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SENIOR PROJECT

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≪Vive la République, Vive la France≫: The Continuity of French Republicanism in the Policy and Discourse of Education and Immigration in the Twenty-First Century

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I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

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(Signature)

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For Dad

"Do it because you love it."

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Abstract

In this project, I look at how the French republican model still holds true in the twenty-first century as demonstrated in the policy and discourse of French political systems. I argue that throughout the twenty-first century that French politicians have implemented a more traditional form of republicanism with a major emphasis being on integration, focusing on how immigrants must adopt French values. In the first chapter, I break down the republican model and explain republicanism, address how scholars have talked about republicanism, and talk about citizenship in France. In the second chapter, I argue how throughout the twenty-first century politicians in regards of the school have implemented a more traditional form of republicanism by taking a stronger stance of the wearing of religious symbols in the school, and I trace the current debate back to past debates about the question of secularism in the school. Lastly, in the third chapter I argue that present in the many immigration policies of the twenty-first century that notions of the republican model play a key role in the policy and discourse of political systems, such as the French Constitutional court. This project looks at policies and political discourse as it frame of analysis.

Introduction

Emmanuel Macron, at the end of numerous speeches has proclaimed "Vive la République, vive la France." Using such words gives a glimpse into the attachment that France has to the republican model, which has existed since the French Revolution in 1789. Today, the relevance of the republican model is questioned as France since the 1970s has increasingly closed its borders to immigration, there is the presence of the social and economic inequality that second and third-generation migrants experience, and how France at multiple points in its history has sought to end automatic birthright citizenship for all children born in France to non-French parents. Something that is worth considering for the relevance of the republican model, is the popularity of the National Rally where Jordan Bardella, the current president of the National Rally, who has proposed the end of birthright citizenship.[1]

Another common criticism of the French republican model is that it fails to recognize the diversity of France and that it expects immigrants and even those who are new citizens to be exemplar citizens such as to adopt and express French values such as secularism and puts the pressure of integration on the immigrants themselves. Despite this criticism, immigrant groups, such as SOS-Racisme have advocated for equal treatment and a desire to integrate into French society. Integration with the republican model is a double-edged sword as integration is framed in very open terms; however, immigrants, specifically those from Maghreb countries, countries in North Africa, such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco experience discrimination and despite fully becoming citizens are still considered by segments of the French population "immigrés" and not being fully integrated.

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[1] L'Opinion, "Législatives: Jordan Bardella peut-il vraiment supprimer le droit du sol?," June 19, 2024, video, 00:00-00:02, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iP9PiQHCK2s.

Additionally, the question of the relevance of the French republican model interests me as with the increasing political salience of migration and trend to close borders, countries are faced with the pressure to go against an established social contract. To answer this question of the relevance of the French republican model I use the political-process approach proposed by Miriam Feldblum, a scholar of immigration and citizenship and the national models approach proposed by Rodgers Brubaker and James Hollifield, both of whom are scholars of citizenship and immigration. The political-process approach is fruitful for my project as it considers how ideas are influential and shaping discourses and policies of citizenship, but also the interaction between institutions and actors. I employ the national models approach adopted by both James Hollifield and Rodgers Brubaker because it considers how ideas of republicanism are prevalent in discourse surrounding immigration and citizenship.

Moreover, I find that language, specifically the language used by French politicians in political discourse and policy relating to immigration and education, often uses language associated with republicanism. Specifically highlighting the importance of language is the journal article titled, "Terrorism and the discursive construction of national identity" which states, "Political discourses are therefore not neutral reflections of reality but construct that reality through language."[2] I use the language used in both policy and political discourse to highlight the enduring role of republicanism in the twenty-first century. Moreover, immigration and education are the two areas I use to talk about the relevance of the French republican model because both are areas that are crucial to the French republican model and where a lot of discourse and policy surrounding republicanism is used.

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[2] Ariane Bogain, 2019. "Terrorism and the Discursive Construction of National Identity in France." *National Identities* 21 (3): 241-265.

Overall, I argue that the French republican model is still relevant in the twenty-first century as republicanism is evident in the policy and discourse of political systems. Additionally, I argue that throughout the twenty-first century, politicians have implemented a more traditional form of republicanism as seen in its influence on the French education and immigration system. In Chapter 1, I will explain the key components of the French republican model and provide an in-depth literature review of how the republican model and questions concerning citizenship and integration have been approached by scholars. Chapter 2 will look at how republicanism is present in the political discourse and policy in the French education system, how education is an essential component for the French republican model, and how throughout the twenty-first century republicans have implemented a more traditional form of immigration. Lastly, in chapter 3 I will argue how ideas of republicanism are present in immigration policy particularly relating to the integration of immigrants and how politicians have utilized a more traditional form of republicanism in terms of integration policy in immigration. Chapter 3 will also provide a brief outline of historical tensions in the French citizenship and immigration model because France seeming to move away from the republican model is not new.

Chapter 1: Setting the Stage – Defining the Republican Model and Literature Review

Before addressing the role that republicanism plays in contemporary discourse regarding education and integration in France, I will define what republicanism is, identify its origins, explain how it connects to the principles of citizenship in France, and provide a literature review of how scholars have wrote about republicanism. In doing a work of definitions, it is important to note that similar to other ideologies that republicanism takes on many meanings.[3]

To begin, the principle values of the French republican model are *laïcité* (secularism), universalism, assimilationism.[4] The principle of *laïcité*, as defined by political theorist Cécile Laborde, "encompasses a comprehensive theory of republican citizenship, articulated around three ideals: equality (religious neutrality of the public), liberty (individual autonomy and emancipation from religious oppression), and fraternity (civic loyalty to the community of citizens)."[5] In more simple words, *laïcité* covers the separation of church from the state and the public sphere of life being free *from* religious influence.[6] This is different from the American model of freedom *of* religion. Arguably one of the key components of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* and that is still relevant to the republican model is the prioritization of the individual, which states that there is no interference in the relationship between the individual and the

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[3] Miriam Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 3.
[4] Alec G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France* (New York: Routledge,1995), 160.
[5] Cécile Laborde, "The Culture(s) of the Republic: Nationalism and Multiculturalism in French Republican Thought." *Political Theory* 29, no. 5 (2001): 718.
[6]Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 160.

state.[7] Moreover, the principle of *laïcité* prioritizes the relationship between the individual and the state.[8]

Another key component to the republican model is universalism. Universalism as defined by Fred Constant, a political scientist, "[I]s expressed through loyalty to a set of national institutions and a national history taken to embody universal values and through participation in the public political sphere as a means of transcending individual interests."[9] The school is the place where universalism is expressed as Jeremy Jennings, a political theorist writes, "It is, in short, the school that figures as the principal site or location of individual emancipation."[10] This idea of universalism is specifically applicable in chapter two where I discuss how republicanism is present in the political discourse and policy regarding the wearing of religious symbols in public schools.

Furthermore, historically assimilationism in the French republican model has referred to the idea that immigrants would be incorporated into French society and expected to give up distinctive cultural, linguistic, and social characteristics.[11] Integration, rather than assimilation, is used much more widely now, where immigrants are expected to adopt and respect French republican values such as *laïcité*, equality, and fraternity.

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[7] Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 160.
[8] Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 160.
[9] Jeremy Jennings, *Universalism*. *The French Republic:History, Values, Debates* (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2017), 148.
[10] Jeremy Jennings, Universalism. The French Republic:History, Values, Debates (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2017), 148.
[11] Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Sixth ed (New York: The Guilford Press, 2014), 326.

Chapter 1.1: The French Republican Model and Citizenship

Under the French republican model, citizenship is mostly based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, but incorporates elements of *jus soli*.[12] Under *jus sanguinis*, French citizenship is automatically granted to children of French citizens at birth.[13] The principle of *jus soli* in the French republican model is expressed in the *Constitution of 1791*, which confirms that citizenship is granted for members of the nation born in France, but also that citizenship is granted to those who have lived in France for five years.[14] Specifically, citizenship is granted automatically at eighteen to all children born in France, given they had at least five years of residence in France.[15] Germany, opposite of France, has a citizenship model based solely on *jus sanguinis*.[16] Similar to the model of republicanism, which originated in the French Revolution, the formal delineation between citizen and foreigner did not occur until after the French Revolution. Prior to the French Constitution of 1791, there was a subtle distinction between those who belonged to the state and foreigners. The "qualité de français" although not a formal model of citizenship in France is where ideas of citizenship originated, particularly the ability of individuals to leave and inherit property.[17] The right to inherit property and the ability to leave property to others was something granted to Frenchmen, while *aubains* (foreigners) did not possess the same rights.[18]

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[12] Rodgers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 81.
[13] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 81.
[14] Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 161.
[15] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 81.
[16] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 81.
[17] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 36.
[18] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 36.

In a sense, citizenship and French republicanism are interconnected to one another because for many politicians being a French citizen involves the respect of *laïcité*, universalism, and putting individual rights before that of different communities.[19] To nationalists, being a French citizen entails more than formal citizenship status, but to adopt French cultural values.[20] Questions concerning citizenship is especially present in political discourse during the mid-1980s, specifically during the national debate over the end of *jus soli* citizenship in regards to *Article 23*, which granted citizenship to third-generation immigrants, and *Article 44* of the French Constitution which grants citizenship to second-generation immigrants born in France under the condition that they were born in France and have had residence there since they were thirteen.[21] The language in *Article 23* and *24* of the French Constitution applies to all migrants; however, the political discourse surrounding revising *jus soli* and how it is granted to individuals was centered on the citizenship of all Algerians in France in the 1980s and the 1990s, and today is centered on individuals from Mayotte, a French department.[22] As well as the nationalist perspective present in the political discourse surrounding the conditions of citizenship is a voluntarist perspective which has criticized how under *Article 23* the attribution of French citizenship to second-generation immigrants is unconditional, meaning that individuals are not given the option to choose citizenship and that individuals are automatically granted dual citizenship.[23] For voluntarists, this was a point of contention because by having French citizenship be automatic to second-generation immigrants allows, in a sense, allowed for French culture to take priority over Algerian

[19] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 147.
[20] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 147.
[21] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 140.
[22] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 140.
[23] Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 140.

culture.[24] On the other hand, nationalists take issue with *Article 23* and *Article 44*, as political discourse has centered on the fact that Algerians who have been granted citizenship, assume French citizenship for purely instrumental reasons, rather than showing a general enthusiasm for being part of the French state and to promote French values.[25] In the twenty-first century, there is still this view that those who have dual citizenship claim it for purely instrumental reasons. Like nationalists, staunch defenders of republicanism as Cécile Laborde, a scholar of French political theory, writes, "have long insisted that republics can not survive without citizens exhibiting civic virtue."[26]

Chapter 1.2: Literature Review

Similar to the citizenship debate, questions of integration are apparent as there is a multitude of perspectives in how individuals, specifically scholars, think of and engage with how different cultures can be part of the French republican model. For instance, Jeremy Jennings, a political theorist, in his 2000 journal article titled "Citizenship, Republicanism, and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France" addresses three different perspectives of republicanism, all of which address the degree of plurality and multiculturalism that is acceptable in the republican model.[27] The first perspective that Jennings identifies is "traditional republicanism", which upholds that the principles of universalism and *laïcité* need to be respected and this is embodied by Régis Debray, a French philosopher and journalist, who in a 1989 newspaper article titled, "Êtes-vous démocrate ou républicain?" wrote that, "The universal idea governs the republic, the state

[24] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 140.
[25] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 147.
[26]Cécile Laborde, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 10.
[27]Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,"575.

in a republic is unitary and by nature centralized."[28] With republicanism as referenced by Debray there is the notion of a universal set of ideals that all citizens follow. In the traditional republicanism perspective, multiculturalism is incompatible with republicanism as it is associated with individuals valuing their own culture over that of the French republic.[29]

Another perspective of republicanism presented by Jennings is modernizing republicanism which is, to him, most represented by Dominique Schnapper, a sociologist who specializes in questions surrounding integration and citizenship.[30] Under the modernizing republicanism perspective, multiculturalism can be accepted; however, cultural traditions which do not respect the rules of modern democracy can not be accepted.[31] A third perspective which Jennings presents is multicultural republicanism and to him this perspective is represented by writer Joël Roman and Michel Wieviorka and Farhad Khroshrokhavar, who are both sociologists.[32] For Roman, under the republican model, France must stop giving an image of universality, but to recognize the diversity of society.[33] Roman also argues that there needs to be a multitude of ways to be French.[34] Multicultural republicanism recognizes that there is cultural diversity and does not work to oppose diversity.[35] Other than the three different perspectives that Jennings mentions is the theory of critical republicanism proposed by political theorist, Cécile Laborde in her 2007 book titled, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and*

[28] Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,"585.
[29] Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,"587.
[30] Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,"589.
[31] Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,"590.
[32] Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,"592.
[33] Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,"592.
[34] Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France," 593.
[35] Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France," 594.

Political Philosophy. Laborde's critical republicanism addresses the relationship between culture and power, modes of immigrant integration, and criticizes the hijab ban.[36] For Laborde, critical republicanism conceives of itself as being egalitarian as it thinks of the quality of the relationships that citizens have with one another, the ways in which inequalities in the condition and differences in life experiences impact citizenship, and how social exclusion can increase the politicization of ethnic and cultural differences.[37] Critical republicanism, unlike traditional republicanism and similar to what Laborde terms, official republicanism, ignores that different groups of individuals, such as those labeled as *immigrés*, are marginalized and how the operation of the nation-state reinforces and exacerbates these "differences."[38] In writing of the beliefs of critical republicans, Cécile Laborde writes, "critical republicans contra official republicans, believe that the optimal compliance of citizens with republican principles can not legitimately be required under conditions where those principles are only imperfectly realized and upheld by state institutions."[39] The fact that Laborde's critical republicanism recognizes the widespread belief that individuals have to optimally comply with standards of citizenship; however, institutions still reinforce differences. More compelling is what is illustrated in Laborde's statement that, "[Y]et one problem, in France, as is generally true, is that the burden of maintaining standards of civic virtue, patriotic allegiance, and secular restraint or gender equality, second-generation immigrants blamed for 'refusing to be French', have been asked to behave as exemplary citizens of (an increasingly elusive and idealized) French

[36] Laborde, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*, 9.
[37] Laborde, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*, 11.
[38] Laborde, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*, 16-17.
[39] Laborde, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*, 13.

republic."[40] I agree with Laborde that the burden of maintaining standards of citizenship, such as secularism and patriotic allegiance has fallen on "second generation" immigrants .

Lastly, through my reading of Rodgers Brubaker's 1992 book titled *Citizenship of France and Germany* and Joan Scott's 2007 book titled *The Politics of the Veil* both authors explore how French-Algerians, who are considered *immigrés* by segments of the French population, carry the burden of embodying French citizenship. Brubaker discusses how ideas of republicanism and the republican model are crucial in the political discourse around citizenship, particularly the debate around dual citizenship, the supposed devaluation of French citizenship, and the supposed unassimilability of Algerians.[41]

Additionally, the debate around dual citizenship and the perceived devaluation of French citizenship is particularly relevant in regards to Laborde's point that second-generation immigrants are blamed for refusing to be French and expected to uphold exemplary citizenship. Alternatively, Joan Scott, a historian, adds to how Algerians, who are very often labeled as "immigrants" carry the burden of being exceptional models of citizenship. With centering her argument around the headscarf affair in 1989, 1994, and 2003, and the use of newspaper articles, such as articles from *Le Nouvel Observateur* and comments from French officials emphasizes the political discourse over the wearing of headscarves in schools, which employed language of defending republican values. For instance, she includes an article from *Le Nouvel Observateur* where five philosophers are interviewed.[42] In the article the five philosophers state, "The foundation of the Republic is the school."[43] Scott includes

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[40] Laborde, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*, 14.
[41] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 144.
[42] Joan Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 24.
[43] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 24.

another comment from a journalist which states, "These young North Africans, sons of immigrants … today feel more French than Muslim."[44] After including this quote, Scott writes, "The choice was clear: only by giving up all signs of belonging to the Islamic faith could these people become fully French, and then all sorts of differences might keep them on the margins of the society of which they were already a part."[45] With this emphasis on the political discourse that occurs around the headscarf in the school, there is a sense that in order to truly be French one has to fully adopt French values.

Overall, understanding different models of republicanism and the contradictions and tensions within the traditional model of republicanism is crucial for a full understanding of republicanism, as it shows there is a debate that occurs over how republicanism should be. For instance, Régis Debray, who is a philosopher and supporter of the traditional republican model, has defended the traditional republican model. For instance, he defends the traditional republican model in a 1989 newspaper article titled, "Êtes-vous démocrate ou républicain". In this article, he writes, "En république, chacun se définit comme citoyen, et tous les citoyens composent « la nation », ce corps d'associés vivant sous une loi commune et représenté par le même législateur ."[46]In the above statement, Debray reinforces how in the republic each citizen makes up the nation and the nation makes up one community. Later in the same paragraph, Debray differentiates this from democracies as he writes, "En démocratie, chacun se définit par sa

[44] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 83.
[45] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 83.
[46] In the republic, each person is defined as a citizen and all of the citizens make up the the nation, this associated body lives under one common law and is represented by the same legislature. Régis Debray, "Êtes-vous démocrate ou républicain?," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 30 November - 6 December 1989, trans. Olivia Durden

« communauté », et l'ensemble des communautés fait la société."[47] For Debray, democracies reinforce differences between individuals as society is built around a multitude of communities. He supports the notion that French society is one community. In regards to the school he writes, "En république, la société doit ressembler à l'école, dont la mission première est de former des citoyens aptes à juger de tout par leur seule lumière naturelle."[48] He sees the school as a place that embodies the ideals of the republic which includes *laïcité*. For traditional republicans like Debray, emphasis should be on making sure the state is universalistic and continues with secularism and this emphasis continues with the French republican model today. The publication of "Êtes-vous démocrate ou républicain" and his 1989 book titled, *Que vive la république* were written around the time of the first headscarf affair and the proposal for the revision of *Article 23* and *Article 44* of the *French Constitution*, both of which are periods of time that the French republican model experienced tension in defining citizenship and so-called challenging of the republican model. In the latter half of the 1990s there was a shift in scholarship regarding the republican model. Scholars such as Dominique Schnapper, a sociologist, and Michel Wieviorka, another sociologist, represent a shift in scholarly thought regarding the recognition of cultural differences in the French republican model.

Furthermore, the political-process approach proposed by Miriam Feldblum, in her 1999 book titled, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France* offers another way to think of the debate around

[47] In democracy, each is defined by his community and together these communities make up society. Régis Debray, "Êtes-vous démocrate ou républicain?," 30 November - 6 December 1989, trans. Olivia Durden

[48] In the republic, society should resemble the school, that is the first mission: to form citizens capable to judge all by their only natural light. Régis Debray, "Êtes-vous démocrate ou républicain?,"30 November - 6 December 1989, trans. Olivia Durden

republicanism and how it is present in discourses of citizenship. Feldblum describes the political-process approach as "[looking at] political agency, the interaction of institutions and agents, and the construction of ideas and interpretations."[49] Particularly, Feldblum emphasizes the contestations over citizenship and looks at these contestations over citizenship through the political-process approach. In using the political-process approach Feldblum recognizes how particularly during the debate over the revision of the *Code of Nationality*, which would revise *Article 23* and *Article 24* of the French Constitution, that both the Right and Left had different understandings of French republicanism.[50] She specifically states, "The Right's communitarian arguments complemented their emphasis on *volonté*.[51] *Volonté* emphasizes the necessity of a citizen's connection to a community that emphasizes French culture.[52] Communitarianism as defined by Feldblum, "[focuses on] communities of character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life."[53] Communitarianism emphasizes one community, which is the French national community. The Left also expressed their own understanding of republicanism as the left in their arguments emphasized how France has been a pluralistic society for centuries and situated a French national community in terms of language, culture, and a

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[49] Miriam Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 3.
[50] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 66-68.
[51] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France*, 65.
[52] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France*, 65.
[53] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France*, 65.

way of living together.[54] The political-process approach, like the different approaches to republicanism, considers how there are differing ideas of what republicanism looks like. By considering the interactions between different institutions and agents, such as politicians, there is an enhanced understanding of how discourses over citizenship in France involve interactions between institutions and agents, which involved to an extent a debate over what republicanism looks like.

Moreover, Emily Laxer, a sociologist, in her 2019 book titled, *Unveiling the Nation*, finds that the national models approach and focusing on institutions enable or constrain the actions of the state, are insufficient in explaining the political response to the wearing of the headscarf.[55] Laxer describes the national models approach as, "[R]egarding immigrant selection and incorporation reflect systems of meaning that are bound up in countries' unique historical nation-building processes."[56] For Laxer, the national models approach emphasizes republicanism and that scholars of republicanism have been too quick to name republicanism as dictating policy.[57] Specifically, Laxer identifies that Rodgers Brubaker in *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* identified republicanism as encouraging successive French governments to adopt a lax approach to naturalization and citizenship.[58] Laxer also states, "Subsequent research has corroborated the view that France's immigration and integration policies develop in consonance with the civic logic of republicanism."[59] Laxer feels that by focusing on republicanism as the main force behind debates over religious signs like the headscarf,

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[54] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 69.
[55] Emily Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation: The Politics of Secularism in France*, 19.
[56] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation: The Politics of Secularism in France*, 19.
[57] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation: The Politics of Secularism in France*, 21.
[58] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation: The Politics of Secularism in France*, 21.
[59] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation: The Politics of Secularism in France*, 21.

that studies have overlooked the diverse interpretations that political actors bring to republicanism. Additionally, Laxer sees the institutional approach which emphasizes that decision-making by states is limited by institutions such as the *Constitution* and by existing laws and policies, as providing a partial explanation to differing responses to religious signs.[60] Laxer proposes a politics-centered approach which highlights how political parties have attempted to "own" the religious signs issue, reshaping the boundaries of the political sphere in an attempt to win electoral support.[61]

Chapter 1.3: My Take, My Approach

For my own research, I use the national models approach and the political processes approach. Specifically, the national models approach highlights how republicanism has informed the defense of the *jus soli* principle of citizenship and the integration of immigrants. I do agree somewhat with Emily Laxer that the national models approach can be quick to name republicanism as the dictating force behind policy behind the headscarf; however, I do think that Emily Laxer in her critique of the national models approach fails to recognize how to an extent the national models approach considers the role that models of citizenship play in the discourses of institutions and politicians. The political-process approach proposed by Miriam Feldblum is pertinent for my research because of the fact that it considers how ideas are influential in shaping discourses of citizenship, which can further be seen in discourses of integration and immigration. Through the discussion of scholars like Régis Debray, Dominique Schnapper, Joël Roman, and Cécile Laborde there is considerable variation of how scholars think of republicanism in terms of what degree of difference is allowed. The

[60] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation: The Politics of Secularism in France*, 25.
[61] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation: The Politics of Secularism in France*, 41.

political-process approach is nuanced as it considers how there is general sense of what republicanism is in France; however, how people understand it varies considerably. Moreover, through looking at the interactions between institutions and agents, such as the discourse around citizenship in France and politics of immigration is done through the interactions between institutions and political actors. Looking at ideas and interpretations of the French republican model connects to how notions of republicanism are present in the discourse surrounding the school, particularly around the wearing of the headscarf. Joan Scott, in her 2007 book titled, *The Politics of the Veil* provides a compelling case as through the political discourse she includes surrounding the wearing of the veil in schools, how different ideas existed surrounding the wearing of the headscarf in schools and the degree to which to regulate the wearing of the headscarf in the school. For instance, Scott discusses how those who supported François Bayrou in his 1994 decision to ban all "ostentatious" signs of religious affiliation, asserted that a defense of the republic was necessary, while sociologists Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Kosrokhavar interviewed the girls who wore the hijab to see why the girls wore the hijab and believed in negotiation rather than exclusion for integration.[62] Scott's book connects to chapter two as in *The Politics of the Veil* she considers how the discourse of republicanism is present in policies of the school and the discourse of politicians.

[62] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 27-28.

Chapter 2: The School as a Microcosm for French Republicanism

In past and contemporary France, the education system has played a significant role in demonstrating French republican values, specifically *laïcité* and is especially crucial for integration and ideas of French nationhood. Historically and in the modern-day, the French school has been seen as the place for instilling republican values in students, such as *laïcité* and promoting the integration of students by promoting *liberté*, *fraternité*, and *égalité*, three rights that are cherished and part of the ideals of the French republic. To answer the question of the relevance of the French republican model, I will analyze the discourse used around education in France, specifically the wearing of religious symbols in schools, and how over time there has been a furthering of French traditional republicanism. Before that, I will provide background on the principle of *laïcité* in the French education system. Lastly, I will talk about how the intensification of these policies in regards to the French education system connects to questions of integration in France.

Chapter 2.1: Roots of *Laïcité* in the French Education System

To begin, prior to the establishment of a secular education system in 1905, the role of the Catholic church in state affairs, such as the delegation of education oscillated and was heavily debated.[63] The debate of the Catholic Church in state affairs was particularly present in the French Revolution, as there was the view of the conservative counter-republicans, who wanted to promote an institutionalized state religion under the control of the pope and the king, while the revolutionaries favored state-control of education.[64] The French state maintained control over the Catholic Church as the state required priests to express their allegiance to the Constitution and after the fall of Robespierre in 1795, the state guaranteed religious freedom to all, but banned

[63] Emily Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation: The Politics of Secularism in France and Quebec* (Montreal:McGill, 2019), 46.
[64] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation*, 46.

public religious expression, including the wearing of religious clothing.[65] The church regained influence in state affairs as in 1801 Napoleon introduced a Concordat that required the state to officially recognize Catholicism, but again this influence was limited as in 1804 the Napoleonic Civil Code restricted the influence of the church, as state authorities needed to perform marriages and that the state controlled secondary schools and universities, allowing the church to control primary education.[66] Despite the church-state arrangements, tensions increased between the conservative and Catholic tradition of the provinces compared to Paris which tended to be more atheistic.[67]

Additionally, the Catholic Church gained significant influence with the passage of the Falloux Law in 1850 which allowed both the state and church to operate schools at the primary and secondary level.[68] The Falloux Law enabled a significant increase in the number of primary and secondary schools as enrollment in primary schooling went from 3,321,423 in 1850 to 5,341,211 in 1880 and Catholic schools accounted for 80 percent of this growth until 1876.[69] Education among girls increased with the Falloux Law as Catholic schools provided girls with access to schooling.[70] With the Falloux Law, Catholic and state schools worked together as each shared the goal of providing schooling to French children.[71] In terms of the differences in the curriculums between Catholic and state schools, not much difference existed as both produced gendered understandings of the division of labor.[72] Jules Ferry saw the differences in the education of boys and girls and expressed the contradictory nature of the education system when

[65] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation*, 46.
[66] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation*, 47.
[67] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation*, 47.
[68] Patrick J. Harrigan, "Church, State, and Education in France from the Falloux to the Ferry Laws: A Reassessment." *Canadian Journal of History* 36, no. 1 (2001): 55–56.
[69] Harrigan, "Church, State, and Education," 56.
[70] Harrigan, "Church, State, and Education," 56.
[71] Harrigan, "Church, State, and Education," 60.
[72] Harrigan, "Church, State, and Education," 65.

he states, "Ces premières années doivent être consacrées au travail intellectuel qui, dans les écoles de filles, prépare mères de famille, dans les écoles de garçons, prépare des citoyens… ce sont des institutions absolument barbares, primitives."[73] Ferry viewed the education system prior to his proposed reform laws as being stuck in the past and saw a contradiction in the education between men and women. Ferry writing about the contradictions is interesting when considering how today the goal of the education system today is to teach children about what it means to be French citizens, but also that one of goals of the French education system is to promote equality between students. This is noteworthy as one of the key values of the French republican model is equality.

Furthermore, the introduction of Ferry Laws in the Third Republic(1870-1940) and the formal separation of the church and state in 1905, are markers and symbolic of *laïcité* in the education system. The Jules Ferry Law of 1882 made public schooling free, mandatory, and secular, as public education was no longer done by the church.[74] With the 1882 law, the state replaced the church as the source of knowledge and became the place to develop a sense of nationhood among children, a value which is still reflected in the republican model in the twenty-first century.[75] When discussing the *laïcization* of education, it is important to recognize that despite the Jules Ferry law of 1882, that two school systems remained in France.[76] It was not until the 1905 Law of Separation that the semi-official status of Catholicism ended and that secularism was formally defined.[77] Despite education being secular with the Jules Ferry Law of

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[73] These first years should be filled with intellectual work; however the schools for girls teaches them to be mothers, while schools for boys prepares them to be citizens, these are absolutely barbaric and primitive institutions. Jules Ferry, *Discours et opinions de Jules Ferry*, 1896, 48. trans. Olivia Durden

[74] Harrigan, "Church, State, and Education, 76.

[75] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation,* 48.

[76] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation*, 48.

[77] Laxer, *Unveiling the Nation*, 50.

1882, students were not expected to attend classes on Sunday and were given an extra day off to receive religious instruction in their churches.[78] Special accommodations have continued to be given to Catholicism despite constitutions in the Fourth and Fifth Republic constitutions (1946, 1958) which define France as being secular.[79] The school calendar continues to observe only Catholic and state holidays and despite the proposal of the Stasi Commision in 2003 to include a Jewish and Muslim holiday, that proposal was rejected by Jacques Chirac on the grounds that Christian holidays do not violate the principle of *laïcité*.[80]

Chapter 2.2: *Laïcité* in Algeria Prior to Algerian Independence in 1962

When discussing how republicanism is present in the policy and discourse regarding education, special attention must be given to how Islamic clothing has been targeted in schools, as France colonized countries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Understanding the history of colonization of Algeria is specifically pertinent in this discourse because it highlights how from the beginning an image of how education was supposed to look. Prior to Algerian independence in 1962, from the period of 1830-1962, Algeria was seen as being part of France and because of this sense that Algeria was part of France, there was a perceived need to promote French republican values.[81] When discussing the history of education in Algeria it is important to mention that it is a subject that lacks sufficient literature.[82] Interestingly, it was settlers in Algeria who advocated for and instilled a secular version of education prior to the establishment of the Jules Ferry laws in the 1880s.[83] The settlers of Algeria, were composed of individuals who were

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[78] Joan Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2007), 100.
[79] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 100.
[80] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 100-101.
[81] Neil MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-1962* (Great Britain:MacMillan Press, 1997)
[82] Kyle Francis,"Algeria for the Algerians: Public Education and Settler Identity in the Early Third Republic" French Politics, Culture and Society 36, no. 1 (2018): 26–51.
[83] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 31.

from Spain, Italy, Malta, and exiles from the French republic after Napoleon III's coup in 1851.[84] In 1867, the Governor General of Algeria, Patrice de MacMahon issued a circular that called for the creation of *écoles mixtes*(mixed schools), that would provide French education in conjunction with children of different religions being educated by a minister of their religion.[85] Despite MacMahon's circular, the municipal council of Algiers in 1868, refused to let Muslim and Catholic religious leaders inside Algiers's school system and instead used secular teachers.[86] From 1870-1871, municipal councils in Algeria continued to work to secularize Algerian schools as the councils forced all Catholic teaching congregations to leave schools.[87] The visions of the municipal councils which were composed of settlers in Algeria excluded *indigénes*, indigenous peoples in Algeria, as for the normal school in Mustapha enrollment for Muslim students never increased to more than three and by 1870 the enrollment of Muslim students dropped to zero.[88]

Additionally, another example of settlers in Algeria failing to accommodate indigenous students, is that in January 1881 Ferdinand-Phillipe Belin, France's prime minister of education in Algeria wrote to Jules Ferry, the French minister of education, about a plan to open public schools for *indigènes* in the Berber-region of Grand Kayle and that in preparation for this plan that the schools settlers attended started to offer Kabyle language classes.[89] Four students from the school in Mustapha agreed to take the Kabyle course; however, during the investigation of the student revolt in 1881, it emerged that all students who planned to take the course backed out.[90] The combination of the municipal councils in Algiers refusing to allow ministers of religion to teach in conjunction to French education, the failure to establish schools with both

[84] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 27-30.
[85] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 31.
[86] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 30.
[87] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 31.
[88] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 31.
[89] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 36.
[90] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 36.

indigènes, settlers, and the children of settlers, and the failure to establish a public school for indigénes reflects a sense of how the settlers of Algeria who were part of France were part of upholding values for the French nation-state. The implications of the exclusion of *indigénes* is described by historian Kyle Francis who states, "In many ways, the narrow application and particularistic tendencies of this homegrown Algerian republicanism served as precursors to the exclusive republicanism and its prohibitions on the public expression of faith in the ascendancy of France today."[91] The actions of the settlers in working to promote secularism in conjunction with the exclusion of indigénes from the educational system, is in what will be discussed later, demonstrates how past historical legacies pertaining to one interpretation of republicanism is used in political discourse today. The actions of the French government to work to accommodate the *indigènes*, also reflects how at one point the French government worked to promote the religious freedom component of *laïcité*, which has been omitted from the political discourse of *laïcité* today.

In summary, through an exploration of the French education system in Algeria, prior to Algerian independence it is worth noting that republicanism in the French schooling system was somewhat limited during French colonization of Algeria, as until the rise of Algerian resistance against French colonization, that French administration officials did not pay much attention to creating an education system that worked to include Algerians. For instance, from the period of 1908 to 1938, non-European enrollment in French primary schools in Algeria only increased from 33,000 to 104,000."[92] Another statistic which demonstrates the limited extent of Algerian students in primary schooling is that, up until 1954, public schools had room for around 300,000

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[91] Francis, "Algeria for the Algerians," 28.
[92] Andrew Alf Heggoy and Paul J. Zingg, "French Education in Revolutionary North Africa." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no. 4 (1976): 575.

students out of 2 million Algerians of primary school age.[93] With enrollment of Algerian students during the colonial period being a small proportion compared to the number of eligible students demonstrates to an extent how *indigènes* resisted participating in French education, but also highlights to an extent how unwilling French authorities in Algeria were to create educational opportunities for *indigénes*. In my opinion a lack of French resources being devoted to providing education to *indigénes* and a lack to teach other educational principles highlights how France has historically constructed their own image of how the education system should be and in this allowed for the exclusion of others.

Section 2.3: Discourses of Republicanism in French Education in the Twenty-First Century

In education, throughout the twenty-first century, republicanism has been evident in the policy and political discourse in the French education system. It is important to note that this is not wholly unique to the twenty-first century and that similar to measures to ban the wearing of religious symbols in 1994, that there has continued to be an emphasis by politicians on a traditional/strict form of republicanism. The date of October 3, 1989 is noteworthy as it was the day that three Muslim girls were expelled from school for refusing to remove their headscarves.[94] The date of October 3, 1989 stands out for a multitude of reasons: 1. occurred at a moment of time after an emphasis of integration was put on citizenship and debates over what it meant to be a French citizen, 2. The school was in a ZEP where the majority of students were at least 500 of the 876 students were Muslim, and 3. the question of how to unite an increasingly more diverse population with the notion of universalism, which historically lacks the recognition of a plurality of cultures.[95] It is important to discuss the context of the 1980s because French society was in

[93] Heggoy and Zingg. "French Education in Revolutionary North Africa,"576.
[94] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 22.
[95] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship*, 131.

conversation of what it meant to be a citizen in France and institutions, political actors, and agents all interacted with one another to make sense of how one would be considered a French citizen. For instance, in 1985, Alain Mayoud of the UDF, a moderate-right party, proposed revising the Code of Nationality, specifically ending automatic attribution of citizenship based on *jus soli*.[96] The key logic surrounding this discourse was the logic of integration and how immigrants were expected to integrate into French society and respect French values such as *laïcité* and universalism. This proposed revision of the Code of Nationality failed; however, on the question of citizenship, *The Nationality Commission* was established in 1987 by Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of France at the time, and their purpose was to deliberate on the meaning of French citizenship.[97] The report published by the commission favored that nationality policy must play a key role in the process of integration and for the national integration of immigrants, which meant as Miriam Feldblum states, "the construction and transmission of a strong sense of the common identity … the spread of common cultural forms."[98] Now knowing that the report published by the commission favored a nationality policy that prioritized the integration of immigrants, specifically North Africans one can better understand what is often referred to as "l'affaire des foulards." The expulsion of the three girls exposed French society to the bigger question of the wearing of religious signs in French public schools, but also brought in a variety of opinions when it came to how the principle of *laïcité* should be respected in schools and the invocation of how individuals should participate in the republic. Contrary to the backlash from the public and scholars, Lionel Jospin, the Minister of Education at the time, referred the question to the *Conseil D'État*, an administrative body which advises the government on whether

[96] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship*, 57.
[97] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship*, 103–104.
[98] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship*, 109.

to implement certain laws and measures.[99] The *Conseil D'État* at the time ruled that the wearing of religious signs by students in public schools did not necessarily violate *laïcité*, as long as the signs were not polemical and as long as the religious symbols were not worn while entering the classroom, a public space and that students could not be refused admission for wearing headscarves, as it would violate the right of individual expression.[100] The decision of the *Conseil D'État* is significant because it shows how *laïcité* was being respected, but how there was not an all out ban on religious symbols and that in many cases students were to still continue to wear the headscarf in school hallways and courtyards.[101]

Additionally, the year 1994 is important to discuss as Ernest Chenière, as a representative of the center-right party, RPR, offered a bill which would ban all "ostentatious" signs and on September 20, 1994, François Bayrou, decreed that all ostentatious signs of religious affiliation would be banned in schools.[102] Ostentatious signs, as defined by Joan Scott, were distinguished as, "to introduce difference and discrimination into an educational community that, like the nation it served, ought to be united."[103]What is particularly interesting is the discourse surrounding the wearing of religious symbols in school, as in a circular, which often provides an interpretation for applying laws, issued on September 27, 1994, is the reinforcement and construction of the school being an integral component of the component and being a place of integration. A sentence from the circular which captures the particular idea of integration and strong sense of republican nationhood is "L'école est, par excellence, le lieu d'éducation et d'intégration où tous les enfants et tous les jeunes se retrouvent, apprennent à vivre ensemble et à

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[99] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 25.
[100] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 25–26.
[101] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 26.
[102] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 27.
[103] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 27.

se respecter."[104] As can be seen with the discourse of wearing religious symbols in schools in both 1989 and 1994, whether or not the wearing of certain symbols in traced back to the republic, showing how the notion of the republic, specifically ideas of nationhood and *laïcité* plays a key role in the framing of one's construction of ideas towards the wearing of religious symbols in the school.

Furthermore, in the 2000s there is a continued discourse of the implementation of *laïcité* and implementation of an educational policy that marks a more traditional stance of republicanism. The date 2003 stands out because once again there is debate around the wearing of headscarves in schools. Before addressing the specific discourse present in 2003, it is essential to provide some context. In 2003, Nicholas Sarkozy brought the question of the wearing of headscarves in public spaces to the forefront of French political debate when he ruled that Muslim women posed bare-headed for official identity photographs.[105] Also relevant is that socialist deputy, Jack Lang presented a bill to the National Assembly which would ban all signs of religious affiliation in public schools and that in response to the proposal of such a bill, that President Jacques Chirac appointed a commission, led by Bernard Stasi, to look at the feasibility of enacting a law banning all religious symbols in schools.[106] While the commission was meeting, two students, Lila and Alma Lévy were expelled for refusing to remove their headscarves or wear "un foulard léger."[107] The ruling of the Stasi Commission reflects how there was intensification of the principle of *laïcité* in defining what symbols were tolerated in the school. For instance, the Stasi commision called for the banning of the wearing of "conspicuous"

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[104] "Neutralité de l'enseignement publique," Circulaire Ministérielle no. 35, September 29, 1994, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/dossiers/documents-laicite/document-3.pdf.
[105] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 30.
[106] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 30.
[107] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 30.

signs of religious symbols in public spaces.[108] France in 2004 reflected the idea of the hardening stance of French republicanism when in March, the French legislature passed a law banning all conspicuous religious symbols because with this law unlike what had been allowed in the past, there was no room for the extent of compromises negotiated in the past such as, scarves on the shoulders and "lite" scarves.[109] With the state taking a harder stance on the wearing of religious symbols in school through policy we see how there was a more traditional form of republicanism as the French state put more emphasis on the fact that to be allowed in a French public school, one had to fully respect *laïcité* and that there would be no room for compromise. With the public outrage of the Lévy sisters wearing the hijab to school and the *affaires des foulards* in 1989, efforts were not made to ask the girls why they were wearing the hijab and headscarf, but assumed that the girls were wearing the headscarf as a sign of rejecting French citizenship, therefore rejecting to participate in the republic.[110] Sociologists Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar, asked the girls why they wore the headscarf. Gaspard and Khosrokhavar on the subject of why girls wore the headscarf found that, "Enfin, le voile des posts-adolescents qui se réclament d'une «identité voilée» ne peut être interprété comme un rejet de la citoyenneté française, mais comme une volonté d'intégration *sans* assimilation, une aspiration à être françaises *et* musulmanes."[111] With the public discourse surrounding the wearing of the veil putting emphasis on those who wear the veil not wanting to be French citizens shows how respecting *laïcité* is seen as requisite for belonging in the French state and is a perception of belonging that ignores how dual citizens define their belonging in the French state. The findings

[108] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 34.
[109] Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*,
[110] Jeremy Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France." *British Journal of Political Science* 30, no. 4 (2000): 593.
[111] Finally, the veil of the adolescents which expresses a veiled identity can not be interpreted as a rejection of French citizenship but rather as a desire to integrate without assimilation, a desire to be French and Muslim., *Le Foulard et la République*, 204, trans. Olivia Durden

by Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar also show how many were quick to make assumptions about the girls without considering why they wore the headscarf, but rather as an attack on French republican values.

Lastly, highlighting the continued relevance of the French republican model is the decision and discourse of Gabriel Attel, the minister of education from July 2023 to January 2024, to ban the *abaya*, a full length robe, from being worn in French public schools .[112] In defending the ban of the *abaya* in French public schools, Attal stated, "un geste religieux, visant à tester la résistance de la République sur le sanctuaire laïc que doit constituer l'école."[113] The language used by Attal positioned the wearing of the *abaya* as going against *laïcité* and positioned the wearing of religious symbols as being done to resist the republic. His discourse also constructs the wearing of a religious symbol as going against the values of the republic. The discourse of Emmanuel Macron specifically highlights the continued relevance of the republican model informing discourse in an interview with Hugo Travers on September 4, 2023, he defended the ban of the *abaya* and similarly to Attal used the principle of *laïcité* to defend the ban and positioned the wearing of the *abaya* in French public schools as being incompatible with *laïcité*. Macron specifically states, «Nous vivons dans notre société aussi avec une minorité de gens qui détournant une religion viennent défier la République et la *laïcité*.»[114] Macron with this statement expresses that there is a sense in French society of Islam being incompatible with the Republic and *laïcité*, and that the wearing of the *abaya* is part of this tension. Macron's defense

[112] France Inter, "Abaya à l'école et assassinat de Samuel Paty: ce qu'a dit précisément Emmanuel Macron," *Radio France*(Paris,France), Sept. 5, 2023.
[113] A religious gesture, seen to test the limits of the Republic on the laïc sanctuary which makes up the school. France Inter, "Abaya à l'école et assassinat de Samuel Paty: ce qu'a dit précisément Emmanuel Macron," Sept. 5, 2023, trans. Olivia Durden.
[114] We live in our society with a minority of people who resort to a religion that defies the Republic and laïcité. HugoDécrypte - Grands formats, "L'interview d'Emmanuel Macron par HugoDécrypte," Sept. 4, 2023, video, 48:40, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Z6HnUJ3hcw, trans. Olivia Durden.

of the ban and expression of tension between French republican values and the wearing of religious signs in public reflects a hard line against practices that are seen to go against the values of the republic.

Conclusion

When discussing where the republican model stands in France, discussing the education system, particularly the hardening stance of *laïcité* is of significant importance. Through the dates listed, a key point is that the attention of wearing religious symbols is centered on Muslim religious symbols and that with the discourse involved that there is a continuous emphasis on *laïcité.* In chapter 3, where I discuss how discourse of republicanism has been present in the policy and discourse of the French politician, there are similarities in how this connects to the discourse of *laïcité* and reinforcement of national ideas of integration.

Chapitre 3: L'Immigration et l'intégration - un déplacement à l'extrême droite?

L'immigration, spécifiquement la citoyenneté, est un débat très important en France et a beaucoup d'importance historique. La France a une longue histoire d'immigration.[115] Au XXe siècle, la France a accueilli beaucoup d'immigrants qui ont travaillé dans les industries avec les pénuries de main-d'œuvre pendant la première guerre mondiale.[116] Jusque dans les années 1980, il y avait peu d'attention portée sur l'immigration parce qu' avant la décolonisation, beaucoup de procédures d'immigration étaient temporaires.[117] Avant de discuter des discours et des lois de la citoyenneté et de l'intégration, je donnerai quelques informations sur l'histoire du système de l'immigration et le principe républicain.

On peut tout d'abord parler des ordonnances de 1945, qui sont importantes pour le système de l'immigration.[118] Avant la création des ordonnances de 1945, Charles de Gaulle, qui était le chef du gouvernement provisoire, a voulu créer un système de l'immigration pour faire face à la diminution de la population française après la deuxième Guerre Mondiale.[119] Il y avait aussi un grand débat sur le système de l'admission des immigrés.[120] Georges Mauco, qui était le Secrétaire général du Haut Comité consultatif de la population et la famille, a défendu un système de l'admission sur la base d'une sélection éthnique par quotas.[121] En revanche, Alexandre Parodi, qui était le Ministre du Travail, et Adrien Tixier, qui était le Ministre des Affaires Sociales, ont soutenu d'un modèle qui respecte aux valeurs républicaines d'égalité, qui c'est-à-

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[115] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 219.
[116] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 221.
[117] Alec G Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, 1st ed (London;New York: Routledge, 1995), 5.
[118] Rygiel Philippe. "France: immigration since 1945" in *The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration*, Immanuel Ness, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 1.
[119] Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Étrangers: L'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration de 1938 à nos jours* (Gallimard,1991), 77.
[120] Weil, *La France et ses Étrangers*, 78.
[121] Weil, *La France et ses Étrangers*,78.

-dire que l'égalités des droits sociaux sont le même pour les immigrés et les citoyens français.[122] Notamment, l'ordonnance du 19 octobre 1945 a donné les autorisations temporaires de séjour sur la base de loyalisme politique et ont ajouté des conditions pour la citoyenneté.[123] Le loyalisme politique est l'idée que quelqu'un montre une fidélité totale à la France.[124] L'ordonnance du 2 novembre 1945 a créé un système de l'immigration qui établit les conditions d'entrée et séjour des étrangers.[125] Spécifiquement, l'ordonnance nº 45-2441, a créé un nouveau code de la nationalité française.[126] En effet, les conditions pour la citoyenneté étaient pour quelqu'un d'être assimilé, d'être en bonne santé, et d'attester d' une résidence constante en France depuis au moins cinq ans.[127] Les ordonnances de 1945 sont importantes parce qu'aujourd'hui pour la citoyenneté français et la résidence française, un niveau d'intégration est obligatoire pour la citoyenneté et pour la résidence.

Chapitre 3,1: Les tensions historiquement dans le système républicain de l'immigration

L'idée de la fin du modèle républicaine n'est pas un nouveau phénomène, comme dans les années 1980 et les années 1990, il y a eu les mesures pour la fin de *droit du sol* et pour changer *le Code de Nationalité*. Aux ces moments, une variété des institutions utilisent les idées de républicanisme dans ses discours, mais aussi les politiciens utilisent les discours de républicanisme. Pendant le débat pour changer *Le Code de Nationalité* dans 1985 et 1986, il y a eu trois points du vues qui étaient très similaires.[128] Miriam Feldblum, une spécialiste de

[122] Weil, La France et ses Étragers,78.
[123] Alexis Spire, *Étrangers à la carte: L'administration de l'immigration en France(1945-1975)* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2005), 22, 35.
[124] Spire, *Étrangers à la carte*, 23.
[125] Spire, *Étrangers à la carte*, 19.
[126] Richard Plender, "The New French Nationality Law," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 23, no. 4 (1974): 713.
[127] Plender, "The New French Nationality Law," 35.
[128] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship*, 61.

citoyenneté et l'immigration s'appelle ces trois arguments: nativiste, «communitarian», et «voluntarist».[129] Selon Feldblum, les trois arguments partagent la même logique nationaliste.[130] Cette logique nationaliste valorise la loyauté totale aux France et l'idée que toute les citoyenettés partagent les mêmes valeurs.[131] Quand Charles Pasqua, le Ministre de l'Intérieur a proposé la fin du citoyenneté automatique pour les personnes nées en France aux parents étrangers, le Conseil d'État a dit que la loi était contre le principe de la tradition du modèle républicain.[132]

Puis, les années 1990 sont notamment quand on discute de l'idée de la fin du modèle républicain parce que malgré les lois qui étaient contre le modèle républicain un discours de républicanisme était évident dans le discours de politiciens et les institutions politiques, mais dans les lois après les loi qui étaient contre le modèle républicaine. Par exemple, en 1993, le ministre d'intérieur, Charles Pasqua a proposé un loi qui a enlevé le procès équitable et a réduit le droit à l'asile pour les migrants.[133] Cette loi présente un risque pour le modèle républicain parce que le procès équitable et un procès en bonne et due forme réduisaient pour les demandeurs d' asiles sont des principes essentiels dans le modèle républicain.[134] C'est notamment que Lionel Jospin, qui était le premier ministre de 1997 à 2002, en 1997 dans une parole de Parliament s'est appelé «un nouveau pacte républicain.»[135] Spécifiquement dans sa parole, il a parlé beaucoup de choses liées au modèle républicain. Par exemple, il dit que,

> La France, vieux pays d'intégration républicaine, s'est construite par sédimentations, creuset donnant naissance à un alliage d'autant plus fort que ses composants étaient divers et nombreux. C'est pourquoi le droit du sol est consubstantiel à la nation française. Nous le rétablirons. Rien n'est plus étranger à la France que le discours xénophobe et raciste. La

[129] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship*, 61.
[130] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship*, 61.
[131] Feldblum, *Reconstructing Citizenship*, 61.
[132] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 232.
[133] Hollifield., 237.
[134] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 237.
[135] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*,

France doit définir une politique d'immigration ferme et digne, sans renier ses valeurs, sans compromettre son équilibre social.[136]

Les mots de Lionel Jospin montrent son engagement pour la continuation du modèle républicain. C'est intéressant qu'il parle de France comme un pays de l'intégration et que ses mots défendent le *droit du sol*. Cette parole par Lionel Jospin montre l'influence du républicanisme dans le discours. Pendant les années de Lionel Jospin comme le premier ministre, la loi Guigou a été promulguée.[137] La loi Guigou qui a été promulguée en 1998, a renforcé le principe du *droit du sol* pour les enfants nées en France aux parents étrangers et cette loi crée un carte de l'identité républicaine.[138]

Enfin, c'est important de parler de discours et des lois de l'immigration dans les années 1980s et les années 1990s parce que similaire à XXI^{e} siècle il y avait beaucoup de pression sur le modèle républicain, mais malgré ces pressions des politiciens et des institutions ont défendu le modèle républicain.

Chapitre 3,2: Les continuités dans les politiques de l'intégration et discours pendant le XXI^{e} siècle

Au XXI^{e} siècle beaucoup d'événements se sont passés. Par exemple, en 2002 après le premier tour d'élection présidentielle Jean-Marine Le Pen étaient en deuxième place et en 2005 il y avait des émeutes surtout France après deux adolescents qui habitaient à Clichy-sous-bois, un banlieu à l'extérieur de Paris, ont été électrocutés après une tentative pour échapper à la police parce que la police les a suivis.[139] Un mesure qui montre que les politiciens

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[136] Lionel Jospin, "Le discours de Jospin," *Libération*, 20 June 1997, https://www.liberation.fr/evenement/1997/06/20/le-discours-de-jospin-i_209174/?redirected=1.
[137] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 242.
[138] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 242.
[139] Anna McKeever, "Immigration and Integration Policy Change in France during Sarkozy's Era." French Politics 22, no. 2 (2024): 101.

en XXI[e] siècle est qu'en 2003 Nicolas Sarkozy, qui était ministre d'intérieur de 2002-2007, était l'auteur d'une loi qui a lié les permis de séjour aux immigrés montrent l'intégration républicaine.[140] Spécifiquement, les immigrés étaient obligés aux signer un contrat d'accueil et d'intégration.[141] Ce contrat existe encore et ce contrat inclut la formation civique.[142]Pour moi, cette loi réfléchit un modèle de républicanisme traditionnel parce que le modèle de républicanisme traditionnel valorise *laïcité* et universel et avec le contrat de l'intégration beaucoup d'attention est met sur les immigrés adoptent des valeurs comme la *laïcité*. Cette loi montre aussi la mise en œuvre de modèle républicaine comme le modèle républicaine valorise le principe de l'intégration, qui c'est-à-dire l'adoption de valeurs républicaines. De plus, Anna Mckeever, qui est scientifique politique dans l'article, «Immigration and integration policy change in France during Sarkozy's era.» Elle parle de la présidence de Nicolas Sarkozy(2007-2012), spécifiquement la politique de l'intégration est devenu plus stricte.[143] En 2007, il a créé *le Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire*.[144] Le but de ce ministère est d'améliorer l'intégration et de promouvoir l'identité nationale.[145] La création de ce ministère montre la valorisation d'un modèle traditionnel de républicanisme. En 2009, Éric Besson, le ministre de l'immigration, a lancé le débat sur l'identité nationale.[146] Il a dit que, «J'ai envie de lancer un grand débat sur les valeurs de l'identité nationale, sur ce qu'est être Français aujourd'hui.»[147] Il a dit aussi que «Nous n'aurions jamais dû

[140] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 244.
[141] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 247.
[142] République Française, "Qu'est-ce que le contrat d'intégration républicaine (CIR) ?," République Française, 8 January 2025.
[143] McKeever, "Immigration and integration policy change in France during Sarkozy's era,"87
[144] Ibid., 93.
[145] Ibid., 102.
[146] Ibid., 102.
[147] "Besson relance le débat sur l'identité nationale," *Le Monde*, 26 October 2009, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/10/25/besson-relance-le-debat-sur-l-identite-nationale_1258628_823448.html

abandonner au Front national un certain nombre de valeurs qui font partie du patrimoine républicain.»[148] C'est intéressant qu'il ait voulu lancer un discours sur l'identité française. La discussion de l'identité française n'a pas reçu beaucoup de soutien du public français parce que cette discussion était associée au Rassemblement National.[149] Le discours d'Eric Besson montre comme une forme de républicanisme qui valorise la nation existe encore.

Le discours de François Hollande pendant sa présidence montre comme modèle du républicanisme est pertinent encore. Par exemple, en 2015 pendant sa présidence, il y a eu deux attaques terroristes.[150] Après ces attaques terroristes, il a utilisé beaucoup de discours républicanisme. Par exemple, Ariane Bogain, qui est scientifique politique, trouve que Hollande dans les discours après le premier et deuxième attaque terroriste que François Mitterrand dans ses paroles a utilisé beaucoup de mots qui a créé un sens de l'homogénéité pour la France et l'idée de la France comme une nation unie.[151] Par exemple, il dit que «We are attached to values: values of freedom, democracy, pluralism, dignity, equality between men and women.»[152] Selon Bogain, «The repressive nature of Hollande's Republic led to a closure of national identity around a traditional republican model, which, as outlined through this article, was based on a myth that ignored feelings of alienation and exclusion from it.»[153] Le fait que Hollande a utilisé les mots liés au modèle de républicanisme traditionnel est notamment en France pendant la XXI^{e} siècle comme beaucoup de discours et politique de l'immigration, concernent l'idée de l'intégration et une identité nationale.

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[148] Ibid
[149] McKeever, "Immigration and Integration Policy,"102.
[150] Bogain, "Terrorism and the discursive construction of national identity in France," 241.
[151] Bogain, "Terrorism and the discursive construction of national identity in France," 245.
[152] Bogain, "Terrorism and the discursive construction of national identity in France," 248.
[153] Bogain, "Terrorism and the discursive construction of national identity in France," 257.

Les dernières politiques à discuter sont la loi de 2018 qui s'appelle la loi «Pour un contrôle strict de l'immigration, une politique d'asile efficace et une intégration réussie» et la loi de 2024 qui s'appelle, «pour contrôler l'immigration, améliorer l'intégration.» La loi de 2018 réduit le temps un demandeur d'asile peut appliquer pour asile en France.[154] La nouvelle loi donne un demandeur d'asile quatre-vingt dix jours d'appliquer pour asile.[155] Notamment, cette loi a violé le principe de *fraternité* parce que les personnes qui aident un migrant illégal aurait problèmes juridiques.[156] La décision légal par le *Conseil Constitutionnel,* qui contrôle de conformité d'une loi à la *Constitution*.[157] *Le Conseil Constitutionnel* a intervenu dans un affaire judiciaire où Cédric Herrou, un fermier, qui aide des réfugiés à la frontière française-italienne a réaffirmé le modèle républicain parce que le principe de *délit de solidarité*.[158] On peut regarder ce débat récemment avec le loi no. 2024 - «pour contrôler l'immigration, améliorer l'intégration.»[159] Cette loi a été promulguée le 19 décembre 2023 et des mesures notamment et très controversées ont inclus des quotas pour la migration et la fin de la nationalité française donne automatiquement à l'âge majeur pour les personnes nées en France aux parents étrangers.[160] Beaucoup de membres d'Assemblée Nationale, étaient contre cette loi. Malgré l'Assemblée Nationale promulgue cette loi, cette loi n'était pas mise en œuvre jusqu'à ce que janvier 2024 à cause des censures par le Conseil Constitutionnel. Le conseil constitutionnel, qui

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[154] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 259.
[155] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 258.
[156] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*, 259.
[157] Louis Gilbert, "France: New Immigration Law Enacted After Extensive Censure by Constitutional Council," *Library of Congress*, 9 February 2024.
[158] Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration,* 259.
[159] "Loi du 26 janvier 2024 pour contrôler l'immigration, améliorer l'intégration," *Vie Publique*, 27 January 2024, https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/287993-loi-immigration-integration-asile-du-26-janvier-2024.
[160] Le Monde, "What's in France's controversial immigration law?," *Le Monde*, 20 December 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/12/20/what-s-in-france-s-controversial-immigration-law_6361995_7.html.

contrôle de conformité d'une loi à la *Constitution*, a mis un vote de censure sur l'article pour changer les conditions pour *droit du sol* et les quotas d'immigration.[161] La décision du Conseil Constitutionnel montre le rôle que les institutions jouent dans la continuation du modèle républicain. Une autre partie de la loi de 2024 qui montre comment les politiciens implémentent un modèle traditionnel de républicanisme est la condition nécessaire pour les personnes signer un contrat pour respecter les principes de la république.[162]

Chapitre 3.3: Le Rassemblement Nationale, un parti politique intégral pour comprendre l'immigration et l'intégration

Le Rassemblement National, précédemment le Front National, est important pour comprendre le contexte de discours et de politique de l'immigration en XXI^{e} siècle. Le Rassemblement National a été fondé en 1972 par Jean Marie Le Pen.[163] Il était parachutiste en Algérie et était contre l'indépendance de l'Algérie.[164] Lui et les autres politiciens du Rassemblement National ont utilisé le discours qui parle de la nation française et l'importance de l'identité française.[165] Par exemple, Bruno Mégret qui était un politicien de Rassemblement National a dit que «To be French signifies the belonging to a group, rootedness in a soil, and the identification with a culture.»[166] Ses mots montrent l'importance de la nation et une interprétation de la signification de la culture française pour quelqu'un qui se considère comme français. Le Rassemblement National a soutenu l'idée du changement du *Code de la Nationalité*.[167] En

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[161] Louis Gilbert, "France: New Immigration Law Enacted After Extensive Censure by Constitutional Council," *Library of Congress*, 9 February 2024.
[162] République Française, "Loi sur l'immigration: plusieurs dispositions entrent en vigueur," Service-Publique.fr, https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/actualites/A17534?lang=en.
[163] Peter Davies, *The Extreme Right in France 1789 to the Present: From de Maistre to Le Pen* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 133.
[164] Davies, *The Extreme Right in France 1789 to the Present*, 133.
[165] Peter Davies, *The National Front in France* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 68.
[166] Davies, *The National Front in France*, 68.
[167] Davies, *The National Front in France*, 76.

particulier, Bruno Mégret a dit que «To enter into the national community … to integrate into an exceptional community of destiny, is not something to be given to every man on earth.»[168] Ses mots montrent la manière dont il perçoit la nationalité française comme un privilège. Le modèle républicain valorise les personnes et montre leur loyauté à la France mais aussi le *droit du sol*. Ce discours de Mégret utilise l'idée républicaine de la nationalité française.

De plus, l'immigration est un sujet qui a beaucoup d'importance pour le Rassemblement National.[169] L'immigration pour le Rassemblement National représente un danger pour la France.[170] Par exemple, en 1979 le Rassemblement National utilise le slogan, «One million unemployed is one million immigrants too many" et ce slogan a changé dans les années 1980 et les années 1990.[171] Le Rassemblement National utilise le slogan «La France pour les français.»[172]Ce slogan est contre l'idée républicaine parce que le modèle républicaine reconnaît que les personnes de nationalités différentes peuvent devenir français par adopter les valeurs français.[173] Ce slogan montre aussi la promotion du modèle basé seulement sur le *droit du sang* par le Rassemblement National. Beaucoup de membres du Rassemblement National promeuvent le principe du *droit du sang*. Par exemple, Marine Le Pen dans un discours de l'Assemblée Nationale le 6 février 2025, elle a dit que «Nous pourrions et même nous devrions supprimer le droit du sol pour l'ensemble du territoire national.»[174] Marine Le Pen comme son père soutiennent l'idée de la fin du *droit du sol*. Son idée est contre le principe républicaine parce que le *droit du sol* est une valeur fondamentale. Beaucoup de personnes d'extrême droite soutiennent

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[168] Davies, *The National Front in France*, 76.
[169] Davies, *The National Front in France*, 20.
[170] Davies, *The National Front in France*, 20.
[171] Davies, *The National Front in France*, 21.
[172] Davies, *The National Front in France*, 80.
[173] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 107.
[174] Marine Le Pen, "Il faut supprimer le droit du sol sur l'ensemble du territoire français!," February. 6, 2025, video, 00:28-00:35, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ObyFE2bJ0t4.

l'idée de la fin du *droit du sol*, mais il y a une tendance pour les autres politiciens et le public français soutenir *le droit du sol*. Par exemple, en 2024 Gérald Darmanin, le ministre d'intérieur, a annoncé la fin de la citoyenneté automatique française pour les enfants en Mayotte.[175] Ce projet a reçu beaucoup de réactions négatives de politiciens sur la gauche et le centre.[176] Ces politiciens s'opposent à ce projet parce qu' ils ont perçu que ce projet établit un précédent dangereux.[177] C'est important noter que Mayotte a plus strictes règles de la citoyenneté française que le tout de la France.[178] En 2018, le gouvernement français a établi un règle qui a fait nécessaire pour un parent habiter en France pour au moins trois mois avant la naissance d'un enfant.[179]

En conclusion, dans les décennies passées et récemment l'immigration était un grand débat de la société française. Il y a eu les efforts pour fermer la frontière, mais il y a aussi beaucoup d'attention sur l'intégration et pour le gouvernement maintenir le *droit du sol*. À cause du Rassemblement National et les autres politiciens comme Charles Pasqua, il y avait les défis du modèle républicain. Malgré ces défis le *droit du sol* a été protégé en France, qui montre la protection du modèle républicain. C'est important à considérer les tensions entre les politiciens du modèle républicain, mais aussi l'influence du Rassemblement National et si la France s'éloignera le modèle républicain.

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[175] RFI, "France to revoke birthright citizenship in overseas Mayotte to stem migration," *Radio France International*(Paris, France), November 2, 2024.
[176] Ibid
[177] Ibid
[178] Ibid
[179] Ibid

Chapitre 3.4: La fin du chapitre

En conclusion, dans les décennies passées et récemment l'immigration était un grand débat de la société française. Il y a eu les efforts pour fermer la frontière, mais il y a aussi beaucoup d'attention sur l'intégration. À cause du Rassemblement National et les autres politiciens comme Charles Pasqua, il y avait les défis du modèle républicain. Malgré ces défis le *droit du sol* a été protégé en France, qui montre la protection du modèle républicain. C'est important à considérer les tensions entre les politiciens du modèle républicain, mais aussi l'influence du Rassemblement National et si la France s'éloignera le modèle républicain.

Conclusion

When thinking of the relevance of the French republican model in the twenty-first century, one can help but not to think about how the republican model will be applicable after the 2027 elections. Through looking at other countries such as America after our presidential elections one can not help but think about how France's immigration and integration policy will look like after the elections in 2027. France, unlike America, has a legislature that constantly is changing immigration policy. Through the bigger question of the relevance of the French republican model I argue that in both education and immigration policy, France continues its path with its republican model as ideas of republicanism are present in the policy and discourse in the fields of education and immigration, two areas that hold great significance in the French republican model. Immigration policy following the republican model has continuously focused on integration, highlighting the enduring power of the republican model. With education and immigration throughout the twentieth centuries there has been an intensification of republicanism and a veering towards a more traditional form of republicanism as lots of emphasis is placed on integration and the adoption of French values such as *laïcité*.

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