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Beyond Economics:
Reevaluating the Success of West Germany's Guest Worker Program

Department *of* International Studies



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Reevaluating the Success of West Germany's Guest Worker Program

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I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....ii

Quotes.....iii

Introduction.....iv

Chapter 1: 1961 – 1973: The Time of the *Gastarbeiter*.....1

Chapter 2: The *Gastarbeiter* Program's Effects on Germany's Political Economy.....14

Chapter 3: The Social Effects of the *Gastarbeiter* Program.....26

Chapter 4: *Die DDR:Weniger Gastarbeiter machen eine bessere Deutschland?*.....34

Conclusion.....52

Bibliography.....57

Abstract

West Germany's guest worker program from 1961 – 1973 provided the German economy a substantial boost, helping Germans to achieve phenomenal growth. Thus, from a purely economic perspective, it is often considered a given that the guest workers were beneficial for Germany. However, this assertion needs to be qualified by other factors, such as social effects, humanitarian concerns, and the actual intentions of guest worker policies. Furthermore, West Germany's position as a global actor in the context of the Cold War needs to be included in this evaluation, namely in regard to the guest worker program's effects on the countries who sent workers as well as West Germany's competition with East Germany. When these factors are accounted for, what results is a more nuanced view of the benefits that the guest workers accrued to West Germany.

"Western Europeans asked for a temporary work force, but they got men." - Max Frisch

"Nationalism springs from a favoured group called the nation, bound together by one or more factors of similar appearance and a shared language and/or language. From these raw materials evolve cultures and state structures." - Panikos Panayi

Introduction

The history books refer to Germany[1] between 1950s and the 1970s as the "economic

[1]When I speak about Germany, I am referring to the Federal Republic of Germany; East Germany will be specified.

wonder, ” a period when Germany experienced incredible growth rates for a western nation. Post war Germany was a war-torn landscape, and due to the hard work of Germans and help from the United States, a new Germany emerged from the ashes by the 1950s. With basic infrastructure built, Germany needed more workers to support the new economy. Hence, Germany signed contracts with Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Spain, and Italy; it was due to these guest workers that Germans were able to have higher level jobs and that Germany as a whole was able to sustain its growth rates through the 1960s and into the 1970s. However, there are aspects of this guest worker-aided growth that are not apparent from economic statistics. One must temper these statistics with the social issues which arose from the guest worker program, as well as the effects the program had on the sending nations, the intentions of German government, and the exploitation of the guest workers. With this more nuanced look at the economic miracle, we can evaluate how much of a benefit to Germany the guest worker program really was.

In order to determine whether the guest worker program was beneficial to Germany or not, the definition of beneficial must be set. Deciding whether or not the guest worker program was beneficial overall will be considered in several ways: a) Did the program allow for Germany to grow economically, or overall was Germany at a higher level of economic prosperity due to the presence of guest workers? b) Were the ends worth the means? c) What was the impact of the program on other nations and on the guest workers themselves? And d) What impact did the guest worker program have on Germany's reputation as a model democracy in the midst of the Cold War?

In addition to the overarching framework, this paper will use several variables to determine the degree to which Germany benefitted from the guest worker program. These have been sorted under the broad categories of political/economical effects and social effects. If political/economic

aspects and social aspects were equally weighted for this study, we would see the positive and negative scale being almost exactly balanced; this, however, is not a fair representation of the variables. I have decided that the overall positive economic effects for Germany are more important than the issues I present, tipping this study toward the beneficial-with-nuances thesis. Thus, my argument is that Germany did benefit overall from the guest worker program, but it could have been more beneficial if Germany had handled guest workers as more than economic assets and exhibited more long-term planning in its policies. As the scholar Ray Rist states:

> Germany [could not] continue to have it both ways – both the economic benefits accruing to the society from the presence of the foreign workers, and the maintenance of a discriminatory society that relegates the immigrants and their children to inferior status and occupational positions" (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism, xiii).

Chapter 1 lays down the historical context in which the guest worker program took place. I discuss the post-war situation that lead up to the need for the guest workers, the scene during the presence of the guest workers, and the circumstances in which the program end. In Chapter 2 I discuss the policies Germany had towards the guest workers and how these changed over the decade, as well as the political atmosphere that accompanied these changes. I will also show the economic achievements of the guest worker program and how they allowed the native Germans to have greater social mobility and a more affluent society. Chapter 3 casts a long shadow on the brightness of the previous chapter as I delve into the social aspects of the guest worker program. Within these depths I describe how the guest workers were treated by the native population, how the guest workers were exploited, and how much Turkey as a whole as well as individual Turks

did not benefit from migration.[2] Finally, Chapter 4 compares the East German contract worker program with that of West Germany in order to determine whether communism or capitalism treated its foreign labor better. I briefly describe the differences in the structures of East and West Germany to show what capacities each had for certain actions they took, then proceed to compare these actions. We shall see that East Germany had a greater ability to control all aspects of its economy and thus its contract worker program as well as the contract workers themselves, and it was this degree of control allowed East Germany to have a better program.

[2]I use Turkey as the primary example throughout this essay due to the fact that Turks represented the largest cohort of foreign labor in Germany – and they were also the most culturally distinct from Germans.

Chapter 1

1961 – 1973: The Time of the *Gastarbeiter*

The time period in Germany between 1961 and 1973 was characterized primarily by a shift from a distinctively economic focus to a more humanitarian one on the part of the German people. This shift is reflected in other changes, such as more social political preferences, more openness about the Nazi past, friendlier relations with East Germany, and greater cooperation with other nations. The guest workers were an integral part of all of these shifts both directly and indirectly; therefore, their presence helped to show Germany that it needed to change. In this chapter, I describe the German world that the guest workers arrived in as well as the world they left, illustrating the push and pull factors which influenced them. By giving a brief glance at the 1940s and 1950s, it is easier to understand possible reasons as to why guest workers experienced such a hostile environment in the 1960s – post war Germany was still forming its new identity and had trouble doing so. Finally, I explore Germany's expanding role in the rest of the world, since context of the Cold War is especially central to understanding Germany's actions and the role of guest workers in democracy.

An Overview of Germany in the 1960s and 1970s

In 1949, Germany was split in two by forces beyond its control – it's fate was decided between Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States - and thus a weak nation became even weaker. Four years after World War II, Germany still lacked infrastructure, able-bodied men, and had only just gained the ability to make most of its own decisions. In 1950, there were 15.5 million men between the ages of 15 – 64, compared to 18.6 million women of the same demographic. Throughout the time period of this examination, this discrepancy does not change;

in fact, it does not level out until 1985 (Korte 41). Through the 1950s, it became clear that the Federal Republic of Germany would require more workers to expand economically. Thus, in 1955, an agreement was signed with Italy to send over the first guest workers.

The Germany in the late 1950s to 1960s was vastly different from the Germany of the early 1950s. Instead of having a broken infrastructure, life was picking up again and the "economic miracle" was beginning. Autobahns and trains were beginning to reconnect places as well as open up others which had always been remote. Buildings, streets, and houses were all fresh and modern, ready for new life. Businesses were starting up and flourishing; connected with that, less Germans worked in manufacturing and farming and instead gravitated toward these higher jobs (History of Germany 1918 – 2000 163). By August 13th, 1961, the Federal Republic of Germany increasingly needed more laborers to fuel this growing society. Until this date, it had access to East German and other East European workers to augment its own workforce. Then, the Berlin Wall was erected, cutting the Federal Republic of Germany off from its traditional source of labor. This necessitated the signing of guest worker programs with non-traditional sources such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. These workers often did not speak German or have much of an education, and were relegated to jobs that Germans no longer wanted to do themselves (Koepke 188). This meant that they unevenly clumped up in the manufacturing, construction, and service industries – industries that doled out low wages and provided little mobility, but were essential to keep the economy running and growing larger. Therefore, the mobility and access to a more affluent standard for Germans was made possible by the guest workers, who filled the low skilled jobs.

As the number of guest workers increased, Germany's economy was able to sustain high rates of growth, save for the recession in 1967 – 1968, until 1973. It was this year that Germany

and other European countries banned imported labor from non-EEC countries, the official explanation springing from the oil-related recession. Many scholars claim that the guest worker flow was stopped instead because European countries were attempting to fix problems caused by the large number already present and were looking for a way to discontinue the program without upsetting the sending nations (“Migration and Marginality,” 97). Whichever explanation holds true, recruitment offices in the sending countries closed, resulting in a sharp decrease of new workers. It is not to say that the recession was not a legitimate concern; oil prices skyrocketed. In Germany, prices increased from USD 1.40 per liter to USD 2.80 by 1973. Inflation rates went from 2.1 percent in 1969 to a high of 7 percent in 1973 and 1974, which made all commodities more expensive. Unemployment also began to increase, making a large jump from 582,000 in 1974 to over a million the next year. Growth rates also ground to a halt – in 1973, GDP grew 4.7 percent, but in 1974, there was no growth at all, followed by a drop of 1.1 percent in 1975 (Engelbrecht 84). Germany's economy was unable to simply “bounce back” from these shocks and continue on its path; in fact, it has not been able to attain the growth rates from the 1960s and 1970s since. This unspectacular economic performance marks 1974 as the end of the economic miracle for Germany.

Push Factors: Turkey's Situation

All of the sending countries had the opposite problem that Germany had: they had too many people and too little capital. This meant that even with investments in companies and technology, there were not enough jobs generated to employ the bulk of the population. It was determined by the countries in this position that the best thing to do would be to send workers abroad, where they would earn money and send some back home. These remittances would inject

more money into the sending country while relieving pressure on the job market, allowing the country to create jobs for the smaller population and stabilize.

Let us consider Turkey. Turkey in the 1960s had a mostly agrarian economy, with agriculture comprising 40 percent of its GDP and 80 percent of its exports in 1963 (Aydas 55). It also lacked governmental stability. At the signing of the guest worker agreement in 1961, Turkey had just formed a new government after a military coup in 1960. The democratic party had been removed from power, and its voter base was dispersed between three other parties. This resulted in difficulties in forming government coalitions between 1961 – 1964. In Turkey's first Five Year Plan in 1963 (as well as the plans which followed until 1977), economic growth and industrialization were the stated goals. Turkey increasingly decided that exportation of work was necessary in order to achieve its desired growth rate (Aydas 55). There were enough problems stemming from having too large of a population that the Turkish government thought the benefits of sending labor would outweigh the harms. For instance, the unemployment index rose from 100 in 1962 to 162 in 1972, even with millions of Turks finding work abroad during this period. The reason for this unemployment is from the other goal of the Five Year Plans – industrialization. Even with growing unemployment, Turkey experienced an average growth of 7 percent a year, but this was from building up high-tech industries rather than incomes (Aydas 55 - 56). There were not enough people trained to work in these facilities for these new industries to provide jobs in a short amount of time. Meanwhile, the population grew and those employed in agriculture fell, creating an unemployment that was not easily remedied. I will discuss the economic push factors in more depth in chapter 2.

Besides lack of jobs and the government promotion of migrant labor, political violence also developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Justice Party, which had finally been able

to form a working government, could not control the political violence that had swept over Turkey. The situation became dire enough that the military intervened again, installing conservatives in the government and decreeing martial law in many provinces until 1973. The early 1970s saw many military clashes with guerilla groups as well as arrests and trials. Extremist parties were banned from the government. However, in 1973, the military's candidate for presidency lost, and politics resumed as they had before 1971. This led to a resumption of participation of extremist groups and political violence resumed, raising the death toll. Guest workers thus had a greater incentive to stay in Germany during the 1970s and bring their families; it was becoming dangerous for some to go back.

New Identities and Post-Nazism: Conflicts with Foreign Influences

Guest workers did not enter the most culturally stable society when they came to 1960s Germany. Germany was still in a stage of forming a new national identity that was still German but not Nazi. The addition of foreign elements however was helpful in identifying what it was to be “German,” since guest workers were different: the majority of these people had brown eyes and hair, different facial structures, different languages, different religions, and different cuisines. However, defining Germans by appearances and culture automatically excluded guest workers from having the ability to become German or add to the definition of being German; this established a mindset that sat uncomfortably well with the old ideas of Nazism. This was especially poignant when former Nazis were still in positions of power and making laws and policies about guest workers. Let us proceed by viewing the growing pains of post-war Germany, keeping in mind that guest workers entered this world.

Post-war survivors in Germany had more than just physical destruction to rectify. Almost

every facet of their lives was tainted by Nazism, something that they had to abandon in order to move into the future. Thus, the German people had to redefine themselves under the supervision of the Allies. This was hardly a simple task. German culture and society had been suffused with racism and ideas of eugenics and social darwinism for several generations by the end of the war; and just because the war ended did not necessarily mean that Germans would stop believing in these ideas. Few areas remained untainted by Nazism: pre-Nazi literature and music, food, and language. Many other more recent bonds, such as land, politics, shared experiences and history, social groups, and social norms were no longer commonalities that held Germans together. The Allied occupation of Germany allowed Germans to be exposed to "acceptable" cultures; for instance residents of Cologne could simply adopt an American identity during their cultural and societal transition. During the immediate post-war years, there was much uncertainty over Germany's future, as witnessed by the pseudo-anthem "*Eingeborenen von Trizonesien*," which reflected the attempt to establish an identity in the divided occupation zones.

In the confusion, and also out of practicality, parts of Nazi Germany remained. The late 1940's were supposed to be "*die Stunde null*," the new beginning for Germany, a wiping away of Nazism. It also implies forgetting that the past happened, however. Everybody, save for the important Nazis, could simply start over again. Ex-Nazis were still in prominent positions as bureaucrats, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and teachers, partially due to the 131 Law, which allowed employment or pension for ex-civil servants under the Nazi regime (Fulbrook, Mary. German National Identity after the Holocaust, 51, 60, 64). Indeed, many members of Konrad Adenauer's government turned out to be former members of the Nazi party, the object of much controversy during the 1950s. The most infamous was Dr. Hans Globke, who worked with SS main security and the Office of Jewish Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior. His greatest infamy was signing

the Protection of German Blood laws; he was in fact directly involved in planning the Final Solution. Under Adenauer, he secured the influential post of Secretary of State, and additionally had other ex-Nazis under him, such as former Wehrmacht intelligence officer Reinhard Gehlen (Tetens 37 – 44).

If the government still contained Nazis well into the 1950s, similarly the people had a slow transition to a new reality. Many civilians did not immediately turn against national socialism after the war. Polls taken by the Information Control Division of the Office of Military Government for Germany indicated that in April 1947, only 41 percent of Germans thought "National Socialism was a bad idea," this number decreasing further to 32 percent by the next month; between 1945 and 1947, 53 percent and 55 percent (respectively) of people believed that National Socialism was "a good idea, badly carried out"(Fulbrook, Mary. German National Identity after the Holocaust, 52). Learning about the concentration camps and hearing the Nuremberg Trials did inform people about what had happened, but at the same time enforced the idea that only a few perpetrated the crimes and that the rest were not to blame (Fulbrook, Mary. German National Identity after the Holocaust, 55). Additionally, anti-communism was a strong theme which continued from the Nazi era into the occupation and Adenauer ones, so that at least one national socialist tenet could have been simply transferred from a dictatorship to a democracy. It is certainly true that the ailing Christlische Demokratische Union (CDU) made a conscious effort to gather the old National Socialists and Neo-Nazis into their ranks, and election results from 1953 show that this increased votes substantially in certain states (Tetens 58 – 59). Newspapers in every major city reported the continued existence of right-wing groups well into 1957, including West Berlin, which had a Nazi party at least 200,000 strong in 1951 (Tetens 76 – 80).

This is not to say that Nazism lived on for everybody, but rather that the people who had

experienced Nazism largely lived on. O'Brien simplifies the situation to “old ways die hard;” that is, the people's ideas, schooling, and reality had indubitably been shaped by National Socialism (O'Brien 109). Without realizing it, the Germans could still harbor racist ideas, continuing to transfer them on through parenting and schooling. Given that the civilian's strategy for denazification was to forgive and forget, racism was not a subject that was properly addressed by the general populace for some time. It was a social taboo to talk about it; to do so would have been seen as obstructing progress toward becoming a democracy. It was only a decade later when guest workers appeared, testing the German people's tolerance for those who are “different.” It certainly appears that Germany was not prepared for more foreigners. Surveys taken in 1961-1962 verify this claim; 83 percent of those polled held the belief that “each group of people had naturally inherited distinctive racial characteristics” and 65 percent believed that “even if people of all nationalities had the same life chances some races would be more successful than others (Panayi 226).” These guest workers were Mediterranean, Slavic, and Turkic, having different looks and languages than Germans and performing jobs that were left to be desired. It was, in a way, like filling the class the Jews had once been allotted, the *Unterschichtung*, with a new set of people. Ernst von Klee called them a sub-proletariat, using Cold War era rhetoric (Gastarbeiter: Analysen und Berichte, 25).

The opinions held by Germans in the 1960s and 1970s when guest workers first arrived reflect lingering racial and societal ideas, although it should be noted that these factors were not the only ones influencing German opinions. According to surveys done by the Institut für Demoskopie and EMNID, 36 percent of Germans polled agreed that “everything is quite all right with the foreign workers,” however the majority of 48 percent reported having both good and bad opinions about guest workers. A majority also were in favor of restrictions, such as a stay limit of

five years and dependency on the economic situation. The general conclusions from these numbers was that Germans had very mixed feelings about guest workers, and that they were "more cautious than enthusiastic" towards them. Thus, while Germans seemed open to the interests of guest workers, they also seemed like they were not particularly concerned, either (Hoskin 198). This is also reflected in polls taken by the European Community during the years just after the guest worker ban. The surveys asked citizens of the member states what problems were most important within the EC, and guest worker or immigration issues in general did not even make the list ("Euro-barometer No. 1," 4 – 12).

As the 1960s progressed, there was an increasing rift between those who had lived through Nazism and the younger generation. Younger people, like their counterparts in other countries, wanted less of an emphasis on economics and more of a focus on social well-being. The shift of power was represented by the fact that the CDU, which had held the majority since the early 1950s, lost its place to the SPD in the late 1960s. Elected was a man named Willie Brandt, a man who, unlike his predecessors, was not a former Nazi with a new title and suit. On the contrary, he had fought against the Nazis in Norway, which gave him a better moral appeal in the eyes of many (Fullbrook, History of Germany 1918 – 2000, 169).

The most recent generation also began to be more inquisitive about its past, since the older generations did not talk about it. In schools, students realized that their teachers must have lived through the Nazi period and began to ask about their experiences. It wasn't until the late 1960s and the stimulus of right-wing parties gaining power that they began to talk. Nazi hunts had been afoot during the early 1960s, capturing former SS men, but as was already mentioned, normal Germans had not seen themselves as perpetrators. Talking about one's role at the time situated many people within the Nazi system in some way, since even if a person had not perpetrated crimes themselves,

they conversely had not stopped Hitler from rising to power or stopped the Holocaust from happening. In this way, most of the population was guilty. The students in the 1960s, however, were persistent. How had Germans, specifically their parents, let these things happen, and with this strengthening of right-wing groups, could it happen again (Kusser Lecture 2010)? Stories began to come out, and as interest in the past rose, studies in the 1970s began to sincerely try to piece together the Nazi past. This resulted in the mass of detailed information held at the Holocaust Museum in Berlin, in the hopes that Germans would never let this reoccur.

While the past was being given a through examination, the present was getting one as well. Due to the greater visibility of social issues associated with guest workers (further discussed in chapter 3), steps were taken to improve their living standards. One such benefit amended marriage laws for couples of one foreigner and one German. Until 1973, if a German married a foreigner, the foreigner could still have his or her residence permit revoked and they could get deported, regardless of whether or not children were involved. If a German woman was married to a foreigner, in this situation she either had to follow her husband back to his country of origin or get a divorce. The position held by the courts was:

> The resettlement is not too much to ask of the plaintiff's wife, since at the time of marriage with a 'guest worker,' it must have been clear to her that he would have to return to his homeland sooner or later. One does generally expect of a German wife that she will follow her husband abroad (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism, 139).

The 1973 law determined that this marriage discrimination was unconstitutional, given that normal marriages provide legal protection. The law also gave the ability to choose the country to live in to both partners in the marriage rather than just the male.

Another law benefiting the guest workers was passed in 1971, called "*Richtlinien für die Unterkünfte ausländer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublic Deutschland* (Regulations for the Living Quarters of Foreign Workers in the Federal Republic of Germany). These mandated minimum living conditions for guest workers, such as providing one bed per worker, a lockable cupboard for food, clean bedsheets, bathrooms in the same building, and insulated walls and roofs. This law was issued by a federal office, but there was another law passed in the Bundestag which reinforced it as well as signified the support of the political bodies. The laws were not perfect, given that within them there was no mandate to check compliance with them, but it was nevertheless a step in a more humanitarian direction.

However, more attention was given to Germany's change of attitude toward its Eastern counterpart both at the time and with a historical eye. West Germany changed its view towards East Germany in the late 1960s, accompanying a shift in the political scene. Until the SPD gained power, the CDU maintained Adenauer's Hallstein Doctrine, which stated that West Germany did not recognize East Germany as a separate nation, nor did West Germany have relations with any nation who recognized East Germany (besides the Soviet Union). Willy Brandt was adamant that relations between them be formed, and circumstances finally allowed for this. At the time, the United States and the Soviet Union were trying to avoid coming to arms in Europe, so positive relations between the Germanies looked like a good alternative. With the signing of the Four Point Accord in 1971 by France, England, the United States, and the Soviet Union, negotiations between East and West Germany were allowed. On the East Germany side, Walther Ulbricht had been against friendly relations, but he had to step down from the SED party leadership due to his health, and a more open-minded Erich Honecker replaced him. Hence, *Ostpolitik* was born. It was a series of new negotiations with East Germany, which established a mutual recognition of both Germanies

as separate nations and opened up opportunities for cooperation and exchange between the polarized nations. While the CDU was outraged, the German public endorsed the change by reelecting the SPD, making them the largest party in the Bundestag in 1972.

The Global Context

The Cold War is the stage upon which all of Germany's actions took place. Since Germany was one of the few countries split by the ideological borders of capitalism and communism, it was closely watched by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Western powers helped build Germany up to be very Americanized, creating a representation of the US at the border of the Soviet Bloc. Thus, West Germany was under considerable pressure to be a strong democratic front. However, Germany had different goals than the Western powers during the 1950s – they considered the separation of East and West to be temporary, and that reunification was only a matter of time. While they focused on building up their economy, they also kept their policies open to East Germany, refusing to recognize it as a separate country until the late 1960s. Willy Brandt and his *Ostpolitik* advocated closer ties to its eastern brother, and this greatly worried the former Allied powers as well as the rest of Western Europe (Dinan 57).

The Cold War was the not the only pressure on Germany to be a model democracy. Even though Germany in the 1960s and 1970s was becoming more economically integrated with the rest of Europe through the EC, it was still under "probation." It still was not entirely autonomous in that it still had to obtain permission from the former Allied powers on important issues such as policies regarding East Germany until 1971. There was still a wariness of Germany on the part of both the Allied powers and other nations in Europe. Any policies or actions that were reminiscent of the Nazi regime were cause for concern, and Germany would usually have to amend these or

risk its new economic and social ties. Even economic strength worried other European nations, who feared economic domination by Germans instead of physical occupation. The guest workers were especially important in this instance. Even though many other European countries had similar social issues arise that Germany did, these countries did not have to continuously prove that they were not Hitlerites. Any mistreatment of minorities thus threatened Germany's democratic foundations.

For all of these pressures, Germany was wise to change its policies towards guest workers. It could not continue on its path of merely focusing on economic growth at the expense of social considerations and reconciliation with the past. Germany had to confront the issues that arise in a post-material society, namely inequalities in its own borders. It also had to realize that it could not continue to focus on self-growth while simultaneously ignoring the well-being of other nations. It existed in a time of deepening of economic ties to the rest of Europe, of increasing dependency on labor and goods of the rest of the world, and increasing tension between the superpowers. The presence of guest workers helped the Germans to realize that this change needed to occur mainly due to increasingly visible social issues that arose from the aforementioned inward economic focus as well as insecurity in a new German identity.

Chapter 2

The *Gastarbeiter* Program's Effects on Germany's Political Economy

From an economic perspective, the guest worker program was overwhelmingly successful in helping Germany become a stronger country during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the benefits accrued to Germany need to be tempered by other factors than growth, such as Germany's growth *relative* to the sending countries, the degree of exploitation of the guest workers, and the lack of

control over the number of workers admitted. One of the most important nuances is that the guest worker program did not have the desired affect for those on the other end of the agreements, namely the Southern European nations and their exported workers. By digging into these more subtle components, we will see what other factors were at play behind Germany's robust economic growth.

German Economic Performance: Overview

Germany's economic statistics from the 1960s and 1970s tell a story of massive growth for a developed nation. Real GDP grew at rates of 5 – 7 percent a year while interest rates ranged from 5 to 8 percent, representing high levels of productivity in a short period of time. This productivity was caused by an incredible amount of work on the part of Germans. The labor force participation rate for men in the early 1970s was above 90 percent, which means that 9 of every 10 men age 15 and older was working (OECD 2011). Women were becoming a greater share of the labor force every year – in 1973, half of all women age 15 and older were working - supplementing the incomes earned by the men. The hard work paid off; between 1950 and 1973, Germany's GDP per capita increased more than that of any other country in Northern Europe, from 4,281 to 13,152 (measured in 1990 international dollars), causing the affluence experienced in the 1960s and 1970s (Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, 6).

With German labor in a state of almost full usage, the guest workers added growth that Germany could not have achieved with only its own workers. There were over a million migrant workers by the mid 1960s and 2.6 million workers by 1973 (O'Brien 115). The workers were overwhelmingly dominant in the manufacturing industry; in 1961 54.6 percent of foreigners were employed in the sector, and by 1970, the number had risen to 64.5 percent (Korte 40). During the

1967 – 68 recession, the unemployment rate among the guest workers was higher than that of the native population at 11.6 percent (compared to 5.2), representing their status as extra labor that could be cut off when no longer needed (Guest Workers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism 71). Now that the basic economic framework has been established, we can weigh Germany's actions, described later in the chapter, with their perspective in mind.

Guest Worker Policies

The mode of entry into Germany for potential workers was through recruitment offices, set up in the home country by the German Federal Labor Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*,or BfA*)*. Migrants would apply at an office; the office then acted as a match maker, choosing potential workers for specific employers. If chosen, workers would be sent to Germany in groups. Their ticket into the country was a labor legitimacy card, which served as a form of identification until a physical job contract was obtained. The number of potential laborers imported to Germany was thus based on the need of companies. If, for instance, Ford Motor Company needed 45 workers to work on one of its assembly lines, it would contact the BfA, and the BfA would find 45 appropriate workers via the recruitment offices. The BfA only monitored the amount of guest workers, they did not try to restrict them; so Ford would receive all 45 workers it desired. This reflects an uninhibited neoclassical supply-and-demand form of immigration, and given the rate of growth Germany experienced, what resulted was a strong demand for an essentially endless supply of labor (Castles 768).

The only real control of the foreign population once they were on German soil was that the workers needed labor and residence permits. These permits, however, were rather important in that they granted the worker his rights. The law governing guest workers until the mid 1960s was

born from the renewing of the Aliens Police Decree of 1938, which the Nazi regime originally wrote and used against foreigners. Unfortunately the law retained flavorings of its first authors. For instance, foreign workers could stay as long as "they [were] worthy of the hospitality shown them." The catch was that it could be revoked for reasons such as "injur[ing] the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany," which could be as innocent as accepting unemployment compensation. This law was replaced in 1965 by the Aliens Law, but the change was merely cosmetic; the new law still iterated that foreigners had rights, but not "freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and freedom of choice of occupation, place of work and place of education, and protection of extradition from abroad" (O'Brien 116). The rights foreigners were barred from were reserved exclusively for citizens. Guest workers were merely "guests," so they were not given the ability to affect Germany in the same way that a citizen could. The 1965 Aliens Law, in effect, officially created a group of people with less power than their German counterparts, giving a legal basis for the separation of guest workers into the *Untershichtung*. Guest workers who stayed in Germany longer than others still crucially could not change jobs or move to a different region legally.

The reason for comparatively loose control on migration but tight restriction on workers once they arrived was that Germany had just changed to a market economy in 1948. This meant that the state no longer dictated which industries needed to produce which items and in what quantities, as in the Nazi era, but rather companies could make their own decisions and act independently from the government. This did not mean that the government did not regulate or help industries; in the early post-war years, German businesses needed assistance to rebuild and become the powerhouse of Europe once again. The Germany government's policies in the 1950s and 1960s for example reflected the need to be competitive in the world market. Business and

industry were favored and given a proper environment in which to grow; one of the benefits was to have an unlimited supply of workers (Facts about Germany 331). These imported workers could not be allowed to add to Germany's population, though – they were simply economic assets to be controlled and monitored as such. It was precisely this focus on economic conditions and an ensuing lack of attention to migrational control that changed Germany into an immigration country, even if Germany denied this for several decades.

Realities from the Guest Worker Perspective

The relationship between a sending country and a receiving country was supposed to be mutually beneficial for several reasons. First of all, sending workers out of one's economy was supposed to lessen the pressure on their employment market. By diminishing the pool of available workers, there would be less competition for those who remain; ergo, the country could focus on strengthening its economy rather than compromising by fighting unemployment. Second, remittances sent by workers abroad were supposed to boost the incomes of those back home, putting more money into the home country's economy and increasing the purchasing power of the people. It was also hoped that remittances would help to pay for the cost of imported finished goods and therefore help close the trade gap. Lastly, workers sent abroad were supposed to get valuable training, gaining knowledge and skills that they would bring back home, where they would help modernize their domestic economies.

Unfortunately, these ideas were too simple and had unexpected and sometimes counteractive effects. It was true that the labor markets in the sending countries shrank in the sense that millions left it. But on the other hand, those who left the home country were the more qualified, motivated, and industrious young men. So while the pool of available workers did

lessen, those who were remained did not, or could not, necessarily fill in the void (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects of Pluralism 39). As I described in chapter 1, Turkey began to industrialize, but there were not many Turks trained to work in industry; at the same time, Turks began leaving the agricultural sector. This situation resulted in continued unemployment regardless of labor exportation. Part of this was also due to the fact that those who went abroad for work were young men, so there was a disproportionate amount of women, children, and elderly, who normally were not highly represented in the workforce. Additionally, the work in Germany tended to attract those who already had jobs, rather than being unemployed; higher wages abroad were more attractive. Thus, the unemployment situation, as well as the overall level of development in the sending country did not significantly change for the better; indeed, it created a brain-drain (Benard 288).

The wages were certainly a high point for the guest workers. Often, even earnings that were lower than the minimum wage in Germany were much higher than earnings of comparable jobs or higher level jobs in Turkey and other sending countries. As long as the guest workers were temporary, the low wages were not really a social issue; in the eyes of the state of and the German populous, guest workers were not members of German society, so the same rules that applied to German citizens did not apply to the workers. Besides, they were becoming rich by Turkish standards, weren't they? Therefore it was not until the Germans realized in the 1970s that the workers were staying longer that inferior wages became important, due to both humanitarian considerations and because German unions began to lobby on behalf of the guest workers (Martin and Miller 325).

The sending of remittances actually did behave as economists predicted in that they gave the home economies a considerable inflow of capital, an aspect of migration thought by some

scholars as the only benefit of the guest worker contracts for the sending countries (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism 44). Despite the fact that the guest worker programs in Europe ended in 1973, 6.6 billion USD was still transferred from guest workers (in all work-importing countries in Europe) back to their home countries that year, not counting money sent in the form of checks or brought back personally (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism 42 – 43). Turkey had a significant share of these billions – remittances constituted 20 percent of its total imports in 1970 (Aydas 55). Remittances are the preferred capital flow espoused by many economists, because remittances do not need to be paid off like loans do. This provided low-cost money[1] for Turkey to industrialize, something Turkey was doing with zeal during the 1960s and 1970s to help modernize its economy. While the macroeconomic benefits look convincing, others argue that remittances only helped on a micro level, helping families pay off debts and pay for food. It did not allow for investment, especially since it the remittances would have to end at some point due to the short-term nature of the work. This is a trivial criticism in the case of Turkey as a whole, though. Turkey was not a stable country during this time, characterized by increasingly volatile inflation rates, political violence, and a weak government. These variables did not provide the most fertile ground in which to invest, especially compared to developed countries. Thus remittances were more important to individuals and their families – with domestic issues affecting their lives, remittances were more dependable than other sources of income (Brown 58).

A sizable proportion of guest workers had aspirations to start new businesses at home, but when they returned, they found it difficult to apply any skills they learned to their home situation. Turkish land and commodity prices for example inflated sharply throughout the 1960s and 1970s,

[1]The monetary costs of sending its better workers abroad (as well as the costs of not having the inside their own economy) make remittances not entirely free money.

which made using the money earned much more expensive than the worker would (or could) have planned for. These sort of obstacles resulted in the failure of 30 – 40 percent of businesses started by returning workers less than a year after they began (Heckmann 80). According to the oft-quoted scholar Francesco Cerase, there are four categories of returning migrants:

> **The return of failure** occurs when a guest worker's situation did not improve by going abroad; indeed, it may have gotten worse;
>
> **The return of conservativism** is when a migrant holds onto his way of life and wants to return to it, with some money and business plans;
>
> **The return of retirement** indicates a worker who plans to cease working all together and leave the workforce; and
>
> **The return of innovation** is the most prized category for a worker because he has gained useful skills and *intends* to use them to better his position in his home country (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism, 48).

Crucially, Cerase's study reports that migrants who stayed in the receiving country longer were typically the innovators; in other words, those who stayed in Germany longer than intended were the ones that the home country benefitted from the most. Unfortunately, most of the skilled workers, comprising 30 percent of all migrants, never came back at all (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism, 49). The belief that these skilled workers would be the "catalyst" to the developing economy, therefore, is a farce. This loss of the majority of skilled workers abroad equated to a loss in remittances and human capital, limiting the possibilities for the catalyst effect to occur. The Southern European countries thus were disadvantaged in their agreements with the North yet again; not only were most guest workers not trained in skills to be used when they returned, many of the ones who gained skills did not return.

To Germany's credit, this particular development effect may have been an unrealistic goal to begin with. Most real changes in the most Southern European economies came from the top in the form of large businesses, the government, or the military (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism, 49). Turkey's economy was most strongly effected by its government. While the government was weak in the 1960s, this did not necessarily leave room for returning guest workers to gain more power. It was instead usurped by extremist groups, who strengthened during the 1960s and became a formidable force in the 1970s. These groups infiltrated the government and caused uncontrolled violence throughout the country, upsetting any stable atmosphere in which the would-be innovators could have thrived in. This was a variable that Germany nor Turkey could have planned for, but it severely limited the abilities of the returning guest workers to contribute.

Even in Germany, the benefit of extra labor was not entirely positive, economically speaking. While guest workers helped initially by filling the factories and keeping the assembly lines running, it was difficult to stop the cycle once it started. For companies, it was much easier and cheaper to continue hiring guest workers than to invest in new pieces of machinery. In this way, humans were still being subjected to long hours of monotonous labor, when they could have been replaced with more efficient robots for example, which were being developed for industrial use in the 1960s. Thus, companies were able to stay competitive without having to improve their technologies or products (Martin and Miller 327; Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects of Pluralism, 29). This equated to less advances in production than would have occurred in the absence of extra labor.

Exploitation and Democracy

A major argument in the guest worker debate is whether or not the program was exploitative. Exploitation, by the classic Marxian definition, is a situation in which the worker is used unfairly for others to profit. This broad of a categorization automatically relegates guest workers into the exploited category, simply on the basis that they earned less money than natives in similar occupations. Scholar Robert Mayer defines exploitation more explicitly, saying that exploitation only occurs when the worker does not make more money than he would settle for in his home country (Mayer 322). Mayer concludes that the German guest worker program was not as exploitative as others and that it was the best option ("a lesser wrong") compared to restrictive immigration policies, where people in sending countries would be stuck in a worse situation (Mayer 333). However, his argument assumes that other countries would not have guest worker programs or more open immigration policies, which is improbable. Even in this two-nation view, he still calls the guest worker program "mildly exploitative," which represents a situation that is still unfair to guest workers, their home nations, and other competing nations. Ergo, while most guest workers earned several times what they earned back home, they could have made even more had they been paid the same as Germans in comparable occupations. Furthermore, these wages alone did not always make them better off, especially when other economic effects, such as domestic inflation, or societal effects, such as poor housing conditions, are considered. I will explore these social issues more in chapter three.

The exploitation of guest workers set them apart as a separate economic group from natives, which was also reflected on a more global scale in the form of the North/South divide. This divide in its simplest form separates countries who imported work from those who exported it. The countries constituting the North - France, Germany, Switzerland and England – were countries with newly rebuilt economies who required more manpower to expand them. The

Southern countries - Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, and Turkey - who did not lose as much of their working-age populations in World War II as Northern countries had, had extra labor available and frail economies that badly needed outside capital flow. The agreements made between these Northern and Southern nations were supposed to help both groups grow. However, the guest worker programs turned out to be more of a benefit to the Northern countries than the Southern ones. The numbers look positive when one looks only at GDP of the Southern countries – the average GDP in 1970 was 10.7 billion USD, which raised to 15.9 billion USD by 1973 (OECD 2011). The northern countries, however, had an average GDP of 119.4 billion USD in 1970, increasing to 194.7 billion USD in 1973 (OECD, Nationmaster, and Tradingeconomics 2011).[2] This, by no means, shows any evening-out between the Northern and Southern countries; if anything, the North increased the inequality gap even further. The Northern average GDP grew from 11 times larger than the Southern average to 12 in just these three years. It comes as hardly a surprise that Germany, as well as other northern European countries, were denounced for not honoring their treaties with the southern countries by their respective governments. Aside from the continued wealth discrepancy, the contract between Germany and Turkey, for instance, specifically stated that guest workers shall not become second-class people and should be provided training programs. Turkey was not pleased when images and complaints of ghettoization, racism, and unsavory business practices began to accumulate in addition to the lack of economic success its workers (Martin and Miller 319).

The Northern expansion was produced by the brains of native workers and sponsored by the labor of the guest workers. The workers became useful, and the countries they worked in became dependent on them. Their cheap labor, extended work hours, and lack of representation

[2]I would have used an earlier year than 1970, but the OECD has no information before this year. Also, Greece is not included in this calculation.

made them more efficient than native workers. In turn, native workers stopped taking menial and low skilled jobs because guest workers could fill them instead. Thus, it was becoming more evident each year by the increasing exclusivity of guest workers in industrial and construction jobs that guest workers would continue to be needed in the foreseeable future (Martin and Miller 320). Moreover, Turkey and other sending nations continued to have unemployment and underdevelopment, which maintained the need to keep sending workers (Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism, 17). This is relationship between more developed countries and less developed ones has so many examples throughout the world that it has a name: Dependency Theory.

Thus, while guest workers undoubtedly helped Germany's economy grow in the incredible way that it did, the growth was not mutual in the sending countries. The direct benefits for Germany were that it was able to sustain incredible growth, fueled by a constant flow of cheap guest workers; from this it regained its position as the most powerful country in Europe and its citizens enjoyed a period of affluence and social mobility. Meanwhile, the sending countries, namely Turkey, experienced high growth rates from modernizing their economies, which in turn were stimulated by remittances, however other gains that were promised did not materialize in the way they had hoped for. Considering the lesser benefits of sending countries, the guest worker program is overall a nuanced benefit for Germany.

Chapter 3

The Social Effects of the *Gastarbeiter* Program

Since Germany's focus toward guest workers was purely economic during the 1960s, many of the worker's human needs were forsaken. If economic strength for Germany was the light side, certainly the social issues that arose formed the dark side of the guest worker program. Guest workers neither fit into the defined German mold nor did they have the benefits of citizenship, and thus they were relegated to an *Unterschichtung*, or a lower class, on the outer edges of society. They were in superlative categories, having "the most dangerous" jobs, "the worst" living conditions, "the lowest" wages, and so on, indicating positions outside the norm and on the fringes of society. Life on the outside was certainly difficult, not only for the Turks, but for all guest workers in Germany. Much of the focus of this chapter is on the experience of Turkish guest workers because they were the largest demographic as well as the most culturally different from Germans.

Guest workers faced discrimination by Germans on a daily basis. Though there is not a great wealth of scholarly writings detailing this treatment, it is evident in media from the 1960s and 1970s, such as in the film Ali: Fear Eats the Soul. The movie was released in 1974 in Germany, just after the worker ban, and directed by the controversial Rainer Werner Fassbinder. The film details the experiences of a German woman who falls in love with a Moroccan guest worker and the hardships they face because of their relationship. Many people just stared at them when they

were in public places while others had more dramatic reactions. For instance, after the couple gets married, the German woman invites her adult sons and daughter to her house to tell them the news and, upon hearing it, one son disowns her, another kicks in her television, her daughter says “let's get out of this pig sty,” and they all proceed to leave.[3] Many other scenes in the movie capture the social stereotypes attached to guest workers, including one at the German woman's job as a house cleaner. Her coworkers gossip about guest workers, saying things such as “all they're concerned about is money,” “all they want is sex,” “they're pigs,” and “I'd die of shame if I was married to a guest worker.” In another scene, the guest worker went to a grocery store that the German woman frequented. He asks the clerk for an item in a very clear way and in German, but the clerk pretends not to understand him and kicks him out of the store; the clerk later claims that he has no prejudice against foreigners, but that they should learn German. The German woman is eventually ostracized by her coworkers, neighbors, and community for her continued relationship. While the movie puts forth these stereotypes and the lead couple's tryst then proves many of them wrong, it leaves some with credibility. For example, the guest worker did cheat on the German woman several times, which does not allow the audience to completely toss out the “they only want sex” assumption. The mix of disproving stereotypes on one hand and not entirely ruling them out on the other reflects well the complexity of the societal situation of the early 1970s.

If one removes discrimination from the equation, the realities of life faced by guest workers were still grim. First, their jobs were the most mundane and/or treacherous, as they were concentrated mostly in manufacturing and construction jobs. Foreigners were two and a half times more likely to have accidents in their work than natives (Panayi 222). While their jobs were inherently more dangerous by definition, foreigners often worked longer hours doing more

[3]The spoken language of the movie is German, but I watched it with subtitles, so it is the English subtitles that I am quoting.

repetitive tasks than their native counterparts as well, which created conditions for mistakes to occur (Korte 43). The working environments themselves caused nervous disorders and tuberculosis in a large number of the guest workers (Martin and Miller 325). They were not allowed vacation time (paid or unpaid), and workers unions resisted helping them or allowing them to join until the 1970s, since they were viewed as unfair competition. This economically equalled a higher turnover rate of foreigners, but socially it brought attention to their exploitation.

Since guest workers were only temporary residents, and oftentimes single men, they were allotted poor housing. In the early years of the guest worker program, the most common housing were barracks on the company property (O'Brien 117). These barracks were spartan at best, with few furnishings or amenities, and were run by the company in an authoritarian style. A quarter of these buildings were wooden, and a third were made before 1948 (Panayi 220). Some workers were able to obtain housing elsewhere, and while conditions were not so regimented or crowded as in the barracks, the places did not substantially improve a guest worker's standard of living. An italian guest worker described his living situation in an interview as such:

> I've lived in five barracks. My wife has written...that we can't live this way. I've looked at many places to live. A relative of mine has found a wooden barrack, but it was so old, and pigs and rabbits had been in it. But it was our only possibility. I have looked for three, four months and these were our only possibilities. I have put 500 Marks into this barrack and have made it better. Carpeted and cleaned. It was horrible. When it rained, the water flowed through everything. And there was no toilet, no water, no flowing water, all we had was a small well in the yard. But in winter, it was ice. During the winter it was horrible: in the considerable amount of snow, the well was in the field. A Spanish worker also lived in my barrack.

> When we cooked together, there was a short circuit. Every evening we sat without power (Gastarbeiter: Analysen und Berichte, 166).[4]

Housing however improved the longer a guest worker stayed, especially if he arrived in the late 1960s and into the 1970s. This is also at a time when guest workers would bring their families to live with them, so barracks were no longer acceptable domains. Guest workers were able to rent apartments and homes, but still found themselves living below the level that Germans did. 84 percent of their homes had four or less rooms (early 1970s), and in Nordrhein-Westfalen, guest worker houses were on average 36 percent smaller than homes of Germans. Again, guest workers also tended to live in older homes than their native counterparts (Panayi 221). They also had restraints on where they could live. Limits were established in certain areas on how many guest workers could live there. This was true particularly in industrial and urban areas like Cologne, where residence permits were refused as soon as guest workers reached 12% of the population in a given district. Even where the quota wasn't reached, guest workers often were either turned down or charged higher rents (Hoskin 195).

With more guest workers bringing their families to Germany, more foreign children entered the German school systems and faced similar issues as their parents did. German schools were not prepared to accommodate for foreign children, since children were not expected to follow their temporary worker parents. The solution proposed by the Standing Conference of State Ministers of Education directed the schools to simply put the kids into normal classes (O'Brien 117). They

[4]I translated this from the original German; untranslated : Ich habe in fünf Baracken gewohnt. Meine Frau hat vielmal geschrieben...wir können nicht so leben. Ich habe viele eine Wohnung gesucht. Mein Schwager hat eine Holzbaracke gefunden, aber so alt, wo vorher Schweine und Kaninchen drin waren. Aber es war unsere einzige Möglichkeit. Ich habe drei, vier Monate gesucht und hatte nur diese Möglichkeit. Ich habe 500 Mark in diese Baracke gesteckt und habe verbessert. Tapezieren und saubergemacht. War so schrecklich. Wenn es regnete, floß das Wasser alles rein. Und war keine Toilette, kein Wasser, kein fließend Wasser, war nur im Hof ein kleiner Brunnen. Aber in Winter war Eis. Im Winter war es schrecklich: der viele Schnee, der Brunnen stand im Feld. In meiner Barake wohnte auch ein spanischer Arbeiter. Wenn wir zusammen kochten, gab es einen Kurzschluß. Jeden Abend saßen wir ohne Strom.

were expected to have the same knowledge of German language and culture as native children, but were not offered special classes to make this expectation justified. For their part, the German schools had to deal with a lack of knowledge about whether a child was staying temporarily or permanently, and thus had a difficult choice of deciding how to teach them (Hoskin 195). By the 1970s, it was obvious by the failure rates that ignoring the needs of foreign children was not helping them learn (O'Brien 117). Furthermore, as these children aged, they often became delinquents, adding to the visible social issues (O'Brien 118). Therefore, even as children of guest workers, these kids were marginalized just like their parents, even though they had vastly different roles in society.

Most of these social issues stemmed from the lack of regulation or anticipation of so much immigration. Guest workers were expected to adjust to German life with no outside help at the work place and their children were not given extra help or special classes in school. The amounts of migrants in itself transformed the plight of the guest workers into a social issue, into a problem that needed solving. These were just starting to be rectified in the early 1970s, when many social programs for the guest workers were implemented, such as the marriage laws I examined in chapter 1. From a humanitarian perspective, the ban in 1973 was a way to help the guest workers that were already in Germany, because they could be focused and improved on (Martin and Miller 318).

Guest Worker Identity

The position of the guest workers in German society increasingly made them feel negatively toward themselves. A young immigrant from Macedonia felt very uncomfortable around Germans; enough to say “I feel that if xenophobia intensified the Germans would grind us

to soap powder" (Panayi 226). She tried to hide herself by doing things like looking down when she walked past Germans "so that [they] would not see her dark eyes," and when in public, she only spoke German to her children (Panayi 226). This represents a feeling shared by many foreigners; they implicitly realize that Germans think lowly of them, and they feel ashamed of themselves. They were uncomfortable with their ethnic differences because Germans still felt that they were dominant.

In addition to the historical racism I discussed in chapter 1, this idea of German dominance can also be explained by Germany's unwillingness to admit that it was a multicultural society. Germany was a country forming a new German identity, and while it was no longer "Nazi," it was still "German," characterized by the German language, being Catholic or Protestant, eating German foods, wearing German clothing, being white, and so on. These traits which defined "Germanity" excluded those who did not fit the mold. Thus, all guest workers entering German society were inherently not German in either an ethnic nor cultural sense.

The differences were especially marked between German and Turkish cultures. Turkish guest workers arrived to find themselves in a society comprised of Germans; there was no room to be Turkish except for on the outside. If the guest worker wanted to fit in, he would have to hide or entirely give up his own culture. This was not so much of a problem for those who only stayed for a year, but because many guest workers stayed for many years or permanently, they had to face this choice as long as Germany defined itself as not being multicultural. The decision was not a simple one due to the sheer number of factors that needed considering – uncertainty on how long a guest worker would stay in Germany, how attached to he was his home culture, the strength of ethnic enclaves in his area, if he had or was going to have kids, et cetera.

The play Dreck by Robert Schneider, published in book form in 1993, exemplifies the

conflict specifically experienced by Turks in Germany; if anything, the fact that Turks were still being treated differently by this time makes the play's message more potent for studying the feelings of early guest workers. The main conflict in Dreck is that of an illegal rose seller trying to stay tied to his home and culture. At the same time, he loves Germany, but he feels that Germans do not like him in return. He always worries about how dirty his presence makes Germany and is ashamed of everything he is while around Germans. He feels a constant unease during the entire play, and a threatening mechanical sound keeps getting louder and louder until he cannot stand it anymore. Through the job of selling roses, one is able to see how temporary and not settled the life of a guest worker is; the mechanical sounds always present remind the reader of the manufacturing positions many guest workers held, something that kept them at the bottom of society.

While Dreck is theatrical, there have also been polls which indicate that Turks have always felt unwanted in Germany, even up to the present day ("Poll: Most Turks in Germany Feel Unwelcome." Deutsche Welle; Klee 30). Their situation was a product of mixed messages from Germany and its citizens toward foreigners. For instance, guest workers at first were viewed as being temporary, and not in need of programs to help them learn German language or culture. But as the years passed and a decent proportion of migrants stayed for many years at a time, they felt pressure to assimilate and become more like the native population. Even with attempted assimilation, however, guest workers were still not considered German enough. All of this unsureness meant that Germans created this problem on their own. And today, since assimilation is still espoused as the goal for immigrants, many Turks and others still feel conflicted and find themselves in the *Unterschichtung*. It is merely the icing on the cake that guest workers and migrants became scapegoats for many of Germany's problems both then and today.

It is important to point out that nearly all of the above points to negative social aspects and that they only began to improve in the last years of the guest worker program. The reason is simple: there simply few positive points to mention. While the main goal of the guest workers were met – making money to bring or send home – many of his base needs were neglected. He had food, air, and social ties amongst other workers; but at the same time he did not always have water, a suitable shelter, or safe working conditions. This is a situation that should not have been allowed to happen under a democratic system, and as we will see in the next chapter, it was a situation that did not occur with the same severity in communist East Germany.

Kapitel 4:

Die DDR: Weniger Gastarbeiter machen ein bessere Deutschland?

Manche Deutsche Leute sagen heute, dass die Gastarbeiter schlecht für Deutschland waren. Man kann in der folgenden Zitat von topix.com ein Beispiel eines typisches Arguments gegen Ausländer sehen:

> Sie glauben wirklich, dass sie durch ihren Aufenthalt, verbessern das Land. Es ist komisch, dass es Deutschland so gut ging, bis ein riesiger Zustrom dieser Kakerlaken in dieses früher große Land kam. Wie zum Beispiel dem Mord in Hamburg. Wenn der Bruder (Afghane, der gleiche Abfall in meinen Augen) seine Schwester tötete, weil sie „westlicher" sein wollte. Also, wenn du die westliche Kultur nicht magst, dann geh zurück zu dein Land der Ameisen und leb in deinem eigenen Nest. Sie kommen und sie nehmen, sie stehlen, sie wollen, dass die Gesetze zu ihrem Vorteil geändert werden und sind dann immer noch nicht zufrieden. Und dann sitzen sie über einer Tasse mit bitterem Tee und wundern sich, warum die Deutschen sie nicht mögen. Deutschland muss mehr von ihnen vertreiben . - 18 Mai 2008 von „Say What" in Waldenburg, Deutschland.[5]

Aber würde Deutschland besser ohne viele Gastarbeiter sein? Von 1961 bis 1973 hat die BRD Gastarbeiter importiert aus Spanien, Jugoslawien, Griechenland und der Türkei. Zwischen den 1950er und 1970er Jahren wird die BRD aus Ruinen wieder aufgebaut und taucht als ein

[5]Diese Zitat war ursprünglich auf Englisch. Ich habe mein Best versucht um ihn zu übersetzen. Originell: They really believe by being in Germany they are doing good to this country. It's funny how Germany did so well until a huge influx of these roaches came into this once wonderful land. Just like the killing the other day in Hamburg. Where the brother (Afghan) same garbage in my eyes, killed his sister because she wanted to be more west like. Well if you don't like western culture then go back to your land of ants and live in your own nest. They come they take, they steal, they want the laws changed for their advantage, and then they still aren't happy. And then they sit over a cup of bitter tea and wonder why the Germans don't like them. Germany needs to start expelling more of them.

starkes westliches Land auf. Es ist kein Zufall, dass diese Fälle gleichzeitig geschahen. Es war mit der Hilfe der Gastarbeiter, dass Deutschland sein Wirtschaftswunder hatte. Die Gastarbeiter waren wirtschaftlich gut für das Land und die Leute. Weil die Gastarbeiter die Fabrik- und Bauarbeiter Jobs übernahmen, konnten die Deutschen bessere Berufe haben. Die deutsche Regierung aber hat nicht für so viele Gastarbeiter geplant und soziale Probleme entwickelten sich. Diese Probleme in ihrer aktuellen Form, waren verantwortlich dafür dass viele Gefühle wie in dem oben erwähnenden Zitat herauskommen. Aber was geschieht in der DDR? Die DDR hat sehr wenige Einwanderer und nicht so viele Vertragsarbeiter (der Name für Gastarbeiter in der DDR) wie die BRD, weil ihr System isoliertes war. In diesem Aufsatz vergleiche ich die DDR mit der BRD und benutzen ich die Gastarbeiter/Vertragsarbeiter als Brennpunkt. Wir Blicken zuerst auf die Ökonomien der DDR und der BRD – wie sie funktionieren und was sie leisten – um die wirtschaftliche Gründe für importierte Arbeiter zu etablieren. Dann studieren wir die Ausländer, die in den 1960er und frühen 1970er Jahren in der BRD kamen. Wir werden auch die DDR ein bisschen später untersuchen, weil sie in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren Kubaner und Vietnamesen importiert, weil diese Zeit der Importe mit der BRD vergleichbar ist. Die Analyse soll die Unterschiede und neuen Einsichten über die Gastarbeiter Streitfrage zeigen. Wir werden sehen, dass trotz der verschiedenen Systeme und unterschiedlicher Politik die DDR und die BRD interessante Parallelen hatten.

Die Ökonomie der DDR

Als die DDR die Berliner Mauer gebaut hatte, konnte sie wirklich ihre Ökonomie fördern, weil die Bevölkerung in der DDR blieb und die Mauer westliche Einflüsse verhinderte. Diese zwei Ziele waren besonders wichtig, weil die DDR eine zentralisierte Wirtschaft hatte. Das heisst, dass

die Ökonomie (Politik, Geschäft, Produktion, Material) von der Regierung gesteuert wurde. Es war aber nicht genau wie die Struktur der Sowjetunion. Die Produktionsziele hatten nicht eine Basis in der Quantität der Waren, sondern in ihrem Wert. Eine Firma musste zum Beispiel Qualität Waren machen und ihre Produktionskosten bewältigen. Auf diesem Weise hatten die Firmen mehr Kontrolle als in dem Sowjetsystem. Arbeiter konnten Bonusse verdienen und höhere Löhnen bekommen, wenn sie mehr produzierten. Es gab auch Bänke, die Kredit für Investitionen gaben (zu technologisch forgeschritte Industrien). Diese neuen kapitalistischen Dinge waren aber schwierig zu implementieren und zu erhalten. Die Regierung brauchte Geld von der Sowjetunion in den 1960er Jahren, um die Ökonomie zu stärken. Die BRD hatten im Gegensatz zur DDR eine Marktwirtschaft. Die Regierung kontrolliert die Ökonomie wenig und daher haben die Firmen die Kontrolle. In den 1960er und 1970er Jahren genoss die BRD „das Wirtschaftswunder“: eine Zeit des großen wirtschaftlichen Wachstums. Man braucht nur einige Fakten, um diesen Wachsen zu zeigen. Die Wirtschaft wuchs zum Beispiel von 5 – 7 Prozent pro Jahre; die Inflationsrate war zwischen 1 – 3 Prozent in den 1960er Jahre und BIP pro Person hat sich von 1950 bis 1970 verdreifacht (OECD 2011 und Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, 6).

Die DDR war auch „eine beachtliche wirtschaftliche Macht“ in der siebziger Jahren, weil sie eine gute Versorgung mit Konsumgütern hatte (Koepke 188). Ein Grund für diese starke Ökonomie war die Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik bedeutete, dass die BRD die DDR als eine getrennte Regierung anerkannte. Die anderen westlichen Länder erkannten die DDR auch an, und sie hatte endlich Legitimität. Daher konnte die DDR mit anderen Ländern Waren austauschen und fremdes Geld verdienen. Diese neue Status bedeutet weniger Abhängigkeit von der Sowjetunion, und die DDR begann sich für Exports zu interessieren. Dieses Interesse war nicht gut für die DDR. Sie verteilte ihre begrenzten Mitteln von der Gesellschaft auf die Exporte. Geld werde nicht zur

Erhaltung beutet der Infrastruktur und sie begann zu brechen. Es war die Teilnahme am kapitalistischen System, die die DDR wie anderen kommunistische Länder wirtschaftlich geschwächt hat.

Migration und Gastarbeiter

Die Berliner Mauer symbolisierte diese „Mobilitätsloskeit:“ Wenige Leute konnten die DDR verlassen und wenige Leute konnten in die DDR kommen. Vor der Mauer war es leichter, in die DDR einzureisen oder aus der DDR auszureisen; durch die Ostpolitik in den 1970er Jahren war es wieder möglich; aber von 1961 bis 1972 war es sehr schwer. Leute aus der BRD kamen nur unter ganz bestimmten Umständen, um manchmal Familie und Freunde besuchen. Das Leben in der DDR war nicht attraktiv genug für die Westdeutschen, um dort zu bleiben (German National Identity after the Holocaust, 205).

In der Tat hatte die DDR zuerst Ein- und Auswanderung, aber es war vor allem Auswanderung. Viele Leute flohen zwischen 1950er und 1980 als Flüchtlinge aus der DDR - ungefähr 3,5 Millionen („Migration and Marginality,“ 97) – und die meisten verließen die DDR vor dem Bau der Mauer in Berlin. Die DDR hatte nur 18,3 Millionen Einwohner am Anfang, so dass diese 3,5 Millionen (fast 20 Prozent der Bevölkerung) eine deutliche Wirkung auf den Arbeitsmarkt hatte (Panayi 228). Man würde denken, dass in einem zentralisierte Wirtschaft, die Zahl der Arbeiter nicht wichtig sein würde, weil die Betonung auf der Zahl der Waren, die produziert wurden, lag. Die DDR war anders – sie wuchs wirklich in den späten 1960er und 1970er Jahren – und mit ihrer Gewinnbasis brauchte die DDR mehr Arbeiter, mehr Waren zu produzieren. Wegen der Abwanderung braucht die DDR mehr Arbeiter von anderen Ländern, wenn sie ihr Wachstum halten wollte.

Die DDR machte 1961 Verträge mit Bulgarien, Polen und Ungarn. Die Skala der Importe waren kleiner als die der BRD, die Millionen von Arbeitern hatte. Die DDR hat die Zahlen geplant – sie würde 15000 Arbeiter aus Bulgarien, 10000 aus Polen und 5000 aus Ungarn nehmen (Panayi 228). Diese Länder hatten einen Überschuss an Arbeitern und sie hofften, dass der Druck der Arbeitskräfte abnehmen würde, wenn sie zusätzliche Arbeiter exportierten. Dann würde die DDR mehr Arbeiter haben, und sie könnte weiter wachsen. Es war beabsichtig, dass die Arbeiter nur vorübergehend in der DDR bleiben würden, ähnlich wie die Arbeiter in der BRD.

Die Vertragsarbeiter wurden streng kontrolliert. Die Regierung hat nicht nur die Zahlen der Vertragsarbeiter, sondern auch die Zahlen in jedem Industriegebiet geplant. zum Beispiel macht die DDR 1963 einen spezifischen Vertrag mit Polen für 300 Arbeiter in der Lignitindustrie einem getrennten Vertrag wurde zwei Jahre später festgelegt, dass die Polen in die DDR pendeln durften. Meistens haben die Vertragsarbeiter Handarbeit, gemacht wie die Gastarbeiter in der BRD. In der BRD wurden die Zahlen der Gastarbeiter von den Firmen entschieden. Wenn eine Firma 30 Arbeiter benötigte, kontaktierte sie die Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (BfA). Die BfA hat Geschäftsstellen in den exportierenden Ländern, und diese Geschäftsstellen würden 30 qualifizierte Kandidaten für die Firma finden. Die DDR hat daher direkte Kontrolle über die Zahlen der Arbeiter und die BRD hat keine Kontrolle – ihre Zahlen wurden ausschleißlich von Angebot und Nachfrage entschieden.

Alle Arbeiter exportierenden Länder für die DDR waren andere kommunistische Länder hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang. Sie waren eine traditionelle Quelle für Arbeiter in Deutschland, besonders die Polen. Polnische Arbeiter kamen seit dem Anfang der Deutschen Nation bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg nach Deutschland, bis das Dritte Reich Polen besetzt hat. Die Deutschen hat Animosität für die Polen, aber sie waren gewöhnt an sie und hat den gemeinsame Ideologie. Die

BRD könnten nicht die Polen benutzen und sie müssten fremdere Leute importieren. Die Türken hatten zum Beispiel dunkle Haare und Haut, aßen anderes Essen, sprachen eine andere Sprache, und waren moslemisch. Sie passten nicht in die deutsche (oder westliche europäische) Gesellschaft und hatten keine Geschichte in Deutschland wie die Polen. Die DDR hatte den Vorteil, dass sie Zugang zu ihren „traditionelle“ Arbeiten hatte.

Sowohl die BRD und die DDR hatten daher Gastarbeiter aus gleichen wirtschaftlichen Gründen aber aus verschiedenen Ideologien. Die BRD war offensichtlich ein kapitalistisches System und die Einfuhr der Gastarbeiter war einfach ein ökonomischer Vermögenswert. Die BRD konnte die Gastarbeiter benutzen und im Austausch wurden die Ausländer reicher als ihre Landsmann. Die DDR aber verliehen den Arbeitern viel Wichtigkeit, so wie konnte die Einfuhr von Vertragsarbeiter gerechtfertigt werden? Im Kontext des Kalten Krieges war das Ziel der beiden Ideologien ihre wirtschaftliche Stärke zu zeigen, aber auch die Vorteile ihres eigenen Systems. Wenn kommunistische Nationen Gleichheit für alle Leute förderten, dann mussten die kapitalistischen Länder zeigen, warum ihre Freiheit besser ist, und so weiter. Das bedeutete, dass ein neuer Wettbewerb zwischen den Kräften begonnen hatte, weswegen die BRD und die DDR mehr Arbeiter brauchten und beide hatten Verträge mit ärmeren Nationen gemacht. Wer konnte eine stärkere Ökonomie aufbauen? Wer behandelte seine ausländischen Arbeiter besser? Wer hat einen besseren Lebensstandard? Diese grundlegenden ökonomischen Kriterien waren wichtig im Kalten Krieg.

Soziale Probleme mit Ausländern in der DDR

Wir haben gesehen, dass die DDR Vertragsarbeiter von Polen hatten. Es gab nicht viele Vertragsarbeiter, aber die Gegenwart der Polen verursachte soziale Konflikte. Man kann diese

Konflikte am Besten im Jahre 1972 sehen. In diesem Jahr öffnete die DRR die Grenze mit Polen, um eine gute Beziehung zwischen den Einwohnern der zwei Länder zu kultivieren. Viele Polen reisten als Touristen nach Deutschland und umgekehrt. 1972 kamen 9 Millionen Polen in die DDR und 6,5 Million Deutsche besuchten Polen. Es waren Freundschaften zwischen Personen, aber Feindlichkeit gegen die Polen als Nation. Die Deutschen hatten keine Angst vor der Polizei, wenn sie über ihren Ärger mit den Polen gesprochen haben. Ein Mann hatte sich zum Beispiel beschwert, dass die Polen „alles wegkaufen“ (Zatlin 684).[6] Die Ökonomie der DDR war größer und produktiver als die polnische Ökonomie, und die Deutschen wollten nicht, dass die Polen alle ihre sogenannten Luxuswaren kauften. Es gibt wenig Berichte über diesen „Kaufeifer,“ aber ein Pole versucht zum Beispiel 103 kg Rosinen zu schmuggeln. Das war ein Gegenschlag gegen die Öffnung der Grenze und die Polen. Es gab Polizeiberichte über körperliche Übergriffe der polnischen Touristen und andere Fälle von Beschimpfungen (Zatlin 686 - 690).

Die starke Animosität in der DDR kommt teilweise aus der Isolation des Staates. Jean Edward Smith sagt, dass man in der DDR viel mehr „Germanness“ in den Aktion, Einstellungen und Erscheinen sah als in der „amerikanisierten“ BRD. Der Staat blickt zum Beispiel auf seine pre-Krieg Struktur. Die Art der Leute – Tradition, Ordnung und Obrigkeit – war auch eher deutsch als amerikanisch („Red Prussianism,“ 373). Er konnte in dieser Umwelt seine alten Anschauungen behalten und er hat wenig Ausländer, die eine neue Sichtweise bringen könnten. Auf diese Weise zeigt sich ein langjähriger Hass aus die Slawen – eine „Tradition der Verachtung“ (Zatlin 688).

Diese Tradition der Verachtung begann, bevor Deutschland als Nation gegründet wurde. Die Polen werden immer als faul und schlau beschrieben, und sie würden angeblich Deutschland überfluten und ruinieren. Mit der Popularisierung der Eugeniks aber hat diese Verachtung eine

[6]I translated this from the cited article; original: the Poles “are buying everything out from under us.”

neue Schicht erobert. Es gab einen „wissenschaftlicher“ Grund, warum die Polen unmenschlich waren – es war akzeptabel sie zu hassen – und im Zweiten Weltkrieg wurde Polen besetzt. Die Polen „brauchten eine starke deutsche Hand,“ weil sie „Kleptomanen“ waren; dieses Vorteil bedeutet die Vernichtung von Millionen polnischer Juden und Katholiken. Der Hass bliebt nach dem Kriegsende als Polen die 8 Millionen Deutschen aus ihrem Land vertrieben; aus dem Land, das wirklich „Deutschland gehört“ (Zatlin 688 – 689).

Die Touristen blieben nicht so lang wie die Vertragsarbeiter oder Gastarbeiter; daher hatte die DDR nicht das gleiche Problem in dieser Zeit wie die BRD. Sie hat diesen langjährigen Hass auf die Polen, und die touristischen Begegnungen waren vorübergehend. Es gibt nicht viel Literatur über die spezifische Probleme mit den Arbeiten, weil die Zahlen so gering waren. Die DDR scheint in diesem Punkt besser als die BRD in ihrer Kontrolle und Behandlung der Vertragsarbeiter (aber nicht ihrer Touristen). Aber das ist nicht das Ende der Geschichte der Vertragsarbeiter.

Eine bekanntere Situation: Kubaner und Vietnamesen in der DDR

Um eine Situation wie sie in der BRD zu finden war, war muss man nach 1973 suchen. Die BRD hat ihr Gastarbeiterprogramm 1973 gestoppt, weil die Ökonomie eine Abschwung hatte. Dieser Abschwung war ein Problem in allen westlichen Ländern, weil OPEC begann, die Ölpreise zu manipulierten. Die BRD waren sehr abhängig von dem Öl aus den OPEC Ländern, und die Preismanipulation erhöhte die Preise der anderen Waren. Der Ölpreisschock aber hat keinen Effekt auf die DDR, weil ihr Öl aus der Sowjetunion kommt. 1973 war daher nicht ein besonderes Jahr für die DDR, und sie musste nicht ihre Vertragsarbeiter reduzieren wie die BRD. 1975 hatte die

DDR Verträge mit Kuba und 1980 mit Vietnam gemacht und diese Vertragsarbeiter kamen in den 1980er Jahren. Diese Länder waren kommunistisch wie Polen, Bulgarien und Ungarn und sie hatten auch die gleichen Probleme – zu viele Leute im Arbeitsmarkt. Vietnam war von dem Krieg mit Amerika zerstört und brauchte Hilfe von anderen kommunistische Ländern. Kuba sah zum Beispiel eine 3.07 Prozent Vergrößerung zwischen 1970 und 1980 in seinem Arbeitsmarkt (Perez-Lopez und Diaz-Briquets 276). Manche dieser Ausländer arbeiteten in Handarbeit oder in Fabriken – spezifisch in Reifen-, Auto-, Chemiefasern- und Werkzeug- Industrien (Panayi 229). Die exportierten Arbeiter waren jung und unerfahren; in der DDR sollten sie Fähigkeiten lernen. Kuba schickte zum Beispiel Leute, die in spezifischen Industrien arbeiten – Industrien, die gleichzeitig in Kuba aufgebaut werden. Auf diese Weise sollte Kuba erfahrene Arbeiter haben (Perez-Lopez und Diaz-Briquets 282). Kubaner blieben 4 Jahre in der DDR und der Vertrag war erneuerbar. Die Zahl der Arbeiter wuchs nicht durch den Jahre, aber sie schwankte. Es gab in 1982 5,836 Kubaner in der DDR, 20,000 im Jahre 1985 und 9,380 im Jahre 1988 (Perez-Lopez und Diez-Briquets 284). Es war das Gleiche mit den Vietnamesen: 1982 4,740, 1885 284 und 1988 30,567 (Dennis 340). Auf diese Weise hatten die DDR nicht das Problem „zu viele Gastarbeiter zu haben," das die BRD hatte.

Kubaner und Vietnamesen hatten viele Vorteile, wenn sie in der DDR arbeiteten. Ein Vorteil für die Arbeiter waren, dass sie nach 2 Jahren eine bezahlte Reise nach Kuba bekamen. (Perez-Lopez und Diaz-Briquets 283). Am Arbeitsplatz hatten Kubaner und Vietnamesen Übersetzer, weil diese Arbeiter meistens kein Deutsch sprachen (Panayi 229). Ihre Löhne und Vergünstigungen waren die gleichen wie die der Deutsche Arbeiter – eine Situation, die man nicht oft in westlichen Ländern sah. Diese Gleichheit bestand, weil die DDR die Gewerkschaften aus Kuba anerkannte. Kubanische Vertragsarbeiter konnten sogar kandidieren (für Bürgermeister

z.B.), etwas, was kein Gastarbeiter in der BRD machen konnten. Kubaner und Vietnamese konnten 60 Prozent ihrer Löhne nach Hause schicken; die restlichen 40 Prozent ging an die Kubaner oder Vietnamesen und die deutsche Regierung (Dennis 343).

Das Leben der Kubaner und Vietnamesen war kontrolliert; und diese Kontrolle war manchmal nicht so schlecht, wenn wir an die vorgenannten Vorteile blicken. Diese Kontrolle war nicht sehr gut für andere Teile des Lebens. Die Wohnungen der Kubaner waren zum Beispiel Schlafsaale; für Vietnamesen war es eher „Konzentrationslager“ mit Stacheldraht und Wachen (Perez-Lopez und Diaz-Briquets 284). Die Arbeiter durften nicht mehr als 4 Leute pro Zimmer haben und sie durften auch eine Kochfeld für jeweils 3 Leute, Sanitäranlagen und eine Clubzimmer haben (Dennis 344). Dieser Bedarf wurde durch Gesetze teilgelegt, aber er wurde nicht total durchgesetzt. Die DDR hatte selber eine Wohnungsnot besonders in den 1980er Jahren, und Arbeiter mussten manchmal zu seiner Firma wohnen (Dennis 346). Die Gesetze, die von denen Vertragsarbeiter keine Vorteile hatten, waren sehr streng – wenn man zum Beispiel Besucher nach 20 Uhr hatte, konnten die Arbeiter dafür deportiert werden. Diese Gesetze werden, wie die Zimmergesetzte nicht immer durchgesetzt, so dass das Leben nicht immer so kontrolliert war. Sie konnten aber trotzdem aus vielen anderen Gründen deportiert werden. 1984 wurden 23 schwangere Frauen und 103 kranke Arbeiter deportiert, weil sie wahrscheinlich nicht arbeiten konnten (Panayi 228). Diese Möglichkeiten der Deportation hatte schlechte Nebenwirkungen. Schwanger Frauen verletzten sich manchmal absichtlich, um eine Fehlgeburt zu veranlassen; in manchen Fällen die DDR förderte eine Zwangsfehlgeburt um Deportation zu vermeiden (Dennis 350).

Kuba und Vietnam waren nicht europäische Länder und hatten sehr verschiedene Kulturen und Lebensweisen im Vergleich mit den Deutschen. Die Vietnamesen hatten Schwierigkeiten,

wenn sie in die DDR kamen. Sie waren an ein wärmeres Klima gewohnt und hatten daher nicht die Kleidung für den kalten deutschen Winter (Dennis 343). Wenn sie sich an die DDR gewöhnt hatten, machten sie warme Kleidung wie Jeans und Mäntel in ihrer Freizeit. Sie verkauften illegal diese Kleidung auf der Straße an andere Arbeiter und auch an Deutschen, weil Jeans und Mäntel für alle knapp waren (Dennis 347). Auf diese Weise beschafften sich die Vertragsarbeiter Kleidung und mehr Geld; die Deutschen konnten auch mehr Zugang zu Waren haben. Es war auch schwierig für die Arbeiter, dass die Familie nicht mitkommen durften. Es war verboten, dass mehrere Familienmitglieder gleichzeitig nach Deutschland kamen. Manchmal durfte ein Bruder oder die Frau mitkommen, aber sie durften nicht miteinander wohnen (Dennis 343). Die DDR hatte ähnliche Ansichten über die Heirat zwischen einem Ausländer und einem Deutschen wie die BRD. Beide Länder machten solche Heiraten durch Gesetze sehr schwierig. In der DDR waren diese Heiraten verboten, aber man konnte trotzdem heiraten, wenn die Regierungen die Erlaubnis gab. Es war nicht normal für die Regierung die Erlaubnis zu erteilen, und es gab viele Hindernisse nach dem eine Erlaubnis gegeben war, so dass viele Beziehungen später wieder getrennt wurden.

Diese Unterschiede waren nicht immer willkommen in der DDR. Die Gründe hatten manchmal eine Basis in Problemen, die die Arbeiter „selbst verschuldet hatten“. Ein Problem waren die Waren, die die Arbeiter in ihr Heimland schicken wollten. Sie schickten nicht nur persönliche Waren, sondern auch viele große Dinge. Erlaubt waren: 2 Mopeds, 5 Fahrräder, 2 Nähmaschinen, 150 Meter Stoff, 1 Kamera, 8 Anoraks und 100 kg Zucker (Dennis 344). Diese Menge ist ansehnlich für eine Person, besonders wenn man diese Dinge schicken musste, aber viele Arbeiter schickten sogar mehr. Die Deutschen mochten nicht, dass diese Warenkisten die Post und den Flughafen verstopften. Die Deutschen sahen auch die Zahlen der Waren, die das Land verlassen würden. Die deutsche Regierung versuchte mehr Regulierungen, aber die

Vertragsarbeiter waren nicht abzuschrecken. Die Vietnamesen hatten einen Schwarzmarkt aufgebaut, und die Deutschen konnten ihn nicht unterbinden; manche Deutschen untergingen die Regulierungen, weil sie die Waren verkauften oder schmuggelten.

Ausländer waren nur 1.2 Prozent der Bevölkerung, aber man sehen kann, dass dieser geringe Prozentsatz genug war, um eine Gegenreaktion zu verrauschen. An dem polnischen Beispiel kann man sehen, dass das Gefühl der „Germanness“ eine Umwelt der Ausschließung geschaffen hat. Ein Grund für diese Behandlung war, dass die Regierung nicht die Absicht hatte, diese Arbeiter integrieren zu hatte. Das Ziel der DDR war „ die Vertragsarbeiter von den Deutschen getrennt zu halten“ (Dennis 340 - 343).[7] In ihren spezialen Schlafäale und Arbeitsplätzen waren Vertragsarbeiter getrennt von den Deutschen; die kulturellen Unterschiede machen diese Trennungen klar. Die Vertragsarbeiter bildeten eine Unterschicht wie die Gastarbeiter in der BRD. Die vietnamesische Regierung wollte auch Trennung und die Ungerechtigkeiten waren akzeptabel, wenn die Leute Geld und Waren verdienten.

Viele vietnamesische Arbeiter dachten, dass ihre Zeit in der DDR gut war, weil der Lebensstandard besser war und sie konnten mehr Geld verdienen (Dennis 349). Diese Länder hatten verschiedene spezifische, ursächliche Faktoren für das gleiche Problem nämlich, dass sie zu viele Leute in ihrem Arbeitsmarkt hatten. Sie kamen wie die Polen, Bulgarien und Ungarn ihnen in die DDR. In der DDR verdienten die Vertragsarbeiter normalerweise das Gleiche wie die Deutschen und hatten viele Vorteile. Ihre Wohnungen waren besser als in ihrer Heimat und es war erlaubt, ethnische Enklaven. Es gab Diskriminierung gegen die Kubaner und Vietnamesen, aber es war nicht schlimmer als die Diskriminierung gegen die Türken in der BRD oder die Polen in der DDR. Obwohl die Kubaner und Vietnamesen verschiedene Kulturen als hatten, waren die

[7]Diese Zitat kommt aus einen Englischen Artikel; originell Zitat: „to keep the contract workers apart from East Germans.“

Probleme eher wirtschaftlich als nationalistisch. Vergleicht man die türkischen Gastarbeiter in der BRD mit den kubanischen und vietnamesischen Vertragsarbeitern so halten die Kubaner und Vietnamese Situation in der DDR.

Abschluss

Die DDR hatten Vertragsarbeiter wie die BRD, aber sie hatten total verschiedene Systeme. Die BRD hatten eine Marktwirtschaft und die DRR eine zentralisierte Wirtschaft, aber beide Länder entschieden, dass sie Arbeiter importieren mussten. Die BRD hatte keine Kontrolle über die Zahlen der Gastarbeiter, die in ihr Land kamen, weil der Fluss der Immigranten durch Angebot und Nachfrage bestimmt wurde. Die DDR aber hatte totale Kontrolle über die Zahlen, weil die Regierung direkt und spezifische Verträgen mit anderen Regierungen gemacht hatte. Die DDR hatte daher kein Problem mit vielen Ausländern, wie die BRD es hatte. Die DDR konnte Leute deportieren, wenn sie es wollte; Deportation war schwieriger für eine Demokratie wie die BRD. Dass heisst, dass die DDR die Vorteile von mehr Arbeitern hatte, ohne das Problem, dass Arbeiter, die nicht mehr gebraucht werden, im Land bleiben konnten, wie in der BRD. Die DDR ist der klar Gewinner in diesem Punkt.

Die DDR hatte auch ihre Vertragsarbeiter besser behandelt. Die Arbeiter waren in beiden Länder anfällig für Diskriminierung von den Deutschen, aber die Arbeiter in der DDR hatten mehr Vorteile bekommen. Sie verdienten die gleiche Löhne wie die deutschen Arbeiter und hatten Vorteile wie Krankenversicherung und Freizeit. Die Arbeiter in der BRD verdienten weniger als deutschen Arbeiter und hatten wenigen oder keine Vorteile. Die Arbeitskontrakte waren länger in der DDR und daher konnten die Vertragsarbeiter mehr Geld als die Gastarbeiter verdienen. Es gab Diskriminierung in beiden Ländern, weil sie eine gemeinsame Geschichte und Kultur hatten –

Deutsche waren Deutsche, Grenze oder keine Grenze – daher wurden Ausländer ähnlich in beiden Ländern behandelt. Diese Diskriminierung waren meistens auf mündliche Beschimpfungen eingeschränkt. Die DDR ist dann auch hier der Gewinner.

Im Kontext der Kalten Krieges war es wichtig, dass die BRD die DDR in den Schatten stellte. Die Teilung Deutschlands legt einen Vergleich der Politik: beide Länder waren deutsch, aber ein Teil war kommunistisch und der andere Teil kapitalistisch. Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Sowjetunion konnten ihre Systeme vergleichen, wenn sie auf die DRR und die BRD blickten. Der Druck waren daher hoch für die BRD den Kapitalismus und die Demokratie gut zu repräsentieren. In meinem Beispiel sieht man, dass die BRD und die DDR mit ihren verschiedenen Systemen ähnliche Entscheidungen getroffen haben; aber die Systeme hatten auch große Unterschiede. Von der Perspektive der Gast/Vertragsarbeiter hatten daher die BRD letztlich im vergleich mit der DDR verloren.

English Summary

In this chapter, I compare West Germany's guest worker program with that of East Germany's, with the intention of determining which system had a better foreign worker program, who treated its workers better, and ultimately which country fared better in the face of the Cold War. I begin by explaining the differences between the capitalist system of West Germany and the communist one of East Germany, and what these differences implied for the guest worker programs. Then, I establish basic information – where guest workers came from, when they came, how many, what industries they were employed in, and so on. Comparisons between the Germanies are made in the areas of social reactions to foreigners, economic treatment towards the guest workers, and the roles that the state systems played in the program. In this summary I

will present only the major findings and conclusions.

East Germany, even though it was a communist country, had guest workers at the same time that West Germany did. Before the Berlin Wall was built, nearly 3.5 million East Germans crossed the border and permanently left the country. With a population of only 18 million to begin with, this decline of 20% had very significant implications for the work force. By closing off the borders with the Berlin Wall, East Germany could finally focus on its economy and foster its growth with all factors under its control. It needed more workers in order to expand, and other communist nations had surplus labor to supply. Thus, during the 1960s and through the 1980s, East Germany signed contracts with Poland, Bulgaria, Cuba, Vietnam, Hungary, and other socialist nations to send fixed amounts of workers for specific industries when needed. For instance, if the East German government decided that their lignite industry needed 50 additional workers to reach a desired output, a contract would be signed with Poland's government for them to send 50 workers. Such contracts usually lasted for 4 years each and could be renewed. In this way, East Germany was able to benefit from extra labor as well as control the amount of workers entering the country, something that West Germany did not do. As I have shown in previous chapters, West Germany did not attempt to stem the flow of workers, and thus accumulated upwards of two million by 1973. East Germany's foreign worker population did not increase over time, rather it varied year-by-year; but East Germany also had much more control over all facets of life. The contract workers were brought over through government contracts, housed by the government, employed by the government, and also sent back home by the government. West Germany knew roughly how many guest workers were present, but they had little ability to deport them if they stayed longer than their worker's permits allowed.

Workers of different nationalities were subject to different regulations depending on the

specifications set by their home countries, but generally workers received similar treatment regardless of country of origin. Unlike in West Germany, the contract workers usually earned the same wages as German workers did, and they were eligible for bonuses.[8] They also got benefits, such as health care and paid vacations. Housing was provided by the state, usually in the form of dormitories. Regulations required that certain minimum requirements be met, such as having a maximum of 4 workers per bedroom, a cooking apparatus for every 3 workers, proper bathing facilities, and a club room. Though these regulations were not always enforced, the housing overall was much better than the converted barns and barracks in which guest workers lived in West Germany.

Discrimination against the foreign workers was similar in both West Germany and East Germany. In both cases, complaints were mostly economic in nature, in West Germany stemming from their sub-class status in German society and in East Germany based on contract workers usurping precious commodities. In both countries there were very few (or at least unreported) physical attacks on foreign workers, but they faced verbal and non-verbal discrimination from both citizens and the state. I showed in previous chapters that in West Germany, guest workers were legally relegated to the fringe of society, seen by Germans as a sub-proletariat working stigmatized jobs and being culturally distinct from the native population. In the East German case, it was the Polish workers who faced especially harsh treatment, even those that were merely tourists. This stemmed mostly from the long standing animosity between Poles and Germans; West Germany had no access to Polish labor after World War II, but reactions to them would likely have been the same.

East Germany and West Germany both imported labor around the same time, although

[8]East Germans called their foreign labor *Vertragsarbeiter*, or "contract workers;" the term "guest worker" was the West German equivalent.

East Germany continued to do so long after West Germany discontinued their program. Cut off from the market forces which effected western nations, East Germany still exhibited parallels with its Western twin: it grew considerably, necessitating extra labor needing to be imported from other countries, and both treated their workers in a similar fashion. However, East Germany had a greater capacity to both provide for its contract workers and control their numbers. As flawed as the greater East German economy was, their foreign laborers had a better experience than those in West Germany. This "win" for East Germany is especially important when placed within its Cold War context. East and West Germany served as experiments in which the world could see whether capitalism was "better" than communism. It was not only because of their symbolic position, forming the border of the western world and the Eastern Bloc, but also that all Germans had a common history, culture, and language, and thus their only major difference was ideology. In this specific case, communism prevails as having managed their guest workers better than capitalism. This must be nuanced with the fact that it is difficult to determine what actually occurred in East Germany due to the questionable legitimacy of information given; this analysis had to be based on what information was provided.

Conclusion

While one cannot deny that Germany's economy grew extensively during the 1960s and into the 1970s, there was more to the story than just economic factors. Guest workers aided Germany's growth by providing the extra manpower needed. For their help however, they received little in return. They were temporary economic assets, ordered and installed in factories just like spare parts. Germany allowed all of these “spare parts” to be ordered on the basis of supply and demand, which meant that many arrived, but that when these parts needed replacing, who would ensure they actually were replaced? Just as the uncontrolled laissez-faire economics in the United States had lead to unprecedented prosperity as well as inequality, the uncontrolled nature of guest labor allowed Germany to become powerful at the expense of the workers. The social needs of the workers were ignored, because Germany was under the impression that workers would only stay as long as their contracts were valid. Under this assumption, why would they need extensive German lessons or decent housing? It was a temporary situation. Unfortunately, such short-sightedness and confidence in their strength of own rules disillusioned the German government into thinking the guest worker situation was fine when it really was not. Had longer term policies been made at the beginning, including a control on the numbers of workers entering and enforced regulations on the well-being of workers, the guest worker program would have been more of a success for Germany. These were mechanisms that East Germany had in place for its contract workers, allowing their program to function more in the way the government intended it to.

While the guest worker program was an overall success for Germany, it only marginally helped the sending countries, at best. Remittances sent home by guest workers did provide a substantial inflow of currency, but oftentimes remittances went towards basic goods rather than investments. The economies of the Southern European nations did grow at high rates during the 1960s and 1970s, but this was not necessarily because of the guest worker programs. Many of them, especially Turkey, were investing in new industries, which was the reason they had high growth rates. But these countries sent their workers with the idea they would return as skilled workers that could run their newly built industries; in reality, many guest workers stayed in the host countries or returned without the needed training. Hence, the guest worker program's effects on the sending countries was an inflow of capital and an outflow of skilled labor, neither of which significantly improved their situations.

Given that my conclusion is that the guest worker program was an overall success but could have been planned better, some interesting "what if" questions arise at the close of this essay. What would have happened if there had been no Cold War and German split, for instance? Germany may not have needed Turkish guest workers to begin with, since both East and West Germany would have been one country and ergo had access to eastern Europeans. This is an event out of Germany's control, however, and central to its identit(ies) during this period. It was set in the minds of Germans that they would reunite, and then they would no longer need guest workers from places like Yugoslavia or Turkey, further adding to their temporary status. Indeed, if reunification had happened during the guest worker period, the program would likely have ended soon afterword. The "full" Germany would have still needed extra labor, but just as cutting off migration in 1973 did not hugely decrease the number of workers that were there at the time, there would probably have been enough who chose to stay to fill in.

Now, a key question: what if Germany had opted to not import workers at all? From my overall assertion that the guest worker program was marginally beneficial, would it perhaps have been better if laborers had stayed in their home countries? First of all, Germany would have struggled to grow substantially with its limited workforce, which was further constrained by the Berlin wall (Martin and Miller, 327). Many sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing and construction, would have shrunk more than others. Germans would have had to rely on their engineering prowess to develop technology in order to keep their industries competitive. Germany might not have been the powerful member of the European Community it became if it had not kept up with the other Western European powers, who incidentally also imported labor.

Certainly, democracy on the whole would have looked better if the workers were treated less as assets than as individuals; communist East Germany treated their contract workers in many respects just like native German workers. In the global competition between capitalism and communism, this was a solid win for communism. It would have been relatively easy for West Germany to win in the foreign worker program; if, for instance, West Germany had paid guest workers native wages, several positive outcomes would have been accrued: 1) guest workers could have remitted more money home, allowing for more investment possibilities or at least a higher standard of living; 2) German wages would not have gone down (in the few places this happened at all) and higher wages may have encouraged Germans to fill these jobs, making guest workers less necessary to begin with; and 3) guest workers would not have been in the economic position of sub-proletariat if they earned the same wages as comparable Germans. Yet, Germany chose to profit more from guest worker labor than help out less the developed nations from which the workers came.

It would have been more prudent for Germany to have controlled the numbers of workers

entering the country like East Germany did rather than simply letting the amounts be determined by industrial demand. If smaller amounts had been let in, they could have been more easily accommodated for, allowing better housing and less marginalization. There also could have been more of a system in place, with better vocational training and language classes, similar to current study abroad programs through colleges. In this way, guest workers would have gotten more positive aspects out of the program than just money and perhaps would have been more successful in their business endeavors when they returned home.

But could migration in the capitalist world truly have been controlled? It is, after all, a global movement of people, influenced by several factors that a single country could not easily control. Often, when countries make policies attempting to control immigration, they have unintended effects. For instance, Australia was at one time mostly white in its demographics. After World War II, the government decided that they needed a larger population to be a strong country. The assumption was that immigrants would be mostly British and otherwise European. The reality was that most of the immigrants were asian, and they then needed to be assimilated. Assimilation thus became the new policy; but this didn't really work due to the separation of work, communities, and lifestyles. Now, Australia espouses a multicultural policy, the result of all of their past policies not going as planned (Castles, “Factors that Make and Un-Make Migration Policies,” 852 -853).

Both of these countries had a similar core problem: they were making policies based on the current situations and needs of the country. The policies were not designed for the long-term and assumed that their measures of control would sufficiently enforce their policies. Additionally, Germany saw its guest workers simply as an economic factor, not as people, and did not plan on having to treat them as such. When short-term merged into the long-term, the weaknesses of the policies became exposed and needed amending. With better planning and fair treatment of guest

workers, Germany could have had more successful guest worker program. Instead, it took the German government until 2001 (40 years) to officially admit that Germany was, and has always been, an immigration country.

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