics can be seen in Haiti's post-dictatorial period.

It is important to first consider the political culture of division in Haiti as it has impeded senses of unity in the country. In Haiti, political power has – in particular during the twentieth century – been derived from the exciting of social divisions in Haitian society. As explored in earlier chapters, social divisions – primarily those of color – served as strategic sources of power among political elites who were able to excite them and in turn reinforce them. Due to this political culture of divisiveness, Haitians have been unable to overcome these differences in order to create at least the semblance – if not the myth – of national identity. In Haiti, the strongest notions of unity and national pride come from those moments in which the Haitian people fought

against what they saw as White, (neo)colonialist oppression: the Haitian Revolution of 1804 and the U.S. occupation in 1934. The 1987 Constitution declares the country "indivisible," but moments of complete unity are rare and part of the country's history rather than its present.

The social divisions that have characterized Haitian politics also contradict those moments of unity in Haiti's history. The ideals of the Haitian revolution trumped the ideals of the French revolution insofar as they guaranteed for all of humanity what the French revolution reserved for white Europeans (Dupuy). The U.S. occupation was seen as a violation of state sovereignty that – through the insertion of puppet presidents –deprived the Haitian people of their right to self-determination. However, the dynamic between Haiti and France and Haiti and the United States during those events is the same dynamic that has existed between the Mulatto elite and the black masses in Haiti's domestic politics throughout its history. Until the consolidation of black power under François Duvalier, the Mulatto elite's claim to legitimacy and thus to power was its greater aptitude, derived from racial mixing with white Europeans and better education. These mulatriste ideas perpetuated the oppression and marginalization of the black masses even throughout the country's independence. The antagonisms that existed between Haiti and other nations have thus also existed among Haitians in the form of color- and class-based discrimination, which led to political domination and exclusion. These internal divisions therefore weaken the power of the country's key historical moments to unite people in a general sense of collectivity.

In this sense, the color question in Haiti has not changed. Though class has obscured color in political discourse and the fall of Baby Doc marked a transition to rhetoric of democracy and egalitarianism, politics in Haiti is still characterized by dominance among political, economic, and social elites who have been largely ineffectual in addressing the needs and demands of

the masses. In other words, in Haitian politics there is still a divide between the elite and the masses, which has only weakened the faith in the government among the masses due to the large amount of international and foreign aid Haiti receives. That the Haitian government has failed to follow through on its claims to support the masses has been an obstacle to the construction of civic nationalism, and erodes the idea of the nation-state: that the state of a particular nation derives its power from and exists to serve the citizens. Some evidence for a lack of civic nationalism on the part of the Haitian masses can be seen in a lack of civic engagement with the state. Since the fall of Duvalier, voter turnout as a percentage of the voting-age population has been low: it peaked in 2006 at nearly 70 percent, but has otherwise fluctuated between 20 and 50 percent ("Voter").

The weakness of civic nationalism is not mirrored in the ethnic nationalism of the country, which is very strong. The twentieth century saw the rise of two influential race-based movements, which sought to revalorize African peoples, their cultures, languages, and religions in the face of the elitism of European culture: the Indigeniste and Noiriste movements. The movements rejected notions of European cultural superiority and sought to generate a greater sense of pride in the country's African origins. Though these movements were still subject to the cultural divisions within the country (Mulatto cultural superiority), the cultural elements that defined these movements are still the most prevalent in Haiti today, and are the basis of widespread Haitian cultural identity.

One of the most notable of these elements is the Voodoo religion – the amalgamation of West African religions and Christianity. Though the majority of Haitians still practice or believe in Voodoo today (in various forms and degrees), the country's official religion is Catholicism. Voodoo in Haiti has been the subject of much of the work of Haitian anthropologist Laënnec

Hurbon, whose research works to dispel the myths of black magic and zombie culture that surround conceptions of Voodoo. These inaccurate portrayals of the religion have contributed to the cultural elitism in Haiti, which views Voodoo as a religion of poor, backwards people who are responsible for the country's digression.

Creole has been similarly stigmatized in Haiti. Though Creole, the most widely spoken language in Haiti, was recognized as an official religion in the 1987 Constitution, French still predominates as the language of sophistication and power. Voodoo and Creole nonetheless form a very strong basis for cultural unity and cohesion in Haiti. They are common to the vast majority of Haitians, and are certainly critical components to the sense of cultural and ethnic identity; but the perception among the elite that these forms of culture are unsophisticated and backwards have therefore contributed to a lack of cohesion in ethnic nationalism.

Discussions of nationalism and political identity in Haiti bring the color question to the fore. While color has been replaced by class in the politicization of social divisions, color still plays a role in the political dynamics of the country. This is clear in the disconnect between civic and ethnic nationalism in Haiti. It would be incorrect to assert simply that there is a lack of nationalism or national identity in Haiti: strong notions of language, religion, and culture have grounded ethnic forms of nationalism that pervade the country. However civic nationalism is certainly weak in the country. This is largely due to a lack of faith and trust in the government, created no doubt by the fact that the government – despite being one of the largest recipients of international and foreign aid – has been largely ineffectual in addressing the country's many problems. The lack of progress in Haiti since the fall of the dictatorship suggests that class functions in Haitian politics as did color: it is a means of gaining power, and does not necessarily bring the prospect of political, economic, or social advancement.

The manifestations of the color question become even clearer when considering the implications of this disconnect between ethnic and civic nationalism. That the disconnect translates into the failure of the government to address the needs of the masses means that nothing has changed in Haiti: politics is dominated by political, economic, and social elites. Therefore, though class has obscured color in political discourse, to speak of class in Haiti is still to speak of color: to aim policy towards or to seek votes from Haiti's impoverished population is to seek out the Black masses; to speak of Haiti's middle or elite class is still to speak of classes in which Mulattos are far better represented. This is the very nature of the color question: that color and class are fused and that one never operates without the other. Color has been absent from discourse since the fall of Baby Doc, but the politicization of class implicitly politicizes color.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I explored the depoliticization of color in Haiti and the prevalence of the color question through nationalism. The decline of color in politics, I argued, was due to the new articulations of class among the political elite who sought to capitalize on the rise of the economically exasperated masses in order to gain political power. The decline of color can also be explained by the consolidation of Duvalier's power – the most prominent politicizers of color in the twentieth century – to reinforce their political support along color lines by advancing the positions of the black middle class. Furthermore, the persistence of political elites to excite and capitalize on social divisions in Haiti as a means of gaining political power has been an obstacle to the construction of a sense of nationalism in Haiti. There is as a result a disconnect between ethnic and civic nationalism, which translates – as it always has in Haiti – into the domination of the political sphere by elites. The continuation of elite-dominated politics demonstrates that, despite

the obstruction of color by class in political discourse, color remains politicized in Haiti due to the simple nature of the color question: the fusion of color to class.

CONCLUSIONS

COLOR CONTINUES

The color question in Haiti has paradoxically been both dynamic and static. It has been dynamic in the sense that it has taken many forms and been manifested in many ways throughout the course of Haiti's history: it has been the basis of struggles for power and, most recently, it has become depoliticized and obscured by other bases of mobilization. It has been static in the sense that – despite all of the political and economic turmoil that Haiti has faced – it has remained engrained in Haitian society. The goal of this study was to examine the significance and the influence of the color question on Haitian politics since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship. In the end, the color question has proven itself to be pervasive.

Haiti's colonial period planted the seeds of color-based social stratification. Super- and subordination in society were determined by the intersection of both skin color and wealth, though color was a more powerful determinant than color. The social groupings based on this cross-cutting cleavage of color and class in colonial Haiti were the basis of what we know today as Black and Mulatto groups. The tensions between these groups that have persisted through history have their roots in the divisions created during the colonial period, as do the color ideologies formed in Haiti after the U.S. occupation and that came to influence the politicization of color in the twentieth century.

During the twentieth century, Haiti saw color politics come to the fore. The U.S. occupation catalyzed the sentiments of neocolonialism whilst deepening tensions between Mulatto and Black groups by favoring Mulattos in the political appointments. The political period thereafter was characterized by the tensions between class and color groups, the Marxists and the Black Nationalists. Struggles for power erupted into political chaos, which ultimately gave rise to

François Duvalier, who ran on the platform of Black Nationalism. This period constituted the height of the politicization of color difference: the advancement of Blacks in politics was Duvalier's public concern; he removed mulatto leaders and replaced them with his Black supporters. After he moved swiftly to consolidate his power, however, color fell quickly out of his political discourse. Duvalier's son Jean-Claude, who succeeded François in 1971, completely abandoned the Noiriste movement and rhetoric of black power and advancement. It was thus under the Duvaliers that Haiti saw both the rise and fall of the politicization of color difference. This seemingly contradictory pattern exposed color as a veil over what was truly an intra-class struggle for power among social and economic elites.

The overthrow of Baby Doc in 1986 marked a transition in Haitian politics. The rise of the masses was significant in that it was one of the first times in Haiti's history that the masses exerted their influence on the direction of politics in the country. This sudden inclusion of the masses in the political decisions of the country created the space for new articulations among the political elite. The economic exasperation brought about by the exhausting economic policies of the Duvalier dictatorship suddenly thrust class-based issues of poverty onto the political scene. This allowed Jean-Bertrand Aristide to mobilize political support along class lines, rather than color ones. Despite the political failures of Aristide, he did provide a valuable contribution to the country insofar as he exposed class as a common basis of struggle in Haiti. This new direction promoted by the political elite corresponds to the new focus in Haiti on economic development and progress, which has been maintained by René Préval.

Daniel Posner's theories on the political salience of ethnic difference has particular explanatory power in the case of the (de)politicization of color in Haiti. His theory – that ethnic difference becomes politically salient when the size of the ethnic group is significant in relation to

the voting population – corresponds to the rises of color and class. Duvalier politicized the Black middle class as a means of building political support because his opposition consisted of the Mulatto elite and middle class. Focusing on this group allowed him to divide the power among the economic elite into color groups, which allowed him enough support to gain power on the basis of black solidarity. Similarly, Aristide's mobilization of support along class lines was successful because at the time the masses were desperate for policies that would address their concerns.

The importance of the color question and the implications of this research are most evident in questions of nationalism and national identity. Haiti's history as the first black republic suggests that the country might have a strong sense of nationalism and collective sense of belonging. But the internal divisions based on the color question directly undermine the significance of those historical moments. Furthermore, the fact the politics in Haiti continues to be dominated by elite groups erodes the sense of civic nationalism in Haiti: the legitimate membership in a state in which members are known through their political identities as citizens. This does not correspond to a weak sense of cultural identity in Haiti; this is rather quite strong. But the disparity between ethnic and civic nationalism among the masses in Haiti has contributed to an overall weak sense of nationalism: that the state derives its power from and exists to serve the people. That the government has been ineffectual in addressing the needs of the masses – despite large amounts of international and foreign aid – shows the state's lack of dedication to serving the masses. It is in this way that the color question is manifested in politics, due to the very nature of the color question. To speak of class in Haiti is to speak implicitly of color. Color and class groups still correspond to each other generally today, much as they did in the colonial period.

The color question is still very much present in Haitian society as a source of division and tension. Though it has become depoliticized in terms of the prevalence of color-based issues in

political discourse, the color divide in Haiti can be seen in the division between the elite and the masses. Aristide's and Préval's political campaigns – *Lavalas* and *Lespwa*, respectively – both focused on Haiti's lower classes for political support. This lack of focus on the masses suggests that Haiti's politics remains dominated by elites, who do not seek to benefit the whole citizenry. All efforts to overcome the challenges Haiti faces will be stymied if they continue to be subject to the deep-seated political, economic, and social manifestations of the color question. Politicians need to engage the whole citizenry and include them in public decision-making so that all Haitians can make a concerted effort towards progress and equality.

Politics in Haiti are an example of the obstacles that color-, ethnic-, or race-based social divisions can present – not just to development – but to governance as a whole. What is particularly noteworthy about color politics in Haiti is the shift in the politicization of color divisions within society before and after the Duvalier dictatorship. The depoliticization of color is a significant development: it demonstrates that deep or salient social divisions can become depoliticized without being removed from or resolved within society. The fact that color divisions can be politically manifest – through class-based issues – and stymie progress – by influencing struggles for power among the elite – without being politically overt or explicit indicates the fundamental and pervasive nature of the color question in Haiti. This is what has become of the color question: it still very much exists, but in a new and alternative form.

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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER ONE SUMMARY

THE HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COLOR QUESTION

The color question in Haiti is profound. During the colonial period from the end of the fifteenth century to 1804, society was stratified according to skin color, with several different color categories based on the number of "parts" white or black one was. The country's constitution after independence declared that all Haitians, regardless of origin, skin color, or social class, were black. Color was later the foundation of the political power of François Duvalier, Haiti's most extreme nationalist leader. It is impossible to say that the color question has not played an influential role in Haitian history and politics. In order to understand its impact in the contemporary period, one must understand the roots and foundation of color as one conceives of it today. In this chapter, I explore key moments and developments in the history of Haiti through the lens of the color question. I will first consider the country's period of colonialism and slavery, and then explore the ideologies of color in Haiti.

Slavery and Colonialism

As is the case with many under developed countries, Haitian society is the product of the country's long and difficult history. In his famous and celebrated book *The Black Jacobins*, scholar C.L.R. James provides an impassioned account of the colonization of the island and of the historical revolution. The island was quickly colonized after Christopher Columbus, representing Spain, arrived to the island in 1492. Due to the introduction of slave labor, disease, and murder, the indigenous population was reduced from 500,000 in 1492 (some less conservative estimates put this number closer to 1 million) to 60,000 in 1507. Imported slavery began in 1518, thus laying the foundation of Haiti's history (James 3-5; Lewis 101).

Discovery and Development

This island to which Columbus arrived in 1492 and which the Spanish named *Hispaniola* was originally named *Ayti* by its indigenous inhabitants, the Arawak. As mentioned above, slavery and colonization were immediately introduced, causing the Arawak to perish without leaving behind significant traces of their people or culture from pre-Columbian times (Nicholls, *From* 19). Dominican saint Bartolomé de las Casas, personally horrified by the atrocities committed against the indigenous, plead the Spanish crown for the importation of African slaves, believing them to be more "robust." Thus, Charles V ordered the importation of 15,000 African slaves in 1518 to San Domingo, as the Spanish colony was named, officially commencing African slave labor and the slave trade (James 4; Lewis 100-2).

French buccaneers arrived to the island in 1629, landing on its northwest portion, from where they began to harass the previously established Spanish settlement (Nicholls 19; James 4). As Spanish power in the world began to decline, the French were able to acquire the western third of the island in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswick (Dupuy, *World* 11; Mintz 270). Shortly thereafter, French colonists began to arrive in large numbers and developed plantations of indigo, sugar, cotton and coffee, all based on the system of slavery (Nicholls, *From* 19). This dynamic quickly established the dependence between the colony and the metropolis, which scholars still use to explain Haiti's underdevelopment. But it is important here to recognize Haiti's incredibly high rate of expansion and growth during this period: by the start of the revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, there were approximately 790 plantations of sugar, 2,000 of coffee, 700 of cotton, and 3,000 of indigo; Saint Domingue, as the French colony was known, exported 140 million pounds of sugar to Europe, equaling the exports of all the British colonies combined; and estimates of the slave population were between 450,000 and 500,000 (Nicholls 19; Dupuy 21).

Slave Economy and Demography

The importation of African slaves truly began to increase in Saint Domingue when sugar production grew to a large scale (Dupuy, *World* 20). The potential for the island to become the world's largest producer of sugar by the time of the revolution was largely due the richness and fertility of its soil, which created great demand for sugar plantations and ultimately, due to the lack of indigenous labor, African slaves. For the French metropolis, the transition to a slave economy was quite successful, and led to its expansion. The growth and expansion also led to great demographic shifts in the colony. By the mid-eighteenth century, Saint Domingue received 72 percent of all slaves exported from Africa by France. By the 1770s, it received 90 percent. In 1681 there were 4,336 whites and 2,012 African slaves. In 1720 there were 7,926 whites and 47,528 African slaves. By the beginning of the revolution, there were approximately 40,000 whites, 28,000 *affranchis* (or free Africans), and 455,000 African slaves (21). It was by far the largest number of slaves in any Caribbean colony, and this was mirrored in the scale of its production. Whereas other French colonies Martinique and Guadeloupe had total production of 6 million pounds, Haiti had 200 million (21). Slavery thus launched the island into the capitalist global economy and established it as principally African.

Social Stratification in Saint Domingue

In Saint Domingue, at the end of the eighteenth century, there were three "castes" into which one was born and from which it was difficult to move: the whites, the *affranchis*, and the slaves. These three castes formed a hierarchy of economy and social power in the colony: atop the structure were the whites, numbering about 40,000; at the bottom were the slaves, numbering about 450,000; and in between were the approximately 28,000 free Africans who accumulated enough wealth to be free, known as the *affranchis* (Nicholls, *Context* 23). This structure was the

product of colonialism and racist European ideology[7], and it has formed the base of Haitian society throughout history.

Social stratification during this colonial period was very specific. Again, people were grouped into one of three categories: whites, *affranchis*, and slaves. The whites coincided with the group atop the power structure, but were divided into two groups: *grands blancs* and *petits blancs*. The *grands blancs* were comprised of large plantation owners, the merchant bourgeoisie, lawyers, and representatives of the French state. This group possessed the vast majority of land and production in the colony and had the greatest political power and influence (Dupuy, *World* 26). The *petits blancs* were comprised of middle and working classes who owned smaller plantations of cotton, cacao, indigo, and coffee. These landowners were not as powerful as the *grands blancs* because their plantations required less capital and production, which corresponded to less wealth (Dupuy, *World* 26; "Class" 8).

Interesting about this group of *petits blancs* is that it included a minority of wealthy *affranchis*, the majority of whom was classified as mulatto: the product of racial mixing between people of European and African descent. The *affranchis* were able to improve their social position during the 1750s and 1760s during what is called the coffee revolution. Many *affranchis* left urban centers where they were objects of racial discrimination, and established small plantations on unclaimed rural lands. They began to produce coffee for export, and during these decades coffee became the second largest export of the colony. Exports increased from 7 million pounds in 1755 to 77 million in 1790. In 1789 the value of coffee exports nearly equaled that of sugar exports, and Saint Domingue produced 60 percent of the coffee sold in the western world (Dupuy,

[7] I will consistently use the term "racist ideologies" to refer to those ideologies that acknowledge significant differences between people of different races, and that determine relative social superiority and inferiority based on these differences.

World 27; "Class" 8). This economic growth allowed some *affranchis* enough upward social mobility to be included among the *petits blancs*.

The majority of *affranchis* were considered Mulattos, but there also existed a black contingent within the group. The *affranchis* are sometimes referred to as the group of "colored people." The group was comprised of people of many "shades," from nearly white to nearly black. The specificity of stratification during the colonial period is clear in the several classifications for individuals based on the mathematical composition of one's ethnicity: *sacatra, griffe, marabou mulâtre, quateron*, etc. These titles were based on the number of "parts" white or black on was. Yet despite this specificity, the members of this group were often called Mulattos, *jaunes*, or simply colored people (Nicholls, *From* 23-4).

The group on the bottom of the stratification was the slaves, who were comprised nearly wholly of imported Africans and their descendants, though there was also a small contingent of enslaved Mulattos. Until the revolution, slaves were essentially forever condemned to lives of slavery, unless they were lucky and daring enough to flee from plantations and lives as outlaws in the hills. This small minority of slaves were called *marrons* (23-4).

The social stratification during the colonial period is often described as social "castes." Aside from the discussion on the proper use of this term, "caste" implies in this context that social status is based on the intersection of class and color. Though movement between castes was difficult, it was not impossible; and groups were, to a small extent, racially fluid, and also divided by class differences. This is to say that the *grands* and *petits blancs* were comprised of both European colonists and wealthy Mulattos, and the *affranchis* were comprised of light- and dark-skinned individuals of color (Nicholls 24). Social castes generally coincided with color divisions in the society, but they were not absolutely rigid.

Revolt, Revolution, and Independence

The slave revolt of 1791 was a monumental moment in the history of the world. The Haitian revolution was the third in history, and the second to rebel against colonialism; but it was the first to rebel against slavery and European racism[8]. Haiti became the world's first black republic in 1804, and it instantly became a symbol of anti-colonialism and racial equality (Dupuy, "Class" 7; Nicholls, *From* 4). Nevertheless, the impacts of the revolution on the country are varied, and guaranteed that the color question would be a national issue.

The Revolution

David Nicholls writes that one explanation for the emergence of the revolution in Haiti and not in other French colonies is the rapid growth of the *affranchis* in the fifty years preceding the revolution (Nicholls, *From* 30). The population growth of this mostly mulatto group was undoubtedly a significant factor, considering that the racial discrimination of whites towards all people of color was a significant grievance of non-whites in the colony. Before the breakout of the slave revolt in 1791, negotiations between white colonists and the *affranchis* had already been taking place in order to appease the *affranchis* who were demanding racial and social equality among the whites. However, after several failed negotiations, the anger of the slaves in the north could not be contained. The uprisings marked the beginning of the Haitian Revolution (Knight 112).

The American and French revolutions had great impact on the start of revolution in Haiti, encouraging the slaves and victims of racial discrimination to assert autonomy and perhaps independence from France. However, the role of color was more than a simple grievance between

[8] I also use the term "European" or "European-style racism" to refer to a puritan view on race, which is similar to the "one drop" theory – that any person with at least one "drop" of African blood in his or her genetics would be considered black.

white and colored groups. Some *affranchis* found it opportune to ally with the merchant bourgeoisie in their support for the colonial administration (Dupuy, "Class" 10-1). They also saw the opportunity to push for equality with the whites. Furthermore, while *affranchis* were divided on the question of colonialism, the whites and *affranchis* were, at the beginning of the revolution, united on the question of slavery, pushing for its survival in the face of the slave revolt. However, the *affranchis* later aligned with the revolting slaves after realizing that the only way to end racial discrimination was to rid the island of white supremacy altogether (10-12).

In 1794, France completely abolished slavery in the colony, but the movement toward revolution was too powerful to be stopped. The abolition of slavery allowed the *affranchis* to exert authority over white supremacists, though this was short-lived: the arrival of Toussaint Louverture on the scene shifted power to the black revolutionaries (12). Under the leadership of Louverture, 4,000 former slaves fought off the Spanish and English, who sought to take advantage of the internal disorder of the colony to acquire it and reestablish slavery (Dupuy, *World* 48-50).

Louverture asserted authority over the island in a letter written to Napoleon in 1801 without officially declaring independence, but the forceful removal of representatives of the French government and the seizing of key military positions sent a clear message (Dupuy, *World* 53). When a French military force arrived to the island in 1803 seeking to reestablish slavery, Louverture, however, did not defend the colony from the invasion and remained loyal to France. Instead, Jean-Jacques Dessalines mobilized Mulattos and former slaves to arrest and deport Louverture to France, and to defeat the French forces. Independence was declared on January 1, 1804, and Saint Domingue was renamed Haiti in honor of the original Arawak name (Dupuy, "Class" 16-7).

The Success and Merit of the Revolution

The Haitian revolution was an historical event. Alex Dupuy makes the assertion that it was the first modern revolution in history because it fought for the ideals of universal equality for the entire human race, which was a right that the American and French Revolutions reserved exclusively for white Europeans and their descendants (6). Though the revolution did not free Haitian society of its complications, it did present a moment – albeit brief – of unity for the Haitian people.

This unity is clear in the constitution promulgated by Dessalines. It made two grand proclamations: first, that no white man should ever step foot on the island as a master or property owner, nor should he become one; and second, that all Haitians, regardless of origin, race, or skin color – and including naturalized Germans and Polish residents – were black (Christophe et al; Nicholls, *Context* 24; Nicholls, *From* 5). This unity marks a departure from the previous system of social stratification that persisted throughout the colonial period. However, it is difficult to say that this historic moment in the history of the world was more than symbolic for Haiti. Post-independence society retained its racial stratifications and was still rife with inequality left to be resolved (Dupuy, "Class" 18).

Post-Colonial Stratification

Although slavery was officially abolished by the French in 1793 and the constitution awarded civil rights to all with respect to color, the racial hierarchy that placed the *affranchis* above the slaves continued to exist post-independence. Nonetheless, the absence of a dominant white class changed the social power structure of Haiti for the rest of its history.

The largest and most contentious division in post-colonial society existed between those who were called "former free men" (*anciens libres*) and "new free men" (*nouveaux libres*) (Ni-

cholss, *Context 24*). The former free men coincide with the *affranchis* caste while the new free men coincide with the former slaves. There were also color explanations for this division: the former free men derived from the largely mulatto class, which meant they were generally of lighter skin and a product of black and white racial mixing; while the new free men derived from the slave class, which meant they had generally darker skin and were wholly African (24). There were of course also class-based explanations: the former free men were already in possession of property and thus production capital, while the new free men were acquiring property for the first time. In the newly independent society, class was a more powerful determinant than color, though color was definitely an important factor in determining social status. Alex Dupuy summarizes the social battle in Haiti as the country emerged from independence as twofold: first, between the former mulatto landowners and an emerging black middle class; and second, between this landowning middle class and the black masses (Dupuy, "Class" 12).

Color Ideologies in Haiti

As has already been discussed, the color question has existed in Haiti since the importation of African slaves, and it has been manifested in Haitian society in many complex ways. The most influential color ideologies in twentieth century Haitian politics were solidified and brought to the fore after the American occupation of the island from 1915 to 1934. The three predominant and pervasive ideologies, between which one must distinguish, are *Mulâtrisme, Indigénisme*, and *Noirisme*.

Mulatrisme

By the time of the American occupation of Haiti, mulatto elitism was well established in Haiti. The term "Mulatrisme" refers to a mulatto-centric ideology which values the mulatto group – that is, the former *affranchis* who were racially mixed – above all else. This mulatto ide-

ology rejected the idea that there was a fundamental difference between people of different races. Its logic for promoting Mulattos above other Haitians was simply that all of the world's advanced societies, even European ones, are the product of racial miscegenation. Thus, the mulatto minority in Haiti was more advanced and thus more "capable" than the country's black population, which was viewed as "backwards" (Dupuy, *World* 122-3). Proponents of this ideology thus saw Mulattos as those most naturally capable to govern.

The rejection of the idea of a fundamental difference between different human races is an important distinction to make, and one that sets Mulatrisme apart from European racist ideology. European-style racism avoided any and all forms of racial mixing in order to preserve its "whiteness," which was viewed as the determinant of civilization (123).

The mulatriste ideology had direct political implications for the country. Mulattos were much better represented than Blacks in the bourgeoisie. Additionally, Mulattos argued that they were best equipped to rule because they were in general better educated than their black counterparts, and were thus best fit to govern. This idea was best manifested in the slogan of the Liberal Party: "power for the most capable" (Trouillot, "Culture" 161). The education, social position, and influential role of the Mulattos in history formed the basis of their claim to legitimacy and thus to power.

Indigenisme

It is impossible to speak about the role of color in contemporary Haitian society without mentioning the name of Jean Price-Mars, Haitian intellectual and politician to whom the birth of the Indigenist movement is often attributed. His famous work, *Ainsi Parla l'Oncle (So Spoke the Uncle),* was one of the first attempts to revalorize African culture during the American occupa-

tion in the face of Eurocentrism and the dominance of French culture in political and cultural domains.

The Indigenist movement in Haiti grew out of the Negritude movement which began to spread in Paris in the 1920s ("Negritude"). The two movements were similar in that they both espoused the revalorization and validity of African culture: the rejection of the idea that Europeans were more civilized than Africans and their descendants; and the complete refusal of the idea that there existed a fundamental difference between races (Nicholls, *From* 164; Kaussen 69; Trouillot, "Culture" 166). Indigenisme, however, was much smaller in scope than Negritude, was oriented particularly toward the African roots in the Haitian domain, and did not include any direct political implications (Trouillot, "Culture" 165-6).

Although Indigenist sentiment did not originate during the American occupation of Haiti, the presence of the United States helped solidify anti-occupation feelings toward what many Haitians saw as neocolonialism. It was the occupation which provoked intellectuals like Price-Mars and Anténor Firmin to write their influential works. The impact of the American occupation on color was not simple. In one regard, the occupation imposed Jim Crow-style segregation laws and the "one-drop" theory in discrimination against all people of color (Kaussen 68). But in another regard, the occupation presented Mulattos with an advantage due to American conceptions of governability: Americans viewed the Mulattos as better educated and thus better fit to govern, based on European educational values (Nicholls, *From* 163; Kaussen 67; Dupuy, *World* 139-40). Nonetheless, the strongest sentiments in Haiti among Mulattos and Blacks were those of neocolonialism (Nicholls, *From* 163).

Indigenisme stood apart from other color ideologies because, unlike Mulatrisme and Noirisme, Indigenisme did not promote a greater political role for blacks but simply a greater ap-

preciation and validation for a distinct Haitian version of African culture, which included voodoo. It was in the face of an obsession with French culture that Price-Mars and Firmin promoted this ideology and accused the Mulatto elite of being too "Francophile" and of "collective bovarisme" (France 643; Kaussen 69; Price-Mars). In this way, Indigenisme was a much more culturalist that political ideology.

Indigenisme was a very important movement in Haitian history and influenced many other thinkers of the time. Price-Mars and Firmin are often recognized for their contribution to the progress of race in Haiti even though derivations of the ideology are not as celebrated: Indigenisme inspired the thinking of Noirisme, which was the ideology that motivated François Duvalier during his dictatorship.

Noirisme

Noirisme was the most radical and influential color ideology of the twentieth century. The Noiriste movement began as a radical right-wing faction of the Indigenist movement. The movements were similar in a general sense: both promoted and sought to revalorize African culture instead of French culture, which the mulatto bourgeoisie cherished as a symbol of their social superiority (Dupuy, *World* 148). A fundamental difference, however, is that Noirisme is a racist ideology. Noirisme reacted to Mulatrisme, which claimed Black people could not govern themselves, not because of their color, but due to a lack of civilization (Hurbon, *Comprendre* 45). Noirisme agreed with Mulatrisme insofar as it claimed one group was better fit to govern than the other; Noirisme, however, was a racist ideology, and insisted on the biology of black Haitians, saying that it determined the group's psychology, which in turn determined its "collective personality." Furthermore, Noiriste ideology claimed that although all Haitians were to vary-

ing extents products of racial mixing, it was the African biology by which Haitians were predominantly characterized (Nicholls, *From* 169; Nicholls, *Context* 53).

During the 1920s, a group of young men appeared known as the Three Ds, two of whom were the influential Lorimer Denis and François Duvalier. These men came from the black middle class and formed a literary and ethnographic review in 1938 known as *Les Griots*. In their works, the Three Ds explained that Haiti found itself in its state of underdevelopment due to prolonged colonialism, which could be attributed to the selfishness of the Mulatto elite (Nicholls, *From* 168-9; Kaussen 70, 71; Dupuy, *World* 123). The Noiriste movement had explicitly political goals: they claimed that Haiti needed a black "guide" that was "fused" to the black masses by voodoo (Hurbon, *Comprendre* 98; Nicholls, *Context* 59). The Griots and Noirisme thus promoted a brand of Black nationalism that revalorized African culture and religion as it was specific and unique to Haiti. This nationalism was the basis of Duvalier's election in 1957.

Money Whitens

The color ideologies discussed above were influential during the twentieth century, but that must always be considered in conjunction with class-based forms of identification. In Haiti, the self-identification based on both color and class can be viewed as a cross-cutting cleavage – the Haitian people cannot be easily divided solely on color or class lines. Michel-Rolph said it best: "Color never operates alone…" (149). This intersection of color and class is also evident in the famous saying of Jean-Jacques Acau, a nineteenth century private rural army leader: "A rich black is a Mulatto; a poor Mulatto is a Black" (155). And, as Gordon Lewis puts it: "In American society, money 'talks'; in Caribbean society money 'whitens'" (10).

Conclusions

Haiti is often appropriately recognized in history as a symbol in the fight against colonialism, slavery, and racism. However, tragically, Haiti was unable to completely free itself from the scars and vestiges of colonialism, against which the united colony fought for independence. The most important color division that persisted in Haiti was that between the wealthy Mulattos and the poor black masses. During the nineteenth century, Haiti's politics was largely led by the military, as the nation struggled with self-governance. The political presence of the military failed to create a political system that included all Haitians, and thus engendered the economic and social domination of the mulatto elite and middle class. By the turn of the twentieth century, tensions between the mulatto elite and black masses often erupted in political chaos, which peaked with the U.S. invasion. The dynamic between Haiti's twentieth century politics and color divisions – firmly solidified and rooted in the country's colonial history – is the subject of the following chapter.

APPENDIX B

COLOR CATEGORIZATION OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Table 1
Increasing Specificity of Whiteness

Categorization	Parts White
Noir	0-7
Sacatra	8-23
Griffe	24-39
Marabou	40-48
Mulâtre	49-70
Quarteron	71-100
Métif	101-112
Mamelouc	113-120
Quarteronné	121-124
Sang-mêlé	125-127

Table 1 Source: Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier* p. 25

Table 2
Specificity and Variety of Color Combinations Derived from Categorization


Categorization	Parts White	Parts Black	Number of Color Combinations Possible of Being Produced
Nègre	0	128	0
Sacatra	16	112	3
Griffe	32	96	5
Marabou	48	80	5
Mulâtre	64	64	12
Quarteron	96	32	20
Métif	112	16	6
Mamelouc	120	8	5
Quarteronné	124	4	4
Sang-mêlé	126	2	0
Blanc	128	0	0

Table 2 Source: Labelle, *Idéologies de couleur et classes sociales en Haïti* p. 49

APPENDIX C

INTERSECTION OF COLOR AND CLASS IN HAITI


Figure 1
Ranked and Unranked Ethnic Systems



Arrows indicate direction of ethnic conflict

Figure 1 Source: Horowitz*, Ethnic Groups in Conflict* p. 22

Figure 2
Color and Class in Haiti



Arrows indicate direction of group conflict
Letters each theoretically represent one color group, Mulattos or Blacks

APPENDIX D

THE HAITIAN FLAG

The National Flag

1806-1964, 1987 – Present



1964-1987



Haitian Coat of Arms

1806-1964, 1987 – Present



1964-1987

