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Abbreviations

ALN: Armée de Libération National/National Liberation Army
BRS: Bureau de Renseignement Spécialisé/Intelligence Specialist Office
CFDT: Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail/French Democratic Confederation of Labor
CRUA: Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action/Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action
ENA: Étoile Nord-Africaine/North African Star
FEN: Fédération de l'Education Nationale/Federation for National Education
FLN: Front de Libération National/National Liberation Front
GRPA: Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne/Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
ICFTU: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
MNA: Mouvement National Algérien/National Algerian Movement
MTLD: Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratique/Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties
OAS: Organisation Armée Secrète/Armed Secret Organization
OPA: Organisation Politico-administrative
PCA: Parti Communiste Algérien/Algerian Communist Party
PCF: Parti Communiste Français/French Communist Party
PPA: Parti de Peuple Algérien/Algerian People's Party
PSU: Parti Socialiste Unifié/Unified Socialist Party
SAT-FMA: Services d'assistance technique aux Français musulmans d'Algérie/Technical Service Assistance for French Muslims from Algeria
UEC: Union des Étudiants Communiste/Communist Students Union
UNEF: Union Nationale des Étudiants Français/National Union of French Students
USTA: Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens/Algerian Workers' Union

Abstract

The Algerian War was a crisis that continues to affect Algeria and France today. During its history as a colony, French Algeria was considered to be a part of France and not just a colony, which was more than the other colonies. Even the population of Algeria was largely European and had the largest French population of the remaining colonies. The Algerian War for Independence was the bloodiest and longest of France's decolonization war because of the shared history between Algeria and France. Algerian nationalism grew throughout the history of French Algeria.

Algerian nationalism played an important role in the Algerian War. It led to the creation of many groups that worked toward achieving independence. These groups worked with French individuals and groups throughout the Algerian War, and this collaboration was vital for Algerian independence. This project will examine the different groups' participation in the Algerian independence struggle and show that even though many of these groups claimed to be in favor of Algerian independence, not all of the groups wanted an independent Algeria.

Introduction

The Algerian War was a crisis that continues to affect Algeria and France today. During its history as a colony, French Algeria was considered to be a part of France and not just a colony, which was more than the other colonies. Even the population of Algeria was largely European and had the largest French population of the remaining colonies. Because of this relationship between France and Algeria, the Algerian War was one of the "longest and bloodiest wars of decolonization" (Evans, xi).

The Algerian War officially started in November 1954 and lasted until the signing of the Évian Accords in March 1962. The war caused turmoil in metropolitan France and in Algeria. Clashes between various groups for independence caused conflicts for the future of the two states. On January 8 1961, the French state held a referendum on whether or not Algeria should be granted self-determination. In France and in Algeria, the referendum passed with approximately 75% of the votes being for self-determination. After the French referendum, the Évian Accords, a treaty to end the Algerian War signed by the French government and the GPRA, were agreed upon and passed by another referendum. Finally, on July 1, 1962, there was an Algerian referendum on whether or not they should become an independent state and it passed with almost 100% voting in favor of independence.

One of the major consequences of the Algerian War was the collapse of the Fourth Republic of France. In May 1958, a group of generals in Algeria organized and carried out a coup d'état to reinstate Charles de Gaulle in a high position of power in France. Before the

putsch, there had been disagreement and revolts within the French army between those who wanted to keep French Algeria a colony and those who did not. The crisis of May 1958 showed that the Fourth Republic had very little, if any, support from the army in Algeria; this was a very important factor that led to de Gaulle's return to power.

After the putsch, the parliament voted to dissolve the Fourth Republic. Charles de Gaulle was reinstated at President of France on May 29, 1958. The constitution of the Fifth Republic was written and it gave more power to the president and executive office, including during times of emergency. The Fifth Republic and its constitution remain in France to this day.

Because of the Algerian War and the conflict within the MNA and the FLN in metropolitan France and in Algeria, the FLN took control of the Algerian government. Algeria was dominated by the one political party, which led to the authoritarian state that Algeria became throughout the presidencies of Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene. Starting in 1991, other groups, such as the Islamic Salvation Front, started rising into power only to be put out by the Algerian authorities. Since then, different groups have tried coming into power and have led uprisings and revolts against the government. Because of this Algeria has undergone constitutional and political reform and continues to do so.

With the invasion of Algiers in 1830, the French gained control of Algeria from the Ottoman Empire. In 1848, the territory of French Algeria was divided in three *départements* that remained until 1962 with Algerian independence. At the time of the conquest, there was little resistance to the idea of colonialism. Even members of the left at the time "saw Algeria as a blank slate" on which they could impose their socialist ideals onto Algeria to create a utopia (Evans, 14). However, due to the instability of the French government in the seventeenth

century, French Algeria was shaped by the occupying military. The military rule somewhat protected the Arabic population of Algeria, but the European settlers considered the military rule too "Arabic-friendly" and pushed for change. In 1870, a decree was passed that French citizenship to Jews, which placed the Muslin Algerians below them. This caused the Muslim Algerians to revolt; the Mokhrani revolt spread to all the major cities in Algeria, but because it was so unorganized, it was unsuccessful. Because of the attempted uprising, repression of the Algerian people became even harsher, but throughout it all, Algerian nationalism persisted.

The aftermath of the Mokhrani revolt devastated Algerian society. One third of the population died due to the violence after the revolt or a famine in 1867. Much of the infrastructure, such as "mosques, religious schools, [and] communal stores of food put aside for hardship" were destroyed (Evans, 16). Even more, the Muslim Algerians had been humiliated by the invasion of a mainly Islamic society by a Catholic nation that repressed the Muslims violently. This created a hatred that would last until the end of the Algerian War.

In rural areas, where there was less, if any, Europeans, Algerians were not exposed to the daily racism present in the big cities with large European populations. Therefore, these Algerians "retained a strong sense of pride and dignity" (Evans, 38). This also allowed them to practice Islam more openly, which reminded them daily that they were not French, but Algerian. This sense of pride would later evolve into the nationalism that would fuel the Algerian War.

At the end of World War Two, ideas of independence and decolonization began circulating around Algeria. With that, nationalist groups began emerging. Similarly, in France, people were already thinking about the morality of colonization after the Occupation of France. These groups of people would be vital for their roles during the Algerian War.

In this project, I will look into the different activities of French and Algerian groups in France that promoted and worked toward Algerian Independence during the war. Despite their shared goal, I will show that the ideologies of the different groups are not exactly the same and how the French and the Algerians had to work together to end the Algerian War and to free Algeria from its colonial ties to France.

Chapitre 1: Les mouvements français pour l'indépendance algérienne

La lutte des algériens, ou la lutte pour l'indépendance de l'Algérie, a conduit à plusieurs mouvements en France et en Algérie pendant les années avant et pendant la guerre d'Algérie. Il y avait plusieurs mouvements en faveur de l'indépendance d'Algérie, même les mouvements composés des Français. Même des français, des intellectuels aux ouvriers aux étudiants, ont contribué au mouvement pour l'indépendance d'Algérie. Dans plusieurs cases, les mêmes acteurs intellectuels qui étaient membres de la Résistance contre les Nazis et le gouvernement Vichy pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale étaient des membres des mouvements pour l'indépendance de l'Algérie dans la guerre d'Algérie. Le niveau d'aide et de soutien pour le mouvement d'indépendance algérienne différait avec chaque groupe. Malgré cela, il y avait plusieurs types de mouvements des Français qui étaient en faveur de l'indépendance algérienne. Dans ce qui suit, je vais exposer les niveaux différents des français qui contribuaient au mouvement pour l'indépendance algérienne. Je vais parler des niveaux différents parce que leurs activités ont contribué différemment à la Guerre d'Algérie.

Le Manifeste des 121

Le Manifeste des 121, ou la "Déclaration sur le droit à l'insoumission dans la guerre d'Algérie", est une réponse importante contre la guerre en Algérie. Écrit par Maurice Blanchot et Dionys Mascolo, le manifeste était une lettre ouverte publiée en 1960 dans le magazine de gauche, *Vérité-Liberté*. Il était signé par 121 intellectuels (notamment des écrivains et des philosophes) des partis politiques de la gauche, plusieurs d'entre eux était membres de la

Résistance pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Les auteurs voulaient que "l'opinion française et internationale en soit mieux informée" des événements dans la guerre (Manifeste des 121). Le Manifeste des 121 terminait avec trois propositions qui étaient les thèmes de tout le manifeste:

> - Nous respectons et jugeons justifié le refus de prendre les armes contre le peuple algérien.
> - Nous respectons et jugeons justifiée la conduite des Français qui estiment de leur devoir d'apporter aide et protection aux Algériens opprimés au nom du peuple français.
> - La cause du peuple algérien, qui contribue de façon décisive à ruiner le système colonial, est la cause de tous les hommes libres. (Manifeste des 121)

Ces trois propositions annoncent que les signataires du Manifeste des 121 soutenaient les Français qui ne voulaient pas combattre dans la guerre, les Français qui soutenaient et étaient membres des mouvements en faveur de l'indépendance d'Algérie, et le mouvement pour l'indépendance algérienne lui-même.

Le manifeste, qui était destiné au gouvernement gaulliste et à l'opinion public, a exigé la France et tout le monde de reconnaître le conflit en Algérie comme une guerre d'indépendance, quand la guerre était vue de façon ambiguë en France. Il dit que la guerre d'Algérie n'est

> Ni guerre de conquête, ni guerre de "défense nationale", ni guerre civile, la guerre d'Algérie est peu à peu devenue une action propre à l'armée et à une caste qui refusent de céder devant un

> soulèvement dont même le pouvoir civil, se rendant compte de l'effondrement général des empires coloniaux, semble prêt à reconnaître le sens. (Manifeste des 121)

Selon cette citation du manifeste, la guerre est devenue "une action propre à l'armée" (Manifeste des 121). Par ailleurs, les Français refusaient de donner l'indépendance aux Algériens, qui "l'État affecte de considérer comme Français, mais qui, eux, luttent précisément pour cesser de l'être" et qui voulait être "reconnue comme communauté indépendante". (Manifeste des 121).

Une autre chose que le Manifeste des 121 a adressé est le mauvais traitement des Algériens et des Français qui soutenaient le mouvement d'indépendance ou refusaient de combattre contre les Algériens et il a dénoncé la torture et l'utilisation de la torture par l'armée et le gouvernement français. Le manifeste indique que le combat de l'armée était "criminel et absurde" et que l'armée et le gouvernement n'ont pas suivi la loi. Ils "[agissaient] parfois ouvertement et violemment en dehors de toute légalité" et, en faisant cela, ils trahissaient la France et ses citoyens, même les Algériens. Il osait comparer le militarisme en France à "l'ordre hitlérien" parce que l'armée "[restaurait] la torture et à en faire à nouveau comme une institution en Europe" (Manifeste des 121). Finalement, le manifeste a déclaré que l'armée a agi antidémocratique et que ces "[cases] de conscience" remontaient au début de la guerre (Manifeste des 121). L'idée de soutenir les Français qui refusaient de combattre contre les Algériens et les Français qui soutenaient les mouvements d'indépendance algérienne qui est une des propositions finales venait du mauvais traitement des Français par l'armée et le gouvernement.

Le rôle des intellectuels dans la Guerre d'Algérie

Les deux auteurs du Manifeste des 121 étaient très actifs politiquement avant et après la publication du Manifeste des 121. Maurice Blanchot a commencé son activisme politique en 1929 quand il a déménagé à Paris. À Paris, il a commencé à étudier la médecine, mais il s'est intéressé au journalisme. Avant la deuxième guerre mondiale, Blanchot était de droite et il a contribué des articles aux magazines extrêmement droites. Blanchot était même un membre du groupe de droite Action Française. Cependant, ses pensées politiques ont changé par le début de la guerre d'Algérie et il était de gauche comme plusieurs grands personnages du mouvement pour l'indépendance algérienne. Contrairement à Blanchot, Dionys Mascolo était toujours de gauche. Il était brièvement dans la Partie Communiste Française jusqu'à 1949. Dans les années cinquante, ses pensées politiques ont conduit à son activisme contre le colonialisme et à son faveur de l'indépendance de l'Algérie. Mascolo était membre des groupes contre la guerre et il a collaboré avec Jean-Paul Sartre et Bernard Pinguad pour écrire "Le rôle de l'intellectuel dans le mouvement révolutionnaire." Son séjour dans la PCF a inspiré plusieurs œuvres sur le sujet du communisme avant et après la guerre d'Algérie. Les deux étaient membres du 'Groupe de la rue Saint-Benoît', un groupe d'intellectuels qui ont discuté et ont débattu la politique.

Parmi les 121 signataires, il y a beaucoup de monde très connus pour leurs activités dans la Résistance contre l'Occupation des Nazis et dans les mouvements pour l'indépendance algérienne. Plusieurs d'eux faisaient partie de la Résistance intellectuelle pendant l'Occupation écrivant des poèmes et des œuvres avec les thèmes de la libération et les articles dans les

journaux de la Résistance qui contenait l'information pour les autres membres de la Résistance. Ces thèmes se reflètent dans leurs activités dans la guerre d'Algérie.

Un des résistants et signataires le plus connu est écrivain et philosophe Jean-Paul Sartre. Un autre signataire célèbre est philosophe Simone de Beauvoir, qui avait une relation très proche avec Sartre. Les deux étaient existentialistes ; une croyance de l'existentialisme est que le bien est "tous qui en certain façon servent homme, servent ses besoins, son bonheur, sa liberté, le développement de sa vie" et le mal est les choses qui s'immiscent avec le bien (Interview avec Simone de Beauvoir). Parce que le colonialisme s'immisce avec la liberté des hommes et est une forme d'oppression, Sartre, de Beauvoir, et des autres existentialistes (comme pied-noir célèbre, Albert Camus) étaient anticolonialiste donc c'est logique qu'ils étaient pour l'indépendance d'Algérie. Sartre et de Beauvoir faisaient partie du mouvement pour l'indépendance algérienne et ils ont soutenu le Front de Libération Nationale en Algérie. Des autres signataires très connus et actifs dans les mouvements pour l'indépendance en Algérie incluaient Marguerite Duras, un membre de la Résistance et du PCF; Jean Baby, un membre du PCF qui était un des oppositionnels; et Jean Schuster, qui a travaillé avec Dionys Mascolo sur un journal antigaulliste en 1958.

Pas tous les intellectuels n'étaient complètement pour ou contre la décolonisation de l'Algérie. Albert Camus, un pied-noir intellectuel, était contre la colonisation dans la plupart des cas, mais il était très ambigu sur le sujet de la décolonisation dans le cas de l'Algérie. Parce qu'il était pied-noir, la Guerre d'Algérie "placed him in an impossible position" [l'a placé dans une situation impossible]; il était "torn between his moral commitments and his sentimental attachments" [déchiré entre ses engagements moraux et ses attachements sentimentaux] (Judt,

116). Il était compatissant aux actions du gouvernement français contre les Algériens et les révoltes algériennes. Cependant, il a vu les avantages pour l'Algérie si elle resterait française et les bénéfices le gouvernement français donnerait aux Algériens. Pour l'Algérie, Camus a préconisé plus d'autonomie pour l'Algérie ou une fédération française qui compris la France et l'Algérie, mais il n'était pas d'accord avec une Algérie complètement indépendante.

Pour beaucoup de monde en France, Camus avait été l'image parfaite des intellectuels français, mais cela a changé avec le début de la Guerre d'Algérie. Il faisait partie de la Résistance; il était un journaliste clandestine pour les journaux de la Résistance. Il était existentialiste et, avec Sartre, de Beauvoir, et des autres existentialistes, mais, contrairement à Sartre et de Beauvoir, Camus n'était pas actif dans la politique. Il ne voulait pas être considéré comme un philosophe et il pensait qu'un écrivain ne doit pas très actif dans la politique. À cause de la Guerre d'Algérie, Camus a été réduit à la silence, mais "sometimes he spoke through his characters" [quelques fois, il a parlé par ses personnages] comme dans *La Peste* et dans *L'Homme révolté* (Judt, 92). Avec la Guerre d'Algérie, Camus ne pouvait pas séparer ses opinions personnelles et politiques. Parce qu'il était non affilié avec les politiques et après sa participation dans la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, ses pairs intellectuels l'ont vu irresponsable.

La plupart des intellectuels qui ont contribué à l'indépendance d'Algérie étaient de la politique de gauche, mais il y a des gens de droite qui ont participé aussi. L'un des hommes de droite le plus connu est Raymond Aron, un philosophe et un contemporain de Sartre. Aron était d'accord avec les autres intellectuels sur le besoin d'une Algérie indépendante, mais ses raisons étaient différentes. Beaucoup de ses raisons étaient basées sur l'économie. Il a pensé que "the empire as a whole and not simply Algeria… was a bad economic deal for France" [tout l'empire

français, pas strictement l'Algérie était une mauvaise affaire économique pour la France] (Davis, 176). Selon Aron, il est nécessaire d'assimiler la culture algérienne et la culture française, mais c'était "culturally impossible and financially overwhelming" [culturellement impossible et financièrement écrasent] (Davis, 177). Par ailleurs, le nationalisme algérien était trop fort et la force militaire ne pouvait pas le contenir. Cependant, Aron n'était pas contre le colonialisme ou d'accord complètement avec l'idée d'indépendance algérienne. En plus, il a pensé que "l'abandon de la souveraineté," ou l'absence des ressources nécessaires de gouverner un nouveau pays, est pire qu'une guerre coloniale, qui conduit typiquement à la pire forme de l'abandon de la souveraineté (Judt, 166). Donc Aron pensait que si la France maintiendrait l'Algérie comme colonie, il serait mal pour les deux, la France et l'Algérie, et que la guerre ferait l'Algérie pire qu'une décolonisation pacifique.

Le but principal pour les intellectuels était d'influencer l'opinion publique. Beaucoup d'intellectuels contre la Guerre d'Algérie ou l'utilisation de la torture par l'Armée Française ont écrit des articles, des romans, ou des manifestes contre la guerre. En faisant cela, le public français était mieux informé sur la guerre et les actions de l'armée et du gouvernement. Parce que les intellectuels étaient respectés et considéré de savoir beaucoup de choses sur l'actualité, c'était plus facile pour eux d'influencer l'opinion public que les Algériens de l'influencer.

Le Manifeste des 121 est un exemple de comment les intellectuels ont travaillé pour changer l'opinion public. Des autres exemples comprennent des articles dans les magazines et les périodiques par des gens comme Sartre et Jeanson. Certains articles parlent de l'expérience personnelle des auteurs (comme dans les articles de Jeanson sur son séjour en Algérie publié en *Esprit*) et d'autres se concernent la philosophie (comme les articles de Sartre sur

l'existentialisme). Un livre très important pour influencer l'opinion public et *La Question* par Henri Alleg.

Henri Alleg était un journaliste très actif pendant la Guerre d'Algérie. Il habitait à Paris jusqu'à l'âge dix-huit ans, quand il a déménagé en Algérie. Pendant ce temps-là, Alleg est devenu impliqué dans le Parti Communiste Algérien et il a travaillé comme directeur du quotidien nationaliste et anticolonialiste, *Alger républicain*. En septembre 1955, les autorités françaises ont fermé le journal et le PCA a été interdit. Alleg avait besoin de vivre dans la clandestine jusqu'en 1957 quand il est allé à l'appartement d'un autre membre du PCA et la police française l'ont arrêté. Pendant sa détention, Alleg a été torturé pour révéler de l'information sur le PCA, mais il l'a résisté. En prison, il a commencé d'écrire "a fuller account of his torture" [un exposé plus complète de sa torture] et de faufiler des pages un par un à une maison d'édition avec l'aide de ses avocats (Reid, 573-574). Ces pages sont devenues son livre qui dénonce l'utilisation de la torture: *La Question*, qui a été publié en février 1958. En 1960, Alleg a été "convicted… of attempting to reconstitute a banned group" [déclaré coupable… de tenter de reconstituer un groupe interdit] et il a été condamné à dix ans en prison à Rennes. En 1961, il a échappé et il est allé à Prague et puis il est retourné en Algérie en 1962.

La Question est devenue très réussie et elle a été interdite par le gouvernement français en mars 1958, moins d'un mois après sa publication. Avant d'être interdit, *La Question* a vendu 65.000 exemplaires et après son interdiction, elle a vendu 90.000 exemplaires de plus illégalement. Sur le sujet de la torture, Alleg a dit que:

> the scandal has never been that prisoners should have been tortured
>
> but simply that the facts should have leaked out, and all their

> efforts have been devoted, not to stopping the torture, but to concealing it always more effectively. [Le scandale n'a jamais été que les prisonniers auraient été torturés mais simplement que les faits auraient divulgué, et tous leurs efforts ont été consacrés, pour ne pas arrêter la torture, mais à la cacher toujours plus efficacement.] (Reid, 574)

Les nouvelles de l'usage de la torture par le gouvernement et l'armée ont conduit à un grand mouvement du déplacement de l'opinion public à l'opposition de la torture et de la Guerre d'Algérie. *La Question* a révélé au public la forte utilisation de la torture par l'Armée Française en Algérie et comment il était passé de torturer un petit nombre de personnes considérées comme étant dangereux d'être largement utilisé sur les adversaires politiques et même la population civile. Après la publication de *La Question*, le gouvernement français avait besoin de répondre à ce qui se passait en Algérie, et le public n'approuvait pas de tout l'usage de la torture dans le nom des Français.

Les intellectuels français n'ont pas travaillé strictement parmi eux-mêmes; il y a des coopérations entre les Français et les Algériens de montrer l'opinion des Algériens. L'un des exemples de la coopération entre les Français et les Algériens le plus connus est le cas de Djamila Boupacha. Boupacha était un membre algérien du FLN. Elle a été arrêtée en février 1960 pour déposer une bombe pour le FLN. Elle, son père, son frère, sa sœur, et son beau-frère ont été détenus pour un mois. Boupacha, son père, et son beau-frère tous ont été torturés et elle a été violée par les membres de l'Armée Française. Quelque chose de choquant est qu'elle a décidé de mettre en place une action contre ses agresseurs.

L'avocat Gisèle Halimi a décidé de représenter Boupacha au procès et elle a convaincu Simone de Beauvoir de publier l'histoire du cas. De Beauvoir a écrit un article dans *Le Monde* et un livre qui s'appelle *Pour Djamila Boupacha*. Les deux se concernaient avec l'histoire de la détention, de la torture, et du viol de Boupacha ; ils ont mis l'utilisation de la torture par l'Armée Française aux yeux du public, même le public international. Apres la publication de *Pour Djamila Boupacha*, des autres intellectuels, comme Sartre et Aragon, ont rejoint de Beauvoir en créant la Comité pour Djamila Boupacha, qui a mis plus de pression sur le gouvernement français d'agir en faveur de Boupacha et contre l'utilisation de la torture par l'Armée Française en Algérie. Pendant le procès, Boupacha a été condamnée à mort par la guillotine, mais après la fin de la guerre, elle a reçu l'amnistié et a été libérée de la prison.

Un cas similaire est survenu trois ans plus tôt. Djamila Bouhired était un membre du FLN. Elle a été capturée par les Français et elle a été torturée pour l'information sur une démonstration à venir. Après la torture, elle a été libérée, mais elle a été arrêtée encore en 1957 après l'accusation qu'elle a déposé une bombe dans un café. Pendant qu'elle était en prison pour ce crime, elle a été encore torturée.

Jacques Vergès était son avocat pour le procès contre elle. Vergès a collaboré avec écrivain Georges Arnaud. Vergès et Arnaud ont écrit un manifeste titré *Pour Djamila Bouhired*, qui est le titre de Beauvoir a modifié pour le livre sur Boupacha. *Pour Djamila Bouhired* décrit le temps Bouhired passait en prison et sa torture. Pendant le procès, Vergès a accusé le gouvernement français de la torture de Djamila Bouhired, mais, malheureusement, Bouhired a été reconnue coupable et condamnée à mort par la guillotine. Grace à la pression sur le

gouvernement français par l'opinion public internationale, l'exécution a été rapportée indéfiniment. Bouhired a été libérée à la fin de la Guerre d'Algérie en 1962.

À cause du travail des intellectuels de montrer l'utilisation étendue de la torture par l'Armée Française, l'opinion public sur la Guerre d'Algérie a beaucoup changé du début de la crise en Algérie à la fin de la Guerre d'Algérie. Les œuvres comme *Pour Djamila Bouhired*, *Pour Djamila Boupacha*, et *La Question* ont révélé des histoires personnelles et descriptives de l'usage de la torture et des victimes. Grâce au changement de l'opinion public, le gouvernement français a commencé de finir la Guerre d'Algérie et de donner l'indépendance à l'Algérie. Cela montre le rôle important des intellectuels dans la Guerre d'Algérie.

Le Réseau Jeanson

Au contraire du soutien moral des mouvements de l'indépendance algérienne du Manifeste des 121 et des intellectuels, le Réseau Jeanson aidait directement des agents du Front de Libération Nationale en France métropole. Il était un mouvement pour l'indépendance algérienne compris des gens de gauche et, pour la plupart, des intellectuels français. Dirigé par Francis Jeanson, le groupe aidait le FLN en portant des papiers et de l'argent pour les Algériens et les membres du FLN qui travaillaient en France.

Avant la création du Réseau Jeanson, les Jeanson, Francis et Colette, étaient assez actifs dans les mouvements d'indépendance d'Algérie. Sa participation dans les mouvements nationalistes algériens n'était pas les premières désobéissances civiles de Francis Jeanson (Ulloa, 140). Dix ans avant la guerre d'Algérie, Jeanson a refusé de collaborer avec le gouvernement Vichy et les Allemagnes. En 1943, il a décidé de quitter la France parce qu'il l'a considéré une

prison. Il est allé par Espagne en Algérie, mais il est retourné en France, où il a rejoint la Résistance. Jeanson a expliqué qu'il a rejoint la Résistance à cause des raisons morales. Il a cité des raisons morales encore pendant la Guerre d'Algérie. Dans son œuvre, *Notre guerre*, Jeanson a écrit :

> "In societies of the present day, the moral act in the strict sense is located precisely at the level of refusal…We firmly believe that one must become involved *on the political level*, but there is no human – that is, effective – politics that is not conditioned, constantly subtended, *by a moral decision*." [Dans les sociétés d'aujourd'hui, l'acte moral au sens stricte se trouve précisément au niveau de refus ... Nous croyons fermement que l'on doit s'engager *sur le plan politique*, mais il n'y a aucun être humain - c'est-à-efficace - politique qui n'est pas conditionné, constamment sous-tendu *par une décision morale*.] (Ulloa, 28-29)

Cette citation de Jeanson a été écrite pour la Guerre d'Algérie, mais les sentiments sont les mêmes pour son appartenance dans la Résistance.

Francis et Colette Jeanson ont commencé leur participation avec les mouvements d'aide pour l'indépendance algérienne tôt dans leur mariage quand les deux sont visités l'Algérie pour leur lune de miel. Quand ils sont retournés en France, M. Jeanson a écrit plusieurs articles sur l'Algérie qui ont critiqué le racisme en Algérie et l'oppression française des Algériens, mais le premier article dans *Esprit*, publié en 1950, n'a pas été publié dans l'édition algérienne. Dans son article "*Cette Algérie, conquise et pacifiée*," Jeanson a écrit que les politiques de l'Algérie

avait "[des] facteurs d'incohérence et d'inhumanité" (Jeanson, 613). Cependant, Francis Jeanson n'était pas trop concerné par la situation en Algérie avant le début de la guerre en Novembre 1954.

Commençant en 1955, les Jeanson rencontraient des Algériens qui étaient avec le FLN et ces réunions conduisaient à l'écriture du livre *L'Algérie hors la loi*. *L'Algérie hors la loi* montre les injustices en Algérie et il présente l'histoire de la colonisation de l'Algérie par la France avec la concentration sur "the oppression and tragedy it created for the Algerian people" [l'oppression et la tragédie qu'elle a créée pour le peuple algérien] (Ulloa, 144). Le livre a reçu des critiques, spécifiquement sur le manque d'information sur le Mouvement National Algérien, dirigé par Messali Hadj. Les Jeanson ont décidé de soutenir le FLN en 1955 mais plusieurs intellectuels de la gauche n'ont pas fait la décision entre le FLN et le MNA jusqu'à un an après en 1956. Graduellement, les intellectuels de la gauche ont décidé de soutenir le FLN, grâce à la décision de ne pas "condamner la position pro-FLN en *L'Algérie hors la loi*" par le Comité d'Action des Intellectuels contre la Poursuite de la Guerre en Afrique du Nord (Ulloa, 149). Pendant une réunion du Comité d'Action des Intellectuels contre la Poursuite de la Guerre en Afrique du Nord le 27 janvier 1956 le comité a "décidé de soutenir le FLN comme la seule représentation des Algériens légitime" (Ulloa, 149). Le comité s'est dissocié avec *L'Algérie hors la loi* mais plusieurs futurs membres du Réseau Jeanson ont basé leur engagement avec le mouvement d'indépendance sur leur jugement de *L'Algérie hors la loi* (Ulloa, 153).

Pour les intellectuels actifs dans les mouvements en faveur d'indépendance algérien, l'écriture était une méthode très commune. Jean-Paul Sartre a pensé que le discours des intellectuels engagés était au même niveau d'action militante. Cependant, Francis Jeanson

croyait que l'écriture est une action nécessaire, mais ce ne suffisait pas. Il a voulu s'engager plus directement donc le Réseau Jeanson a été créé. Malgré son opinion sur l'écriture, Sartre soutenait le Réseau Jeanson. Cependant, il ne pouvait pas être un des "porteurs de valise" à cause de son statut comme une personnalité publique. Sartre a dit à Francis Jeanson qu'il était "cent pour cent d'accord avec l'action" du Réseau Jeanson (Hamon et Rotman, 151). Il a même trouvé des amis d'aider le réseau et même de Beauvoir a prêté sa voiture et son appartement au réseau et au FLN.

Le Réseau Jeanson a commencé, pas comme un réseau, mais comme un groupe d'amis qui aide les Algériens avec des petites activités (Hamon et Rotman, 55). Au début du Réseau Jeanson, en juillet 1956, ce n'était que Francis Jeanson qui faisait des services pour ses amis algériens. Il se comportait comme un chauffeur de taxi et il conduisait des hommes qui travaillaient pour le Front de Libération Nationale à Paris et dans ses banlieues. "Il mesure la portée et les conséquences éventuelles de ses gestes" et son aide pour le FLN se développait (Hamon et Rotman, 54). Les activités "de [Francis] Jeanson n'y [suffisaient] plus" et la femme et des amis de Jeanson ont commencé aider le FLN (Hamon et Rotman, 54). Jusqu'au début de 1957, le groupe d'amis aidait le FLN en France "de manière ponctuelle" (Hamon et Rotman, 55). Avant l'arrêt du chef de la Fédération de France du FLN, Louanchi, Jeanson a continué à présenter des conférences donc le gouvernement et les polices ne peuvent pas penser qu'il était "plus d'un intellectuel politisé" (Ulloa, 157). Le groupe est devenu encore plus important en 1957, mais le réseau restait clandestin et il n'avait pas de structure fixe.

Le 2 octobre 1957 a été la date où Jeanson a développé une structure plus fixe pour le Réseau Jeanson. Après une réunion chez les Jeanson, les premiers membres du réseau ont reçu

des tâches spécifiques et Francis Jeanson est devenu le superviseur de sécurité et des accommodations (Ulloa, 157). Le réseau clandestin s'est développé et il était nécessaire de créer des chemins pour traverser les frontières. Jacques Vignes était responsable de créer ces chemins pour amener les Algériens, secrètement et directement, en France.

Par ailleurs, le Réseau Jeanson était responsable pour diriger les fonds des Algériens. En 1958, vers six à huit valises, qui contenaient de l'argent, ont été transportées pour les Algériens du FLN en France. Les valises ont été ajoutées à 400 millions francs par mois pendant 1958. Cet argent était utilisé pour acheter des armes pour les Algériens en Algérie d'utiliser contre les Français. Jeanson a essayé de minimiser la contribution monétaire du Réseau Jeanson au Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, disant que sans les fonds du Réseau Jeanson le GPRA pouvait avoir "les moyens identiques" (Ulloa, 159). Malgré ses affirmations, c'est connu aujourd'hui que l'argent donné au FLN par le réseau composait la plupart des fonds de l'effort de guerre du FLN.

L'argent collecté par les membres du Réseau Jeanson était apporté en dehors de la France par un homme qui s'appelait Henri Curiel. Curiel était vital pour la transportation de l'argent. Il était un égyptien qui soutenait le réseau et son travail, mais il n'était pas un membre. Il était le fils d'un banquier qui avait un rapport privilégié avec le système des banques (Ulloa, 160). L'argent était subtilisé de la France par plusieurs comptes bancaires jusqu'à Genève, où il était retiré et donné aux militants du FLN par la femme du Curiel, Rosette. Cette méthode continuait jusqu'à l'indépendance de l'Algérie, même après les arrestations des membres du réseau.

En 1958, il était nécessaire de devenir plus clandestine. Jeanson a divisé les responsabilités entre plusieurs membres du réseau donc s'il serait arrêté le réseau peut continuer.

Henri Curiel restait en charge du transport des fonds. Jacques Vignes continuait de développer les chemins à travers des frontières, et en 1958, il a créé des chemins de la France à l'Allemagne où le FLN a établi une résidence à Düsseldorf. Par ailleurs, un nouveau membre a rejoint le Réseau Jeanson. Pole Adolfo Kaminsky, ou "Monsieur Joseph," un ancien membre d'une organisation qui aidait les juifs pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, a été recruté pour faire des papiers faux, comme des passeports et des cartes d'identité.

Après la chute du Réseau Jeanson en février 1960 avec les arrêts de Jeanson et de Curiel, Francis Jeanson était perçu comme un traître de la France. Pendant les procès contre lui en septembre du même an, il a été accusé de trahison. Malgré tout cela, Jeanson a justifié et défendu ses actions, même l'échange des armes utilisé contre les Français. Il a été reconnu coupable par la cour, mais la conviction a été contestée parce que personne ne pouvait parler de la Guerre d'Algérie pendant le procès (Ulloa, 218). Après le procès, Jeanson a dit qu'il était fidèle aux idéaux de la France.

Le Parti Communiste Français

La plupart des membres des groupes qui travaillait pour l'indépendance algérienne était de la gauche politiquement, mais le Parti Communiste Français n'était pas d'accord avec l'idée de l'indépendance. Le PCF était de l'extrême-gauche, mais il se concernait avec le conflit entre l'Union soviétique, sur laquelle les idées du Parti Communiste Français s'alignait, et les États-Unis, dont l'idéologie le Parti désapprouvait. Le PCF a vu tous en rapports de la polarisation du monde entre les États-Unis capitalistes et l'Union soviétique communiste. Dans l'opinion du PCF, les États-Unis étaient le pays impérialiste le plus puissant et ils voulaient les colonies des

pays impérialiste moins puissant qu'eux et presque toute la politique de la France "was related to the US 'threat' to French national independence" [a été liées à la 'menace' des États-Unis à l'indépendance nationale française] (Joly, 43). Le PCF croyait qu'ils utilisaient sa puissance sur la France, un pays impérialiste moins puissant et si la France a perdu l'Algérie, elle deviendrait capitaliste sous l'influence des États-Unis.

La peur de perdre l'Algérie au capitalisme était très forte dans le Parti Communiste Français. Le Parti était d'accord avec la décolonisation de l'Indochine parce que "the liberation movement in Indo-China was led by communists" [le mouvement de libération en Indochine a été dirigé par les communistes] mais "this was not the case for the Algerian national liberation struggle" [ce n'était pas le cas pour la lutte pour l'indépendance nationale algérienne] parce que le FLN en Algérie n'a pas été dirigé par les communistes (Joly, 72). À cause de cela, le PCF ne faisait pas confiance au Front de Libération Nationale et ne voulait pas soutenir le FLN et le mouvement pour l'indépendance algérienne. «

L'idéologie du Parti Communiste Français avait des divergences. La responsabilité du PCF était de défendre l'Union soviétique et ses idées. Il faut qu'il aide les ouvriers dans les pays capitaliste et les mouvements d'indépendance dans les colonies. Cependant, pour le PCF l'Algérie était "a special case" [un cas spécial] parce que "'Algeria is a colony of a particular type'" [l'Algérie est une colonie d'un type particulier] (Joly, 74). Au lieu d'exiger l'indépendance pour l'Algérie, le PCF a exigé 'l'autonomie' pour l'Algérie. Jusqu'à 1957, le Parti a déclaré que l'Algérie une "nation en formation" mais au début de 1957, Maurice Thorez, le chef du Parti Communiste Français, a appelé l'Algérie une nation formée. Vers la fin de la guerre, pendant son seizième congrès en 1961, le Parti a annoncé que la position du PCF, depuis

le début de la lutte, était que l'Algérie avait le droit à l'indépendance. Malgré les changements de ses opinions, au début de la guerre pour l'indépendance algérienne le Parti Communiste Français n'a pas soutenu ni le mouvement ni le FLN et sa stratégie. De se concentrer aux affaires en France, le PCF n'a pas changé beaucoup du début de la Guerre d'Algérie à la fin.

Malgré l'opinion officielle du Parti Communiste Français, il y avait un groupe des communistes français qui n'était pas d'accord avec le parti et ses actions. Le groupe, les oppositionnels, reconnaissait le droit de l'Algérie d'être indépendant et ils voulaient une participation plus concrète par le PCF dans la Guerre d'Algérie. Les oppositionnels ont cru que le PCF refusait l'Algérie le droit d'autonomie, une idéal du Parti Communiste Français. Parce que le PCF refusait d'aider les mouvements d'indépendance algérienne, les oppositionnels pensaient que le PCF faisait partie de l'opposition de l'indépendance. Les oppositionnels croyait qu'une Algérie libre réduirait l'hégémonie des États-Unis, pas l'augmenterait comme le PCF croyait. Ils n'approuvaient pas avec les actions du PCF et ils voulaient plus de soutien du PCF plus tôt dans la guerre. Par ailleurs, les oppositionnels soulignaient la solidarité entre les ouvriers en France et le mouvement nationaliste pour l'indépendance en Algérie; dans l'opinion des oppositionnels, les ouvriers français et les nationalistes algériens étaient alliés. Idéalement, l'union entre les deux combattrait contre l'impérialisme français. Les oppositionnels n'étaient pas complètement d'accord avec la position du Parti Communiste Français et ils voulaient l'indépendance pour l'Algérie dès le début de la lutte.

Les oppositionnels utilisaient la presse comme une méthode d'agir contre la guerre et contre la position du PCF. Pendant la Guerre d'Algérie, il y avait plusieurs périodiques des oppositionnels, dans lesquelles ils insistaient qu'ils ne voulaient pas former un nouveau parti,

mais de retourner aux idéals marxistes. Par crainte d'être expulser du Parti Communiste Français, les auteurs des périodiques ne signaient pas leurs articles. Cependant la plupart des périodiques était de courte durée, les revues qui ont remplacé les autres qui ont été arrêtées avaient les mêmes contributeurs. Le nombre des lecteurs de toutes les revues des oppositionnels était environ 20 000, vers cinq pour cent des membres du PCF. Malgré les petites statistiques, les oppositionnels étaient plus influents, particulièrement parmi les intellectuels.

Même les oppositionnels avaient des différences en croyances, et les revues montraient cela. *L'Étincelle*, *Voies Nouvelles*, et *Unir* était plus sympathique au Parti Communiste Italien. *La Voie Communiste*, la plus grande des revues des oppositionnels, s'intéressait beaucoup au Parti Communiste de la Chine et le préférait à l'Union soviétique. *L'Étincelle* et *Voies Nouvelles* parlaient du Parti Communiste de la Chine aussi. La seule revue de maintenir un soutien constant pour l'Union soviétique était *le Communiste*, qui, avec *Tribune de Discussion* et *la Voie Communiste* avaient des éléments trotskistes. Néanmoins les différences entre les oppositionnels, ils désapprouvaient de tous les actions du Parti Communiste Français par rapports à la Guerre d'Algérie; ils exigeaient que le PCF soutienne le mouvement d'indépendance algérienne. Toutes les revues étaient d'accord avec l'idée que la Guerre d'Algérie était plus importante que le PCF pensait et qu'elle méritait plus d'attention (Joly, 135).

L'Union des Étudiants Communistes ne suivait pas la position sur la guerre en Algérie du Parti Communiste Français. Elle était contre la guerre et de plus en plus les étudiants français devenaient plus hostiles à la guerre. Elle a exigé en septembre 1960 d'abolir la conscription et de commencer des pourparlers de paix avec le Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne. Le PCF utilisait les slogans de l'UEC mais il les a changés; par exemple, il a ajouté

‘mais pas de désertion’ à l’idée d’abolir la conscription (Joly, 120). Par ailleurs, quelques organisations politiques, l’Union Nationale des Étudiants Français, la Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail, et la Fédération de l’Education Nationale, ont organisé une manifestation en faveur de la paix en Algérie. Le Parti Communiste Français et la Confédération Générale du Travail se dissociaient avec la manifestation qui a conduit à plus de différences entre les positions du PCF et de l’UEC. L’UEC s’est conformé avec le PCF et les membres de l’UEC était interdits d’aller à la manifestation de l’UNEF, de la CFDT, et de la FEN. Quand même, plusieurs membres de l’UEC y sont allés. Comme avec les oppositionnels, l’attitude de l’UEC différait notamment de celle du PCF et la position de l’UEC est devenue plus concrètement contre la Guerre d’Algérie et en faveur du mouvement pour l’indépendance algérienne.

Les jeunes communistes voulaient être plus actifs dans les mouvements contre la guerre donc ils formaient des comités. Il y avait des comités qui étaient composés des intellectuels aussi. Pour la plupart, il y avait plusieurs types dont comités faisaient partie. Une sorte de comité était ceux qui voulaient la paix en Algérie. Un de ces comités était le Comité des intellectuels français contre la poursuite de la guerre en Afrique du Nord, qui incluait Dionys Mascolo, Jean-Paul Sartre, Robert Barrat, André Mandouze, et Daniel Guerin qui tous ont signé le Manifeste des 121. Le Comité de liaison de l’enseignement secondaire pour la paix en Algérie et le Comité Universitaire pour la paix en Algérie était composé des étudiants le premier avec les lycéens et le deuxième avec les étudiants de l’université. Même les ouvriers faisaient partie des comités; ils avaient le Comité ouvrier contre la guerre d’Algérie, qui comprenait 120 usines et qui était actif dans les activités contre la guerre (Joly, 124).

Un deuxième type de comité était des comités contre la torture dans la Guerre d'Algérie. La torture était adressée dans le Manifeste des 121 donc plusieurs des intellectuels qui l'ont signé étaient membres de ces comités. Le comité contre la torture le plus connu était le Comité Maurice Audin, qui a reçu le nom d'un jeune homme qui était arrêté, torturé, et tué par les parachutistes. Le but de ce comité était d'exposer l'utilisation de la torture pendant la guerre parmi les Algériens et les Français.

Plusieurs membres du Parti Communiste Français étaient membres des comités, mais le PCF n'encourageait pas l'adhésion de ces comités. Il permettait ses membres d'être membres dans les comités pour la paix, contre la torture, et contre le fascisme, mais les membres du PCF qui collaboraient et aidaient le FLN était expulsé du PCF. Les raisons du PCF de ne pas soutenir les mouvements pour l'indépendance, même les comités, étaient pour le patriotisme pour la France et de ne pas abandonner son pays dans une guerre, une idée de Vladimir Lenin de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Les oppositionnels pensaient que la Guerre d'Algérie n'était pas comparable à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale donc les raisons ne justifiaient pas le PCF.

Malgré le fait que la position officielle du Parti Communiste Français était de ne pas s'immiscer avec le gouvernement français et la Guerre d' Algérie, pas tous les membres du PCF n'ont suivi cette décision. Parce que les combats en Algérie ont grandi, c'était nécessaire d'avoir plus de soldats, mais l'armée ne suffisait pas. Alors l'armée avait besoin d'appeler les conscriptions et les conscrits, ou les rappelés, ont protesté leur service militaire. Le PCF a soutenu les mouvements, et dans une certaine mesure des rappelés et plusieurs membres du PCF ont participé dans les mouvements. Le PCF voulait soutenir les rappelés qui protestaient, mais il le ne voulait pas être associé avec les actions contre la France et à cause de cela, la position

officielle du PCF était de ne pas approuver la désobéissance (Joly, 116). En 1956, quand les manifestations sont devenues plus radicales, le PCF a dénoncé officiellement les protestations du mouvement des rappelés. Les oppositionnels du Parti Communiste Français n'étaient pas complètement d'accord avec les actions du PCF, et ils pensaient que le PCF devait diriger un mouvement avec une position plus forte contre la Guerre d'Algérie et que son soutien ne suffisait pas.

Le Charonne Massacre de 1962

Après son retour au pouvoir en 1958 avec la Cinquième République, Charles de Gaulle a changé son point de vue sur la guerre d'Algérie et l'indépendance algérienne. Pour cette raison, l'OAS a été créée par des pieds-noirs en Algérie et par les Algériens qui voulaient rester français et résister à l'indépendance algérienne. En France et en Algérie, l'OAS a commencé à attaquer le FLN fréquemment. Le massacre de Charonne le 8 Février, 1962 a commencé comme une manifestation organisée pour dénoncer l'OAS, qui faisait de plus en plus d'attaques en métropole, et pour protester contre la guerre d'Algérie.

La manifestation de Charonne a été organisée par le PCF, l'UNEF, la FEN, et le Parti Socialiste Unifié, des groupes politiques de gauche français et essentiellement composée de Français contre la guerre. Les organisations ont appelé pour une manifestation pacifique et même s'il a été interdit, ils ont continué avec la manifestation. Elle s'est située à la Place de la Bastille et puis un cortège vers la place de Voltaire.

La police parisienne a été commandée par Maurice Papon pour réprimer cette manifestation comme il l'avait fait en Octobre 1961 avec le massacre des Algériens qui

manifestaient. La manifestation était pacifique, mais “la police charge à coup de matraque les manifestants qui cherchent alors à se réfugier dans le métro” (“Métro Charonne 8 février”). Les policières ont jeté des gens “dans l'escalier par-dessus la rampe de la bouche du métro” et ont lancé des grilles de fer vers le bas sur les manifestants, tuant huit personnes dans la station et une personne supplémentaire qui est mort à l'hôpital, et en blessant beaucoup d’autres (“Métro Charonne 8 février”). Parce que la massacre est arrivé sous terre, il y était plus “[d’] un trouble spécifique… qu’on ne retrouve pas parmi les riverains de surface” (Dewerpe, 73). Les manifestations ont étendu “sous le tunnel” et “sur le quai” de la station de métro. Mais au-dessus du sol “le massacre, du dessous, [était] inassumable” (Dewerpe, 79). Depuis 2001, la ville de Paris “rend hommage aux victimes” et rappelle aux gens de ne pas oublier le massacre. En 2007, le maire de Paris, Bertrand Delanoë ont commémoré le massacre avec une plaque à la place de la station Charonne.

Il y avait plusieurs niveaux des mouvements pour l’indépendance d’Algérie composés des Français. Les types de mouvements différents ont contribué dans des façons différentes, mais ils tous ont aidé le mouvement en faveur de l’indépendance algérienne. Néanmoins, les groupes français ne pouvaient pas accomplir le but de l’indépendance algérienne sans les groupes Algériens, ce que je vais discuter dans le prochaine chapitre.

Chapter 1: French Movements for Algerian Independence

The Algerians' struggle, or the struggle for Algerian independence, led to several movements in France and in Algeria during the years before and during the Algerian War. Many French citizens contributed to independence movements, from intellectuals to workers to students. The level of help and of support for the Algerian independence movements differed between each level of the movement. Because of that, there were many types of French movements which were in favor of an independent Algeria. In this chapter, I will examine the different levels of the movements from the intellectuals, who aimed to change public opinion about the war, to the individuals, who personally helped the FLN in France with the Jeanson Network.

The Manifesto of the 121

The Manifesto of the 121, or the "Declaration on the Right to Insubordination in the Algerian War," was an important response to the Algerian War. Written by Maurice Blanchot and Dionys Mascolo, the manifesto was an open letter, published in 1960 in the leftist magazine *Vérité-Liberté*. It is named after the 121 intellectuals (notably writers and philosophers), mainly from the political left, who signed the manifesto. The authors wanted the "opinion française et internationale en soit mieux informée" [French and international opinion to be well informed] (Manifeste des 121). The Manifesto of the 121 finished with three propositions, which were the main theme of the entire manifesto:

- Nous respectons et jugeons justifiée refus de prendre les armes contre le peuple algérien. [We respect and consider the refusal to take up arms against the Algerian people justified.]
- Nous respectons et jugeons justifiée la conduite des Français qui estiment de leur devoir d'apporter aide et protection aux Algériens opprimés au nom du peuple français. [We respect and consider the conduct of the French who consider it their duty to provide assistance and protection to the oppressed Algerians on behalf of the French people justified.]
- La cause du peuple algérien, qui contribue de façon décisive à ruiner le système colonial, est la cause de tous les hommes libres. [The cause of the Algerian people, which contribute in a decisive method to ruin the colonial system, is the cause of all free men.] (Manifeste des 121)

These three propositions announced that the signatories of the Manifesto of the 121 support the French people who did not want to fight in the war, the French people who supported and were members of movements in favor of Algerian independence, and the independence for Algeria movements themselves.

The manifesto was aimed at the Gaullist government and public opinion. It urged France and the entire world to recognize the conflict in Algeria as a war for independence, which was important as the war was viewed ambiguously in France. It declared that the Algerian War was

> Ni guerre de conquête, ni guerre de « défense nationale », ni guerre civile, la guerre d'Algérie est peu à peu devenue une action propre à l'armée et à une caste qui refusent de céder devant un soulèvement dont même le pouvoir civil, se rendant compte de l'effondrement général des empires coloniaux, semble prêt à reconnaître le sens. [Neither a war of conquest, nor a war for national security, nor a civil war; the Algerian War little by little became a proper action of the army and the castes that refuse to yield to an uprising which even the civil power, realizing the general collapse of colonial empires, seem ready to recognize the meaning.] (Manifeste des 121)

According to this quote from the manifesto, the war was an official armed conflict, the French people refused to give Algerians independence, which the French people and government considered to be part of France, but the Algerians did not want to be French and wanted to be an independent state, free from its colonial ties to France (Manifeste des 121).

Another thing that the Manifesto of the 121 addressed was the poor treatment of Algerians and French who supported the independence movements or refused to fight against the Algerians. The manifesto said that the fight was "criminal et absurd" [criminal and absurd] and that the French government was not following the law (Manifeste des 121). The government "[agissaient] parfois ouvertement et violemment en dehors de toute légalité" [acted sometimes openly and violently outside of all legality] and in doing that, they betrayed France and its citizens, even the Algerians. The manifesto dared to compare the militarism in France to Nazi

Germany and its time under Hitler's regime because the army "[restaurait] la torture et à en faire à nouveau comme une institution en Europe" [restored torture and torture as an institution in Europe] (Manifeste des 121). Finally, the manifesto declared that the army acted antidemocratically and that these "[cases] de conscience" [cases of conscience] resurfaced at the beginning of the war (Manifeste des 121). The idea of supporting the French people who refused to fight against the Algerians and the French people who supported and participated in Algerian independence movements, one of the final propositions, came from the mistreatment of the French people by the army and the government.

The main arguments of the manifesto were that of support for the people who refused to fight against the Algerians and the support for the French who helped the Algerians and their cause. Another declaration of the Manifesto of the 121 was that the signatories were against the mistreatment of French citizens and the negative actions by the government. The manifesto claims that the desire to be an independent country is the desire of everyone, therefore the Algerians were correct. The Manifesto of the 121 was a very important response to the Algerian War from the French intellectuals.

The Role of French Intellectuals during the Algerian War

The two authors of the Manifesto of the 121 were very politically active before and after the publication of the Manifesto of the 121. Maurice Blanchot began his political activism in 1929, when he moved to Paris, where he began studying medicine until he became interested in journalism. Before the Second World War, Blanchot was on the political right; he contributed to magazines of the political extreme right. However, his political opinions changed by the

beginning of the Algerian War. Conversely, Dionys Mascolo was always a member of the political left and a member of the French Communist Party until 1949. In the 1950s, his political thoughts led to his activism against colonialism and in groups in favor of Algerian independence.

Among the 121 signatories, there were many people famous for their activities in the Resistance against the Nazi occupation and the movement for Algerian independence. Many of them were part of the intellectual Resistance during the Occupation, which involved writing poems and other works with the themes of liberation and newspaper articles of the Resistance, which contained information for other members of the Resistance. These themes reflected themselves in their activities in the Algerian War.

One of the best-known signatory of the Manifesto of the 121 and a member of the Resistance was writer and philosopher Jean- Paul Sartre. Another signatory and Resistance member was philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, who had a very close relationship with Sartre. Both were existentialists and one of the main beliefs of existentialism is that good is "tous qui en certain façon servent homme, servent ses besoins, son bonheur, sa liberté, le développement de sa vie" [all things that serve in some way man serve his needs, his happiness, his freedom, the development of his life] and evil are the things that interfere with the good (Interview with Simone de Beauvoir). Because colonialism interferes with the freedom of men and is a form of oppression, Sartre, de Beauvoir, and other existentialists (such as famous pied-noir Albert Camus) were anti-colonialists so it makes sense that they were in favor of the independence of Algeria. Sartre and Beauvoir were part of the movement for Algerian independence and they supported the National Liberation Front in Algeria. Other well-known members active in the movement for independence in Algeria included Marguerite Duras, a member of the resistance

and the PCF; Jean Baby, a CPF member who was one of oppositional; and John Schuster, who worked with Dionys Mascolo on anti-Gaullist newspaper in 1958.

Not all of the French intellectuals were completely for or against the decolonization of Algeria. Albert Camus, an intellectual pied-noir, was against colonization in most cases, but he was very ambiguous on the issue of decolonization in the case of Algeria. Because he was a pied-noir, the Algerian War "placed him in an impossible position;" he was "torn between his moral commitments and his sentimental attachments" (Judt, 116). He was sympathetic to the actions of the French government against Algerians and the Algerian uprising. However at the same time, he saw the benefits for Algeria if it would remain French and the benefits for the Algerians. For Algeria, Camus advocated greater autonomy for Algeria or French federation including France and Algeria, but he did not agree with a completely independent Algeria.

For many people in France, Camus was the perfect image of French intellectuals, but that changed with the start of the war in Algeria. He was part of the Resistance; he was a reporter for newspapers illegal Resistance. He was existentialist, though he did not consider himself a philosopher, like Sartre, de Beauvoir, and other existentialists. Unlike Sartre and Beauvoir, Camus was not active in politics. He thought that a writer should not be very active in politics. Because of the war in Algeria, Camus was reduced to silence, but "sometimes he spoke through his characters," like in *La Peste* and *L'Homme révolté* (Judt, 92). With the war in Algeria, Camus could not separate his personal and political views. Because of his lack of affiliation to a certain political view and after his participation in the Second World War, his intellectual peers saw his actions as "irresponsible."

Most intellectuals who contributed to the independence of Algeria were left politically, but there were people on the right who participated as well. One of the most famous men of the political right to contribute to groups in favor of Algerian independence was Raymond Aron, a philosopher and contemporary of Sartre. Aron agreed with other intellectuals on the need for an independent Algeria, but his reasons were different. Many of his reasons were based on the economy. He thought that "the empire as a whole and not simply Algeria… was a bad economic deal for France" (Davis, 176). According to Aron, it was necessary to assimilate the Algerian and French cultures, but that was "culturally impossible and financially overwhelming" (Davis, 177). Additionally, Algerian nationalism was too strong and the military could not contain it without force. However, Aron was not against colonialism or completely in favor of the idea of Algerian independence. He thought that "the abandonment of sovereignty" or the lack of resources necessary to govern a new country was worse than a colonial war, which typically leads to the worst form of abandonment of the sovereignty (Judt, 166). So Aron thought that if France maintained Algeria as a colony, it would be bad for both France and Algeria, and the war would be worse than a peaceful decolonization of Algeria.

The main goal of the intellectuals was to influence public opinion. Many intellectuals, who were against the war in Algeria and/or the use of torture by the French Army, wrote articles, novels, or manifestos against the war. By doing this, the French public was better informed about the war and the actions of the army and the government. Because intellectuals were respected and considered to know a lot about current events, it was easier for the intellectuals to influence public opinion than it would be for Algerians.

The Manifesto of the 121 is one example of how intellectuals worked to change public opinion. Other examples include articles in magazines and journals by people like Sartre and Jeanson. Some articles talk about the personal experience of the authors (as in Jeanson's articles on his stay in Algeria published in *Ésprit*) and others were based on philosophy (such as articles on existentialism of Sartre). Another very important influence public opinion and The Question by Henri Alleg book.

Henri Alleg was a journalist that was active during the Algerian War. He was lived most of his early life in Paris before at the age of eighteen he moved to Algeria. While there, Alleg became involved in the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) and worked as the director for the nationalist and anti-colonial newspaper, *Alger républicain*. In September 1955, French authorities shut down *Alger républicain* and the PCA was banned. Alleg was forced to live underground until 1957 when he went to another member of the PCA's apartment and the French police arrested him. While imprisoned, Alleg was tortured to find out information about the PCA. From prison, Alleg started writing and sneaking out "a fuller account of his torture" one page at a time (Reid, 573-574). Eventually those pages became Alleg's book denouncing the use of torture: *La Question*, published in February 1958. In 1960, Alleg was "convicted…of attempting to reconstitute a banned group" and sentenced to ten years in prison in Rennes. In 1961, he escaped prison and went to Prague before returning to Algeria in 1962.

La Question became very successful and was eventually banned by the French government less than a month later in March 1958. Before being banned, *La Question* sold 65,000 copies and after its banishment, it sold another 90,000 copies illegally. About the torture, Alleg stated that

> "the scandal has never been that prisoners should have been tortured but simply that the facts should have leaked out, and all their efforts have been devoted, not to stopping the torture, but to concealing it always more effectively." (Reid, 574)

The news of the use of torture by the government and the army led to a mass movement of public opinion shifting to opposition of torture and the Algerian War. *La Question* revealed to the public the high use of torture by the French army in Algeria and how it had gone from torturing a small number of people seen as being dangerous to being used widely on political opponents and even the civilian population. After the publication of *La Question*, the French government had to answer to what was going on in Algeria, and the public did not approve of the torture being used in their names.

The French intellectuals did not strictly work amongst themselves. One of the best examples of collaboration between the French and the Algerians was with Simone de Beauvoir, Gisèle Halimi, and Djamila Boupacha. Djamila Boupacha was an Algerian member of the FLN. She was arrested in February 1960 for planting a bomb for the FLN. Boupacha, along with her father, brother, sister, and brother-in-law, was held captive for a month. She, her father, and her brother-in-law were all tortured and she was raped by members of the French army. Boupacha decided to bring up a suit against her abusers, something unheard of before her.

Halimi decided to take Boupacha's case and she urged de Beauvoir to write about it. De Beauvoir wrote an article in *Le Monde* and a book called *For Djamila Boupacha*. Both of de Beauvoir's works on Boupacha told the story of her torture and rape, putting the use of torture in the French Army in the public eye, including the international public. After the publication of

For Djamila Boupacha, other intellectuals, such as Sartre and Aragon, joined de Beauvoir in forming the Committee for Djamila Boupacha, which put more pressure on the French government to act in favor of Boupacha and against the use of torture by the French army in Algeria. Boupacha was condemned to death by guillotine, but after the war she was given amnesty and released from prison.

A similar case occurred three years earlier. Djamila Bouhired was a member of the FLN. She was captured by the French and tortured for information about an upcoming demonstration. Afterwards, she was released, but she was arrested again in 1957 after being accused of planting a bomb in a café. While she was in prison for this crime, she was tortured again. Lawyer Jacques Vergès decided to defend her in court and he teamed up with writer Georges Arnaud. Vergès and Arnaud wrote a manifesto titled *For Djamila Bouhired*, a title which de Beauvoir paraphrased for her book on Boupacha. *For Djamila Bouhired* described her time captive and her torture. In Vergès's defense, he claimed the French government itself was to blame for Bouhired's torture, but unfortunately Bouhired was convicted and sentenced to death by guillotine, but her execution was delayed indefinitely thanks to the pressure put on the government from the international public opinion. Bouhired was released at the end of the war in 1962.

Because the intellectuals used their work to show the widespread use of torture by the French Army, the public opinion on the war in Algeria changed. Works like *For Djamila Bouhired*, *For Djamila Boupacha*, and *La Question* revealed personal and descriptive stories of the use of torture and the stories of the victims. Because of the change in public opinion, the

French government began to end the war in Algeria and give independence to Algeria. This shows the important role intellectuals played in the end of the war in Algeria.

The Jeanson Network

Unlike the moral support of the intellectuals for the Algerian independence movements, the Jeanson Network directly helped agents of the National Liberation Front in metropolitan France. It was a movement for Algerian independence that included members of the left and, for the most part, French intellectuals. Led by Francis Jeanson, the group helped the FLN by carrying papers and money for Algerians and FNL members who worked in France.

Before the creation of the Jeanson Network, the Jeansons, Francis and Colette were active in the independence movements in Algeria. His participation in the Algerian nationalist movement was not the first civil disobedience Jeanson (Ulloa, 140). Ten years before the Algerian War, Jeanson has refused to cooperate with the Vichy government and the Nazis occupying France. In 1943, he decided to leave France, because he saw it as a prison. He went through Spain to Algeria, but he returned to France, where he joined the Resistance because of moral reasons. He cited moral grounds even during the war in Algeria. In his article *Notre Guerre*, Jeanson wrote:

> "In societies of the present day, the moral act in the strict sense is located precisely at the level of refusal…We firmly believe that one must become involved *on the political level*, but there is no human – that is, effective – politics that is not conditioned, constantly subtended, *by a moral decision*." (Ulloa, 28-29)

This quote from Jeanson was written in the context of the Algerian War, but the sentiments were the same as in the context of the Resistance.

Francis and Colette Jeanson began their participation to help the Algerian independence movements early in their marriage when they both visited Algeria for their honeymoon. When they returned to France, Mr. Jeanson wrote several articles on Algerian society, which criticized racism in Algeria and French oppression of Algerians, but the first article in *Ésprit*, published in 1950, was not published in the Algerian edition. In his article "*Cette Algérie, conquise et pacifiée*," Jones wrote that Algeria had policies "[des] facteurs d'incohérence et d'inhumanité" [factors of inconsistency and inhumanity] (Jeanson, 613). However, Jeanson was not too concerned by the situation in Algeria before the start of the war in November 1954.

Beginning in 1955, the Jeansons met Algerians who were involved with the FLN and these meetings led to the writing of *L'Algérie hors la loi*. *L'Algérie hors la loi* highlighted the injustices in Algeria and it presented the history of the colonization of Algeria by France while focusing on "the oppression and tragedy it created for the Algerian people" (Ulloa, 144). The book has received criticism, specifically for the lack of information on the Algerian National Movement, led by Messali Hadj. The Jeansons decided to support the FLN in 1955 but many left intellectuals did not choose between the FLN and the MNA until a year later in 1956. Gradually, the intellectuals of the left decided to support the FLN, thanks to the decision not to "condemn the pro-FLN in *l'Algérie hors la loi*" by the *Comité d'Action des Intellectuels contre la Poursuite de la Guerre en Afrique du Nord* [Action Committee of Intellectuals against the Continuation War in North Africa] (Ulloa, 149). During a meeting on January 27, 1956 the committee "decided to support the FLN as the only legitimate representation of

Algerians" (Ulloa, 149). The committee dissociated itself from *L'Algérie hors la loi*, but several future members of the Jeanson Network based their engagement with the independence movement on their judgment of the book (Ulloa, 153).

For intellectuals active in working for Algerian independence, writing was a very common method. Jean-Paul Sartre thought that the involved intellectual discourse was the same level of tangible action. Francis Jeanson disagreed with Sartre and believed that writing was a necessary action, but it was not enough. He wanted to engage more directly so he created the Jeanson Network. Despite their differences in opinion on intellectual discourse, Sartre supported the Jeanson Network. But due to his status as a public figure, Sartre could not be a "porteur de valise" [suitcase carrier]. Sartre told Jeanson that he "[était] cent pour cent d'accord avec l'action" [agreed one hundred percent with the action] of the Jeanson Network (Hamon and Rotman, 151). Sartre even found others to help with network and even de Beauvoir lent her car and apartment to the network and the FLN.

The Jeanson Network began, not as a network, but as a group of friends who help the Algerians with small tasks (Hamon and Rotman, 55). In July 1956, at the beginning of the Jeanson Network, it was not only Francis Jeanson who did tasks to help the Algerians. Jeanson acted as a taxi driver and he drove the men, who worked for the National Liberation Front, around Paris and its suburbs. "Il [a mesuré] la portée et les conséquences éventuelles de ses gestes" [he measured the scope and possible consequences of his actions] and his support for the FLN grew (Hamon and Rotman, 54). The activities "de [Francis] Jeanson n'y [suffisaient] plus" [of [Francis] Jeanson were no longer [enough], and his wife and friends began assisting the FLN and the network (Hamon and Rotman, 54). Until early 1957, the group helped the FLN in

France “de manière ponctuelle” [in a timely manner] (Hamon and Rotman, 55). Before Louanchi stopped being the head of the Federation of France, he and Jeanson continued to give lectures so the government and the police would not think that the network was more of an intellectual discourse (Ulloa, 157). The Jeanson Network became more important in 1957, but it still remained underground and had no fixed structure.

On October 2, 1957, Jeanson developed a more fixed structure for the Jeanson Network. After a meeting at the Jeansons’ home, the original members of the network were given specific tasks and Francis Jeanson became the supervisor of security and accommodations (Ulloa, 157). The underground network began developing. It became necessary to create paths to cross borders into France and Jacques Vignes became responsible for creating these paths to get Algerians, secretly and directly in France.

In addition to their other tasks, the Jeanson network was responsible for directing Algerians’ funds. In 1958, about six to eight suitcases, which contained money, were transported to the Algerian FLN in France. The suitcases contained around 400 million francs per month for the entire year of 1958. This money was used to buy weapons for the Algerians in Algeria to use against the French. Jeanson tried to minimize the importance of monetary contribution Jeanson Network to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, saying that without funds Jeanson Network GPRA could have the same means (Ulloa, 159). Despite his claims, it is now known that the money given to the FLN by the network made up most of the funds of the war effort of the FLN.

The money raised by members of the Jeanson Network was brought outside France by a man named Henri Curiel, who was vital for transportation money. He was an Egyptian who

supported the network and its work, but he was not a member. He was the son of a banker and therefore had a privileged relationship with the banking system (Ulloa, 160). The money was taken from France and put into several bank accounts in Geneva, where he had retired and the money would be given to FLN militants by Curiel's wife, Rosette. This method continued until the independence of Algeria, even after the arrests of members of the network.

In 1958, it was necessary to become more clandestine. Francis Jeanson divided the responsibilities of the network between the members; this was done to allow the network to continue if Jeanson was arrested. Henri Curiel remained in charge of the transportation of funds. Jacques Vignes continued to develop paths to cross France's borders, and in 1958, he created paths to cross into France from Germany, because the FLN had established a residence in Dusseldorf. Additionally, a new member joined the Jeanson Network: Aldofo Kaminsky, or "Mister Joseph," a former member of French Resistance during World War Two. Kaminsky was recruited to make false papers, like passports and identity cards, for FLN members.

After the fall of the Jeanson Network in February 1960 with the arrests of Jeanson and Curiel, Francis Jeanson was perceived as a traitor to France. During his trial in September of the same year, he was accused of treason. Despite all that, Jeanson justified and defended his actions, even the trading of weapons that were used against the French. He was found guilty, but the condition was contested because throughout the entire trial, no one was allowed to talk about the Algerian War (Ulloa, 218). After the trial, Jeanson declared that he had remained faithful to the ideals of France.

The French Communist Party

Most members of groups that worked for Algerian independence were politically left, but the French Communist Party did not agree with the idea of Algerian independence. The PCF was the extreme left, but it focused on the conflict between the Soviet Union, with which the ideas of the French Communist Party was aligned, and the United States, of whose ideology the Party disapproved. The PCF saw everything in the context of the polarization of the world between the capitalist United States and the communist Soviet Union. In the opinion of the PCF, the United States was the most powerful imperialist country and it wanted the colonies of the less powerful than imperialist countries, like France. Additionally, the party believed that almost all policy France should be related to the U.S. 'threat' to France and its national independence (Joly, 43). The PCF believed that the United States used its power over France, a less powerful imperialist country and if France lost Algeria, the U.S. influence over would turn Algeria into a capitalist nation.

The fear of losing Algeria to capitalism was very strong within the French Communist Party. The PCF readily agreed with the decolonization of Indochina because "the liberation movement in Indo-China was led by communist" and "this was not the case for the Algerian national liberation struggle" because the FLN in Algeria was not led by communists (Joly, 72). Because of this, the PCF did not trust the National Liberation Front and did not want to support it and the movement for Algerian independence.

The PCF had several divergences between their ideology and what they said. The responsibility of the PCF was to defend the Soviet Union and its ideas. It was also necessary to help the workers in capital countries and movements for independence in colonies. However, for the PCF, Algeria was "a special case" because "'Algeria is a colony of a particular type'" (Joly,

74). Instead of demanding independence for Algeria, the PCF demanded 'liberty' for Algeria. Until 1957, the party stated that Algeria was a "nation in training" but in early 1957, Maurice Thorez, the leader of the French Communist Party, called Algeria 'a formed nation.' Towards the end of the war, during the sixteenth congress of the PCF in 1961, the party announced that the position of the PCF, since the beginning of the fight was that Algeria had the right to independence. Despite changing its views, the French Communist Party did not support either the movement or the FLN and its strategy at the beginning of the war for Algerian independence. Looking at its activities in France, the PCF did not changed much from the beginning of the war in Algeria to the end of it.

Despite the official opinion of the French Communist Party, there was a group of French communists who disagreed with the party and its actions. The group, the *oppositionnels*, recognized the right of Algeria to be independent and they wanted more effective participation by the PCF in the Algeria War. The *oppositionnels* believed that the PCF refused to give Algeria the right to self-determination, an ideal of the French Communist Party. Because the PCF refused to help Algerian independence movements, *oppositionnels* thought that the PCF was part of the opposition to independence. *Oppositionnels* thought that a free Algeria would reduce the hegemony of the United States, not increase it as the PCF believed. They did not agree with the actions of the PCF and they wanted more support from the PCF earlier in the war. Furthermore, *oppositionnels* emphasized solidarity between workers in France and the nationalist movement for independence in Algeria; in the opinion of *oppositionnels*, the French workers and Algerian nationalists were allies. Ideally, the union between the two would fight against French imperialism. The *oppositionnels* did not completely agree with the position of the French

Communist Party and the *oppositionnels* wanted independence for Algeria since the beginning of the fight.

The *oppositionnels* used the press as a method to act against the war and against the official position of the PCF. During the Algerian War, there were several *oppositionnel* periodicals, in which they insisted they would not form a new party, but they would return to Marxist ideals. For fear of being expelled from the French Communist Party, the authors of the periodicals did not sign their articles. However most periodicals were short-lived, the journals that replaced the others that were ended often had the same contributors, meaning *oppositionnel* writers contributed regularly. The number of readers of all *oppositionnel* journals was about 20,000, or about five percent of PCF members. Despite the small statistics, *oppositionnels* were more influential, especially among intellectuals, than the official French Community Party.

Even the *oppositionnels* had differences in their ideologies. The *oppositionnel* magazines and journals showed these differences. The journals *L'Étincelle*, *Voies Nouvelles*, and *Unir* were more sympathetic to the Italian Communist Party. *La Voie Communiste*, the largest *oppositionnel* journal, was very interested in the Communist Party of China and it preferred Communist China over the Soviet Union. *L'Étincelle* and *Voies Nouvelles* spoke of the Communist Party of China as well. The only journal to maintain a constant support for the Soviet Union was *le Communiste*, which, with *Tribune de Discussion* and *la Voie Communiste* had Trotskyist elements. Regardless of the differences between the *oppositionnels*, the *oppositionnel* collective disapproved of the French Communist Party's activities in relation to the Algerian War; they demanded that the PCF support the movement for Algerian independence. All *oppositionnel* journals agreed with the

idea that the war in Algeria was more important than the PCF thought and that it deserved more attention from the party (Joly, 135).

The *Union des Étudiants Communists* [Union of Communist Students] also did not follow the PCF's position on the Algerian War. It was against the war and more and more, French students became more hostile towards the idea of the war. The UEC demanded in September 1960 to abolish the draft and to start peace talks with the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* [Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic]. The PCF used some of the UEC's slogans, but changed them; for example, the PCF added 'but not desertion' to the idea of abolishing the draft (Joly, 120). Several political organizations (the *Union Nationale des Étudiants Français* [National Union of French Students], the *Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail* [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], and the*Fédération de l'Education Nationale* [Federation of National Education]) organized a demonstration for peace in Algeria. The French Communist Party and the *Confédération Générale du Travail* [General Confederation of Labour] dissociated themselves from the event which led to more differences between the positions of the PCF and the UEC. The UEC conformed to the PCF's views and its members were not allowed to go to the manifestation of the UNEF, the CFDT, and FEN. Regardless, several members of the UEC went to it. Like with *oppositionnels*, the UEC's attitude differed notably from that of the PCF and the position of the UEC became more concretely against the war in Algeria and in favor of the movement for Algerian independence.

Young communists wanted to be more active in the movement against the war, so they formed sub-committees of the PCF. The committees were made up of intellectuals, students, and workers, not just young people. For most members of the PCF, there were several types of

committees to be part of. One type of committee was for those who wanted peace in Algeria. One of these committees was the *Comité des intellectuels français contre la poursuite de la guerre en Afrique du Nord* [Committee of French Intellectuals against the Continuation of the War in North Africa], which included Dionys Mascolo, Jean-Paul Sartre, Robert Barrat, Mandouze André, and Daniel Guerin, who all signed the Manifesto of the 121. The *Comité de liaison de l'enseignement secondaire pour la paix en Algérie* [Liaison Committee of Secondary Education for Peace in Algeria] and the *Universitaire pour la paix en Algérie*[University Committee for Peace in Algeria] were composed of students, the former being high school students and the latter being university students. Even the workers were part of the committees; they had the worker *Comité ouvrier contre la guerre d'Algérie* [Committee against the war in Algeria], which had members from 120 factories and had a lot of participation in activities against the war (Joly, 124).

A second type of committee was the committees against the use of torture in the Algerian War. Torture was addressed in the Manifesto of the 121; so many intellectuals who signed were members of these committees. The most well-known committee against torture was the *Comité Maurice Audin* [Maurice Audin Committee], which got the name from a young man who was arrested, tortured, and killed by the paratroopers in Algeria. The purpose of this committee was to expose the use of torture during the war among Algerians and French.

There were a lot of members of the French Communist Party that were also members of committees, but the PCF did not encourage membership of these committees. It allowed its members to be members of the committees for peace, against torture, and against fascism, but the PCF members who collaborated and helped the FLN were expelled from the party. The PCF did

not support movements for independence, even committees, for reasons of patriotism for France and to not abandon its country in a time of war, an idea of Vladimir Lenin from World War Two. The *oppositionnels* thought the Algeria War was not comparable to the World War Two so they did not think that idea justified the PCF's lack of support.

Despite the fact that the French Communist Party's official position was to know interfere with the French government and the Algerian War, not every member of the PCF followed that decision. Because the fighting in Algeria grew, it became necessary to have more soldiers, but the army was not enough. So the army called for a draft and the conscripts, or the *rappelés*, protested their military service. The PCF supported the movements, and, to a certain extent, the *rappelés* and PCF members that participated in the movements. The PCF wanted to support the protesting *rappelés*, but it did not want to be associated with actions that could be considered against France and because of this, the PCF officially not to approve disobedience (Joly, 116). In 1956, when the demonstrations became more radical, the PCF officially denounced the protests movement of the *rappelés*. The *oppositionnels* of the French Communist Party did not completely agree with this and they thought that the PCF should lead a movement with a stronger position against the war in Algeria and that its support was not enough.

The Charonne Massacre of 1962

After his return to power in 1958 with the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle changed his view on the Algerian War and Algerian independence. Because of this, the OAS was created by pieds-noirs in Algeria and Algerians who wanted to remain French and to resist Algerian independence. In France and in Algeria, the OAS began attacking the FLN frequently. The

Charonne massacre on February 8, 1962 started off as a demonstration organized to denounce the OAS and to protest the Algerian War.

The Charonne protest was organized by the PCF and other French left political groups and mainly consisted of French people against the war. The organizations called for a peaceful protest and even though it was forbidden, they continued on with it. The Parisian police was ordered by Maurice Papon to suppress this demonstration as it did in October 1961 with the massacre on the protesting Algerians. The police charged the protestors, who attempted to take shelter in the Charonne metro station. The police threw iron plates down onto the protestors, killing eight people in the station and an additional person who died at the hospital, and injuring many more.

Both of these massacres started off as peaceful protests against the mistreatment of Algerians in France and against the Algerian War. The police's violent actions against them shows the French police's and the government's opposition to an independent Algeria, despite the French people's desire to end the war and give Algeria its independence.

There were several different levels of support for the independence movements in Algeria made up of French citizens. The different levels contributed in different ways, but all the groups helped the movements in favor of Algerian independence. Nevertheless, the French groups could not have accomplished Algerian independence without the Algerian groups fighting for independence, which I will address in my next chapter.

Chapter 2: The Growth of Algerian Nationalism and Political Parties in France during the Algerian War

Algerian nationalism and groups for independence, including those based in metropolitan France, highly influenced the Algerian War. While most of the fighting during the war took place on Algerian soil, there was non-combat activity in metropolitan France. In my previous chapter, I addressed the groups composed of French people who worked with other French people and with Algerians in favor of Algerian independence, and in this chapter I will look into Algerian activities in favor of Algerian independence in France during the Algerian War.

The Origin and Growth of Algerian Nationalism

Algerian nationalism resurfaced in Algeria during World War One, when Algerian soldiers fought for France, but did not receive the same benefits and treatment as French soldiers. The nationalist movement was headed by *évolués*, North Africans who had received an education from the French school system in place in the colonies. Additionally, a large group of Algerian soldiers who served in the French army during World War One and those who worked in factories that aided the war effort contributed to the nationalist movement. After the combat ended, some Algerian soldiers chose to stay in metropolitan France, where the standard of living was higher than in the North African colonies.

During World War Two, Algerian nationalism experienced a similar growth as that during World War One. Additionally, nationalist parties, such as the Algerian's People Party, became

more influential among the Algerian Muslim population throughout World War Two (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 126). As of the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the war, members of the PPA were "ready to take up arms against the French in Algeria" (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 125). Because of this, some nationalists considered collaborating with Nazi Germany as a way of helping the cause for independence. However, when France fell to German occupation, the Nazis refused to continue helping Algerian nationalists since they "now considered [Vichy] France an ally" (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 126). Not all Algerian nationalists saw collaborating with Germany as beneficial; for these nationalists, including Messali Hadj, "collaboration had compromised the nationalist struggle and conflicted with the ideological and organizational stance" of the nationalist groups (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 126). There were many reforms, including an Algerian parliament, universal suffrage for all Algerians, and the end of colonization, proposed by Algerian nationalist groups during the war, but they were all rejected and instead several *ordonnances*, related to "employment in the civil service, accession to citizenship, the control of native provident societies, and the development of primary education for indigenous children," were presented by General Georges Catroux, the governor-general of Algeria during the last few years of the war (Belmessous, 196). These *ordonnances* "introduced some minor reforms but maintained the colonial status quo" (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 127). Even Charles de Gaulle in 1943, declared reforms that were more in line with the nationalists' proposed reforms and similar to the Blum-Viollette project, but his reforms still maintained the status quo of the colonial system. These reforms were not welcomed by the nationalist leaders and caused them to create the *Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté*,

whose goal was to create equality for and solidarity amongst all Algerians regardless of religion or background. This idea, according to the AML, was the basis for a nation and fueled the independence movements.

Immediately after the two World Wars, Algerian nationalism began leading to the desire for self-determination. The birth of this nationalism was "difficile, quelquefois sanglante, jalonnée de blessures et de pansement" (Stora, 39) [difficult, sometimes bloody, marked with injuries and bandages]. With the end of the war, President Woodrow Wilson gave his speech on the Fourteen Points, which laid out "specific recommendations for a comprehensive peace settlement" ("Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918"). The fifth point of his speech called for "free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" and for "the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight" (Woodrow). To many Algerian nationalists, this point brought forth the idea of independence, or at least autonomy over the North African colonies. To appease the grievances of the population in the colonies, the Third Republic attempted to pass a law that would give full French citizenship to the Algerian population, however the proposed law, the Blum-Viollette proposal, did not pass through the Parliament because of the Deputies and Senators from the three colonies that made up Algeria acted "on behalf of the European interests in Algeria," not on behalf of interests of the indigenous North Africans (Crozier and Mansell, 310). Due to the failure of the passing of this law, Algerian nationalists turned to creating their own political parties to get their opinions heard instead of those of the pieds-noirs. This led to the creation of several independent movements, such as the National Liberation Front and the National Algerian Movement. Initially, however, most of these groups focused not on an independent Algeria, but an autonomous Algeria functioning

under the French federal government.

The Evolution of the National Algerian Movement

In December 1954, Messali Hadj and his followers, the Messalists, created the National Algerian Movement to counteract the actions of the FLN, while Messali was in prison. Created as the rival to the FLN, the MNA tried to organize the entire independence uprising. Because of the vague the MNA was able to bring together many different nationalist organizations, some of which were fighting amongst themselves since 1926 for the independence movement (Atger, 107). Because of the combination of the different organizations, the MNA in its early years had the support of most of the Algerian nationalists in Algeria, and especially in France. Its dominance was short lived however due to the FLN's emerging importance.

Ahmed Messali Hadj played a very important role for Algerian nationalists nearly two decades before the independence struggle. Before the creation of the MNA, Messali had been involved in the founding of other nationalist movements and was "recognized as the 'undisputed leader of the Algerian people'" (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 128). From the beginning of his political career, he aimed for Algerian independence. Nevertheless, Messali criticized other nationalist organizations for their lack of commitment to the goal of independence. Specifically, in the case of the *Front algérien pour la défense et le respect de la liberté*[Algerian Front for the Defense and the Respect of Liberty], he claimed that it was "based on a 'minimum programme of action' and called on it to demand 'independence and national

sovereignty in Algeria'" (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 133-134). Because of this criticism, Messali set out to create other organizations that would align more with his ideas and would act for the independence cause. In 1927, he began working with the Algerian immigrant community in France when he became the head of the *Travailleurs Algériens* organization in Paris. After his work in metropolitan France, Messali focused more on pro-independence and nationalist movements and was very influential among the Algerian population. Messali was the founder of several nationalist organizations, including *Étoile Nord-Africaine* [North African Star], *Parti du Peuple Algérien* [Algerian People's Party], and the *Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques* [Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties]. Neither the ENA nor the PPA was successful and long-lasting and they were both shut down by the French government. After the fall of the PPA, Messali was arrested by the French police for his participation in the independence and anti-colonial movements and imprisoned. After the end of World War One, Messali created the MTLD, which would eventually evolve into the MNA. However by the end of World War One, Messali had lost most of his influence in Algeria since he was kept under house arrest in metropolitan France and could not work directly with the Algerian population. In 1954 with the start of the Algerian War for independence, Messali formed the MNA, but it could not effectively compete with the FLN. After the end of the Algerian War, Messali was no longer relevant and he moved to France until his death in 1974.

Towards the end of 1954, Egyptian authorities arranged negotiations to unite all Algerians, specifically focusing on the FLN and the MNA, "to fight French colonialism more effectively," but they were not successful (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 139). After these

meetings, Messali cut all ties with the FLN and further fueled the rivalry between the two organizations. From that point on, the Egyptian authorities sided with the FLN and increased its international presence.

The Political Activities of the MNA in France

During the beginning of the Algerian War, the MNA had a lot of support from Algerians in Algeria and in France. However, the MNA "perdit assez rapidement toute crédibilité en Algérie" [lost somewhat quickly all credibility in Algeria], but that was not the same case for the MNA in France, (Atger, 107). Additionally, the MNA maintained their influence in Algiers, the Algerian capital, the only place in which the MNA continued to exist excluding metropolitan France. At first, the MNA had more support from Muslim Algerians in France than the FLN did. Additionally, since the MNA evolved from the *Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques* [Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties], a previous organization which had a great deal of support from Algerians, the MNA inherited the support for the former organizations from the Algerian population.

The MNA had reached metropolitan France before the FLN and, therefore, towards the beginning of the war and the rivalry between the FLN and the MNA, the MNA was the main organization for Algerians in France. In January of 1956, the MNA called for a boycott of the legislative elections in metropolitan France, which the FLN also did. Then the MNA decided it needed to be more active in the Algerian independence movement in France; it organized the purchase and transfer of weapons for anti-colonialists in Algeria and France. The MNA also arranged for groups of volunteers to distribute the weapons it obtained.

Most of the MNA's support came from the Algerian workers in France throughout 1956. It organized strikes and protests, "which in some cases up to 80 per cent of North African workers supported" (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 142). Because of the high support among workers, the MNA set up the *Union syndicale des travailleurs algériens* [Union of Algerian Workers] in Algiers, Algeria. A month later, in March 1956, the MNA established the French federation of the USTA in Paris. Unfortunately, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions refused to affiliate with the USTA and therefore the USTA did not get much support from the ICFTU. After this and the conflict between the FLN and the MNA, the USTA slowly started to lose its support base.

By the late 1950s, the MNA had practically lost all of its support even in France. The MNA did remain in power in Lyon from 1959 until the 1960s. The FLN had thousands of contributors in the Lyon area while the MNA only had dozens, so the power struggle was in favor of the FLN, but despite that, the MNA managed to kill "deux fois plus de personnes que le FLN, tout en ayant quarante fois moins de cotisants" [more than two times as many people as the FLN, all while having forty times fewer contributors] (Atger, 108).

One September 5, 1956, the MNA organized a control operation, the operation "Chut!" [Hush!], in Lyon. As a result of the operation, 45 militant members of the MNA were arrested. These arrests "[ont plongé] le MNA dans la crise" [plunged the MNA into crisis] and it was about to lose its militant base in Lyon (Atger, 110). In order to reaffirm its legitimacy as the Algerian nationalists' representation, the MNA arranged a demonstration in Paris on March 9, 1956 to show that it was capable of mobilizing the Algerian community in France. The demonstration was very successful, with one thousand of the eight thousand Algerian workers in

Lyon going on strike. The MNA called for another strike weeks later on March 29, 1956 and then, 3,500 to 6,000 Algerians participated in Lyon. In May 1956, the FLN in Lyon called for a strike with only 2,300 Algerians on strike. Afterwards, the MNA declared that through these demonstrations the Algerians in Lyon had reaffirmed their loyalty to the MNA and to Messali Hadj. However, from January to February 1957, the FLN showed that it too could mobilize "plus de 70% des immigrés algériens" [more than 70% of Algerian immigrants], which posed a threat to the MNA (Atger, 111).

The MNA and the FLN in Lyons had bursts of action with the Café Wars, but that did nothing to substantially increase the MNA's membership base. In the surrounding area of Lyon, Messalists and MNA members grouped in the smaller cities and the MNA retained control in some of these areas until the end of the Algerian War. The MNA in Lyons was completely wiped out by the FLN. Its loss of power to the FLN and the police activities against the MNA led to the elimination of the MNA in France. After the end of the Algerian War, the MNA disappeared entirely from France and from Algeria.

The Tangible Action of the National Liberation Front

The National Liberation Front was created in November 1954 with the merging of several smaller nationalist groups, including the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien*[Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto], by the *Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action* [Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action]. The CRUA urged all the nationalist groups in Algeria to fight against France as an individual, united force, and within the first two years of the Algerian War, almost every nationalist organization had become part of the FLN, with the

exception of the Messalist groups, which joined the MNA under Messali Hadj's control. With its creation, the FLN declared, "the National Movement [had] reached its final phase of implementation" and that colonialism was its "sole obstinate and blind enemy [that had] always refused to grant the smallest freedom through peaceful means" (Aissaoui, "Fratricidal War" 228). Its main goal was to achieve independence, not autonomy like previous movements sought, for Algeria.

The FLN was the main organization leading the war on the Algerian side. It used the National Liberation Army, the ALN, which was the combative part of the FLN, to fight the French military during the Algerian War. The ALN fought using conventional warfare against the French army and using guerrilla warfare against the rival nationalist group, the MNA. The ALN's troops had bases in Algeria and some of its neighboring countries, Morocco and Tunisia. The conventional warfare of the ALN was stronger, but was less active than the guerrilla forces.

In France, the FLN had a separate organization, the French federation of the FLN, which worked specifically in metropolitan France during the Algerian War. The French federation projected the FLN's policies on the Algerian immigrant community in France. The FLN created the French federation "primarily in an attempt to win over Algerian workers from the MNA" (Hutchinson, 14). The main function of the French federation was to engage, mobilize, and organize Algerians workers in France (Hutchinson, 93). It was created in 1955 with the initial goal of eliminating the influence of the MNA, which had already established itself in metropolitan France in 1954, among the Algerian community in France, thus furthering the rivalry between the FLN and the MNA. In addition to influencing the Algerian community, the French federation worked on changing public opinion of French intellectuals and politicians.

The French federation was initially headed by Salah Louanchi, but in 1957 he was arrested and the federation was left without the head of the federation (Hamon and Rotman, 79). Afterwards, the federation started growing again, but slowly.

The French federation of the FLN was a key player for the independence movement that worked with the Jeanson Network. Because of the prior relationship between Colette Jeanson and Salah Louanchi, the head of the French federation, Francis Jeanson started collaborating with Louanchi and the French federation through the Jeanson Network. Under the ruling of Louanchi, the French federation's involvement with the Jeanson Network and the network itself had "no clandestine structure governing the group" (Ulloa, 156). That changed in the summer of 1957, when Omar Boudaoud took over as head of the FLN's French Federation. Boudaoud disagreed with how the network was being run. In particular, he condemned the way Francis Jeanson continued his public presence (Ulloa, 157). Additionally, his "mission was to breathe new life into the French federation," including making changes to the relationships between the French federation, the FLN, and the Jeanson Network (Ulloa, 157). Under the guidance of Boudaoud, the Jeanson Network became more structured than it was under Louanchi's leadership of the FLN. Because of the new structure, the network added members, some of whom had already been working with the FLN in France.

The French federation also provided money to help the Jeanson Network as it lacked the funds necessary to carry out its duties. Once channels to cross the French borders were established, the French federation bought more cars for the Jeanson Network to use to sneak Algerian members of the FLN across the Spanish border into France. For the Jeanson Network, "l'argent, c'est le principal 'travail'" [money was the main job] and it became almost like a

business while the FLN "[a conforté] son emprise politique" [strengthen its political power] over the Algerian community in France (Hamon and Rotman, 85). The French federation of the FLN played an important role in the FLN's relationship with the Jeanson Network as it was the main contributor of funds.

Another contribution of the Algerian community in France towards the Algerian independence movement was the task of fundraising, which was done entirely by the Algerians in France, not the French. French members of the independence movement were in charge of the bookkeeping, but that was only after the money had been collected (Ulloa, 158). The fundraising occurred at three different levels: by neighborhoods, by cities, and by regions. Algerians in France were obligated to pay the FLN, which was in charge of collecting the money. The amount they were forced to pay varied by their career: "Wage earners were required to pay 2,000 francs and merchants a percentage of their gross" (Ulloa, 158). In some cases, the money collectors used force to get the funds from people. After the money was collected, it was transported by the Jeanson Network "from Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Lyon to Paris," where it was counted by the network workers and stored in "apartments reserved solely for that use" (Ulloa, 158). In total, according to the war budget of the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne*[Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic] the French federation brought in a "few billion insubstantial francs" yearly, which made up just a small percentage of the annual war budget, without which, the war effort could have continued on "with identical means" (Ulloa, 159). However, had the Jeanson Network and the French federation of the FLN not contributed financially to the GPRA, it would have relied more on foreign countries that would impose their political ideologies on Algeria's growing government. Therefore, thanks to

the French federations and its work with the Jeanson Network, the GPRA and the FLN could maintain their "political independence" (Ulloa, 159).

In 1958, the FLN's French federation, after establishing the relationship with the Jeanson Network, and the FLN turned their attention towards a second front in metropolitan France. The goal of this second front was "to create a sense of insecurity" and to "raise consciousness" (Ulloa, 162-163). Unfortunately, this would consist of random terrorist acts, which, in the opinion of Francis Jeanson, would alienate other anti-colonialists. Boudaoud, after two days of deliberation, agreed with Jeanson's criticisms and the FLN decided there would not be random attacks on civilians. The French federation of the FLN continued its work with the Jeanson Network but turned its focus to its rivalry with the MNA and the Café Wars.

The *Organisation spéciale*, the Special Organization, was another part of the FLN that operated in metropolitan France. The OS started off as the clandestine armed wing of the MTLD, but over the course of the war, it led to the creation of the FLN. The OS "specialized in attacking the Parisian police" and conducted many attacks on Parisian police officers and stations and the French police was quick to retaliate against the OS (Fytton). In addition to attacking the police, the OS frequently attacked Harkis and the MNA in France. The OS attacked metro stations frequented by their targets by "[driving] past a station with guns blazing and [attempting] to throw grenades through the door" (Fytton). However, often their victims were not only their intended targets, but also civilian casualties in the Algerian areas around the metro stations, including children.

Café Wars and the Rivalry between the FLN and the MNA

In Algeria and in France, both the National Liberation Front and the National Algerian Movement fought frequently for control over the independence cause. Both of the organizations wanted to be the one leading and to be the embodiment of the movement and to be the sole representative of the Algerian people. Their similar ideologies only fueled the rivalry further. The struggle lasted throughout the Algerian War, and mainly affected the Algerian immigrant community and workforce in France. The MNA had established itself early on in metropolitan France, but their constant struggle led to the FLN gaining more popularity amongst the Algerian community in France.

Despite their shared goal of Algerian independence, the MNA's and the FLN's method of achieving that goal differed greatly. The organization of the FLN was made up of "elaborate and complex clandestine networks" and the organization used acts of violence in France and in Algeria to gain independence (Hutchinson, 12). The MNA on the other hand believed that the way to achieve Algerian liberation was through political action; they organized protests and strikes and they believed that "d'ouvrir sans tarder un dialogue franco-algérien" [to open without delay a French-Algerian dialogue] would put an end to the Algerian War (Stora, "La gangrene et l'oubli" 141). By doing this, the MNA argued, it acted as a "second front" and was "a way of keeping French police forces in France and away from the Algerian front" (Aissaoui, "Fratricidal War" 230). However, due to the public fashion of the MNA's actions, it was easier for French police to infiltrate the MNA and harder for it to publish and spread propaganda. This was not a problem for the secret organization of the FLN, which "continuously refined the system of control of the Algerian population… to create a closed-in universe," which was more difficult for the French police to infiltrate and allowed for easier publication and spread of their ideas (House

& MacMaster, 65). Additionally, the abundance of public demonstrations made for more repression by the French police.

The FLN's and the MNA's main method towards achieving Algerian independence may have differed, but on certain issues, they both acted in the same manner. The MNA's and the FLN's war efforts in France and in Algeria were funded largely by "voluntary or forced donations" from the Algerian immigrant community in France (Aissaoui, "Fratricidal War" 230). Additionally, both the FLN and the MNA, even though it was directly connected to and under the control of the FLN, praised the ALN and its fight in Algeria against the French Army. Both encouraged Algerians in France, who had finished their national service and were physically capable, to return to Algeria to join the ALN. Furthermore, both organizations imposed laws on the Algerian community in France, such as not allowing the selling or consuming of alcohol or not allowing Algerians in France to move without permission, and failure to comply with these rules or seeming to be pro-French resulted in consequences from the member's organization.

Initially, the rivalry between the FLN and the MNA resulted in both groups just attempting to convert members of the other group to join theirs, like distributing propaganda leaflets against the other group, but it soon escalated to doing whatever was necessary, even resorting to violence to "put [the other organization] out of action" (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 142-143). The FLN, for example, claimed that if the members of the MNA did not join the FLN, they "would be destroyed" (Aissaoui, "Fratricidal War" 234). They even frequently infiltrated USTA meetings and "[turned] them into groups controlled by the *Amicale générale des travailleurs algériens* [General Association of Algerian Workers], the FLN trade union in France" (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 142). Despite maintaining its power in

some parts of metropolitan France throughout 1956, by early 1957 “more than half of [the MNA’s] members had defected to the FLN” (Aissaoui, “Immigration and National Identity” 143). Nonetheless, the MNA maintained the rivalry. When conflicts arose between the FLN and the MNA in Algeria, they would be reflected in the actions by the two groups in France.

Part of the power struggle between the FLN and the MNA consisted of a series of terrorist attacks known as the Café Wars, which was “un des conflits armé les plus meurtriers que l’Europe occidental ait connu depuis la second guerre mondiale” [one of the most deadly armed conflicts that Western Europe knew since the second World War] (Atger, 107). Both groups committed the attacks, which were mainly bombings of and killings in cafés aimed at members of the opposite organization. Because the FLN and the MNA were both underground, the attacks appeared to the French population to be random terrorist or gang-related killings despite the political reasons behind each attack.

The Café Wars resulted in many casualties. Between 1956 and 1957, “1 musulman sur 80 vivant en France a été victime du terrorisme” [1 Muslim out of 80 living in France were victims of terrorism] from the MNA or the FLN (Stora, 143). Additionally, in 1957 alone, from January to May there was, on average, eight victims (killed and injured) daily. This number increased to 14 victims daily from May to August. There was a lull in the victims in September 1957, but it increased substantially in “octobre: 100 morts, 196 blessés; novembre: 127 morts, 271 blessés; décembre: 119 morts, 260 blessés” [October: 100 deaths, 196 injured; November: 127 deaths, 271 injured; and December: 119 deaths, 260 injured] (Stora, 143).

The importance of the cafés to the FLN and MNA rivalry was more than just being the targets of the attacks. Individuals affiliated with the MNA or the FLN not through another

individual, but through a café; if the café owner was a member of the MNA or the FLN, their patrons would most likely be members of the MNA or the FLN as well. The café owners acted as bankers for their Algerian patrons, and therefore, the owner's influence "could be decisive in determining the allegiance of his café's members" (Hutchinson, 45). The influence of the café owners on their patrons led to them collecting membership fees from the customers and made the owners "les principaux contributors du mouvement" [the principal contributors to the movement] (Atger, 111). Because of this, the French cafés in Algerian immigrant areas and in large cities affiliated with the FLN became important targets for the MNA and vice versa.

The MNA and the FLN were both underground organizations, but the French police believed the "internal war could only weaken the nationalist movement" so they considered the rivalry as an advantage for France (Aissaoui, "Immigration and National Identity" 143). Throughout the war, police actions against the FLN and the MNA increased, and with that, both groups became suspicious that it was the other group that turned them in to the French police, which only furthered hostilities between them. During the Algerian War, the French police arrested Algerian immigrants, closed Algerian businesses, and searched Algerians' homes during the middle of the night. The searches led to more arrests and confiscations of weapons and money from members of the FLN and the MNA. In November 1957 alone, 942 Algerians in metropolitan France were arrested, "1626 night searches were carried out," and "263 weapons and approximately nine and a half million francs" were seized (Aissaoui, "Fratricidal War" 235). The arrests took a large toll on the MNA in France. In April 1958, the MNA received "un coup fatal" [a fatal blow] after a series of arrests on members of the MNA in Lyon and the armed framework of the MNA had been shattered (Atger, 114). Between July and December 1958, the

existence of the MNA diminished until it was estimated that only "quelques dizaines des militants" [a few dozen militants] of the MNA were left by the end of 1958 (Atger, 114).

The Paris Massacre of October 1961

Before the massacre of October 1961, the French police force had been issuing stricter regulations on the Algerian community in France to cut back on attacks from the FLN and the MNA. In March 1958, the leader of the Parisian police force, Félix Gaillard, was removed from his position and Maurice Papon, who worked for the police under the Nazi-occupied Vichy government, took over as the head of the Paris police. As soon as he was promoted, he started "about the complex task of reviewing police procedure and operations against the FLN" within Paris (House & MacMaster, 61). The Organisation politico-administration, a subgroup of the army and police used to combat the FLN at the local level, had tremendous control over the Algerian immigrant community in Paris, and as time went on, the FLN began to have as much control over the same population. Within Paris alone, the FLN was very influential politically, due to the large amount of Algerian immigrants in Paris and its suburbs. Starting in August 1958, the FLN began its 'second front' in metropolitan France with attacks on French military and police.

Between June 1958 and late 1960, Papon initiated the 'Papon System,' a system created to further repress the Algerians in France. The 'Papon System' established a number of restrictions imposed on Algerians. The police then had the right to hold an Algerian under arrest for two weeks and the Interior Minister had been given the ability to "hold Algerians in detention camps without trial or to return them into the hands of the army in Algeria" (House &

MacMaster, 69). In order to obtain information about the FLN, the police sent out, seemingly ordinary, health and lodging inspectors with police officers of the *Service d'assistance technique aux Français musulmans d'Algérie* [Technical Support for French Muslims from Algeria], to "establish a census of each lodging house, and to chart the location of suspected groupings of FLN sympathizers or activists" and then the police targeted them (House & MacMaster, 72). The SAT-FMA also made Algerians go to Bureaux de renseignements spécialisés offices that promoted assistance, such as sending money home to family in Algeria and applying for state benefits; afterward, they would have to continue visiting the BRS offices to "renew identity cards, gain authorization to travel to Algeria or, in October 1961, to obtain passes to go to work during the night-time curfew" (House & MacMaster, 73). This was used to gain information about the Algerians in France to see if there were any connections between the individuals that came into the BRS offices and nationalist groups. When activities between the police and the FLN got more violent in 1960-1961, Papon created the Force de police auxiliaire, "a quasi military brigade of 'native' police modeled on the traditional auxiliary forces used by the colonial regime in Algeria," which was extremely violent and used "systematic terrorization of Algerian neighborhoods" and added "torture centers" (House & MacMaster, 77, 80). The FPA led to further repression of the Algerian people in France and was shut down in June 1961. The FPA was succeeded by the *Service action* and the *Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage*, which was equally violent and which was the police organization that addressed the massacre in October 1961.

On October 17, 1961, the French Federation of the FLN arranged a demonstration to protest to new restrictions, in particular the new curfew, imposed on Algerians in Paris and the

surrounding suburbs where Algerians lived. The protest started out as a peaceful boycott of the curfew and had the Algerian community walking major streets of Paris after the curfew. The Parisian police force, led by Papon, blocked access to Paris from the suburbs, raided various parts of the city, and arrested and detained not only Algerians, but Tunisians and Moroccans.

Despite the arrests, there were several thousand Algerians who continued the peaceful protest. Once they reached a police block, they turned around, until the police opened fire into the crowd. The police charged at the crowd, shot at, and beat the protestors. On several bridges, Algerians were thrown and herded into the Seine, where they drowned. The massacre resulted in many Algerian deaths, with numbers ranging from 30 to 200, while the French government admitted to around 40 deaths.

The massacre was planned and directed by Papon. Papon ordered the police to sabotage the demonstration and promised them immunity from prosecution for their actions. Immediately after the massacre, the police force claimed that only two Algerians were killed and "the left-leaning French newspaper Libération reported the official toll as two dead, several wounded and 7,500 arrests" (Hani). The number of casualties has increased since the end of the Algerian War; the Géronimi Report investigated the archives about the October 17th massacre and claims "a total of 246 Algerians… had suffered a violent death" (House & MacMaster, 107). In May 1998, the French government finally acknowledged the Paris Massacre of October 1961 for the first time, but still claimed there were a smaller number of Algerian deaths than what is now estimated. The Interior Minister commissioned the Mandelkern Report in October 1997 to figure out the number of deaths and found a "figure of several dozen Algerian deaths at least," which was still higher than any other official report (House & MacMaster, 312). On the 51st

anniversary of the massacre in 2012, French President François Hollande recognized the event and approximately 200 deaths that happened during the massacre.

The movements in favor of Algerian independence fought the war against the French army on the Algerian front and a war against each other on the French front. At the beginning of the war, the National Algerian Movement had more members and more support from Algerian workers in France than in Algeria, but due to their extreme hostility towards the National Liberation Front, they lost many members to the FLN and eventually lost the internal war within the two movements. At the end of the Algerian War, the FLN remained in power and continue to do so in today's political scene in Algeria. The legacy of the Algerian War and the FLN of the pre-independence era live on in Algeria today.

Conclusion: A Comparison of the Ideologies and Methods of French and Algerian Independence Movements in France

The Algerian War inspired many independence movements from Algerian nationalist and the French left. In France alone, there were many interactions between the Algerian and French groups in favor of Algerian independence. While in general, both the French and the Algerian groups had the main goal of obtaining an independent Algeria, each groups' ideologies and methods for achieving their goals differed. In my previous two chapters, I looked at the different groups working toward Algerian independence that functioned in France; I addressed the French intellectuals and left-wing parties and the Algerian nationalist parties, the MNA and the FLN. To conclude this, I will be examining the differences and similarities between the French independence movements and the Algerians in France independence movements.

Interdependence among French and Algerian Groups

It is practically impossible to separate French groups working towards Algerian independence from their Algerian counterparts. The French groups worked with the Algerian groups and vice versa. The combination of the joint effort between the two peoples was what made independence for Algeria possible. The Algerian groups could not have affected public opinion in the sure way that the French groups did and the French groups could not have been a driving force without the strong sense of nationalism the Algerians themselves had. Without the collaboration, Algerian independence would have been very difficult to achieve.

The MNA focused solely on the Algerian workers in France, but not the French people themselves. As I stated in the last chapter, the MNA worked mainly in political methods, such as organizing demonstrations and calling for strikes. The goal of these activities was to manipulate public opinion; however the MNA was not as successful in doing this as the French people that worked to change public opinion about the Algerian War.

Further, the French intellectuals did not work strictly amongst themselves. Some of the best examples of French intellectual and Algerian collaboration are the cases of Djamila Bouhired and Djamila Boupacha. The stories of both Bouhired and Boupacha put the use of torture by the French army in the public eye and helped change public opinion about the Algerian War and torture, which helped lead to the referendum for Algerian independence.

Similarly, it is impossible to talk about the Jeanson Network without talking about the French Federation of the FLN and vice versa. The two organizations are completely connected and interdependent on one another. Without the French Federation, the Jeanson Network would not have had the means to do all the work they did. Without the money from the French Federation, the Jeanson Network could not have purchased the cars it used to bring FLN agents into metropolitan France and transfer funds from Algeria to FLN members in France. Additionally, without the Jeanson Network, the French Federation of the FLN could not have transported their members, money, and illegal documents within metropolitan France. Both the Jeanson Network and the French Federation of the FLN relied heavily on each other to continue doing their jobs to achieve Algerian independence.

Finally, French and Algerian groups in France acted similarly in some aspects. Both Algerian nationalist organizations and French political groups organized demonstrations against

the war and the mistreatment of Algerians. The French government was against all groups, French and Algerian that attempted to help the Algerians and their cause during the Algerian War. Despite this, both continued to arrange political demonstrations against the Algerian War. The Paris massacre of 1961 and the massacre at Charonne metro station in 1962 were two of the most famous demonstrations because they both were forcibly shut down by the French police.

Differences in Ideologies within Groups for Algerian Independence

Although both the French and the Algerian groups that promoted independence had some similarities in their beliefs, not all of these groups sought Algerian independence. Most of the Algerian groups started off as just nationalist groups that wanted more autonomy from France and then evolved into groups wanting independence. Some of the French groups, like the French Communist Party early in the Algerian War and the members of the political right who were against the war for moral reasons, wanted to maintain France's image and "grandeur" as a colonial empire. Within the same group, individuals did not share the same opinion on Algerian independence and the ideology of the group was that of the group as a whole, not that of individual members.

For the French, some groups were not actually about independence at all, but an end to the war with an autonomous French Algeria. The French Communist Party was very obviously in favor of an autonomous Algeria, but not an independent Algeria. Throughout the Algerian War, the PCF spoke in favor of "liberty" for Algeria, but not for freedom. The PCF was against Algerian independence because "if Algeria became independent from France [it would] fall under the control of US imperialism," and then "it would strengthen imperialism on a world

scale. Therefore independence for Algeria was not seen as a desirable solution by the PCF" (Ulloa, 69). The party saw Algerian independence as a benefit for the United States and thus a detriment to the USSR and since the PCF viewed everything in relation to the Cold War conflict, they took this stance on the Algerian War. Despite this, the PCF advocated self-determination for individual countries, but "carefully reserved its judgment as to whether it should uphold separation itself" and therefore did not approve of separation of colonies (Ulloa, 68). The PCF's ideology shows that although it is an extreme left political party, it was not in favor of an independent and separate Algeria.

While the official French Communist Party's view on the Algerian War was that Algeria should not be independent, there was opposition to this opinion within the party. As I mentioned in the first chapter, the *oppositionnels* of the PCF's policies wanted independence for the Algerian people. They disagreed with the PCF's official ideology, but within the *oppositionnels*, there were differences in ideology as well. The members of the PCF who considered themselves *oppositionnels* aligned their views more with different communist parties outside of France, such as the Italian Communist Party, the Soviet Union, and Communist China.

The few members of the political right that participated in groups fighting for Algerian independence often did not want an independent Algeria. Raymond Aron acknowledged the problems in Algeria, but believed they affected not just Algeria, but the entire French empire. Aron recognized the need for an independent Algeria as well, because the cost of maintaining Algeria as a colony was too much for France and would require a great amount of force. He wanted to keep Algerian as a colony to therefore maintain the grandeur of France and its image as a colonial power, as he believed "France's identity was intimately bound up with her

worldwide possessions and influence" (Judt, 165). To many people, an independent Algeria was not wanted, but necessary.

The ideology of the intellectuals in France is even more diverse. The intellectuals were in fact against the war, but the vital job for them was to alter public opinion to show the atrocities of the war and to get the French public against the government's and the army's actions. Individually, the intellectuals worked more towards affecting public opinion. Like the cases with Simone de Beauvoir and Djamila Boupacha and Georges Arnaud and Djamila Bouhired, the intellectuals focused on exposing truths to the war that would turn the French public against the war. These cases show the importance of the opposition to torture in the French intellectuals' ideologies. In addition to the use of torture, the Manifesto of the 121 and its signatories expressed their solidarity with the Algerian people. They believed that the desire to be independent was just and therefore supported the Algerian revolution to gain their independence.

The ideologies of the different Algerian nationalist groups were practically the same. Both the FLN and the MNA wanted Algerian independence with no French interference, while some still argued for a French federation where Algeria had more autonomy, but was still considered French. This differed greatly from the French people's ideologies. The Algerian nationalist groups actively sought independence from France, while the French groups opposed the war for various reasons, such as the opposition of torture and the belief that colonialism was a form of oppression. Frantz Fanon described the differing ideologies between the French and the Algerians: "In contrast to the French intellectual… the Algerian people fought not against torture or 'the rape of Algerian girls,' but against French imperial domination tout court" (Surkis, 46).

Wars within the Algerian War

The Algerian War was made up of various types of activity. The actual combat fighting consisted of fighting between the ALN and the French in Algeria, and the café wars and the public opinion struggle in France. All of these were different in methods and in goals, but they all contributed to shaping the Algerian War, the achievement of independence, and the future state of Algeria.

The War between the Algerian Nationalist Groups:

As discussed in the previous chapter, the FLN and the MNA had a strong rivalry that led to violence in Algeria and in France. The café wars were vital to shaping the Algerian War. The MNA had a strong influential presence in France in the early years of the war. The café wars weakened the MNA's influence over the Algerian population and the FLN gained control in Algeria and in France. The FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which negotiated with the French government to pass the Évian Accords, which ended the Algerian War and led to Algerian independence. After the end of the war and the FLN took power in Algeria and established a one-party government, thus eliminating any power of the MNA that remained in Algeria after the War.

Public Opinion and the Algerian War:

The public opinion 'war' was taken on by the French intellectuals. As mentioned before, the Boupacha and Bouhired cases were used to manipulate French and international public

opinion by de Beauvoir and Arnaud. Another important work that affected public opinion was *La Question* by Henri Alleg. The cases of Bouhired and Boupacha show the mistreatment of Algerians by the army, but equally shocking was how the French army treated Frenchmen, as shown in *La Question*. The main response to the war that reflects the ideology of the intellectuals is the Manifesto of the 121. The manifesto mostly focuses on the mistreatment and use of torture by the French government and army towards those who either refused to fight against the Algerians or aided the Algerians and their cause. Without the French intellectuals, the Algerians' true stories of what was going on in the war zone would not have been as easily shared with the French public, and would not have had the impact on French public opinion as it did with the intellectuals' collaboration.

Both French and Algerians fought for Algerian independence. It is virtually impossible to separate the French groups from the Algerian groups because there was so much interconnectedness among them. In some cases, the ideologies and activities were different and in some cases, their ideologies and activities were similar. The Algerians could not alter French public opinion and the French could not organize the Algerian nationalists. Without the French to change public opinion and without the Algerians to work towards Algerian independence, independence would have been very difficult to obtain. By looking at the different groups in France that worked for Algerian independence, it is easier to understand the war on a larger scale. The Algerian War was not a conventional war like the World Wars and Algeria's long

history with France made the issue of independence much more complicated than in other decolonization scenarios.

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