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
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 610

SENIOR PROJECT

Kathleen Bacon

Argentina: Radical or Moderate Democracy?

Department *of* International Studies



Argentina: Radical or Moderate Democracy?

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I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

(Signature)

Approved by:

Professor Shannan Mattiace

Professor Barbara Riess

Professor Ian Binnington

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Abstract

In recent years, the presidencies of Latin America have experienced a significant shift to the left in terms of economic, social and political policy. As the left emerged it began to separate into two sections. Scholars have categorized these as the radical and moderate left. Clear cases of the radical left include Venezuela and Bolivia, while cases of the moderate left include Brazil and Chile. Argentina however, has not been clearly defined as a radical or moderate leftist government. The presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner represented the shift to the left in Argentina's government. While the Kirchners share a similar history and economic policy with that of moderate presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of Brazil, they also share several policy characteristics with the radical presidency of Evo Morales, of Bolivia. The Kirchners took a pragmatic view when dealing with radical and moderate democracies within the region. Rather than aligning with one ideology or the other, the Kirchners have chosen to align themselves with both sides in a way that is most advantageous to their country. While the classification of Latin American countries sometimes leads to a categorization of "good" and "bad" countries, these definitions are important in gaining insight into the policies of leftist democracies within the region.

Introduction

In recent years Latin America has experienced a shift to the left in presidential politics. This shift has come out of years of struggle to establish stable democracies and governments. The left has risen out of a need to change the status quo. Therefore, presidential candidates of the left have often come from middle class or minority backgrounds. Overall, the left seeks to maintain electoral democracy, remain open to foreign trade and enrich the lives of their citizens. However, as the left progressed it began to diverge. As the left diverged, scholars began to classify parties into two separate categories, the radical left and the moderate left. The parties of the radical left are defined as being relatively new to the political sphere with little to no organization.¹ These parties focus on the social welfare of citizens and strongly encourage the nationalization of large sectors of the economy. In contrast the parties of the moderate left are defined as having a long history with a strong organization and structure.² These parties focus on the economy of the nation ensuring prosperity through a market oriented framework.

Scholars have clearly defined several cases of the radical and moderate left. In general, Bolivia and Venezuela are defined as the clearest cases of the radical left, while Brazil and Chile are clear cases of the moderate left. However, Argentina is often left out of this classification or is said to be too ambiguous to classify. Through the examination of the radical and moderate left the following chapters seek to determine how Argentina corresponds to these classifications. Also, the relationship between Argentina, the region and the United States will be discussed in order to determine how the policies of Argentina affect its relationships with other countries.

First, the cases of Bolivia, radical left, and Brazil, moderate left, will be discussed to establish a set of characteristics for the radical and moderate left. This will be done through the examination of the economic, political and social policies of each country. Specifically, the policies of Evó Morales (Bolivia) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil) will be examined. While Lula (2003-2010) assumed the presidency before Morales (2006-present), both Morales and Lula represent the beginning of the shift to the left for their country. These two countries have been chosen as the case studies of the radical and moderate left as their presidencies represent a distinct shift to the left. The similar time period also allows for the examination of the policies through a similar historical lens. The policies of Bolivia and Brazil will explore the differences of economic, social and political policies within the radical and moderate left. These differences will then establish a set of characteristics to define the policies of the radical and moderate left.

Second, after defining the characteristics of the radical and moderate left, the case of Argentina will be examined. Argentina will be examined through the presidencies of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner. Similar to Morales and Lula, the Kirchners represent the beginning of the shift to the left within Argentina. The Kirchner presidencies will be examined together as they are a progression of the same policies. Although Néstor Kirchner did not seek reelection, the policies of his wife, Cristina, have taken the same path established during his presidency. The examination of the policies of the Kirchners will show how Argentina corresponds to the radical and moderate left.

Third, after establishing the policies of Argentina and where it lies within the left, the foreign policy of Argentina will be discussed. The examination of the foreign policy of Argentina will give insight into how Argentina interacts with its radical and moderate

counterparts. Also, the examination of Argentina's foreign policy will explore the how the classification of Argentina affects the relationship between the United States and Argentina.

The classification of Latin American democracies into the radical and moderate left has led to the establishment of "good" and "bad" democracies. While the moderate left is associated with being a "good" democracy, the radical left is associated with "bad" democracies. Through the examination of radical and moderate democracies, this paper shows that neither category is wholly "good" or "bad". Both the radical and moderate left have characteristics which are beneficial, as well as, detrimental to their countries. Rather than being a manner in which to separate countries into good or bad democracies, this classification should be used to better understand how the left has varied. The terms radical and moderate left describe two different paths leftist democracies have taken not two opposing sides.

Notes
Introduction

¹ Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid and Wendy Hunter, "The Policies and Performance of the Contestatory and Moderate Left" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid and Wendy Hunter, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.

² *Ibid.*, 1.

Chapter One: Radical vs. Moderate Left, the Cases of Bolivia and Brazil

Introduction

Latin America has a long history of struggle with democracy and creating stable governments. According to Arturo Valenzuela, between 1930 and 1980 the region underwent 277 changes of government, 104 of which took place through a military coup. However, from 1980 to 1990 only 7 changes took place through military intervention and the region has reached a place of moderate stability.¹ Recently political parties with leftist leanings have risen to the presidential level and gained increasing popularity. Approximately two-thirds of Latin America is currently governed by left-leaning presidents.² Scholars, such as Kurt Weyland, Diego Abente Brun and Jorge G. Castaneda, have begun to categorize these leftist parties into either the radical left or the moderate left. In *Leftist Governments in Latin America*, the differences are described as follows:

Whereas the moderate left is composed of older, more institutionalized parties with a relatively well-consolidated organizational apparatus, the contestatory [radical] left consists of younger, more fluid and personalistic movements that have not yet had time to develop organizational rules, cadres, and structures.³

Diego Abente Brun supports this description; he states that the radical left is more recent in appearance and has yet to form a stable institutionalized base, while describing the moderate left as having close historical ties to labor parties and being highly institutionalized.⁴ This is further supported by Jorge Castañeda, who describes the moderate left as open-minded, reformist, internationalist and originating from the hard-core left of the past and describes the radical left as being close-minded, nationalist, strident and born of Latin American populism.⁵ The moderate

left has moved into a mainstream and international political sphere, while the radical left fights against the mainstream.

In order to better examine the radical and moderate left, this chapter will focus on two cases, Bolivia and Brazil. These two countries have been examined by numerous scholars and most conclude that Bolivia is currently led by the radical left while Brazil is led by the moderate left. This analysis will focus on the presidencies of Evo Morales (2006-present) in Bolivia and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) in Brazil. By examining these two countries, a set of characteristics and qualities will be established. This will be done through the examination of social, economic and political policy of Bolivia and Brazil. The analysis of Bolivia and Brazil through scholars' opinions and country policies will be used to determine a definition and base set of characteristics. These definitions and characteristics will be used in the following chapter in determining where Argentina fits among moderate and radical democracies.

Brazil Background

The recently elected President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, is of the Worker's Party (PT) as was her predecessor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In order to give the most complete examination, this paper will focus on the period in which Lula was in the presidency (Jan 2003-Dec 2010) and the left first came to power.

The Partido dos Trabalhadores or the Workers' Party (PT) is one of the largest leftist parties in Latin America. Currently the PT (and the government of Brazil) is considered to be a part of the moderate left. According to Castañeda, Brazil is a good example of the moderate left as it emphasizes social policy within an orthodox market framework and originates from a reconstructed, formerly radical left.⁶ The PT was founded in 1980 and was formerly an

influential radical left party within Brazil. As a radical leftist party the PT focused on social programs and emphasized discipline, loyalty, and cohesion. Through its founding until the election of Lula in 2002 the PT remained a strong opposition party. However, when Lula came to power the PT began to lose many of the characteristics that had made it a more radical leftist party.

Before the assimilation of the PT into the mainstream political sphere, the PT held economic and political positions to the left of most other parties.⁷ From 1980 until 2002 the PT was largely in opposition to the government. The party called for less foreign control over the Brazilian economy as well as less involvement of the International Monetary Foundation (IMF). In addition, the PT strongly opposed the privatization of state enterprises and public services. According to Wendy Hunter, in a country of weak political parties the PT stood out as well organized and unified.⁸ The organization of the PT and its opposition to the Cardoso (Jan 1995-Dec 2002) government helped Lula to gain the presidency in 2002. However, the Lula government soon realized the necessity of continuing Cardoso's economic reforms in order to maintain a stable economy. By continuing these economic policies, Lula won the trust and praise of international investors.⁹ Lula and his party also made economic concessions in order to reach out to centrist and center-right voters. In contrast to the PT's original platform, Lula and his strategists agreed to abiding by the IMF agreement set by Cardoso as well as vowing to devote 3.75% of the Gross National Product (GNP) to pay off the interest on the foreign debt of Brazil.¹⁰ While these concessions may have gone against the original agenda of the PT, they have been essential to forming a coalition of parties within the Senate. Although Lula won the presidency, the PT was not the majority party. In forming a coalition of parties around an

economic agenda of solvency and market discipline, Lula attempted to gather a legislative majority.¹¹

The government of Lula focused much of its effort on foreign policy, within and outside the region. Lula actively diversified Brazil's export markets, mediated conflicts within the region and created political alliances with developing countries. Through this effort Lula strived to make Brazil a power within the region, while maintaining ties to the United States and key international organizations. Unlike other nations in the region, such as Argentina, Brazil has continued to work with the IMF in turning its economy around. In the first two years of Lula's presidency the public debt was reduced from 62% to 53% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹² President Lula's continued commitment to macroeconomic stability led to decreases in inflation while increasing the per capita income and growth rate of Brazil. Between 2003 and 2008 inflation was reduced to 6.9%, the growth rate increased by 4.1% and the per capita income increased by 2.7%.¹³ These are significant achievements when compared to the 14.9% inflation of the previous presidency.

While improving the economy of Brazil was the main focus of President Lula, he also positioned the country to become a more influential international actor. Brazil has become increasingly more assertive within Latin America and subsequently has assumed a more global role. According to Peter Hakim, in 2010 President Lula and his Turkish counterpart persuaded Iran "to shift a major part of its uranium enrichment program overseas-an objective that had previously eluded the US and other world powers."¹⁴ Brazil has not only become more active internationally but has also demonstrated its power within the region of Latin America. It sided against the US and Colombia when the two countries announced a military arrangement allowing the US to expand its access to Colombian military bases.¹⁵ Although Brazil and the US have had

a relatively cordial relationship, Brazil's assertion of power in the region has created tension between the two countries. Lula also sought to unify the region through the trade agreement of Mercado Comun del Cono Sur (Mercosur) and the more comprehensive agreement of Union de Naciones Suramericanas (Unasur). Mercosur is an economic trade agreement between four member states, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Also involved are associate members, which include Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Unasur is a more comprehensive agreement signed in 2008 which includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela. This alliance is a political integration of the countries and was founded in the manner of the European Union.

Already several characteristics of the moderate left, as defined by Weyland and Brun, can be seen. The current presidency in Brazil is backed by a party with a long history. The PT began as a strong leftist party and moved towards a more moderate approach. Also the PT is organized, unified and has stable institutions. These three characteristics directly correlate to the definition of the moderate left as being "composed of older, more institutionalized parties with a relatively well-consolidated organizational apparatus"¹⁶ In the following sections economic, social and political policy will be explored and compared with those of Bolivia.

Bolivia Background

In December 2005 Evo Morales won 53.7% of the popular vote in the Bolivian presidential election. This was the first time that an Aymaran peasant was elected as president and the first time a candidate reached the presidency without a congressional runoff. It was through the support of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) that Morales was successful in

winning the presidential election. Morales had formed the MAS ten years earlier and since its emergence it has spread from the rural countryside to the cities, becoming the dominant political party of Bolivia.¹⁷ In 2002, the MAS emerged as the principle force in fighting the existing neoliberal government.¹⁸ Although the MAS share many of the same goals with Brazil (PT), they are on two divergent paths. According to Santiago Anria, what makes the MAS and Morales different is the way in which political leadership has spawned from autonomous popular movements which have been organized from below.¹⁹ Rather than working within the existing framework or hierarchy the MAS originated from the poorest parts of Bolivia. The MAS formed in the Chapare region and expanded to become a powerful electoral coalition. One thing that makes the MAS more than a typical political party, such as the PT in Brazil, is that it exists both in the political institutional sphere and the social sphere.²⁰

When Evo Morales became president, he quickly nationalized natural gas and oil and established that the state would keep 82% of all revenue while the companies would keep the remaining 18% for production costs and to provide profit. Although existing companies were not expropriated, the state did claim ownership of all oil and natural gas extracted in Bolivia.²¹ The nationalization of hydrocarbons significantly increased the financial resources of the state. The increase in financial resources has allowed Morales to distribute more wealth through social programs. While the nationalization of hydrocarbons has seemed to create more resources for the poor, it goes against the guidelines of the IMF. According to Joseph Stiglitz, an economist at Columbia University, Bolivia did everything right by IMF standards, "they liberalized, they privatized and they felt the pain. Now it is 20 years and they're saying, 'When is the gain?'"²² The lack of results was one reason behind the formation of the MAS and the rise in popularity of Evo Morales.

Morales enjoyed popularity through his first term, and won a second term, in 2009, with sixty-four percent of the vote.²³ However, in the beginning of 2011 Morales' popularity began to decline. The short-term economic prosperity that was felt with the increase in taxes on oil and gas has begun to run out. While some believe that Bolivia has experienced a fiscal deficit since 2009 the Bolivian government did not officially forecast a fiscal deficit until 2011 (expected to be \$870 million).²⁴ In order to counteract this deficit the Morales government has attempted to remove subsidies on fuel. This was met with much violence; some believe that these actions caused a rupture between the MAS and Morales.

The history of the MAS shows characteristics distinctive of the radical left. The MAS is a fairly recent political movement that is centered on a highly dynamic leader, Evo Morales. Evo Morales, and the MAS, have little institutional experience and a more nationalistic approach. Looking back at the definitions of the radical left these three characteristics support each scholar's definition. Kurt Weyland described the radical left as being a younger and personalistic movement, Diego Abente Brun describes a party which is recent in appearance and without an institutional base and Jorge Castañeda describes it as being nationalistic.²⁵ The following sections further explore the economic, social and political policies of Bolivia and Brazil in order to fully determine the characteristics of the radical and moderate left.

Bolivia vs. Brazil: Economic, Social and Political Differences

In June 2006 the Bolivian government developed a National Development Plan (NDP). This plan outlined how the government would implement social, economic and political change in Bolivia. The NDP focuses largely on hydrocarbons and the way in which they could provide an opportunity for change. It states:

The proposal for change consists of: recovering state sovereignty over hydrocarbon resources, strengthening the state-owned hydrocarbons company as the key agent in the chain of production, granting the state the power to make decisions about production quantities and sale prices, defining new rules of the game through new contracts, and attracting new revenues for the Bolivian state.²⁶

The nationalization of the hydrocarbon market as well as the new tax on hydrocarbons has led to a significant increase in revenue for the Bolivian government. This rapid increase of revenue has allowed Bolivia to implement several reforms, and at least in the short run to be successful in positive societal and economic changes. From 1980 to 2007 Bolivia has achieved an overall rate of social change comparable to China. In terms of human development indicators, such as reducing infant mortality and extending life expectancy, Bolivia has seen more change than top achievers, such as China. This is an impressive feat, as Bolivia accomplished this with a significantly lower level of GDP per capita growth over time.²⁷

Contrary to the nationalistic approach of Morales, Lula worked with international entities, such as the IMF, in order to make changes within the country. During Lula's presidency the government dedicated its agenda to market reform and fiscal stability, surpassing the fiscal-surplus targets which were agreed upon with the IMF. These policies have established a stable economy and allowed the expansion of social programs. Although Brazil did not experience rapid growth to the economy or a severe reduction in poverty, many scholars believe that the gradual policies implemented by Lula will lead to a long term solution.

Social Policy

Lula and Morales both made significant changes in the social policy of their respective country. Due to his focus on economic stability, Lula has made more gradual changes to the social policy of Brazil. Morales, however, has used the revenues from Bolivia's hydrocarbon market to make rapid changes to Bolivian social policy and the reduction of poverty. While Morales has made significant changes in the short term, many scholars fear these will not last. In comparison, Lula's focus on market reform may allow for a long term solution to the reduction of poverty within Brazil.

At the end of Lula's first term, Brazil passed a pension reform bill. This bill addressed the deficits of the special pension system for government employees. The passage of the bill raised the minimum retirement age, reduced survivor benefits, limited benefit ceilings and called for taxes to be levied on pensions and benefits for the most affluent citizens.²⁸ While the bill was not as harsh on pension reform as wished for by the PT it addressed the need to even out income distribution. The Lula government also expanded upon the Bolsa Familia (Family Stipend), a program begun by the Cardoso government. The Bolsa Familia was set up to provide low-income families a minimum income, encourage them to enroll their children in school and help them to afford minimum health care. The program allows children to miss approximately 15 % of their classes with penalties. This is important as many families depend on the children during harvest season or to supplement the family income through work. The Bolsa Familia is regarded as a stunning success and is a popular model throughout the world. Since its expansion in 2003 the Bolsa Familia now covers 12.4 million households.²⁹ Brazil has experienced great success in the reduction of poverty, and the Bolsa Familia became an integral part of that. According to the Fundação Getulio Vargas, a university, "the number of Brazilians with incomes below US\$440 a

month has fallen more than 8% every year since 2003.”³⁰ Part of this reduction is due to the increase in minimum wage. However, a large part of this reduction is due to the Bolsa Familia program. The program compensates families for losing the income of their children. Meanwhile, the education that the children receive allows these families more opportunities in the future. In 2006 President Lula once again expanded the Bolsa Familia, increased minimum wage by 13% and made it easier for the poor to obtain bank loans.³¹ Although these reforms were enacted in large part to retain voters after scandals involving members of Lula’s political party, they affectively reduced poverty and inequality.

According to Weyland, the more gradual social policy strategy of the moderate left has produced substantial reductions in poverty.³² Brazil has been able to produce lasting progress in the reduction of poverty by creating a more long term foundation. This has been done through the stabilization of the economy and the political sphere. Between 2004 and 2007 the number of Brazilians benefitting from social programs more than doubled and in 2006 11.5 million households were included in social programs.³³ Although Brazil has not experienced the short term gains of Bolivia they are better poised to rectify imbalances between the businesses and consumers and spread the benefits more broadly.³⁴ A stable market will allow Brazil to continue to support these programs. The statistics show that while unemployment has dropped in Brazil from 9.6% in 2000 to 8.2% in 2009, Bolivia experienced an increase of 4.8% in 2000 to 5.2% in 2009.³⁵

With the revenue from its hydrocarbons, Bolivia has been able to finance several social programs. Two of the most noticeable are Bono Juancito Pinto and Renta Dignidad. Bono Juancito Pinto is a program similar to Bolsa Familia, it provides financial support to school-age children in order to increase school enrollment.³⁶ In November 2006 1.32 million children were a

part of the program, and in 2009 this number increased to 2 million. Each child receives 200 Bolivianos (US\$26) annually.³⁷ This stipend is used to offset the cost of books, transportation and uniforms. The Renta Dignidad is a program for retirement age citizens, which provides financial support to both those with retirement income and those without retirement income. For those who do receive retirement income, Renta Dignidad provides them with 1,800 Bolivianos (US\$240) per year. The citizens who do not receive retirement income are provided with 2,400 Bolivianos (US\$320) per year.¹

In Bolivia public infrastructure investment, such as the building of roads, has significantly increased; in 2005 about US\$629 million was spent. This number increased to US\$1.1 billion in 2007 and US\$1.9 billion in 2009.³⁸ However, while there has been a steady increase in public investment, social investment has declined. During this period, 2005-2009, social investment has dropped to less than thirty percent of total investments.³⁹ A simulation by Verónica Paz Arauco in 2008 established that, based on the current distribution of finances, the human development gap between the rich and the poor will increase until 2015.⁴⁰ Although Bolivia has made significant strides in reducing the poverty rates of the country, it faces a much bigger battle. So far Morales has fought poverty through the revenue created by nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector. However, as the following section will explain, this revenue may not

¹ According to Molina, the source of this financial support is highly controversial. Approximately US\$55.6 million is paid by the prefectures and US\$134.4 million is provided by the Treasury, municipalities, universities and capitalized enterprises.¹ Molina states, "The deduction of prefectural funds has been contested by civic committees and prefects, who argue it amounts to a 38 percent reduction in their IDH (Impuesto Directo de Hidrocarburos) [Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons] transfers, or about 8 percent of their total funds."¹ The IDH tax was initiated in 2005, and initially a large portion of the revenue went to sub national government's (prefectures) budgets. However, amendments to the distribution rules of IDH revenue have taken this money away from the prefectures and redirected it to finance programs such as Renta Dignidad.¹

last if changes are not made. Morales has greatly benefited from Bolivia's natural resources. How long this rapid changes and source of revenue will last remains to be seen.

Economic Policy

Bolivia and Brazil have fairly similar goals in regards to social policy. The major divergence was in the funding and the reach of these programs. However, in the area of economic policy Bolivia and Brazil have different goals and ideas. From the beginning, Morales sought to nationalize the hydrocarbon resources of Bolivia. Morales, and the MAS, have little regard for the IMF and trade agreements such as Mercosur². In comparison, Lula continued the economic policies of his predecessor. Lula maintained a market-oriented framework and expanded international exports. Also, Brazil has been an influential part of trade agreements such as Mercosur.

According to George Gray Molina, the nationalization and increase in the government take of hydrocarbon resources in Bolivia has both positive and negative aspects. The first positive effect is that these reforms have increased hydrocarbon prices and led to better negotiations with Argentina and Brazil; this raised the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Bolivia significantly.⁴¹ Second, this has increased the revenue that the government receives from hydrocarbons to US\$967 million in 2007, almost twice as much as what Bolivia received in total foreign aid.⁴² However, there have been at least three negative effects. First, the exportation of these resources has led to an increase in commodity prices of almost six times more in 2006 than the previous eight years. Second, the gas sector has become more uncertain in respect to new

² Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) is the economic trade agreement established by the Treaty of Ascunción in 1991. The member states include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Associate members include: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The goal of Mercosur is to unify South America in one economic trading bloc, and it is currently the fourth largest trading bloc in the world. Membership in Mercosur allows the states benefits of trade deals and debt relief.

investment. For example, Bolivia has been unable to fulfill existing contracts with both Brazil and Argentina. This increases the risk for foreign investors when investing in Bolivia. Third, Bolivia has focused closely on the regional market and largely ignored the importance of the international market. If Bolivia does not expand beyond its regional market it will be unable to compete against regional competitors.⁴³ This lack of competitiveness will cause a loss of revenue, which will eventually affect the social programs of the Morales government.

While Bolivia has experienced significant short term gains, President Lula has presided over steady and strong economic growth. This growth has decreased the levels of inflation and has helped to close the gap between the rich and poor. In his first two years in office Lula reduced public debt from sixty-two percent to fifty-three percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).⁴⁴ Although President Lula campaigned against the economic policies of the preceding presidency, he has since followed the economic guidelines set by former President Cardoso. By continuing the economic policies of Cardoso, President Lula was able to win the trust of investors and praise in international markets.⁴⁵ This has been important to sustaining and expanding the Brazilian economy; exports have become a key part of the Brazilian economy and without the trust of investors and international markets the economy would be unable to expand. According to Wendy Hunter and Timothy Power, Lula actively diversified Brazil's export markets while creating economic alliances within the region.⁴⁶ Also Lula was careful not to alienate the United States, which plays a large role in the IMF. This has allowed Brazil to create stronger international ties and gain more investors.

Creation of Mercosur was important to the economic policy of Brazil. The Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) is an economic and political agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, and Venezuela. It is the largest trading bloc in South America and seeks

to eliminate the obstacles of high tariffs, income inequalities or conflicting requirements for bringing products to market.⁴⁷ Not only does the agreement allow for the trading of goods but also for the flow of people from country to country. According to Katherine Hancy Wheeler, the goal of Mercosur is "to unify the Southern Cone and then all of South America in an economic bloc."⁴⁸ This unification would allow for greater trade security within the region. In addition to its full members, Mercosur has several associate members, one of which is Bolivia. Although Bolivia is being considered for full membership, President Evo Morales has been strongly critical of Mercosur. President Morales has said that Mercosur and other trade blocs do nothing to benefit the poor and are simply tools to benefit the wealthy.⁴⁹ This stance highlights Morales' preoccupation with the improving the lives of poor Bolivians. In contrast President Lula, and Brazil's active role in Mercosur, shows his concern for strengthening the economic power of Brazil.

Political Policy

In terms of political change, Bolivia and Brazil have two very different approaches and goals. The MAS, in Bolivia, seeks to eliminate the opposition and create a majority for itself. Through this majority, the MAS has changed the relationship between the state and the market, making the state the primary actor in economic development.⁵⁰ However, the PT, in Brazil, seeks to compromise and work with the opposition and existing majorities.

According to Molina, the MAS has dismantled grassroots civic movements and wishes to open the sphere of politics to areas in which it has a strong majority.⁵¹ Through these actions the MAS is attempting consolidate power. Through constitutional changes, Evo Morales and the MAS consolidated power in the presidency, and in some scholars opinions this has devalued

democratic procedures and weakened the public debate on policy issues.⁵² Instead of valuing the views of the opposition, the MAS has eliminated them. This creates a void within the political sphere as opposition voices are not being heard. The consolidation of power in the presidency and the MAS is consistent with radical democracies. Although scholars such as Molina view these actions a threat to democracy, other see it as a way to bring change to an impoverished nation. According to Nancy Postero, the new constitution passed in 2009 has granted autonomy to indigenous nations, recognized indigenous cultures, language, and customs, and institutionalized a far-reaching new land reform programs.⁵³ The Morales government made significant improvement in the lives of the indigenous people of Bolivia, who make up the majority of the population. Postero suggests that these changes are leading away from democracy but are “moving toward vernacularizing liberalism to make more democratic and more relevant to Bolivia’s indigenous populations.”⁵⁴ While some scholars view the constitutional assembly in 2006, and the subsequent constitution in 2009, as a power grab by the MAS, Postero argues that the MAS viewed this as a “revolutionary intervention.”⁵⁵ From the perspective of the MAS and Morales, the election of their party was an indication that the people wanted change and they were mandated to make that change. The MAS was making a grab for power but as a means to give power back to the majority of Bolivia.

Since the 2006 election the MAS have held the electoral majority; however, Morales presides over a highly polarized political landscape. The attempt to eliminate the opposition has created major rifts. Without the support of opposition parties Morales will likely find it hard to accelerate further change. Also the NDP, which focuses on the use of hydrocarbons to improve social initiatives, highlights the weak administrative capacity of the Morales government.⁵⁶ This

weak administrative capacity is another characteristic of radical democracies, which lack the organizational and much of the political experience of their moderate counterparts.

In his campaign President Lula and PT strategists reached out to center-right voters by agreeing to abide by the IMF agreement and vowing to devote 3.75% of the Gross National Product (GNP) to pay off the interest on Brazil's foreign debt.⁵⁷ This was an early sign of President Lula and the PT's interest in creating coalition and working with the opposition. According to Kurt Weyland, the moderate left has taken a more cautious approach in reforming existing institutions and prefers to negotiate changes with the opposition rather than impose them.⁵⁸ In order to create a majority, Lula sought out opposing parties. Instead of eliminating these parties Lula reached out and brought them to his side. This would indicate that Lula will be able to accomplish more within the government. Through compromise and acceptance of the opposition, Lula will gain more supporters within the Senate.

Radical vs. Moderate: Similarities and Differences

Brazil and Bolivia have taken two very different paths down the road to leftist democracy; however, they share a few characteristics and goals. Some aspects that the radical and moderate left share are maintaining electoral democracy, remaining open to foreign trade and investment and seeking to enrich the lives of their citizens through social programs.

While the governments of Brazil and Bolivia contain these similarities, they diverge in their policy course. According to Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, the clearest divergence of these countries is in their political strategy.⁵⁹ Brazil, part of the moderate left, has respected existing political institutions and seeks common ground with the opposition. Bolivia, part of the radical left, has tried to sweep away established framework and eliminate institutional bastions of

opposition.⁶⁰ Brazil's respect of existing political institutions and compromise with the opposition has resulted in an increase of the economy and the success of social programs. Through compromise with the opposition it seems that Brazil, and the PT, will have better success in the long term. However, Bolivia's contention for established framework and the opposition has created tension. This tension is sure to affect the future policy ambitions of President Morales.

Overall, the radical left has taken a more aggressive stance on economic, social and political issues. President Morales has increased state intervention in the economy, especially within the hydrocarbon sector, and has outlined more ambitious goals in both social policy and land reform. In comparison, the moderate left has remained within the bound of liberal democracy, maintaining a market-oriented framework. President Lula worked with the IMF in an effort to improve the Brazilian economy. He also focused on creating strong ties within the international community. Due to this commitment to liberal, representative democracy, there is far less need to concentrate political power as Lula does not intend to enact radical economic and social policies.⁶¹ Lula has gradually expanded the Bolsa Familia program and experienced great success in the reduction of poverty. Some scholars believe that this gradual progression of policies creates a better framework for long term stability and action within the country.

Another factor in the deviation of the two lefts is the background of each country. Brazil has been influenced by organizational, institutional and resource constraints.⁶² Moderate democracies, such as Brazil, have worked within the framework established and have used historical politics and policies to shape the left. However, the radical democracies, such as Bolivia, fought against these constraints and sought to establish a new framework.⁶³ The historical differences of Bolivia and Brazil have allowed for different opportunities. In Brazil the

old parties and institutions were strong which left little room for extreme radicalism. However, Bolivia had weak institutions and political parties which allowed for radical parties to gain power. In Bolivia, a decline of center-left political parties left a space for more radical parties to emerge. Bolivia also has a large indigenous population which was able to mobilize, creating the MAS. In Brazil there has been more consistency. The PT is a well established party. Due to its substantial history the PT has achieved a higher level of institutionalization than the MAS. The differences between these two parties are not only seen in their background and policies but also in their goals and successes within their respective governments.

Each country has found success in their policies; however, many scholars view the success of the radical left as being short term. The radical left, including Bolivia, enacted policies to rapidly change the social, economic and political landscapes of their country. Many of these initiatives have been based on the rise of the hydrocarbon sector. Bolivia has made significant changes in regards to its hydrocarbons sector, which although beneficial in the short term may prove to be unstable in the long run. The moderate left, represented by Brazil, has made gradual policy changes. These policy changes have focused mainly on expanding the economy through a market-oriented framework. The expansion of the economy has allowed for the increase in social funding as well as an increased role regionally and globally. The solid economic framework that Brazil created is thought to be more stable in the long run.

Conclusions

Bolivia and Brazil have two very different histories. Although the PT and the MAS come from the same historical left, therefore sharing many of the same goals, they have followed two different paths. The approach of Morales was to create rapid change and growth within Bolivia.

At the start of his presidency, Morales' main focus was the distribution of wealth to the poor. In this regard, Bolivia has experienced significant success. Morales has managed to reduce poverty at the same rate of a country with a much higher GDP. Lula however, took a much more gradual approach to the growth of Brazil. By continuing his predecessor's economic policies Lula broke away from the radical left. By meeting and exceeding IMF standards Lula has managed to significantly reduce inflation and the national debt of Brazil.

With these standards and definitions set, the following chapter will examine the social, economic and political policies of Argentina. By examining the policies of Argentina in comparison to the policies of Brazil and Bolivia set forth in Chapter One, Chapter Two will look to determine whether the presidency of Argentina is of the radical or moderate left.

Notes

Chapter One: Radical vs. Moderate Left, the Cases of Bolivia and Brazil

¹ Arturo Valenzuela, "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted" in *Latin America's Struggle for Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Diego Abente Brun (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 3.

² Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid and Wendy Hunter, "Introduction" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.

³ Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid and Wendy Hunter, "The Policies and Performance of the Contestatory and Moderate Left" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 144.

⁴ Diego Brun, "Introduction" in *Latin America's Struggle for Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Diego Abente Brun (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), x.

⁵ Jorge G. Castaneda "Latin America's Left Turn", *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 3 (2006): 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷ Wendy Hunter, "The Partido dos Trabalhadores: Still a Party of the Left?" in *Democratic Brazil Revisited*, ed. Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 19.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁹ Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power, "Lula's Brazil at Midterm", *Journal of Democracy* 16 no. 3, 131.

¹⁰ Lourdes Sola, "Politics, Markets, and Society in Brazil", in *Latin America's Struggle for Democracy* ed. Larry Diamond, Marc. F. Plattner and Diego Abente Brun (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 127.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 132-133.

¹² Hunter, "Lula's Brazil", 136.

¹³ Peter R. Kingstone and Aldo F. Ponce, "From Cardoso to Lula", in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 106.

¹⁴Peter Hakim, "US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict", *Inter-American Dialogue* (2010).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, "The Policies and Performance", 144.

¹⁷ Santiago Anria, "Bolivia's MAS: Between Party and Movement" in *Latin America's Left Turns*, ed. Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hershberg (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 101.

¹⁸ Anria, "Bolivia's MAS", 107.

¹⁹ Anria "Bolivia's MAS", 101.

²⁰ Anria "Bolivia's MAS", 104.

²¹ ---, *Bolivia: Transparency Snapshot*, Revenue Watch Institute
<http://www.revenuwatch.org/countries/latin-america/bolivia/transparency-snapshot>.

²² Joseph Stiglitz quoted in "Bolivia regrets IMF experiment" *New York Times*, December 14, 2005.

²³ ---, "Bolivia's Evo Morales: The Calle gets Restive" *Economist*, Mar. 3, 2011.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Weyland, Madrid and Hunter "The Policies and Performance", 144. ;Brun. "Introduction" x.; Castaneda "Latin America's Left Turn", 1.

²⁶ ---. Government of Bolivia, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (La Paz Bolivia: Ministry of Development Planning, 2006), quoted in George Gray Molina "The Challenge of Progressive Change under Evo Morales" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 65.

²⁷ George Gray Molina, "The Challenge of Progressive Change under Evo Morales" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 72.

²⁸ Hunter, "Partido", 27.

²⁹ ---, "How to get children out of jobs and into school." *Economist*, July 2010.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Sola, "Politics, Markets, and Society in Brazil", 134.

³² Kurt Weyland, "The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America", in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12.

³³ Sola, "Politics, Markets and Society in Brazil", 127.

³⁴ Weyland, "The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America", 23.

³⁵ ---. "2010 World Statistics Pocketbook Country Profile", United Nations
<http://unstats.un.org>.

³⁶ Molina, "The Challenge of Progressive Change", 66.

³⁷ Ibid., 67.

³⁸ Ibid., 67.

³⁹ Ibid., 67.

⁴⁰ Verónica Paz Arauco, *El Desafío Urgente: Actuar ante la Asimetría Departamental*. Documento de trabajo, Informe de Desarrollo Humano. (La Paz, Bolivia: PNUD, 2008) quoted in George Gray Molina, "The Challenge of Progressive Change under Evo Morales" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 67.

⁴¹ Molina, "The Challenge of Progressive Change", 66.

⁴² Ibid., 66.

⁴³ Ibid., 66.

⁴⁴ Hunter and Power, "Lula's Brazil at Midterm", 136.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 131.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 134.

⁴⁷ Stephanie Hanson and Joanna Klonsky, *Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc*, <http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762>

⁴⁸ Katherine Hancy Wheeler quoted in Stephanie Hanson and Joanna Klonsky, *Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc*. <http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-trade-bloc/p12762>

⁴⁹ Hanson and Klonsky, *Mercosur*.

⁵⁰ Nancy Postero, "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia", *Latin American Research Review* (2010):62.

⁵¹ Molina, "The Challenge of Progressive Change", 73.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 57.

⁵³ Postero, "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia", 62.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁵⁶ Molina, "The Challenge of Progressive Change", 65.

⁵⁷ Sola, "Politics, Markets, and Society in Brazil", 127.

⁵⁸ Weyland "The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America", 15.

⁵⁹ Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, "The Policies and Performance", 140.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁶² Weyland, "The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America", 17.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 17.

Chapter Two: the Case of Argentina

Introduction

Most scholars agree that Bolivia and Brazil are two solid cases of the radical and moderate left, respectively. However, many scholars have yet to classify the government of Argentina. For most scholars Argentina is an ambiguous case with characteristics that contradict one another. Like most countries in the region, the election of Néstor Kirchner ushered in a more left leaning political ideology. This continued with the election of his wife, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-present). While scholars maintain that the Kirchners are part of the movement to the left, they have been unable to agree on whether the Kirchners' administrations are part of either the radical or moderate left. The Kirchner governments in Argentina have maintained ties with both radical and moderate leftist democracies, leaving many to speculate about where Argentina fits among leftist democracies.

At the beginning of Néstor Kirchner's presidency it would seem that Argentina should be classified as a moderate leftist democracy. Néstor Kirchner came from an established and well-organized political party, one part of the definition of the moderate left. The Kirchner governments have pursued a market-oriented economic reform, collaborating with Brazil in the creation of Mercosur. However, the Kirchners have openly supported Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela, and a definite radical leader. In February 2007 Néstor Kirchner pledged to deepen ties with Venezuela, which his wife Cristina has continued.¹ The support of the Kirchners for Chávez would seem to indicate favorable policies towards radical democracy; however, while Argentina has focused on stopping neo-liberalism and providing benefits to the poor, it has not taken extreme measures like those of Chávez and Morales.

The following chapter will examine the history and policies of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner. Social, economic and political policies of the two governments will be examined and then compared to those of Bolivia and Brazil. The definitions and descriptions of the radical and moderate left examined in the first chapter will be used to determine where Argentina fits. The chapter will explore Argentina as a definition of a radical or moderate democracy. It will also explore the idea of Argentina as a hybrid of the two categories, with certain arenas more radical or moderate than others.

History of the Kirchners

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner recently won her second election and is the current President of Argentina. Cristina's time in office was preceded by that of her husband, Néstor Kirchner, who was president from May 2003 until December 2007.

Partido Justicialista (PJ), currently a left of center political party backs the presidency of Cristina, and the previous presidency of Néstor Kirchner. The PJ is the Peronist party, stemming from its foundation by Juan and Eva Peron in 1947, and possesses a stable electoral base with ties to grassroots and activist organizations. The PJ experienced several changes in political alignment: originally a populist party, the PJ became part of the neo-liberal right wing movement under President Carlos Menem (1989-1999). The election of Néstor Kirchner created a divide within the Peronist party, with the followers of Kirchner becoming the "Frente para la Victoria" (Front for the Victory).² Néstor Kirchner's platform envisioned a center-left political party based on the return of national popular politics of the earlier Peronist era.³ To achieve this, the Kirchners have balanced liberal economic policies with human rights measures and minimal welfare policies.⁴

Néstor Kirchner started as a governor of Santa Cruz before his predecessor, Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003), backed him in a campaign for the presidency. Although not well known at the national level, Néstor had substantial experience with combative politics at the provincial level.⁵ Once in office, Kirchner replaced the cabinet with loyal supporters creating an atmosphere that suppressed dissent.⁶ This effectively cut off the opposition and consolidated power in the presidency. This is a characteristic that both Néstor and Cristina have been criticized for.

While Néstor had little experience at the national level, Cristina lacked her husband's executive experience. Prior to her husband's presidency, Cristina had spent many years in the Senate but had never held an executive position. Many critics feared that Cristina was merely a puppet for her husband in order to continue the Kirchner regime. However, Néstor's death in October of 2010 removed part of this fear. Cristina's history of legislative experience and interest in foreign affairs while in the Senate led many to believe an improvement of diplomatic relations and institutions would follow.⁷ Néstor's hostile stance towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the renationalization of several private companies, led to increasing diplomatic isolation.⁸ This isolation was detrimental to investment and the international standing of Argentina. Foreign investors and countries such as the United States and Brazil, are hoping Cristina's foreign experience will reestablish ties to international bodies, such as the IMF. While this did not happen immediately, after losing financial support from Venezuela, due to the downturn of the economy, Cristina has once again opened up Argentina to the IMF.

The following section examines political, economic and social policy decisions of the Kirchner's. Once established, these policies will be compared with those of Bolivia and Brazil, in order to determine which decisions coincide with the policies of the radical and moderate left.

Political Policy

After years of corruption and military dictatorship, President Néstor Kirchner made several changes in the personnel of the judicial, military and law enforcement agencies. This was a key political policy of the Kirchner presidency which gained much recognition. However, the Kirchner governments have experienced criticism for the consolidation of presidential power.

The government of Néstor Kirchner made important changes in the judicial, military and law enforcement institutions. The overhaul of the Supreme Court was the most notable of these changes. In one of his first presidential acts, Néstor replaced the corrupt "automatic majority" of Supreme Court justices.⁹ The majority of the Supreme Court justices were followers of Carlos Menem, Néstor Kirchner's predecessor. These justices turned a blind eye to the injustices of the military dictatorship. They supported Carlos Menem's decision to pardon military commanders who had committed crimes during this period. This decision was deemed unconstitutional after Néstor Kirchner's election and the replacement of several Supreme Court justices. Menem's decision was subsequently repealed, and the amnesty previously granted to generals who participated in human rights crimes was taken away. By appointing a group of respected jurists to Supreme Court and removing the corruption of the Supreme Court, Néstor restored public trust in the government. In regards to the military and law enforcement, Néstor forced many top generals and police chiefs, with ties to abduction and torture of civilians during the dictatorship, into retirement. Néstor's efforts to rid the Supreme Court and law enforcement of corruption

helped to re-legitimize public institutions. This was achieved through providing a semblance of honesty, accountability and responsiveness to human rights concerns.¹⁰

Although Néstor removed the Supreme Court and military of many corrupt leaders, there is still work to be done. Removing officials from the top did not change the structure of the system that perpetuates corruption and crime. While Argentina has a strong set of democratic institutions, they are still weaker than the political and economic institutions of Brazil.¹¹ Néstor Kirchner made significant steps towards re-legitimizing the Supreme Court and law enforcement agencies; it is now Cristina's turn to continue this work.

In general, the Kirchners have received high marks for respecting political and civil liberties. According to Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland, the Kirchners have held free and fair elections, and respected the freedom of speech and association.¹² However, they have been criticized for excessively centralizing power.¹³ Many scholars have accused Néstor and Cristina Kirchner of concentrating power within the presidency. An example of this is the presidential decree in October 2009, made by Cristina Kirchner, which created the Asignación Universal por Hijos (AUH), a cash transfer program for families with school age children. While the AUH has been beneficial to reducing poverty, it was "criticized by opposition legislators for bypassing the parliamentary process and disallowing debate on alternative proposals."¹⁴ By implementing the AUH through presidential decree, the Kirchner government excluded opposition parties, many of which had concerns over the effectiveness of the program. This exclusion concentrates power in the presidency and discredits opposition voices, which are essential to the function of democracy. Recently, Cristina Kirchner has been criticized for her attempt to regulate the news. According to the *Economist*, after regaining the majority in Congress, the government "is pushing through a measure to regulate newsprint,

which arouses fear in newspapers that have been critical of the Kirchners.”¹⁵ These actions threaten the democratic institutions and legitimacy of the government.

James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer believe that Néstor promoted alliances that cut across party lines and social movements.¹⁶ They see this as a positive policy of the moderate left, in which the government works with the opposition, such as in Brazil. However, Nikolas Kozloff believes that through co-opting popular political leaders Néstor Kirchner diluted the independent strength of social movements.¹⁷ This was not a violent or aggressive elimination of the opposition, however; it was a form of eliminating the opposition instead of working with it.

While Néstor and Cristina have taken steps towards consolidation of power, much of the president's actions have been limited by the robust democratic institutions of Argentina.¹⁸ According to Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, this means that “elections are clean, civil liberties are broadly protected, and the military has withdrawn from politics.”¹⁹ While Néstor may have consolidated power in the presidency, this has been countered by the strong institutions in place. Also, the Kirchner government's superior record of civil liberties, as compared to predecessors, has greatly increased public trust in these institutions. The limitation of these strong institutions has stopped the Kirchner government from taking an authoritarian turn like some other leftist governments in the region.

Economic Policy

The economic policies of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner have focused on building agriculture exports. Through the increase of exports and strict regulation of imports, Argentina has experienced significant economic growth. However, economists fear this growth will not last.

Néstor Kirchner inherited an economy deep in financial crisis. In 2001, Argentina experienced a devastating financial loss. Unemployment rates reached 20%, large amounts of public spending were cut and interest rates rose severely. This crisis affected all sectors of the public and was a catalyst for the election of Néstor Kirchner. During Néstor Kirchner's presidency, the economy of Argentina experienced a 9% increase in Gross National Product (GNP). Due to favorable international conditions, foreign trade of agricultural and mineral exports significantly increased. Countries, such as Argentina, with primary source exports, including oil, grains and soybeans, experienced a greater economic increase (2000-2007).²⁰ The favorable conditions of agricultural exports were key to bringing Argentina out of the 2001 economic crisis. Néstor Kirchner's focus on building up industrial infrastructure was also essential, which Cristina has continued. Beginning with Néstor's presidency the Kirchner governments have encouraged local manufacturing. Between 2002 and 2004, industrial production increased 33% and then increased another 19% between 2004 and 2007.²¹ During this period, 2002-2007, unemployment decreased by 5.9%. Most significantly, between 2000 and 2005, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Argentina grew at a rate of 9.2%.²² However, this increase in capital remains with large enterprises at the top of the economic pyramid.²³

Argentina experienced significant economic growth since the Kirchner's took office; however, the concentration of economic power in the top has led to a deeper inequality between classes than any other Latin American country.²⁴ Unlike other leftist parties, the Kirchner governments been criticized for their lack of focus on the poor of Argentina. The economic decisions of the Kirchner governments have largely benefitted the middle and upper classes. According to Jill Hedges, "despite Kirchner's public pro-poor stance, in practice many of his policies were directly designed to favor middle classes, whose votes were more difficult to

obtain, and who valued a return to greater consumption opportunities after the dark post-2001 period.”²⁵ While other leftist parties, such as Bolivia, have used their economic gains to redistribute wealth, Argentina’s gains remain at the top of the economic structure. At the end of Néstor’s first year in office 51% of the population lived below the poverty line and the level of extreme poverty continued to increase.²⁶ It was not until 2009 that serious efforts were made to improve this imbalance. Similar to Brazil, Cristina Kirchner implemented a cash transfer program for school-age children and their families. While Argentina has seen improvement in poverty levels since Néstor’s term in office, there remains an unequal distribution of wealth.

According to Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid and Wendy Hunter, the Kirchner’s intervened significantly in the economy of Argentina.²⁷ This was done through a series of price controls on exports and products such as meat, milk, gas and electricity. To be fair, Argentina has been taxing farm exports since before Néstor Kirchner, a policy meant to raise revenue. However, the Kirchner’s have since used it as a way to justify the discouraging of commodity exports in favor of local manufacturing.²⁸ While these policies were helpful following the crisis and the period in which the cheap peso ensured competitiveness, inflation has since risen. The increase of inflation hurt Argentina’s competitiveness and the restrictions the government has imposed are deemed more “harmful” to the economic trade than any country, besides Russia, according to Global Trade Alert.²⁹ The continued international trade restrictions have decreased imports, creating an imbalance between exports and imports. It also raised the prices of several goods and decreased the production of previously exported goods.

Néstor Kirchner also renationalized several private companies, such as the national post office, water utilities and national airlines.³⁰ Furthermore, Néstor took steps to encourage greater government participation in the energy sector, with the creation of Energía Argentina Sociedad

Anónima (ENARSA). ENARSA was established in 2004 as a state energy company. However, it does not have a significant presence in the energy market of Argentina.³¹ The nationalization of the energy shows intervention of the states, a characteristic of the radical left.

While many observed Néstor's policy of "normal capitalism"¹ as leftist, James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer believe that this policy is leftist in a limited sense.³² The economic growth of Argentina after the 2001 crisis represents the change in the world economy rather than specific policies of Néstor Kirchner. According to Jill Hedges, the economic success of the Kirchner's is due to external conditions rather than policy. The government policies of the Kirchner's have been erratic and have done little to encourage investment.³³ Previously stated, the Kirchner governments encouraged local production while discouraging imports. They have also increased trade restrictions, creating a weak environment for foreign investors.

Although the Kirchner government complied with International Monetary Fund (IMF) commitments, it has largely kept the IMF at a distance. At the beginning of his term, Néstor negotiated an agreement with the IMF which limited the Fund's demand for a fiscal surplus to 3% for the rest of 2003. This means that in order for Argentina to receive support from the IMF the country had to show a budget that spends 3% less than they are bringing in. Also the government "refused to draw on its considerable foreign reserves to pay down the nearly \$3 billion in maturities that were due in September and freed itself of having to pay on \$21 billion in maturities due to the international financial institutions over the next three years."³⁴ After going into default, the Argentine government has maintained a distance from the IMF and practiced "heterodox" macroeconomic policies. According to J. Edgar Williams, "heterodox"

¹ An economic system in which the government does not have control over the market and there is a space for private ownership.

macroeconomic policies are “at odds with those recommended by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.”³⁵

The Néstor Kirchner government took a hostile stance towards the IMF, the United States and the United Kingdom, key investors and powers in the international economy. After paying off its debt to the IMF, Néstor Kirchner forced the IMF out of Argentina. Néstor sought to establish Argentina's independence from outside actors. Therefore, he renationalized several private companies in the hands of foreign investors and took a step away from the IMF, the US and the UK. This hostility increased diplomatic isolation and investor wariness.³⁶ The economic gains made through the increase in commodities' prices were temporary. This is why investors are crucial to building up an economy and creating capital. Without investors the economy will stagnate, which is why forming relationships with international economic groups is important. According to Jill Hedges, the freezing of tariffs and frequent shifts in policy towards investors “tended to deter the capacity investments needed.”³⁷ By working with the IMF and other international groups, countries show that they are interested in expanding their economy, a positive sign for foreign investors.

Recently, Cristina has adopted more conciliatory positions by reopening negotiations with Paris Club, an informal group of financial officials, to pay off defaulted debt and invited the IMF back into Argentina. This is a positive sign for foreign investors and the economy of Argentina.

Social Policy

The Kirchner governments focused mainly on the improvement of the economy and political policies. While the Kirchners have not ignored social policy, it remains relatively weak

compared to other leftist democracies. The cash transfer programs and the bureaucracy involved has received much criticism from educators and recipients.

According to Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, while the Kirchner government is considered left of center it has largely ignored social policies.³⁸ Jill Hedges agrees with this assessment, stating that despite the Kirchner's pro-poor stance, the policies of the government were designed mostly for the benefit of the middle class.³⁹ Unemployment has remained high and the divide between the rich and the poor has significantly increased.

According to a report published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the poorest 20% of the nation receive only 3% of the national revenue while the richest 20% of the nation receives 55% of the revenue.⁴⁰ This statistic indicates that there is a great inequality between the poor and the rich. It also confirms that the revenue created by the Kirchner's economic policies have remained within the top tier.

Although the Kirchner's policies have largely benefitted the middle class, there have been some beneficial social programs created. In 2009, through a presidential order, the Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH), a conditional cash transfer program, was implemented. This program provides school-age children, and their families, with money to encourage increased school attendance as well as vaccination of the children. The policy provides monthly payments up to \$180 per child of unemployed and informal workers. Eighty percent of this is paid out automatically while the other twenty is received when the parents provide documentation of vaccination. AUH is administered by the National Security Administration (ANSES) which reports a significant drop in poverty and indigence due to this program.⁴¹ In a report by the Universidad de la Plata, the AUH is called the "most transcendent social policy

decision in a long time.”⁴² While the program has boosted school attendance and helped to reduce poverty statistics, the problems of Argentina’s education infrastructure still remain.

Argentina’s schools are ill-equipped to receive such an influx of students. The resources provided to schools in poverty areas are insufficient and unequal to those received in middle and upper class areas. According to Mirta Petrocini, president of the Federation of Buenos Aires Educators (FEB), “the growing demand in matriculation is not reflected in a bigger budget or efficient management in order to resolve the daily problems seen in provincial schools.”⁴³ The schools do not have the resources to accommodate the influx of students, resulting in a lack of space and unsanitary conditions. These resources also include the quality of teacher. In more favorable zones 75% of the teachers receive a university degree; however, in the less favorable zones only 25% of the teachers received a university degree.⁴⁴ According to Ariel Fiszbein, there is a mechanism of discrimination based on nationality, social status and skin color within the Argentina education system.⁴⁵ This led to unequal distribution of resources and a continuing gap between the rich and the poor.

Another significant social policy has been the actions against the *piquetaro* movement. The *piquetaro* movement, which began in the 1990s, gives a voice to the workers of Argentina. *Piquetaros* influence social condition through picketing and marches. Signs, songs, strikes and marches are used to make disgruntled workers feelings felt. These protests can shut down transportation systems, such as the buses and subway, as well as streets. There is a very strong *piquetaro* presence in Argentina, especially in the capital of Buenos Aires, where they can often be seen closing down streets in protest. The movement attracted attention from the left for its tactics and after 2002 its numbers expanded.⁴⁶ At the beginning of Néstor Kirchner’s term, the administration avoided confronting or repressing the *piquetaros*. Instead, Néstor sought to divide

the movement through opposition of hard-line activists while pursuing dialogue with the more moderate activists.⁴⁷ Due to this pressure, the movement began to fragment and in 2006 some factions pledged political alliance to Néstor.⁴⁸ Although the Kirchner's have not openly suppressed workers, there remain questions about their loyalty to the advancement of the underclass.

According to P. Yakovlev, the Kirchner governments have seen insufficient improvement in the area of social poverty.⁴⁹ In order to resolve the inequality and poverty of Argentina the government must put more effort into its social programs. This can be seen with the recent implementation of the AUH; however, more work needs to be done.

Compared with Brazil

Similar to the left wing forces in Brazil, Argentina has been shaped by organizational, institutional, policy and resource constraints. The Kirchners and Lula both have backing from a well-established and organized political party. Also, each worked within the economic resources it was given, largely the exportation of agricultural goods.

From the examination of policies, Brazil and Argentina appear more similar in terms of social and economic policies. However, there are some discrepancies between the two. While Brazil has maintained good relations with the IMF and the United States, in order to obtain more recognition internationally and emerge as a leader in the region, Argentina is just beginning to let the IMF back into their economic policy. In the following chapter the intricate relationship between the United States and the region will show slightly strained relations between Argentina and the United States. Also, the government of Argentina has largely ignored social policy while

the government of Brazil has one of the most lauded social programs in the region, Bolsa Familia.

Brazil reduced inflation and built up the economy through a market-oriented framework. However, Argentina has continued to experience problems with inflation and has been routinely criticized for misreporting numbers.⁵⁰ Brazil maintained close ties to the United States and the IMF. Through these economic policy decisions, Brazil won the trust of investors and international markets. However, the Kirchners have followed “heterodox” macroeconomic policies. These policies put them at odds with the International Monetary Fund and other international investors.

In addition, Brazil was one of the founding members of Mercosur. Argentina is also a founding member of Mercosur and has seen significant economic growth during the Kirchner governments. While both Argentina and Brazil have seen great economic success, they have both faced increasing inequality. There remains a significant gap between the rich and the poor. However, each nation has seen noted improvement in the percentage of unemployment. Between 2000 and 2009 Brazil experienced a decrease in unemployment from 9.6% to 8.2%. Similarly, Argentina experienced a decrease of unemployment from 15% to 7.9%, between 2000 and 2009.⁵¹

The Lula government of Brazil addressed social issues through several initiatives. The most successful of these initiatives is the Bolsa Familia. The Bolsa Familia has been credited with significantly decreasing poverty and bridging the gap between the rich and the poor. Similarly, Argentina implemented the Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH), which the

government has credited with significantly decreasing poverty rates. However, Argentina has been criticized for a lack of significant social programs or policy.

Compared with Bolivia

As stated in chapter one, radical leftist parties are comprised of more recent, less organized and more personalistic movements. President Evo Morales of Bolivia created the MAS less than twenty years ago through charisma and hard work. The Morales government focused on the nationalization of the economy and a buildup of social programs. While Morales maintains electoral democracy, he has been criticized for consolidating power within the presidency.

In comparison, the PT is a well-established political party with a long history in Argentina. While Néstor and Cristina Kirchner are both charismatic leaders, they have largely focused on rebuilding the economy of Argentina. Also, the Kirchners have failed to emphasize social programs in a way that is characteristic of the radical left.

The nationalization of Bolivia's hydrocarbon sector was a key economic policy. This policy set it apart from Brazil, which maintained a market-oriented framework. Similar to Bolivia, the Kirchner government renationalized the energy sector and private pensions. This was seen by scholars as a significant intervention of the state. It is also a characteristic of the radical left. Although the Kirchners renationalized several economic sectors, they also maintained a space for private investments and companies. They joined Brazil in the creation of Mercosur, while Bolivia is only an associate member.

The Morales government has made many radical and seemingly successful changes to the social policy of Bolivia. While Brazil and Argentina have largely focused on the build-up of the

economy, Bolivia has used the boom in commodity prices to provide social initiatives such as the Bono Juancito Pinto and the Renta Dignidad. Bolivia spent 6.9% of its GDP on education, while Brazil and Argentina spent only 5.1% and 4.9% respectively.⁵² Although Argentina has begun to improve social policy, with initiatives such as the Asignación Universal por Hijo, these policies are not as dramatic as those of Bolivia. A significant amount of Bolivia's resources have been budgeted to social improvement programs. However, the majority of Argentina's wealth remains with the upper class.

Another important aspect of Morales' government is the focus on the poor and indigenous, as these groups are the base of his power. In contrast, the Kirchner governments have focused on obtaining the vote of the middle class. Therefore, the Kirchner government does not have the radical focus on social policy that is a characteristic of the radical left. Until recently, the Kirchner governments ignored social policy in some respects, leading to greater inequality. After assuming the presidency, Néstor Kirchner focused on rebuilding the economy of Argentina and asserting the country's independence. This meant a lack of social welfare programs. Cristina Kirchner followed this legacy and only recently, as Argentina has pulled out of the 2001 economic crisis, has she begun to put greater focus on social programs.

The Morales and Kirchner governments begin to converge in their political policies. Both Morales and the Kirchners have been criticized for consolidating power within the presidency and dismantling the opposition. The Kirchners have consolidated power through the appointment of loyal and unquestioning supporters as well as passing presidential decrees, such as the Asignación Universal por Hijo. However, the strong institutions of Argentina have held this consolidation in check. While the Kirchners have not completely shut down the opposition, they have co-opted opposition leaders. This tactic creates a void where the opposition voices and

opinions should be in a democratic government. Also, the Kirchners have maintained ties with many radical democracies in the region, including Bolivia.

While the Kirchner government may not share all the same characteristics as Bolivia, there are a significant number of similarities. The Kirchner governments' social policy is clearly not a shared characteristic between Bolivia and Argentina. However, there are many similarities in the economic and political policies. Both have nationalized their energy sectors, although, Argentina remains more open to a market-oriented framework, and they have both consolidated power within the presidency.

Conclusions

The governments of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner are hard to classify since they have evolved over time and adopted characteristics of both radical Bolivia and moderate Brazil. In terms of social policy the Kirchner government is far away from the policies of Bolivia. However, the economic and political policies of the Kirchner governments share several characteristics of radical Bolivia.

Overall, the Morales government took an aggressive social and political stance while the Lula and Kirchner governments made gradual policy progression. Argentina, like Brazil, has focused on strengthening the economy; however, this has come at the cost of the social welfare of the nation. While the Kirchners have made significant improvements in social welfare, many criticize Argentina for the lack of focus upon social programs and question their effectiveness. In contrast, the Bolsa Familia cash transfer program of Brazil has lauded as one of the most successful social programs in the world. The social policy of Argentina still needs significant

improvement in order to be viewed as leftist social policy. However, it seems that the Kirchner government is taking the route of moderate Brazil rather than radical Bolivia.

Also, as stated in Chapter One, the moderate left is made up of well-established and organized political parties. The current party in power developed from the PJ, a long established and well organized political party in Argentina. The PJ was established in the 1940's and experienced significant ideological changes while in office. This history is not unlike that of the PT in Brazil. The PT was a well-established party with a long history that once in power began to change. These established institutions and history have tempered the effects of presidential consolidation, ensuring that Argentina does not take an authoritarian turn. However, without these restraints the political policy of the Kirchners would look similar to that of Morales in Bolivia.

The economic policy of the Kirchners can be viewed as a mix of radical Bolivia and moderate Brazil. Argentina has sought to expand its economy, like Brazil, through an open market. However, the Kirchners have also taken steps, such as the renationalization of the energy sector and the eviction of the IMF in Argentine economic matters, which align with the radical left.

It is easy to see why many scholars consider Argentina an ambiguous case in the definition of radical and moderate leftist democracies. Rather than aligning with one or the other, the Kirchner governments of Argentina are a mix of the two. Argentina has gradually shifted more towards the left. The government first began to take on leftist leanings with Néstor Kirchner. These have progressed to a place where Argentina can definitively be defined as part of the Latin American left. The left can be defined as maintaining electoral democracy,

remaining open to foreign trade and investment and seeking to enrich lives through social programs. While the Kirchner governments have maintained electoral democracy and remained open to foreign trade and investment, they have largely ignored social programs. This has begun to change with Cristina Kirchner. Just as the PJ evolved into a leftist party, the Argentine government continues to evolve as a leftist democracy. However, the government has yet to align with one group or the other. As Cristina Kirchner continues in government it will be interesting to see if Argentina progresses down the leftist path towards a more radical or moderate government.

In the following section the observations made in Chapter Two will be used to determine the effect Argentina as a leftist democracy will have in the region. Argentina currently has ties to several radical and moderate democracies. Chapter Three will examine how these relationships may change as the leftist government of Argentina evolves.

Notes
Chapter Two: the Case of Argentina

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³ James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *What's Left in Latin America* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 58.

⁴ Petras and Veltmeyer, *What's Left in Latin America*, 58.

⁵ Hedges, *Argentina a Modern History*, 282.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 286.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 283.

⁹ Petras and Veltmeyer, *What's Left in Latin America*, 57.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 57.

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¹⁴ Kyle Younker, "Asignación Universal por Hijo, One Year Later", *The Argentina Independent*, October 12, 2010,
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¹⁷ Nikolas Kozloff, *Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 182.

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²¹ Ibid., 60.

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²⁵ Hedges, *Argentina*, 284.

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³⁰ Kozloff, *Revolution!*, 40.

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⁴⁸ Ibid., 174.

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Chapter Three: Foreign and Regional Relations

Introduction

The foreign policy of the Néstor and Cristina Kirchner administrations focuses on how its actions will most benefit the country domestically. According to Andrés Malamud, the main objectives of the Kirchners' foreign policy have been to elicit electoral support and to obtain financial assistance abroad.¹ Néstor Kirchner inherited a country deep in economic crisis and in the midst of political change. Since election, the Kirchners sought to reestablish and strengthen the economic and political foundations of Argentina. In restructuring the economic, political, and social policies of Argentina, the Kirchners have adopted policies of both the moderate and radical left. As the Kirchner administrations gradually shifted to the left, the relationship between regional and international actors has changed. In order to achieve the stabilization of the economy and politics, the Kirchners sought support from both moderate and radical democracies, as well as from international actors.

The main concern of the Kirchner governments has been the political and economic advancement of Argentina. Therefore, they have sought support from both moderate Brazil and radical Venezuela. They have also maintained ties with the United States. Instead of limiting themselves to countries with ideological similarities, the Kirchners have sought support from whoever is willing to give it. According to Andrés Malamud, "the Kirchner's foreign policy can be uncontroversially depicted as personalist, based on short term planning, and principally pragmatic rather than ideological".² This has led to an often contradictory and erratic foreign policy.

This chapter will seek to examine how the policies put forth in Chapter Two affect the interaction of Argentina with both regional and international actors. Argentina interacts with

three main countries: Brazil (moderate democracy), Venezuela (radical democracy) and the United States (liberal democracy).³ Chapter Three will explore how the policies adopted by the Kirchners affected their diplomacy with these three countries and others within the region.

Relationship of Argentina and Moderate Democracies (Brazil)

The geographical proximity of Brazil has made it both an ally and a rival of Argentina. The Kirchners worked closely with President Lula da Silva and continue to work with his successor. While their proximity has led to beneficial alliances, such as Mercosur, it has also pushed—Argentina—towards—the—radical—democracy—of—Venezuela. However, the Kirchner administration has also sought to undermine the influence of Brazil within the region.

According to Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Brazil is viewed as an indispensable ally that expands the national autonomy and international negotiation capacity of Argentina.⁴ Brazil expands Argentina's international negotiation capacity through ties to the US and the IMF. Investors are confident in the economic policies of Brazil; therefore, an alliance of Brazil with Argentina increases investors' confidence in Argentina. The agreements and alliance of Brazil and Argentina through Mercosur have opened up trade between the countries. Mercosur allows for free trade between the member states, which include Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Brazil is one of the more dominant forces within Mercosur, having the largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the member states. According to Katherine Hancy Wheeler, union of these countries into a trading bloc gives them more trading security.⁵

A point of contention between Argentina and Brazil has been the ambition of Brazil to become a leader regionally and internationally. According to Riordan Roett, while Brazil has risen, Argentina's regional and international profile "has diminished dramatically".⁶ Brazil's

greater interest, with the election of Lula in 2003, in expanding internationally has led to the focus of international attention on Brazil. To prove its viability as an international actor, Brazil has sought a closer relationship with international actors and asserted its dominance within the region. President Lula was careful not to alienate the United States and key international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Lula worked with the IMF and maintained a distance from Néstor Kirchner, whose policies opposed the presence of the IMF within Argentina.⁷ This distance from the more radical economic policies of Argentina opened a space for Venezuela to ally itself with Argentina. According to Andrés Malamud, when Brazil begins to hint at affirming itself as either a regional or global power, the Kirchner's foreign policy moves closer to the US or Venezuela.⁸ In order to counter Brazil's ambitions of dominance in the region, the Kirchner administrations have found it pragmatic to form alliances with these two countries. However, the Kirchners have also grown closer to Hugo Chávez as the US has increasingly deferred to Brazil.

Not only is the Kirchner administration threatened by Brazil's ambition but Brazil is also Argentina's principal geopolitical rival and threatens the security and territorial integrity of Argentina.⁹ This rivalry is another reason for Argentina's alliance with Venezuela. With the support of Venezuela, Argentina has been able to counter Brazil's claims to leadership within the region. Also, the Kirchners have received a greater amount of support, politically and economically, from Venezuela than Brazil. Due to Brazil's ambitions in becoming an international leader, the Brazilian government has been restrained in its support of radical democracies and policies, such as Néstor Kirchner's expulsion of the IMF. Meanwhile, Venezuela has largely disregarded international expectations and specifically sought out allies, such as the Kirchners, within the region. Chávez's disregard, and disdain, for international actors

has allowed Argentina to receive greater financial benefits. In 2009, Chávez “declared that Venezuela is ready to supply Argentina with oil and later liquefied gas for the next 100 years.”¹⁰ The Kirchners, being pragmatic in their foreign policy outlook, readily accepted the aid and support of Venezuela.

Although Brazil has received increasing international attention it “has failed to command a strong following in its own backyard”.¹¹ This is due in part to being seen as a “peace-loving, law-abiding and benign” force.¹² Although Brazil has the largest defense budget in the region, it has no intention of becoming a military power. This limits the government in enforcing its presence within the region. The other nations in the region do not see Brazil as an enforcer; therefore they do not see the need to follow Brazil. Also while Brazil has the largest economy in Latin America, with a GDP of US\$1,571,960 (trillion), it is outperformed by several of its neighbors through human development indicators and GDP per capita.¹³ The countries in the region, including Argentina, have publicly opposed Brazil’s global ambitions. In 2004, Brazil attempted to win a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. However, Argentina severely opposed these efforts, infuriating Lula.¹⁴ While the administrations of Brazil and Argentina remain allies, they are also in serious competition with each other, as evidenced above.

Brazil’s foreign policy seeks to expand the country’s influence both regionally, and internationally. According to Michael Reid, “under Lula, Brazil became less discreet in proclaiming its ambition to be seen as a regional leader and global player.”¹⁵ This ambition has hindered the relationship between Argentina and Brazil. International actors, such as the United

States and IMF, have had more influence on the policies of Lula than those of the Kirchners.¹ Lula focused on foreign policy to further the ambitions of Brazil internationally. However, the Kirchner administration has focused on using foreign policy to solve domestic issues rather than catering to international actors.¹⁶ Despite these differences, the Kirchner administration continues to work with the government of Brazil.

Relationship of Argentina and Radical Democracies (Venezuela and Bolivia)

The Kirchner administration has also maintained strong ties with the radical democracies within the region, specifically Venezuela. These relationships are used to benefit Argentina domestically but are also used to counter the emergence of Brazil as a leader within the region. Venezuela has provided significant economic and political support to the Kirchner administration and in return has found a strong ally within the region.

According to José Briceño Ruiz and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, Kirchner began a strategic alliance with Venezuela in order to balance the emergence of Brazil as a leader.¹⁷ This alliance was also strategically advantageous to Venezuela. While Chávez and Lula put on a public show of solidarity, the political and economic policies of the radical and moderate democracies are clearly different. Due to these differences Chávez did not find a true ally in Lula and therefore, turned to the Kirchners for support.¹⁸

The Kirchner administrations have routinely relied on the support of Chávez. The more radical aspects of the Kirchners' economic policy have allowed for a closer relationship between the two countries. According to Nikolas Kozloff, Chávez's opinions in the area of energy resources carry significant weight in Argentina.¹⁹ During the 2001 economic crisis, the Kirchner

¹ According to Nikolas Kozloff, Brazilians are culturally oriented towards the US, learning English instead of Spanish, rather than their Latin American neighbor, Argentina.

administration turned to Venezuela, as it was the only country that would buy Argentine state bonds.²⁰ The Kirchners had turned to the US for economic support. However, the Bush administration “was accused of being unhelpful when Argentina’s economy collapsed.”²¹ This early support led Venezuela to become Argentina’s most significant financial supporter. In 2007, the Venezuelan government purchased US\$4,250 million in Argentina debt bonds.²² Venezuela not only supports Argentina financially but numerous trade agreements have been made between the two countries. Of the international agreements the Kirchners have signed 28% have been with Venezuela, which account for 45% of the agreements Argentina has made within the region.²³ Hugo Chávez has become a significant ally to the Kirchners economically.

Although Argentina has grown closer to Venezuela since the Kirchner administrations, Argentina has not become a client state of Hugo Chávez. According to Andrés Malamud, the closeness of Chávez and the Kirchners has more to do with the mutual benefits rather than ideological proximity.²⁴ This is quite different from the relationship between Bolivia and Venezuela. The natural resources and economy of Venezuela have allowed it to become the major radical democracy within the region. As such, Hugo Chávez extended generous amounts of financial support to smaller radical democracies, client states, within the region. Bolivia is an example of such a client state. Although Bolivia has benefitted from its natural resources, the economy remains far below that of Argentina or Venezuela. Similar to Argentina, Bolivia has received significant financial aid from Venezuela. However, due to the size and relative lack of wealth, Bolivia is not seen as a partner but rather a follower. While Hugo Chávez expects support from Evo Morales, which he has routinely given, this support is not as significant as that of the Kirchners. The Kirchners’ unique policy positions and the prestige of their country allow

them more weight within the region. This makes them a significant partner and ally to Chávez rather than a follower.

The Kirchners' mix of policies has allowed them to form a solid relationship with the radical democracies of the region. This is due in part to the pragmatic nature of the Kirchners foreign policy. While the Kirchner administration may not hold all the same ideals as Chávez or Morales, they are able to work with them in order to greater benefit their country.

Relationship of the United States and Argentina

In previous decades the United States had a significant hold on the region. However, through the changing priorities of the US and the shift to the left of the democracies of Latin America this hold has lessened. The US is no longer able to dictate or impose policy through the IMF and World Bank, as it did in the 1980s and 1990s.²⁵ As the countries, such as Argentina and Bolivia, have removed the IMF from their economic policy, the US influence in the IMF has little impact on the economic policies of these countries. Also, the US foreign policy shift of focus to the Middle East has allowed the governments of Latin America to establish their own set of policies. As stated by James Petras:

The ability of President Chávez to confront and oppose the US economic and political power would have been more constrained had the US been more fully engaged in the region, even without the economic power of oil and of US dependence on it.²⁶

The disengagement of the United States within the region has also allowed for the economy of these countries to expand on its own. This means that the financial crisis of the US has had less effect on Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil than it previously would have. As stated above, this is

largely due to Néstor Kirchner forcing out of the IMF and, in the case of Argentina, the uncoupling of the peso from the dollar.

In regards to Argentina and the Kirchner administration, there has been a significant shift in the relationship with the US. Prior to the Kirchners, the Argentine government fostered a relatively close relationship with the US. The US supported the government throughout several autocratic governments. In return, the Argentine government closely followed the policies set forth by the US and the IMF. However, the Kirchners have sought to break away from the US influence. Not only has there been a decoupling of the economies but also a decrease in military collaboration between the United States and Argentina. This has been a departure for the countries, which have a history of military support.²⁷ This shift away from the US is due to the Kirchners suspending the policy of automatic alignment and instead focusing on closer ties to other Latin American countries.²⁸ Similar to many of the leftist democracies in Latin America, Argentina has focused its foreign policy on building relationships with its neighbors. Through the formation of Mercosur and Unasur, the US has been cut out of economic and political agreements within Latin America. Specifically, the formation of Mercosur, of which the Kirchners were founding members, has blocked the creation of a free trade agreement between Latin America and the US.

Although the Kirchners lessened Argentina's ties with the US, the relationship has not been completely severed. While there has been a decrease in military collaboration since the election of the Kirchners, the US continues to provide Argentina with military equipment.²⁹ The Kirchner administrations and the US government have also collaborated in several areas. The Kirchners and the US government have come together are international trade and support in negotiations as well as international security, specifically in regards to Iran.³⁰ Once again the

Kirchners are pragmatic in their foreign policy outlook. They form alliances where they believe Argentina will receive the most benefit.

Due to the July 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, in which Iran played a role, the Kirchners have supported the US against Iran. Unlike some radical democracies, the Kirchners have been able to maintain bilateral relations due to the shared interest of bringing Iranian-sponsored terrorist to justice.³¹ This position is in opposition to most other Latin American countries, including Brazil and Venezuela. According to Andrés Malamud,

“it is perhaps the only issue in which Buenos Aires was closer to Washington than Caracas”.³²

Also, the US took a key part in convincing the IMF to be more flexible in the financial requirements of Argentina’s debt repayment.³³ Néstor Kirchner then ordered the repayment of Argentina’s debt in full and cut off the IMF from Argentina.

While the Kirchners sought out early support from the US in the situation with the IMF and Iran, Cristina Kirchner has since strained relations with the US. At the beginning of her presidency, Cristina Kirchner was involved in a presidential campaign scandal.² The US harshly criticized Cristina Kirchner and Venezuela. The two leaders accused the US of orchestrating the scandal in order to divide the Latin American nations.³⁴ This scandal caused the Kirchner administration, and Hugo Chávez, to accuse the US of a conspiracy and a restriction of the US ambassador’s activities within Buenos Aires.³⁵ These actions have put a strain on the relationship between the US and Argentina. However, the two nations have since returned to their previous relationship.

² In August 2007, a Venezuelan-American citizen, Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson, attempted to enter Argentina with US\$800,000 of cash in his suitcase. Wilson did not declare this money to customs and was flying on a flight chartered by the Argentine government. Following the incident a US assistant attorney declared in court that the money was illegal contributions for Cristina Kirchner’s presidential campaign. Several allegations were proven true and individuals involved were sent to prison. The Kirchners believe the trail was a smear campaign against the Argentine government and restricted the activity of the US ambassador to Argentina.

The United States and Latin America

The relationship between the United States and other countries within the region, such as Brazil and Bolivia, has also experienced significant changes. The elections of Morales and Lula forced the US to rethink foreign policy in the region. As seen, the rise of the left has led to significant policy changes, which the US must now take in to account.

The election of Evo Morales in Bolivia followed the shift to the left in Latin America and posed a challenge to the foreign policy of the United States. According to Roger Burbach, the victory of Morales represented a defeat to the past policies of the United States and a challenge to see if the US could bend itself to the new government of Bolivia.³⁶ The radical policies of Morales were contrary to those supported by the United States. In the past, the US had supported presidential candidates they believed fit their policies and the campaign of Morales was no different. The US funded anti-Morales social movements which caused tension between the two governments and eventually the expulsion of the US ambassador. These movements were funded through the embassy and the Agency for International Development (USAID), which also provided support to "political forces that opposed Morales himself and the MAS."³⁷ While the relationship between Argentina and the US has not come to this extreme, the Kirchners have made it clear that they will support those countries, such as Venezuela, which provide it with substantial support.

In regards to Brazil, the United States has increasingly deferred to Brazil in issues regarding Latin America. In 2008, instead of responding to rising tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, the United States left it to Brazil and Unasur to mediate the issue.³⁸ As previously stated, Brazil is beginning to emerge as a regional and global leader. Lula made it

clear that, while Brazil would maintain a cordial relationship with the US, Brazil was to be the dominant power within Latin America.

As the United States has become distracted by issues in the Middle East and the democracies of Latin America have made a significant shift, the relationship between the US and these countries has changed. Several strong governments have risen out of the shift to the left. These governments, such as that of Brazil, have provided a counterpart to the US in Latin America.

Foreign Relations and the Classification of the Radical and Moderate Left

According to Benjamin Arditi, the purpose of the classification of the left is to provide a guide for US foreign policy.³⁹ After losing hold within the region, the US is seeking to redefine their policy within Latin America. The left in Latin America, especially radical democracies such as Bolivia and Venezuela, is suspicious and critical of the US. This has changed the way in which US policy relates to Latin American countries. As previously stated, the US has increasingly deferred to Brazil in regards to situations with the region. Current events, such as the September 11th terrorist attacks, have led the US to increase their focus on the Middle East. Therefore the US has found it relevant to establish a friendship with Brazil. The US recognizes Brazil as a power in the region with similar policies. They have relied on Brazil to moderate the radical democracies, such as the anti-American campaign of Venezuela.⁴⁰

Many scholars would argue that the categorization of the moderate and radical democracies of Latin America has led to a grouping of “good” and “bad” countries. The “good” are identified as the moderate democracies, such as Brazil, who maintain policies deemed acceptable by the United States. While the “bad” are the radical democracies, such as Bolivia

and Venezuela, which have adopted policies unacceptable in the eyes of the United States. The United States maintains relationships with both categories. However, the categorization of these countries has led to the general population's ignorance of the benefits of radical policies. Those who are unknowledgeable in the policies of these two categories would assume that radical democracies are detrimental to their society. However, as seen in the previous chapters each has its own benefits and downfalls. While Brazil has succeeded in expanding its economy and international prestige, it has fallen short in providing these benefits to its citizens. Argentina consistently outperformed Brazil in gross domestic product per capita and human development indicators. According to UN World Statistics Pocketbook, the GDP growth rate for Argentina in 2009 was .9% while Brazil's was -.2%.⁴¹ However, Bolivia has been much more aware of improving its social indicators and advancing the welfare of its citizens. Bolivia, as well as Argentina, consistently outperforms Brazil in this area, although- Brazil maintains the highest gross domestic product.

Categorizing the radical and moderate democracies of Latin America is beneficial in understanding the nuances of the leftist democracies of the region. However, it should not be used to provide a framework of "good" and "bad". Each country has both gained and lost from implemented policies. Many scholars believe that the economic policies of the moderate left will prove more beneficial in the long run. In the same way, the social policies of the radical left have provided a more beneficial system for the welfare of their citizens. Whether one is "good" or "bad" can only be determined by the citizens and politicians of the country.

Therefore, scholars and government officials should be cautious in their use of categorizing the left. As stated, the categories of radical and moderate democracies provide a

framework to understanding the history and differences of the radical and moderate left. However, this should not be used to determine which democracy is right and which is wrong.

Conclusions

As outlined in this chapter, moderate and radical democracies can and do work with one another. Although Brazil and Bolivia share different ideologies, they both are taking part in integrating the region through Mercosur and Unasur. This integration has been somewhat more fluid for Argentina, whose policies allow it to identify with both the radical and moderate democracies. Argentina has also taken a more pragmatic outlook regarding integration; the Kirchners view integration as a benefit to Argentina and are therefore willing to work with both ideologies.

The ability of the radical and moderate left to work together demonstrate that while there are significant differences in policy, each nation is seeking to benefit itself and the region. The region is resource rich and has seen significant success in the past few decades. Integration of the countries within Unasur will hopefully allow for continued improvement in the areas of social and economic policy. If these countries can continue to work together, South America is likely to become a major player in the world stage.

Notes

Chapter Three: Foreign and Regional Relations

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² Malamud, "Argentine Foreign Policy under the Kirchners", 100.

³ Miguel de Luca and Andrés Malamud, "Argentina: Turbulencia económica, polarización social y realineamiento político", *Revista de Ciencia Política* 30, no. 2 (2010), 176.

⁴ Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, *El lugar de Brasil en la política exterior argentina*, (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003), 7.

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⁷ Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power, "Lula's Brazil at midterm", *Journal of Democracy* 16, no 3. (2005): 134.

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⁹ Russell and Tokatlian, *El lugar de Brasil en la política exterior argentina*, 7.

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¹⁵ Michael Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 309.

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¹⁷ José Briceño Ruiz and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, "Las diferentes percepciones sobre la construcción del Mercosur en Argentina, Brasil and Venezuela" *Foro Internacional* 50 no.1 (2010):54.

¹⁸ Nikolas Kozloff, *Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 7.

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²⁰ Malamud, "Argentine Foreign Policy under the Kirchners", 94.

²¹ Reid, *Forgotten Continent*, 299.

²² Malamud, "Argentine Foreign Policy under the Kirchners", 94.

²³ Luca and Malamud "Argentina: Turbulencia económica, polarización social y realineamiento político", 175.

²⁴ Malamud, "Argentine Foreign Policy under the Kirchners", 95.

²⁵ James F. Petras, *What's Left in Latin America?*, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009), 229.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 229.

²⁷ Kozloff, *Revolution!*, 85.

²⁸ Malamud, "Argentine Foreign Policy under the Kirchners", 95.

²⁹ Nikolas Kozloff, *Revolution!*, 85.

³⁰ Malamud, "Argentine Foreign Policy under the Kirchners" 95.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 97.

³² *Ibid.*, 95.

³³ *Ibid.*, 96.

³⁴ Ibid., 96.

³⁵ Ibid., 96.

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Capítulo Cuatro: ¿Argentina: Radical o Moderado?

Introducción

Recientemente, hay un cambio de las políticas de Latinoamérica a la izquierda. Aproximadamente, dos tercios de los gobiernos en Latinoamérica son de la izquierda.¹ Eruditos, como Kurt Weyland, Diego Abente Brun and Jorge G. Castañeda, empezaron a calificar estos gobiernos de la izquierda a categorías de la izquierda radical y la izquierda moderada. Países como Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela y Chile están clasificados en los dos grupos de la izquierda moderada-y-radical. Sin embargo Argentina no está clasificada como un gobierno de la izquierda moderada o radical. Para los eruditos, Argentina tiene un gobierno ambiguo. Este trabajo va a examinar las políticas económicas, sociales y políticos para determinar cómo el gobierno de Argentina corresponde con la clasificaciones de la izquierda.

Hay muchas definiciones de las dos izquierdas. Por el propósito de este examen la izquierda moderada consta de partidos viejos, más institucionalizados y organizados. Otro lado la izquierda radical consta de partidos nuevos, con movimientos más fluidos y carismático. Los partidos de la izquierda radical no tiene el tiempo a desarrollar reglas o unas estructuras.²

Para examinar la izquierda radical y moderada este trabajo usa los casos de Bolivia y Brasil. Según los eruditos, Bolivia es un buen ejemplo de la izquierda radical mientras que Brasil es un buen ejemplo de la izquierda moderada. Esta revisión se enfocar en las presidencias de Evo Morales (2003-ahora) de Bolivia y Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) de Brasil. El primer capítulo construyó una colección de características para determinar las diferencias entre la izquierda radical y la izquierda moderada. Para determinar las características, la revisión enfoca en la política económica, social y político.

El segundo capítulo examina Argentina y las presidencias de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner. Con las características de la izquierda radical y moderada que el primer capítulo estableció, este capítulo analiza las políticas de los Kirchners en comparación a Morales y Lula. El propósito de este capítulo es determinar si Argentina tiene características de la izquierda radical o moderada.

Finalmente, el tercer capítulo examina las interacciones entre Argentina y los países de Bolivia, Brasil y los Estados Unidos. El propósito de este capítulo es demostrar cómo las características de la izquierda radical y la izquierda moderada afectan el político exterior. Las relaciones entre Argentina, los países radicales, los países moderados y los Estados Unidos serán examinados. También cómo estas relaciones y la división de la izquierda afectan el región.

Sección 1: Brasil y Bolivia

Brasil

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva fue el presidente de Brasil desde 2003 hasta 2010. La presidencia de Lula fue parte de la transición a la izquierda en Latinoamérica. El Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) fue el partido de Lula y está en poder ahora.

El Partido dos Trabalhadores es uno de los más grandes partidos de la izquierda en Latinoamérica. Actualmente, el PT es un partido de la izquierda moderada. Según Jorge Cataneda, Brasil es un buen ejemplo de la izquierda moderada porque enfatiza la política social en una estructura de mercado ortodoxo y originado desde una izquierda radical reconstruida.³ El PT fue fundado en 1980 y fue un partido de la izquierda radical de influencia en Brasil. Sin embargo, cuando Lula recibió la presidencia el PT empezó a perder las características que hacen lo un partido radical.

El gobierno de Lula enfocó muchos de sus esfuerzos en la política exterior y la economía, dentro de y afuera de la región. Lula diversificó los mercados de exportación, medió conflictos en la región y creó alianzas políticas con países subdesarrollados. Distinto de otros países de la región, como Argentina, Brasil continuó trabajando con el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) en el área de economía. Durante los primeros años de la presidencia de Lula la deuda pública fue reducirla del 62% al 53% de Producto Interior Bruto (PIB)⁴ También desde 2003 y 2008 la inflación fue reducirla a 6,9%, la tasa de crecimiento aumentó por 4,1% y la renta per cápita aumentó por 2,7%.⁵ Esto es significativo en comparación a la inflación de 14.9% durante la presidencia anterior.

La economía fue el primer enfoque del gobierno de Lula pero también él ayuda a promover la posición de Brasil en el mundo. Durante la presidencia de Lula, Brasil se hace una potencia en la región. Por eso, los Estados Unidos consulta Brasil en sus acciones en la región y hay un poco de tensión entre los dos países.

La historia de la presidencia de Lula demostró algunas características de la izquierda moderada. La presidencia de Lula fue apoyada por un partido con una historia larga. También el PT es organizado, unificado y tiene instituciones estables. Estas tres características correlacionan con la definición de la izquierda moderada que dice la izquierda moderada está compuesto de partidos viejos y tiene mucha organización.⁶

Bolivia

La presidencia de Evo Morales empezó en 2005, después de que Morales ganó el 53,7% del voto popular. Esto fue la primera vez que una persona Aymara fue elegido a la presidencia. Morales ganó la presidencia con el apoyo del Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). El MAS se

formó diez años antes de la elección de Morales. Desde su formación, MAS extendió desde el campo hasta las ciudades y se hizo el partido dominante en Bolivia.⁷ Aunque MAS comparte muchas de las mismas metas con el PT (Brasil) ellos van a direcciones diferentes. Según Santiago Anria, la diferencias entre el MAS y el PT es cómo el movimiento empezó desde abajo.⁸ Mientras el PT y Lula trabajaron en la estructura anterior MAS originó en las partes más pobres de Bolivia y trabaja en contra de la estructura. Una cosa que distingue el MAS desde otros partidos, como, el PT, es que el existe en el área política y el área social.⁹

Cuando Evo Morales empezaba su presidencia, él nacionalizó el gas natural y el petróleo y estableció que el estado recibe el 82% de los ingresos mientras las compañías reciben el 18% por sus costos de producción y beneficios. La nacionalización de hidrocarburos aumentó los recursos económicos del estado. El aumento de los recursos económicos permitió que Morales a distribuyera más recursos a los pobres.

La historia y descripción de MAS y Morales demostró características de la izquierda radical. MAS es un partido nuevo en que su líder Evo Morales es central. Evo Morales, y el MAS, no tienen mucha experiencia institucional y también tienen un punto de vista nacionalista. Estas tres características apoyan la definición de la izquierda radical según los eruditos. Kurt Weyland describió la izquierda radical como un partido joven y "personalistic", Diego Abente Brun describió el partido como reciente y sin una base institucional y Jorge Castaneda lo describió como un partido nacionalista.¹⁰

Sección 2: Bolivia y Brasil: las diferencias económicas, políticas y sociales

Social

Ambos Lula y Morales hacen cambios en la política social de sus países. A causa de su enfoque en la economía, Lula hace cambios más graduales en Brasil. Sin embargo, Morales usó los beneficios del mercado hidrocarburo a hacer cambios más rápidos a la política social de Bolivia y reducir la pobreza. Mientras Morales hace muchos cambios importantes a corto plazo, muchos eruditos creen que estos no pueden durar. En comparación, la atención de Lula en la reforma del mercado puede ayudar Brasil a largo plazo.

La Bolsa Familia, fue el programa social más importante de la política social del gobierno de Lula. Este programa apoya familias pobres con dinero para la educación de sus hijos. Las familias reciben dinero y asistencia sanitaria para la matrícula de sus hijos en escuela. Bolsa Familia es un gran éxito y muy popular en el mundo. Desde su expansión en 2003, la Bolsa Familia apoya a 12,4 millón familias.¹¹ Según el Fundação Getulio Vargas, una universidad, el número de brasileños con ingresos abajo US\$440 per mes disminuyó más de 8% cada año desde 2003.¹²

Con los ingresos de los hidrocarburos, Morales estableció algunos programas sociales. Los dos programas más importantes son Bono Juancito Pinto y Renta Dignidad. Bono Juancito Pinto es un programa similar a la Bolsa Familia. El programa apoya familias con dinero y aumenta la matriculación de niños en escuela.¹³ En 2006 1,32 millones de niños recibieron ayuda, y en 2009 esto número aumentó a 2 millones.¹⁴ Renta Dignidad es un programa para jubilación en que ciudadanos reciben apoyo financiero. Los ciudadanos que tienen ingresos de jubilación pueden

recibir 1.800 bolivianos (US\$240) cada año mientras los que no tienen ingresos de jubilación pueden recibir 2.400 bolivianos (US\$320) cada año.

La economía

Bolivia y Brasil tienen metas similares en el área de la política social. Sin embargo en el área de economía Bolivia y Brasil tienen metas muy diferentes. En Bolivia, Morales enfoca en la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos. También Morales, y el MAS, no tienen una buena opinión del FMI y el mercado internacional. En comparación, Lula mantuvo una estructura del mercado y pidió el apoyo de inversores internacionales. También, Brasil tenía mucha influencia en las alianzas regionales como Mercosur.

La política económica más importante de Bolivia fue la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos. Esto tiene aspectos buenos y malos para la economía de Bolivia. El primer aspecto positivo es que estas reformas aumentaron los precios y ahora hay más negociaciones buenas con Argentina y Brasil. Por eso el Producto Interior Bruto (PIB) de Bolivia aumentó considerablemente.¹⁵ El segundo aspecto positivo es que los ingresos desde hidrocarburos para el gobierno aumentan a US\$967 millón en 2007. Esto dato fue doble la cantidad de ayuda extranjero que Bolivia recibió.¹⁶ Sin embargo hay tres aspectos negativos. Primero, la exportación de recursos aumentó el precio de productos en Bolivia. Segundo, en el área de petróleo, Bolivia es un riesgo para inversores. Tercero, el gobierno de Bolivia enfocó en el mercado regional e ignoró el mercado internacional. Sí Bolivia no expande afuera del mercado regional el no puede competir con sus competidores.¹⁷

En comparación, la economía de Brasil tuvo aumento fuerte y constante durante la presidencia de Lula. Lula ganó la confianza de inversores y elogios en el mercado internacional

con sus políticas económicas.¹⁸ La confianza de inversores es importante en la expansión de la economía de Brasil. Las exportaciones son clave en la expansión de la economía y sin la confianza de los inversores Brasil no puede expandir su mercado. Según Wendy Hunter y Timothy Power, Lula diversificó las exportaciones de Brasil mientras creyó alianzas económicas dentro de la región.¹⁹ Un ejemplo de estas alianzas es el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur). Mercosur es una alianza económica y política entre Brasil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay y Venezuela. Es la alianza económica más grande en Sur América y el propósito es a eliminar desigualdad de ingresos y tarifas entre los países.²⁰ La unificación de los países ayudaría la seguridad del comercio en la región.

Aunque Bolivia tiene privilegios en Mercosur, Morales es un crítico de la alianza. Él cree que la alianza solamente beneficia a los ricos.²¹ Esta posición demuestra la preocupación de Morales con la pobreza de Bolivia. En comparación, Lula está preocupado con la economía de Brasil y la expansión de Brasil en el mercado internacional.

La política

La política de Bolivia y Brasil son muy diferentes. Mientras el MAS es un partido de los pobres y afuera del sistema, el PT tiene una gran historia con el sistema y es un partido de clase media.

En su campaña Lula trabajó con su oposición y cambió su política para ganar los votos de los moderados. Lula aceptó los términos del FMI y dedicó el 3,75% del PIB para pagar las deudas de Brasil.²² Para el propósito a crear una mayoría, Lula habló con los partidos opuestos. Según Kurt Weyland, la izquierda moderada tiene un enfoque más cauto en la reformación de las

instituciones y quiere hablar con la oposición.²³ Otro lado, Morales eliminó su oposición y movimientos que amenazan el MAS.

Sección 3: Argentina

La historia de los Kirchners

Bolivia y Brasil son dos casos claros de la izquierda radical y moderada. Sin embargo, hay más discusión entre eruditos en la clasificación de Argentina y las presidencias de los Kirchners. Néstor Kirchner empezó su presidencia en 2003 y su marida, Cristina, ganó la presidencia después de él.

Las presidencias de los Kirchners tienen el apoyo del Partido Justicialista (PJ). El PJ es un partido de peronismo y a la izquierda. Como el PT, en Brasil, el PJ tiene una larga historia en Argentina que empezó con Juan y Eva Perón en 1947. La elección de Néstor Kirchner causó una escisión en el partido. Los seguidores de Kirchner formaron el Frente para la Victoria y su política enfoca en el regreso de políticas populares y nacionales durante la época de Perón.²⁴ El enfoque del gobierno de Néstor Kirchner fue la economía y la creación de confianza en la presidencia.

La política de los Kirchners

Después de muchos años de corrupción y dictadura militar, Néstor Kirchner hizo muchos cambios a los organismos militares, judiciales y de la policía. En su primer acto como el presidente, Néstor Kirchner reemplazó los jueces corruptos en el tribunal supremo.²⁵ También Néstor revocó la amnistía de los generales que participaron en los crímenes contra los derechos humanos. Con estos actos Néstor restableció la confianza del público en la presidencia y el

gobierno. Sin embargo, los Kirchners hacen cambios que amenazan las libertades políticas y civiles. Cristina Kirchner recibió mucha crítica para su regulación en los periódicos. Aunque hay instituciones que regulan el poder del presidente, estos actos son símbolos de la izquierda radical.

La política económica de los Kirchners enfoca en la exportación de productos agrícolas. El aumento de exportación y los límites en importación ayuda la economía de Argentina a crecer. Durante la presidencia de Néstor, la economía de Argentina tuvo un aumento de 9% en PIB. Las condiciones del mercado fueron positivas por la exportación de agricultura. Estas condiciones fueron claves a ayudar a Argentina después de la crisis de 2001. Según Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid y Wendy Hunter, los Kirchners intervinieron significativamente en la economía de Argentina.²⁶ Los Kirchners pusieron controles de precios en las exportaciones y los productos como carne, leche, petróleo y electricidad. Aunque estos controles de precios ayudaron a Argentina inmediatamente después de la crisis ahora, la inflación aumenta porque de estos controles. En el futuro estas políticas pudieran perjudicar la economía de Argentina.

Aunque la economía de Argentina tenía mucho éxito durante las presidencias de los Kirchners la concentración de poder arriba causó mucha desigualdad entre el rico y el pobre.²⁷ Distinto de los otros partidos de la izquierda, los gobiernos de los Kirchners no enfocan en la pobreza de Argentina. Según las UNESCO, los 20% más pobres de la nación reciben el 3% de los ingresos mientras los 20% más ricos reciben 55% de los ingresos de la nación.²⁸ La política de Néstor favoreció la media clase, pero el gobierno de Cristina tiene más enfocado en la pobreza. Un ejemplo es el programa Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH) que es un programa similar a Bolsa Familia. Cristina empezó AUH en 2009 y después de la implementación del programa hay una disminución en la pobreza.²⁹ El programa tiene algunos problemas pero es un buen comienzo en la corrección de pobreza.

En comparación a Brasil y Bolivia

Similar a la izquierda de Lula en Brasil, los Kirchners en Argentina tienen el apoyo de un partido establecido y organizado. También cada uno de los presidentes trabajan dentro de los recursos económicos de sus países, la mayoría en los productos agrícolas.

Ambos países fueron fundadores de Mercosur y tuvieron mucho éxito en sus economías a través de las exportaciones. También mientras ambos países tuvieron éxito, ellos tienen mucha desigualdad entre los ricos y los pobres. El gobierno de Lula trató el problema con programas como Bolsa Familia. Igualmente, Argentina implementó el AUH, que el gobierno dice disminuyó la pobreza. Sin embargo, los gobiernos de los Kirchners reciben muchas críticas de sus políticas sociales.

La inspección de las políticas de Brasil y Argentina demostró que los países son similares en las áreas de las políticas sociales y económicas. Sin embargo, hay algunas diferencias entre los dos países. Mientras Brasil mantiene buenas relaciones con los Estados Unidos y el FMI, Argentina empezó una nueva relación con el FMI en 2010. También, mientras Brasil está preocupado con su posición en el mundo como un líder, Argentina tiene más atención en la región y el bienestar de Argentina como una nación.

Los gobiernos de los Kirchners son una mezcla de estilos y políticas de los moderados y radicales pero hay políticas en que ellos son más cerca de los radicales o moderados. Mientras Brasil y Argentina tienen políticas económicas y sociales muy similares, Bolivia y Argentina tienen políticas muy similares.

La nacionalización de hidrocarburos fue clave en la política económica del gobierno de Morales. Los Kirchners también nacionalizaron la energía y las pensiones de Argentina. Sin

embargo ellos mantienen un mercado abierto y establecieron el Mercosur con Brasil. Mientras Bolivia es un miembro asociado de Mercosur, Morales está muy crítico de la alianza. Otra diferencia es la atención de los Kirchners en la economía de Argentina mientras Morales esta atención en los cambios sociales de Bolivia. Morales usó el aumento de la economía para a empezar reformas y programas sociales. Aunque Argentina empezó programas sociales, estos son recientes y no tienen el apoyo de los programas de Bolivia. Entre 2005 y 2010, Bolivia gastó 6,9% de su PIB para educación mientras Brasil y Argentina gastó 5,1% y 4,9%, respectivamente.³⁰

El aspecto en que Bolivia y Argentina se reúnen es las políticas. Ambos Morales y los Kirchners recibieron crítica para la consolidación del poder en la presidencia y desmantelando la oposición. Los Kirchners consolidaron poder con el nombramiento de partidarios fieles y con decretos presidenciales. Sin embargo, las instituciones de Argentina interrumpieron la consolidación de mucho poder en la presidencia.

Los gobiernos de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner son difíciles de clasificar porque las políticas de ellos cambian durante su tiempo y ellos tienen características de ambos Bolivia y Brasil. En fin, el gobierno de Morales tiene políticas más agresivas que Argentina y Brasil. Argentina y Brasil tienen un enfocado en la economía de sus países mientras Bolivia esto enfocado en los programas sociales. También, según la definición de la izquierda moderada estos partidos son muy organizados y tienen una historia. Ambos el PT (Brasil) y PJ (Argentina) son partidos muy organizados y con una historia muy larga. Sin embargo, Argentina tiene políticas económicas que son similares a las políticas de Bolivia. Los Kirchners nacionalizaron la energía y no mantienen una buena relación con el FMI, ambas acciones son aspectos de la izquierda radical.

En conclusión, los gobiernos y las políticas de los Kirchners son una mezcla de las características de los radicales y los moderados. Argentina gradualmente movió a la izquierda. Este movimiento empezó con Néstor Kirchner y progresó durante su presidencia y la presidencia de Cristina. Durante esta época hay muchos cambios en las políticas de los gobiernos. Por ejemplo el gobierno de Néstor no tiene mucho enfocado en las políticas sociales y ahora Cristina tiene políticas que cambia esta situación. Con la reelección de Cristina Kirchner sería interesante ver si Argentina tiene más características de la izquierda radical o moderada.

Sección 4: Política Exterior de Argentina

Política exterior de Argentina

La política exterior de los gobiernos de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner tiene un enfoque en acciones que beneficiaron Argentina. Según Andrés Malamud, los objetivos de la política exterior de los Kirchners fueron obtener apoyo electoral y apoyo económico de otros países.³¹ Néstor Kirchner empezó su presidencia con un país en una crisis económica. Por eso, los Kirchners han trabajado a restablecer y aumentar las fundaciones económicas y políticas de Argentina. Ellos lograban estas metas con la reestructuración de las políticas económicas, políticas y sociales en la manera de la izquierda radical y moderada.

Néstor y Cristina Kirchner han pedido el apoyo de tanto Brasil como Bolivia porque el bienestar de su nación es lo más importante de sus objetivos. También ellos mantienen una relación con los Estados Unidos. En vez de trabajar solamente con países de ideologías similares los Kirchners han pedido el apoyo de alguien que quiere apoyar Argentina.

Las relaciones entre Argentina y las democracias moderadas (Brasil)

La locación de Brasil geográficamente hace Brasil un aliado y rival de Argentina. La amistad entre Argentina y Brasil crea muchas alianzas, como Mercosur, que son beneficiosas a ambos países. Otro lado, la riqueza y influencia de Brasil en la región hace Brasil una amenaza a Argentina.

Según Roberto Russell y Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Brasil es un aliado indispensable a Argentina.³² La alianza de Mercosur y los acuerdos comerciales entre Brasil y Argentina abrió el comercio entre los dos países. También Brasil y Argentina son las economías más fuertes en la región del Cono Sur. Por eso es beneficioso a crear una alianza que abrió el comercio y también el círculo de trabajadores.

La ambición de Brasil de ser un líder en la región y el mundo crea una amenaza a Argentina. Según Riordan Roett, mientras el papel de Brasil aumentó en el mundo, el de Argentina disminuyó drásticamente.³³ Para ser un líder, Brasil mantiene relaciones cercanas con el FMI y los Estados Unidos. Lula tuvo una relación cercana con los Estados Unidos y creyó una distancia desde las políticas radicales de los Kirchners. La distancia desde estas políticas creyó un espacio para Venezuela a crear una alianza con Argentina. Según Andrés Malamud, cuando Brasil empezó a ser un líder en el mundo, la política exterior de los Kirchners se mueve más cerca al gobierno de Venezuela. Para que oponer las ambiciones de Brasil como un líder, los gobiernos de los Kirchners se dieron cuenta el pragmatismo de alianzas con Brasil y Venezuela.

Las relaciones entre Argentina y las democracias radicales (Bolivia)

Los gobiernos de los Kirchners también mantienen relaciones con las democracias radicales, específicamente Venezuela. Estas relaciones benefician a Argentina en su economía y

con su opuesto de Brasil como un líder en la región. Venezuela es un aliado importante de Argentina porque de su apoyo económico y político.

Como se describió en la sección anterior, la alianza entre Argentina y Venezuela comenzó a crear un equilibrio opuesto de Brasil. También, la alianza es beneficiosa para Venezuela. Mientras Chávez y Lula tuvieron una alianza en público, las políticas económicas y políticas de los moderados y radicales son diferentes. Por eso, Chávez no encontró un aliado fuerte en Lula y empezó una relación con los Kirchners.

Cuando Argentina necesitaba apoyo económico y los Estados Unidos no apoyaron el país, Néstor Kirchner encontró apoyo con Hugo Chávez. Durante la crisis de 2001, Venezuela fue el solo país que compró los bonos del estado de Argentina.³⁴ Desde el 2001 Argentina y Venezuela firmaron muchos acuerdos comerciales. De los acuerdos internacionales que los Kirchners firmaron 28% estaban con Venezuela, y son 45% de los acuerdos regionales que los Kirchners firmaron. Hugo Chávez es un aliado importante para los Kirchners en el área de la economía.

Aunque Argentina tiene una relación cercana con Venezuela, desde los gobiernos de los Kirchners, Argentina no es un estado cliente de Hugo Chávez. Los Kirchners recibieron apoyo desde Chávez pero ellos mantienen todas las ideas políticas de Chávez. Según Andrés Malamud, la relación entre Chávez y los Kirchners no es por causa de una proximidad ideológica pero por los beneficios que cada país recibe. El prestigio de Argentina y la mezcla de políticas de los Kirchners dan Argentina más poder en la región. Por eso ellos son un aliado importante para Chávez más que un seguidor.

Las relaciones entre Argentina y los Estados Unidos

Entre los Estados Unidos y Argentina había un cambio en sus relaciones después de los gobiernos de los Kirchners. Antes de los Kirchners, el gobierno de Argentina tuvo una relación cercana con los Estados Unidos. Los EEUU apoyó el gobierno durante varios gobiernos autocráticos. En agradecimiento, el gobierno de Argentina siguió la política de los EEUU y el FMI. Sin embargo, los Kirchners rompieron con la influencia de los EEUU. Como muchos de los países de la izquierda, los Kirchners enfocan en sus relaciones con sus vecinos. A través de Mercosur y Unasur, los países de Latinoamérica disminuyeron la influencia de los EEUU en las áreas de la economía y los políticos.

Aunque los Kirchners disminuyeron la influencia de los EEUU en Argentina, ellos tienen una alianza en su oposición de Irán. Por causa del atentado de un edificio judío en 1994, los Kirchners han apoyado los EEUU en sus acciones en contra de Irán. La posición de Argentina en contra de Irán está opuesta de la mayoría de los países en Latinoamérica. Similar a sus relaciones con las democracias radicales y moderadas, los Kirchners tienen una política pragmática con los Estados Unidos.

Sección 5: Conclusiones

La clasificación de la izquierda radical y moderada

Según Benjamin Arditi, el propósito de la clasificación de la izquierda es para la política exterior de los Estados Unidos.³⁵ Por causa del cambio en las relaciones entre los EEUU y los países de Latinoamérica, los EEUU necesitan redefinir su política exterior en la región. La izquierda, especialmente las democracias radicales como Venezuela y Bolivia, en Latinoamérica

están suspicaces y críticas de los EEUU. Por eso la manera en que los EEUU relacionan con estos países cambió.

Muchos eruditos sostienen que la clasificación de las democracias radicales y moderadas creó “buenos” y “malos” países. Los “buenos” países son las democracias moderadas, como Brasil, que mantienen políticas agradables a los EEUU. Mientras los “malos” países son las democracias radicales, como Bolivia y Venezuela, que mantienen políticas en contra de los EEUU.

La clasificación de los países esta importante para el entendimiento de la región y las diferencias entre la izquierda. Sin embargo, esta clasificación no puede ser una división de buena y mala. Cada país tiene beneficios y pérdidas por las políticas de posición. Algunos eruditos, como Kurt Weyland y Wendy Hunter, creen que las políticas económicas de las moderadas van a obtener más beneficios a largo plazo.³⁶ En la misma manera, las políticas sociales de los radicales tienen más beneficios para los ciudadanos de estos países. Solamente los ciudadanos y los políticos de los países pueden determinar cuál posición esta mejor para el país.

Argentina en la clasificación de las democracias radicales y moderadas

Los gobiernos de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner son difíciles de clasificar porque ellos cambiaron durante sus presidencias y tienen características de ambos los radicales y moderados. La importancia de este examen es para entender cómo las políticas cambian y cómo estos cambios afectan Argentina y sus relaciones.

Ahora el gobierno de Cristina Kirchner está enfocado en el bienestar de su país. Ella mantiene una perspectiva pragmática. Por eso ella continuará sus relaciones con tantos los países radicales como los moderados. También ella aumentó la relación entre Argentina y el FMI. Ella

quiere mantener la economía de Argentina, por eso ella invitó el FMI a volver a Argentina. Si ella continúa con una política pragmática, las relaciones entre Argentina y las democracias radicales y moderadas continuarán. Sin embargo, la historia de los Kirchners sugiera que el gobierno tiene la potencia de mover más a la izquierda. Es posible que los Kirchners muevan más a la izquierda radical a causa de sus relaciones con Venezuela o más a la izquierda moderada por sus relaciones con Brasil.

Notas

Capítulo Cuatro: ¿Argentina: Radical o Moderado?

¹ Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland, "Introduction" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.

² Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland, "The Policies and Performance of the Contestatory and Moderate Left" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 144.

³ Jorge Castaneda, "Latin America's Left Turn", *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 3 (2006): 4.

⁴ Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power, "Lula's Brazil at Midterm", *Journal of Democracy* 16 no. 3, 131.

⁵ Peter R. Kingstone and Aldo F. Ponce, "From Cardoso to Lula", in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 106.

⁶ Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland, "The Policies and Performance of the Contestatory and Moderate Left" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 144.

⁷ Santiago Anria, "Bolivia's MAS: Between Party and Movement" in *Latin America's Left Turns*, ed. Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hershberg (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 101.

⁸ Ibid., 101.

⁹ Ibid., 104.

¹⁰ Madrid, Hunter and Weyland, "The Policies and Performance", 144.; Diego Brun, "Introduction" in *Latin America's Struggle for Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner; Jorge Castaneda "Latin America's Left Turn", *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 3 (2006): 1.

¹¹ "How to get children out of jobs and into school", *Economist*, July 2010.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ George Gray Molina, "The Challenge of Progressive Change under Evo Morales" in *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter and Kurt Weyland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 66.

¹⁴ Ibid., 67.

¹⁵ Ibid., 66.

¹⁶ Ibid., 66.

¹⁷ Ibid., 66.

¹⁸ Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power, "Lula's Brazil at Midterm", *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005):131.

¹⁹ Ibid., 134.

²⁰ Stephanie Hanson and Joanna Klonsky, *Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc*, <http://www.cfr.org/trade/mercosur-south-americas=fractional-trade-bloc/p12762>

²¹ Ibid.

²² Sola, "Politics, Markets, and Society in Brasil", 127.

²³ Weyland, "The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America", 15.

²⁴ James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *What's Left in Latin America*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 58.

²⁵ Ibid., 57.

²⁶ Madrid, Hunter and Weyland, "The Policies and Performance", 173.

²⁷ Petras and Veltmeyer, *What's Left in Latin America*, 61.

²⁸ UNESCO, *Reaching the Marginalized* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010), 317.

²⁹ Kyle Younker, "Asignación Universal por Hijo, One Year Later", *The Argentina Independent*, October 2010, <http://www.argentinaindependent.com/socialissues/development/asignacion-universal-por-hijo-one-year-later/>

³⁰ United Nations 2010 World Statistics Pocketbook, <http://unstats.un.org>.

³¹ Andrés Malamud, "Argentine Foreign Policy under the Kirchners: Ideological, Pragmatic, or Simply Peronist?" in *Latin American Foreign Policies* ed. Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 88.

³² Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, *El lugar de Brasil en la política exterior Argentina*, (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2003), 7.

³³ Riordan Roett en Alexei Barrionuevo, "Kirchner Achieves an Easy Victory in Argentina Presidential Election", *New York Times* (2011).

³⁴ Malamud, "Argentine Foreign Policy under the Kirchners", 94.

³⁵ Benjamin Arditi, "Arguments about the Left turns in Latin America", *Latin American Research Review* 43, no. 3 (2008), 60.

³⁶ Madrid, Hunter and Weyland, "The Policies and Performance", 173.

Conclusion

While the radical and moderate lefts have taken two different paths, they each strive to better their countries. As evidenced in the examination of Bolivia and Brazil, both radical and moderate democracies have achieved success in their policy. The focus of the MAS in Bolivia has been the redistribution of wealth, and in this regard they have been very successful. In Brazil the PT has focused on the economy. This focus led to one of the main divergences between the radical and moderate left.

Overall, the radical democracy of Bolivia took a more aggressive stance on economic, social and political issues. President Morales increased state intervention in the economy and routinely criticizes economic alliances, such as Mercosur, made by other leftist democracies. In contrast, President Lula took a more conservative approach to the economic policy of Brazil. Lula maintained the market-oriented framework of his predecessor, as well as, expanded the international interests of Brazil. Before winning the presidency, the MAS and Morales were relatively new to politics and the national government of Bolivia. The MAS did not have established policies or strong opposition parties that they had to work with; instead they were fighting against the established government. Therefore, the MAS was able to quickly and strongly implement change. However, Lula and his supporters are part of a well-established and historical party. In order to implement change Lula had to work with the PT as well as the strongly established opposition parties. This has been one of the biggest differences in the rise of the left in Bolivia and Brazil.

The examination of the Kirchners' policy in Argentina has shown that the Kirchners faced similar challenges. The Kirchners found support from a well-established party with a long

history, as Lula did in Brazil. They also faced several opposition groups. Due to these constraints the establishment of the left in Argentina developed in a similar way to the left in Brazil. The policy of the Kirchners has slowly developed from being slightly left of center to being clearly defined as a leftist democracy, with some policies that are considered radical. While the Kirchners focused on the health of their economy through market-oriented policies similar to those of Brazil, they have also maintained strong ties with radical democracies such as Bolivia and Venezuela.

The progression of the Kirchner government to the left started with the election of Néstor Kirchner. After Néstor's death his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, continued his legacy moving even farther to the left. Cristina continued the economic and political policies begun by her husband. She also significantly altered social policy through the implementation of social programs such as the Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH).

Rather than aligning with either the radical or moderate left, the Kirchner governments have taken on aspects of both, keeping a pragmatic outlook in regards to the welfare of their country. This pragmatic outlook makes it possible for the Kirchners to maintain ties with both radical and moderate democracies, as well as the United States. Instead of being bound by an ideological alignment, the Kirchner government cultivates relationships with countries that provide the most benefits to Argentina. Therefore, the current government of Argentina cannot be called a radical or moderate government but instead lies somewhere in between.

According to Benjamin Arditi, the purpose of the classification of the left is to provide a guide for US foreign policy.¹ While this paper does not examine the use of this classification in US foreign policy, it does show that US interaction within the region has begun to change. It also

explores how the differences of the radical and moderate left has both positive and negative effects in the region. In examining the radical and moderate left through economic, social and political policy a greater understanding of the left in Latin America is developed. The classification of Latin American countries into the radical and moderate left is a useful tool in understanding the goals and policies of the different democracies. However, it should not be used as an instrument in separating the countries into "good" and "bad" democracies.

Critics of this categorization of the left, and leftist democracies in Latin America, believe that some scholars place too much importance on how the policies of the radical and moderate left compare to those of the United States. Many scholars, such as Kurt Weyland and Wendy Hunter, imply that the moderate left is a "good" form of democracy, while the radical left is a "bad" form of democracy. However, both forms provide a different set of benefits to their nation and its citizens. The categorization of the radical and moderate left should instead be used to form a more complete picture of the governments within Latin America. It can be used to identify the goals of different governments and how they are most likely to react in different situations.

The examination of the radical and moderate shows that while each began with the same goals they have slowly moved away from each other. It is interesting to see how the history and the constraints placed on each democracy shaped their policy and goals. The cases of Bolivia and Brazil show clearly where the radical and moderate left diverged. However, the case of Argentina gives an interesting perspective in how a leftist democracy can develop radical policies in one area while establishing moderate policies in another.

Notes
Conclusion

¹ Benjamin Arditi, "Arguments about the Left turns in Latin America", *Latin American Research Review* 43, no. 3 (2008), 60.

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